People vs.

Bayotas; Civil liability ex delicto

08/22/2013 G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

Facts: Rogelio Bayotas was charged with Rape and eventually convicted
thereof. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died.

Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution dismissed the criminal
aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its
comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of
the offense charged. In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view
that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a
result of his commission of the offense charged.

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the
Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of
conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties
Issue: whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguish his civil liability.

Held: Yes. Per Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code- Criminal liability is totally
extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and
as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

xxx

The sub-issue of the petition is on the meaning of the phrase "before final
judgment." The court held that the meaning of the phrase- 'by fair
intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one
positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal
Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not
become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely
guilty of the felony charged against him.'

Thus, 'in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final
determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the
prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is
extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said
civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is
dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil
liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be
declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished
from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers
to the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a
criminal proceeding.'

Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary
money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the
estate of the deceased accused.

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, the Court hold that the death
of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability
based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is
hereby dismissed without qualification.

The remedy of the aggrived party is to recover from the estate of the accused
provided that the latter's civil liability arises from other sources of obligation
but not on delicts.

Thus, the ruling in this case is summarized as follows:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:
a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) . . .

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action
for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on
the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of
the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.

Villamor vs. Salas; jurisdiction
06/24/2013 G.R. No. 101041 November 13, 1991

Facts:
Petitioner Judge Adriano Villamor decided a case involving private
respondent George Carlos and certain Gloria Naval. The case involves the
recovery of ownership of a coconut land. While the civil case was pending,
Carlos filed a criminal case against naval. The criminal case was archived
because of the pendency of the civil case. Petitioner's decision states that
Gloria Naval is the owner of the disputed lot. Carlos reactivated the criminal
case, but was dismissed by the petitioner, since the criminal case became
moot and academic since Naval is declared the legal owner.
It is for this reason that Carlos filed an administrative case against Villamor.
Said case was dismissed. Dissatisfied with the outcome of the administrative
case, respondent Carlos filed a civil action for damages against Judge Villamor
for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment when he dismissed the five (5)
criminal cases against Naval, et al. The summons was served upon Judge
Villamor, but instead of answering the complaint, Judge Villamor issued an
order of direct contempt against Carlos and his lawyer Atty. Antonio T.
Guerrero, "for degrading the respect and dignity of the court through the use
of derogatory and contemptous language before the court," and sentenced
each of them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for five (5) days and to
pay a fine of P500. The said order of Judge Villamor was restrained by the
SC.

In the civil acase filed by Carlos, Judge Villamor filed a motion to dismiss,
but respondents Judge Salas denied the same. Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Judges Aleonar and Salas may take cognizance of the
actions for damages against Judge Villamor for allegedly having rendered an
unjust order of direct contempt against Carlos and Attorney Guerrero which
this Court subsequently annulled.

Ruling:
No. as explained by the Court, no Regional Trial Court can pass upon and
scrutinize, and much less declare as unjust a judgment of another Regional
Trial Court and sentence the judge thereof liable for damages without running
afoul with the principle that only the higher appellate courts, namely, the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, are vested with authority to review
and correct errors of the trial courts.

To allow respondent Judges Aleonar and Salas to proceed with the trial of
the actions for damages against the petitioner, a co-equal judge of a co-equal
court, would in effect permit a court to review and interfere with the judgment
of a co-equal court over which it has no appellate jurisdiction or power of
review. The various branches of a Court of First Instance (now the Regional
Trial Court) being co-equal, may not interfere with each other's cases,
judgments and orders.

This Court has already ruled that only after the Appellate Court, in a final
judgment, has found that a trial judge's errors were committed deliberately
and in bad faith may a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision be
levelled against the latter.

Moreover, nowhere in this Court's decision annulling Judge Villamor's order of
direct contempt can there be found a declaration that the erroneous order was
rendered maliciously or with conscious and deliberate intent to commit an
injustice. At most, the order of direct contempt which the Court nullified may
only be considered an error of judgment for which Judge Villamor may not be
held criminally or civilly liable to the respondents.



A judge is not liable for an erroneous decision in the absence of malice or
wrongful conduct in rendering it.

Manotoc vs. CA; Civpro- service of summons
06/21/2013 G.R. No. 130974

Facts:
A case for Recognition and/or Enforcement of Foreign Judgmentwas
filed against petitioner Imee Marcos Manotoc. Respondent Trajano seeks the
enforcement of a foreign courts judgment rendered by the United States
District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of America, in a case entitled
Agapita Trajano, et al. v. Imee Marcos-Manotoc a.k.a. Imee Marcos, for
wrongful death of deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by military
intelligence officials of the Philippines allegedly under the command, direction,
authority, supervision, tolerance, sufferance and/or influence of defendant
Manotoc, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39 of the then Revised Rules of
Court.

Based on paragraph two of the Complaint, the trial court issued a
Summons addressed to petitioner at Alexandra Condominium Corporation or
Alexandra Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City.

The summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served upon
(Mr.) Macky de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of petitioner at the condominium
unit mentioned earlier. When petitioner failed to file her Answer, the trial
court declared her in default. Because of this, petitioner, by special
appearance of counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court over her person due to an invalid substituted
service of summons.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid service of summons.

Ruling:
No, there was an invalid service of summons. As reiterated by the court,
the courts jurisdiction over a defendant is founded on a valid service of
summons. Without a valid service, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over
the defendant, unless the defendant voluntarily submits to it. The defendant
must be properly apprised of a pending action against him and assured of the
opportunity to present his defenses to the suit. Proper service of summons is
used to protect ones right to due process.

Thus in an action in personam, explained the Court as in this case, personal
service on the defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is, by handing
a copy of the summons to the defendant in person. If defendant, for
excusable reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a reasonable
period, then substituted service can be resorted to. While substituted service
of summons is permitted, it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of
the usual method of service. Hence, it must faithfully and strictly comply with
the prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules.
Indeed, compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as
much important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction.

By way of exception, if substituted service of summons is to be effected, it
must be shown that there is an impossibility of personal service and the
summons must be served (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

In this case, the sheriff's return does not show an impossibility of service of
summons and an earnest effort to locate petitioner for the purpose serving
summons.

Moreover, adds the court, there is a serious nonconformity from the
requirement that the summons must be left with a person of suitable age and
discretion residing in defendants house or residence. Thus, there are two (2)
requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient must be a person of suitable age
and discretion; and (2) recipient must reside in the house or residence of
defendant. Both requirements were not met.

In this case, the Sheriffs Return lacks information as to residence, age, and
discretion of Mr. Macky de la Cruz, aside from the sheriffs general assertion
that de la Cruz is the resident caretaker of petitioner as pointed out by a
certain Ms. Lyn Jacinto, alleged receptionist and telephone operator of
Alexandra Homes.

It is doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz is residing with petitioner Manotoc in the
condominium unit considering that a married woman of her stature in society
would unlikely hire a male caretaker to reside in her dwelling :-). With the
petitioners allegation that Macky de la Cruz is not her employee, servant, or
representative, it is necessary to have additional information in the Return of
Summons. Besides, Mr. Macky de la Cruzs refusal to sign the Receipt for the
summons is a strong indication that he did not have the necessary relation of
confidence with petitioner. To protect petitioners right to due process by
being accorded proper notice of a case against her, the substituted service of
summons must be shown to clearly comply with the rules.

Gemperle vs. Schenker; summons
06/19/2013 G.R. No. L-18164; January 23, 1967
Facts:

This case was the result of William Gemperles retaliatory act when
respondent spouses Paul and Helen Schenker filed a case against him for the
enforcement of Schenker's allegedly initial subscription to the shares of stock
of the Philippines-Swiss Trading Co., Inc. and the exercise of his alleged pre-
emptive rights to the then unissued original capital stock of said corporation
and the increase thereof, as well as for an accounting and damages. Petitioner
alleged that the said complaint tainted his name as a businessman. He then
filed a complaint for damages and prays for the retraction of statements made
by Helen Schenker.
Summons was personally served to Helen Schenker but not to Paul
Schenker. Helen then filed an answer with a counterclaim, but Paul Schenker
filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the court never acquired jurisdiction
over his person since admittedly, he is a Swiss citizen, residing in Zurich,
Switzerland, and has not been actually served with summons in the
Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Paul
Schenker.

Ruling:

Yes, although as a rule, when the defendant is a non-resident and in
an accion in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be
acquired only through voluntary appearance or personal service of summons.
But this case is an exception to the said rule. The Supreme ratiocinated:

We hold that the lower court had acquired jurisdiction over said defendant,
through service of the summons addressed to him upon Mrs. Schenker, it
appearing from said answer that she is the representative and attorney-in-fact
of her husband aforementioned civil case No. Q-2796, which apparently was
filed at her behest, in her aforementioned representative capacity. In other
words, Mrs. Schenker had authority to sue, and had actually sued on behalf of
her husband, so that she was, also, empowered to represent him in suits filed
against him, particularly in a case, like the of the one at bar, which is
consequence of the action brought by her on his behalf.

Briefly, in an accion in personam where the defendant is a non-resident,
substituted service of summons does not apply. However, by way of
exception, substituted service of summons may be effected, if the following
requisites are present:

1. The summons is served to the spouse of the defendant

2. The spouse must be residing in the Philippines

3. The spouse is appointed as attorney-in-fact of the spouse defendant in a
previous case involving the non-resident spouse.

Buaya vs. Polo; CrimPro- Jurisdiction
06/18/2013 G.R. No. L-75079 ; January 26, 1989

Facts:
Solemnidad Buaya is an insurance agent of private complainant of Country
Bankers Insurance Corporation. Private respondent Buaya, was authorized to
transact and underwrite insurance business and collect the corresponding
premiums for and in behalf of the private respondent. Under the terms of the
agency agreement, the petitioner is required to make a periodic report and
accounting of her transactions and remit premium collections to the principal
office of private respondent located in the City of Manila. Allegedly, an audit
was conducted on petitioner's account which showed a shortage. She was
charged with estafa before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the Regional Trial
Court of Manila has no jurisdiction over the offense since the collection was
done in Cebu City and the offense complained of is purely civil in nature. The
RTC denied the motion to dismiss.

Issues:
1) Whether or not RTC Manila has jurisdiction over the case.
2) Whether of not the offense complained is purely civil in nature, hence
warrants the dismissal of the criminal case.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court reiterated that the averments in the complaint or
information characterize the crime to be prosecuted and the court before
which it must be tried. Thus, in order to determine the jurisdiction of the court
in criminal cases, the complaint must be examined for the purpose of
ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the punishment
provided for by law fall within the jurisdiction of the court where the complaint
is filed. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or information, and not by the findings the court
may make after the trial.

Further, Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all
criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of
the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any of the
essential elements thereof took place.

The subject information charges petitioner with estafa committed "during the
period 1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines . . . ."

Clearly then, from the very allegation of the information the Regional Trial
Court of Manila has jurisdiction.

Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be
prosecuted at the place where any of the essential elements of the crime took
place. One of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the
offended party. The private respondent has its principal place of business and
office at Manila. The failure of the petitioner to remit the insurance premiums
she collected allegedly caused damage and prejudice to private respondent in
Manila.

As to the second issue, the contention that the subject matter is purely civil in
nature, suffice it to state that evidentiary facts on this point have still to be
proved.







Manuel Isip vs. People: Crim Pro: Venue is jurisdictional in criminal
cases.
05/21/2013 G.R. No. 170298; June 26, 2007

FACTS:
Complainant Leonardo Jose came to know petitioner spouses when they
were introduced by his father Nemesio. Nemesio and the Isips were engaged
in the buy and sell of pledged and unredeemed jewelry pawned by gambling
habitus. Since there business is expanding, they needed a capitalist, wherein
they offered to complainant their plan. Complainant agreed, so he gave pieces
of jewelries for the Isips to sell at a commission basis. The said jewelries were
given by complainant in Cavite.
After sometimes, the Isips issued checks which are not sufficiently
funded. Complainant then filed a case of estafa against the Isips.

The RTC of Cavite ruled against the Isips. The Isips contest the decision.
The alleged that the transaction was done in Manila and not in Cavite since
respondent is a resident of Manila. The case should then be filed in Manila.
The CA affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC Cavite has jurisdiction over case.

HELD:
The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is
jurisdictional. The place where the crime was committed determines not only
the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a
fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal
cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court
has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person
charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited
territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is
so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the
evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

People vs. Anonas; Crim pro: Right to speedy trial in Preliminary
Investigation
05/21/2013 G.R. No. 156847 January 31, 2007

FACTS:
On November 19, 1996, SPO4 Emiliano Anonas, respondent, assigned at
the Western Police District, was apprehended by his colleagues during a raid
in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The apprehending police officers claimed that he and four
other persons were sniffing methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly
known as shabu, a regulated drug; and that he was in possession of an
unlicensed .38 caliber revolver

The City Prosecutor of Manila filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
same city, two separate Informations against respondent.

On December 18, 1996, respondent filed with the trial court a motion for
reinvestigation on grounds that he was apprehended without a warrant of
arrest and that no preliminary investigation was conducted. His motion was
granted. However, the prosecutor that was assigned to conduct the
reinvestigation was appointed as judge. He did not inform his successor of the
pending investigation, thus the respondent remained in detention.

On January 4, 2001, respondent filed with the trial court a motion to
dismiss the Informations, contending that the delay in the reinvestigation
violated his right to due process. The trial court denied thew motion of
respondent.







People vs. Astrologo; Crim Pro: when can the illegality of an arrest
be raised?
05/21/2013 G.R. No. 169873 June 8, 2007

FACTS:
Astrologo (accuse) was charged raping his daughter. Complainant
reported the incident to the Barangay. In response, Astrologo was arrested by
barangay tanods and policemen. He was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty.

In his defense, Astrologo denied raping his daughter; it was impossible
for him to have done it, since he was with his friends when the crime was
committed. The trial court found accuse guilty of the crime charge.

Accuse appealed the decision of the RTC. In his appeal, he raise as one
of the issues the illegality of his arrest. He contends that the trial court failed
to consider that his arrest was legally objectionable because the barangay
tanods and the arresting officer who arrested him had no personal knowledge
of the facts indicating that he had committed the crime
ISSUE:
Whether or not the objection on the illegality of the arrest of the accuse
was timely made.

HELD:
No. The court explained in this wise:
"Appellant cannot possibly claim that the arresting officers did not have
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that he committed the alleged rape.
The victim herself reported to the barangay authorities that it was appellant
who raped her. The arresting officers therefore, had probable cause to believe
that appellant raped the victim.

Nevertheless, it is a well-entrenched rule that any objection, defect or
irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his
plea on arraignment. And, having failed to move for the quashing of the
Information against him before the arraignment, appellant is estopped from
questioning the legality of his arrest."