4th meeting of the Space Systems Reliability Tools Standards Working Group was held on Tuesday, may 14,!!, from "#$! %M to 11#$!! %M &'T( the meeting consisted of two separate teleconferences. The ob-ecti.e of the SSRT Standards WG is to de.elop a commercial standard that pro.ides a single framework for linking different reliability assessment tools.
4th meeting of the Space Systems Reliability Tools Standards Working Group was held on Tuesday, may 14,!!, from "#$! %M to 11#$!! %M &'T( the meeting consisted of two separate teleconferences. The ob-ecti.e of the SSRT Standards WG is to de.elop a commercial standard that pro.ides a single framework for linking different reliability assessment tools.
4th meeting of the Space Systems Reliability Tools Standards Working Group was held on Tuesday, may 14,!!, from "#$! %M to 11#$!! %M &'T( the meeting consisted of two separate teleconferences. The ob-ecti.e of the SSRT Standards WG is to de.elop a commercial standard that pro.ides a single framework for linking different reliability assessment tools.
SRE Space Systems Reliability Tools Standards Working Group
The 4th meeting of the Space Systems Reliability Tools Standards Working Group was held on Tuesday, May 14, !!, from "#$! %M to 11#$! %M &'T( The meeting consisted of two separate teleconferences( )ne teleconference was mediated at The %erospace *orporation in +l Segundo, *%, and the other teleconference was mediated at 'S, ,nternational, in )range, *%( The meeting agenda is on page $( The ob-ecti.e of the SSRT Standards WG is to de.elop a commercial standard that pro.ides a single framework for linking different reliability assessment tools( This framework shall be built by defining critical process addresses 1 and standard formats for all data elements used in appropriate identification, analysis, and .erification of Reliability, Maintainability, and %.ailability /RM%0 re1uirements for space systems( ,n the conte2t of this standard, 3appropriate identification, analysis, and .erification45 means there would be negligible risk of ad.erse effects from using the results( The title of the standard shall be, 3Standard Format for Space System Reliability Computer Applications,5 and its scheduled completion date is $! September !!( The WG is organi6ed into two teams( Team 1 is tasked with defining the data elements and their critical process addresses( The members of Team 1 are all Reliability +ngineering e2perts and their lead is Tyrone 7ackson( Team is tasked with defining the standard formats for the data elements( The members of Team are all reliability tool de.elopers and their lead is 'an 8artop( &articipants at the May 14 th meeting were# NME !"M#N$ #%"NE E&M'( Ste.e 8arbater TRW "9":9;:$4;! Ste.e(8arbater<trw(com 'an 8artop /0 'S, ,ntl( =14:>$=:;$9 dhartop<dsiintl(com 7im Sketoe ?oeing 9$:==$:";1 7ames(+(Sketoe<boeing(com %l 7ackson *S@A? +ng Grad *ollege $1!:4;$:=4>; -acksona<simanima(com Tyrone 7ackson /10 %erospace *orp( $1!:$$>:>1=! Tyrone(7ackson<aero(org Buegao /'a.id0 So8ar ,nc( $$:>9$:4=1= Buegao<sohar(com Walt Willing Corthrop Grumman 41!:=>9:=$= walterDeDwilling<md(northgrum(com /10 Meeting coordinator and Team 1 lead /0 Team lead 1 The critical process addresses may be defned using machine-readable alphanumeric symbols or human-readable Extended Machine Language (XML) keywords. 1 The following indi.iduals are on regular distribution for the SSRT Standards WG Meeting minutes# NME !"M#N$ #%"NE E&M'( Mike *anga C%S% 7S* "1:4"$:9$;9 michael(a(canga1<-sc(nasa(go. 7 * *antrell %erospace *orp( $1!:$$>:";; 7ohn(*(*antrell<%ero(org Terry Einney Spectrum %stro =1;:99!:!$9 Terry(Einney<specastro(com Robert &olt6 'esign %nalyt2 "==:$=:=99! getreliability<designanalyt2(com Eamran Couri ,tem Software =14:;$9:;!! kamran<itemsoft(com 7ames Womack%erospace *orp( $1!:$$>:=>4= 7ames(M(Womack<aero(org 7ohn ,ngram:*otton %erospace *orp( $1!:$$>:14; 7ohn(,ngram:*otton<aero(org 'a.e 'ylis R%* $19:$$;:=!99 ''ylis<,,TR,()RG +ric Gould 'S, ,ntl( =14:>$=:;$9 egould<dsiintl(com 7im Eallis Raytheon $1!:>4=:$>! -mkallis<west(raytheon(com ?ill Geimer Corthrop Grumman >>:"1:="$ William(Geimer<northropgrumman(com Aeo F( Watkins Aockheed Martin "1=:;$9:449 Aeo(F(Watkins<AM*)(com Marios Sa..a Reliasoft 9!:"">:!41! Marios(Sa..a<reliasoft(com %damantios Mettas ReliaSoft 9!:"">:!$>> +2t( ; %damantios(Mettas<ReliaSoft(com 'oug )gden ReliaSoft 9!:"">:!$>> +2t( 41 'oug()gden<ReliaSoft(com Rich &ugh &ratt Whitney pugh<pwfl(com Een Murphy %R,C* 9!9:4":!>4! EM@R&8G<arinc(com *huck %nderson GR* ,nternational "1:4"$:4!"= charlton(r(anderson1<-sc(nasa(go. Myron 8echt Sohar ,nc( $$:>9$:4=1=B111 Myron<sohar(com Rebecca Menes Sohar ,nc( $$:>9$:4=1=B1!1 ?ecky<sohar(com ?ob Miller TRW $1!:"1:"4! Robert(Miller<trw(com Ee.in &( Han Fleet Rele2 Software =4:"$>:""!! 21!9 ke.in(.anfleet<rele2software(com 8unter Shaw Rele2 Software =4:"$>:""!! 8unter(Shaw<rele2software(com *larence Meese SR+ cmeese<ny2(net 2 May 14 t) Meeting genda Time SRE Working Group dministrati*e Topics "#$! : "#4! &'T Take roll Hote to appro.e the minutes of the %pril $!th meeting Remind participants to pay their SR+ membership dues Time Team 1 +iscussion Topics "#4! : ;#!! &'T 'iscuss Status of %ction ,tems from the %pril $!th Meeting I Tyrone 7ackson ;#!! : ;#! &'T 'iscuss the +lectrical Stress 'erating %nalysis Flow 'iagrams I Ste.e 8arbater ;#! : ;#9! &'T 'iscuss the Reliability &rediction &rocess Flow 'iagram for the &reliminary 'esign &hase I 7im Sketoe ;#9! : 1!#!! &'T ?reak
1!#!! : 1!#49 &'T 'iscuss the First:*ut Standard Formats for Reliability 'ata I Tyrone 7ackson Team 2 +iscussion Topics "#$! : ;#9! &'T 'iscuss Status of %ction ,tems from the %pril $!th Meeting I 'an 8artop ;#9! : 1!#!! &'T ?reak
1!#!! : 1!#49 &'T ?egin 'e.eloping a 'raft )utline for the Standard, which is titled, 3Standard Format for Space System Reliability Computer Applications5 I 'an 8artop Team 1 , 2 Summary 1!#49 : 11#$! &'T Summary and Re.iew of %ctions ,tems I %ll 11#$! &'T Meeting %d-ourn 3 Team 1 +iscussion Topics Team 1 participants in the %pril $! th meeting were# Tyrone 7ackson /Team Aead0 Ste.e 8arbarter Walt Willing 7im Sketeo The group did not meet the minimum number of participants re1uired for a Team 1 1uorum and decided to postpone the .ote on appro.al of the %pril $! th meeting minutes until the ne2t scheduled meeting on May " th ( The group agreed that Hisio !!! diagrams should be con.erted to Hisio 9 format before distribution to the working group for re.iew( The group re.iewed Ste.eJs Stress +lectrical 'erating &rocess Flow 'iagram and accompanying write:up( Ste.e mentioned that sometimes the secondary parameters are not included in the stress derating analysis to sa.e money( Tyrone .olunteered to de.elop draft definitions for some of the electrical stress derating parameters( 8e plans on using the Fortran source code for an old M,A: 8'?E:1= program to build a list of component:specific derated parameters( The group re.iewed 7imJs Reliability &rediction &rocess 'iagram for the &reliminary 'esign &hase( The group agreed that unit le.el and component le.el trade studies are often performed during the &reliminary 'esign &hase( Therefore, the use of reliability data to support trade studies should be added to Reliability &rediction &rocess 'iagram( 7im will modify the diagram( The group discussed the widespread trend away from piece part FM+*%( Walt said that, at a minimum, FM+*% should be performed to identify the effects of failures at the interfaces of a Aine Replaceable @nit /AR@0( 8e added that identifying internal failure modes of an e2isting AR@ would not be efficient use of an analystJs time, but identifying internal failure modes of a new or modified AR@ would be efficient use of an analystJs time( The group agreed with Walt( The group agreed that FM+*% should be used to .alidate the Reliability ?lock 'iagram /R?'0, and both the FM+*% and R?' should begin at the same le.el of indenture( The group agreed on the following concepts# o ,n an ideal world, where tools are a.ailable to apply all reliability methods with e1ual effort to all items, the preferred order of reliability methods would be# 1( Field data ( Test data 4 $( &hysics of failure /&oF0 e1uations if they were deri.ed from applicable test data 4( 8andbook reliability prediction e1uations if they were deri.ed from applicable field data o The MT?F calculation for *)TS should be based on either field data or test data( o ,n the real world /at least for now0, handbook reliability prediction methods are the most cost effecti.e choice for MT?F calculations because# ,nsufficient field and test data is a.ailable for all items in modern space systems( % key goal of the Responsible 'esign +ngineer /R'+0 should be to eliminate all wearout mechanisms that can affect mission success( Therefore, &oF would not be necessary if this goal is met( *ost effecti.e &oF tools are not a.ailable( o Some of the problems associated with handbook reliability prediction methods include# @se of proprietary parameters Failure rate e1uations that were not deri.ed from field data @nknown confidence bonds for calculated failure rates %ssumed e2ponential /constant0 failure rates for all items Aack of a comprehensi.e set of ha6ard rate e1uations for non: electronic parts Aack of a comprehensi.e set of non:operating failure rate e1uations for electronic parts Tyrone discussed an e2ample for a standard reliability data format that he deri.ed from the old ?1 and ? sheets in M,A:ST':1$"":%( The e2ample consists of predefined keywords that ha.e origination points identified on critical process flow diagrams( The points on the diagrams ser.e as data addresses( To allow consistent identification of the data by different reliability assessment tools, the keywords are arranged in an indentured configuration that is based on data dependency( Take for e2ample, a spacecraft Mean Mission 'uration /MM'0 prediction( ,ts standard electronic data interchange format might look something like this# 5 RE('-'('T$ #RE+'!T'"N MM+ RWE'-.(( /Rayleig)&Truncated Weibull0 S!(E 1 2030 S%#E 1 1345 -WER".T /-egin Wearout0 1 62 MWER".T /Mean Wearout0 1 47 !"N8'+EN!E 1 035 .N'TS 1 M"NT%S Team 2 +iscussion Topics Team participants in the May 14 th meeting were# 'an 8artop /Team Aead0 'a.id Buegao %l 7ackson The group met the minimum number of participants re1uired for a Team 1uorum( The following tasks ha.e been completed# o *reated, @pdated and Re.iewed ,nitial Schema o 'ocumented @pdated Schema *onsiderations for re.iew by Team o 'iscussed potential ,nteroperability paths and approach %s a side note, 'S, will ultimately create an BSA style sheet /-ust a fancy BMA document for automatically changing BMA into something useful0 for con.erting a Fault Tree BMA /FTMA K0 document into an +2cel BMA Spreadsheet /supported by +2cel !!0( This will be accomplished sometime o.er the ne2t few months at 'S,Ls a.ailability( Therefore, we will commit to an %ction ,tem that will not ha.e a definite date other than by September !!( Team 2 8uture genda o Team : *omplete re.iew of Gate Types, ensure consistent parsing for e2isting tools o Team : 'efine interoperability paths for Fault Tree and other Schemas o Team 1 : &ro.ide input to Team regarding current schema
ction 'tems 1( Team 1 %ction ,tems I 6 a( %ll I Re.iew the updated Fault Tree Schema that Team constructed( Specifically, check for correctness, completeness, and compliance with the stated ob-ecti.e of standard /see page 10( b( 7im I @pdate the diagram for the Reliability &rediction &rocess during the &reliminary 'esign &hase( Specifically add references to Reliability Trade Studies and FM+*%( c( Tyrone and Ste.e I Tackle the Team action item to begin de.eloping a draft outline for the standard, which is titled, Standard Format for Space System Reliability Computer Applications5( d( Tyrone I *onstruct a flow diagram for Similarity %nalysis that shows how indi.idual reliability assessment tasks might be integrated at the Reliability &rogram le.el( e( Tyrone I 'e.elop draft definitions for some of the more typical electrical stress derating parameters( f( Tyrone I Write a draft guide and construct Reliability %nalysis &rocess Flow 'iagrams for the 'etailed 'esign &hase( ( Team %ction ,tems I a( %ll : Re.iew the updated Fault Tree Schema( Specifically, check for correctness, completeness, and compliance with the stated purpose of standard /see page 10( b( S)8%R : 'efine interoperability /inputs and outputs to e2isting tools0( c( S)8%R : *omplete re.iew for completeness of Gate Types( d( 7ohn : Re.iew and update schema documentation( e( %ll : Re.iew Team 1 documentation M findings(
7 Ne9t Meeting The ne2t SSRT Standards WG Meeting is scheduled for May ", !!, at "#$! %M &'T( Team 1 and Team will hold separate teleconferences from "#$! %M to 1!#49 %M &'T( %t 1!#49 %M &'T, Team 1 will -oin the Team teleconference to discuss progress and actions( The following teleconference numbers are to be used# Team 1 teleconference number : /"""0 99!:9;>;, pass code >4>$94 Team teleconference number : /"""0 99!:9;>;, pass code 1>!"! %rrangements ha.e been made for Team 1 to use CetMeeting concurrently during the teleconference( For those that prefer face:to:face discussions, meeting rooms ha.e been reser.ed at the following locations# Team 1 meeting room : The %erospace *orporation, ?uilding ':", !! C( %.iation ?oule.ard, +l Segundo, *% ;!49:4>;1 Team meeting room : 'S, ,nternational, 19=4 C( ?ata.ia, Suite $, )range, *% ;">=
8 #lanned 8uture Meetings (ocation: The %erospace *orporation, ?uilding ':", !! C( %.iation ?oule.ard, +l Segundo, *% ;!49:4>;1 +ate: 2002 9N" Teleconference >N11 Teleconference >N9 Teleconference =N1> Teleconference =N$! Teleconference "N1$ Teleconference "N= Teleconference ;N1! Teleconference "N4 Teleconference &lease direct all comments regarding these meeting minutes to# Tyrone 7ackson SSRT Standards Working Group *oordinator Tyrone 7ackson Reliability M Statistics )ffice The %erospace *orporation &h( /$1!0 $$>:>1=! Fa2 /$1!0 $$>:9$>9 +mail# Tyrone3;ackson<aero3org 9 Top&10 problems t)at a==ect t)e Reliability #rograms o= Space Systems as determined by an internal >orking group sur*ey: 1( Haluable reliability lessons learned often are not in a format that is readily useable by the Reliability &rogram, or they ha.e become 3lessons forgotten5 or 3lessons ignored5( ( Some reliability critical items often are not identified at all or are not properly controlled( $( System reliability predictions often do not include probability of occurrence estimates for all rele.ant failure modes, failure mechanisms, and failure causes( /&robability of an induced fault during manufacture, or probability of damage during assembly often is not included in reliability predictions(0 4( The percei.ed accuracy of high:precision system reliability predictions often is not supported by the input data which is of lower precision that the result( 9( The steadily shrinking pool of 3e2perienced5 Reliability +ngineering specialists is unable to meet the needs of a steadily growing number of space system de.elopment pro-ects( >( Many commercial reliability assessment tools ha.e ma-or shortcomings that may not be ob.ious to the casual reliability analyst /e(g(, inaccurate e1uipment failure rate models, use of un.erifiable parameters in e1uations, high misapplication rates, etc(0( =( )ften, insufficient funding is pro.ided to perform all of the tasks necessary for a 8igh:Reliability &rogram( /Some customers and managers belie.e that high:reliability can be tested:in more cost:effecti.ely than it can be designed:in(0 "( 'ifferent approaches are being used across the space industry to perform reliability assessment tasks that are called by the same name, but which often ser.e different purposes( /,nconsistency in reliability assessment practices has become a ma-or problem since 'o' canceled military standards in the late ;!Js(0 ;( Some customersJ belie.e that all dependability predictions for space .ehicle constellations are too conser.ati.e( /The basis of this belief is rooted in historical e.idence that shows contingency procedures of ground operations are .ery effecti.e for e2tending the useful life of a space .ehicle far beyond itJs predicted mean:life( This phenomenon has resulted in many customers buying more space .ehicles than necessary to meet the dependability re1uirements of the constellation(0 1!( Sometimes the reliability analyst cannot take ad.antage of /or is unaware of0 some of the critical data paths that link a particular task of the Reliability &rogram with# 10 a( )ther tasks within the Reliability &rogramO b( Systems +ngineering &rocess functions outside the Reliability &rogramO or c( +2ternal product:related data sources( d( 11