Political Law Case 8a

Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary

The Facts:
The Plebiscite Case
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by
Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the
Constitution of the Philippines. Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132,
approved on August24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said Convention
was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June1,
1971.While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No.1081
placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law. On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines
issued Presidential Decree No. 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor,"
as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.
On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the
Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said respondents or their agents from implementing
Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court, upon the grounds, inter alia, that said
Presidential Decree has no force and effect as law because the calling of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines
for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the
voters, and the appropriation of public funds for
thepurpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress, and there is no proper submission to the
people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and
assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof.
In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-35948 filed an "urgent motion," praying
that said case be decided as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15,1973. On the same date,
January 15, 1973, the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said case G.R. No. L-35948 to file an
answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January16, 1973, and setting the motion for hearing on
January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m. While the case was being heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the
Secretary of Justice called on the writer
of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to him
(the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President. Thereupon, the writer
returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing
in connection therewith was still going on and the public here present that the President had, according to
information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning.
Thereupon, the writer read Proclamation No. 1102
"ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.
The Ratification Case
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the Executive Secretary and the
Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents "and their subordinates or agents
from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present Constitution"
referring to that of 1935. The petition therein, filed by Josue Javellana, as a "Filipino citizen, and a qualified and
registered voter" and as "a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated," was
amended on or about January 24, 1973. After reciting in substance the facts set forth in the decision in the
plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged that the President had announced "the immediate implementation of the
New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of
jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President, as Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the
same "are without power to approve the proposed Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to proclaim
the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held to ratify the
proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void."
The Issues:
1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non- justiciable,
question?
2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly
(withsubstantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions?

Ruling:
The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices expressed the view that they
were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the exercise of his political
prerogatives. Further, there being no competent evidence to show such fraud and intimidation during the election,
it is to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question of the
validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was left to the people in their sovereign capacity to
answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such acquiescence. The court was severely divided on the
following issues raised in the petition: but when the crucial question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief,
six members of the court (Justices Makalintal,Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the
petition. Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, voted to grant the relief being sought,
thus upholding the1973 Constitution.
Details:
1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non-
justiciable, question?
On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,Fernando, Teehankee
and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a
justiciable and non-political question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed there
has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been
such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but, in
negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the1935
Constitution been complied with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that
the issue is political and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry."
2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with
substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions?
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly ratified
pursuant to Article XV, In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that
factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution
without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in
the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes
in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its
political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in
effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified."
Political Law Case 8b
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, et.al. vs. MANUEL ALBA, et.al.
GR No. L-57883
Facts: In 1981, BP 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes, was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that
would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional
provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He averred that only the SC can remove
judges NOT Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129).
HELD: The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to discipline judges of inferior courts
and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to remove
judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be
distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent
office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who
would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any
impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the
effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the
assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that
as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the
fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that
this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly
this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do
so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into
who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the
Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial
power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the
charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the
present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from
any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.
Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives
between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.

WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown, this petition is dismissed.
No costs.