Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh Summary Cases: Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh 75 Phil 113 G Subject: De Facto Government; Postliminy in International Law; Belligerent Occupation Facts: This involves a petition for mandamus praying that the respondent judge of the lower court be ordered to continue the proceedings in a civil case before said court. The proceedings were initiated under the regime of the government (called Republic of the Philippines) established during the Japanese military occupation. The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in the said case on the ground that the proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur, upon American re-occupation, had the effect of invalidating all judicial proceedings and judgements of the court of the Philippines under the Japanese military occupation, and that, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority. The respondent judge likewise contends that the government established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation were not de facto governments. Held: De Facto Government All acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid.There are three kinds of de facto governments.(a) Government de facto in the proper legal sense-- that government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains itself against the will of the latter. (b) Government of paramount force-- that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war. (c) That established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state Copyright Thinc Office Corp. All rights reserved The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines, both governments established during the Japanese military occupation, are de facto governments of the second kind. The fact that they were a civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals, is of no consequence. The ultimate source of its authority was the same ? the Japanese military authority and government. Being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. Courts are creatures of statutes and such laws, not being a political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty, and continue in force "ex proprio vigore" unless and until repealed by legislative acts. A proclamation that said laws and courts are expressly continued is not necessary. Principle of Postliminy According to that principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. Effects of a belligerent occupation According to the precepts of the Hague Conventions, the belligerent occupant:(i) possesses all the powers of a de facto government; (ii) can suspend the old laws and promulgate new ones and make such changes in the old as he may see fit; (iii) the municipal laws in force in the country must be respected, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances prevailing in the occupied territory. (i.e. affect private rights of person and property and provide for the punishment of crime); (iv) laws of a political nature or affecting political relations are considered as suspended during the military occupation (i.e. right of assembly, the right to bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the right to travel freely in the territory occupied); (v) local ordinary tribunals are authorized to continue administering justice; judges and other judicial officers are kept in their posts if they accept the authority of the belligerent occupant or are required to continue in their positions under the supervision of the military or civil authorities appointed. (vi) There is no transfer of sovereignty during a belligerent occupation. The occupation, being essentially provisional, does not serve to transfer sovereignty over the territory controlled. The de jure government, during the period of occupancy, is deprived of the power to exercise its rights as such. Copyright Thinc Office Corp. All rights reserved (Note: There is no suspension of sovereignty during a belligerent occupation, but merely the suspension of the exercise of sovereignty by the de jure government)
Afran Transport Company, as Owner of the Steamship Northern Gulf v. United States of America, British American Oil Co., Ltd. v. United States of America, and S.S. Northern Gulf Andafran Transport Company, Claimants-Third Party, 435 F.2d 213, 2d Cir. (1971)
David Golia Paladin v. Frank Finnerty, Chief Counsel Lawton Squires, Assistant Counsel Ruthann Geary, Assistant Counsel Catherine T. England, Chairwoman for the Second Judicial Department's 10th Judicial District, in Their Official and Individual Capacities, and in Their Successors in Interest Victor Levin and Michael F. Sperendi, Former Chairmen of the Committee on Grievances, Bar Association of Nassau County, New York, Inc., in Their Official and Individual Capacities, and in Their Successors in Interest Robert H. Straus, Chief Counsel, New York State Grievance Committee for the Second Judicial Department's 10th and 11th Judicial Districts, in His Official and Individual Capacity and in His Successor in Interest Gary Casella, Chief Counsel for the New York State Grievance Committee for the Second Judicial Department's 9th Judicial District, in His Official and Individual Capacity and in His Successor in Interest Honorable Guy J. Mangano, Presiding Justice in His Capacity as Chief Adm