Transcendental Realism

Transcendental Realism (henceforth 'TR') is among the most basic tenets of the Critical Realist (CR) project, and
one that sets it clearly apart from most present-day approaches to philosophy of the natural and social sciences. It
can best be eplained by unpac!ing both terms, seeing ho" they fit together, and contrasting this specific usage of
the phrase "ith other (on the face of it) similar proposals from theorists of #arious persuasion. I should emphasise
that Critical Realism is itself a fairly broad church encompassing some li#ely differences of #ie" $ on this as on
other topics $ and therefore that my aim in "hat follo"s is not so much to present a recei#ed (orthodo) account as
to pic! out the main points in common "ith primary reference to their formulation in the "or! of Roy %has!ar. &ll
the same the TR thesis is so central to any #ersion of the Critical Realist case in "hate#er domain or field of
application that one can reasonably claim to set it out in representati#e and clear-cut terms.
'Realism' is easier to define at first approimation. %riefly put, it is the thesis that there eists a real-"orld
physical domain of objects, e#ents, structures, causal po"ers, and so forth "hich decide the truth-#alue of our
#arious statements or theories concerning them and "hich cannot be treated as in any sense dependent on our
current-best or e#en future-best attainable state of !no"ledge. It thus comes out #ery strongly against an epistemic
(!no"ledge-relati#ised) conception of truth and #ery strongly in fa#our of an alethic (truth-based and objecti#ist)
account of !no"ledge. This thesis may be 'ualified to some etent, e.g., as regards certain artefacts (li!e
transuranic elements, synthetic ()& proteins, or subatomic particles produced in cyclotrons) "hose eistence is
indeed a result of applied techno-scientific !no"-ho". *o"e#er $ so the TR argument runs $ their production is
subject to #arious physical constraints (such as those of subatomic charge, chemical #alence, or molecular bonding)
"hich define the range of possible realia and hence determine the scope and limits of effecti#e human inter#ention.
+hat is crucial here is the comple dialectical relationship bet"een, on the one hand, those ,transfactually
efficacious- la"s of nature that depend not at all on our #arious !inds of controlled obser#ation, eperimental set-
up, manipulati#e techni'ue, etc., and, on the other, those non-naturally-occurring (but e'ually la"-go#erned)
phenomena that sho" up under just such specialised, e.g., laboratory conditions. +e can ma!e full allo"ance for
the role of human agency in bringing such phenomena about $ or in creating the appropriate (physically enabling)
en#ironment $ "hile none the less maintaining a realist position "ith regard to the scientific object-domain along
"ith its intrinsic structural features, dispositional properties, causal po"ers, and so forth.
Thus one chief sense of the term ,transcendental- in Critical Realist parlance is the sense. ,pertaining to
an order of objecti#e reality and a range of li!e"ise objecti#e truth-#alues that may al"ays in principle transcend or
surpass the limits of human !no"ledge-. To this etent TR comes out firmly opposed to any positi#ist, empiricist,
instrumentalist, or other such epistemic approach that "ould reject the idea of #erification-transcendent truths,
e#en if $ as in some recent #ersions of the case $ "hat counts as ,#erifiable- is defined in terms of idealised rational
acceptability or optimal epistemic "arrant ,"hen all the e#idence is in-. *o"e#er there is a second, more
,technical- sense "hich goes bac! to /ant-s distincti#e usage of the term in his Critique of Pure Reason (0120) and
"hich has to do "ith the conditions of possibility for !no"ledge and eperience in general. That is to say, it
in#ol#es a transcendental deduction "hich accounts for our capacity to ac'uire such !no"ledge or to ha#e such
eperience in terms of certain strictly a priori concepts and intuitions (e.g., those of time, space and causality) that
alone ma!e it possible for the mind to impose an intelligible order on the other"ise inchoate flu of sensory
impressions. This "as /ant-s ans"er to *umean scepticism, or the philosophic ,scandal- (as he sa" it) of a radical
empiricist outloo! that despaired of achie#ing any ade'uate solution to the problem of !no"ledge. Rather "e
should see that *ume-s 'uandary need not $ could not $ arise if philosophy turned its attention to those constituti#e
po"ers or faculties of mind "hich enabled us to bring phenomenal (sensuous) intuitions under concepts of
understanding. +here pre#ious thin!ers had gone so disastrously "rong $ empiricists and rationalists ali!e $ "as
in failing to obser#e this cardinal re'uirement, and hence falling foul of /ant-s cautionary dictum that ,intuitions
"ithout concepts are blind- "hile ,concepts "ithout intuitions are empty-.
3uch "as the ,Copernican re#olution- that /ant claimed to ha#e brought about in epistemology and
philosophy of mind. 4n his account it mar!ed the epochal s"itch from a mista!en, dead-end, scepticism-inducing
concern "ith "hat reality is li!e 'uite apart from our !no"ledge of it to a scepticism-allaying concern "ith ho"
reality must appear to us, gi#en the #arious a priori forms and modalities of human !no"ledge. Thus, for /ant, the
purpose of transcendental reasoning is to deduce just that range of necessary presuppositions "ith regard to the
structure of phenomenal eperience that pro#ide a common frame"or! for our understanding of objects and e#ents
in the physical domain and for our self-understanding as conscious, reflecti#e beings "hose identity consists in our
sense of a continuous spatio-temporal eistence. This latter is "hat /ant refers to as the ,transcendental unity of
apperception-, i.e., the synthesising po"er of mind "hich $ ho"e#er elusi#e its nature $ must be ta!en as the basic
precondition for any such a"areness. 5oreo#er it ensures that our phenomenal intuitions of space, time and
causality cannot but correspond to the "ay things stand in reality since reality just is $ so far as "e can possibly
!no" $ the "ay it appears to us through those gi#en forms of jointly intuiti#e and conceptual grasp. 3o !no"ledge
must confine itself strictly to the limits of phenomenal eperience if it is to ha#e any hope of defeating the *umean
sceptic, or of closing the other"ise unbridgeable gulf bet"een an order of objecti#e or mind-independent (hence
un!no"able) reality and "hate#er lies "ithin our epistemic grasp.
To be sure, reason $ as distinct from understanding $ finds itself impelled to transgress those limits and to
posit the eistence of a noumenal domain (that of ,things-in-themsel#es-) beyond our phenomenal grasp. 3uch is,
once again, the transcendentally deduced condition of possibility for any notion "e can frame $ or any scientific
theory "e propose $ "ith regard to the ,eternal "orld-. *o"e#er it can ser#e only as a /antian ,regulati#e idea-,
that is, a source of guidance or orientation for our #arious cogniti#e endea#ours, rather than playing a constituti#e
role in the ac'uisition of !no"ledge. *ence the title Critique of Pure Reason, epitomising /ant-s point that "here
reason o#ersteps its appointed bounds $ "here it presumes to gi#e !no"ledge of that "hich can only be thought $
then it runs into all manner of dead-end antinomies or contradictions. That is to say, "e can think of !no"ledge as
aimed to"ard an ideal (limit-point) conception of truth at the end of en'uiry but can ne#er actually achieve such
!no"ledge since by #ery definition it "ould bring us out on the far side of human attainability. *ence also /ant-s
claim to ha#e resol#ed the *umean problem of !no"ledge by managing to reconcile a full-scale doctrine of
,transcendental idealism- "ith a some"hat less de#eloped but still (as he argued) indispensable outloo! of
,empirical realism-. In support of the former /ant enlists pretty much the entire conceptual apparatus of the 6irst
Critique. &s concerns the latter his arguments are philosophically uncon#incing and do little to support the alethic
realist-s claim that there eists both a mind-independent (objecti#e) reality and also $ in conse'uence of that $ a
great range of to us un!no"n (perhaps un!no"able) truths.
Indeed one can trace all the #eing dilemmas of present-day epistemology to the radical clea#age thus
opened up bet"een /ant-s ,transcendental idealism- and ,empirical realism-, along "ith his li!e"ise problematical
attempt to eplain ho" the manifold of sensuous intuitions can be someho" ,brought under- concepts of
understanding. Transcendental Realism brea!s the hold of those dilemmas by adopting the alternati#e that /ant
ruled out since he considered it another manifestation of the tendency of reason to o#erstep its proper (i.e.,
regulati#e) limits and lay do"n the !no"ledge-constituti#e terms and conditions of cogniti#e en'uiry. That is to
say, it criti'ues /ant-s criti'ue by maintaining (along "ith the alethic realist) that truth might al"ays $ no" as
heretofore $ transcend or surpass our utmost epistemic po"ers "hile none the less holding this itself to be a matter
of !no"ledge borne out by the history of science to date and by our grasp of the comple dialectical process
through "hich science progressi#ely con#erges on truth under #arious determinate (e.g., material, techno-
scientific, and socio-economic) conditions. This ma!es it ,transcendental- in the /antian sense of deri#ing from
thought about the #ery possibility of scientific !no"ledge and progress in general but also in the non-/antian
realist sense of allo"ing us to !no" $ not merely ,thin!- $ ho" such claims can be "arranted or justified.
4ne source of its eplanatory superiority in this regard is the fact that Critical Realism allo"s for an
ade'uately comple or ,stratified- account of the relationship bet"een subject and object, !no"er and !no"n, or
cogniti#e agency (in a strong sense of that term) and the #arious physical domains "herein that agency is
eercised. Thus it ma!es a chief point of a#oiding the !inds of dead-end dualist thin!ing that ha#e ta!en such a
firm and disabling hold on the discourse of epistemology from (escartes, through /ant, to logical empiricism. This
is "here Critical Realism mar!s a decisi#e ad#ance beyond theories $ "hether in the natural or the social and
human sciences $ "hich endorse some #ersion of the standard dichotomy bet"een causal eplanations on the one
hand and, on the other, approaches that emphasise the rational or normati#e character of scientific thought. That is
to say, it ma!es due allo"ance for the constant, many-le#elled interaction bet"een physical processes, la"s of
nature, and the #arious "ays in "hich these become manifest through eperiment, obser#ation, and theory. +here
most philosophy of science goes "rong is by ignoring this strictly dialectical relationship bet"een !no"ledge and
the object of !no"ledge and hence running into a familiar range of dead-end epistemological 'uandaries. &mong
them is the positi#ist fetishisation of ,facts-, ,sense-data-, ,obser#ation-statements-, and so forth, as if these latter
could be someho" disjoined from the !inds of theoretically-informed obser#ation or eperimental set-up "hich
allo" them to emerge under certain specifiable conditions. Thus scepticism is merely the flipside or reacti#e
counterpart of a positi#ist dogmatism that allo"s no commerce $ no room for this producti#e t"o-"ay echange $
bet"een ,contet of disco#ery- and ,contet of justification-. In "hich case logical positi#ism7empiricism can best
be seen as the latter-day #ersion of an argument "hich goes right bac! to *ume-s drastic disjunction bet"een
,matters of fact- and ,truths of reason-, and "hich is sure to insert its sceptical "edge "hene#er philosophy falls
into this "ay of thin!ing.
4f course such arguments ha#e long been raised against the logical empiricist programme, not least by
those $ li!e +. 8. 9uine $ "ho s"ing right across to the opposite etreme of a radically holistic theory premised on
the t"in doctrines of the ,theory-laden- character of obser#ation-statements and the ,underdetermination- of
scientific theories by the best a#ailable e#idence. They also play a crucial part in Thomas /uhn-s paradigm-
relati#ist argument that (in some rather ill-defined sense of the phrase) ,the "orld changes- for thin!ers li#ing
before and after a major re#olution in the currency of scientific thought. *o"e#er such responses merely eacerbate
the problem by relati#ising the ,truth- of any gi#en statement at any gi#en time to the entire body of presently
accepted beliefs, concei#ed as etending all the "ay $ as 9uine describes it $ from those at the logico-theoretical
core to those at the empirical or obser#ational periphery. In "hich case no belief is ,immune from re#ision- since
e#en certain aioms of classical deducti#e logic $ li!e bi#alence or ecluded middle $ might ultimately ha#e to be
abandoned under pressure from conflicting empirical e#idence, e.g., 'uantum phenomena such as superposition or
"a#e7particle dualism. 6rom a TR standpoint these post-logical-empiricist de#elopments should be seen as so many
symptoms of the deepening crisis in mainstream analytic philosophy of science rather than as pointing a hopeful
"ay for"ard from the #arious problems be'ueathed by /ant. Thus they purport to o#ercome the dilemmas of
logical empiricism but only at the cost of embracing a 9uinean doctrine of "holesale ,ontological relati#ism-
"hich finds no room for normati#e criteria of truth, rationality, and progress.
*ence the alternati#e CR proposal. that "e reject the #arious failed solutions to the problem of !no"ledge
deri#ing from /ant-s li!e"ise failed attempt to s'uare his cardinal theory of transcendental idealism "ith a figleaf
#ersion of empirical realism. Rather "e should ta!e the route "hich /ant "as at such pains to close off, i.e., that of
Transcendental Realism or the thesis that truth might al"ays eceed the limits of present-best (or e#en future-best
attainable) !no"ledge "hile none the less pro#iding the standard or criterion by "hich all truth-claims must
ultimately be assessed. +hat ma!es this possible $ so the CR argument runs $ is the process of constant dialectical
echange bet"een theory, obser#ation, and eperimental practice "hich lea#es no room for such merely notional
(and scepticism-inducing) dualisms as afflicted the discourse of logical empiricism and "hich opened the "ay to
their o"n come-uppance at the hands of 9uinean ,ontological relati#ity- and /uhnian paradigm-relati#ism. These
latter doctrines can be seen to result from a sceptical o#er-reaction to the fact that scientific theories al"ays operate
at a certain remo#e from the #arious complicating factors (e.g., of interference by eternal forces or disturbing
influences of #arious !inds) "hich can ne#er be ta!en fully into account by any theoretical science. 3uch
idealisations $ li!e that of the frictionless solid plane or the in#iscid and irrotational medium of fluid mechanics $
are the price one pays (necessarily so) "hen ad#ancing hypotheses beyond the limits of empirical #erification. 6or
the sceptic about scientific realism or ,la"s of nature- they sho" that this price is most definitely not "orth paying
since e#ery increase in theoretical or causal-eplanatory po"er goes along "ith an in#erse reduction in the "ay of
detailed descripti#e or phenomenological yield. That is, there is regular la" of diminishing returns "hereby any
putati#e ad#ance in the scope and generality of scientific theories must entail a corresponding loss of empirical
precision or accountability. In "hich case $ so it seems $ "e are better off adopting a sensibly scaled-do"n (e.g.,
,constructi#e empiricist-) approach that renounces any claim "ith regard to the eistence of real-"orld objects,
properties, or causal po"ers and in stead ma!es terms "ith the limits thus imposed on our capacity for forming
"ell-grounded scientific conjectures beyond the strict limits of empirical "arrant. 4r again, more drastically, this
argument leads to an anti-realist position "hereby there is simply no concei#ing of objecti#e (#erification-
transcendent) truths that "ould someho" surpass the scope of humanly achie#able !no"ledge, proof, or
ascertainment.
4n this #ie" TR entails the do"nright contradictory pair of propositions (0) that e#ery "ell-formed (truth-
apt) statement has its truth-#alue fied 'uite apart from our best !no"ledge concerning it, and (:) that #eridical
!no"ledge is yet "ithin our cogniti#e grasp $ perhaps at the ideal limit $ through #arious "ell-tried methods of
en'uiry. *ence $ to repeat $ the pyrrhic conclusion embraced by some sceptics and anti-realists, namely that "e
can either ha#e (some notion of) objecti#e truth or the idea of ,truth- as epistemically constrained and therefore ex
hypothesi !no"able, albeit at the cost of ruling out any alethic (i.e., objecti#ist) conception. Transcendental
Realism rejects this as a false dilemma and one that has ta!en hold only in conse'uence of the "idespread
epistemic fallacy according to "hich it is strictly inconcei#able $ a species of logical nonsense $ that truth should
someho" transcend or elude the compass of optimised human !no"ledge. 3uch arguments sometimes go a long
"ay to"ard granting the force of opposed realist intuitions, e.g., in Crispin +right-s elaborately nuanced proposals
for ,superassertibility- and ,cogniti#e command- as criteria that approimate objecti#ist truth "hile !eeping it
"ithin certain specified epistemic bounds and thus stopping short of ma!ing that crucial concession. Indeed the
chief effort of recent "or! in this ,moderate- anti-realist #ein has been to offer formulations of "hat properly counts
as truth in some particular area of discourse "hich a#oid the (supposed) sceptical nemesis of alethic realism and
yet ma!e room for some middle-ground approach on terms that the realist might be brought to accept. *o"e#er $
from a CR #ie"point - this amounts to yet another (more elaborately 'ualified or nuanced) #ersion of the epistemic
fallacy. That is, it stops crucially short of ac!no"ledging (0) the eistence of a real-"orld (mind- and theory-
independent) physical domain along "ith its sundry objects, structures, la"s of nature, causal po"ers, etc., and (:)
the #arious !inds and le#els of human interaction "ith that physical domain "hereby its affordances sho" up under
gi#en (e.g., obser#ational or eperimental) conditions.
Thus there is no problem for Critical Realism in maintaining both an objecti#ist (alethic or non-epistemic)
conception of reality and an account of scientific practice that ma!es full allo"ance for the role of human agency
in re#ealing certain processes, la"s, and causal properties "hose manifestation (though not their reality) depends
on our procedures for finding them out. This eemplifies the close dialectical relationship bet"een TR as a matter
of straightfor"ard ontological commitment and the CR ,stratified- conception of reality as that "hich affords
!no"ledge of the "orld through #arious in#estigati#e methods and techni'ues. In so far as these claims appear
incompatible or do"nright contradictory it can only be on account of that deep-laid dualist mindset that has
characterised so many episodes of epistemological debate from /ant to logical empiricism. 6rom this point of #ie"
CR loo!s li!e a hopeless attempt to s'uare the circle, that is, to eplain ho" "e can and do ac'uire !no"ledge of
objecti#e, hence mind-independent, hence strictly un!no"able realia. 6rom a CR standpoint, on the other hand,
such objections merely go to sho" that philosophy has been on the "rong trac! $ and subject to periodic outbrea!s
of scepticism and anti-realism $ since /ant introduced his fateful split bet"een the realms of phenomenal (sensory-
cogniti#e) appearance and noumenal (!no"ledge-transcendent) reality. If "e can only brea! the hold of this
dichotomy $ one that has defined the ,problem of !no"ledge- for philosophers of many, often sharply di#ergent
#ie"s $ then "e shall see that TR in#ol#es not so much a s'uaring of the circle as an adoption of just that approach
"hose ruling-out by /ant has been the cause of so many subse'uent epistemological "oes.
This also in#ol#es dra"ing certain modal distinctions, as bet"een the orders of contingent (,might-ha#e-
been-other"ise-) fact, la"s of nature "hich apply (necessarily so) to our o"n "orld and all others that physically
resemble it, and ,trans"orld necessary- truths $ such as those of logic and mathematics $ "hich cannot be
concei#ed as failing to apply in any possible "orld "hatsoe#er. 3uch arguments ha#e been de#eloped chiefly by
modal logicians concerned to eplicate the logic of necessity and possibility. They ha#e also been deployed by
philosophers of science in order to pro#ide an account of causal eplanation in counterfactual-dependent terms,
that is to say, in terms of "hat "ould (or "ould not) ha#e occurred at some other, physically ,nearby- "orld in the
presence (or absence) of certain antecedent and eplanatorily rele#ant conditions. Critical Realism gi#es added
substance to these often rather recondite and speculati#e claims through its stratified conception of reality and its
firm grasp of the #arious ontological distinctions in#ol#ed. It also does much to clarify the issue bet"een a hard-
line modal realist such as (a#id ;e"is "ho ta!es all those possible "orlds to co-eist, i.e., to stand ontologically
on a par "ith our o"n and ,actualists- "ho hold that modal tal! is a useful heuristic de#ice but "ho refuse to
endorse any such (in their #ie") "ildly etra#agant doctrine. 6or ;e"is, ,actual- is a to!en-reflei#e (or deictic)
term that functions $ in a similar "ay to "ords li!e ,I-, ,here-, ,no"-, ,tomorro"-, and so forth $ al"ays "ith
reference to some indi#idual spea!er in some specific time, place, or contet of utterance. Thus to call ours the
,actual- "orld is no more than to locate oneself in relation to just that range of spatio-temporal co-ordinates, causal
regularities, and la"s of nature that happen to obtain in just those "orlds that are physically compossible "ith ours.
+hat it cannot rule out $ unless at the cost of etreme ontological parochialism $ is the real (though for us non-
actual) eistence of all those other possible "orlds "hich differ from our o"n in certain specifiable respects. 3o
"hen critics of ;e"is charge him "ith indulging a grossly inflated ontology $ "hen they protest that his distinction
bet"een ,actual- and ,real- gi#es rise to some absurd conse'uences $ he can turn the charge around and as! by "hat
right they deploy modes of counterfactual reasoning if not "ith reference to something more than a realm of
merely abstract, i.e., unrealised possibility. &fter all $ ;e"is argues $ such reasonings must lac! any genuine
eplanatory force unless they are ta!en to 'uantify o#er #arious possible (for us non-actual but objecti#ely real)
"orlds "herein certain physical constants and la"s of nature are subject to a process of controlled #ariation.
4ther"ise philosophers are getting their arguments on the cheap, that is, eploiting modal-counterfactual tal! in a
"ay that $ as Russell famously remar!ed in a different contet $ has all the ad#antages of theft o#er honest toil.
Transcendental Realism allo"s an approach that enjoys those ad#antages honestly and gi#es substanti#e
content to modal claims "hile a#oiding any ;e"is-style recourse to the notion of endlessly multiplied di#ergent
counterpart "orlds. This it does, to repeat, by dra"ing a firm and principled distinction bet"een real
(,transfactually efficacious-) physical constants or la"s of nature "hose "or!ings are "holly independent of our
#arious in#estigati#e methods and, on the other hand, "hate#er sho"s up through the deployment of increasingly
refined, e.g., technologically enhanced obser#ational means. Thus it has no need for the !ind of far-fetched
speculati#e argument that "ould assert the reality of "orlds "hich someho" eist in a realm of possibilia spatio-
temporally disconnected from ours and hence entirely beyond our epistemic !en. Rather, the TR distinction falls
out bet"een objects, structures, properties and po"ers that pertain to the nature of this-"orld physical reality,
objecti#ely concei#ed, and the etent to "hich these are actualised $ made manifest $ through modes of applied
scientific research. That is to say, the ,actual- is not (as in ;e"is) a localised subset of those #arious, e'ually ,real-
counterpart "orlds that occupy the entire space of logical possibility but a product of certain specific operations $
in#ol#ing (say), electron microscopes, radio telescopes, or particle accelerators $ "hich re#eal certain other"ise
inscrutable aspects or constituents of physical reality. This also enables the TR approach to gi#e an ade'uately
detailed account of those #arious hypothetical-conditional or counterfactual-supporting modes of argument that
play a large role in causal eplanations. Thus, for instance, in eplaining "hy the match ignited "hen struc! one
might adduce a "hole range of this-"orld possible conditions under "hich it "ould not ha#e thus ignited. &mong
them "ould count (0) its ha#ing been pre#iously doused in "ater, or (:) its containing not phosphorus but some
other non-combustible substance, or (<) its ha#ing been struc! "ith insufficient force to generate the re'uired
frictional heat, or (=) perhaps in an oygen-depleted atmosphere, or again (>) $ at further counterfactual stretch $
in one "here the oygen atoms had entered some "eird state of 'uantum superposition.
*o"e#er such eamples precisely go to emphasise the point that this approach via modal or possible-
"orld thought eperiments is one that possesses eplanatory force only in so far as the "orlds in 'uestion can be
ran!ed on a scale of relati#e proimity or distance from the "orld that "e really (not just ,actually-) inhabit. That
is to say, conditions (0) to (=) of the abo#e series can be thought of as yielding highly plausible realist eplanations
of "hy the match might counterfactually not ha#e ignited, and hence of "hy it did so ignite "hen those abnormal
conditions "ere absent. Item (>), on the other hand, re'uires our ta!ing lea#e of e#eryday (if not scientifically
concei#able) reality, "hile beyond that lies a "hole cornucopia of logically possible "orlds "here so much becomes
subject to thought-eperimental #ariation $ from the la"s of chemical bonding to those of gra#itational attraction $
that "e are simply no longer in the realm of genuine (this-"orld) causal-eplanatory reasoning. These debates in
the pro#ince of modal logic ha#e mostly been conducted by philosophers of language and science "ithout any o#ert
or ac!no"ledged allegiance to the programme of Critical Realism. 3till, as I ha#e said, they con#erge "ith that
programme in a number of crucial respects, not least in their commitment to basic principles of inference to the
best causal eplanation across all and only those physically possible "orlds that most closely approimate to our
o"n. Transcendental Realism has the great #irtue, in this contet, of sustaining a modal-realist approach "ith
ade'uate counterfactual-eplanatory resources but "ithout ha#ing to #enture beyond the limits of a plausible
physicalist ontology. It also pro#ides a strong alternati#e to #arious !inds of social-constructi#ist or paradigm-
relati#ist thin!ing "hose appeal deri#es chiefly from their setting up a typecast, reducti#ely characterised ,realist-
opposition "hich bears no resemblance to the comple, dialectical, and stratified CR model. Indeed its criti'ue of
such grossly simplified conceptions $ along "ith their burden of unresol#ed problems and antinomies $ has been
among the most stri!ing achie#ements of "or! in the Critical Realist mode. In so far as TR plays a crucial role in
that project (for reasons eplained abo#e) it should be seen as a major contribution to present-day, post-empiricist
philosophy of science.
References
;e"is, (a#id (0?1?) Counterfactuals. 4ford. %lac!"ell.
;e"is, (a#id (0?2@) The Alurality of +orlds. 4ford. %lac!"ell.
%radley, Raymond and )orman 3"artB, eds. (0?1?) Aossible +orlds. an introduction to modal logic.
4ford. %lac!"ell.