Bruce rutherford: Egypt's Parliament voted to renew emergency law in 2006. Law gives president extraordinary powers to detain, prevent public gatherings, he says. Constitutional court ruling limited president's authority under the emergency law, he writes.
Bruce rutherford: Egypt's Parliament voted to renew emergency law in 2006. Law gives president extraordinary powers to detain, prevent public gatherings, he says. Constitutional court ruling limited president's authority under the emergency law, he writes.
Bruce rutherford: Egypt's Parliament voted to renew emergency law in 2006. Law gives president extraordinary powers to detain, prevent public gatherings, he says. Constitutional court ruling limited president's authority under the emergency law, he writes.
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For more information send email to: permissions@press.princeton.edu C HAP T E R ONE HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy ON APRIL 30,2006,theEgyptianParliamentvotedbyalargemajority torenewtheemergencylaw.Thislawgrantsthepresidentextraordinary powers to detain citizens, prevent public gatherings, and issue decrees withlittleaccountabilitytoParliamentorthepeople.Thevotewasafamil- iarritual:theEgyptianParliamenthasroutinelyapprovedtheemergency lawformostofthepastfortyyears. 1 However,thisacquiescencetopresi- dentialpowerisnotuniversal.AfewmonthspriortotheAprilvote,the SupremeConstitutionalCourtissuedarulingthatsubstantiallylimited the scope of the presidents authority under the emergency law. The Courtsdecisionprohibitedthepresidentfromusingtheemergencylaw to assert government control over private property in non-emergency situations,andadmonishedtheprimeministerforapplyingitinaman- ner that disregarded the constitutional rights of Egyptians. 2 Many civil society groups also challenged the law, especially the Muslim Brother- hood. It organized several demonstrations to protest the parliamentary voteandcriticizedthelawextensivelyinthemedia.Itsparliamentarydele- gationdenouncedthemeasureascontrarytotheprinciplesofIslambe- causeitignoredthewishesoftheEgyptianpeopleandfailedtoservethe publicinterest. 3 TheseeventsillustrateagrowingcontradictionincontemporaryEgypt. Anobservercouldeasilyconcludethatthecountryisaclassicexampleof 1 TheemergencylawwasinvokedduringtheJune1967war.Ithasbeeninforceever since,withonlyabriefinterruptionfromMay15,1980untilOctober6,1981.Fordetails oftheemergencylaw,seeA.SeifEl-Islam,ExceptionalLawsandExceptionalCourts,in Egypt and Its Laws, ed. Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron and Baudouin Dupret (New York: KluwerLawInternational,2002),36466.AmendmentstotheConstitutioninMarch2007 incorporatedmanyofthepowersoftheemergencylawintotheConstitution.Theseamend- mentswillbediscussedinchapter6. 2 SCCdecision74forJudicialYear23,issuedJanuary24,2006.Thisdecisionsupple- mentedearlierrulingsbytheadministrativecourtsthatnarrowedthepresidentsauthority toarrest citizensunderthe emergencylawand furtherlimitedthe typesof propertythat couldbeseized.SeeHighAdministrativeCourt,Cases675and797,JudicialYear22,issued May27,1978;HighAdministrativeCourt,Case830,JudicialYear20,issuedDecember29, 1979;HighAdministrativeCourt,Cases1435,1310,1271,126,and810,JudicialYear28, March12,1985.Thesecaseswillbediscussedingreaterdetailinchapter2. 3 Bayanal-Ikhwanal-MusliminanQanunal-Tawari(Cairo:n.p.,April2006).Also seethecoverageoftheparliamentaryvoteinal-Misri al-Youm,May1,2006. 2 ChapterOne stableauthoritarianism.Theregimecontrolsmuchofthemedia,domi- natespoliticallife,andsuppressesitsopponentswithavastarrayoflegal andextra-legaltools.Italsocarefullymonitorsandmanipulatescivilsoci- etygroupsandpoliticalparties.Andyet,Egyptianpoliticallifeincludes severalfeaturesthatsuggestadifferentpicture.Thecountryhasavibrant andaggressivejudiciarywhoserulingsconstraintheregime. 4 Italsohas anincreasinglyassertivejudgesassociation(theJudgesClub)thatopenly confrontstheexecutiveandlobbiesforlegalandpoliticalreform.Inaddi- tion,Egypthasalargeandwell-organizedIslamistorganization(theMus- lim Brotherhood) that calls for increased governmental accountability, greater respect for law, and improved protection of citizens rights. Al- thoughtheBrotherhoodhasnoformalcapacitytoconstrainthestate,it regularly challenges and delegitimizes abuses of power by invoking Is- lamicprinciplesoflawandgovernance. 5 Someanalystsmaybeinclinedtodismissthesecriticsofexecutivepower asmarginalactorswithlittlesubstantiveimpactonpolitics.However,this viewneglectsafundamentalchangeinthecharacterofEgyptianpolitics sincetheearly1990s.ThestatistordercreatedduringtheNassererahas beenunderminedbyeconomiccrises,economicrestructuring,andinte- grationintotheglobaleconomy.Thesechangeshaveweakenedkeyinsti- tutionsofstatecontrol,particularlythepublicsectorandthesubsidysys- tem.Theyhavealsoerodedtheideologythatlegitimatestheregime.This doesnotmeanthatthestateisfadingaway.However,thestatenolonger dominatestheeconomyandsociety.Thissituationhascreatedopportuni- tiesforcompetingideologiesandinstitutionstoemergemostnotably, aliberalconceptionoflawwithinthejudiciaryandanIslamicconception of governance within the Muslim Brotherhood. These new approaches to constitutional order have grown into meaningful alternatives to the decliningstatismoftheregime.Furthermore,thesetwoalternativesshare importantfeatures.Theiragendasconvergearoundacoresetofreforms thatembodythekeyfeaturesofclassicalliberalism,includingconstraints onstatepower,strengtheningtheruleoflaw,andprotectingsomebasic rights.Thissetofreformshasalsogainedsupportfrompartsofthebusi- nesscommunityandthereformistwingoftherulingparty.Thisdevelop- mentsuggeststhatEgyptspoliticalfuturemayincludeasteadydeepening ofliberalismand,possibly,democracy. 4 Forexample,EgyptscourtshaveissueddecisionsthatdissolvedtheParliamentontwo occasions, reduced regime-sponsored electoral fraud, created twelve political parties, and overturnedgovernmentorderstocloseoppositionnewspapersandsilencecriticaljournalists. Thesecaseswillbediscussedinchapter2. 5 Eachofthesetopicswillbediscussedingreaterdepthinchapters2through4. HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 3 THE IMPERATIVE OF ARAB DEMOCRACY: CHANGING INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC PRIORITIES Thepossibilityofsustainedliberalanddemocraticdevelopmentisnovel intheMiddleEast.FormostofthepostWorldWarIIperiod,political reformhasbeenalowpriorityforbothlocalleadersandtheinternational community.TheUnitedStateshasaparticularlyundistinguishedrecord inthisregard.OneofitsearliestinterventionsduringtheColdWaroc- curredinIranin1953,whenAmericanagentsassistedacoupthatover- threwapopularlyelectedleader(MohammadMossadeq)andrestoredthe authorityoftheshah.TheUnitedStatesthenprovidedextensivemilitary andeconomicaidtotheshahsregimeoverthenexttwenty-sixyears.The UnitedStateshasalsoprovidedsubstantialsupporttoothermonarchies intheregion,particularlyinSaudiArabia,Jordan,Kuwait,andMorocco. Itswillingnesstobackautocracyreachedapeakinthe1980s,whenthe United States provided military and intelligence assistance to Saddam Husseins Iraq in order to strengthen its hand against Iran. 6 The U.S. secretaryofstateatthetime,GeorgeShultz,candidlyexplainedthatthe UnitedStatessimplycouldnotstandidleandwatchtheKhomeinirevolu- tionsweepforward. 7 As Shultzs comment suggests, U.S. policy toward the region was guidedbyitscorestrategicinterests,namely,accesstoadequatesupplies ofoilatstableprices;thesecurityofIsrael;andtheminimizationofSoviet inuence.WiththesuccessoftheIranianrevolutionin1979,thecontain- mentofradicalIslaminitsShiaand,later,Sunnivariantswasadded tothislist.Buildingstabledemocracieswasconsideredasecondaryobjec- tive,atbest.Whenevertheissueofdemocratizationarose,theprevailing viewwas,Whyrocktheboat? 8 Democratizationwouldalmostcertainly produceaperiodoftransitionthatwouldincreaseinstability.Thisinstabil- ity,inturn,mightjeopardizethesmoothowofoilandcouldprovide opportunities for anti-American groups to expand their political inu- ence.Itsimplymadelittlesensetojeopardizeglobaleconomicprosperity inordertoembarkonanuncertainpathofpoliticalreform.Whenthere 6 AmatziaBaram,USInputintoIraqiDecisionmaking,19881990,inThe Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment, Fourth Edition,ed.DavidW. Lesch(Boulder,CO:WestviewPress,2007),352.Also,AlanFriedman,Spiders Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq (NewYork:BantamBooks,1993). 7 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Scribners,1993),237. 8 WilliamB.Quandt,AmericanPolicytowardDemocraticPoliticalMovementsinthe MiddleEast,inRules and Rights in the Middle East: Democracy, Law, and Society,ed.Ellis Goldbergetal.(Seattle:UniversityofWashingtonPress,1993),166. 4 ChapterOne wereopportunitiestopromotedemocracy,theywerepursuedeitherhalf- heartedlyornotatall.Forexample,inlate1991andearly1992,Algerias presidentmadethesurprisingdecisiontoallowrelativelyfreeparliamen- taryelections.Theyledtowidespreadlossesfortherulingpartyandunex- pected success for an Islamist movement, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS).InordertoblocktheFISfromgainingcontroloftheParliament, theAlgerianmilitaryintervenedbydeclaringastateofemergency,cancel- ingtheelectionresults,andimprisoningtheleadersandactivistsofthe FIS.TheUnitedStatesofferednoobjection.Speakingafewyearslater, the U.S. secretary of state at the time (James Baker) recalled that the UnitedStateschosenottodefendthedemocraticprocessbecauseitwould haveproducedagovernmentwithviewshostiletowardtheUnitedStates. Inhiswords,Wedidntlivewith[theelectionresults]inAlgeriabecause wefeltthatthefundamentalistsviewsweresoadversetowhatwebelieve inandwhatwesupport,andtothenationalinterestoftheUnitedStates. 9 TheUnitedStateshadanevenbetteropportunitytopromotedemocracy duringtheGulfWarof199091.IraqunderSaddamHusseinhadinvaded andannexedKuwaitinAugust1990.TheUnitedStatesanditsalliesinter- venedwithover500,000troopstoexpelIraqiforcesandrestoretheKu- waiti monarchy. Some American politicians and analysts argued that AmericanmilitaryactionshouldbeconditionedonKuwaitsrulingfam- ily,theal-Sabah,agreeingtoaspecictimetablefordemocratization.In thisview,Americantroopsshouldnotrisktheirlivestodefendafeudal monarchy. 10 SuchreasoningwasnotincorporatedintoAmericanpolicy. PresidentGeorgeH.W.BushsspeechontheeveoftheAmericanairwar againstIraqisstrikingforitslackofreferencetoanypoliticalgoalbeyond therestorationoftheKuwaitimonarchy. 11 Aseniorpolicymakeratthe timeobserved,IamamongtheunregeneratefewwhobelievethatAmer- icanforeignpolicymustservethenationalinterestwhichisnotinevery casetobeconfusedwiththefurtheranceofAmericanidealsoverseas. 12 Thisviewthatdemocratizationtakesabackseattocorestrategiccon- cerns has played an important role in the U.S. relationship with Egypt. 9 LookingBackontheMiddleEast:JamesA.BakerIII,Middle East Quarterly 1,no. 3(1994):83.Interestingly,theAlgeriancoupisnotevenmentionedinBakersmemoirs. SeeJamesA.Baker,The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 19891992 (New York:G.P.PutnamsSons,1995). 10 Forexamplesofthisargument,seeDavidIgnatius,IntheComingNewGulfOrder, WeMustHelptheArabWorldJointheGlobalDemocraticRevolution,Washington Post, August26,1990;CaryleMurphy,GulfStatesNextTest:Democracy,Washington Post, September15,1990. 11 SeethetextofGeorgeH.W.Bushsspeech,PresidentBushAssuresAmericanPeople: WeWillNotFail,Washington Post,January17,1991. 12 TheofcialisquotedinThomasL.Friedman,ANewU.S.Problem:FreelyElected Tyrants,New York Times,January12,1992.Thenameoftheofcialisnotgiven. HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 5 Thisrelationshipisshapedbythestrategicinterestsmentionedearlier oil,Israel,theSovietUnion(until1991),andradicalIslam.Itisalsoinu- encedbytheUnitedStateseagernessafter1979tosustaintheCampDavid peace agreement and, if possible, to extend this peace to other Arab re- gimes. 13 In pursuit of these goals, the United States began substantial levelsofeconomicaidinthemid-1970s. 14 Theassistancestartedwith$370 millionineconomicaidin1975.By1978,thisgurehadrisento$943 million. It then rose further in 1979, to $1.1 billion, as a result of the peaceagreementwithIsrael.Awhopping$1.5billioninmilitaryassistance was also added to the package. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. militaryandeconomicaidaveragedroughly$2.2billionperyear.In2000, theUnitedStatesbegantocutbackoneconomicaidatarateof5percent peryearwiththegoalofreducingeconomicassistanceby50percentover tenyears.ThisreductionwaspartofabroaderstrategytoshifttheU.S.- Egyptianeconomicrelationshipfromaidtotrade.In2006,economic assistance hadfallento$490million.Militaryassistanceremainedatits well-establishedlevelofroughly$1.2billionperyear.Bytheendof2006, theUnitedStateshadsentover$62billionineconomicandmilitaryassis- tancetoEgyptoverthepreviousthirty-oneyears(innominaldollars). 15 Despitethisextraordinarylevelofassistance,theUnitedStatesnever used aid as a lever for accelerating political reform. Indeed, the United Stateswasskepticalofthevalueofdemocratizationfromtheearliestdays oftheNasserregime.AtthetimeoftheFreeOfcerscoupin1952,the U.S.ambassadorconcludedthatEgyptwasnotreadyfordemocracy. 16 Hebelievedthatgreaterfreedomsandfreeelectionswouldmerelyprovide opportunitiesforcommuniststoexpandtheirinuence,andmightpro- ducesocialdisorderthatcommunistscouldexploit. 17 Thissentimentper- 13 RogerOwen,Egypt,inThe Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World,ed.RobertChaseetal.(NewYork:W.W.Norton,1999),133;AlfredL. Atherton,Egypt and U.S. Interests (Washington,DC:ForeignPolicyInstitute,1988),57. 14 TheimpetusforstartingthisassistancewasSadatsdecisionin1972toseverEgypts militarytieswiththeUSSR.ItwasreinforcedbySadatswillingnesstoengageinadialogue overEgyptian-Israelisecurityconcernsinthewakeofthe1973Arab-Israeliwar,particularly withregardtotheorderlydisengagementofEgyptianandIsraelitroopsinSinai. 15 AllaidguresaretakenfromJeremyM.Sharp,Egypt:BackgroundandU.S.Rela- tions(Washington,DC:CongressionalResearchService,January10,2007),3133.For discussionofthestrategytoshifttheU.S.-Egyptianeconomicrelationshipfromaidtotrade, seeStrategyIntroductioninUSAID-Egypt 20002009 Strategy,p.1.TheUnitedStates hasannouncedplanstocontinuemilitaryaidatalevelof$1.3billionperyearthrough2017. RobinWright,U.S.PlansNewArmsSalestoGulfAllies,Washington Post,July28,2007. 16 KirkJ.Beattie,Egypt during the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics, and Civil Society (Boul- der,CO:WestviewPress,1994),99. 17 Ibid.TheUnitedStatesalsobelievedthatamilitaryregimewasbetterabletoundertake keysocialreforms(particularlylandreform)neededtostimulateeconomicdevelopmentand 6 ChapterOne sistedoverthenextvedecades.Inthelate1980s,aformerU.S.ambassa- dortoEgypt(AlfredAtherton)wroteacarefulandthoroughdiscussion oftheU.S.-Egyptrelationshipwithoutevenmentioningdemocracypro- motion. 18 Similarly,aformerNationalSecurityCouncilofcialwhospe- cializesinEgypt(WilliamQuandt)wroteaseventy-seven-pageessayon U.S.-Egyptianrelationsin1990withoutaddressingtheissuesofdemoc- racyorpoliticalreform. 19 Democracy and human rights were sometimes mentioned in ofcial documents.Forexample,theU.S.StateDepartmentissuedanannualre- portonhumanrightsthatdrewattentiontotheEgyptiangovernments recordoftorture,electoralfraud,andsuppressionofcivilsociety. 20 Italso issuedperiodicstatementsthatencouragedEgypttodevelopmorerepre- sentative and accountable government. It even allocated some USAID funds for this purpose. 21 However, political reform was understood by bothsidesasbeingsubordinatetothestrategicconcernsthatlayatthe heartoftheU.S.-Egyptianrelationship. ThisviewofdemocratizationinEgyptandtheArabworldunderwent asignicantchangefollowingtheterroristattacksofSeptember11,2001. PriortoSeptember11,U.S.policymakersassumedthatstableandfriendly authoritarianregimesintheArabworldwerethebestguaranteeofAmeri- cansecurityandeconomicinterests.Inthewakeoftheattacks,U.S.lead- ers from both parties concluded that terrorism by radical Islamists was partiallyaresultoftherepressionandeconomicstagnationofArabdicta- torships.Thesesuffocatingconditionsproducedalargepooloffrustrated, hopeless,andangryyoungmenwhoyearnedforgreaterdignityandpur- poseintheirlives.Theywereeasyrecruitsforterroristideologuespromis- inghonorandmartyrdominastruggleagainstinjustice. 22 prevent a peasant revolution. Ibid., 141. Also, Joel Gordon, Nassers Blessed Movement: Egypts Free Ofcers and the July Revolution (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1992),195. 18 HewrotebrieythatEgypthastodayagoodrecordintheeldofhumanrights... Egypthasmadeimportantadvances,especiallyunderMubarak,towardestablishingdemo- craticinstitutionsandreducingcorruption.Hemakesnomentionofwhetherdemocracy promotionshouldbeagoalintheU.S.relationshipwithEgypt.Atherton,Egypt and U.S. Interests,19. 19 The book focuses primarily on economic reform and the Arab-Israeli peace process. WilliamB.Quandt,The United States and Egypt (Cairo:AmericanUniversityinCairoPress, 1990). 20 These reports were prepared by the Department of States Bureau of Democracy, HumanRights,andLabor.TherecentreportsareavailableontheStateDepartmentsweb- site:http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/. 21 Beginninginthe1990s,USAIDbeganallocatingfundstosupportinstitutionalre- form. These programs focused on legal reform, judicial training, and strengthening the Parliamentsadministrativecapabilities.SeeStrategicPlan19962001(Cairo:USAID/ Egypt,September1996),iiiiv. 22 PresidentBusharticulatedthisviewinaspeechtotheNationalEndowmentforDe- mocracyinNovember2003.Hestated,AslongastheMiddleEastremainsaplacewhere HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 7 Foradvocatesofthisview,thekeytodefeatingterrorismlayinending repressionandpoorgovernanceintheArabworld.Inthewordsofthe secretaryofstate,forsixtyyearstheUnitedStatespursuedstabilityatthe expenseofdemocracyintheMiddleEastandweachievedneither.Now, wearetakingadifferentcourse.Wearesupportingthedemocraticaspira- tions of all people. 23 In November 2003, President George Bush pro- claimedthattheUnitedStateshadadoptedaforwardstrategyoffreedom intheMiddleEastthatwouldbeacentralfeatureofAmericanforeign policy. 24 Thisposturewaspartofabroaderplantopromotedemocracy throughout the world. Theadministrations National Security Strategy, issuedinMarch2006,statedinitsrstparagraph,Thegoalofourstate- craftistohelpcreateaworldofdemocratic,well-governedstatesthatcan meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in theinternationalsystem. 25 Itfurtherarguedthatdemocraticregimesare more stable, more economically prosperous, and more peaceful toward their neighbors than any alternative form of government. As a conse- quence,promotingdemocracyisthebestwaytoprovideenduringsecu- rityfortheAmericanpeople. 26 Thisviewwassharedbyotherprominent Republicans,particularlyJohnMcCain. 27 The MiddleEast was clearlythe primaryfocus of thisstrategy. From 2002 to 2006, the administration allocated over $400 million to the freedom does not ourish, it willremainaplaceofstagnation, resentment, and violence readyforexport.Andwiththespreadofweaponsthatcanbringcatastrophicharmtoour countryandtoourfriends,itwouldberecklesstoacceptthestatusquo.GeorgeW.Bush, SpeechonDemocracyandFreedomintheMiddleEast,presentedattheNationalEndow- mentforDemocracy,November6,2003. 23 CondoleezzaRice,RemarksattheAmericanUniversityinCairo,June20,2005.The UndersecretaryofStateforPoliticalAffairsreafrmedinApril2005thatTheU.S.plansto makeasapermanentfeatureofitspolicyintheregionabroadandsubstantialprogram tohelpthepeoplesoftheMiddleEastreachamoresecureanddemocraticfuture.R.Nicho- lasBurns,ATransatlanticAgendafortheYearAhead,speechdeliveredattheRoyalInsti- tuteforInternationalAffairs,London,April6,2005. 24 GeorgeW.Bush,SpeechonDemocracyandFreedomintheMiddleEast,presented attheNationalEndowmentforDemocracy,November6,2003. 25 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington,DC:The WhiteHouse,2006),1.Bushstruckasimilarthemeinhissecondinauguraladdress,where heconcludedthatthesurvivaloflibertyinourlandincreasinglydependsonthesuccessof libertyinotherlands.GeorgeW.Bush,InauguralAddress,January20,2005. 26 National Security Strategy of the United States, 1. 27 McCainwasacosponsoroftheAdvanceDemocracyActin2005.Whenintroducing theAct,heproclaimedthatthepromotionofdemocracyandfreedomissimplyinseparable fromthelong-termsecurityoftheUnitedStates.WhenthesecurityofNewYorkorWash- ington or California depends in part on the degree of freedom in Riyadh or Baghdad or Cairo,thenwemustpromotedemocracy,theruleoflaw,andsocialmodernizationjustas wepromotethesophisticationofourweaponsandthemodernizationofourmilitaries.He has also backed legislation supporting democraticreform in Iraq, Jordan, Russia, Central America,Haiti,Fiji,Kosovo,Burma,andAfghanistan.SeeMcCainsofcialwebsite:http:// mccain.senate.gov.AccessedAugust15,2007. 8 ChapterOne newlycreatedMiddleEastPartnershipInitiative(MEPI)thatseekstoin- crease the fairness of elections, support civil society groups, strengthen judiciaries, and improve protection of womens rights. 28 Another $250 million has been proposed by Congress under the Advance Democracy Act,withmostofitearmarkedfortheMiddleEast. 29 USAIDsbudgetfor democracypromotionintheMiddleEastalsoincreasedsharply,from$27 millionin2001to$105millionin2005. 30 And,theUnitedStatesinvaded Iraq.Thewarwasjustied,inpart,asanefforttobringdemocracytothe region.Theadministrationarguedthatthedemocratictransformationof Iraqwouldserveasabeaconofliberty,inspiringdemocraticreformers throughouttheMiddleEast. 31 ThegoalofbuildingdemocracyintheMiddleEasthasattractedbiparti- san support. Democrats voted in large numbers to fund the democracy promotionprogramsputforwardbytheBushadministration. 32 Thedem- ocratsdeputyleaderintheSenate,RichardDurbinofIllinois,statedin 2004, I agreewholeheartedly with the president thatone of the most important things this country can do to ght terrorism is to promote democracy in the Middle East. The lack of democracy in many Middle EasterncountrieshasleddirectlytoIslamicextremism. 33 HillaryClinton assertedina2006speechthathumanfreedomandthequestforindivid- ualstoachievetheirgod-givenpotentialmustbeattheheartofAmerican approachesacrossthe[MiddleEast].Thedreamofdemocracyandhuman 28 A more detailed list of the MEPIs programs is available at http://mepi.state.gov/ c16050.htm.AlsoseeJeremyM.Sharp,The Middle East Partnership Initiative: An Overview (Washington,DC:CongressionalResearchService,July20,2005). 29 Theprogram isdescribed ina pressreleasefrom oneof itsco-sponsors, SenatorJoe Lieberman,at:http://lieberman.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=232762. 30 Roughly70percentofthisfundingwenttodemocracypromotionprogramsinIraq. SeeTamaraCofman-WittesandSarahE.Yerkes,TheMiddleEastFreedomAgenda:An Update,Current History 106,no.696(January2007):35. 31 Remarks by Stephen Hadley, assistant to the president for national security affairs, before the Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 20, 2005. Hadley further concluded that theresulting spread of democracy in the regionwould lead to a Middle East that is more peaceful, more stable, and more inhospitable to terrorists and theirsupporters. 32 FundingfortheMiddleEastPartnershipInitiativeencounteredsomeresistanceinthe Congressbut,ironically,thisresistancecameprimarilyfromRepublicans.Theyobjectedto what they considered the MEPIs lack of clear objectives. They were also concerned that someofitsprogramsduplicatedexistingprogramsalreadysupportedthroughUSAIDfund- ing.SeeJeremyM.Sharp,The Middle East Partnership Initiative;also,TheMiddleEast PartnershipInitiative:PromotingDemocratizationinaTroubledRegion.Hearingbefore theSubcommitteeontheMiddleEastandCentralAsiaoftheCommitteeonInternational Relations,HouseofRepresentatives,March19,2003. 33 DurbinmadethesecommentsduringaoorstatementregardingtheSyriaAccount- abilityActin2004.Thestatementisavailableathttp://durbin.senate.gov/issues/syria.cfm. AccessedJune15,2007. HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 9 rightsisonethatshouldbelongtoallpeopleintheMiddleEastandacross theworld...wemuststandonthesideofdemocracywhereverwecan helpittakehold. 34 BarackObamaheldasimilarview,claimingthatthe keytodefeatingradicalIslamlayinprovid[ing]thekindofsteadysup- port for political reformers and civil society that enabled our victory in theColdWar. 35 ObamawasalsooneofsixcosponsorsoftheAdvance DemocracyAct,whichcalledfortheexpansionofdemocracypromotion intheMiddleEast. When the democrats gained controlof the House of Representatives andtheSenatein2006,theysoughttobringsomeofthisrhetoricinto reality.TheyincorporatedfundingforMEPIintotheirsignaturebillon national security, the Real Security Act of 2006. 36 Several prominent democrats also initiated an effort to withhold $100 million in military assistance to Egypt, which provided further opportunity to voice their supportforhumanrightsanddemocracyinEgyptandtheArabworld. 37 AmericascallsfordemocracyintheMiddleEastwerejoinedbyequally convincedthough less effusiveEuropean allies. The German foreign minister,forexample,agreedthattheghtagainstterrorismrequireda muchbroaderconceptionofsecuritythatincludedsocial-culturalmod- ernizationissues,aswellasdemocracy,theruleoflaw,womensrightsand goodgovernance. 38 TheEuropeanSecurityStrategy,adoptedinDecem- ber2003,statesthatthequalityofinternationalsocietydependsonthe qualityofgovernmentsthatareitsfoundation.Thebestprotectionofour securityisaworldofwell-governeddemocraticstates. 39 TheEuropean UnionCommissionpresidentreiteratedthisview, 40 asdidotherEuropean 34 ChallengesforU.S.ForeignPolicyintheMiddleEastRemarksofSenatorHillary RodhamClintonatPrincetonUniversitysWoodrowWilsonSchoolofPublicandInterna- tionalAffairs,January19,2006. 35 Barack Obama, Renewing American Leadership, Foreign Affairs (July/August 2007),11.Alsoseepage14. 36 See the description of the Real Security Act at http://democrats.senate.gov/ newsroom/record.cfm?id=262588. 37 TheeffortwasinitiatedbyDavidObey,thechairoftheHouseAppropriationsCommit- tee.Heproposedtheamendmentbecause,inhiswords,Iamincreasinglyconcernedthat EgyptisheadedinadirectiondomesticallythatputsatrisknotonlyU.S.interestsinthe regionbuttheverystabilityofEgypt.SeeObeysstatementattachedtotheHousereport onbill109486ForeignOperations,ExportFinancing,andRelatedProgramsAppropria- tions Bill, 2007. For a record of the debate on the bill in June 2007, see Congressional RecordHouse,volume153,number100(110thCongress,1stSession). 38 TheremarksweremadebytheGermanforeignminister,JoschkaFisher,atthe40th MunichConferenceonSecurityPolicy,February7,2004. 39 ASecureEuropeinaBetterWorld:EuropeanSecurityStrategy.IssuedDecember 12,2003.Availableonlineat:http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. 40 TheCommissionpresident,JoseManuelBarroso,notedduringhisvisittotheWhite HouseinOctober2005thattheUnitedStatesandEuropeshareastrategicpartnershipthat 10 ChapterOne leaders such as Tony Blair. 41 The EUs efforts are carried out primarily withintheframeworkoftheEuro-MediterraneanPartnership,whichin- cludesfundingtostrengthencivilsocietygroups,humanrights,andthe rule of law. The funding for these programs increased substantially aftertheterroristattacksof2001. 42 IndividualEuropeancountrieshave also undertaken bilateral efforts to promote the rule of law and human rightsinArabcountries,withBritain,Denmark,France,andSwedentak- ing thelead. 43 Inaddition, European nationshave cooperated withthe UnitedStatesonanannualconferenceintheregion,theForumforthe Future. This event brings together G-8 ministers, ministers from Arab governments,businessmen,andcivilsocietyleaderstodevelopprograms forpoliticalandeconomicreform. 44 Itiscurrentlytheonlysettingthat allowsdemocracyadvocatestointeractdirectlywithgovernmentministers andbusinessleaders. Ofcourse,theUnitedStatesandEuropestilldefendthestrategicinter- estsmentionedearlier.Democracypromotionhasnottrumpedthesein- terests.Attimes,ittakesabackseattothem,whichleadstovariationsin seekstopromotedemocracy,humanrights,theruleoflaw,andthemarketeconomyaround the world. European Commission President Barroso meets U.S. President Bush at the WhiteHouse,EUpressrelease,October15,2005. 41 See,forexample,TonyBlairsspeechbeforetheU.S.CongressonJuly17,2003.He states that, The spread of freedom is the best security for the free. It is our last line of defenseandourrstlineofattack.Justastheterroristseekstodividehumanityinhate,so wehavetounifyitaroundanidea,andthatideaisliberty. 42 JohnCalabrese,FreedomontheMarchintheMiddleEastandTransatlanticRela- tions on a New Course? Mediterranean Quarterly (2005): 4546. From 1995 through 2004,thetotalfundingforthePartnershipwas$1billionperyear.Thisfundingwasapplied toprogramsinthreeareas:economicdevelopment,politicalreform,andculturaldevelop- ment.ThePartnershipunderwentathoroughreviewonitstenthanniversaryin2005.Asa resultofthisreview,totalfundingwasincreasedto$1.2billionperyearandprogramsfor politicalreformweregivenhigherpriority.DanielDombeyandRoulaKhalaf,Euro-Med LeadersLooktoBuildonBarcelonaProcess,Financial Times,November26,2005. 43 MichaelEmersonandothers,TheReluctantDebutanteTheEUasPromoterofDe- mocracyinitsNeighborhood,inDemocratisation in the European Neighborhood,ed.Mi- chaelEmerson(Brussels:CenterforEuropeanPolicyStudies,2005),2038.Also,Richard Youngs,EuropesUncertainPursuitofMiddleEastReform,inUncharted Journey: Pro- moting Democracy in the Middle East,ed.ThomasCarothersandMarinaOttaway(Washing- ton,DC:CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,2005),23435.TheEUhasalso undertakenbilateralagreementsforpoliticalreformwithJordan,Morocco,andthePalestin- ianAuthority.ItisnegotiatingsuchagreementswithEgyptandLebanon.HaizamAmirah- Fernandez,EU:BarcelonaProcessandtheNewNeighborhoodPolicy,Arab Reform Bul- letin 4,no.1(2006),56. 44 TheseconferencestakeplaceundertheheadingoftheBroaderMiddleEastandNorth AfricaInitiative,whichisalsocalledtheForumfortheFuture.Therstconferenceoccurred inRabat,MoroccoinDecember2004.ThesecondwasheldinManama,BahraininNovem- ber2005.ThethirdmeetingoccurredinJordaninDecember2006. HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 11 thestrengthofWesternadvocacyfordemocracyovertimeandbetween countries. 45 However,thisnormalebb-and-owofinterestsshouldnotbe construed asinsincerity. Since2001, democratizationhas beenelevated fromanappealingafterthoughtamongpolicymakerstoastrategicobjec- tiveinitself.True,itisonlyoneobjectiveamongmany.Butitnowcarries signicantweightamongpolicymakersintheUnitedStatesandEurope. MajorWesterngovernmentsnowarguewithincreasingconvictionthat the absenceof democracyin the regionhas adirect impacton regional andglobalsecurity. 46 Thischangeontheinternationalstagehasbeenmatchedbyaserious effort amongArab intellectuals andactivists to promotedemocratic re- form.ThemostsystematicworkinthisregardistheArabHumanDevel- opmentReports(AHDR)of2002,2003,2004,and2005. 47 Thesereports werepreparedbyateamofprominentArabintellectualsundertheaus- picesoftheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgram.Theyreceivedwide distributionforexample,over1millioncopiesofthe2002reportwere downloaded from the UNDPs website. 48 The reports focus on three decitsthatplaguetheArabworld:alackoffreedom,insufcientrights forwomen,andinadequateeducationalsystems.Theyemphasizethatall peopleareentitledtothefullrangeofcivilandpoliticalrights,andthat eachcitizenhastherighttoparticipateinhisowngovernance.Thereports assertthattheseprinciplesarefundamentaltohumanfreedomwhich,in turn,isthefoundationforeconomicgrowthandhumandevelopment. 49 45 Forexample,SecretaryofStateCondoleezzaRicevisitedEgyptinJanuary2007and heldalongmeetingwithPresidentMubarak.Duringhervisit,shemadenoefforttoencour- age politicalreform. Rather,she focused ongainingEgyptssupport forAmerican policy towardtheArab-Israeliconict,Iraq,andIran.Thisstandsinsharpcontrasttohervisitin June2005,whenshepubliclycalledformorerapiddemocratization.ForherspeechinJune 2005,seeCondoleezzaRice,RemarksattheAmericanUniversityinCairo,June20,2005. For her remarks during her visit in January 2007, see Condoleezza Rice, Remarks with EgyptianForeignMinisterAboulGheit,January15,2007.AvailableontheStateDepart- mentswebsite:http://www.state.gov/.AccessedJune12,2007. 46 AsHenryKissingerputit,Theadvocatesoftheimportantroleofacommitmentto democracy in American foreign policy have won their intellectual battle. Henry A. Kis- singer,InterventionwithaVision,inThe Right War? The Conservative Debate on Iraq, ed.GaryRosen(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2005),53. 47 Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating Opportunities for Future Generations (NewYork:UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgram,2002);Arab Human Development Re- port 2003: Building a Knowledge Society (NewYork:UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgram, 2003);Arab Human Development Report 2004: Towards Freedom in the Arab World (New York: United Nations Development Program, 2005); Arab Human Development Report 2005: Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World (NewYork:UnitedNationsDevelopment Program,2006). 48 Arab Human Development Report 2003,i.ThereportwascitedbyTime magazineas themostimportantpublicationof2002. 49 Arab Human Development Report 2004,23. 12 ChapterOne ThereportsalsoarguethattheArabworldconfrontsseveralacuteprob- lems thatcan bemanaged onlythrough skilledand accountablegover- nance.Themostformidableoftheseproblemsincludethefollowing: A demographic youth bulge. Roughly38percentoftheregionspopu- lationisundertheageoffourteen.Theregionwillneed50millionnew jobsby2010inordertoaccommodatethem.Thisdemographicchallenge draws attention to two core weaknesses of the current order: the poor qualityofstate-ledeconomicmanagement,whichhasproducedweakeco- nomicgrowth;andtheabsenceofpoliticalinstitutionsthatcanrepresent theinterestsoftheseyoungpeopleandrespondtotheirconcernsquickly andeffectively.IntheviewoftheAHDR,democratizationaddressesboth oftheseproblems.Itincreasesthetransparencyandaccountabilityofgov- ernmentdecisionmaking,therebyimprovingeconomicpolicyandperfor- mance.Italsoprovidesanorderlyandreliablemechanismforincluding citizensinpoliticallife. The political repercussions of economic restructuring. Inordertoimprove economicperformance,manycountriesintheregionhaveadoptedmar- ket-orientedeconomicreformsthatshrinkthepublicsectorandreduce statesubsidies.Intheshortterm,thesemeasurescauseseverehardship, particularlytopublic-sectorworkersandunskilledlabor.Intheviewof theAHDR,democraticreformsareessentialforcreatingpoliticalinstitu- tionsthatcanrespondtotheneedsoftheseworkersandprovideapeaceful avenueforexpressingandmanagingtheirdissent. The growing power of Islamist groups. Throughout the Middle East, Islamist groups have developed broad popular support, effective social servicenetworks,and aformidablecapacityto mobilizetheirfollowers. The appeal of these groups is likely to increase in the future. In the view of the AHDR, democratic reforms are the only way to integrate these groups into the political process and give them a stake in peace- fulchange. TheauthorsoftheAHDRbelievethatthecurrentpoliticalstructures oftheArabworldaresimplynotuptothesechallenges.Iftheregionis tocopeeffectively,democratizationisessential.Ifitdoesnotoccur,Arabs facetheprospectofintensiedsocialconict...violentprotest...[and] internaldisorder. 50 Supportfordemocratizationisnotlimitedtothesmallcircleofintellec- tuals who wrote the AHDR. Opinion polls indicate signicant public backingfordemocraticprinciples.ApollbytheWorldValuesSurveyin Egypt,Jordan,Morocco,andAlgeriafoundthatover85percentofre- spondentsconsidereddemocracybetterthananyotherformofgovern- 50 Ibid.,19. HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 13 ment. 51 The percentageofrespondentswho considereddemocracythe bestformofgovernmentexceededthatofanyotherregioninthedevel- oping world. 52 The Arab respondents also expressed the highest rate of rejection (80 percent) of authoritarian rule. 53 A poll conducted by the AHDR indicates that Arabs place a high value on freedom of thought, expression,andbelief. 54 Additionalsurveyresearchreachessimilarconclu- sionsandsuggeststhattheArabpublicsupportsmanydemocraticvalues, withtheimportantexceptionofwomensequality. 55 Public advocacy of democratization has also become widespread and forceful.Meetingsofintellectuals,civilsocietyorganizations,andbusiness groups frequently include declarations of support for democracy. 56 The Arab media also increasingly advocates democratization, with satellite televisionstationsleadingtheway.Themostpopularsatellitestation,al- Jazeera, hasmadepoliticalreformacentralthemeofitsprogramming.A recentstudyofitsbroadcastssince1999foundthatroughlyone-thirdof itstalkshowprogramsdealwiththistopic.Theyfrequentlyincludeharsh attacksontheregimesoftheregionandvigorousdemandsfordemocratic change.Intheviewofthestudysauthor(MarcLynch),al-Jazeera has helped to transform Arab political discourse by creating an intellectual climate where challenging political authority is not only tolerated, but 51 Respondentswerepresentedwiththestatement:Despiteitsproblems,democracyis betterthananyotherformofgovernment.IneachofthefourArabcountriesstudied,over 85percentoftherespondentseitherstronglyagreedoragreedwiththisstatement.The resultsofthesurveywithregardtotheMiddleEastaresummarizedinMarkTessler,Do IslamicOrientationsInuenceAttitudesTowardDemocracyintheArabWorld?Evidence fromEgypt,Jordon,Morocco,andAlgeria,inIslam, Gender, Culture, and Democracy,ed. RonaldInglehart(Willowdale,ON:deSitterPublications,2003),13. 52 World Values Surveys Four-Wave Integrated Data File, 19812004.Downloadedfrom theInter-UniversityConsortiumforPoliticalandSocialResearch. 53 The question involved asked whether the respondent would accept a strong leader whodoesnothavetobotherwithparliamentandelections.Ibid. 54 ThesurveyissummarizedintheArab Human Development Report 2004,9899. 55 The 2002 Gallup Poll of the Islamic World (Princeton,NJ:GallupOrganization,2002). ThispollwasconductedinDecember2001andJanuary2002.Itincluded4,300Arabre- spondentsfromJordan,Kuwait,Lebanon,Morocco,andSaudiArabia.Also,JamesJ.Zogby, What Arabs Think: Values, Beliefs, and Concerns (New York: ZogbyInternational, 2002), especiallypp.3342.Thispollinvolved3,800Arabsineightcountries.Also,PewGlobal AttitudesProject,Views of a Changing World: June 2003 (Washington,DC:PewResearch CenterforthePeopleandthePress,2003),especiallypp.4770.Thispolldealswithonly twoArabcountries,LebanonandJordan.AlsoseeAmaneyJamalandMarkTessler,Atti- tudesintheArabWorld,Journal of Democracy 19,no.1(January2008):97110. 56 Themostprominentdeclarationsare:theSanaadeclarationofJanuary2004,which wasproducedbytheRegionalConferenceonDemocracy,HumanRights,andtheRoleof theInternationalCriminalCourt;andtheAlexandriaCharterofMarch2004,whichwas theresultofaconferenceofArabcivilsocietyorganizationsentitledArabReformIssues: VisionandImplementation. 14 ChapterOne encouraged. It is building the foundation of a more democratic Arab politicalculture. 57 In addition, civil society groups and activists increasingly undertake demonstrationsandotheractsofpublicresistanceinsupportofpolitical change. For example, the Kifaya (enough) movement in Egypt orga- nizedthousandsofdemonstratorsinthespringof2005tocallforanend toPresidentMubaraksruleandtheconveningofcompetitivepresidential elections.TheMuslimBrotherhoodmobilizedthousandsofitsfollowers toparticipateinthesedemonstrations.Italsoorganizedseparatedemon- strationstosupportpoliticalandconstitutionalreform.InLebanon,the March14thmovementbrought1.2millionpeopleontothestreetsin 2005toprotestSyriaspresence.Theyorganizedseveralsubsequentdem- onstrationstoadvocatepoliticalreformandnationalreconciliation. 58 Sig- nicantpublicmobilizationinfavorofpoliticalreformhasalsooccurred inMoroccoandJordan,despitethethreatofimprisonmentandnes. 59 WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD? Forthersttimeintheregionshistory,therearestrongindigenousde- mandsfordemocracybackedbysignicantinternationalsupport.These pressureshavenotyetledtodemocratictransitions.However,therehave been some meaningful steps toward political reform. Improvements in electoralprocedureandmonitoringhaveproducedmorecompetitiveelec- tionsinAlgeria,Kuwait,Lebanon,Jordan,andMorocco.Judicialinde- pendencehasincreasedinEgypt,Kuwait,Jordan,andMorocco. 60 Judges inEgyptandKuwait,inparticular,haveshownawillingnesstochallenge 57 MarcLynch,ShatteringthePoliticsofSilence.SatelliteTelevisionTalkShowsand theTransformationofArabPoliticalCulture,Arab Reform Bulletin 2,no.11(2004):3; also,MarcLynch,Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today (NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2006). 58 PaulSalem, Lebanon at the Crossroads: Rebuilding an Arab Democracy (Washington, DC:BrookingsInstitution,2005);OussamaSafa,LebanonSpringsForward,Journal of Democracy 17,no.1(2006):2237. 59 ForfurtherinformationonMorocco,see:AndrewR.SmithandFadouaLoudiy,Test- ingtheRedLines:OntheLiberalizationofSpeechinMorocco,Human Rights Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2005): 10691119; Marina Ottaway and Meredith Riley, Morocco: From Top- Down Reform to Democratic Transition? (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for InternationalPeace,2006).ForfurtherinformationonJordan,see:GeorgeJoffe,Jordan in Transition (London:HurstandCo.,2002);RussellE.Lucas,DeliberalizationinJordan, Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 (2003): 13744; Anne Marie Baylouny, Jordans New PoliticalDevelopmentStrategy,Middle East Report 35,no.3(2005):4043. 60 NathanBrown,ArabJudicialReform:BoldVisions,FewAchievements, Arab Re- form Bulletin,October2004. HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 15 executivepower. 61 Parliamentshavegainedgreaterauthoritytoquestion membersoftheexecutiveandremoveministersinJordanandMorocco. Changesinlegislationandprocedurehavemadeiteasiertoformpolitical partiesinMoroccoandEgypt.Strongcivilsocietygroupscallingforpolit- icalreformhaveemergedinEgypt,Lebanon,Morocco,andJordan.And, pressfreedomhasimprovedinBahrain,Morocco,andJordan. 62 Inaddition,severalcountriesintheregionhaveundergoneeconomic restructuring that carries important repercussions for political change. Themassivewelfarestatesthatenhancedregimelegitimacyinmanycoun- trieshaveprovennanciallyunsustainable.Persistentbudgetdecitsand scalcriseshaveforcedcutbacksinkeyinstitutionsofstatecontrolsuch asthepublicsector,thesubsidysystem,andthecivilservice.Thisispartic- ularlythecaseinEgypt,Morocco,andJordan. 63 Thestateinthesecoun- triesiscertainlyinnodangerofcollapsing.However,itscapacitytocon- trol the economy and society has declined. 64 At the same time, new institutionsareemergingwithinthestate(suchasindependentjudicia- ries)andwithincivilsociety(suchasIslamistgroups).Theseinstitutions challengeandconstrainstatepower.Asnotedearlier,theymayalsooffer an alternative conception of political order that competes with the re- gimesideology. Althoughthesedevelopmentsareencouraging,wemustbecarefulnot to exaggerate their signicance. As one might expect, there have been setbacks.Lebanon,inparticular,hassufferedfromarecentdescentinto sectarian rivalries and violence. In addition, the autocrats of the Arab worldhaveadoptedcountermeasurestoprotecttheirpowerandfrustrate reform.Thestill-formidablerulingelitesoftheregionhaveasubstantial 61 Mostrecently, theKuwaiti ConstitutionalCourt voidedfteen clausesof thePublic Gatherings Law, which restricts public gatherings that convene without prior permission fromtheauthorities.Itheldthattheclausesviolatedtherighttofreedomofassemblyguar- anteedbytheconstitution.Therulingmarkedthersttimethatacourthadchallengedthe emergencypowersoftheemir.SeeArab Reform Bulletin,May2006(issue4).Fordiscussion oftheEgyptianjudiciary,seechapter2. 62 ThesepointsaregleanedprimarilyfromareviewofthemonthlyArab Reform Bulletin fromSeptember2003throughMay2006.TheBulletin ispublishedbytheCarnegieEndow- mentforInternationalPeace. 63 TheEgyptiancaseisdiscussedinchapter5.Forfurtherinformationoneconomicre- structuring in Morocco, see Fostering Higher Growth and Employment in the Kingdom of Morocco (Washington,DC:WorldBank,2006).ForinformationonJordan,seeKatherine Blue Carroll, Business as Usual? Economic Reform in Jordan (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2003);WarwickM.Knowles,Jordan since 1989: A Study in Political Economy (London:I. B.Tauris,2005). 64 For further discussion of the changing character of the state in the Arab world, see HassanHakimianandZibaMoshaver,eds.,The State and Global Change: The Political Econ- omy of Transition in the Middle East and North Africa (Richmond:CurzonPress,2001). 16 ChapterOne arsenal of tools at their disposal. 65 Autocratic institutions are not being swept away in dramatic popular upheavals comparable to the people powerofthePhilippinesorthecoloredrevolutionsofcentralEurope. Rather,thetoolsofcentralizedstatepoweraregraduallyeroding.Asthis unfolds, new institutions emerge alongside these weakenedbut still functioningstateinstitutions.InEgypt,forexample,thecountryspow- erfulsecurityinstitutionsandthelegalcodesthatempowerthemarenot beingdismantled.Instead,increasinglyassertiveadministrativeandcon- stitutionalcourtschallengetheirpowerandlimittheirauthority. 66 InJor- dan,thestatessocialserviceinstitutionsandeducationalsystemarenot shuttingdown.Instead,theycontinuetofunctioninafragmentaryand incompletefashion,andaresupplementedbyindependentIslamicinstitu- tionsthatperformthesamefunctions. 67 Someinstitutions(suchasinde- pendentjudiciaries)maybeproductsoftheregimespolicies,butthisdoes not mean they are controlled by the regime. Rather, they develop and functionalongsidetheautocraticinstitutionsofthestateandoftenconsti- tuteameaningfulconstraintonit. Thenetpoliticalresultofthisprocessisneitherauthoritarianismnor democracy.Rather,theoutcomeisahybridregimethatsharescharacteris- tics of both an autocratic order (characterized by a powerful executive withfewformalchecksonhisauthority)andademocraticorder(which includes institutions thatconstrain the state andincrease governmental accountability).Furthermore,thesedemocraticinstitutionsareoftensup- portedbyIslamicthinkersandactivists.Islamicpoliticalandlegalthought playsanincreasinglyimportantroleindeningandlegitimizingtheinsti- tutionalalternativestoautocracy. AfulltransitiontodemocracyisnotlikelyinanycontemporaryArab regime.However,forregimeswiththesehybridcharacteristics,areversion to fullauthoritarianism is equally unlikely. In order to understand the futureofdemocracyintheArabworld,weneedtounderstandhowthese hybrid regimes emerge, why they remain stable, and whether they will transitiontowarddemocracy.Thetheoreticalliteratureonhybridregimes providesavaluablestartingpointforthisanalysis. 65 ForfurtherdiscussionofthetacticsofArabauthoritarianism,seeEberhardKienle,A Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt (NewYork:I.B.Tauris,2001); MayeKassem,Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule (Boulder,CO:Lynne Rienner,2004);RussellLucas,Institutions and the Politics of Survival in Jordan: Domestic Responses to External Challenges, 19882001 (Binghamton: State University of New York Press,2005);EllenLust-Okar,Structuring Conict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Oppo- nents, and Institutions (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2005). 66 Thesecourtrulingswillbediscussedinchapter2. 67 JanineA.Clark,Islam, Charity, and Activism: Middle-Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen (Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,2004),82114. HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 17 HYBRID REGIMES AND POLITICAL CHANGE Scholarsofauthoritarianismhavelongbeenawareofregimesthatcontain bothautocraticanddemocraticinstitutions.Linzsclassicstudyofauthori- tarianismdiscussesthistopicinsomedetail. 68 Diamond,Linz,andLipset alsoexamineitintheirextensivemulti-countrystudyofdemocratization. Theybeginbyobservingthatalldemocraciesfallshortofthedemocratic ideal.However,someregimesfallsofarshortthattheycannotbedescribed asdemocratic.Theauthorsidentifyseveraltypesofregimesthatfallwithin thisgreyzonebetweendemocracyandautocracy:semidemocracy,in which competitiveelectionsoccur among multiple partiesbut there are seriousawsintheelectoralprocessorsharprestrictionsonthepowersof representative institutions; low-intensity democracy, in which vibrant andrelativelyfairelectionstakeplace,butgovernmentslackmeaningful accountabilityduringtheperiodbetweenelections;andhegemonicparty systems,inwhichfreeelectionsoccur,butonepartythoroughlydomi- natestheelectoralprocessandprecludesanymeaningfulcompetitionfor power. 69 Each of these is an example of a hybrid regime that exhibits a differentmixofauthoritariananddemocraticinstitutions. 70 Ottawayde- scribeshybridregimesinsimilarterms. 71 They maycontain legislatures, independentjudiciaries,andcivilsocietyorganizations.However,theydo notallowthetransferofpowerthroughelectionsand,therefore,arenot fullyfunctioningdemocracies. 72 68 JuanJ.Linz,Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder,CO:LynneRienner, 2000),5861. 69 LarryDiamond,JuanJ.Linz,andSeymourMartinLipset,Introduction:WhatMakes forDemocracy?inPolitics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, ed.LarryDiamond,JuanJ.Linz,andSeymourMartinLipset(Boulder,CO:LynneRienner, 1995),78. 70 Avarietyofothertermsappearintheliteraturetodescribethistypeofmixedregime, including:virtualdemocracy,pseudodemocracy,illiberaldemocracy,semi-authoritarianism, softauthoritarianism,electoralauthoritarianism,andpartlyfree.SeeStevenLevitskyand LucanA.Way,TheRiseofCompetitiveAuthoritarianism,Journal of Democracy 13,no. 2(2002), 51.Also, ArielC.Armony andHector E.Schamis,Babel inDemocratization Studies,Journal of Democracy 16,no.4(2005),113. 71 MarinaOttaway,Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism (Washing- ton,DC:CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,2003),3. 72 Thisdiscussionofhybridregimesdrawsattentiontotheimportanceofdistinguishing betweenliberalismanddemocracy.Westernanalystsareaccustomedtoseeingthesetwoprin- ciplesmergedintoasingleidealiberaldemocracy.However,theyaredifferentconcepts. Liberalismisasetofinstitutionsandinstitutionalrelationshipsthatconstrainstatepowerand protectcitizenscivilandpoliticalrights.Theseinstitutionsincludeaclearandunbiasedlegal code, the separation of powers, checks and balances among these powers, an independent judiciary,andeffectivelegalinstitutionsthatimplementthelaw.Democracyistheprocessof selecting a countrys leaders through free and fair elections. In many hybrid regimes, the 18 ChapterOne Hybridregimeshavebeenpartofthepoliticallandscapeforseveralde- cades. 73 However, their number grew dramatically after the end of the ColdWar.ThedemiseoftheSovietUnionledtothewithdrawalofexter- nalsupportfrommanyoftheworldsdictatorships.Russiahadneitherthe resourcesnorthewilltocontinuesupportingcommunistregimesaround theworld.WiththeSovietmenacegone,theUnitedStateshadlittlerea- sontosupportright-wingdictatorshipsthatcounterbalancedcommunist inuence. This termination of external support precipitated severe eco- nomic crises in many dictatorships in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Autocratshadlittlechoicebuttoopentheirpoliticalsystemsinorderto retainpower,buttheydidsoinamannerthatfellshortoffulldemocratic transition. 74 Theresultwasasharpincreaseinhybridregimes. TheSovietUnionscollapsealsolefttheWestinapositionofpolitical andeconomicpreeminence.Communistandsocialistmodelsofdevelop- ment had lost their credibility and popularity. The Western democratic model swept the global competition of ideas and became the natural choiceforadvocatesofpoliticalreforminauthoritarianregimes.Further- more,afterthecollapseoftheUSSR,theWestheldavirtualmonopoly oneconomicassistance.Autocratswhowantedapieceofthispiewould needtoshowatleastrhetoricalsupportfortheprinciplesofdemocracyand accountability.SeveralWesterncountrieswentastepfurtherandexplicitly incorporateddemocracypromotionintotheirforeignpolicies.Asnoted earlier,thiswasparticularlythecasefortheUnitedStatesandthemem- bersoftheEuropeanUnion. 75 Thesemeasureswerereinforcedbyagrowingnetworkoftransnational civilsocietygroupsthatpromoteddemocracyandhumanrights. 76 These institutionsofliberalismhaveemergedandconstrainsomedimensionsofexecutivepower. However, the core institution at the heart of democracyfree electionsremainsweak or nonexistent.Thisdistinctionbetweenliberalismanddemocracyisparticularlyimportantfor understandingtheEgyptiancase.Itwillbediscussedinfurtherdetailinchapter6. 73 Particularlylong-livedexamplesincludeMexicobefore1997andpost-independence Malaysia.ThefollowingdiscussionofthehistoryofhybridregimesdrawsonLevitskyand Way,TheRiseofCompetitiveAuthoritarianism,6163. 74 BrattonandvandeWalleofferaparticularlycleardiscussionofthisphenomenonin Africa.SeeMichael BrattonandNicolasvan deWalle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997),97122. 75 ThomasCarothers,Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington,DC: CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,1999),6;KaterinaDalacoura,U.S.Democ- racyPromotionintheArabMiddleEastsince11September2001:ACritique,Interna- tional Affairs 81,no.5(2005):96379;AnaEchagueandRichardYoungs,Democracy andHumanRightsintheBarcelonaProcess,Mediterranean Politics 10,no.2(2005):233 38;RichardGillespieandRichardYoungs,eds.,The European Union and Democracy Promo- tion: The Case of North Africa (London:FrankCass,2002). 76 MargaretE.KeckandKathrynSikkink,Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Marina Ottaway and HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 19 organizationsincludedhumanrightsgroups,internationalpartyfounda- tions,andmediaadvocacygroups.Theydrewinternationalattentionto humanrightsabusesandlobbiedWesterngovernmentstomonitorand punish autocratic regimes. 77 Some of the groups also sought to protect and strengthen pro-democracy forces through lobbying, funding, and training. 78 In addition, international election observers became an im- portantforceforidentifyinganddocumentingelectoralfraud.Theiref- fortsledtosubstantialimprovementsinthefairnessandtransparencyof elections. 79 These changes in the international setting dramatically increased the incentivesforauthoritarianleaderstoadoptatleastthetrappingsofde- mocracy.AsLevitskyandWayconclude,formostgovernmentsinlower- andmiddle-incomecountries,thecostsassociatedwiththemaintenance offull-scaleauthoritarianinstitutionsandthebenetsassociatedwith adoptingdemocraticonesroseconsiderablyinthe1990s. 80 Diamond reachesthesameconclusionandobservesthatoneofthemoststriking features of the late period of the third wave [of democratization] has beentheunprecedentedgrowthinthenumberofregimesthatareneither clearlydemocraticnorconventionallyauthoritarian. 81 Heestimatesthat, by2001,roughlyone-thirdoftheworldsregimescouldbedescribedas hybrids. 82 Furthermore,theseregimeshaveshownremarkabledurabil- ity. Manyhybrid regimes haveexisted forfteen years orlonger, which exceedsthelifespanofmostbureaucratic-authoritarianregimesinLatin America. 83 Thisdurabilitysuggeststhathybridregimescannotbecharac- ThomasCarothers,eds.,Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion (Wash- ington,DC:CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,2000). 77 KeckandSikkink,Activists Beyond Borders,1213. 78 Ibid.;ThomasRisse,StephenC.Ropp,andKathrynSikkink.,eds.,The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (New York: Cambridge University Press,1999). 79 ThomasCarothers,TheObserversObserved,Journal of Democracy 8,no.3(1997): 1731. 80 StevenLevitskyandLucanA.Way,AutocracybyDemocraticRules:TheDynamicsof CompetitiveAuthoritarianisminthePostColdWarEra.Paperpresentedattheconfer- ence, Mapping the Grey Zone: Clientelism and the Boundary between Democratic and Democratizing.(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2003),6. 81 LarryDiamond,ThinkingaboutHybridRegimes,Journal of Democracy 13,no.2 (2002):25. 82 Diamond identies three categories of hybrid regimes: competitive authoritarian (inwhichcompetitiveelectionsexistwithinastableauthoritarianregime),hegemonicelec- toral authoritarian (in which a single party dominates regular elections), and ambiguous regimesthatstraddletheboundarybetweendemocracyandauthoritarianisminotherways. Ibid.,26. 83 StevenLevitskyandLucanA.Way,Competitive Authoritarianism: International Link- age, Organizational Power, and Hybrid Regimes in the PostCold War Era (NewYork:Cam- bridgeUniversityPress,forthcoming),chap.1. 20 ChapterOne terizedasstalledorprolongedorincompletetransitionstodemoc- racy. 84 Rather,theyareadistinctregimetypethatneedstobeunderstood onitsownterms. 85 Ashybridregimesbecamemorenumerousandlong-lived,scholarsof comparative democratization began to study them with greater care. LevitskyandWayundertookaprojectthatanalyzedthirty-sevenofthese regimes.Theyfoundthattraditionalauthoritarianregimesassumeahy- brid character through the emergence of four arenas where opposition forces challenge autocratic incumbents: elections, in which opposition candidatesrunsuccessfullyagainstmembersoftheregime;legislatures, where opposition parliamentarians challenge and constrain the govern- ment;thejudiciary,wherejudgesrepealrepressivelawsandlimitthescope ofexecutivepower;andthemedia,whereindependentjournalistsinvesti- gateandexposeabusesofpowerbytheregime. 86 Theircarefulstudyof change in each of these arenas suggests that hybrid regimes emerge throughthreeprocesses: Elite calculations for survival:Rulingelitesinautocraticregimesoften confrontperiodsofcrisisbroughtonbypooreconomicperformance,mil- itary defeat, excessive repression, or a similar event. They may also face externaldemandstodemocratizeasaconditionforeconomicaidormem- bershipininternationalorganizations.Inordertocopewiththesepres- sures,rulingelitesmayadoptlimitedreformssuchasreleasingpolitical prisoners,expandingcivilandpoliticalrights,andallowingsomepolitical competition.Thesemeasuresarecarefullycalibratedtoenhancethere- gimes legitimacy and international stature without allowing genuine competitionforpower. Change in the relative power of institutions within the state and society: Authoritarianregimesarebaseduponcontrolofseveralkeyinstitutions. Themostobviousarethesecurityservicesandpolice,whichprovidethe hardpowertomaintainorderandrepressopponents.However,these regimesalsorelyonsoftpower,whichshapestheprioritiesofcitizens byprovidingthemwithincentivestosupporttheexistingorder.Atthe heart of this soft power are economic institutions such as the public sector,thesubsidysystem,andthebureaucracy.Theseinstitutionsprovide jobs,food,housing,education,andahostofotherimportantservices.A successfulauthoritarianregimeutilizesthemtomaintaintheloyaltyand cooperationofitssupporters.Theseinstitutionsarealsovaluabletoolsfor co-optingorharassingtheregimesopponents. 84 LevitskyandWaystudy37casesofhybridregimesfrom1990through2005.Ofthese, only14underwentatransitiontodemocracy.Ibid.,chap.1. 85 ThomasCarothers,TheEndoftheTransitionParadigm,Journal of Democracy 13, no.1(2002):521. 86 LevitskyandWay,TheRiseofCompetitiveAuthoritarianism,5457. HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 21 Theseinstitutionsmaybeunderminedbyeconomiccrises,economic mismanagement,oreconomicrestructuring.Whentheseinstitutionsare weakened,the regimespatronage networkerodesand itcan nolonger provide the services that are essential for preserving its legitimacy and power. This can lead to two institutional outcomes that contribute to thedevelopmentofahybridregime.First,governingelitesmayallowthe emergenceofnew institutionswithinthestateinorder toenhancethe regimeseconomicperformance.Theymay,forexample,allowthedevel- opmentofanindependentjudiciaryinthehopethatitwillcreateamore attractiveinvestmentenvironmentbyprotectingpropertyrightsanden- suring reliable enforcement of contracts. Second, the weakening of the institutionsthatprovidepublicservicescreatesanopportunityforprivate service organizations to emerge and grow. These may take the form of charitableorganizations,religiousgroups,orcommercialrms.Theyhelp tomeetthebasicneedsofsocietyineldssuchashousing,medicalcare, andeducation.Thus,ahybridregimemayemergethroughthecombina- tionofautocraticinstitutionsweakeningandalternativeinstitutionsex- pandingwithinthestateandcivilsociety. Erosion of the political ideas that legitimate the regime:Autocraticregimes oftenrelyonasetofideastojustifytheircentralizationofpowerandtheir denialofcivilandpoliticalrights.Forexample,theInstitutionalRevolu- tionary Party (PRI) in Mexico stressedthe goal of reordering society to achievethejusticeandequitypromisedbytheMexicanrevolution.Tanza- niaunderJuliusNyereretriedtoimplementAfricansocialism,whichwas based on Nyereres unique mix of socialist and tribal principles. Egypt underNassersoughttoadvanceArabnationalism,whichcombinedEgyp- tiannationalism,anti-colonialism,andaspirationsforregionalleadership. Politicalideassuchasthesemaynotbesufcientlyrigorousorsystematic towarrantthelabelideology.Nonetheless,theymatterforlegitimating anautocraticregimeandjustifyingitsmonopolyonpower.Theselegitimat- ingideasoftenerodeduetothedeathofthefoundingleader,pooreco- nomicperformance,excessiverepression,militarydefeats,andotherpracti- calfailuresofgovernance.Astheseideaserode,alternativeviewsofpolitical orderhavetheopportunitytodevelopandbuildsupportwithinthestate andsociety.Thegrowthofthesealternativeconceptionsoflawandgover- nanceisanotherimportantstepinthecreationofahybridregime. Thus,hybridregimesemergethroughacombinationofelitecalcula- tions, institutional change, and ideational competition. However, as scholarlyinterestinhybridregimesincreased,researchtendedtoconcen- trateonlyontheshort-termmaneuveringofautocraticelites. 87 Thelitera- 87 See,forexample,MaxwellA.Cameron,Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru: Polit- ical Coalitions and Social Change (NewYork:St.MartinsPress,1994);WilliamCase,Can the Halfway House Stand? Semidemocracy and Elite Theory in Three Southeast Asian 22 ChapterOne turefocusedparticularlyontheroleofelectionsinauthoritarianregimes. Works by Schedler, Magaloni, Geddes, Pripstein Posusney, Lust-Okar, Lucas,Brownlee,andothersexaminedthetacticsandpoliticaldynamics ofelectionsunderauthoritarianismwithcareandprecision. 88 However, thisliteratureleavesseveralimportantaspectsofhybridregimesunderex- ploredandunconceptualized.Whileprovidinginsightintotheshort-term calculationsthatsustaintheseregimes,itneglectsthelonger-terminstitu- tionalinteractionandideationalcompetitionthatproducethem,deter- minetheirstability,andshapetheirdevelopment.Theseinstitutionaland ideationalconsiderationsinclude:changesinthesizeandfunctionsofthe state;deteriorationofthestatescapacitytomonitorandcontrolsociety; erosionofthepoliticalideasthatlegitimatetheregime;andtheemergence ofcompetingideasandinstitutionsthatconstrainthestateandfurther weakenitslegitimacy.Theselonger-termprocessesaretheunderlyingex- planation for the emergence of a hybrid regime. Elections are merely a symptomoftheregimesweaknessandatacticformanagingit.Thisdoes notrenderthemunimportant.However,analysisofthistacticforregime survivaltellsusrelativelylittleabouttheunderlyinginstitutionalandide- ationaldynamicsthatdeterminetheregimescharacterandstability. Inasimilarvein,thefocusonelectionshastiltedtheliteraturetoward studyofelitecalculationsatagivenmomentintimewithinaxedsetof institutionalandideationalconstraints.Itdoesnotanalyzetheoriginsof Countries,Comparative Politics 28,no.4(1996):43764;MichaelMcFaul,TheFourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World,World Politics 54,no.2(2002):21244. 88 For examples from the literature on comparative authoritarianism, see Andreas Schedler, ed., Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition (Boulder, CO:LynneRienner,2006);AndreasSchedler,TheNestedGameofDemocratizationby Elections, International Political Science Review 23, no. 1 (2002): 103122; Andreas Schedler, The Menu of Manipulation, Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 3650; BeatrizMagaloni,Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006);BarbaraGeddes,WhyPartiesandElec- tionsinAuthoritarianRegimes?PaperpresentedattheannualmeetingoftheAmerican PoliticalScienceAssociation,Washington,DC,September2005;WilliamCase,Southeast AsiasHybridRegimes:WhenDoVotersChangeThem?Journal of East Asian Studies 5, no.2(2005):215238;ToddA.Eisenstadt,Courting Democracy in Mexico: Party Strategies and Electoral Institutions (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003).Forexamplesdeal- ingspecicallywiththeMiddleEast,see:MarshaPripsteinPosusney,MultipartyElections intheArabWorld:ElectionRulesandOppositionResponses,inAuthoritarianism in The Middle East: Regimes and Resistance, ed. Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michele Penner Angrist(Boulder,CO:LynneRienner,2005),91118;JasonBrownlee,TheDoubleEdge of Electoral Authoritarianism: A Comparison of Egypt and Iran. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, September 2001;BradfordDillman,ParliamentaryElectionsandtheProspectsforPoliticalPluralism inNorthAfrica, Government and Opposition 35,no.2(2000): 21136;CurtisR.Ryan andJillianSchwedler,ReturntoDemocratizationorNewHybridRegime?The2003Elec- HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 23 theinstitutionalandideationalcontextthatshapestheoptionsopento elites,affectstheirchoices,andinuenceshowthosechoicesunfold.The literaturealsoassumesthattheseinstitutionalandideationalconstraints areconstantwhen,inreality,theyareundergoingsteadychangeinmany hybridregimes. Inaddition,theconcentrationonelectionshassteeredanalysisintoan arenaofpoliticswheretheregimehasextensivecapabilitiestomanipulate theoutcome.Inmosthybridregimes,thegovernmentcontrolseverydi- mensionofhowelectionsunfold.Itdetermineswhomayregistertovote. Itdenesthenatureoftheelectoralcampaign,includingwhichcandidates mayparticipate,theamountofmoneytheymayspend,thesizeandfre- quency of their rallies, and their degree of access to the media. It also controlsthepollingprocessitself,includingwhomayhaveaccesstothe polls,whocountsthevotes,howtheresultsareannounced,andhowthe electoral outcome is translated into political power (number of seats in parliament,inmunicipalcouncils,etc.).Concentratingonlyonelections producestwobiasesinourunderstandingofhybridregimes.First,ityields anexaggeratedsenseoftheregimescapacitytocontrolthepolity.Itgives theimpressionthattheregimecanmanipulateeverycornerofpolitical lifeasthoroughlyasitcontrolstheelectoralprocess.Second,afocuson electionsneglectsthoseaspectsofpoliticalcompetitionthatarenotpart oftheelectoralprocess.Theseincludeinstitutionaldynamicsthatcancon- strainthepowerofanautocraticstate(suchastheemergenceofaninde- pendentjudiciary)andideationalcompetitionthatinvolvesactorswhoare either excluded from elections or whose participation is tightly con- strained(suchasIslamists). Thisemphasisonelectionsislargelytheproductofscholarsassuming thathybridregimesaretransitioningtowarddemocracy.Thisassumption leadsmanyscholarstobasetheirresearchuponthetheoreticalliteratureon democratization.Thisliteraturearguesthatdemocraciesemergethrougha two-stagesequence.Therststageisademocratictransition,whichisde- nedastheholdingoffreeandfairelections.Thesecondstageisapro- tractedprocessofdemocraticconsolidation.Thisentailsforminginstitu- tionsthatconstrainexecutivepower(suchasanautonomouslegislature), increasetransparency(suchasindependentmediaoutlets),andestablish theruleoflaw(suchasanindependentjudiciary).Consolidationalsoin- volvesthewidespreadadoptionofdemocraticpoliticalideassuchaspopu- larsovereignty,equalitybeforethelaw,andgovernmentalaccountability. 89 tionsinJordan,Middle East Policy 11,no.2(2004):13851;Lucas,Institutions and the Politics of Survival in Jordan;Lust-Okar,Structuring Conict in the Arab World. 89 Thissequenceisexplained withparticularclarityinJuanJ. LinzandAlfredStepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and 24 ChapterOne Scholarsofhybridregimeshaveimplicitlyacceptedthissequenceand focused tightly on elections, which are the rst step along the road to democratictransitionandconsolidation.However,hybridregimesarenot necessarily in transition. They occupy a stable middle ground between democracyandautocracy.Theycombine theinstitutionsofautocracyand democracy.Asaconsequence,institutionsthatscholarsofdemocratiza- tiondefertolaterintheiranalysissuchasindependentjudiciaries,strong civilsocietygroups,andindependentmediaoutletsassumeaprominent andearlyroleintheanalysisofhybridregimes.Similarly,politicalideas thataregenerallyassociatedwiththeconsolidationphaseofdemocratic developmentsuchasregimeaccountability,popularsovereignty,andre- spectforindividualrightsmayemergequiteearlyinahybridregimeand developsupportwithinpartsofthestateandcivilsociety. Thekeyfeatureofahybridregimeisthatthesedemocraticinstitutions andideasemergealongsidetheinstitutionsandideasofanautocraticre- gimeandco-existwithit.Furthermore,thisphenomenonisnotsimply theoutcomeofcarefulcalculationsbyautocraticeliteswhomanipulate thepoliticalarenatotheiradvantage.Itisalsotheresultofinstitutional and ideational competition. It is the product of an autocratic regimes decliningpoweramidtheemergenceofinstitutionalandideationalalter- natives.Theregimemaytoleratethisdevelopment,oftenbecauseitlacks thepowertostopitorthecostofstoppingitisunacceptable.But,this acquiescencedoesnotmeanthattheregimecontrolsitorsupportsit. Inordertomorefullyunderstandhybridregimes,weneedaframework thatpaysdueattentiontotheshort-termcalculationsofelites.However, itmustalsoplacethesecalculationswithinthebroadercontextofinstitu- tionaldevelopmentandideationalcompetition.Historicalinstitutional- ismoffersthebasisforsuchaframework. UNDERSTANDING THE EMERGENCE OF HYBRID REGIMES: A HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH Thedeningfeatureofahybridregimeisthedevelopmentofdemocratic institutions alongside well-entrenched authoritarian institutions. This phenomenon of a polity containing multipleand conictinginstitu- tionshasreceivedconsiderableattentionfromscholarsofhistoricalinsti- tutionalism, particularly Skowronek, Hall, Skocpol, Steinmo, Mahoney, Pierson,andThelen. PostCommunist Europe (Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1996),315.Alsosee LarryDiamond,Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: JohnsHopkins UniversityPress,1999),123. HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 25 Oneoftheleadingscholarsofthisapproach,PeterHall,denesinstitu- tionsastheformalorinformalprocedures,routines,normsandconven- tionsembeddedintheorganizationalstructureofthepolityorpolitical economy. 90 Thehistoricalinstitutionalistsregardthepolityasaninter- locking set of institutions that were created at different times, often to servedifferentpurposes. 91 Thismosaicofclashinginstitutionsisapersis- tentfeatureofthepoliticallandscapethatpushesdevelopmentalongpar- ticularpaths.Itcreatesastructuralcontextthatdenestherelativepower ofactorsandtherangeofoptionsavailabletothem. 92 Inthehistoricalinstitutionalistperspective,politicalchangeoccursasa result of critical junctures that weaken old institutions and strengthen others.Therearedifferenttypesofcriticaljunctures,whichproducedif- ferentopportunitiesforchange.Themajortypesincludethefollowing: Military defeat:Lossofawarcansmasharegimeslegitimacyandrob itoftheresourcesneededtogovern,therebysettingthestageforinstitu- tionalchange.ArgentinasdefeatintheFalklandswarisagoodexample. Succession crises: The legitimacy of newly established regimes is often built around the charismatic appeal of a single national leader, such as NasserinEgypt,KhomeiniinIran,orAttaturkinTurkey.Totheextent thattheseleadersconstructinstitutions,theyareusuallydesignedtorein- force and extend the personal power of the leader rather than create a rational-legalbasisforauthority.Thedeathofthecharismaticleaderoften 90 PeterA.HallandRosemaryC.R.Taylor,PoliticalScienceandtheThreeNewInstitu- tionalisms,Political Studies 44(1996):938.Practitionersofhistoricalinstitutionalismgen- erallyacceptthisdenition.Foraslightlydifferentperspectiveonhowtodeneinstitutions, seeThedaSkocpol,WhyIAmanHistoricalInstitutionalist,Polity 28,no.1(1995):105. 91 StephenSkowronek,OrderandChange,Polity 28,no.1(1995):95;KarenOrren andStephenSkowronek,InstitutionsandIntercurrence:TheoryBuildingintheFullness of Time, in Political Order, ed. Ian Shapiro and Russell Hardin (New York: New York UniversityPress,1996):11146;JamesMahoneyandDietrichRueschemeyer,Compara- tiveHistoricalAnalysis:AchievementsandAgendas,inComparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences,ed.JamesMahoneyandDietrichRueschemeyer(Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress,2003),340;PaulPiersonandThedaSkocpol,HistoricalInstitutionalism inContemporaryPoliticalScience,inPolitical Science: The State of the Discipline,ed.Ira KatznelsonandHelenV.Milner(NewYork:W.W.Norton,2002),693721.Historicalin- stitutionalists also use the metaphor of layering of institutions. This results from new institutions being established on top of existing institutions, rather than replacing them. Theproductisanincreasinglycomplexsetofinstitutionsresemblingalayeredcakethat oftenworkatcrosspurposeswitheachother. 92 Kathleen Thelen, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, Annual Re- view of Political Science 2(1999):369404;SvenSteinmoandKathleenThelen,Historical InstitutionalisminComparativePolitics,inStructuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis,ed.SvenSteinmoetal.(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1992), 132; Ira Katznelson, Structure and Conguration in Comparative Politics, in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, ed. Mark Irving Lichbach and AlanS.Zuckerman(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1997),81112. 26 ChapterOne leadstoaperiodofcrisis,aspotentialsuccessorscompeteforpowerand asinstitutionsseektosecuretheresourcesandauthorityneededtosustain theirinuence. Economic decline:Rampantinationandunemploymentcanundermine public condence in a political and economic order and produce social despairthatfuelscallsforchange.Itcanalsosapthestateoftheresources neededtosustainkeyinstitutions,patronagenetworks,andsocialservices. ThecollapseoftheWeimarRepublicandtheriseofGermanfascismoc- curredamidstthistypeofcriticaljuncture. Technological change:Theintroductionofnewtechnologiescanweaken the stateand strengthen oppositiongroups, thereby facilitatingthe de- clineofapoliticalorderandstimulatingtheemergenceofnewinstitu- tions.Forexample,improvementsincommunicationstechnologyinIran inthe1970sgreatlyaidedthedispersionofradicalIslamicdoctrinethat undermined the legitimacy of the shahs regime and contributed to its overthrowin1979.Morerecently,thewidespreaddispersionofsatellite television in the Middle East since the early 1990s weakens the states monopoly on the dissemination of information and exposes citizens to alternativeconceptionsofpoliticsandsociety.Thisdevelopmenterodes statepowerandlegitimacyandcreatesopportunitiesforchange. 93 Thedirectionofchangeatoneofthesecriticaljuncturesisshapedby twofactors: 1. The relative strength of major institutions, which is the result of institutionalhistoriesandtheeffectsofthecriticaljuncture.Thestrength of an institution is a function of its degree of adaptability, complexity, autonomy,andcoherence. 94 2.Theconceptionofpoliticsembedded 95 ineachoftheclashinginstitu- tions. 96 Therangeofpoliticalideasonofferataspeciccriticaljuncture denesthemenuofchoicesavailabletopoliticalactors.Theamountof inuenceexertedbyanideaisshapedbythestrengthoftheinstitutionin whichitisembedded. 93 Lynch,Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today. 94 ThisapproachtoassessingthestrengthofaninstitutionistakenfromSamuelP.Hun- tington,Political Order in Changing Societies (NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,1968), 1223. 95 Byembedded,Imeanintegratedintothenorms andpoliciesoftheinstitutionas reectedinitspublications,trainingprograms,andspeechesbyleadingofcials.Forauseful discussionofhowideasbecomeembeddedinaninstitution,seeKathrynSikkink,Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,1991),2627. 96 HallandSikkinkexploretheroleofideasinparticulardetail.See:PeterHall,The MovementfromKeynesianismtoMonetarism:InstitutionalAnalysisandBritishEconomic Policy in the 1970s, in Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 27 Thus,inordertounderstandthedirectionofchange,weneedtoana- lyzechangesinthestrengthofmajorinstitutionsandtheideasofpolitical orderembodiedintheseinstitutions. 97 Itshouldbestressedthatthisap- proach emphasizes the importance of both ideas and institutions. Ideas exertasustainedimpactonpoliticsonlywhentheyareembeddedinan institution that provides nancial resources, personnel, and an effective organizationalstructure. Thishistoricalinstitutionalistperspectivesuggeststhatanauthoritarian regimecandevelopintoahybridregimethroughthefollowingscenario: Criticaljunctures(suchasaneconomiccrisisoramilitarydefeat)weakenkey institutions of state power. The institutions affected may include political institutions(suchasthepresidency),securityinstitutions(suchasthearmed forces),oreconomicinstitutions(suchaspublic-sectorcompaniesorthesub- sidysystem). Regime elites try to preserve their power under these new conditions by adopting political, legal, and economic reforms. For example, they may strengthenthejudiciaryandtheruleoflawinthehopethatthisstepwill improvetheefciencyofthestateandattractessentialforeigninvestment. Or,theymayadoptlawsthatexpandcivilandpoliticalrightsinthehopethat these measures will enhance the regimes popularity. These reforms create opportunitiesforcompetingconceptionsofthepolitytoemergeandgrow. Institutions that espouse alternative conceptions of the polity (such as the judiciaryorIslamistgroups)exploittheseopportunities.Theymaybejoined by other actorssuch as lawyers, human rights activists, intellectuals, and businessmenwhosupportpoliticalchangeduetotheirnormativebeliefsor theirself-interest(orboth).Thisinteractionbetweenreformistinstitutions andkey actorsin civilsociety broadensand deepenstheconstituencies for politicalchange.Italsodenestheagendaforreformanddetermineswhich institutionscommandthegreatestinuenceasthereformprocessunfolds. Thegovernmentpermitsthisprocesstoproceedeitherbecauseitisunable tostopit,orbecausethereformsitproducesprovidebenetstotheregime. Thesebenetsmightincludeeconomicgrowthstemmingfromastrengthen- ingoftheruleoflaw,orenhancedregimelegitimacyproducedbyimprove- mentsincivilandpoliticalrights. Analysis,ed.SvenSteinmoetal.(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1992),90113; Sikkink,Ideas and Institutions. 97 For further discussion of the sources of institutional change, see Kathleen Thelen, TimeandTemporalityintheAnalysisofInstitutionalEvolutionandChange,Studies in American Political Development 14 (2000): 1029; Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve:InsightsfromComparativeHistoricalAnalysis,inComparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. JamesMahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge: Cam- bridgeUniversityPress,2003),20840;KathleenThelen,How Institutions Evolve: The Polit- 28 ChapterOne The resulting hybrid regime not only tolerates multiple conceptionsof the polity.Itsoperationisgroundedintheregularinteractionofthesecompeting ideasandtheinstitutionsthatembodythem.Inthisenvironment,political entrepreneurscanpursueseveralstrategies:theymaylookforopportunities tobroadentheirsupportbycooperatingwithmajorinstitutionsandco-opt- ingtheirideas;theymayregardexistinginstitutionsandideasasthreatsto theirpowerandseektoisolateandweakenthem;or,theymaytrytocreate entirelynewinstitutionsthatbreaknewconceptualgroundandmobilizenew groupsintothepoliticalprocess.Themixofcooperation,conict,andinnova- tiondeterminesboththestabilityofthehybridregimeandthetrajectoryof changefromit.Inordertounderstandthedevelopmentofthisregime,we musttracethechangesintherelativestrengthofmajorinstitutions,theideas thattheseinstitutionsembody,andthebehaviorofpoliticalentrepreneurs. Thisisananalyticalapproachthatnotonlyexamineskeyactorsandthe tacticsthattheyemploytomaximizetheirinterests.Italsoconsidersthe institutionalsettingthatconstrainstheseactorsandtheideasthatthese institutionsespouse.Itexplicitlyanalyzestheinstitutionalandideational contextthatshapestheinterests,options,anddecisionsofthemajoractors withinthepolity. Thisperspectivesuggeststhefollowingstrategyforstudyingtheemer- genceofahybridregime: 1.Delineatethemajorconceptionsofpoliticalorderthatcompetefor preeminenceinthepolity.Theseconstitutedistinctschoolsofconstitu- tionalismthatofferalternativevisionsofthecountryspoliticalfuture. 98 Inordertounderstandthesedistinctconceptionsofpolitics,theanalysis willfocusoneachschoolsideasintwoareas: Itsapproachtogovernance,whichincludesitsviewsregardingconstraints onstatepower,governmentalaccountability,protectionofcivilandpolitical rights,andpublicparticipationinpoliticallife. Itsconceptionoflaw,whichconsistsofitsideasregardingthreeissues:the institutionsthatareempoweredtodraft,interpret,andimplementlaw;the sourceoflawslegitimacy(whetheritlieswiththepeople,thestate,orGod); andthepurposeoflaw.Thislastpointasks:islawintendedprimarilytopro- tectcitizens fromthestateand regulatetheirinteractionwith eachother? ical Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan (NewYork:Cam- bridgeUniversityPress,2004). 98 This project utilizes the denition of constitutionalism put forward by Stephen Holmes.Hedenesconstitutionalismasamethodoforganizinggovernmentthatdepends onandadherestoasetoffundamentalguidingprinciplesandlaws.StephenHolmes,Con- stitutionalism,inThe Encyclopedia of Democracy,ed.SeymourMartinLipset(Washington, DC:CongressionalQuarterly,1995),299. HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 29 Or,isitprimarilyaninstrumentofstatepowerthataidstheimplementation of policy?Or, is it areection of divine willthat aims to createa divinely guidedcommunityonearth? 2.Identifytheinstitutionsthatespousethesecompetingconceptions ofconstitutionalismandanalyzetheirdevelopment. 3.Studythecriticaljuncturesthatweakentheautocraticinstitutionsof thestate.Theseincludemilitarydefeats,successioncrises,economiccri- ses,andmomentsofdisruptivetechnologicalchange. 4. Examine the regimes efforts to adapt to these critical junctures throughpolitical,legal,andeconomicreforms. 5.Assesshowthesereformsstrengtheninstitutionsthatcompetewith theregimeandcreateopportunitiesforalternativeconceptionsofconsti- tutionalismtobroadentheirsupportwithinthestateandsociety. 6.Examinehowthesecompetingconceptionsofconstitutionalismpro- duceadistinctivetrajectoryofpoliticalchange.Thisentailsstudyingtheir points of convergence and difference regarding the character of gover- nanceandthesourceandpurposeoflaw.Interactioninthesetwoarenas determinesthenatureofthehybridregime,itsstability,andthetypeof regimeitwilltransitiontoward. THE PATH AHEAD The following volume applies this analytical framework to Egypt. This countryisaparticularlyinsightfulandimportantcaseforunderstanding theprospectsfordemocracyintheMiddleEast.Allthreeconceptionsof politicalorderthatcompeteforpreeminenceintheArabworldliberal, Islamic,andstatisthavedeephistoricalandinstitutionalrootsinEgypt. Furthermore,thecompetitionamongthemhasbeenrelativelyopen.It canbeexaminedthroughstudyofsourcesthatareeasilyaccessibleand throughinterviewswithrelevantactors.Thus,theEgyptiancaseprovides anopportunitytoanalyzethecompetitionamongideasandinstitutions thatshapestheentireregion.Furthermore,Egyptisthekeytopromoting democracyintheMiddleEast.IthastheArabworldslargestpopulation (81millionin2008),largestmilitary,andsecondlargesteconomy.Itis theculturalleaderoftheregionandanimportantsourceofSunnireligious thought and tradition. The country also serves as a model for political developmentinotherArabstates.Itspoliticalandlegalinstitutionshave beenemulatedtovaryingdegreesinKuwait,theUnitedArabEmirates, Jordan,Iraq,andSyria.AllofthesefactorsgiveEgyptuniquestatureand inuence.Itsexperiencewithliberalism,Islam,anddemocracywillexert 30 ChapterOne aprofounddemonstrationeffectonitsneighbors.Itwillshapethetiming, character,andsuccessofdemocratizationthroughouttheArabworld. TheanalysisofEgyptbeginsinchapter2,whichstudiestheemergence of liberal constitutionalism. It examines the historical foundations of Egyptianliberalisminthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies, and observes that this conception of governance became tightly inte- grated into the development of the legal profession. As a consequence, lawyersandjudgesbecamethemostdedicatedadvocatesofliberalreform. TheBarAssociationplayedaleadingroleinpromotingtheliberalcause formostofthetwentiethcentury.However,changesinitsmembership andsteadyregimerepressioneventuallyfragmentedtheBarandunder- mined itseffectiveness. Thejudiciary, in contrast,has retained astrong senseofliberalidentityandhasdevelopedarobustconceptionofliberal constitutionalism.Inordertounderstandthisapproachtolawandpoli- tics, the chapter studies the decisions of Egypts major courts (the Su- premeConstitutionalCourt,theadministrativecourts,andtheCourtof Cassation). It uses this body of jurisprudence to analyze the judiciarys views with regard to four core elements of constitutionalism: the rule oflaw,constraintsonstatepower,protectionofbasicrights,andpublic participationingovernance. Chapter 3 examines the development of Islamic constitutionalism, whichisbasedintheMuslimBrotherhood.Thechapterbeginsbystudy- ing the re-emergence of the Brotherhood since 1970 and the political pressures that have pushed it toward a moderate conception of Islamic governance.Itthenanalyzesthewritingsoffourcontemporarythinkers whoplay acriticalrole indening theBrotherhoodsview ofconstitu- tionalorder:Yusufal-Qaradawi,MuhammadSalimal-Awwa,KamalAbu al-Majd, and Tariq al-Bishri. The analysis focuses on their positions re- gardingthesamefouraspectsofconstitutionalismdiscussedintheprevi- ouschapter:theruleoflaw;constraintsonstatepower;protectionofcivil andpoliticalrights;andpublicparticipationinpolitics. Chapter4beginswithaconcisesummaryofthestatistconceptionof political order that underlies Egypts current autocratic regime. It then documents the economic contradictions that brought this order to the point of crisis in the early 1990s. In response to this crisis, the regime adoptedreformsthatenabledliberalconstitutionalismandIslamicconsti- tutionalismtobroadentheirinuenceandsupport.Theanalysisexamines the growth of these two alternative views of constitutionalism through theactionsoftheirmostdeterminedadvocates:thedefactoprofessional associationforjudges(theJudgesClubNadi al-Quda) andtheMuslim Brotherhood.TheanalysisndsthatpoliticalcompetitionunderEgypts repressive regime has pushed advocates of liberal constitutionalism and Islamicconstitutionalismtowardcommonground.Theirpoliticalagendas HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 31 convergeinseveralareas,particularlywithregardtokeyelementsofliber- alismsuchasconstraintsonstatepower,strengtheningtheruleoflaw,and protectionofcivilandpoliticalrights. Chapter 5 observes that the implementation of market-oriented eco- nomicpoliciessince1991hasstrengthenedthepoliticalinuenceofthe businesscommunity.Egyptsmostpowerfulbusinessmenhaveusedthis opportunity to articulate a distinctive conception of market liberalism throughthepublicationsofaprominentthinktank,theEgyptianCenter forEconomicStudies.Thechapterdocumentsandanalyzesthisviewof thestate,law,andtheeconomy.Italsonotesthatthisapproachtomarket liberalismhasbeenadoptedbytherulingNationalDemocraticPartyand implementedbythereformistprimeministerwhoassumedpowerin2004 (AhmadNazif). Chapter6observesthatthepathofinstitutionalchangeadvocatedby thesemarketliberalssharesimportantareasofagreementwiththereforms advocatedbysupportersofliberalconstitutionalismandIslamicconstitu- tionalism.Eachofthesegroupsfavorsthecreationofamoreliberalstate witheffectiveconstraintsonitspower,aclearandunbiasedlegalcode, andprotectionofcivilandpoliticalrights.However,thereisnocompara- bledegreeofconsensusonthevalueofbroadeningpublicparticipation inpolitics.Thisfactsuggeststhatliberalismanddemocracyhavebecome de-linkedintheEgyptiancase.Liberalismislikelytoprogresssteadilyin thefuture,whiledemocracyislikelytoadvanceslowlyandunevenly.This trajectorymayeventuallyleadtodemocracyatsomepointinthefuture, particularlyifliberalismenhancestheprivatesectorsindependencefrom the state and leads to a more autonomous and politically active middle class.However,thisoutcomeisnotinevitable.Recentamendmentstothe Constitutionin2007wereparticularlydisappointingtodemocrats.They suggestthatEgyptislikelytoremainahybridregimethatcontainssome legal and institutional constraints on executive power, but which falls shortofWesternnormsofdemocracy.