Water war in the Mekong Basin?apv_1484 147..

162
Scott W.D. Pearse-Smith
National Centre for Peace and Conict Studies, University of Otago, C/O Scott Pearse-Smith, PO Box 56, Dunedin 9054,
New Zealand.
Email: scottps@gmail.com
Abstract: The Mekong River system provides a crucial source of natural resources for riparian
nations. However, the increasingly rapid pace of hydro-development in the Mekong Basin is threat-
ening the integrity of the river system, posing a real concern for Lower Basin states, which are
particularly dependent on the basin. This scenario has led to warnings of armed conict, or even
water war, between riparian states. Certainly, the expanding scale of hydro-development can be
expected to continue increasing interstate tensions in the Mekong region; but are these tensions
really likely to escalate to armed conict? This paper explores this question by drawing on the water
and conict theory of Aaron Wolf. Ultimately, this paper concludes that interstate tensions over
Mekong hydro-development are unlikely to generate armed conict. This is in part due to the
strategic impracticality of such a conict as well as the presence of a river basin management
institution. Most compellingly, though, armed conict is unlikely because the economic imperative
shared by Mekong states is better served by cooperation or at least non-interference than conict,
over regional hydro-development. In closing, the paper urges that the study of water and conict in
the Mekong Basin be refocused at the intrastate level.
Keywords: environmental conict, hydropower development, international relations, security,
transboundary rivers, water resources
Introduction
The Mekong River is the lifeblood of mainland
Southeast Asia. With the increasing pace and
scale of hydro-development in the Mekong
Basin, however, the integrity of this crucial
resource is under threat (Friend et al., 2009).
With the prospect of China adding four more
upper mainstream dams to the four it has
already built, in addition to Lao and Cambodian
plans for a combined twelve lower mainstream
dams, tensions between riparian nations are
undoubtedly increasing.
These tensions are generating growing con-
cern about the possibility of conict between
riparian nations. Conict is a broad term that
can be used to describe any situation where
two or more parties perceive their interests
are incompatible, express hostile attitudes,
or . . . pursue their interests through actions that
damage the other parties. (United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs
(UNDESA), 2003: 15) As such, the spectrum of
conict ranges in intensity from non-violent
conict to armed or violent conict, to full-
blown war. This paper focuses upon the risk of
armed interstate conict as a result of Mekong
hydro-development.
Some in the media have reported fears of
increasing hydropolitical tensions leading to war
between Mekong nations (Macan-Markar, 2009;
Hoyle, 2010; Mony, 2011). Experts have gener-
ally been more reserved, consciously avoiding
the ambiguous and provocative term, water
war (Gleick, 2010). However, that is not to say
that experts are not concerned about the possi-
bility of armed interstate conict. Water and
conict scholar Peter Gleick (2010) recently
warned of the possibility of Mekong hydro-
development giving way to interstate violence.
Brahma Chellaney (2011: 264) also warned that
the Mekong Basin holds the seeds of possible
inter-riparian conict,
1
in his recent book pro-
pounding water as Asias new battleground.
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Asia Pacic Viewpoint, Vol. 53, No. 2, August 2012
ISSN 1360-7456, pp147162
2012 Victoria University of Wellington doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8373.2012.01484.x
Other commentators, on the other hand,
dismiss the possibility of interstate tensions
escalating to armed conict as unlikely (Hirsch,
2004; Lauridsen, 2004; Keskinen et al., 2008;
MacQuarrie et al., 2009; Cronin and Hamlin,
2010). Commonly, these authors cite some
combination of the complex interdependencies
that exist among the Mekong countries and the
existence of the Mekong River Commission,
as the fundamental reason against escalation
to armed conict (Ravnborg, 2004: 16 citing
Lauridsen, 2004).
Despite the divergence of opinions, the issue
at hand lacks comprehensive analysis. This
paper attempts to explore the risk of armed
intrastate conict with greater focus and rigour.
To this effect, this analysis draws on the existing
water and conict literature, which has been
only sparingly applied to the Mekong context
to date. In particular, this study employs the
water and conict research of Aaron T. Wolf as
a theoretical framework.
Water and conict theory
Water and conict literature is that which con-
siders the ability of shared water resources to
generate violent conict. This topic was rst
popularised by the so-called water wars litera-
ture of the 1980s and 1990s.
2
Based largely on
anecdotal evidence and intuition, this writing
suggests that transboundary rivers are inherently
conict inducing, because water which does
not conform to political borders and is ever-
increasing in scarcity is a necessity of life for
which there is no substitute (Homer-Dixon,
1999; Wolf, 1999). As such, some have arrived
at the conclusion that, the wars of the [twenty-
rst] century will be about water.
3
More recently, researchers such as Wolf
(1998, 1999, 2001a,b) have developed a more
thorough and empirically based body of litera-
ture concerning the relationship between fresh-
water resources and conict. This was sparked
by the release of Oregon Universitys Trans-
boundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD)
study, which prompted an instant paradigm
shift in water and conict studies (Phillips
et al., 2006: 25). The most remarkable nding of
the TFDD study was that apart from one case
over 4500 years ago, there has never been a
single war fought over water (Wolf, 1998: 5). In
the twentieth century, only seven minor skir-
mishes occurred over transboundary water, in
contrast to 145 water-related treaties signed
over the same period (Wolf, 1998). This nding
led Wolf and other scholars to conclude
that shared water resources are more likely
to drive cooperation, rather than conict,
between states (Nicol, 2003; Wolf et al., 2003a;
MacQuarrie et al., 2009).
Wolfs theory does not simply rest on the
historical evidence that there has not been a
water war for 4500 years; he also propounds a
number of other reasons why armed interstate
conict over water is unlikely. First, he argues
that riparian nations generally have a number of
shared interests, which can be better served
through cooperation over water resources than
conict (Wolf, 1999). By cooperating over the
development and management of transbound-
ary water resources, states are able to turn an
otherwise zero-sum situation, into a positive-
sum situation of joint gains (Wolf, 2001a). For
example, one riparian nation might fund a
hydropower project in another riparian nation,
in return for a share of the power generated. In
another example, where a river acts as a bound-
ary, both riparian states have an interest in lim-
iting pollution to ensure a healthy river system
(Wolf, 1999).
Wolfs (1999: 261) second argument is that
where river basin management institutions or
agreements exist, they generally prove to be
tremendously resilient. Wolf (2001b) cites the
Mekong River Commissions survival of the
Vietnam War among his cases in point. Finally,
Wolf (1999) makes a strategic argument.
4
He
contends that for aggression to be a strategically
viable option for a riparian state against another
riparian state, a number of conditions must
coexist. First, the aggressor would have to be
both downstream from, and more powerful
than, the target nation. Second, the aggressor
would have to consider whether the attack
would actually achieve its purpose and secure a
healthy water supply. For example, if the objec-
tive was to destroy an upstream dam or indus-
trial facility, this may actually result in pollution
or a dangerous surge of water downstream. Fur-
thermore, the aggressor would also have to be
prepared to occupy the target nation after the
attack to ensure that the upstream nation does
not seek retribution by simply polluting the
S.W.D. Pearse-Smith
2012 Victoria University of Wellington 148
water source of the invading state. Fourth, both
countries could not be democracies, as political
science tells us that democracies will not wage
war with each other. Wolf (1999) concludes that
this list of requirements rules out aggression as
strategically viable in the vast majority of the
worlds transnational river basins although not
the Mekong.
Despite Wolfs (1998: 9) proclamation that
[n]ations do not, and probably will not, go to
war over water, he does acknowledge that
some conict is to be expected between ripar-
ian nations over the management of trans-
boundary river systems (Wolf et al., 2003a). He
identies two key variables that affect the risk of
tension, and thus conict, in transboundary
basins: the institutional capacity of the basin
management institution and the rate of change
in the basin (Wolf et al., 2003a); The likelihood
and intensity of conict rises as the rate of
change within a basin exceeds the institutional
capacity to absorb that change (Wolf, 2001a:
10). He considers the most rapid changes that
can take place in a basin to be the creation of
new riparian nations, or on the physical side,
the development of a large-scale dam or diver-
sion project (Wolf, 2001a: 10).
Hydro-development of the Mekong Basin
The Mekong Basin
The Mekong Basin is dened by the land area
surrounding all the streams and rivers that ow
into the Mekong River (Mekong River Commis-
sion (MRC), 2011: para. 1). The Mekong River
5
begins its 4800-kilometre journey on the
Tibetan Plateau in the basin hegemon and
single-party socialist superpower China. As it
exits Chinas Yunnan Province, it forms the
border between the reclusive military dictator-
ship of Myanmar and another single-party
socialist state Lao PDR. It then ows into Lao
PDR, before forming 600 kilometres of the Lao
border with the basins most developed and
democratic nation Thailand. The Mekong then
enters the Lower Basins poorest nation the
newly democratic Cambodia. After cutting
south through Cambodia, the Mekong enters
the rapidly developing, single-party socialist
state of Vietnam. Once in Vietnam, the river
transforms into the Mekong delta, before nally
emptying into the South China Sea (Backer,
2006; Sneddon and Fox, 2006; Adamson et al.,
2009).
The Mekong Basin can be usefully divided
into two sub-basins. The Upper Mekong Basin
refers to the area of the Mekong Basin that is
within the national territories of China and
Myanmar (Radosevich and Olson, 1999). This
comprises about 30% of the area of the basin as
a whole and has a population of about 15
million. From the Golden Triangle, south, is
the Lower Mekong Basin, representing the area
of the Mekong Basin within the national territo-
ries of Lao PDR, Thailand, Cambodia and
Vietnam (Elhance, 1999). This accounts for the
remaining 70% of the area of the Mekong Basin
and is home to about 60 million people (MRC,
2010a); 29.6 million of whom live and work
within 15 kilometres of the Mekong River itself
(International Centre for Environmental Man-
agement (ICEM), 2010a).
The Lower Mekong Basin is more important,
both socio-economically and environmentally,
than the Upper Basin (United Nations Environ-
ment Programme, 2006: 11). The Upper Basin is
largely mountainous, while the Lower Basin
consists of vast areas of lowland and ood
plain. The population of the Lower Basin is over-
whelmingly rural
6
and heavily dependent on the
basins natural resources. The Mekong River is
responsible for the supply of these natural
resources, most notably by providing sh and
nurturing agricultural land (Sarkkula et al.,
2009). Local economic and food security are so
inextricably intertwined with the natural envi-
ronment that the locals are said to have river-
based livelihoods (Shoemaker et al., 2001: 59).
The majority of the populations of Lao PDR
and Cambodia live within the Mekong Basin,
7
and accordingly these states are almost totally
dependent on the river, particularly for sh and
agriculture (Goh, 2007: 19). Vietnam, although
having a much smaller percentage of its popu-
lation within the Mekong Basin,
8
also depends
on the Mekong Basin for the majority of its food
production (Cabrera, 2003; Goh, 2007). Though
at a national level, Thailand is arguably the least
dependent on the Mekongs natural resources of
all the Lower Basin nations, the river still sup-
ports the livelihoods of around a third of its 66
million people, giving it the single largest share
of the basin population (Goh, 2007).
Water war in the Mekong Basin?
2012 Victoria University of Wellington 149
Overview of Mekong hydro-development
Hydro-development can be dened as the
development of a river basins water resources.
Broadly, there are three types of hydro-
development taking place in, or planned for, the
Mekong Basin. The most high prole and the
most environmentally destructive is hydro-
power development. Navigational clearing and
water abstraction generally receive less atten-
tion but also have the potential to alter the
hydrological regime of the Mekong. Each of
these types of hydro-development has already
occurred to some extent in the Mekong Basin,
but what is most concerning is the number and
scale of new projects that have recently been
proposed.
Since early 2007 there has been a rapid
acceleration in hydropower development in
the Mekong Basin (Friend et al., 2009: 307). In
the Lower Mekong Basin, there are already
25 operational tributary dams, with another 99
tributary dams at various stages of exploration
(ICEM, 2010a; MRC, 2010a). A number of
projects have, however, been slowed due to a
downturn in investment resulting from the
global nancial crisis of 2008 (MRC, 2009a).
To date, China is the only nation to have
dammed the mainstreamMekong (see Figure 1).
It has so far constructed the rst four dams in a
planned cascade of up to eight storage hydro-
electric projects (ICEM, 2010a). The lower main-
stream, on the other hand, remains undammed.
However, at least 12 potential mainstream
hydropower developments are currently being
considered by private sector developers for the
Lower Basin (MRC, 2009b). Ten of these pro-
posed projects are planned for Lao PDR, and the
other two for Cambodia. While the majority of
these projects are to be constructed on internal
stretches of the Mekong, two of the Lao projects
are planned for the stretch of the Mekong that
forms the ThaiLao border (ICEM, 2010a). Site
preparation for the rst of the 12 proposed main-
stream projects, Xayaburi, began in April 2011,
with the Lao government and its Thai developer
beginning preparatory earth works and resettle-
ment (Bangkok Post, 2011). However, progress
has since halted, with the Lao government agree-
ing in December 2011 to delay the project
pending further impact studies (International
Rivers, 2011).
As well as mainstream hydropower develop-
ment, the Chinese government is also funding a
navigational clearing project,
9
which aims to
allow ships to navigate freely from Simao in
China to Luang Prabang in Lao PDR (Interna-
tional Rivers Network, 2002; Hirsch, 2004;
Mirumachi and Nakayama, 2007). The project
involves the clearing of rapids, shoals and reefs,
and canalisation of the mainstream Mekong. In
April 2002, the governments of China, Lao
PDR, Myanmar and Thailand signed the Agree-
ment of Commercial Navigation on Lancang-
Mekong River, which signalled the beginning
of the projects implementation (Mirumachi and
Nakayama, 2007). The fate of this project is
unclear, with reports that the Chinese govern-
ment abandoned it after the rst of three phases
(Onishi, 2011).
The nal category of hydro-development
taking place in the Mekong Basin is water
abstraction. This is the diversion or removal of
water from any surface or underground source
for some purpose, such as irrigation (Agricul-
ture Dictionary, 2011). Small-scale abstraction
is common throughout the Mekong Basin and
does not pose a signicant threat to the
Mekongs hydrology (ICEM, 2010a). Speculative
Thai and Chinese plans to divert large quan-
tities of water from the Mekong Basin to other
river basins, on the other hand, are cause for
concern (Molle et al., 2009; Cronin, 2010b;
Tran, 2010). However, the details of any such
developments remain speculative, and very little
information on them is publicly available.
The impacts of Mekong hydro-development
The Mekong River is among the last few large
rivers of the world not dammed for most of its
length and the last remaining river to still ow
freely through ve nations. The Mekongs
hydrological system has remained in dynamic
equilibrium with the ecology and climate of the
basin for thousands of years (ICEM, 2010a).
Over the past 15 years, however, hydropower
development has begun to alter the hydrology
of the basin (UNEP, 2006; ICEM, 2010a). The
cumulative effects of hydropower dam con-
struction on the mainstream and its tributaries
are transforming the fundamental characteris-
tics of the river regime, with pervasive repercus-
sions not only for natural systems, but also for
S.W.D. Pearse-Smith
2012 Victoria University of Wellington 150
Figure 1. Map of the Mekong Basin showing current and proposed mainstream hydropower projects. Map design: Author.
Data source: Mekong River Commission.
Water war in the Mekong Basin?
2012 Victoria University of Wellington 151
hydropower
navigational clearing
water abstraction
social systems and economies (ICEM, 2010a).
These impacts will be accelerated as the pace
and scale of Mekong hydro-development con-
tinues to expand.
It is those situated downstream from hydro-
development projects that face the greatest
impacts of the changing hydrology, although
even those situated upstream from hydro-
development cannot escape all of its negative
impacts. Changes in the Mekongs ow regime
act to deplete and degrade the natural resources
upon which millions of people in the Lower
Basin nations rely (Pearse-Smith, 2012).
Perhaps most concerning for Lower Basin
nations is the forecasted decimation of sh
stocks
10
(Sarkkula et al., 2009; ICEM, 2010a).
The Lower Basin mainstream dams, in parti-
cular, are likely to fundamentally undermine
the abundance, productivity and diversity of
Mekong sh resources (ICEM, 2010a: 16). This
poses a serious livelihood threat to millions in
the Lower Basin nations, where shing is a fun-
damental source of food, nutrition and income
(Friend et al., 2009; Sarkkula et al., 2009; ICEM,
2010a; MRC, 2010b). As such, a large potential
decline in sh production would have very sig-
nicant economic and social impacts (MRC,
2010b: 13). Due to the upstream migration pat-
terns of the majority of Mekong sh species, the
impact on sheries is also of considerable
concern for those situated upstream from
planned hydropower projects (Baird, 2011).
The productivity of agriculture, which is the
other fundamental livelihood source for the
Lower Mekong Basin population, will also be
detrimentally affected by continued hydro-
development. Agriculture is the largest employ-
ment sector in each of the Lower Mekong Basin
nations
11
(MRC, 2010a), and rice is the food
staple for most of the region (MRC, 2010b).
Hydro-development reduces agricultural pro-
ductivity by inundating agricultural land (ICEM,
2010a), reducing the supply and distribution of
natural nutrients to Lower Basin oodplains
(UNEP, 2006; ICEM, 2010a), destroying river-
bank gardens (World Commission on Dams,
2000; ICEM, 2010b) and causing unpredictable
ooding that can destroy productive assets
(Wyatt and Baird, 2007).
12
Continued hydro-development is therefore
destined to have a profound impact on the eco-
nomic and food security of millions in the
Lower Basin nations (Sarkkula et al., 2009). Lao
PDR, Cambodia and Vietnam as the states
most dependent on the Mekongs natural
resources and most vulnerable to upstream
hydro-development will be impacted most
severely (Goh, 2007).
Interstate tension
Hydro-development as a source of interstate
tension
The scale and extent of the impacts of contin-
ued hydro-development is of real concern for
Lower Basin states. The extent of livelihood
losses, in particular, will place immense pres-
sure on the governments of affected nations.
Vietnam and Cambodia, as the most down-
stream nations, are particularly nervous about
how they will fare as hydro-development con-
tinues in upstream states (Goh, 2004, 2007;
Goodman, 2004; Vietnamese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2005).
As could be expected, a number of tensions
are beginning to arise between upstream and
downstream states concerning the transbound-
ary impacts of hydro-development (Daoroung,
2011). Problematically, the number of riparian
states, in combination with the complexity of
ecological systems, often makes the precise
identication of cause and effect relationships
between hydro-development and ecological
changes difcult. Thus, there can be difculties
in establishing not just which nation is to blame
for what, but even whether particular changes
in the Mekong ecosystem are induced by hydro-
development at all (Stone, 2010). One basic
example of the interstate misunderstanding,
nger-pointing and tension that can result, is
the Cambodian government blaming the Lao
government for causing downstream contami-
nation of the Mekong via improper water dis-
posal. The Lao government counters these
accusations by claiming that it is Cambodian
boats illegally crossing into Lao waters that
cause the problem (ICEM, 2010b). This illus-
trates how easily disagreements and tensions
can arise between upstream and downstream
states.
Large-scale hydro-development projects can
therefore be expected to create proportionately
larger and more intense disagreements and
S.W.D. Pearse-Smith
2012 Victoria University of Wellington 152
tensions. One such example is farmers and of-
cials of Lower Basin nations blaming the
Chinese Yunnan cascade for a severe drought in
2010, when subsequent scientic accounts
suggest that the drought was, for the most part,
a natural occurrence (Schearf, 2010; Son, 2010;
VOA News, 2010; Wheatley, 2010).
The lack of institutional capacity
The large scale and rapid pace of Mekong
hydro-development was one of two reasons that
the Mekong was identied as a basin at risk of
tension and conict by Oregon State Universi-
tys Basins at Risk project. The other was that
the Mekong lacks the institutional capacity to
absorb these changes (Wolf et al., 2003a). Insuf-
cient institutional capacity in this case refers
to the weak mandate of the Mekong River Com-
mission (MRC) and the associated Mekong
Agreement,
13
combined with the fact that only
four out of the six riparian nations are mem-
bers (Backer, 2006). The MRC the river basin
management institution at which each of the
four Lower Basin states are represented is
merely a consultative body and cannot prevent
any member from acting unilaterally (MRC,
2001; Lauridsen, 2004). The Mekong Agree-
ment merely requires the consultation of all
members before implementing a mainstream
project with transboundary implications; con-
sensus is not required (Nguyen, 1999; Yu,
2003). For tributary projects, consultation is not
even required; the other member states need
only be informed. Furthermore, the regional
hegemon and uppermost riparian, China, is not
a party to the agreement nor a member of the
MRC and neither is Myanmar (Sunchindah,
2005; Keskinen et al., 2008).
Tension between China and the Lower
Basin states
Increased tension can certainly be expected
between China and the Lower Basin riparian
states as China continues its cascade of hydro-
power dams on the upper mainstream. Due to
the huge storage capacity of Chinas main-
stream dams (MRC, 2010a), there is concern
that they will provide China with the potential
to control the release of water to downstream
nations (Goh, 2004, 2007). While only around
16% of the Mekongs total annual ow origi-
nates in China (MRC, 2010a),
14
this still pro-
vides China with further political power in the
Mekong Basin and a potential bargaining tool
for negotiations with the other riparian states
(Cabrera, 2003; Cronin, 2010a). Chinas limited
enquiry into the downstream environmental
and social consequences of its hydro-
development projects is another key cause for
concern for downstream states (Hirsch et al.,
2006; Goh, 2007). Impact assessments on
Chinas mainstream dams have been repeatedly
criticised for underestimating the negative
downstream impacts (Keskinen et al., 2008).
Despite these concerns, downstream nations
recognise that they only have limited inuence
over Chinese hydro-development (Goh, 2004,
2007). For instance, a Cambodian cabinet min-
ister was quoted as saying of Chinese main-
stream hydropower development (Goodman,
2004: paras. 9 and 15):
China, they will work for their own coun-
try . . . We are downstream, so we suffer all the
negative consequences. If there is no more
water for us, no more sh, no more vegetation,
this is a big disaster . . . They are upstream.
They are a richer country operating in their
own sovereign territory. How can we stop
them?
The Vietnamese government has been the
most vocal against Chinas unilateral approach
to hydro-development of the mainstream (Meh-
tonen, 2008). At a 2005 regional summit, the
Vietnamese Prime Minister emphasised that
when exploiting the resources of the Mekong
Basin, the pursuit of an upstream nations
national interests should not compromise the
interests of downstream nations (Vietnamese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005).
Due to its position as the uppermost riparian
and regional hegemon, China has traditionally
seen little incentive to participate in basin man-
agement. This self-centred approach to hydro-
development (Keskinen et al., 2008: 9192) is
reective of Chinas traditional preference to
keep what goes on within its national borders as
a strictly internal issue (Goh, 2004). Chinas
position, however, appears to be gradually shift-
ing. It has begun to realise the value in present-
ing itself as a responsible neighbour (Sokhem
Water war in the Mekong Basin?
2012 Victoria University of Wellington 153
and Sunada, 2008), moving towards a more
cooperative and constructive approach to the
downstream nations (Onishi, 2011).
Tension among the Lower Basin states
Recently, Vietnamese ofcials have become
increasingly vocal in expressing their concerns
about the rst of Lao PDRs 10 planned main-
stream dams, Xayaburi (Barta, 2011; Ghosh,
2011). Vietnam is forecast to receive the small-
est share of the regional benets of mainstream
hydropower development,
15
while the produc-
tivity of its delta region is likely to be dramati-
cally affected (Cronin, 2010a; ICEM, 2010a,b).
In response to the commencement of construc-
tion on Xayaburi, Vietnam has called for a
10-year moratorium on mainstream hydro-
power development. Thai and Cambodian of-
cials have also notably failed to endorse
Xayaburi, requesting that further research be
carried out on the expected environmental
impacts (De Launey, 2011). In December 2011,
this pressure resulted in the decision of the Lao
government to delay construction on Xayaburi,
pending further impact studies (International
Rivers, 2011). Ultimately, a nal decision on the
future of Xayaburi still has to be made. Yet,
despite the recent delay, it is unclear whether
the pressure from the other Lower Basin nations
will be enough to prevent Xayaburi from going
ahead (Ghosh, 2011). The construction of the
Xayaburi dam risks opening the oodgates for
the subsequent construction of the other
planned lower mainstream dams, leading some
to speculate that Xayaburi will become a
regional ashpoint (Economist, 2011; Trandem
and Cochrane, 2011).
Why these tensions are unlikely to escalate to
armed conict
Riparian states share common goals that can
be better achieved through cooperation
Despite the interstate tensions that large-scale
hydro-development can create in a transbound-
ary river basin, it also presents opportunities for
interstate cooperation towards common goals
(Keskinen et al., 2008). In all six riparian states,
the economic imperative enjoys remarkable
primacy (Goh, 2004: 7). Accordingly, the ripar-
ian governments generally view the Mekong
Basins resources as exploitable in order to
advance economic growth and modernisation
(Goh, 2004; Lang, 2004; Foran and Manorom,
2009). By cooperating, or simply refraining
from interfering, each state can attain some eco-
nomic benet from the hydro-development of
the Mekong Basin.
The Mekong nations are currently experienc-
ing a period of rapid economic growth and
stability not encountered for centuries. Result-
antly, the region is demanding ever-increasing
volumes of electricity and other resources
(Middleton et al., 2009). Forecasted electricity
demand for the Lower Mekong Basin nations
shows a projected increase of up to seven times
the 2005 level by 2020 (MRC, 2010a). While
the accuracy of such predictions is questionable
(Greacen and Palettu, 2007),
16
all Mekong
nations have a strong interest in ensuring access
to reliable and sufcient sources of power,
which is required to underpin economic growth
and modernisation (King et al., 2007).
While Cambodia and to a much lesser
extent, Lao PDR do need to increase domestic
electricity supply, the real driver of mainstream
hydropower projects in Lao PDR and Cambodia
is demand from Thai and Vietnamese markets
(UNEP, 2006; ICEM, 2010a). Vietnam and Thai-
land stand to receive the majority of the power
generated by the mainstream projects, with Thai
and Vietnamese companies set to undertake
much of the construction work (ICEM, 2010a;
Finch, 2011; Hirsch, 2011). In return, Cambo-
dia and Lao PDR will boost their foreign
exchange and tax revenues, while facilitating
industrial growth domestically (ICEM, 2010b).
China, too, exports power to Thailand and
Vietnam, and these exports are set to increase as
development of the Yunnan cascade continues.
These entangled mutual benets align with the
economic imperative that dominates in each of
the Mekong states.
This provides one explanation why, despite
the potentially devastating impact of hydro-
development on the livelihoods of millions of
riparian people, interstate criticism and opposi-
tion of hydro-development proposals have been
relatively limited (UNEP, 2006; Keskinen et al.,
2007). The case of the Yali Falls dam located
on the Se San tributary in Vietnam is illustra-
tive of this unwillingness to criticise regional
S.W.D. Pearse-Smith
2012 Victoria University of Wellington 154
hydro-development. Despite the severe impacts
the Yali Falls dam has had on downstream
Cambodian communities since its completion
in 2001, the Cambodian government remains
reluctant to make an issue out of Yali Falls
with the Vietnamese government (Hirsch and
Wyatt, 2004: 65). Vietnam has plans to build
further dams along the Se San and neighbour-
ing Sre Pok tributaries (Wyatt and Baird,
2007), yet the Cambodian government appears
to have its hands tied by its own desire to
build two mainstream dams upstream from
Vietnam.
Despite some very careful expressions of
concern, the economic imperative is also likely
to prevent any major interstate opposition of
Chinese hydro-development (Cabrera, 2003).
Some Lower Basin states actually stand to
receive some benet from the Yunnan cascade
by way of its contribution to the regional power
trade (Mehtonen, 2008).
17
As well as providing
a much-needed boost to domestic electricity
supply, China plans to increase its power
exports to Thailand, Vietnam and Lao PDR as
the Yunnan cascade proceeds (EVN, 2006 cited
in Middleton et al., 2009; Mehtonen, 2008;
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand,
2009). In addition to an increasing number of
interstate electricity importexport agreements,
interstate investment in riparian nations energy
industries is also increasingly common (Meh-
tonen, 2008). These investment arrangements
are multidirectional, with Chinese companies
investing in Lao, Vietnamese and Cambodian
hydropower development, and Vietnamese and
Thai companies investing in Chinese hydro-
power development (Mehtonen, 2008; Hirsch,
2011).
Even those states that will not receive the
same degree of benet from Chinese hydro-
development are unlikely to vocally oppose it,
for fear of jeopardising their economic and
political relationships with the worlds second
largest economy (Mehtonen, 2008; Central
Intelligence Agency (United States), 2011).
This is particularly so for the governments of
the smallest riparian nations, Cambodia and
Lao PDR, who rely heavily on China as a
major foreign investor, donor and trading
partner (Keskinen et al., 2007; Mehtonen, 2008;
Osborne, 2010). Furthermore, those govern-
ments that have their own mainstream hydro-
development plans have little choice but to
remain silent for fear of indirectly criticising
their own plans or appearing hypocritical
(Mehtonen, 2008; Gray, 2011).
A telling illustration of the propensity of ripar-
ian nations to cooperate in furtherance of their
shared economic imperative is the navigational
clearing agreement, proposed by China, and
signed by the governments of Thailand, Lao
PDR and Myanmar (IRN, 2002; Hirsch, 2004).
This was not simply an omission to oppose
domestically harmful hydro-development, but
rather a positive decision made by the state
parties to put their regional trade interests above
the livelihood concerns of millions of local con-
stituents (Hirsch, 2004).
Historical evidence and institutional resiliency
Historical evidence also weighs against armed
interstate conict over the Mekongs water
resources: The Mekong has seen remarkably
few [interstate] conicts over water, and when
occurring, these have had the form of political
tensions rather than involving violent confron-
tation between riparian countries (Lauridsen,
2004: 48). The Transboundary Freshwater
Dispute Database (TFDD) has recorded only 16
conictive interstate events concerning water
resources in the period 19482008 for the
Mekong Basin, compared with 110 cooperative
events in the same period (TFDD, 2011a) (see
Figure 2). All but one of the conictive events
received the lowest conictive classication,
mild or unofcial verbal hostility, while the
other received the second lowest classication,
strong or ofcial verbal hostility (TFDD,
2011a). This is an impressive record considering
the regions tumultuous and conictual history
(Weatherebee, 1997; Lauridsen, 2004; Keski-
nen et al., 2008), which is littered with warfare
and abounding mutual suspicions (Ball, 1999:
15).
The lack of violent interstate conict over
water resources in the Mekong is often attrib-
uted to the existence, since 1957, of a river
basin management institution (Lauridsen, 2004;
Macquarrie et al., 2008; Yun, 2010). Now in its
third iteration,
18
the MRC has survived through
periods of violent conict between its member
states over other issues, including the Vietnam
War, and more recently the ongoing border
Water war in the Mekong Basin?
2012 Victoria University of Wellington 155
dispute between Thailand and Cambodia (Wolf
et al., 2003a; Lauridsen, 2004; Security Council
Report, 2011). Throughout such periods of
conict between member states, the MRC has
continued to meet and provide a ow of
information concerning water resources (Wolf
et al., 2003a; Lauridsen, 2004).
This conforms to the theory of Wolf et al.
(2003b) that river basin institutions are remark-
ably resilient, and their existence drastically
reduces the likelihood of interstate conict over
water-related resources. Notwithstanding the
weaknesses of the MRC,
19
it at least provides a
forum for sharing and discussion on water-
related issues between Lower Basin riparian
states. Even China, despite its continued prefer-
ence to operate outside of the MRC framework
(Sneddon and Fox, 2006), has become more
willing to utilise the MRC as a forum for com-
munication and information sharing (Goh,
2007; Kate, 2010; Lam, 2010; MRC, 2010c;
Hirsch, 2011; Onishi, 2011).
It is in these dual roles of ensuring formal
channels of communication between riparian
states, and providing a mechanism for conduct-
ing technical studies, that the MRC serves to
signicantly reduce the likelihood that armed
interstate conict will result from hydro-
development (Lauridsen, 2004; Ghosh, 2011).
Strategic argument
The limited strategic viability of armed interstate
conict over the Mekongs water resources is
another factor that reduces its likelihood. As
theorised by Wolf (1999: 259), for violent inter-
vention to be a strategically viable option, the
aggressor would need to be both downstream
Figure 2. International water events in the Mekong River Basin (19522008)
Source: Constructed by the author with data from the TFDD Database 2011. Notes: Only events involving two or more
Mekong States are included. Does not include multiple instances of the same event. For a description of the BAR Scale
rating system, see Appendix I Table 1
BAR, Basins at Risk.
S.W.D. Pearse-Smith
2012 Victoria University of Wellington 156
and the regional hegemon an upstream ripar-
ian state would have no cause to launch an
attack and a weaker state would be foolhardy to
do so. This already limits the possibility of
armed interstate conict in the Mekong to
Vietnam acting as the aggressor against either
Cambodia or Lao PDR, or perhaps Thailand
against Lao PDR.
20
Furthermore, the aggressor
would also have to consider an ongoing occu-
pation of the defending nation in order to
prevent retaliation, which the defending nation
could otherwise achieve simply by sabotaging
the water supply of the downstream nation.
Additionally, if the objective was to destroy a
hydro-development project such as a dam, this
could result in downstream pollution, or a wall
of water rushing back on the downstream terri-
tory (Wolf, 1999: 259). Therefore, though the
Mekong has been identied as a basin where
armed interstate conict is feasible, based on
the above analysis, it seems highly unlikely due
to the huge effort, expense and risk the aggres-
sor would face.
Conclusion
As stated by Lauridsen (2004: 49), whether
diverging interests in water resource manage-
ment will trigger future conicts between states
is difcult to predict. Despite the Mekong
Rivers fairly peaceful interstate record to date,
as the scale and pace of hydro-development
increases, so too does the competition for the
water-related resources of the Mekong Basin
(Lauridsen, 2004; Goh, 2007). This is supported
by data from the TFDD (2011a), which has
recorded 13 conictive events since 2002,
compared with only three recorded in the
period from 1948 to 2002. While all of the
conictive events recorded since 2002 have
been classied as being in the mildest category,
they do portray a clear increase in interstate
tensions over water-related resources.
Considered in light of the empirically
grounded theory of Aaron T. Wolf, however,
these increased tensions seem unlikely to esca-
late to armed conict. This is in part due to the
resilience of the Mekong River Commission as
well as the strategic impracticality of such a
conict. Perhaps most importantly though, the
dominant motives of economic development
and modernisation held by each of the Mekong
states render the economic benets of hydro-
development too attractive, and the risk of
getting offside with major trading partners too
dangerous, to forcibly interfere. The pursuit of
these economic benets generally seems to out-
weigh any tensions owing to the negative
impacts of hydro-development, leading in many
cases to the Mekong nations actually becoming
more cooperative.
Therefore, despite recent warnings of a water
war, I conclude that armed interstate conict
over Mekong hydro-development remains
unlikely in the foreseeable future (Hirsch, 2004;
Lauridsen, 2004; Keskinen et al., 2008). I share
the concerns of Hirsch (2004), that in focusing
too squarely on water conict at the interstate
level, we are neglecting many more intense
conicts playing out at the intrastate level. By
providing a strong case against the risk of armed
interstate conict, it is my hope that this paper
will help to refocus the study of water and con-
ict in the Mekong Basin at the intrastate level.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to the Otago Graduate Research
Committee for their support, by means of the
University of Otago Postgraduate Publishing
Bursary. I would also like to thank the anony-
mous reviewers for their valuable feedback.
Notes
1 Unfortunately, Chellaney (2011) does not elaborate on
the intensity level of the conict he envisages.
2 See, for example, Cooley (1984), Westing (1986), Starr
(1991), Gleick (1993) and Butts (1997).
3 Famously claimed by World Bank Vice President Ismail
Seraeldin (quoted in the New York Times, 10 August
1995).
4 See also Homer-Dixon (1999), who makes a similar
argument.
5 It should be noted that the Mekong River as it ows
through the Upper Mekong Basin is called by the
Chinese, Lancang Jiang. For simplicity, I refer to the
entire river as the Mekong.
6 About 85% of the Lower Basin population lives in rural
areas (Landscan data, 2007 cited in MRC, 2010a).
7 About 91% of the Lao population and about 82% of
the Cambodian population live within the Mekong
Basin (Goh, 2007).
8 About 22% of the Vietnamese population lives within
the Mekong Basin (Goh, 2007).
9 Formally titled the Navigation Channel Improvement
Project from China-Myanmar Boundary Marker 243 to
Ban Houei Sai of Laos.
Water war in the Mekong Basin?
2012 Victoria University of Wellington 157
10 If 11 of the proposed lower mainstream dams proceed,
the total sh loss is forecasted to be between 26% and
42% (ICEM, 2010a).
11 Agriculture employs between 65% and 85% of the
labour force in Vietnam, Cambodia and Lao PDR
(MRC, 2010a).
12 For a more detailed account of the impact of Mekong
hydro-development on local livelihoods, see Pearse-
Smith (2012).
13 Formally titled the Agreement on the Cooperation for
the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River
Basin 1995.
14 Although, when considering the impact of Chinese
dams in the Upper Mekong, it is worth noting the
relative importance of the ow volume contributed by
the Chinese section of the Mekong at different dis-
tances downstream, and at different times of year. At
Kratie (Cambodia), which is in the lower part of the
Lower Basin, the Chinese component provides only
about 1520% of the wet-season ow, while in the dry
season, it can account for up to 40% of the ow. At
Vientiane (Lao PDR), which is in the upper reaches of
the Lower Basin, the Chinese component provides as
much as 75% of the dry-season ow, and as much as
50% of the wet-season ow most years. When aver-
aged for the whole year and whole length of the river,
however, the contribution of the Chinese component
equates to only about 16% of the Mekongs ow
(Adamson et al., 2009).
15 Vietnam is likely to receive only 5% of the total
regional economic benets of the proposed Lower
Basin mainstream hydro-development projects. Lao
PDR is forecast to receive more than 70%, while Cam-
bodia and Thailand are expected to receive 1112%
each (ICEM, 2010a).
16 Energy forecasts for the Mekong region must always be
taken somewhat sceptically, given that they are gener-
ally made by hydropower proponents and habitually
overestimated (Greacen and Palettu, 2007).
17 Principally Thailand, but Vietnam and Lao PDR also
plan to import power from Yunnan (Mehtonen, 2008:
168).
18 The Mekong River basin institution was originally the
called the Mekong Committee, then the Interim
Mekong Committee, before becoming the Mekong
River Commission in 1995.
19 Namely, the lack of Chinese and Burmese membership
and its weak mandate.
20 The idea that the Lower Basin states might unite against
China is highly unrealistic, given the extreme power
asymmetry, and the inability of the Lower Basin states
to align their interests and coordinate their actions
(Goh, 2007: 56).
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Appendix I
Table 1. Explanation of the BAR Scale
BAR
Scale
Event Description
-7 Formal Declaration of War
-6 Extensive War Acts causing deaths, dislocation or
high strategic cost.
-5 Small scale military acts.
-4 Political-military hostile actions.
-3 Diplomatic-economic hostile actions [Includes:
Unilateral construction of water projects against
another countrys protests; reducing ow of
water to another country, abrogation of a water
agreement.]
-2 Strong verbal expressions displaying hostility in
interaction. [Ofcial interactions only.]
-1 Mild verbal expressions displaying discord in
interaction [Both unofcial and ofcial,
including diplomatic notes of protest.]
0 Neutral or non-signicant acts for the inter-nation
situation
1 Minor ofcial exchanges, talks or policy
expressions mild verbal support.
2 Ofcial verbal support of goals, values, or regime.
3 Cultural or scientic agreement or support
(non-strategic). [Includes: Agreements to set up
cooperative working groups.]
4 Non-military economic, technological or industrial
agreement. [Includes: Legal, cooperative actions
between nations that are not treaties; cooperative
projects for watershed management, irrigation,
poverty-alleviation.]
5 Military economic or strategic support.
6 International Freshwater Treaty; Major strategic
alliance (regional or international.
7 Voluntary unication into one nation.
Source: Adapted from TFDD (2011b)
S.W.D. Pearse-Smith
2012 Victoria University of Wellington 162
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