1

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly
inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed
the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's
decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14,
1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals
1
its decision are as
follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as
evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to
the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy
making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof,
then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The
same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as
husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his
nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But,
during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long
walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the
same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no
attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor
did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the
Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her
husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor
prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her
husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that
she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And
that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in
the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological
incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her
very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the
relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and
that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured.
He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there
was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he
wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts,
she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he
did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1)
that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the
defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a
chance to overcome their differences.
2

The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the
purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report.
(Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh.
"2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and he
found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened
by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis
is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of
having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the evidence is
not fabricated."
2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the
defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila,
before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties without
making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological
incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other
constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying itself
that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the
allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the
parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid
acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial
court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it
could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading.
But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall
always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of
marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent
testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by
the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be came
incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on
March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no
judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and
101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is
no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual
contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged
resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva
Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of
whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved
upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have
sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any
physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a
serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).
4

3

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the
trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for
such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have been other reasons,
i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, why private respondent would not want to have sexual
intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and
private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus
between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the
psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering from
phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for private
respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing
her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there
is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he
presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of
erection.
5
Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private
respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and
the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity.
6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse
with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during
the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of
symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she balked
(Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife
was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens
his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her
husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would
expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put
her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to
perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper
motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to
perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious
personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the
contemplation of the Family Code.
7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity
(Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not
any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another.
Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so
because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy
which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is a shared feeling which
between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual
communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the
other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting
adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled
vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is
hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.


4

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony.
Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled
in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouses
capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision
1
and Resolution
2
of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001
and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment
3
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring
the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful
consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely
a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel
4
at the Manila City Hall, and through a
subsequent church wedding
5
at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.
6
Out of
their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,
7
petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his
petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondents incapacity existed at the time their marriage was
celebrated and still subsists up to the present.
8

As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about
herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things,
9
to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,
10
and instead introduced the boy to petitioner
as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boys parentage when petitioner learned about it
from other sources after their marriage.
11

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident
occurred.
12

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that
she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.
13

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a
single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that
a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect
14
but
petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place.
15

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner
claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2
million.
16
Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she
admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.
17
He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her
imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.
18

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a
higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture
dealer.
19
She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.
20

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts.
When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a
reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991.
21

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a
normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondents persistent and
constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and
respect.
22
They further asserted that respondents extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia
since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded
based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.
23

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her
husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented
personalities.
24
She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband.
25

(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from Davids act of
touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.
26

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for
two (2) years.
27

5

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3)
commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She
told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to
the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine
Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.
28

(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez
Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.
29

(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic
matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husbands whereabouts.
30

(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly budget
of P7,000.00.
31

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her
by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient
for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.
32

In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her
psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant,
33
together with the screening
procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that
respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive
behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the
presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.
34

In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one
who administered and interpreted respondents psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called
CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test.
35

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that respondents propensity to lying about almost
anythingher occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among othershad been duly established.
According to the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in
a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage.
36
The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the
Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties.
37
During the pendency of the
appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunals ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due
discretion.
38
Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the
Vatican.
39

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the
RTCs judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals
nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondents psychological
incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals
40
governing the application and
interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate courts pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein that
the evidence conclusively establish respondents psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual
allegations of petitioner.
41
It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof.
42
The Court is
likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner.
Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of
respondent.
43

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains
as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the Courts 1997 ruling
in Republic v. Court of Appeals
44
(also known as the Molina case
45
), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited
the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar.
46
Since Molinawas decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet
to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
47
In fact, even before Molina was
handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,
48
wherein the Court definitively concluded that a
spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family
Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.
49
Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set
of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree
of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it
raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
50
The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of
marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of
a marriage.
6

The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their
reason at the time of contracting marriage."
51
Marriages with such persons were ordained as void,
52
in the same class as
marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A partys mental capacity was not a ground for
divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917,
53
but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its
celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.
54
Divorce on the ground of a spouses
incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation.
55
Upon the enactment of the
Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a
voidable marriage.
56
The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a
marriage void ab initio.
57
Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one
contracted by a party of unsound mind.
58

Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely
given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract.
59
The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both
members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice
of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless
incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.
60
Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the
Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to
the marriage."
61

There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino
opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under
Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only."
62
At the same
time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations,
because then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage."
63
These concerns though were answered, beginning
with Santos v. Court of Appeals,
64
wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."
65

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a
mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina
66
case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now
Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations
he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto."
67
Jurisprudence since then has
recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."
68

It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its
central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."
69
At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court that
the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding
specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis. Rather, the
preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision ona case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law."
70

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:
71

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more
than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment
of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.
72

The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not
cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking
into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is
under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been
consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in
adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone,
the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this
evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this
case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern
the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law
experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee
had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon law,
73
and as one member
admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under
civil law.
74
It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent
understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
75
Still, it
must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even
7

though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial
interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely
persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower
courts.
76

Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration
of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited
Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that
"[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These
provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and the
foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the
strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to
the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it
also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has
been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out
the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of
nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of
marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of
Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of
nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a
nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in
promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a
corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages
under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among
persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations
of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under
Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the
general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
8

Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983
and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage
due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our
people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such
appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.
77

Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons for his
agreement or opposition to the petition.
78
This requirement however was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages.
79
Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated
or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent
to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscals participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from
the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to
the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such,
it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality.
The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with
Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own
testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, and certifications from Blackgold
Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondents claims pertinent to her alleged singing career.
He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent
was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered petitioners evidence as credible
enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.
80

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of
action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between
private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through
the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of
respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that
respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous
stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her
actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among others.
81

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses
from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had
headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals,
82
testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of things that [are]
terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in the
affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment
of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of performing
the basic obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the
person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication
between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and
expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to
happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based on love,
trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she
is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?
x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the
respondent has been calling up the petitioners officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on
the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can
you say about this, Mr. witness?
9

A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on her suspect
(sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not
abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme
is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with another woman
and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that is pathological and we call
that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic
obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Maam.
83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the
psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she
loves to fabricate about herself."
84

These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of
respondents testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine
respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos
85
that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not
required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.
86
We deem the methodology utilized by petitioners
witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopezs common conclusion of
respondents psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioners version as the true set of facts.
However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the
conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioners expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its
decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling
lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this
fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making her
therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to
petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect.
As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to
psychological incapacity.
87

Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the
celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married
petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural childs real parentage as she only confessed when the
latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before
the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise
supports the belief that respondents psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any
prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into
marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide
by the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondents inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the
pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondents inability to understand and
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would
similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding
obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to
any legal or emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had
amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her psychological
condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential
marital obligations. Respondents ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best.
Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondents ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her
commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if the
consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the
previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages
between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under
Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In
this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to
psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the
Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be
able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was
annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference
was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioners efforts to bring the matter to its attention.
88
Such
10

deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in
a Conclusion
89
dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent.
90
Such decree of nullity was
affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,
91
and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.
92
In fact, respondents
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause
93
was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting
respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunals consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective and wherefore
judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a
perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the
correct appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the depositions of the Partes in
Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage
option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and
implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in
terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-
concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired
from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as
well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.
94

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies.
Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are
drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioners allegations. Had the trial court instead
appreciated respondents version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic
Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts,
and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial
court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondents condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede
did not testify to such effect.
95

Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage
work. However, respondents aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and
maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondents condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondents condition is incurable? It would seem, at
least, that respondents psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier
had petitioners expert witnesses characterized respondents condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether
the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts taciturnity on this point.
The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995.
These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the psychological
incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in
Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the
deliberations of the Family Code committee,
96
then the opinion of canonical scholars,
97
before arriving at its formulation of the
doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.
98
Santos did refer to Justice Caguioas opinion expressed during the
deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable,"
99
and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
100
However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court
in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.
101

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling that remained
silent on whether respondents psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the
incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no
jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial courts decision that
required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on
appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,
102
the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should not apply
retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the
date the statute in enacted.
103
Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The requirement that
psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be
divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that
respondents psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such
a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection,
there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review,
where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis
of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable,
even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.
11

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case
perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since
the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC
more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of
respondents psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the
fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological
incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that
annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been inexistent in the
first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her
persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondents avowed
commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality.
Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE,
Petitioner,


- versus -


ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE,
Respondent,

REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Oppositor.

G.R. No. 161793

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

February 13, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x





D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J.:



Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its incorporation in our laws, has
become a clichd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however, with much ado, it having
realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity
should be viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulatedfree in form and devoid of any definition.

For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
August 5, 2003 Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the January 19,
2004 Resolution
[2]
denying the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged decision.

The relevant facts and proceedings follow.

Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering
organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then initially attracted to Rowenas close friend;
but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena. That was in January 1996, when
petitioner was a sophomore student and respondent, a freshman.
[3]


Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a certain degree of
closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that
they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus,
they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket.
[4]


12

However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation and daily sustenance
fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her
uncles house and Edward to his parents home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening
him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles place.
[5]


On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and she,
20.
[6]
The two then continued to stay at her uncles place where Edward was treated like a prisonerhe was not allowed to go
out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave Rowena.
[7]
At one point,
Edward was able to call home and talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at their parents home and live with
them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they could live on
their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be disinherited, and
insisted that Edward must go home.
[8]


After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then hid
him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him.
[9]


In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live with his
parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways.
[10]


After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity.
This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.
[11]


As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP)
of Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between the parties.
[12]
In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in
the scheduled hearings.
[13]


On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not determine if there was
collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits.
[14]


The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically incapacitated, and made the
following findings and conclusions:

BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born Again
Christian at Manila. He finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently
unemployed. He is married to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at
my office for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for Nullification of Marriage against the
latter by the grounds of psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.

Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased sister. Both his
parents are also in the business world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient. This
said virtues are said to be handed to each of the family member. He generally considers himself to be quiet
and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he tried his luck in
being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well
as being quiet and loner, he did not stay long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full
servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from his friends even during his
childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible and hear its message.

Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a disobedient
wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments with her
boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.

In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became the foundation of
their intimate relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is having
problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family and that she
actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that they
should elope and live together. Petitioner hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both young and
inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow manage because petitioner is rich. In the last
week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping and she already bought tickets for the
boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are
supposed to stay at the house of a friend of respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner
was compelled to rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but could not find any so it was
suggested by respondent that they should go back and seek help from petitioners parents. When the
parties arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of the country so respondent
decided to go back to her home for the meantime while petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a few
13

days of separation, respondent called petitioner by phone and said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner
responded immediately and when he arrived at their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why he
appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got
scared so he went home again. Respondent would call by phone every now and then and became angry as
petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent went to the extent of threatening to file a case against
petitioner and scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be able to make
amends and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in
life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondents uncle brought the parties to
Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract before the
Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage License.

Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the parents of
petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go
home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many guns. Respondent
even threatened that if he should persist in going home, they will commission their military friends to harm
his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a declaration that if he should perish, the authorities
should look for him at his parents[] and relatives[] houses. Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to
escape and he went home. He told his parents about his predicament and they forgave him and supported
him by giving him military escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform them that he signed a marriage
contract with respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,]
after the counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the home of
petitioners parents while they are still studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that she would
only live with him if they will have a separate home of their own and be away from his parents. She also
intimated to petitioner that he should already get his share of whatever he would inherit from his parents so
they can start a new life. Respondent demanded these not knowing [that] the petitioner already settled his
differences with his own family. When respondent refused to live with petitioner where he chose for them to
stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the home of his parents. He told her already that he
was disinherited and since he also does not have a job, he would not be able to support her. After knowing
that petitioner does not have any money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed
petitioner that they should live separate lives.

The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and
weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both parties[] unreadiness to commitment and their young
age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically
involved with herself.

TESTS ADMINISTERED:

Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sachs Sentence Completion Test
M M P I

TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:

Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive
upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on marriage.

Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so as to
commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is
absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social interactions
and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it boring and
uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to that of respondent, as aggravated by her
dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid type of person, as he prefer to be
religiously attached and spend a solemn time alone.

ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of
woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is seen
to take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune
because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams realized, she used force and threats
knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is really no chance for
wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the relationship.

REMARKS:

14

Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself before
submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious
institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is
evidently clear that both parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are still unaware of
their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of weakening their relationship by his weak
behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be
unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she is
suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that
started since childhood and only manifested during marriage. Both parties display psychological incapacities
that made marriage a big mistake for them to take.
[15]



The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision
[16]
declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on the
ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
[17]
The Republic,
represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.
[18]


On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision
[19]
in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and
set aside the trial courts ruling.
[20]
It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent. The
clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further,
the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the
evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina
[21]
needed for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
[22]
The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the
decision without the required certification of the OSG briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons for its agreement with or
opposition to, as the case may be, the petition.
[23]
The CA later denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in the likewise
assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.
[24]


Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court
gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
[25]


In his memorandum,
[26]
petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of respondents psychological incapacity, but
rather due to both parties psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that there is no requirement for the psychologist
to personally examine respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP because the latter
represented it during the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court orders and notices.
[27]


For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,
[28]
that the annulment petition filed before the RTC contains no
statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The root cause of the psychological
incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity of
both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical psychologist did not
personally examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements in Molina
[29]
were not satisfied.
[30]


The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between
the parties is null and void.
[31]

I.

We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the development of jurisprudence interpreting it.

Article 36 of the Family Code
[32]
provides:

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.


As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was
based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her separate opinion
in Santos v. Court of Appeals:
[33]


However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the
Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro
traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.

During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a
chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code)
that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some
members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after
15

a number of years of separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then
requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the
spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married
person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually,
such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the
Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this
matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family
Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New
Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as

a special contract of permanent partnership between a man
and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment
of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by law.

With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of
marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution
upon which the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition
that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the
Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two
Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and,
instead, opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on
grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be
an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church
annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice
Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for
celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on
void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes
on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the
two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family
Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals
of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the
enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:

(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest
after the celebration.

as well as the following implementing provisions:

Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or
pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage
void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.

Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.

x x x x x x x x x

It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already be dissolved or
annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of
marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father
Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the
Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has
been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of lack of due discretion for causes that, in other
jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man
who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous
choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit
with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have
found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic
16

personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness,
drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly.
[34]



In her separate opinion in Molina,
[35]
she expounded:

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised
provision even before the session was over:

(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes
manifest after the celebration.

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage and to mentally
incapacitated. It was explained that these phrases refer to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent,
which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation. There being a defect in
consent, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of
consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are
cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a
sense, insanity of a lesser degree.

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term psychological or mental impotence,
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the
Code of Canon Law would rather express it as psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . . Justice
Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with
another.

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of
Art. 36 is: Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex.

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase and is
incurable but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they will
determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that
one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out
by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the
afflicted spouse to remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:

1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under special cases and special situations, hence,
its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage
which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are
void from the beginning.
17


With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters,
now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time,
took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting
marriage: 3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: A marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with
respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or
annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal annuls a marriage, it actually declares the
marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can
never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman
Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a
Court selection and a formal hearing.

Such so-called church annulments are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties
as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage,
not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of
married couples have found themselves in limbofreed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic
Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions,
some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law
Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family
Codeand classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent from
the beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly
for psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old
canons: Canon #1081 required persons to be capable according to law in order to give valid consent;
Canon #1082 required that persons be at least not ignorant of the major elements required in marriage;
and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be present in
order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for
annulment called lack of due discretion and lack of due competence. Lack of due discretion means
that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and, therefore, the
union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the
obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.

Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual
disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind
of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in
several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in
persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing
short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of
hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of
serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an
inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.
[36]



Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might
limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The Committee desired that the courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law.
[37]
The law is then so designed as to allow some resiliency in its
application.
[38]


Yet, as held in Santos,
[39]
the phrase psychological incapacity is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by
Article 68
[40]
of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render
help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
[41]
This interpretation
is, in fact, consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:
18


3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be made between
the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of discretionary judgment and
the incapacity to assume the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference by
an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and on the assumption
that they are capable according to positive law to enter such contract, there remains the object of the
contract, viz, the house. The house is located in a different locality, and prior to the conclusion of the
contract, the house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them. This is the hypothesis
contemplated by the third paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the psychological
process of giving consent because it has been established a priori that both have such a capacity to give
consent, and they both know well the object of their consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather,
C.1095.3 deals with the object of the consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is invalid because
it lacks its formal object. The consent as a psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological
act, however, is directed towards an object which is not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this
distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the positing of consent but with positing the object of
consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act of consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the
responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.

Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity with
respect to marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to understand
as ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage,
especially the incapacity which arises from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which
ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.

The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every case imply a
grave psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of intellect, discernment, and freedom;
or are there sexual anomalies that are purely so that is to say, they arise from certain physiological
dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact the higher faculties
however, so that these persons are still capable of free human acts. The evidence from the empirical
sciences is abundant that there are certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a person towards
sexual activities which are not normal, either with respect to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to
the nature of the activity itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality]. However, these anomalies
notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the higher faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted
continues to have an adequate understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In
fact, he can choose marriage freely. The question though is whether such a person can assume those
responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to understand them. In this latter
hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage issues from the incapacity to
posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself.

Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard. The initial steps
taken by church courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or incapacity
to posit the object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect,
under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly deliberating and its judgment lacks
freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the influence
of this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under
these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a decision made under
duress, such as this irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely the question: is it, as a
matter of fact, true that the intellect is always and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It
would seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think that there are certain cases in which
one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and evaluate quite maturely what marriage is
and what it implies; his consent would be juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit the
object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal way and with usually regularity. It
would seem more correct to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because
the party is consenting to an object that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.

3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his way more clearly
through this tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between the inability to give
consent on the one hand, and the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that
nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and they are usually able to evaluate its
implications. They would have no difficulty with positing a free and intelligent consent. However, such
persons, capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty in another
sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise treated the difference
between the act of consenting and the act of positing the object of consent from the point of view of a
person afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction usually leaves the process of
knowing and understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of consent: the delivering of
the goods.

19

3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal jurisprudence
cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine that the incapacity to
assume the essential obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist in the
same person with the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent judgment, and a mature evaluation and
weighing of things. The decision coram Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse
can have difficulty not only with regard to the moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to the
matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a person in such a condition is incapable of
assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in understanding what the
obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same obligations.

Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this ground as
moral impotence or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific incapacity rooted in
some anomalies and disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will and
the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the impotence that constitutes
the impediment dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable of binding
himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling
the essential obligations. According to the principle affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo
ad impossibile tenetur.

x x x x

3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the contractants are not
capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases where one of the
parties is so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to begin a union
with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such a relationship. A second incapacity could be due
to the fact that the spouses are incapable of beginning or maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which
goes to the very substance of matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is unable to
concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of
the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or contributing to the good of the other
party qua persona rather than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting marriage. Such
would be the case of a person who may be quite capable of procuring the economic good and the financial
security of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of the other. These are general
strokes and this is not the place for detained and individual description.

A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case concerns a
person diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the respondent may
have understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable of
assuming them because of his constitutional immorality.

Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment of responsibilities
is determined not only at the moment of decision but also and especially during the moment of execution of
decision. And when this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it means that the actual fulfillment
of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration that must be factored into the question of
whether a person was in a position to assume the obligations of marriage in the first place. When one
speaks of the inability of the party to assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in
fieri, but also and especially at matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz
collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic
constitution of the person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as
regards the rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the
presence of this personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to recognize and experience how others
feel) is common. A sense of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable treatment, is
usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of
in order to achieve ones ends.

Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial obligations. One of them is
the right to the communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically centered around the
good of the spouses and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be necessarily
incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or several, or even all of these rights. There are
some cases in which interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some characteristic features of inability for
interpersonal relationships in marriage include affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits.

Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric homosexuality was
understood to be invalidating of marriage that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because of the
inability to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its
obligations. Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to assume the
obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with charity, homosexuality as an
autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is said to be unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of matrimonial consent is
20

understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius vitae. The third paragraph of
C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more
adequate juridical structure to account for the complex phenomenon that homosexuality is. The
homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional cases, such a person is
usually capable of full sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so
afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly does
not by itself affect the critical, volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is unable to
assume the responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to fulfill this object of the matrimonial
contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as in the defect of the
object of consent.

3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity specified
by the canon: causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the clause is a
reference to the personality of the contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to the psychic part
of the person. It is only when there is something in the psyche or in the psychic constitution of the person
which impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that the person is incapable according to the hypothesis
contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in this juridical sense only to the extent that he is
found to have something rooted in his psychic constitution which impedes the assumption of these
obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in ones consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a source
of this invalidating incapacity. The difference being that there seems to be some freedom, however remote,
in the development of the habit, while one accepts as given ones psychic constitution. It would seem then
that the law insists that the source of the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some degree of
freedom.
[42]



Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine whether a party
to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v.
Court of Appeals,
[43]
ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts.
[44]


Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the
Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,
[45]
explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the lower court and
was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court,
aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties
to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be
interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict
standards in Molina,
[46]
thus:

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the
bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected
by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's.
21

The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear
that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence
what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Churchwhile remaining independent, separate and apart from each othershall walk together in synodal
cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base
of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
[47]



Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership concurred in the ponencia of then
Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred in the result and another three
including, as aforesaid, Justice Romerotook pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R.
Padilla even emphasized that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions or
generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it
is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu
and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
[48]


Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,
[49]
the Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without too
much regard for the laws clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as courts should interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in
resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the
dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of Article 36 as the most liberal divorce procedure
22

in the world.
[50]
The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant
behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation
of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket,
forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed
diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the
sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said
individuals.
[51]


The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample
safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard
against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
[52]
The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising
number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the
foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a
psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred
bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly.
[53]
Let it be noted that in Article
36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning.
[54]
To indulge in imagery,
the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.

The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a concern for the
Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its business. And second, because the judicial declaration of psychological
incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have become vigilant, and
never again marry a person with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically
incapacitated runs the risk of the latters disorder recurring in their marriage.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as
aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,
[55]
there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which
should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate
once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.

II.

We now examine the instant case.

The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March,
exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder,
and respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.
[56]


By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not
discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.
[57]


Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became
increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a
party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition
of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in
psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting
link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to
that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment casesthat a
person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to
marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now
considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.

23

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, not only to
sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from
assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation
or the right of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the
community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973
have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the
development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each
other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be other oriented since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true
intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church
decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing
and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the
fundamental relationship to the other spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:

The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment:
(1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children
and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to
cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a
marriage:

At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with
the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or
her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its
fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where
the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.

x x x x

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts
whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does
not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the
psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in
their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper
judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be
concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and
obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of
lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and
breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry out marital
responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into.
[58]



Hernandez v. Court of Appeals
[59]
emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise
cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v.
Marcos
[60]
asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity.
[61]
Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes
a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe
and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
[62]
Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the
inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
[63]
an option
for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and evaluation of
the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an
intelligent and judicious determination of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties prerogative to
present their own expert witnesses.

24

Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate, produced the
findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disordersto repeat, dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses
personality disorders as follows

A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a persons recent and long-term
functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated episodes but are deeply
ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental stress or anxieties or to
interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal functioning. Personality disorders are often
recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or
old age. An individual may have more than one personality disorder at a time.

The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a variety of
character traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and occupational
adjustment. Some individuals with personality disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid,
obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors. Such qualities may lead to trouble
getting along with other people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life and often a tendency to blame
others for their problems. Other individuals with personality disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to work
with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced
self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.

Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a variety of causes
of personality disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave
activity.

Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development led to certain
personality types. Thus, some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and phallic character types. Demanding and
dependent behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from fixation at the oral
stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from
fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to shallowness and an inability to
engage in intimate relationships. However, later researchers have found little evidence that early childhood
events or fixation at certain stages of development lead to specific personality patterns.

Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor involved in the
etiology of antisocial and borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other
personality disorders. Some family, adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be
related to genetic factors.

Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, researchers have found
that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of
aggression and a past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with low
platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.

Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in antisocial
personality for many years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of borderline
patients reported that 38 percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a
control group.

Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Associations Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized into
three major clusters:

Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals who have these
disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric habits and traits.

Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who
have these disorders often appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.

Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive personality
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.

The DSM-III-R also lists another category, personality disorder not otherwise specified, that can be
used for other specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the specific
personality disorders.

Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus
therapy may be long-term.
[64]

25



Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner


A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals
usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by
others comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for
overprotection.

Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder
may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to
make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they
believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things
that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone
and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
[65]



and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows


Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the conventional behavioral
limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years, disregard for the rights
of others (either through exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite commonly,
child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame others. There is often a faade of charm
and even sophistication that masks disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to
control others.

Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some individuals who
are prominent in business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of others
may be hidden prior to a public scandal.

During the 19
th
century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The term
described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in reasoning.

According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four dramatic personality
disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.
[66]



The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive
the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void on
ground of both parties psychological incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the
witnesses deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations
of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday
decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to
agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that
are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often
preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
[67]
As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by
the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to
speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.

Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial
personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her
disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame
others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.
[68]
Moreover, as shown in this case,
respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of
committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which
they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision
and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.

26

SO ORDERED.


FIRST DIVISION

MARIETA C. AZCUETA,
Petitioner,


versus


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE
COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 180668


Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

Promulgated:
May 26, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N


LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86162 dated August 31, 2007,
[1]
and its Resolution dated November 20, 2007.
[2]


Petitioner Marietta C. Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met in 1993. Less than two months after their first meeting, they
got married on July 24, 1993 at St. Anthony of PaduaChurch, Antipolo City. At the time of their marriage, petitioner was 23
years old while respondent was 28. They separated in 1997 after four years of marriage. They have no children.

On March 2, 2002, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72, a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 02-6428.

Meanwhile, respondent failed to appear and file an answer despite service of summons upon him. Because of this,
the trial court directed the City Prosecutor to conduct an investigation whether there was collusion between the parties. In a
report dated August 16, 2002, Prosecutor Wilfredo G. Oca found that there was no collusion between the parties.

On August 21, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance for the Republic of the Philippines and
submitted a written authority for the City Prosecutor to appear in the case on the States behalf under the supervision and
control of the Solicitor General.

In her petition and during her testimony, petitioner claimed that her husband Rodolfo was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. According to petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally immature,
irresponsible and continually failed to adapt himself to married life and perform the essential responsibilities and duties of a
husband.

Petitioner complained that Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and instead always asked his mother for financial
assistance. When they were married it was Rodolfos mother who found them a room near the Azcueta home and it was also
his mother who paid the monthly rental.

Petitioner also testified that she constantly encouraged her husband to find employment. She even bought him a
newspaper every Sunday but Rodolfo told her that he was too old and most jobs have an age limit and that he had no clothes
to wear to job interviews. To inspire him, petitioner bought him new clothes and a pair of shoes and even gave him money.
Sometime later, her husband told petitioner that he already found a job and petitioner was overjoyed. However, some weeks
after, petitioner was informed that her husband had been seen at the house of his parents when he was supposed to be at
work. Petitioner discovered that her husband didnt actually get a job and the money he gave her (which was supposedly his
salary) came from his mother. When she confronted him about the matter, Rodolfo allegedly cried like a child and told her that
he pretended to have a job so that petitioner would stop nagging him about applying for a job. He also told her that his
parents can support their needs. Petitioner claimed that Rodolfo was so dependent on his mother and that all his decisions
and attitudes in life should be in conformity with those of his mother.

Apart from the foregoing, petitioner complained that every time Rodolfo would get drunk he became physically violent
towards her. Their sexual relationship was also unsatisfactory. They only had sex once a month and petitioner never enjoyed
it. When they discussed this problem, Rodolfo would always say that sex was sacred and it should not be enjoyed nor
abused. He did not even want to have a child yet because he claimed he was not ready. Additionally, when petitioner
27

requested that they move to another place and rent a small room rather than live near his parents, Rodolfo did not
agree. Because of this, she was forced to leave their residence and see if he will follow her. But he did not.

During the trial of the case, petitioner presented Rodolfos first cousin, Florida de Ramos, as a witness. In 1993,
Ramos, the niece of Rodolfos father, was living with Rodolfos family. She corroborated petitioners testimony that Rodolfo
was indeed not gainfully employed when he married petitioner and he merely relied on the allowance given by his
mother. This witness also confirmed that it was respondents mother who was paying the rentals for the room where the
couple lived. She also testified that at one time, she saw respondent going to his mothers house in business attire. She
learned later that Rodolfo told petitioner that he has a job but in truth he had none. She also stated that respondent was still
residing at the house of his mother and not living together with petitioner.

Petitioner likewise presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist. Dr. Villegas testified that after examining petitioner
for her psychological evaluation, she found petitioner to be mature, independent, very responsible, focused and has direction
and ambition in life. She also observed that petitioner works hard for what she wanted and therefore, she was not
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. Dr. Villegas added that based on the
information gathered from petitioner, she found that Rodolfo showed that he was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital duties and responsibilities. Dr. Villegas concluded that he was suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder
associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings.

She explained that persons suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder were those whose response to ordinary
way of life was ineffectual and inept, characterized by loss of self-confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to make his own
decisions and dependency on other people. She added that the root cause of this psychological problem was a cross-
identification with the mother who was the dominant figure in the family considering that respondents father was a seaman
and always out of the house. She stated that this problem began during the early stages in his life but manifested only after
the celebration of his marriage. According to Dr. Villegas, this kind of problem was also severe because he will not be able to
make and to carry on the responsibilities expected of a married person. It was incurable because it started in early
development and therefore deeply ingrained into his personality.

Based on petitioners evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision dated October 25, 2004, declaring the marriage
between petitioner and Rodolfo as null and void ab initio, thus:

With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds that respondent totally
failed in his commitments and obligations as a husband. Respondents emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility is grave and he has no showing of improvement. He failed likewise to have sexual
intercourse with the wife because it is a result of the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual relationship
since he could not distinguish between the mother and the wife and therefore sex relationship will not be
satisfactory as expected.

The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder and therefore cannot make his
own decision and cannot carry on his responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations to live together,
observe mutual love, respect, support was not fulfilled by the respondent.

Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show that respondent failed to comply
with his marital obligations.

Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be declared null and void on the
account of respondents severe and incurable psychological incapacity.

xxx xxx xxx

Wherefore premises considered, the marriage between Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo B. Azcuata
is hereby declared null and void abinitio pursuant to Article 36 fo the Family Code.

The National Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of Antipolo City are ordered to make
proper entries into the records of the parties pursuant to judgment of the court.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Public Prosecutor and the Solicitor General.

SO ORDERED.
[3]


On July 19, 2005, the RTC rendered an Amended Decision
[4]
to correct the first name of Rodolfo which was
erroneously typewritten as Gerardo in the caption of the original Decision.

The Solicitor General appealed the RTC Decision objecting that (a) the psychiatric report of Dr. Villegas was based
solely on the information provided by petitioner and was not based on an examination of Rodolfo; and (b) there was no
showing that the alleged psychological defects were present at the inception of marriage or that such defects were grave,
permanent and incurable.

28

Resolving the appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and essentially ruled that petitioner failed to sufficiently prove the
psychological incapacity of Rodolfo or that his alleged psychological disorder existed prior to the marriage and was grave and
incurable. In setting aside the factual findings of the RTC, the CA reasoned that:

The evidence on record failed to demonstrate that respondents alleged irresponsibility and
over-dependence on his mother is symptomatic of psychological incapacity as above explained.

xxx xxx xxx

Also worthy of note is petitioner-appellees failure to prove that respondents supposed
psychological malady existed even before the marriage. Records however show that the parties
were living in harmony in the first few years of their marriage and were living on their own in a
rented apartment. That respondent often times asks his mother for financial support may be brought
about by his feeling of embarrassment that he cannot contribute at all to the family coffers,
considering that it was his wife who is working for the family. Petitioner-appellee likewise stated that
respondent does not like to have a child on the pretense that respondent is not yet ready to have
one. However this is not at all a manifestation of irresponsibility. On the contrary, respondent has
shown that he has a full grasp of reality and completely understands the implication of having a
child especially that he is unemployed. The only problem besetting the union is respondents
alleged irresponsibility and unwillingness to leave her (sic) mother, which was not proven in this
case to be psychological-rooted.

The behavior displayed by respondent was caused only by his youth and emotional
immaturity which by themselves, do not constitute psychological incapacity (Deldel vs. Court of
Appeals, 421 SCRA 461, 466 [2004]). At all events, petitioner-appellee has utterly failed, both in her
allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part
of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so immaturity and irresponsibility,
invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity (Pesca vs. Pesca, 356 SCRA 588, 594
[2001]). As held by the Supreme Court:

Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, refusal or neglect in
the performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be
incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. (Navarro, Jr. vs. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, April 13,
2007).

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed decision dated July 19, 2005 fo the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage berween petitioner-appellee Marietta C. Azcueta and respondent Rodolfo B. Azcueta
remains VALID.
[5]
(emphasis ours)

The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to
sustain a finding that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations.

The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, submits that the appellate court correctly ruled that the totality of
evidence presented by petitioner failed to prove her spouses psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code and settled jurisprudence.

We grant the petition.

Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.
[6]
Our family law is based on the policy that
marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger
anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their
preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.
[7]


Thus, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina
[8]
stringent guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the
foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at
the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.

29

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis (Salita v.
Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I
dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. x x x.
[9]
(Emphasis supplied)

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,
[10]
the Court declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
[11]
It should refer to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage.
[12]
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
[13]


However, in more recent jurisprudence, we have observed that notwithstanding the guidelines laid down
in Molina, there is a need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36.
[14]
Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it
is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu
and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
[15]
With the
advent of Te v. Te,
[16]
the Court encourages a reexamination of jurisprudential trends on the interpretation of Article 36
although there has been no major deviation or paradigm shift from the Molina doctrine.

After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that there was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant
the annulment of the parties marriage under Article 36.

First, petitioner successfully discharged her burden to prove the psychological incapacity of her husband.

The Solicitor General, in discrediting Dr. Villegas psychiatric report, highlights the lack of personal examination of
Rodolfo by said doctor and the doctors reliance on petitioners version of events. In Marcos v. Marcos,
[17]
it was held that
30

there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist
as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. What matters is
whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.

It should be noted that, apart from her interview with the psychologist, petitioner testified in court on the facts upon
which the psychiatric report was based. When a witness testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined,
she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony.
[18]
Significantly, petitioners narration of facts was corroborated in
material points by the testimony of a close relative of Rodolfo. Dr. Villegas likewise testified in court to elaborate on her report
and fully explain the link between the manifestations of Rodolfos psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself. It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof.
[19]
Since the trial court itself accepted the
veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn
therefrom by petitioners expert witness.
[20]


Second, the root cause of Rodolfos psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
petition, sufficiently proven by expert testimony, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision.

The petition alleged that from the beginning of their marriage, Rodolfo was not gainfully employed and, despite pleas
from petitioner, he could not be persuaded to even attempt to find employment; that from the choice of the family abode to the
couples daily sustenance, Rodolfo relied on his mother; and that the couples inadequate sexual relations and Rodolfos
refusal to have a child stemmed from a psychological condition linked to his relationship to his mother.

These manifestations of incapacity to comply or assume his marital obligations were linked to medical or clinical
causes by an expert witness with more than forty years experience from the field of psychology in general and psychological
incapacity, in particular. In a portion of her psychiatric evaluation, Dr. Villegas elucidated the psychodynamics of the case of
petitioner and Rodolfo, thus:

Marietta is the eldest of 5 siblings, whose parents has very limited education. Being the eldest, she
is expected to be the role model of younger siblings. In so doing, she has been restricted and physically
punished, in order to tow the line. But on the other hand, she developed growing resentments towards her
father and promised herself that with the first opportunity, shell get out of the family. When Rodolfo came
along, they were married 1 months after they met, without really knowing anything about him. Her
obsession to leave her family was her primary reason at that time and she did not exercise good judgment
in her decision making in marriage. During their 4 years marital relationship, she came to realize that
Rodolfo cannot be responsible in his duties and responsibilities, in terms of loving, caring, protection,
financial support and sex.

On the other hand, Rodolfo is the 3
rd
among 5 boys. The father, who was perceived to be weak,
and his two elder brothers were all working as seaman. Rodolfo who was always available to his mothers
needs, became an easy prey, easily engulfed into her system. The relationship became symbiotic, that led
to a prolonged and abnormal dependence to his mother. The mother, being the stronger and dominant
parent, is a convenient role model, but the reversal of roles became confusing that led to ambivalence of his
identity and grave dependency. Apparently, all the boys were hooked up to his complexities, producing so
much doubts in their capabilities in a heterosexual setting. Specifically, Rodolfo tried, but failed. His
inhibitions in a sexual relationship, is referable to an unconscious guilt feelings of defying the mothers
love. At this point, he has difficulty in delineating between the wife and the mother, so that his continuous
relationship with his wife produces considerable anxiety, which he is unable to handle, and crippled him
psychologically.

Based on the above clinical data, family background and outcome of their marriage, it is the
opinion of the examiner, that Mrs. Marietta Cruz-Azcueta is mature, independent and responsible and is
psychologically capacitated to perform the duties and obligations of marriage. Due to her numerous
personal problems she has difficulty in handling her considerable anxiety, at present. There are strong
clinical evidences that Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is suffering from a Dependent Personality Disorder associated
with severe inadequacy that renders him psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage.

The root cause of the above clinical condition is due to a strong and prolonged dependence with a
parent of the opposite sex, to a period when it becomes no longer appropriate. This situation crippled his
psychological functioning related to sex, self confidence, independence, responsibility and maturity. It
existed prior to marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration due to marital stresses and
demands. It is considered as permanent and incurable in nature, because it started early in his life and
therefore became so deeply ingrained into his personality structure. It is severe or grave in degree,
because it hampered and interfered with his normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustment.
[21]


These findings were reiterated and further explained by Dr. Villegas during her testimony, the relevant portion of which
we quote below:
31


xxx xxx xxx

Q: Now, Madame Witness, after examining the petitioner, what was your psychological evaluation?

A: Ive found the petitioner in this case, Mrs. Marietta Azcueta as matured, independent, very
responsible, focused, she has direction and ambition in life and she work hard for what she
wanted, maam, and therefore, I concluded that she is psychologically capacitated to perform the
duties and responsibilities of the marriage, maam.

Q: How about the respondent, Madame Witness, what was your psychological evaluation with regards
to the respondent?

A: Based on my interview, Ive found out that the husband Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage suffering from a psychiatric
classification as Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related to
masculine strivings, maam.

Q: In laymans language, Madame Witness, can you please explain to us what do you mean by
Dependent Personality Disorder?

A: Dependent Personality Disorder are (sic) those persons in which their response to ordinary way of
life are ineffectual and inept characterized by loss of self confidence, always in doubt with himself
and inability to make his own decision, quite dependent on other people, and in this case, on his
mother, maam.

Q: And do you consider this, Madame Witness, as a psychological problem of respondent, Rodolfo
Azcueta?

A: Very much, maam.

Q: Why?

A: Because it will always interfered, hampered and disrupt his duties and responsibilities as a husband
and as a father, maam.

Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, what is the root cause of this psychological problem?

A: The root cause of this psychological problem is a cross identification with the mother who is the
dominant figure in the family, the mother has the last say and the authority in the family while the
father was a seaman and always out of the house, and if present is very shy, quiet and he himself
has been very submissive and passive to the authority of the wife, maam.

Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, under what circumstance this kind of psychological
problem manifested?

A: This manifested starting his personality development and therefore, during his early stages in life,
maam.

Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, this kind of problem existed to Rodolfo Azcueta, the
respondent in this case, before the celebration of the marriage?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: And it became manifested only after the celebration of the marriage?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: And can you please tell us the reason why it became manifested with thethat the manifestation
came too late?

A: The manifestation came too late because the history of Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta was very mild, no
stresses, no demand on his life, at 24 years old despite the fact that he already finished college
degree of Computer Science, there is no demand on himself at least to establish his own, and the
mother always would make the decision for him, maam.

Q: Okay, Madame Witness, is this kind of psychological problem severe?

32

A: Yes maam.

Q: Why do you consider this psychological problem severe, Madame Witness?

A: Because he will not be able to make and to carry on the responsibility that is expected of a married
person, maam.

Q: Is it incurable, Madame Witness?

A: It is incurable because it started early in development and therefore it became so deeply ingrained
into his personality, and therefore, it cannot be changed nor cured at this stage, maam.

Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, that it is Permanent?

A: It is permanent in nature, sir.

Q: And last question as an expert witness, what is the effect of the psychological problem as far as the
marriage relationship of Rodolfo Azcueta is concerned?

A: The effect of this will really be a turbulent marriage relationship because standard expectation is, the
husband has to work, to feed, to protect, to love, and of course, to function on (sic) the sexual
duties of a husband to the wife, but in this case, early in their marriage, they had only according to
the wife, experienced once sexual relationship every month and this is due to the fact that because
husband was so closely attached to the mother, it is a result of the unconscious guilt feeling of the
husband in defying the mothers love when they will be having heterosexual relationship and
therefore, at that point, he will not be able to distinguish between the mother and the wife and
therefore, sex relationship will not be satisfactory according to expectation, maam.
[22]


In Te v. Te, we held that [b]y the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
[23]


Based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearly explained the basis for its decision, which we reproduce
here for emphasis:

With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds that respondent totally
failed in his commitments and obligations as a husband. Respondents emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility is grave and he has no showing of improvement. He failed likewise to have sexual
intercourse with the wife because it is a result of the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual relationship
since he could not distinguish between the mother and the wife and therefore sex relationship will not be
satisfactory as expected.

The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder and therefore cannot make his
own decision and cannot carry on his responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations to live together,
observe mutual love, respect, support was not fulfilled by the respondent.

Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show that respondent failed to comply
with his marital obligations.

Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be declared null and void on the
account of respondents severe and incurable psychological incapacity.

Third, Rodolfos psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the
celebration of marriage. Contrary to the CAs finding that the parties lived harmoniously and independently in the first few
years of marriage, witnesses were united in testifying that from inception of the marriage, Rodolfos irresponsibility,
overdependence on his mother and abnormal sexual reticence were already evident. To be sure, these manifestations of
Rodolfos dependent personality disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage being rooted in his early development
and a by product of his upbringing and family life.

Fourth, Rodolfos psychological incapacity has been shown to be sufficiently grave, so as to render him unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.

The Court is wary of the CAs bases for overturning factual findings of the trial court on this point. The CAs
reasoning that Rodolfos requests for financial assistance from his mother might have been due to his embarrassment for
failing to contribute to the family coffers and that his motive for not wanting a child was his responsible realization that he
should not have a child since he is unemployed are all purely speculative. There is no evidence on record to support these
views. Again, we must point out that appellate courts should not substitute their discretion with that of the trial court or the
expert witnesses, save only in instance where the findings of the trial court or the experts are contradicted by evidence.
33


We likewise cannot agree with the CA that Rodolfos irresponsibility and overdependence on his mother can be
attributed to his immaturity or youth. We cannot overlook the fact that at the time of his marriage to petitioner, he was nearly
29 years old or the fact that the expert testimony has identified a grave clinical or medical cause for his abnormal behavior.

In Te, the Court has had the occasion to expound on the nature of a dependent personality disorder and how one
afflicted with such a disorder would be incapacitated from complying with marital obligations, to wit:

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential
marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for
he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his
important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are
wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get
approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears
of being abandoned. As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the
persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no
cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
[24]


Of course, this is not to say that anyone diagnosed with dependent personality disorder is automatically deemed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage. We realize that psychology is by no means an exact
science and the medical cases of patients, even though suffering from the same disorder, may be different in their symptoms
or manifestations and in the degree of severity. It is the duty of the court in its evaluation of the facts, as guided by expert
opinion, to carefully scrutinize the type of disorder and the gravity of the same before declaring the nullity of a marriage under
Article 36.

Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of the
Family Code.
[25]
As noted by the trial court, as a result of Rodolfos dependent personality disorder, he cannot make his own
decisions and cannot fulfill his responsibilities as a husband. Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital obligations to live
together, observe mutual love, respect, support under Article 68. Indeed, one who is unable to support himself, much less a
wife; one who cannot independently make decisions regarding even the most basic and ordinary matters that spouses face
everyday; one who cannot contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his spouse is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the meaning of Article 36.

Sixth, the incurability of Rodolfos condition which has been deeply ingrained in his system since his early years was
supported by evidence and duly explained by the expert witness.

At this point, the Court is not unmindful of the sometimes peculiar predicament it finds itself in those instances when it
is tasked to interpret static statutes formulated in a particular point in time and apply them to situations and people in a society
in flux. With respect to the concept of psychological incapacity, courts must take into account not only developments in
science and medicine but also changing social and cultural mores, including the blurring of traditional gender roles. In this day
and age, women have taken on increasingly important roles in the financial and material support of their families. This,
however, does not change the ideal that the family should be an autonomous social institution, wherein the spouses
cooperate and are equally responsible for the support and well-being of the family. In the case at bar, the spouses from the
outset failed to form themselves into a family, a cohesive unit based on mutual love, respect and support, due to the failure of
one to perform the essential duties of marriage.

This brings to mind the following pronouncement in Te:

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the Court is not
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it
refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the
essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of
physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there
is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge
in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn
marriage.
[26]
(emphasis ours)

In all, we agree with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code is proper under the premises.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision dated July 19, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 72, Antipolo City in Civil Case No. 02-6428is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.


34

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, G.R. No. 165424
Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CORONA,
- v e r s u s - VELASCO, JR.,
*

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
PERALTA,
**
JJ.

CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI
and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. Promulgated:
June 9, 2009

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J.:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying petitioners petition
for review on certiorari (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court). The petition sought to set aside the January 26,
2004 decision
[1]
and September 24, 2004 resolution
[2]
of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.

Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili null
and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158.

He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived
together as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship. However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which
point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank
calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. It was only upon making an inquiry that he
found out that the marriage was not fake.

Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder, particularly dependent and
self-defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held that
petitioners personality disorder was serious and incurable and directly affected his capacity to comply with his essential
marital obligations to respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and void.
[3]


On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on the ground that the totality of the evidence
presented failed to establish petitioners psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It was denied.

The case was elevated to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. We affirmed the CAs decision and
resolution upholding the validity of the marriage.

Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his argument that his marriage to respondent ought to
be declared null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity. He stressed that the evidence he presented, especially
the testimony of his expert witness, was more than enough to sustain the findings and conclusions of the trial court that he
was and still is psychologically incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

We grant the motion for reconsideration.

In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines,
[4]
this Court reiterated that courts should
interpret the provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case
basis guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church
tribunals.

Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden
of decision-making, must consider as essential the expert opinion on the psychological and mental disposition of the parties.
[5]


In this case, the testimony
[6]
of petitioners expert witness revealed that petitioner was suffering from dependent
personality disorder. Thus:

35

Q. Dr. Dayan, going back to the examinations and interviews which you conducted, can you briefly tell this
court your findings [and] conclusions?

A. Well, the petitioner is suffering from a personality disorder. It is a mixed personality disorder from self-
defeating personality disorder to [dependent] personality disorder and this is brought about by [a]
dysfunctional family that petitioner had. He also suffered from partner relational problem during his marriage
with Chona. There were lots of fights and it was not truly a marriage, sir.

Q. Now, what made you conclude that Lester is suffering from psychological incapacity to handle the
essential obligations of marriage?

A. Sir, for the reason that his motivation for marriage was very questionable. It was a very impulsive
decision. I dont think he understood what it meant to really be married and after the marriage, there was no
consummation, there was no sexual intercourse, he never lived with the respondent. And after three months
he refused to see or talk with the respondent and afterwards, I guess the relationship died a natural death,
and he never thought it was a really serious matter at all.

xx xx xx

Q. Likewise, you stated here in your evaluation that Lester Halili and respondent suffered from a grave lack
of discretionary judgment. Can you expound on this?
A. xx xx I dont think they truly appreciate the civil [rites which] they had undergone. [It was] just a spur of
the moment decision that they should get married xx xx I dont think they truly considered themselves
married.

xx xx xx

Q. Now [from] what particular portion of their marriage were you able to conclude xx xx that petitioner and
respondent are suffering from psychological incapacity?

A. xx xx they never lived together[.] [T]hey never had a residence, they never consummated the
marriage. During the very short relationship they had, there were frequent quarrels and so there might be a
problem also of lack of respect [for] each other and afterwards there was abandonment.


In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder
[7]
as
[a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such
individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily
hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for
overprotection.

Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this
disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow
others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even
when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to
do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless
when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.


In her psychological report,
[8]
Dr. Dayan stated that petitioners dependent personality disorder was evident in the fact
that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended on them for decisions.
[9]
Petitioners mother even had to
be the one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt confused on what action to take upon learning that his marriage to
respondent was for real.
[10]


Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of persons suffering from a dependent personality disorder, petitioner
typically acted in a self-denigrating manner and displayed a self-defeating attitude. This submissive attitude encouraged other
people to take advantage of him.
[11]
This could be seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to be dominated, first, by his
father who treated his family like robots
[12]
and, later, by respondent who was as domineering as his father.
[13]
When petitioner
could no longer take respondents domineering ways, he preferred to hide from her rather than confront her and tell her
outright that he wanted to end their marriage.
[14]


Dr. Dayan traced petitioners personality disorder to his dysfunctional family life, to wit:
[15]


Q. And what might be the root cause of such psychological incapacity?

A. Sir, I mentioned awhile ago that Lesters family is dysfunctional. The father was very abusive,
very domineering. The mother has been very unhappy and the children never had affirmation. They might
[have been] x x x given financial support because the father was [a] very affluent person but it was never an
36

intact family. x x x The wife and the children were practically robots. And so, I would say Lester grew up, not
having self-confidence, very immature and somehow not truly understand[ing] what [it] meant to be a
husband, what [it] meant to have a real family life.


Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioners personality disorder was grave and incurable and already existent at
the time of the celebration of his marriage to respondent.
[16]


It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had
a deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same Tecase, recognized that individuals with diagnosable personality disorders
usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.
[17]
Particularly, personality disorders are long-standing,
inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles of living. These disorders
affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for
others.
[18]


From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively
renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is declared null and void.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court and
the January 26, 2004 decision and September 24, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 are SET
ASIDE.

The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158 dated April 17, 1998 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.



Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES,
Petitioner,




- versus -





RAMON REYES,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 185286

Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

August 18, 2010


x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x


DECISION

NACHURA, J.:


This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-familiar tale of a marriage in disarray.





In this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be extra careful before making a finding of psychological
incapacity or vicariously diagnosing personality disorders in spouses where there are none. On the other hand, blind
adherence by the courts to the exhortation in the Constitution
[1]
and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable social
37

institution, and validating a marriage that is null and void despite convincing proof of psychological incapacity, trenches on the
very reason why a marriage that is doomed from its inception should not be forcibly inflicted upon its hapless partners for life.

At bar is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No.
89761
[2]
which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854.
[3]


First, we unfurl the facts.

Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the Philippines (UP),
Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. They were simply classmates then in one university subject
when respondent cross-enrolled from the UP Los Baos campus. The casual acquaintanceship quickly developed into a
boyfriend-girlfriend relationship. Petitioner was initially attracted to respondent who she thought was free spirited and bright,
although he did not follow conventions and traditions.
[4]
Since both resided in Mandaluyong City, they saw each other every
day and drove home together from the university.

Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondents style of courtship which included dining out, unlike other couples their
age who were restricted by a university students budget. At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the
Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioners good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latters habit of cutting
classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana.

Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB Sociology from the UP. By 1974,
respondent had dropped out of school on his third year, and just continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant.

On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioners graduation and her fathers death, petitioner and respondent got
married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation.

Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondents family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were shouldered
by respondents parents, and the couples respective salaries were spent solely for their personal needs. Initially, respondent
gave petitioner a monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary.

When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed expenses. A
year into their marriage, the monthly allowance ofP1,500.00 from respondent stopped. Further, respondent no longer handed
his salary to petitioner. When petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about this, the latter told her that he
had resigned due to slow advancement within the family business. Respondents game plan was to venture into trading
seafood in the province, supplying hotels and restaurants, including the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business
took respondent away from his young family for days on end without any communication. Petitioner simply endured the set up,
hoping that the situation will change.

To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live separately from her in-laws.
However, the new living arrangement engendered further financial difficulty. While petitioner struggled to make ends meet as
the single-income earner of the household, respondents business floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at business, a
fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to petitioner sporadically. Compounding the familys
financial woes and further straining the parties relationship was the indifferent attitude of respondent towards his family. That
his business took him away from his family did not seem to bother respondent; he did not exert any effort to remain in touch
with them while he was away in Mindoro.

After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in with petitioners
mother. But the new set up did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the parties became more estranged. Petitioner
continued to carry the burden of supporting a family not just financially, but in most aspects as well.

In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third son. At that time, respondent was
in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of either the petitioner or the newborn. A week later, respondent arrived
in Manila, acting nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with nary an attempt to find out how the hospital bills were settled.

In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondents fishpond business stopped operations. Although without any means to
support his family, respondent refused to go back to work for the family business. Respondent came up with another business
venture, engaging in scrap paper and carton trading. As with all of respondents business ventures, this did not succeed and
added to the trail of debt which now hounded not only respondent, but petitioner as well. Not surprisingly, the relationship of
the parties deteriorated.

Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair. She overheard respondent
talking to his girlfriend, a former secretary, over the phone inquiring if the latter liked respondents gift to her. Petitioner soon
realized that respondent was not only unable to provide financially for their family, but he was, more importantly, remiss in his
obligation to remain faithful to her and their family.

One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties marriage was a surgical operation on petitioner for the
removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be operated on, respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and
simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the
38

operating room. After the operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of respondents lack of concern, and asked her
mother to order respondent to leave the recovery room.

Still, petitioner made a string of final attempts to salvage what was left of their marriage. Petitioner approached
respondents siblings and asked them to intervene, confessing that she was near the end of her rope. Yet, even respondents
siblings waved the white flag on respondent.

Adolfo Reyes, respondents elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter group,
invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The elder couple scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and
respondent, but these did not improve the parties relationship as respondent remained uncooperative.

In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment to determine
benchmarks of current psychological functioning. As with all other attempts to help him, respondent resisted and did not
continue with the clinical psychologists recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.

At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondents siblings, told respondent to move out of their house.
Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner.

With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondents relationship with his children.

Finally, in 2001,
[5]
petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with the
respondent, alleging the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family
Code.

Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioners allegations that he was psychologically incapacitated.
Respondent maintained that he was not remiss in performing his obligations to his familyboth as a spouse to petitioner and
father to their children.

After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr.
Cecilia Villegas, were presented in evidence), the RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null
and void on the ground of their psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled, thus:

Wherefore, on the ground of psychological incapacity of both parties, the petition is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner MA. SOCORRO PERPETUA CAMACHO and respondent
RAMON REYES contracted on December 4, 1976 at the Archbishops Chapel Villa San Miguel
Mandaluyong, Rizal, is declared null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code, as amended. Henceforth,
their property relation is dissolved.

Parties are restored to their single or unmarried status.

Their children JESUS TEODORO CAMACHO REYES and JOSEPH MICHAEL CAMACHO
REYES, who are already of age and have the full civil capacity and legal rights to decide for themselves
having finished their studies, are free to decide for themselves.

The Decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days from notice to the parties. Entry
of Judgment shall be made if no Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial or Appeal is filed by any of the
parties, the Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor General.

Upon finality of this Decision, the Court shall forthwith issue the corresponding Decree if the parties
have no properties[.] [O]therwise, the Court shall observe the procedure prescribed in Section 21 of AM 02-
11-10 SC.

The Decree of Nullity quoting the dispositive portion of the Decision (Sec. 22 AM 02-11-10 SC)
shall be issued by the Court only after compliance with Articles 50 & 51 of the Family Code as implemented
under the Rules on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Property (Sections 19 & 21, AM 02-11-10 SC) in
a situation where the parties have properties.

The Entry of Judgment of this Decision shall be registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Mandaluyong and Quezon City.

Let [a] copy of this Decision be furnished the parties, their counsel, the Office of the Solicitor
General, the Public Prosecutor, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Mandaluyong City, the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar, Quezon City and the Civil Registrar General at their respective office addresses.

SO ORDERED.
[6]



39

Finding no cogent reason to reverse its prior ruling, the trial court, on motion for reconsideration of the respondent,
affirmed the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.

Taking exception to the trial courts rulings, respondent appealed to
the Court of Appeals, adamant on the validity of his marriage to petitioner. The appellate court, agreeing with the
respondent, reversed the RTC and declared the parties marriage as valid and subsisting. Significantly, a special division of
five (two members dissenting from the majority decision and voting to affirm the decision of the RTC) ruled, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 23, 2007
and Order dated July 13, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 in Civil Case No. Q-
01-44854 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Amended Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is
hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
[7]



Undaunted by the setback, petitioner now appeals to this Court positing the following issues:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONER IS LIKEWISE
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF
MARRIAGE.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE TESTIMONIES OF THE EXPERT
WITNESSES PRESENTED BY PETITIONER.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE
BINDING ON IT.



V

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED DULY ESTABLISHED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO
COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.


VI

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF
THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE WERE
ESTABLISHED, NOT MERELY BY A TOTALITY, BUT BY A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.

VII

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PARTIES MARRIAGE, WHICH IS
UNDOUBTEDLY VOID AB INITIO UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, DOES NOT FURTHER
THE INITIATIVES OF THE STATE CONCERNING MARRIAGE AND FAMILY AND THEREFORE, NOT
COVERED BY THE MANTLE OF THE CONSTITUTION ON THE PROTECTION OF MARRIAGE.

VIII

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE AMENDED PETITION WAS VALIDLY
AMENDED TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCE.
[8]


Essentially, petitioner raises the singular issue of whether the marriage between the parties is void ab initio on the
ground of both parties psychological incapacity, as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code.

40

In declaring the marriage null and void, the RTC relied heavily on the oral and documentary evidence obtained from
the three (3) experts i.e., Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas. The RTC ratiocinated, thus:

After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence presented, the Court finds merit in the petition.





Article 36 of the Family Code reads:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization.

and Art. 68 of the same Code provides:

The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.

Similarly, Articles 69-71 further define the mutual obligations of a marital partner towards each other
and Articles 220, 225 and 271 of the Family Code express the duties of parents toward their children.

Article 36 does not define what psychological incapacity means. It left the determination of the same
solely to the Court on a case to case basis.

x x x x

Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of psychological incapacity in
conjunction to the totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis on the pervasive pattern of behaviors of
the respondent and outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and
Dra. Villegas on the psychological condition of the respondent, the Court finds that the marriage between the
parties from its inception has a congenital infirmity termed psychological incapacity which pertains to the
inability of the parties to effectively function emotionally, intellectually and socially towards each other in
relation to their essential duties to mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render
help and support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In short, there was already a fixed niche in the psychological
constellation of respondent which created the death of his marriage. There is no reason to entertain any
slightest doubt on the truthfulness of the personality disorder of the respondent.

The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their findings that respondent is
suffering from personality disorder which psychologically incapacitated him to fulfill his basic duties to the
marriage. Being professionals and hav[ing] solemn duties to their profession, the Court considered their
assessment/diagnos[is] as credible or a product of an honest evaluation on the psychological status of the
respondent. This psychological incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3) expert
witnesses, is serious, incurable and exists before his marriage and renders him a helpless victim of his
structural constellation. It is beyond the respondents impulse control. In short, he is weaponless or
powerless to restrain himself from his consistent behaviors simply because he did not consider the same
as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from his assertion that nothing was wrong in his marriage with the
petitioner and considered their relationship as a normal one. In fact, with this belief, he lent deaf ears to
counseling and efforts extended to them by his original family members to save his marriage. In short, he
was blind and too insensitive to the reality of his marital atmosphere. He totally disregarded the feelings of
petitioner who appeared to have been saturated already that she finally revealed her misfortunes to her
sister-in-law and willingly submitted to counseling to save their marriage. However, the hard position of the
respondent finally constrained her to ask respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling. Even the siblings of the
respondent were unanimous that separation is the remedy to the seriously ailing marriage of the parties.
Respondent confirmed this stand of his siblings.

x x x x

The process of an ideal atmosphere demands a give and take relationship and not a one sided one.
It also requires surrender to the fulfillment of the essential duties to the marriage which must naturally be
observed by the parties as a consequence of their marriage. Unfortunately, the more than 21 years of
marriage between the parties did not create a monument of marital integrity, simply because the personality
disorder of the respondent which renders him psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his basic duties to his
marriage, is deeply entombed in his structural system and cure is not possible due to his belief that there is
nothing wrong with them.

41

The checkered life of the parties is not solely attributable to the respondent. Petitioner, too, is to be
blamed. Dra. Villegas was firm that she, too, is afflicted with psychological incapacity as her personality
cannot be harmonized with the personality of the respondent. They are poles apart. Petitioner is a well-
organized person or a perfectionist while respondent is a free spirited or carefree person. Thus, the
weakness of the respondent cannot be catered by the petitioner and vice-versa.

Resultantly, the psychological incapacities of both parties constitute the thunder bolt or principal
culprit on their inability to nurture and reward their marital life with meaning and significance. So much so
that it is a pity that though their marriage is intact for 21 years, still it is an empty kingdom due to their
psychological incapacity which is grave, incurable and has origin from unhealthy event in their growing
years.

Both parties to the marriage are protected by the law. As human beings, they are entitled to live in a
peaceful and orderly environment conducive to a healthy life. In fact, Article 72 of the Family Code provides
remedy to any party aggrieved by their marital reality. The case of the parties is already a settled matter due
to their psychological incapacity. In the words of Dra. Magno, their marriage, at the very inception, was
already at the funeral parlor. Stated differently, there was no life at all in their marriage for it never existed at
all. The Court finds that with this reality, both parties suffer in agony by continuously sustaining a marriage
that exists in paper only. Hence, it could no longer chain or jail the parties whose marriage remains in its crib
with its boots and diaper due to factors beyond the physical, emotional, intellectual and social ability of the
parties to sustain.
[9]


In a complete turnaround, albeit disposing of the case through a divided decision, the appellate court diverged from
the findings of the RTC in this wise:

On the basis of the guidelines [in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina] vis--vis the totality of
evidence presented by herein [petitioner], we find that the latter failed to sufficiently establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of her husband, as well as of herself. There is thus no basis for declaring the nullity
of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent] is psychologically
incapacitated. Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as purportedly suffering from Mixed
Personality Disorder (Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality Disorder). Further, clinical
psychologist Magno found [respondent] to be suffering from an Antisocial Personality Disorder with
narcissistic and dependent features, while Dr. Villegas diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering from
Personality Disorder of the anti-social type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy especially along
masculine strivings and narcissistic features.

Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely advisory in character. A
court may place whatever weight it chooses upon such testimonies. It may even reject them, if it finds that
they are inconsistent with the facts of the case or are otherwise unreasonable. In the instant case, neither
clinical psychologist Magno nor psychiatrist Dr. Villegas conducted a psychological examination on the
[respondent].

Undoubtedly, the assessment and conclusion made by Magno and Dr. Villegas are hearsay. They
are unscientific and unreliable as they have no personal knowledge of the psychological condition of the
[respondent] as they never personally examined the [respondent] himself.

x x x x

[I]t can be gleaned from the recommendation of Dayan that the purported psychological incapacity of
[respondent] is not incurable as the [petitioner] would like this Court to think. It bears stressing that
[respondent] was referred to Dayan for psychological evaluation to determine benchmarks of current
psychological functioning. The undeniable fact is that based on Dayans personal examination of the
[respondent], the assessment procedures used, behavioral observations made, background information
gathered and interpretation of psychological data, the conclusion arrived at is that there is a way to help the
[respondent] through individual therapy and counseling sessions.

Even granting arguendo that the charges cast by the [petitioner] on [respondent], such as his failure
to give regular support, substance abuse, infidelity and come and go attitude are true, the totality of the
evidence presented still falls short of establishing that [respondent] is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

x x x x

In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quos findings regarding the [respondents] alleged mixed
personality disorder, his come and go attitude, failed business ventures, inadequate/delayed financial
support to his family, sexual infidelity, insensitivity to [petitioners] feelings, irresponsibility, failure to consult
42

[petitioner] on his business pursuits, unfulfilled promises, failure to pay debts in connection with his failed
business activities, taking of drugs, etc. are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but on
serious marital difficulties/differences and mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. [Respondents] defects were not present at the inception of marriage. They were even able to
live in harmony in the first few years of their marriage, which bore them two children xxx. In fact, [petitioner]
admitted in her Amended Petition that initially they lived comfortably and [respondent] would give his salary
in keeping with the tradition in most Filipino households, but the situation changed when [respondent]
resigned from the family-owned Aristocrat Restaurant and thereafter, [respondent] failed in his business
ventures. It appears, however, that [respondent] has been gainfully employed with Marigold Corporation,
Inc. since 1998, which fact was stipulated upon by the [petitioner].

x x x x

As regards the purported psychological incapacity of [petitioner], Dr. Villegas Psychiatric Report
states that [petitioner] manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive
to the emotional needs of her husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.

However, a perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete
facts showing that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of celebration [thereof] even if such incapacity became manifest only
after its celebration xxx. In fact, what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment
be rendered declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04
December 1976 to be void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent
at the time of the celebration of marriage x x x.

x x x x

What is evident is that [petitioner] really encountered a lot of difficulties in their marriage. However, it
is jurisprudentially settled that psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a
neglect in the performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.

While [petitioners] marriage with [respondent] failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less than
the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as
legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be protected by the State.

Thus, in determining the import of psychological incapacity under Article 36, it must be read in
conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for
different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely
voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these
various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. Article
36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor
manifest themselves. x x x

It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its
recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
[10]



After a thorough review of the records of the case, we cannot subscribe to the appellate courts ruling that the
psychological incapacity of respondent was not sufficiently established. We disagree with its decision declaring the marriage
between the parties as valid and subsisting. Accordingly, we grant the petition.

Santos v. Court of Appeals
[11]
solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the principle that the factors characterizing
psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3)
incurability. We explained:

The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
[12]


43


As previously adverted to, the three experts were one in diagnosing respondent with a personality disorder, to wit:

1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas

PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE

[Petitioner] is the second among 6 siblings of educated parents. Belonging to an average social
status, intellectual achievement is quite important to the family values (sic). All children were equipped with
high intellectual potentials (sic) which made their parents proud of them. Father was disabled, but despite
his handicap, he was able to assume his financial and emotional responsibilities to his family and to a
limited extent, his social functions (sic). Despite this, he has been described as the unseen strength in the
family.

Mother [of petitioner] was [actively involved] in activities outside the home. Doing volunteer and
community services, she was not the demonstrative, affectionate and the emotional mother (sic). Her love
and concern came in the form of positive attitudes, advices (sic) and encouragements (sic), but not the
caressing, sensitive and soothing touches of an emotional reaction (sic). Psychological home environment
did not permit one to nurture a hurt feeling or depression, but one has to stand up and to help himself (sic).
This trained her to subjugate (sic) emotions to reasons.

Because of her high intellectual endowment, she has easy facilities for any undertakings (sic). She is
organized, planned (sic), reliable, dependable, systematic, prudent, loyal, competent and has a strong
sense of duty (sic). But emotionally, she is not as sensitive. Her analytical resources and strong sense of
objectivity predisposed her to a superficial adjustments (sic). She acts on the dictates of her mind and
reason, and less of how she feels (sic). The above qualities are perfect for a leader, but less effective in a
heterosexual relationship, especially to her husband, who has deep seated sense of inadequacy, insecurity,
low self esteem and self-worth despite his intellectual assets (sic). Despite this, [petitioner] remained in her
marriage for more than 20 years, trying to reach out and lending a hand for better understanding and
relationship (sic). She was hoping for the time when others, like her husband would make decision for her
(sic), instead of being depended upon. But the more [petitioner] tried to compensate for [respondents]
shortcomings, the bigger was the discrepancy in their coping mechanisms (sic). At the end, [petitioner] felt
unloved, unappreciated, uncared for and she characterized their marriage as very much lacking in
relationship (sic).



On the other hand, [respondent] is the 9
th
of 11 siblings and belonged to the second set of brood
(sic), where there were less bounds (sic) and limitations during his growing up stage. Additionally, he was
acknowledged as the favorite of his mother, and was described to have a close relationship with her. At an
early age, he manifested clinical behavior of conduct disorder and was on marijuana regularly. Despite his
apparent high intellectual potentials (sic), he felt that he needed a push to keep him going. His being a
free spirit, attracted [petitioner], who adored him for being able to do what he wanted, without being
bothered by untraditional, unacceptable norms and differing ideas from other people. He presented no guilt
feelings, no remorse, no anxiety for whatever wrongdoings he has committed. His studies proved too much
of a pressure for him, and quit at the middle of his course, despite his apparent high intellectual resources
(sic).

His marriage to [petitioner] became a bigger pressure. Trying to prove his worth, he quit work from
his family employment and ventured on his own. With no much planning and project study, his businesses
failed. This became the sources (sic) of their marital conflicts, the lack of relationships (sic) and
consultations (sic) with each other, his negativistic attitudes (sic) and sarcasm, stubbornness and insults, his
spitting at her face which impliedly meant you are nothing as compared to me were in reality, his defenses
for a strong sense of inadequacy (sic).

As described by [petitioner], he is intelligent and has bright ides. However, this seemed not coupled
with emotional attributes such as perseverance, patience, maturity, direction, focus, adequacy, stability and
confidence to make it work. He complained that he did not feel the support of his wife regarding his decision
to go into his own business. But when he failed, the more he became negativistic and closed to suggestions
especially from [petitioner]. He was too careful not to let go or make known his strong sense of inadequacy,
ambivalence, doubts, lack of drive and motivation or even feelings of inferiority, for fear of rejection or loss of
pride. When things did not work out according to his plans, he suppressed his hostilities in negative ways,
such as stubbornness, sarcasm or drug intake.

His decision making is characterized by poor impulse control, lack of insight and primitive drives. He
seemed to feel more comfortable in being untraditional and different from others. Preoccupation is centered
on himself, (sic) an unconscious wish for the continuance of the gratification of his dependency needs, (sic)
in his mother-son relationship. From this stems his difficulties in heterosexual relationship with his wife, as
44

pressures, stresses, (sic) demands and expectations filled up in (sic) up in their marital relationship. Strong
masculine strivings is projected.

For an intelligent person like [respondent], he may sincerely want to be able to assume his
duties and responsibilities as a husband and father, but because of a severe psychological deficit,
he was unable to do so.



Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of the examiner, that [petitioner] manifested
inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her
husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to perform
the duties and responsibilities of marriage. [Respondent], on the other hand, has manifested strong
clinical evidences (sic), that he is suffering from a Personality Disorder, of the antisocial type,
associated with strong sense of Inadequacy along masculine strivings and narcissistic features that
renders him psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
This is characterized by his inability to conform to the social norms that ordinarily govern many
aspects of adolescent and adult behavior. His being a free spirit associated with no remorse, no
guilt feelings and no anxiety, is distinctive of this clinical condition. His prolonged drug intake
[marijuana] and maybe stronger drugs lately, are external factors to boost his ego.

The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to his underlying defense mechanisms,
or the unconscious mental processes, that the ego uses to resolve conflicts. His prolonged and
closed attachments to his mother encouraged cross identification and developed a severe sense of
inadequacy specifically along masculine strivings. He therefore has to camouflage his weakness, in terms of
authority, assertiveness, unilateral and forceful decision making, aloofness and indifference, even if it
resulted to antisocial acts. His narcissistic supplies rendered by his mother was not resolved (sic).

It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration, due to marital
demands and stresses. It is considered as permanent in nature because it started early in his
psychological development, and therefore became so engrained into his personality structures (sic). It is
considered as severe in degree, because it hampered, interrupted and interfered with his normal functioning
related to heterosexual adjustments. (emphasis supplied)
[13]



2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan

Adolfo and Mandy[, respondent]s brothers, referred [respondent] to the clinic. According to them,
respondent has not really taken care of his wife and children. He does not seem to have any direction in life.
He seems to be full of bright ideas and good at starting things but he never gets to accomplish anything. His
brothers are suspecting (sic) that until now [respondent] is still taking drugs. There are times when they see
that [respondent] is not himself. He likes to bum around and just spends the day at home doing nothing.
They wish that hed be more responsible and try to give priority to his family. [Petitioner,] his wife[,] is the
breadwinner of the family because she has a stable job. [Respondent]s brothers learned from friends that
[petitioner] is really disappointed with him. She has discussed things with him but he always refused to
listen. She does not know what to do with him anymore. She has grown tired of him.

When [respondent] was asked about his drug problem, he mentioned that he stopped taking it in
1993. His brothers think that he is not telling the truth. It is so hard for [respondent] to stop taking drugs
when he had been hooked to it for the past 22 years. When [respondent] was also asked what his problems
are at the moment, he mentioned that he feels lonely and distressed. He does not have anyone to talk to.
He feels that he and his wife [have] drifted apart. He wants to be close to somebody and discuss things with
this person but he is not given the chance. He also mentioned that one of his weak points is that he is very
tolerant of people[,] that is why he is taken advantage of most of the time. He wants to avoid conflict so hed
rather be submissive and compliant. He does not want to hurt anyone [or] to cause anymore pain. He wants
to make other people happy.

x x x x

Interpretation of Psychological Data

A. Intellectual / Cognitive Functioning

x x x x

B. Vocational Preference

x x x x
45


C. Socio Emotional Functioning

x x x x

In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to project a reserved, aloof and detached
attitude. [Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns. He has deep feelings of inadequacy. Due to a low self-
esteem, he tends to feel inferior and to exclude himself from association with others. He feels that he is
different and as a result is prone to anticipate rejections. Because of the discomfort produced by these
feelings, he is apt to avoid personal and social involvement, which increases his preoccupation with himself
and accentuates his tendency to withdraw from interpersonal contact. [Respondent] is also apt to be the
less dominant partner. He feels better when he has to follow than when he has to take the lead. A self-
contained person[,] he does not really need to interact with others in order to enjoy life and to be able to
move on. He has a small need of companionship and is most comfortable alone. He, too[,] feels
uncomfortable in expressing his more tender feelings for fear of being hurt. Likewise, he maybe very angry
within but he may choose to repress this feeling. [Respondents] strong need for social approval, which
could have stemmed from some deep seated insecurities makes him submissive and over [compliant]. He
tends to make extra effort to please people. Although at times[, he] already feels victimized and taken
advantage of, he still tolerates abusive behavior for fear of interpersonal conflicts. Despite
his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize dangers of indifference and disapproval [of] others.
Resentments are suppressed. This is likely to result in anger and frustrations which is likewise apt to be
repressed.

There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the moment[,] experiencing considerable tension and
anxiety. He is prone to fits of apprehension and nervousness. Likewise, he is also entertaining feelings of
hopelessness and is preoccupied with negative thought. He feels that he is up in the air but with no sound
foundation. He is striving [for] goals which he knows he will never be able to attain. Feeling discouraged and
distressed, he has difficulty concentrating and focusing on things which he needs to prioritize. He has many
plans but he cant accomplish anything because he is unable to see which path to take. This feeling of
hopelessness is further aggravated by the lack of support from significant others.

Diagnostic Impression

Axis I : Drug Dependence

Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder
[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder]

Axis III : None

Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems:
Severe
He seems to be very good at planning and starting things but is unable
to accomplish anything; unable to give priority to the needs of his family;
in social relationships.

Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning Fair (Emphasis supplied)
[14]


3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno

Summary and Conclusion

From the evidence available from [petitioners] case history and from her psychological
assessment, and despite the non-cooperation of the respondent, it is possible to infer with certainty
the nullity of this marriage. Based on the information available about the respondent, he suffers
from [an] antisocial personality disorder with narcissistic and dependent features that renders him
too immature and irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of a marriage. As for the petitioner,
she is a good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her
children. Her achievements in
46

this regard are praiseworthy. But she is emotionally immature and her comprehension of human situations is
very shallow for a woman of her academic and professional competence. And this explains why she married
RRR even when she knew he was a pothead, then despite the abuse, took so long to do something about
her situation.


Diagnosis for [petitioner]:

Axis I Partner Relational Problem

Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-Defeating features

Axis III No diagnosis

Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (spouses immaturity, drug abuse, and
infidelity)
Severity: 4-severe

Diagnosis for [respondent]

Axis I Partner Relational Problem

Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked narcissistic, aggressive sadistic and
dependent features

Axis III No diagnosis

Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (successful wife)
Severity: 4 (severe)

x x x x

One has to go back to [respondents] early childhood in order to understand the root cause of his antisocial
personality disorder. [Respondent] grew up the ninth child in a brood of 11. His elder siblings were taken
cared of by his grandmother. [Respondents] father was kind, quiet and blind and [respondent] was [reared]
by his mother. Unfortunately, [respondents] mother grew up believing that she was not her mothers favorite
child, so she felt api, treated like poor relations. [Respondents] mothers reaction to her perceived
rejection was to act outwith poor impulse control and poor mood regulation (spent money like water, had
terrible temper tantrums, etc.). Unwittingly, his mother became [respondents] role model.

However, because [respondent] had to get on with the business of living, he learned to use his good looks
and his charms, and learned to size up the weaknesses of others, to lie convincingly and to say what people
wanted to hear (esp. his deprived mother who liked admiration and attention, his siblings from whom he
borrowed money, etc.). In the process, his ability to love and to empathize with others was impaired so that
he cannot sustain a relationship with one person for a long time, which is devastating in a marriage.

[Respondents] narcissistic personality features were manifested by his self-centeredness (e.g. moved to
Mindoro and lived there for 10 years, leaving his family in Manila); his grandiose sense of self-importance
(e.g. he would just come and go, without telling his wife his whereabouts, etc.); his sense of entitlement
(e.g. felt entitled to a mistress because [petitioner] deprived him of his marital rights, etc.); interpersonally
exploitative (e.g. let his wife spend for all the maintenance needs of the family, etc.); and lack of empathy
(e.g. when asked to choose between his mistress and his wife, he said he would think about it, etc.)
The aggressive sadistic personality features were manifested whom he has physically, emotionally and
verbally abusive [of] his wife when high on drugs; and his dependent personality features were manifested
by his need for others to assume responsibility for most major areas of his life, and in his difficulty in doing
things on his own.

[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder with marked narcissistic features
and aggressive sadistic and dependent features, is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the
essential obligations of marriage: to love, respect and render support for his spouse and children. A
personality disorder is not curable as it is permanent and stable over time.

From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence that the marriage of [petitioner] and
[respondent is] null and void from the very beginning. (emphasis supplied)
[15]



Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the testimonies of Doctors Magno and
Villegas for being hearsay since they never personally examined and interviewed the respondent.
47


We do not agree with the CA.

The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality
disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay
that would result in their exclusion as evidence.

For one, marriage, by its very definition,
[16]
necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one
spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this case, the
experts testified on their individual assessment of the present state of the parties marriage from the perception of one of the
parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to interact with, and experience,
respondents pattern of behavior which she could then validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist.

For another, the clinical psychologists and psychiatrists assessment were not based solely on the narration or
personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondents own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law
(sister of petitioner), testified on their own observations of respondents behavior and interactions with them, spanning the
period of time they knew him.
[17]
These were also used as the basis of the doctors assessments.

The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,
[18]
citing The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth
Edition (DSM IV),
[19]
instructs us on the general diagnostic criteria for personality disorders:

A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the
expectations of the individual's culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2) or more of the following areas:


(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and events)
(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and appropriateness of emotional response)
48

(3) interpersonal functioning
(4) impulse control

B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of personal and social
situations.
C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational or other important areas of functioning.
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back at least to
adolescence or early adulthood.
E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a consequence of
another mental disorder.
F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a drug
of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., head trauma).

Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder:

A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring
since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the following:

(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly
performing acts that are grounds for arrest
(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal
profit or pleasure
(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead
(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults
(5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others
(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior
or honor financial obligations
(7) lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or
stolen from another

B. The individual is at least 18 years.

C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15 years.
49


D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of schizophrenia or a
manic episode.
[20]



Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of a person based on a
number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder will not necessarily have personal
knowledge thereof. In this case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis
by the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence
and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.

The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayans findings and recommendation, the psychological incapacity of
respondent is not incurable.

The appellate court is mistaken.

A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In general, recommendations for therapy are
given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddocks textbook entitled Synopsis
of Psychiatry,
[21]
treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to pharmacotherapy, for all the listed kinds of personality disorders
are recommended. In short, Dr. Dayans recommendation that respondent should undergo therapy does not necessarily
negate the finding that respondents psychological incapacity is incurable.

Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically declared that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital obligations.
[22]
As aptly stated by Justice Romero in her separate opinion in the ubiquitously cited
case of Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina:
[23]

[T]he professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases.
Data about the persons entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts
and they were asked to give professional opinions about a partys mental capacity at the time of the
wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of
valid consent.
[Because] of advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the
expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective testimonies of Doctors
Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems include chronic irresponsibility;
inability to recognize and work towards providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance abuse;
and a trail of unpaid money obligations.

It is true that a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists diagnoses that a person has personality disorder is not
automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologists or
psychiatrists finding of a personality disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset
by one of the parties or both parties psychological incapacity.

On more than one occasion, we have rejected an experts opinion concerning the supposed psychological incapacity
of a party.
[24]
In Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,
[25]
we ruled that, even without delving into the non-exclusive list found in Republic v.
Court of Appeals & Molina,
[26]
the stringent requisites provided in Santos v. Court of Appeals
[27]
must be independently met by
the party alleging the nullity of the marriage grounded on Article 36 of the Family Code. We declared, thus:

It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Dr. Villegas with nary a link
drawn between the "psychodynamics of the case" and the factors characterizing the psychological
incapacity. Dr. Villegas' sparse testimony does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that the parties were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. Even on questioning from the
trial court, Dr. Villegas' testimony did not illuminate on the parties' alleged personality disorders and their
incapacitating effect on their marriage x x x.

Curiously, Dr. Villegas' global conclusion of both parties' personality disorders was not supported
by psychological tests properly administered by clinical psychologists specifically trained in the tests' use
and interpretation. The supposed personality disorders of the parties, considering that such diagnoses were
made, could have been fully established by psychometric and neurological tests which are designed to
measure specific aspects of people's intelligence, thinking, or personality.

x x x x

The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and
unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from
making its own factual finding on what happened in this case. The probative force of the testimony of an
expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can
50

render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which
the logic of his conclusion is founded.


In the case at bar, however, even without the experts conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of
events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
51

Article 68 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support.

In this connection, it is well to note that persons with antisocial personality disorder exhibit the following clinical features:

Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be normal and even charming and
ingratiating. Their histories, however, reveal many areas of disordered life functioning. Lying, truancy,
running away from home, thefts, fights, substance abuse, and illegal activities are typical experiences that
patients report as beginning in childhood. x x x Their own explanations of their antisocial behavior make it
seem mindless, but their mental content reveals the complete absence of delusions and other signs of
irrational thinking. In fact, they frequently have a heightened sense of reality testing and often impress
observers as having good verbal intelligence.

x x x Those with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be trusted to carry out any task or
adhere to any conventional standard of morality. x x x A notable finding is a lack of remorse for these
actions; that is, they appear to lack a conscience.
[28]



In the instant case, respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to perform
the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse;
(4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family
businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.

On the issue of the petitioners purported psychological incapacity, we agree with the CAs ruling thereon:

A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete facts
showing that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital

obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity became manifest
only after its celebration x x x. In fact,


what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered declaring the
marriage between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of the celebration of
the marriage x x x

At any rate, even assuming arguendo that [petitioners] Amended Petition was indeed amended to
conform to the evidence, as provided under Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, Dr. Villegas finding
that [petitioner] is supposedly suffering from an Inadequate Personality [Disorder] along the affectional area
does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Such alleged condition of
[petitioner] is not a debilitating psychological condition that incapacitates her from complying with the
essential marital obligations of marriage. In fact, in the Psychological Evaluation Report of clinical
psychologist Magno, [petitioner] was given a glowing evaluation as she was found to be a good, sincere,
and conscientious person and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her children. Her
achievements in this regard are praiseworthy. Even in Dr. Villegas psychiatric report, it was stated that
[petitioner] was able to remain in their marriage for more than 20 years trying to reach out and lending a
hand for better understanding and relationship. With the foregoing evaluation made by no less than
[petitioners] own expert witnesses, we find it hard to believe that she is psychologically incapacitated within
the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
[29]


All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in his separate statement
in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina:
[30]


x x x Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.


In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we find ample basis to
conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at the time of his
marriage to the petitioner.

52

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 89761
is REVERSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code isREINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.