Structure

STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY
2.2.1. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

1. Scope
This Section provides guidance for the assessment of safety case content with respect to the loss
of structural integrity of an installation, from hazard identification through to consequence
determination, including risk management measures.
2. Assessment of Adequacy of Demonstration
The evaluation of risk that might stem from each major accident hazard is to be assessed by
identification of the factors that might result in an adverse combination of a source of hazard and
initiator, together with identification and evaluation of escalation paths that might result.
The loss of structural integrity major accident hazard sources have been classified as follows:
Fixed steel installations
Fixed concrete installations
Semi submersible installations
Ship shaped/floating installations
Jack-up installations
For the latent major accident hazards to be activated towards a major accident, initiators have been
identified. These have been classified as:
Accidental hazards
Environmental hazards
Management system hazards
3. Depth of Assessment
This section gives guidance on the depth of assessment required to determine the adequacy of the
demonstration that measures have been or will be taken to ensure compliance with the relevant
statutory provisions.
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Source of Hazard Initiators Risk Evaluation Risk Management
Measures
Performance
Standards
HS1 - Fixed Steel
Installations
G1 - Extreme
Weather, incl
Wave-In Deck
Loading
Frequency Inherent Safety
HS2 - Fixed
Concrete
Installations
G2 - Fatique
Failure
HS3 - Semi
submersible
Installations
G3 - Corrosion F1 - Hazard
Studies
[HAZOPS etc]
F9 - Concept Selection Substructure
- Topsides
HS4 - Ship
Shaped/Floating
Installations
G4 - Marine
Growth
F2 - Generic
Historical Data
F10 - Use of Best
Design Practice
HS5 - Jack-up
Installations
G5 - Poor
Fabrication
Procedures/
Materials
Defects/
Materials Failure
(Brittle Fracture)
F3 - Installation
Specific Data
F11 - Use of Suitable
Safety Factors
Fixed steel
installations
F4 - IVB Data F12 - High Reduncy
Where safety case contents match with good practice identified in the assessment sheets for a
particular topic associated with a major accident, there will usually be no need for an assessor to
probe into the details of the how the good practice is applied. This may, however, be a suitable
issue to follow-up through inspection.
A list of references is provided in each assessment sheet. It should be noted that a more extensive
commentary should be referenced. The documents listed provide further guidance, particularly in
relation to good practice and performance standards. In some cases the reference material will not
be fully applicable and may be limited in some parts. These aspects are referred to on the
assessment sheets.
4. The assessor should examine the adequacy of the hazard identification, risk evaluation and
management in conjunction with the contents of the Categorisation Table below:
Loss of Structural Integrity
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G6 - Topsides
Overloading
Fixed
Concrete
Installations
G7 -Change of
Use / Structural
Modifications
F5 - Reliabilty
Analysis
F13 - Optimum
Materials and
Fabrication Procedures
Semi
Submersibles
G8 - Fire F14 - Maintenance
Management
Procedures
Ship-shaped
Installations/
Floaters
[Hull]
G9 - Explosion Jack-Ups
G10 - Blowout Prevention
G11 -
Foundation
Failure
Consequences
G12 - Scour F15 - Sufficient Air Gap
for 10,000 - Year Storm
G13 - Seismic
Event
F6 - Extent of
Structural
Damage / Failure
F16 - Suitable Safety
Factors (Fatigue,
Applied Loading , Pile
Loads etc.)
G14 - Boat
Impact
F7 - Reduced
Redundancy
F17 - High Redundancy
G15 -
Helicopter /
Aircraft Impact
F8 - Remaining
Fatigue Life
F18 - Maintenance and
Repair Management
Procedures
G16 - Dropped
Objects
F19 - Control Measures
[Management/Structural]
for Accidental Loads
G17 -
Inadequate
Management
System
Extreme
Weather -
Excess
Topsides
Weight
Mitigation Fatigue - Fire
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HS1 Fixed Steel Installations
HS2 Fixed Concrete Installations
HS3 Semi Submersible Installations
HS4 Ship Shaped / Floating Installations
HS5 Jack-Up Installations
G18 -
Inadequate
Design
G19 -
Inadequate
Inspection,
Repair &
Maintenance
During
Fabrication and
Operation
Corrosion -
Explosion
G20 -
Inadequate
Reassessment
F20 - Suitably rated fire
and blast walls / use pf
pfp etc.
Marine
Growth -
Corrosion
G21 -
Inadequate
Verification
F21 - Manintenance &
repair management
procedures
Foundation
Performance
& Scour
G22 - Operator
Error
F22 - System
management
procedures for
accidental loads
Fire
F23 - High redundancy Explosionyo
1. Confirmation should be obtained that installations have been designed and constructed, and/or
re-assessed, maintained and repaired in accordance with the latest edition of a recognised
standard, recommended practice or code of practice. Recognised standards, recommended
practices and codes of practice include:
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API RP2A (21st edition), 2000, Recommended Practice for Planning, Designing, and
Constructing Fixed Offshore Platforms
Classification Society Rules: Semi-Submersibles / Floating Installations / Jack-Ups only
IMO Rules: Semi-Submersibles / Floating Installations / Jack-Ups only
ISO 19900:2002, Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries Offshore Structures Part 1: General
Requirements
ISO 19901-1:2005, Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries - Specific Requirements for
Offshore Structures Part 1: Metocean Design and Operating Considerations
ISO 19901-2:2004, Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries - Specific Requirements For
Offshore structures Part 2: Seismic Design Procedures and Criteria
Offshore Structures Part 3: Topsides Structure
Offshore Structures Part 4: Geotechnical and Foundations Design Considerations
Offshore Structures Part 5: Weight Control During Engineering and Construction
Offshore Structures Part 6: Marine Operations
Offshore Structures Part 7: Station Keeping Systems for Floating Offshore Structures
andMobileOffshore Units
ISO 19902:2007, Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries - Fixed Steel Offshore Structures
ISO 19903:2006, Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries - Fixed Concrete Offshore
Structures
ISO 19904-1:2006, Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries - Floating Offshore Structures -
Monohulls, Semi-submersibles and Spars
ISO 19904-2:2013 Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries - Floating Offshore Structures
Tension Leg Platforms
ISO 19905-1:2013, Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries - Site-Specific Assessment of
Mobile Offshore Units: Part 1: Jack-ups
ISO 19905-2:2013 Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries - Site-Specific Assessment of
Mobile Offshore Units: Part 2: Jack-ups: Commentary and Detailed Sample Calculation
Part 3: Floating Units
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ISO 13822:2010, Basis of Design of Structures - Assessment of Existing Structures
NORSOK N-001, 2004, Structural Design
NORSOK N-002, 1997, Collection of Metocean Data
NORSOK N-003, 2007, Actions and Action Effects
NORSOK N-004, 2004, Design of Steel Structures: Annex A - Design Against Accidental
Loads; Annex B - Buckling Strength of Shells; Annex C - Fatigue Strength Analysis
NORSOK N-005, 1997, Condition Monitoring of Load Bearing Structures
NORSOK N-006, 2009, Assessment of Structural Integrity for Existing Offshore Load-
Bearing Structures
NORSOK S-001, 2008, Technical Safety
NORSOK Z-001, 1998, Documentation for Operation
NORSOK Z-013, 2001, Risk and Emergency Preparedness Analysis
ON27, Status of Technical Guidance on design, Construction and Certification
SNAME Offshore Bulletin 5-5A, 2008, Society of Naval Architects & Marine Engineers
(SNAME), Guidelines for Site-specific Assessment of Mobile Jack-up Units
2. Where a standard, recommended industry/company practice or code of practice other than
those listed above has been employed, judgement of the adequacy of the installation can only be
assessed on an individual basis, taking account of the current condition of the installation.
3. Relevant Legislation, ACOP and Guidance includes:
Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005
Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc) Regulations 1996
Assessment Principles for Offshore Safety Cases [APOSC]
4. Specific Technical Issues:
Hazards to structural integrity arise from three principal sources, namely:
Accidental events, ie fire, explosions, blowout, boat impact, helicopter/ aircraft impact and
dropped objects
Natural events, ie extreme weather, fatigue failure, corrosion, marine growth, scour and
seismic events.
Management system inadequacies, ie poor fabrication procedures, topsides overloading,
change of use/structural modification, inadequate system management procedures,
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G1 Extreme Weather, including Wave-In-Deck Loading
G2 Fatigue Failure
G3 Corrosion
G4 Marine Growth
G5 Poor Fabrication procedures / Materials Defects / Materials Failure (Brittle Fracture)
G6 Topsides Overloading
G7 Change of Use / Structural modification
inadequate design and inadequate inspection, repair and maintenance during fabrication and
operation.
There is a need to consider that different approaches to the management of structural integrity may
be required, depending on:
Whether the installation is manned or normally unmanned.
The age of the installation and the codes and standards that it has been designed to.
For ageing installations, it is important to place special emphasis on the knowledge and
understanding of the integrity.
5. Other Related Assessment Sheets in this Section are:
G1-G4, G12, G13: Environmental hazards
G8, G9, G10, G14, G15, G16: Accidental hazards
G5-G7, G17-G22: Management system hazards
F1F8 Risk evaluation
F1F5 Frequency
F6F8 Consequences
F9F23 Risk management measures:
F9F14 Inherent safety
F15F19 Prevention
F20F23 Mitigation
6. Cross-Referenced Sections and Sheets are:
None
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G8 Fire
G9 Explosion
G10 Blowout
G11 Foundation Failure
G12 Scour
G13 Seismic Event
standard, recommended practice or code of practice for accidental hazards. General requirements
for accidental hazards are found in:
Structures
ISO 19905-1:2013, Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries - Site-Specific Assessment of
Mobile Offshore Units: Part 1: Jack-ups
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ISO 19905-2:2013 Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries - Site-Specific Assessment of
Mobile Offshore Units: Part 2: Jack-ups: Commentary and Detailed Sample Calculation
Part 3: Floating Units
ON27, Status of Technical Guidance on Design, Construction and Certification
SNAME Offshore Bulletin 5-5A, 2008, Society of Naval Architects & Marine Engineers
(SNAME), Guidelines for Site-specific Assessment of Mobile Jack-up Units
4.1 Extreme Weather [Initiator G1]
The installation must be designed to ensure that it can withstand extreme loading, based on the use
of appropriate metocean data. In accordance with ISO 19901-1 the air gap assessment philosophy
should be based on the principle that the deck height should be chosen such that the frequency of
wave impact on the deck is compatible with the target failure rate of the substructure. The use of a
load and resistance factor design methodology requires that extreme waves do not cause major
structural damage with an annual failure probability exceeding 10-4. The structure should remain
capable of withstanding the 100-year environmental load without progressive collapse in the
damaged condition. In both the 10,000-year [intact] and 100-year [damaged] scenarios, load and
resistance factors of unity are to be used.
4.2 Fatigue Failure [Initiator G2]
The consequences of fatigue failure, which is defined as the occurrence of a through thickness
crack, can be very serious and fatigue life is therefore an important structural integrity performance
criterion for offshore structures. The principal sources of guidance on the prediction of fatigue life
are OTO 2001 015, NORSOK N-004, ISO 19902 and NORSOK N-004. Useful background
information can be found in OTO 2001 015. However, there is considerable uncertainty in the
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assessment process and cracking can occur within the design life. The fatigue assessment should
include consideration of the effects of the principal causes of fatigue damage, ie
fabrication defects, including weld root defects
damage from pile driving followed by fatigue, for fixed steel platforms as well as special
factors, eg
single-sided closure welds
ring-stiffened joints
high strength steels [generally defined as steels with a yield strength exceeding 400 MPa]
4.3 Corrosion [Initiator G3]
The consequence of corrosion is loss of member thickness, leading to reduced static strength,
buckling capacity and possible local structural collapse. It is common practice to provide a
'corrosion allowance' for members located near mean sea level [often between 6 -12 mm] where
corrosion rates are higher. Steel exposed to sea spray is also vulnerable and in the splash zone
epoxy or similar paints are often used to provide corrosion protection, since the CP system is
ineffective in this zone.
Overprotection [ie potentials more negative than -1100mV Ag/AgCl] can be damaging to fatigue [ie
it can increase fatigue crack growth rates significantly] and to epoxy or similar coatings, with the
possibility of bonding to the steel being lost. Hence, design of the anode system is important to
minimise this effect and regular monitoring of potentials is also essential to reduce this problem in
practice. Guidance can be found in OTO 2001 011
4.4 Marine Growth [Initiator G4]
The marine growth allowance should be specified in the safety case and controlled to ensure that
the loading on the structure is maintained within the design limits or remedial action is undertaken.
4.5 Foundation Failure [Initiator G11]
The design adequacy of foundations is demonstrated by use of an appropriate standard or
equivalent associated with that type of installation, [ISO 19901-4, ISO 19902, ISO 19903, SNAME
T&R Bulletin 5-5A]. The safety case should give measures to ensure that the design capacity does
not deteriorate to a level whereby foundation instability and failure occurs. For situations where
soils are known to be weak some monitoring of deck level may be appropriate to provide a means
whereby this may be controlled. Interaction of foundations with wells, well drilling or footprints
should be assessed.
4.6 Scour [Initiator G12]
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G16 Dropped Objects
The safety case should specify the allowable scour and means by which the actual scour is
monitored. Remedial activity should be specified where necessary.
4.7 Seismic Events [Initiator G13]
Duty holders should be able to demonstrate that structures have a low probability of catastrophic
failure when subjected to earthquakes and that supports of both safety critical plant and equipment
are sufficiently robust to withstand the accelerations, displacements and relative deflections
caused. The emphasis of the assessment is that the primary control of the seismic hazard is
inherent safety, achieved by the ability of structures and equipment supports to withstand seismic
forces and vibrations through adequate design with suitable safety factors [eg to the 200-year
return period] and a subsequent check to a longer return period [eg to the 10,000-year return
period]. Equipment safety is provided by appropriate specification and attention to vulnerability of
supports. The implications of acceleration, displacement and deflection for the integrity of Safety
Critical Elements also need to be considered. See ISO 19901-2.
6. Cross Referenced Sections and Sheets are:
Section 2.2.2 Stability - Maritime Integrity
Section 2.2.3 Position Keeping System Failures
Section 2.2.1 Wells Risk evaluation and management
Section 2.3.4 Emergency Response
Section 2.4.3 Human and Organisational Factors
ON27 Status of Technical Guidance on Design, Construction and Certification
OTO 2001 013 Loads
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ISO 19902 Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries - Fixed Steel Offshore Structures
ISO 19903 Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries - Fixed Concrete Offshore Structures
ISO 19904 Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries - Floating Offshore Structures
NORSOK S001 Technical Safety
NORSOK Z-001 Documentation for Operation
NORSOK Z-013 Risk and Emergency Preparedness Analysis
SCI Technical Note No 4 Explosion Resistant Design for Offshore Structures
4.1 Fire [Initiator G8]
The structural response of equipment, TR supports and primary structure from fires identified in the
case should be assessed to the Steel Construction Institutes Interim Guidance Notes on fire &
explosion [IGN].
4.2 Explosions [Initiator G9]
The structural response and escalation potential from explosions identified in the case should be
assessed to the IGN.
4.3 Blowout [Initiator G10]
Refer to Section 6 Wells for potential of this hazard.
4.4 Boat impact [Initiator G14]
The structural response from boat impact should be assessed - see Section 2 Vessel Impact.
4.5 Helicopter/Aircraft Impact [Initiator G15]
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G5 Poor Fabrication procedures / Materials Defects / Materials Failure (Brittle Fracture)
G6 Topsides Overloading
G7 Change of Use / Structural Modification
G17 Inadequate Management System Procedures
G18 Inadequate Design
G19 Inadequate Inspection, Repair and Maintenance During Fabrication and Operation
G20 Inadequate Re-assessment
G21 Inadequate Verification
G22 Operator Error
The structural response from helicopter/aircraft impact should be assessed - see Section 8 -
Helicopter Crash.
4.6 Dropped Objects [Initiator G16]
The structural response to dropped objects should be assessed. Normal engineering principles
should have been applied taking account of the size and weight of objects identified in the case.
Section 2.2.4 Vessel Impact
Section 2.3.1 Loss of Containment - Process
Section 2.3.3 Loss of Containment - Fire & Explosion
Section 2.4.5 Helicopter Risks
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standard, recommended practice or code of practice for management system hazards. General
requirements for accidental hazards are found in:
AWS D1.1 / D1.1M:2010, Structural Welding Code Steel
BS EN 10225:2009, Weldable Structural Steels for Fixed Offshore Structures. Technical
delivery conditions
CSWIP Certification Scheme for Welding and Inspection Personnel or equivalent
EEMUA 158, 1999, Construction Specification for Fixed Offshore Structures in theNorth Sea
HS(G)65, Successful Management of Health and Safety
NORSOK N-001, 2004, Structural Design
NORSOK N-006, 2009, Assessment of Structural Integrity for Existing Offshore Load-
Bearing Structures
ON27: Status of Technical Guidance on design, Construction and Certification, 2012
2. Where a standard, recommended industry/company practices or code of practice other than
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4.1 Fabrication Procedures [Initiator G5]
For new installations or platform reuse, fabrication defects are a major cause of fatigue failure in
offshore structures and consequently a principal mechanism for the control of fatigue failure is the
thorough inspection for weld defects during fabrication. Defects detected during fabrication should
be repaired. They may be allowed to remain only where it can be demonstrated that they do not
compromise the integrity of the structure. Further information is given in EEMUA 158.
Studies have shown that significant defects [ie up to 5 mm in height] can be present. Although such
defects would normally be repaired, the detection of defects in this size range is close to the limits
of current inspection techniques for this kind of defect and the integrity assessment should take this
into account.
4.2 Topsides Overloading [Initiator G6]
Evidence of the structures ability to withstand foreseen changes in the topsides loading is required.
This may include weight monitoring procedures see ISO 19901-5. Careful consideration needs to
be given to the ability of the structure to withstand changes in the topsides loading. Appropriate
weight monitoring procedures should be complemented by component and system strength
assessments to ensure that the design limits of the structure are not exceeded during its
operational life.
4.3 Change of Use / Structural Modification [Initiator 3.G7]
Any change of use affecting the original design [eg variation of the topsides loading and change of
process requirements] and any structural modification require a reassessment of the structural
integrity to ensure that the operational limits are not exceeded.
4.4 Management System Procedures [Initiator G17]
The duty holder must implement adequate system management procedures to ensure that the risk
of structural failure is maintained at an acceptable level. Reference should be made to the
requirements of HS(G)65.
Competence is an essential requirement in the management of structural integrity and is now
recognised in the suite of ISO structural standards. The need for suitably qualified personnel in all
aspects of structural integrity management, eg offshore structural engineering and inspection
planning, is specified. Assessors should ensure that suitably qualified personnel to CSWIP or
equivalent are designated.
4.5 Design [Initiator G18]
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The Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc) Regulations 1996 (DCR) place
a requirement on the duty holder to design installations to withstand such forces acting on it that are
reasonably foreseeable and that in the event of foreseeable damage it will retain sufficient integrity
to enable action to be taken to safeguard the health and safety of personnel on or near it so far as
is reasonably practicable. The application of good practice is one of the key measures with respect
to structural integrity risk management in demonstrating compliance with these regulatory
requirements, with particular emphasis on the setting of performance standards [see Verification,
3.G21] and the provision of adequate safety margins against failure from major hazards. This
requires the use of appropriate standards for the design of offshore structures. Where an
installation designed under the previous certification regime does not show the same level of safety
as newer structures, the duty holder should demonstrate that it meets the relevant DCR
requirements.
4.6 Inspection, Repair & Maintenance During Fabrication & Operation [Initiator G19]
Inspection Planning Methodologies
Structural inspection is a key factor in providing data for the management of structural integrity. For
North Sea structures on the UKCS, preparation of an inspection plan is a requirement of Regulation
8 of DCR. This requires the duty holder to ensure that suitable arrangements are in place for
maintaining the integrity of the installation. This entails the quantification/identification of the risk of
structural failure and the subsequent formulation of a suitable cost-effective inspection schedule to
enable the targeting of critical components. The inspection programme should include a thorough
fabrication inspection [see 3.G5], a baseline inspection once the platform has been installed, the
collation and evaluation of platform and inspection data, periodic inspections to monitor any
deterioration [eg from fatigue] and special inspections following any accidental damage or extreme
loading events to determine whether there is a need for any remedial work in the event of damage
or deterioration. Reference should be made to the ISO standard for offshore inspection (ISO
19902), for both in-service inspection and structural integrity management. The plan should contain
information to demonstrate that the accidental hazards are within the design limits.
It is important that the plan takes into account the effects of structural redundancy in setting targets
with a contingency that shows an awareness that unexpected failures may occur in practice, which
will not be predicted using current probabilistic techniques.
Inspection Techniques
A number of different inspection techniques are used during fabrication and operation. The case
should either refer to or describe appropriate inspection techniques. Standard techniques applied in
the fabrication yard include UT, MPI and sometimes RT.
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The use of flooded member detection (FMD) as the principal inspection method applied to primary
and secondary members in steel jacket structures accepts that significant damage must occur for
the damage to be detected and hence total reliance on FMD is not necessarily sufficient to ensure
structural integrity. It is therefore necessary that this approach is complemented with rigorous
structural integrity assessment and management.
Repairs
The ability of a repair to restore the integrity of a fatigue damaged component is a necessary
requirement in maintaining the overall integrity of an offshore structure. Several different repair
methods can be used offshore. They involve weld repair, structural modification or the use of
strengthening techniques. Methods used include:
normal welding for above water repairs
hyperbaric weld repair [underwater]
removal of cracks by grinding with or without subsequent re-welding
drilling of crack arrester holes
member removal or replacement
addition of strengthening members
joint reinforcement using gusset plates
internal grouting of members and joints
use of grouted and mechanical clamps
There is a continuing need for regular inspection of repaired components as part of the overall
inspection of the structure.
4.7 Re-assessment [Initiator G20]
Where structures have come to the end of the design life or suffered significant damage,
reassessment of the structural integrity should be performed to demonstrate that existing
installations continue to meet regulatory requirements. The principal sources of guidance on
reassessment are ISO 13822, ISO 19902 and NORSOK N-001 and NORSOK N-006.
The safety case should demonstrate the criteria for reassessment in ISO 19901 and ISO19902:
extension of service life beyond the original calculated design life
damage or deterioration of a primary structural component
change of use that violates the original design or previous integrity assessment
departures from the original basis of design [eg increased loading or inadequate deck height]
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original design criteria are no longer valid as well as the versions of the design codes used.
Many installations have been designed to earlier versions of structural codes and standards which
have subsequently been updated to reflect improved knowledge and experience. Hence, design
criteria based on the original version of the code may now be unconservative and no longer valid
and reassessment is necessary. In-service inspection practices will determine the nature and extent
of the reassessment process to demonstrate structural integrity. Hence, the reassessment process
needs to take into consideration the changes in inspection practices that have taken place in recent
years as these have implications on the approach to structural integrity assessment.
When it is shown that the structure is not acceptable by analysis then strengthening or repairs may
be required to demonstrate that measures have been or will be taken to ensure compliance with
DCR. When this is not possible operational limits may be needed on the platform [eg demanning
when extreme weather is imminent]. The adequacy of fatigue life for the intended remaining life
should also be reviewed and this should be taken into account when planning repairs and future
inspection schedules.
Ageing Installations
Ageing is characterised by deterioration which is caused mainly by fatigue and corrosion. Any
structural deterioration due to ageing should be taken into account in the reassessment process. It
is therefore important to have accurate knowledge of both the condition of a structure with respect
to fatigue and corrosion and knowledge of the response of the structure to the ageing process for
effective structural integrity assessment.
Knowledge of the design specification and the damage state may not always be available for
ageing structures. Safety margins during reassessment need to be increased in such
circumstances. It is therefore important that good records of both design details and changes in the
structural condition [due to in-service damage and deterioration] are maintained.
4.8 Verification [Initiator G21]
Verification is a key process in the overall SIM as a result of DCR. This includes the identification
and risk management of Safety Critical Elements (SCE). In general, the whole jacket is considered
to be a SCE and other SCEs include the topsides, temporary refuge and helideck. For each SCE,
performance standards need to be developed, providing a statement of the performance required of
the system and which is used as a basis for managing the particular hazard through the lifecycle of
the installation.
4.9 Operator Error [Initiator G22]
The assessment should take into consideration the possibility of the introduction of enhanced risk
resulting from operator error, particularly in areas of weight growth or ships collision.
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G8 Fire
G9 Explosion
G10 Blowout
G14 Boat Impact
G15 Helicopter / Aircraft Impact
G16 Dropped Objects
Section 7 Diving
Section 10 Emergency Response
Section 11 Human Factors
FABIG Technical Note 4, Explosion Resistant Design of Offshore Structures, Steel
Construction Institute, 1996
Steel Construction Institute (SCI), 1992, Interim Guidance Notes and associated Technical
Notes
Structures
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API RP2A (21st edition), 2000, Recommended Practice for Planning, Designing, and
Constructing Fixed Offshore Platforms
NORSOK S-001, 2008, Technical Safety
NORSOK Z-001, 1998, Documentation for Operation
NORSOK Z-013, 2001, Risk and Emergency Preparedness Analysis
ON27, Status of Technical Guidance on design, Construction and Certification, 2012
4.1 Fire [Initiator G8]
The structural response of equipment, TR supports and primary structure from fires identified in the
case should be assessed to the Steel Construction Institutes Interim Guidance Notes on fire &
explosion [IGN].
4.2 Explosions [Initiator G9]
The structural response and escalation potential from explosions identified in the case should be
assessed to the IGN.
4.3 Blowout [Initiator G10]
Refer to Section 6 Wells for potential of this hazard.
4.4 Boat impact [Initiator G14]
The structural response from boat impact should be assessed - see Section 2 Vessel Impact.
4.5 Helicopter/Aircraft Impact [Initiator G15]
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F1 Hazard Studies (HAZOPs etc)
F2 Generic Historical Data
F3 Installation Specific Data
F4 IVB Data
F5 Reliability Analysis
F6 Extent of Structural Damage / Failure
F7 Reduced Redundancy, Remaining Residual and Reserve Strength
F8 Remaining Fatigue Life
The structural response from helicopter/aircraft impact should be assessed - see Section 8 -
Helicopter Crash.
4.6 Dropped Objects [Initiator G16]
The structural response to dropped objects should be assessed. Normal engineering principles
should have been applied taking account of the size and weight of objects identified in the case.
14. Cross-Referenced Sections and Sheets:
Section 2 Vessel Impact
Section 5.1 Loss of Containment - Process
Section 5.3 Loss of Containment - Fire & Explosion
Section 8 Helicopter Crash
Section 10 Emergency Response
Section 11 Human Factors
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1. Confirmation should be obtained that risk evaluation has been carried out in accordance with
industry guidelines and is based on recognised risk data sources, for example:
CMPT, A Guide to Quantitative Risk Assessment for Offshore Installations, 1999
DnV, Guideline for Offshore Structural Reliability Analysis, 1996
UKOOA, Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment QRA Uncertainty, 2000
UKOOA, Formal Safety Assessment, 199UKOOA Giodelines Formal Safety Assessment
DnV Guidelines for Offshore Structural Reliability Analysis
2. Where industry guidance and data sources other than those listed above have been used then
the duty holder will need to justify the validity of other sources of guidance and data.
4.1 Hazard Studies [Initiator F1]
It is not normal engineering practice to perform discrete hazard studies. ISO 19000 [General
Requirements] lists the hazards that are considered in the more specific standards in the ISO
series.
4.2 Generic Historical Data [Initiator F2]
Historical data is usually inappropriate to determine the loss of integrity frequency although some
cases may try and use this approach. If used the appropriateness [type of structure, geographical
location] of the data should be assessed.
4.3 Installation-Specific Data [Initiator F3]
Reliable and comprehensive structural data are an essential requirement for the structural integrity
assessment of an installation during its life cycle. The case should give an account of this
deterioration.
4.4 IVB Data [Initiator F4]
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See F3 Installation-specific data
4.5 Reliability Analysis [Initiator F5]
If the case uses a reliability approach, good practice is to be found in the DnV guidelines for
offshore structural reliability analysis. A recent initiative, Advanced Structural Reliability Network
(ASRANET), has been set up to encourage the integration of reliability analysis with advanced
structural analysis in an attempt to provide more accurate and realistic measures of failure and
hence provide some technical basis for dealing with ageing infrastructures.
CONSEQUENCES [F6F8]
Loss of structural integrity can have serious consequences, depending on the redundancy,
component strength, system strength and fatigue life. The safety case should therefore contain
evidence that foreseeable structural damage to the installation, escalation potentials and all likely
scenarios have been considered.
4.6 Extent of Structural Damage/Failure [Initiator F6]
The case should indicate:
whether there is any existing damage or local failure
the assessment has taken this into account to ensure the appropriate integrity.
4.7 Redundancy, Residual & System Strength [Initiator F7]
Existing codes and standards are based on satisfying component adequacy and hence structures
are normally designed on a component basis. However, fixed offshore platforms generally have a
multiplicity of load paths so that failure of one component does not necessarily lead to catastrophic
structural collapse. The implementation of an effective structural integrity management system
requires the application of system strength analysis to provide an understanding of the performance
of the structural system.
Thus, should the duty holder wish to optimise the design and inspection procedures, full
consideration should be given to the performance of a systems analysis to quantify the reserve and
residual capacities, now recognised as the key parameters in managing integrity, and the
identification of critical components in the structure.
Platform configuration is a key factor to be considered in assessment. X braced panels are more
'ductile' in that they offer alternative load paths compared to, for example, K bracing where once a
member fails there is no alternative load path through the frame. Thus, the potential reduction in
/ / 4 6
F9 Concept Selection
F10 Use of Best Design Practice
F11 Use of Suitable Safety Factors
F12 High Redundancy - Inherent Safety
F13 Optimum Materials and Fabrication Procedures
F14 Maintenance Management Procedures
F15 Sufficient Air Gap for 10,000-year Storm
static strength of a joint in K-based framing is likely to be more damaging than a cracked joint in X-
braced framing and this needs to be reflected in the level of assessment of system strength.
4.8 Remaining Fatigue Life [Initiator F8]
For welded joints in offshore structures, the fatigue life N3 is defined as the point at which a through
-thickness crack forms. However, actual failure will occur when the load bearing capacity of the
remaining ligament is insufficient for the applied load and this is designated N4. At this stage load
shedding will take place and the applied loads will be transferred to neighbouring components.
The reliance on FMD in maintenance strategies for offshore installations requires that the
inspection interval is such that N4 is not exceeded. The available information indicates that the
remaining fatigue life on penetration of the wall thickness may be rather limited. It is therefore
important that due consideration is given in the development of the structural integrity management
plan to the possibility of total member failure occurring after penetration of the wall and of the
consequences to structural integrity.
Section 2.1.2 Risk Assessment (including Human Vulnerability)
/ / 4 6
F16 Suitable Safety Factors (Fatigue, Applied Loading, Pile loads, etc)
F17 High Redundancy - Prevention
F18 Maintenance and Repair Management Procedures
F19 Control Measures (Managment / Structural) for Accidental Loads
F20 Suitably rated Fire and Blast Walls / Use of PFP etc
F21 Maintenance and Repair Management Procedures
F22 System Management Procedures for Accidental Loads
F23 High Redundancy - Mitigation
1. Confirmation should be obtained that risk evaluation has been carried out in accordance with
industry guidelines and is based on recognised risk data sources, for example:
CMPT, A Guide to Quantitative Risk Assessment for Offshore Installations, 1999
DnV, Guideline for Offshore Structural Reliability Analysis, 1996
HS(G)65 Successful Management of Health and Safety
UKOOA, Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment Uncertainty, 2000
UKOOA, Formal Safety Assessment, 1990
2. Where industry guidance and data sources other than those listed above have been used then
the duty holder will need to justify the validity of other sources of guidance and data
Inherent Safety [F9-F14]
4.1 Concept Selection [Initiator F9]
/ / 4 6
The integrity of the concept selected should be of a level which is ensured by following the latest
standards. If reuse is part of the concept, the assessment must consider loss of deterioration and
fatigue in previous uses as well as evidence of the actual condition of the structure.
4.2 Use of Best Design Practices [Initiator F10]
Design best practice is to be found in the latest editions of standards.
4.3 Use of Suitable Safety Factors [Initiator F11]
Standards stipulate safety factors. These are generically suitable but in some cases special
consideration of alternative safety factors may be made. The rationale behind such
consideration should be examined.
4.4 Redundancy [Initiator F12]
Adequate component integrity is achieved through appropriate material selection and design for
static strength and fatigue capacity [complemented by an appropriate level of inspection during
fabrication for weld defects and in service for defects, corrosion and marine growth]. A fundamental
requirement for the design of offshore installations with the required level of inherent safety is the
use of best design practice. The principal documents for the structural design of offshore
installations operated on the UKCS are the appropriate parts of API RP 2A [at least 18th Edition]
and the emerging ISO documents supplemented by information outlined in ON27.
Many installations have been designed to earlier versions of structural codes and standards which
have subsequently been updated to reflect improved knowledge and experience. Hence, design
criteria based on the original version of the code may be unconservative and no longer valid and
reassessment is necessary.
4.5 Optimum Materials and Fabrication [F13]
Most offshore structures are constructed from weldable medium strength steels [usually grade
50D], for which codes and standards exist, eg BS 7191. Welding procedures are now well
developed for the medium strength steels used offshore and are well codified, eg EEMUA 158 and
AWS D1.1. More recently, newer higher strength steels, with a better strength to weight ratio, are
being used increasingly. However, in general there is less test data available to support the design
equations and the duty holder should ensure that sufficient and reliable data are available to enable
a structural integrity assessment with an appropriate level of confidence.
Inspection at the fabrication stage is recognised as a major part of the reliability aspect of
performance standards and there is a need for this to be well documented for proper life cycle
efficiency.
/ / 4 6
4.6 Maintenance Management Procedures/Structural Inspection & Condition Monitoring
[Initiator F14]
Structural inspection is a key factor in providing data for the management of structural integrity. For
North Sea structures on the UKCS, preparation of an inspection plan is a requirement of DCR
Regulation 8. This requires that the duty holder ensures that suitable arrangements are in place for
maintaining the integrity of the installation, through periodic assessments and carrying out any
remedial work in the event of damage or deterioration. The inspection programme includes:
a baseline inspection once the platform has been installed
periodic inspections to monitor any deterioration [eg from fatigue]
special inspections following any accidental damage or extreme loading events.
A set of default inspection requirements is included, with prescriptive survey periods for cases
where an inspection plan has not been produced. The inspection planning methodology should
demonstrate an understanding of the significance of the analytical information requirement and the
inspection strategy implementation.
Normal underwater inspection programmes include a condition survey of the anodes, the extent of
marine growth and corrosion potential monitoring of areas of the jacket structure. Through this,
anodes can be identified and subsequently replaced to ensure an adequate level of cathodic
protection is provided for the life of the structure.
Prevention [F15-F19]
4.7 Sufficient Air Gap for 10,000-year Storm [Initiator F15]
ISO 19900 specifies that the air gap assessment philosophy should be based on the principle that
the deck height should be chosen such that the frequency of wave impact on the deck is compatible
with the target failure rate of the substructure. The NPD approach, which is applicable to the UKCS,
is based on a load and resistance factor design methodology and requires that extreme waves do
not cause major structural damage with an annual failure probability exceeding 10-4. It is
considered acceptable for load damage to occur provided that the structure remains capable of
withstanding the 100-year environmental load without progressive collapse. In both the 10,000-year
[intact] and 100-year [damaged] scenarios, load and resistance factors of unity are to be used.
4.8 Suitable Safety Factors [Fatigue, Applied Loading, Pile Loads, etc] [Initiator F16]
An important requirement in traditional deterministic approaches to engineering design is the
selection of appropriate safety factors, e.g. on fatigue life, the applied loading, the pile loads, etc. A
major calibration exercise has been performed on the ISO standard for offshore structures in order
to derive consistent values for partial safety factors [PSFs] for actions & resistance, based on a
selected target reliability. The target reliability is commonly taken to be the implied probability of
/ / 4 6
structural failure in codes & standards which are judged to be acceptable. For offshore structures,
the system target reliability based on extreme wave system reliability, ignoring fatigue analysis, has
been used.
4.9 High Redundancy [Initiator F17]
High redundancy is redundancy that is significantly more than that enshrined in the latest
standards. Claims for this should be examined with a view to establishing common load paths and
the adequacy of bracing giving the higher than standard redundancy.
4.10 Maintenance and Repair Management Procedures [Initiator F18]
See G17 Inadequate Management Systems Procedure.
4.11 Control Measures [Management/Structural] for Accidental Loads [Initiator F19]
The management system should ensure that the installation retains sufficient structural integrity in
the event of accidental damage so that the overall risk is maintained at an appropriate level.
Mitigation [F20F23]
4.12 Suitably Rated Fire & Blast Walls [Initiator F20]
A significant amount of work [including full scale testing] has been undertaken concerning the
science and engineering of fire and explosion loads and effects on offshore structures.
The design and reassessment framework for this work is currently being considered as the industry
moves to standardise and harmonise matters associated with these hazards.
Topsides structures are sensitive to fire and explosions and consequently it is important to model
steel panels realistically. The strengthening of structures to enable them to withstand large
explosions requires a better understanding of ultimate capacity performance and escalation
prediction. This requires understanding of and data on high temperature and strain rate effects on
materials plasticity and fracture behaviour.
4.13 High Redundancy [Initiator F23]
See F12 Redundancy.
G1 Extreme Weather including Wave-In-Deck Loading
/ / 4 6
Section 2.2.4 Vessel impact
Section 2.3.1 Loss of containment - Process
Section 2.3.3 Loss of containment - Fire & Explosion
Section 2.4.2 Diving Operations
Section 2.4.5 Helicopter Risks
Section 2.1.2 Risk Assessment (including Human Vulnerability)
/ / 4 6

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STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

2.2.1. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

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