Racism and Apartheid in Southern Africa: Rhodesia

Racism and apartheid
in southern Africa
Rhodesia
Racism and apartheid
in southern Africa
Rhodesia
A book of data
by Reginald Austin
I I
The Unesco Press Paris 1975
Cover photograph: Picou.
Published by The Unesco Press,
7 Place de Fontenoy, 75700 Paris
Printed by Imprimeries Runies, Lausanne
ISBN 92-3- 1 O 1270-3
French edition: 92-3-201270-7
oUnesco 1975
Printed ~ r r Swrlrrrlurid
Preface
#
Thi s book on Rhodesi a i s a compani on vol ume to Racism and Apartheid in ~~ i 9 3c, +c
Southern Africa: South Africa and Namibia, publ i shed by Unesco inOctober 1974.
The book is i ntended for the general publ i c and, mor e parti cul arl y, for teachers.
I t seeks to gi ve the background to the present si tuati on in Rhodesi a and to the
newspaper reports on i t, and to assist those who wi sh to i nf ormstudents and
pupi l s mor e fully about Rhodesi a. Suggesti ons for further readi ng are i ncl uded
inthe text and inthe bi bl i ography.
The vi ews expressed are not necessari l y those of Unesco.
The desi gnati ons empl oyed and the presentati on of the materi al in thi s
publ i cati on do not i mpl y the expressi on of any opi ni on whatsoever on the part
of the Unesco Secretari at concerni ng the l egal status of any country or terri tory,
or of i ts authori ti es, or concerni ng the del i mi tati on of i ts fronti ers.
August 1975
Contents
Introduction, 9
SignEficant dates, 1 1
I. Conquest, 2 1
The whi te i nvasi on, 21; The fi rst ar med confl i ct, 24; Resi stance to conquest, 25;
The establ i shment of Rhodesi a, 26 ; Consol i dati on, 30
2. Land, 31
The Tangwena case, 32; The physi cal di vi si on, 33; The qual i tati ve di vi si on, 34;
Economi c subj ugati on, 35
3. Education, 43
Di scri mi nati on, 43 ; Some educati onal stati sti cs. 45 ; The qual i ty of Af ri can educati on,
45 ; Pri mary and secondary educati on, 46; Techni cal educati on and apprenti ceshi p, 48;
Uni versi ty educati on, 51
4. Basic economic data, 5 3
5. Labour, 59
Agri cul ture. 59; Afri cans forced i nto a money economy, 60; Raci al i smand l abour
uni ty, 61 ; I ndustri al Conci l i ati on Act (1934), 63 ; Labour rel ati ons between Af ri cans
and whi tes, 63 ; Negoti ati ng structures, 64; Empl oyment of Af ri cans by economi c
sector, 64; First- and second- cl ass trade uni oni sts, 65; Empl oyment and f reedom
of movement , 66
6. White political power at any price, 67
Non- representati ve rul e, 67; Vi rtual excl usi on of bl acks f romthe vote, 69; The
Federati on (1953-63), 70; Federated brethren , 71 ; Symbol i c desegregati on, 72;
I ntransi gence or transi ti on, 74
7. Soft constitution and hard government, 75
The soft consti tuti on. 75 ; Har d government , 76; Gover nment and Af ri can l eadershi p,
80; Cl ari fi cati on of the confl i ct, 81
8. Civil war, 83
Landmarks, 83; The full circle, 87
9. The liberation struggle, 89
IO. The liberation campaigns 1966-74,91
Il. Sanctions, 95
Appendixes
1. The 1961 constitution, 101
2. 1971 settlement proposals, 1103
3. Rhodesian Front, 104
4. ZAPU : the party's ideological concept, 106
5. Constitution of ZANU, 109
6. The African National Council, 1 I 1
7. The constitution of FROLIZI, 115
8. Zimbabwe declaration of unity, Lusaka, Republic of Zambia, 7 December 1974, 116
Bibliograph-y, 1 i 7
Introduction
As any whi te Rhodesi an will i nf ormyou-to the amazement of hi s bl ack
countrymen- aparthei d has no pl ace in the Rhodesi an soci al , economi c or
pol i ti cal systemand never has been part of i t. I ndeed apol ogi sts and even
i nf ormed cri ti cs frequentl y urge moderati on in j udgement upon and deal i ngs
withi t , toavoi d forci ng whi te Rhodesi a to turn toaparthei d.
Dependi ng on thei r col our, the i nhabi tants often ref er, ei ther proudl y or
sardoni cal l y, tothe Rhodesi an way of l i fe ; thi s book attempts toexpl ai n why.
Aparthei d is an Af ri kaans wor d meani ng separateness. As the pol i ti cal
i deol ogy practi sed in South Af ri ca, i t means terri tori al separati on and separate
admi ni strati ve and soci al structures for whi tes and the vari ous raci al and tri bal
groups, but all under whi te control . As whi te soci ety and i ts economy depend
on bl ack l abour, however, separati on has to be sel ecti vel y appl i ed. Raci al
di scri mi nati on and separati on are essenti al features of aparthei d but, as the
Rhodesi an exampl e shows, can be achi eved by l ess f ormal soci al and economi c
structures of domi nat i on, and bol stered by soci al cust omand l egi sl ati on.
The settl er-domi nated country created l argel y by the efforts of Ceci l
Rhodes and his fol l owers is now cal l ed Rhodesi a, and i ts present whi te i nhabi -
tants are cal l ed Rhodesi ans. Legal l y, however, i t conti nues to be Sout hern
Rhodesi a , bei ng sti l l regarded by the Uni ted Nati ons and all i ts Member States
as a col ony of the Uni ted Ki ngdom, whi ch is i nternati onal l y responsi bl e for the
terri tory.
The vast maj ori ty of the Af ri can popul ati on now ref er to the terri tory as
Zi mbabwe, after one of the pol i ti cal systems whi ch f ormerl y fl ouri shed there.
Rhodesi a and Zi mbabwe represent opposi ng i deal s. Thi s book is pri mari l y
concerned wi th the f ormer.
Significant dates
1200-1500
1400-1500
1511
1500-1 600
1561
1570
1600-1 700
1700-1 800
1819
183&31
1838
1859
1861
1870
1888
1889
1890
Settl ement of vari ous Shona- speaki ng groups inthe area.
Establ i shment of the Mwene Mut apa dynasty after Korekore con-
quest of the Tavara, an area of present north- west Mashonal and.
Ant ni o Fernandes vi si ts Mwene Mut apa.
Gr owt h of the Ronvi conf ederati on in what is now Matabel el and
and western Mashonal and, Mwene Mut apa, and based at Zi mba-
bwe. Regul ar contacts wi th Portuguese, Ar ab and Swahi l i traders.
Portuguese J esui t mi ssi onary Fr Gonzal o da Si l vei ra ki l l ed in
north-east Mashonal and.
Portuguese puni ti ve expedi ti on sent agai nst Mwene Mut apa.
Decl i ne of Mwene Mut apa, i ncreasi ng power of Portugal and the
Rozwi empi re.
Supremacy of the Rozwi and peri od of prosperi ty and peace.
Shoshangane l eads an Ngoni group to settl e in the Li mpopo
val l ey.
Ngoni i nvasi on under Zwangendaba, sacki ng of Zi mbabwe and
death of the Mambo (ki ng) at Taba Zi Ka Mambo. Zwangendaba
go north topresent- day Tanzani a.
Ndebel e i nvasi on and settl ement under Mzi l i kazi Kumal o. Tri bute
i mposed on surroundi ng Shona- speaki ng groups.
Robert Mof f at establ i shes the fi rst mi ssi on stati on at I nyati by
permi ssi on of Mzi l i kazi .
Mzi l a succeeds Shoshongane as Par amount of the Shangana, and
penetrates i nto Manyi kal and, i mposi ng tri bute.
Lobengul a Kumal o succeeds Mzi l i kazi as ki ng of the Ndebel e.
Mof f at negoti ates treaty of peace and ami ty between Lobengul a
and Bri tai n (rati fi edApril).
Rudd concessi on agreed withLobengul a (for C. J. Rhodes).
Royal Charter granted toBri ti sh Sout h Af ri can Company ( BSAC)
toenabl e i t toexpl oi t the concessi on.
Pi oneer col umn recrui ted, enters the terri tory and establ i shes Fort
Sal i sbury ( 12 September).
Racism and apartheid in southern Africa 12
1891
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
Bri tai n establ i shes protectorate over Mashonal and.
I nvasi on of Matabel el and authori zed (3October).
Bul awayo occupi ed (4 November).
Al l an Wi l son patrol , pursui ng Lobengul a, anni hi l ated on Shanga-
ni River (4 December).
Probabl e death of Lobengul a.
Establ i shment of Af ri can reserves innorth and north-east Mat abe-
l el and.
Hut tax i mposed.
Matabel el and Order inCounci l .
Rhodesi a so named by procl amati on (23 Apri l ).
J ameson rai d on Transvaal (29December).
J ameson rai ders captured.
Ndebel e rebel l i on starts inUmzi ngwani district (24 March).
Mashona rebel l i on starts wi th the Mangwende attack under
Mchemwa on the Mr ewa Nati ve Commi ssi oners camp (20 June).
Stormi ng and capture of Mkwat i s stronghol d at Taba Zi Ka
Mambo (5July).
Rhodes fi rst of fi ve idubus wi th Ndebel e l eaders in Mat opo hills
(21 August).
Attacks on Chi ef Makoni s fortress in caves at Gwi ndi ngwi , usi ng
dynami te to bl owthe def enders out (1-3 September).
Makoni surrenders and is shot after a summar y trial ordered by
Li eut. - Col . Al derson (3September).
Kunzwi Nyandoro s kraal stormed (June).
Mashi angombi s kraal attacked and Mashi angombi ki l l ed
(23 July).
Rai l way reaches Bul awayo f romsouth (November).
Two medi ums, Kagubi and Nehenda, tried for murder (2 March).
Nehenda and Kagubi executed together wi th Chi ef Mashanganyi -
ka.
Kagubi recei ved i nto the Cathol i c Church in the death cel l , gi ven
the name Di smas; Nehenda refuses bapti sm, i nsi sti ng she want ed
todi einher home inMazoe.
BSAC promi ses and starts payment of 360, 000 compensat i on to
settl ers.
I mperi al Order inCounci l establ i shes new consti tuti on.
Rai l way reaches Umt al i f romBei ra.
First meeti ng of Legi sl ati ve Counci l under new consti tuti on.
Rai l way reaches Sal i sbury f romBei ra.
Boer War commences, cutti ng Rhodesi a off f romthe Cape.
Maponder a ri si nginMazoe.
Esti mated total of Af ri can- owned cattl e: 55, 000.
Maponder a defeated by Mashonal and nati ve pol i ce (March).
Last battl e unti l 1960s: Maponder a conti nues gueri l l a rai ds, and
to support chi efs Makombe and Chi oco in thei r unsuccessful
resi stance to Portuguese authori ty.
Rhodes di es.
Rhodesia 13
1904
1905
1906
1911
1914
1919
1920
1922
923
924
1925
1926
1927
1929
1930
Rai l way j oi ns Bul awayo and Sal i sbury.
All mal e Afri cans over 14requi red by l awto regi ster and carry the
situp pass at all t i mes.
Boer War ends.
Maponder a captured, tri ed, i mpri soned, but di es after hunger
stri ke.
I mmoral i ty and I ndecency Suppressi on Act passed, maki ng sexual
i ntercourse between bl ack man and whi te woman a cri mi nal of-
fence.
Rai l way compl eted across Zambezi at Vi ctori a Fal l s.
Afri cans in urban areas prohi bi ted by l awto l i ve outsi de l oca-
ti ons except as domesti c servants.
Afri can Labour (I denti fi cati on) Act-to control recrui tment of
Afri can l abour-essenti al l y to prevent unski l l ed l abour goi ng to
South Afri ca.
Commi ssi on r ecommends changes in r eser ves by reduci ng t hemin
both extent and qual i ty. Long seri es of protests, especi al l y in
Matabel el and, organi zed by Nyamanda and the Mat abel e
Nati onal Home Movement .
Pri vy Counci l deci si ons rej ects case for Af ri can and Company
ownershi p of the l and, and hel d i t bel onged to the Cr own.
BSAC compensat ed for assets taken over by the Cr own.
Nati ve reserves total l i ng 2 1 mi l l i on acres establ i shed.
Legi sl ati ve Counci l approves pl an for responsi bl e government .
Ref erendumon cl oser associ ati on wi th Sout h Af ri ca, or respon-
siblegovernment ; maj ori ty for l atter.
A Zul u Angl i can teacher, Abr ahamTwal a, wrot e: . . . experi ence
has taught us that our sal vati on does not lie in Downi ng
Street. . . .
Format i on by Abr ahamTwal a of the Rhodesi an Bant u Voters
Associ ati on, the fi rst Afri can organi zati on to urge Af ri cans to
depend on themsel ves rather than on the Bri ti sh Gover nment .
Rhodesi a annexed to Bri tai n as a col ony (September).
Responsi bl e government establ i shed (10 October).
First el ecti ons for Legi sl ati ve Assembl y, Sir Charl es Coghl an fi rst
pri me mi ni ster. Begi nni ng of Rhodesi a party government whi ch
conti nued (wi th a break in 1936-37) unti l 1962.
Morri s Carter Land Commi ssi on appoi nted to consi der setti ng
apart defi ned areas outsi de reserves for excl usi ve acqui si ti on by
Afri cans and excl usi ve acqui si ti ons by Europeans. Forty-f i ve per
cent of l and sti l l unal i enated. Europeans hel d 31 mi l l i on acres,
i ncl udi ng nearl y all l and over 3, 000 feet and wi thi n 25 mi l es of
rai l ways.
Carter report r ecommends l and apporti onment.
Under Nati ve Affai rs Act, admi ni strati ve, j udi ci al and l egi sl ati ve
powers inrel ati on to Af ri cans vested inNati ve Commi ssi oners.
Land Apport i onment Bill publ i shed. Af ri can opposi ti on.
Land Apport i onment Act passed, after approval by Bri tai n.
1934
1936
1938
1939
1945
1946
1947
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
Di vi des Rhodesi a i nto Afri can and European areas.
Compul sory educati on for Europeans under 1930 Educati on Act.
I ndustri al Conci l i ati on Act provi des structure for i ndustri al bar-
gai ni ng in Rhodesi a, excl udes Afri cans by excl udi ng t hemf rom
the defi ni ti on of empl oyee .
Nati ve Regi strati on Act requi res Afri cans int own tocarry another
pass (inaddi ti on tohi s situp).
Compul sory educati on of Asi an and Col oured chi l dren.
Bl edi sl oe Commi ssi on in pri nci pl e accepts amal gamat i on of
Northern and Southern Rhodesi a.
Second Wor l d War commences. Empi re Trai ni ng School bri ngs
thousands of Bri tons i nto contact wi th Rhodesi a duri ng Royal
Air Force trai ni ng.
End of Second Wor l d War . Stri ke of Afri can rai l way workers.
Nati ve ( Ur ban Areas) Accommodat i on and Regi strati on Act
requi res empl oyers and l ocal government authori ti es to provi de
mi ni mumhousi ng for Afri can workers and fami l i es. Empower s
removal of unempl oyed f romtowns. Total control of l ocal govern-
ment in whi te hands, Advi sory Boards deal wi th Af ri can affai rs
int owns.
Nati ve Labour Board Act empower s non-representati ve bodi es to
settl e wages for Af ri can workers.
Subversi ve Acti vi ti es Act.
Nati ve Land Husbandry Act i ntroduces stri ngent conservati on
measures to force Af ri can f armers to de- stock and modi f y l and
tenure practi ces. I ntroduced and i mpl ement ed wi thout consul ta-
ti on withAf ri cans, i t was strongl y resi sted by Af ri can rural popu-
l ati on, two- thi rds of whomi t woul d have made l andl ess as they
sought temporary empl oyment int owns.
Bri ti sh Labour government agrees to re- open di scussi ons on cl oser
associ ati on. Mar ch conf erence of officials unani mousl y recom-
mends cl oser associ ati on by federati on.
Fol l owi ng Labour defeat, Lyttel ton (Conservati ve Col oni al
Secretary) announces Bri ti sh approval of federati on in pri nci pal .
Federal consti tuti onal conf erences boycotted by Af ri can del egates
f romnorthern terri tori es.
Ref erendumof Rhodesi an voters approved federati on by 25, 570 to
14, 729; onl y 429 Afri cans eligibletovote (Apri l ).
Federati on Act becomes l aw. Sir Godf rey Huggi ns became the
fi rst pri me mi ni ster of the federati on, succeeded by Garfi el d Todd
as pri me mi ni ster of Southern Rhodesi a (July).
I nter-terri tori al Movement of Persons Control Act.
Yout h League f ormed by Nyandor o, Chi kerema, Chi si za, Edson
Si thol e.
Publ i c Or der Act gi ves power to detai n and restri ct wi thout trial.
Yout h League organi zes successful bus boycott in Sal i sbury, bro-
ken by pol i ce. Over 200 detai ned.
Tredgol d Franchi se Commi ssi on to consi der a systemfor j ust
Rhodesia 15
representati on of the peopl e . . . under whi ch government i s
pl aced, and remai ns in the hands of ci vi l i zed and responsi bl e
persons .
Afri can (Regi strati on and I denti fi cati on) Act passed by Todd s
government , enti tl es advanced Af ri cans to an i denti ty card in
pl ace of a situp.
Wi nst on Fi el d, presi dent of the Domi ni on Party (a predecessor of
the Rhodesi an Front), el ected to federal parl i ament.
Bri tai n al l ows federati on ri ght to j oi n i nternati onal organi zati ons
and recei ve di pl omati c representati on.
Nati ve Counci l s Act passed ; i ntroduces communi t y devel opment
i nto Afri can l ocal government .
NewFranchi se Act i ntroduced by the Uni ted Federal Party (UFP)
to ensure that pol i ti cal power remai ns in responsi bl e hands ,
i ntroduces a l ower Speci al Rol l , whi ch coul d count for a maxi -
mum of 20 per cent of the whi te rol l .
Federal consti tuti onal amendment effecti vel y i ncreases whi te el ec-
toral control .
Southern Rhodesi an Afri can Nati onal Congress ( ANC) (based on
an organi zati on started in 1934), f ounded as an Afri can nati onal i st
party demandi ng one man, one vote ; Presi dent: J oshua Nkomo;
Vi ce-presi dent : J . Chi kerema; General Secretary: G. Nyandor o
(12 September).
Garfi el d Todd ousted by cabi net revol t, repl aced by Sir Edgar
Whi t ehead, who i s defeated by Domi ni on Party ina safe seat.
All meeti ngs of ANC inrural areas banned.
Whi t ehead and UFP wi n general el ecti on, but Domi ni on Party
recei ves maj ori ty of fi rst preference votes.
Pl ewman Commi ssi on reports onl y 34. 5 per cent of Af ri can f ami -
l i es inurban areas l i vi ngabove poverty dat uml i ne.
Federati on- wi de emergency decl ared ; Southern Rhodesi an Af ri can
Nati onal Congress banned, 500 member s arrested, 300 detai ned.
Devl i n Commi ssi on reports that federati on is mai n cause of Afri -
can di scontent.
Unl awf ul Organi zati ons Act passed.
Preventi ve Detenti on ( Temporary Provi si ons) Act provi des for
detenti on wi thout trial.
Publ i c Or der Act amended.
Nati ve Affai rs Act amended.
NewI ndustri al Conci l i ati on Act gi ves Af ri cans l i mi ted ri ghts in
whi te- domi nated uni ons.
Nati onal Democrat i c Party (NDP) f ormed by f ormer l eaders of
ANC.
Southern Rhodesi an publ i c servi ce opened to Af ri cans.
Bri ti sh Pri me Mi ni ster Macmi l l an makes wi nd of change speech
inCape Town.
Law and Order (Mai ntenance) Act passed.
Emergency Powers Act repl aced the Publ i c Order Act.
1957
1958
1959
1960
Vagrancy Act passed.
Monckt on Commi ssi on report concl udes that there is raci al ani -
mosi ty inf ederati on; demands i ts end or radi cal franchi se changes.
Consti tuti onal conf erence in London ; Afri can nati onal i sts led by
Nkomo, i nvi ted to attend after initial excl usi on.
Pass Laws repeal ed, but Afri cans sti l l requi red to carry regi stra-
ti on certi fi cates (situpas).
I mmoral i ty and I ndecency Suppressi on Act (1904) repeal ed.
Li quor Amendment Act enti tl es Afri cans to buy European
l i quor.
Consti tuti onal conf erence r ecommends new consti tuti on.
After rank and filei nsi stance, NDP announces refusal to recogni ze
new consti tuti on.
Further conf erence meeti ngs boycotted by NDP.
NDP banned, reconsti tuted as Zi mbabwe Afri can Peopl e s Uni on
(ZAPU).
Rhodesi an Front Party f ormed, mergi ng Domi ni on Party and
other whi te opponent s of 1961 consti tuti on (March).
ZAPU banned (September).
Whi t ehead speaks to Uni ted Nati ons Trusteeshi p Commi t t ee, sug-
gests 1961 consti tuti on woul d bri ng maj ori ty rul e in fi fteen years
(October).
Pol i ti cal meeti ngs on Sundays or hol i days banned (the onl y ti mes
when Afri cans inurban areas coul d meet).
Rhodesi an Front defeats Whi t ehead and UFP in general el ecti ons
hel d under 1961 consti tuti on.
For mer ZAPU executi ve goes toDar es Sal aam.
Conf erence on di ssol uti on of the federati on (June).
Pri me Mi ni ster Fi el d di scusses Southern Rhodesi an i ndependence
wi th Bri tai n.
Zi mbabwe Afri can Nati onal Uni on ( ZANU) f ormed, ledby Rev.
Ndabani ngi Si thol e (August).
Nkomo f orms Peopl es Caretake Counci l (PCC) (August).
Bri tai n vetoes Uni ted Nati ons Securi ty Counci l resol uti on cal l i ng
upon her not to transfer Royal Rhodesi an Air Force (Federal )
ai rcraft to Rhodesi a (September).
Maj or- General Anderson appoi nted General Offi cer Commandi ng
Rhodesi an Ar my after Fi el d promi sed no attempt at illegal i nde-
pendence woul d be made (J anuary).
Fi el d, rel uctant to consi der illegal decl arati on of i ndependence,
forced to resi gn as pri me mi ni ster, succeeded by I an Smi t h (Apri l ).
Smi th states: I f in my l i feti me we have an Afri can nati onal i st
government in power in Southern Rhodesi a, then we will have
fai l edinthe pol i cy that 1 bel i eve i n (May).
African Daily News, owned by Thompson Organi zati on, sol e Afri -
can mass ci rcul ati on paper, banned under Pri nted Publ i cati ons
Act. Emergency decl ared in Hi ghfi el d (Sal i sbury s Af ri can t own-
shi p) (August).
1961
1962
1963
1964
Rhodesia 17
Labour government el ected inBri tai n (October).
Maj or- General Anderson rel i eved as GOC Rhodesi an Ar my
(October).
Smi th, under stri ct securi ty hol ds indubu of 600 chi ef s to obtai n
approval of i ndependence (October).
Ref erendumamong voters: Are you in f avour of i ndependence
based on the 1961 consti tuti on? ; 58,091 voted Yes, 6,096 voted
No (November).
ZANU Crocodi l e Commando kills whi te f armer ( November) .
Bottoml ey, British Commonweal t h Secretary, vi si ts Sal i sbury and
detai ned Afri can l eaders. Pri vatel y stated to Rhodesi an Front the
fi ve pri nci pl es on whi ch Bri tai n woul d consi der granti ng i ndepen-
dence (March).
ZANU rai ders rounded up (Apri l ).
Pri me Mi ni ster I an Smi t h hol ds general el ecti on stati ng the mai n
i ssue to be i ndependence. Rhodesi an Front wi ns all fifty A roll
(whi te) seats. El ecti on al most total l y boycotted by Af ri cans (May).
ZAPU gueri l l as enter Rhodesi a (May).
Bri ti sh Pri me Mi ni ster Wi l son vi si ts Rhodesi a, tal ks wi th Smi t h
and detai ned Afri cans (October).
Wi l son states the demand for Bri tai n to attempt to settl e all
Rhodesi a s consti tuti onal probl ems witha mi l i tary i nvasi on i s out
(31 October).
BSAC pol i ce gi ven a pay ri se (October).
Emergency decl ared under Emergency Powers Act ; uni nterrupted
to date. After assuri ng Southern Rhodesi an Governor Gi bbs that
Uni l ateral Decl arati on of I ndependence (UDI ) woul d not take
pl ace (5 November) , Rhodesi an Front decl ares i ndependence and
promul gates the Consti tuti on of Rhodesi a 1965 to end British
rul e in Rhodesi a. Governor di smi sses Smi t h and his cabi net, Bri -
tai n passes the Southern Rhodesi a Act, reaffi rmi ng that Southern
Rhodesi a i s part of Bri ti shDomi ni ons and empoweri ng the Bri ti sh
Gover nment to make any necessary Orders in Counci l . Southern
Rhodesi a (Consti tuti on) Order i nval i dates Smi th s consti tuti on
and prohi bi ts the l egi sl ature f rommaki ng l aws. Wi l son cal l s on
Rhodesi an ci ti zens to refrai n f romall acts whi ch woul d further
the obj ects of the illegal authori ti es. Subj ect to that, i t is the duty
of all ci ti zens to mai ntai n l awand order in the country and to
carry on with thei r normal tasks. Thi s appl i es equal l y to the
j udi ci ary, the armed servi ces, the pol i ce, and the publ i c servi ces
( November) .
General Assembl y and Securi ty Counci l resol uti ons call on Uni ted
Nati ons Member States not to recogni ze the Smi t h rgi me
(November).
Securi ty Counci l resol uti on 2 17 (1965) cal l s Uni ted Nati ons Mem-
ber States todo ut most to break economi c rel ati ons withRhodesi a
(November).
1966 Securi ty Counci l resol uti on 221 (1966) permi ts the Uni ted
1965
Ki ngdomto use force to bl ockade illegal unl oadi ng of oil for
Rhodesi a at Bei ra (bl ockade never extended to Loureno Mar ques
or South Afri can ports) (Apri l ).
ZANU ini ntermi ttent cl ashes withRhodesi an forces (Apri l ).
Whi t e f armer and wifeki l l ednear Hartl ey (May).
ZAPU acti vi ty di scovered inurban areas (May).
Wi l son has tal ks withSmi th on HMS Tiger. Fai l s ( December) .
Securi ty Counci l resol uti on 232 (1966) extends sancti ons on i m-
ports and exports to and f romRhodesi a (December).
Rhodesi an Front sets up Whal ey Commi ssi on to advi se on a
consti tuti on to ensure the harmoni ous devel opment of Rhodesi a s
pl ural soci ety, havi ng regard to the soci al and cul tural di fferences
among the peopl es of Rhodesi a, to the di fferent systems of l and
tenure . . . (Apri l ).
ZAPU- SAANC mi l i tary al l i ance (August).
Heavy cl ashes between ZAPU- SAANC groups and Rhodesi an
and Sout h Afri can securi ty forces inWanki e area ( August - Sept em-
ber).
I n a seri es of engagement s, fi fty-ei ght guerri l l as ( ZAPU- SAANC)
cl ai med ki l l edby Rhodesi an and Sout h Afri can forces near Si pol i -
lo(March).
Rhodesi a Appel ate Di vi si on (Chi ef J usti ce Beadl e) deci des in
Madzi mbamut o v. Lardner Burke that Rhodesi an Front i s the
l egal government , rej ecti ng Pri vy Counci l deci si on to the contrary
(March).
Smi th rgi me hangs several Afri cans sentenced to death for mur -
der inconnexi on wi th guerri l l a war (March).
Mandat ory economi c sancti ons i mposed by Securi ty Counci l reso-
l uti on (May).
ZAPU- SAANC groups enter north- west Rhodesi a and cl ash with
securi ty forces. Sout h Afri can pol i ce suffer fi rst admi tted casual ty
Further tal ks on HMS Fearl ess between Pri me Mi ni ster Wi l son
and Smi th (October).
Rhodesi an Front consti tuti on approved by ref erendum.
Provi des for eventual maxi mumAfri can representati on in Legi sl a-
ture of 50 per cent. Vi rtual l y guarantees perpetual whi te rul e
(June).
Land Tenure Act repl aced Land Apport i onment Act di vi di ng l and
in equal porti ons between the whi tes (mi nori ty) and Afri cans
(maj ori ty) (J une).
( No i nsurgent cl ashes reported in 1969. )
ZAPU attacks Sout h Afri can pol i ce camp near Vi ctori a Fal l s
(J anuary).
Bri tai n and Uni ted States veto Securi ty Counci l resol uti on seeki ng
to condemn Bri tai n for not usi ng force agai nst the rebel l i on
(March).
Rhodesi a procl ai med a republ i c by Smi th (March).
1967
1968
(J ul y).
1969
1970
Rhodesia 19
I ntermi ttent cl ashes between ZAPU and Rhodesi an forces
(March).
First Rhodesi a general el ecti on si nce rebel l i on, Rhodesi an Front
wi ns all fiftywhi te seats (Apri l ).
Conservati ve government el ected inBri tai n (June).
Lord Goodman r e- commences secret negoti ati ons with Smi t h on
basi s of 1969 consti tuti on (June).
ZAPU and ZANU establ i sh J oi nt Mi l i tary Counci l (March).
Three Rhodesi an sol di ers ki l l edby l andmi ne (Apri l ).
Proposed settl ement agreed by Bri ti sh Gover nment wi th Smi t h
after Sir Alec Dougl as- Home (Forei gn Secretary) vi si ts Sal i sbury
(November).
Af ri can Nati onal Counci l f ormed as a movement to represent the
overwhel mi ng number of peopl e in the country who rej ected the
proposal s , under the chai rmanshi p of Bi shop Abel T. Muzor ewa
(December).
Pearce Commi ssi on arri ves inRhodesi a to test the acceptabi l i ty of
the 1971 proposal s . First attempt by Bri tai n to assess atti tude of
Af ri can masses to i ts agreements wi th the mi nori ty (J anuary).
Bri tai n vetoes Securi ty Counci l resol uti on cal l i ng for rej ecti on of
1971 settl ement proposal s and recal l of Pearce Commi ssi on
(February).
Pearce Commi ssi on reports the rej ecti on of the proposal s by the
Af ri can maj ori ty (March). ANC mani f esto publ i shed.
Front for the Li berati on of Zi mbabwe (FROLI ZI ) f ormed in exi l e
(October).
ZANU guerri l l a attacks re- open with greater i ntensi ty in rural
north-east Rhodesi a (December).
Some 200 ANC officials in north-east arrested.
Smi t h creates no go areas, and protected vi l l ages innorth- east.
Guerri l l a i ncursi ons and attacks i ncrease.
Smi t h cl oses Zambi an border tostop guerri l l a i ncursi ons (J anuary).
Demands guarantee f romPresi dent Kaunda that guerri l l as will be
stopped. Ref used. Smi t h re- opens border, Zambi a refused to do
the same, lost $(R)16.1 mi l l i on annual revenue.
Smi t h warns of mor e guerri l l a acti on ahead, l aunches campai gn to
attract 1 mi l l i on whi te settl ers (J anuary).
After coup dEtat inLi sbon, Portugal announces that Mozambi que,
under FRELI MO, will become i ndependent inJ une 1975. Guerri l l a
acti vi ty conti nues (Apri l ). Moto, onl y Af ri can mass-ci rcul ati on
bi - weekl y paper, banned. Smi t hs representati ves (E. A. T. Smi th
and Gayl ard) have pri vate di scussi ons wi th presi dents of Bot swana,
Tanzani a, Zambi a and FRELI MO. Smi t h rel eases some l eadi ng
detai nees i ncl udi ng J oshua Nkomo and Rev. Si thol e. After meeti ng
wi th presi dents Machel , Kaunda Khama and Nyerere, a uni ty
agreement is reached. ANC FROLI ZI , ZANU and ZAPU mer ge
i nto the ANC as the uni fyi ng force of the peopl e of Zi mbabwe
( December 7).
1971
1972
1973
1974
Ceasefi re decl ared ( December 1 i).
Sout h Afri can pol i ce and BSAP uni t ambushed near Mazoe,
fi ve ki l l ed( December 23).
1975 Lardner- Burke decl ared no further rel eases of detai nees unti l a
cessati on of terrori st acti vi ti es.
ANC l eaders refused permi ssi on by Smi t h to vi si t Lusaka to meet
Bri ti sh Forei gn Secretary.
I nci dents conti nue in north-east provi nce i ncl udi ng l andmi ne
fatal i ti es. ANC and Smi th rgi me accuse one another of breaches
of ceasefi re-Smi th al l egi ng ANC fai l ure to stop ki l l i ngs, ANC
al l egi ng that the rgi me had wrongl y dropped leaflets in the area
demandi ng that guerri l l as abandon their arms and surrender or
return tothei r bases , and wer e attempti ng to di sarmguerri l l as they
made contact wi th (February). Three guerri l l as convi cted of
terrori smhanged. Rev. Si thol e re-detai ned after Smi t h al l eges he
pl otted assassi nati on of certai n opponent s he consi dered to be a
chal l enge in hi s bi d for the l eadershi p of the ANC - a l i st of
thirty potenti al vi cti ms i s menti oned wi thout detai l s, and a heari ng
incamera arranged (March). Two weeks later addi ti onal al l egati ons
made that he i s the Presi dent of ZANU. . . and Commander - i n-
Chi ef of ZANLA .
ANC l eaders rej ect the al l egati on. Herbert Chi tepo ( ZANU
chai rman) assassi nated by a bomb inLusaka ( Mar ch is). Zambi an
authori ti es arrest member s of ZANU supreme counci l .
Reports of ki l l i ngs ari si ng f romi nternal confl i cts wi thi n ZANLA
(February/ March).
I n Rhodesi a the Speci al Court to consi der the re-detenti on of
Si thol e, decl i nes to consi der the assassi nati on al l egati ons and deal s
onl y wi th the al l egati on that as Commander - i n- Chi ef of ZANLA
he had . . . been responsi bl e for the death, si nce the ceasefi re. . .
of terrori st vi cti ms inthe north- east area . After heari ngs in publ i c
on this charge al one, in whi ch Rev. Si thol e refused to parti ci pate,
the court f ound his re-detenti on ful l y warranted . The court stated
that si nce 1972, 53 member s of the Rhodesi an securi ty forces,
13 European ci vi l i ans and 220 Af ri can ci vi l i ans had been ki l l edby
guerri l l as.
ANC del egati on, i ncl udi ng the re-rel eased Rev. Si thol e, attends
the Organi zati on of Af ri can Uni ty (OAU) Counci l of Mi ni sters,
di scussi on on southern Afri ca in Dar es Sal aam. Bi shop Muzor ewa
attends Commonweal t h Pri me Mi ni ster s conf erence (J amai ca),
obtai ni ng assurances of assi stance for Mozambi que to enabl e i t to
cl ose i ts rai l ways to Rhodesi an sancti ons- breaki ng acti vi ti es.
J une 1, Rhodesi an pol i ce, breaki ng up a demonstrati on outsi de an
ANC Nati onal Executi ve meeti ng in Sal i sbury (Hi ghfi el d), shot
and ki l l ed thi rteen and wounded others.
1 Conquest
The white invasion
Li ke the rest of southern Afri ca the terri tory at present known as Rhodesi a has
experi enced successi ve pol i ti cal systems, and a successi on of peopl es and cul -
tures. Most of these changes i nvol ved the growt h and decay of essenti al l y
Af ri can systems, or the i ntrusi on and absorpti on (or rej ecti on) of other Af ri can
groups. European col oni al penetrati on commenced in the si xteenth century,
when the Portuguese came i nto contact wi th the Shona peopl e of what i s now
north-eastern Mashonal and in the thri vi ng Mwene Mut apa conf ederati on. The
l atters strength was as much spi ri tual as economi c and mi l i tary, hence the
conti nui ty of i ts i nfl uence well after i ts subj ecti on to strong Portuguese pres-
sures inthe area whi ch is now Mozambi que.
Unti l the 1830s there Co-exi sted, in what is now Matabel el and and western
Mashonal and, another central i zed systemwhose i nfl uence and strength duri ng
the ei ghteenth century exceeded that of the Mwene Mutapa- the Rozwi conf ed-
erati on, centred on the massi ve stone edi f i ces of Great Zi mbabwe, and stretch-
i ng al most to the core of the Mut apa real ms of the Korekore. The Rozwi
Mambos (ki ngs) of Zi mbabwe successful l y resi sted Portuguese pressures, and
governed an organi zed, peaceful and very prosperous peopl e. The Rozwi con-
federati on, at l east in i ts out ward pol i ti cal f orm, was shattered in the 1830s by
the i nvadi ng Ngoni impis (regi ments) movi ng f romthe south under Zwangenda-
ba, who destroyed the Mambo and hi s court before movi ng north.
I n 1838 the fol l owi ng wave of the Ndebel e, l ead by Mzi l i kazi , qui ckl y
establ i shed a new mi l i tary state in the south- west of what was the Rozwi
empi re, and i t was wi th thi s communi t y that the precursors of European
settl ement negoti ated thei r penetrati on i nto the terri tory.
Thi s chapter will be l argel y concerned wi th the consequences of the Eur o-
pean i nvasi on whi ch here, as el sewhere in Afri ca and in the worl d, had pro-
f ound resul ts; but i t is i mportant to r emember that i t is onl y an epi sode in the
hi story of the area. The Rhodesi an way of l i fe whi ch i ts present whi te benefi -
ci ari es and champi ons stri ve to mai ntai n at al most any cost i s onl y a phase in
the conti nui ng chroni cl e of the peopl es who have come, gone or remai ned
between the Li mpopo, the Zambezi , the eastern mount ai ns of I nyanga and the
western swamp and desert pl ai ns of Makari kari . As Obed Mut ezo, the Afri can
hero of Ndabani ngi Si thol e s novel - come- cont emporary pol i ti cal manual says :
Forei gners come and go, but they l eave us here inZi mbabwe.
Europeans had to negoti ate wi th, and perhaps conquer, establ i shed com-
muni ti es whi ch were often powerf ul . As earl y as 1836 Bri tai n, through the
Governor of the Cape Col ony, had concl uded a treaty of fri endshi p wi th the
Ndebel e ki ng Mzi l i kazi who, in 1870, was succeeded by hi s son Lobengul a. The
Pri vy Counci l , ina f amous deci si on in 1919 (Ni re Southern Rhodesi a) consi der-
i ng the l egal basi s of the European presence in the terri tory. took as thei r
starti ng poi nt Lobengul a s soverei gnty, and wer e of the opi ni on that after a
fashi on [hi s] was a regul ar government , whi ch i nvol ved hi s autocrati c power
assi sted by a senate and popul ar assembl y whose consent l ent authori ty to hi s
publ i c acts . I n the management of hi s external affai rs Lobengul a i s descri bed
by Professor Al exandrowi cz in The European-Africutz Confrontutiotz as one of
the most ski l l ed Afri can rul ers . The Pri vy Counci l conf i rmed that when the
Bri ti sh Sout h Afri ca Company ( BSAC) entered and sought to exerci se control
in the terri tory in 1891 the source of i ts actual admi ni strati on [was] in the
governi ng Soverei gn of the country, ki ng Lobengul a . Southern Rhodesi a was
thus one of the very fewcases in Afri ca of col oni al acqui si ti on by undi sgui sed
conquest. Thi s gi ves added si gni fi cance to the ci rcumstances in whi ch Rhodes,
the BSAC and the settl ers, granted permi ssi on onl y to expl oi t mi neral s by the
ki ng, mani pul ated the si tuati on and the Bri ti sh Gover nment i nto a vi ol ent
conf rontati on in order to take compl ete control . The frui ts of that confl i ct are
sti l l bei ng reaped.
The Berl i n Act of 1885 provi ded a fresh sti mul us to the European col oni za-
ti on of Afri ca. Bri tai n was ready to extend i ts i nfl uence, but rel uctant to
undertake the effecti ve occupati on and j uri sdi cti on needed to establ i sh such
i nfl uence beyond chal l enge. I n part this expl ai ns why Rhodesi a is uni quel y the
creati on of the weal thy, ambi ti ous, i mperi al expansi oni st Ceci l J ohn Rhodes.
Havi ng made an i mmense fortune in the di amond mi nes, he sawthe opportuni -
ty of fulfillinghi s i mperi al i st dreamof a Bri ti sh Afri ca and the prospect of the
further mi neral weal th whi ch all hoped woul d be f ound acrbss the Li mpopo.
Bri tai n s readi ness to al l owsuch pri vate i ni ti ati ve to extend her i nfl uence
was i ncreased by the threatened extensi on, i nherent in an agreement made in
1887 wi th Lobengul a by Presi dent Kruger s emi ssary Grobl er, of Boer i nfl uence
beyond the Transvaal . The mi ssi onary J. S. Mof f at, acti ng on behal f of the
Bri ti sh Gover nment , persuaded the ki ng to abrogate the Grobl er treaty and
enter i nto a treaty establ i shi ng a Bri ti sh sphere of i nfl uence, and agreei ng not to
cede any of hi s terri tory wi thout Bri ti sh sancti on. An i mmedi at e rush of conces-
si on hunters to Lobengul a f ol l owed. Rudd s success was partl y the resul t of the
support gi ven toRhodes agent by the Bri ti sh representati ve. I n return for l o0
per mont h, 1,000 ri fl es, 100,000 cartri dges, pl us an armed steamboat promi sed
(but never del i vered) by the concessi onari es, Lobengul a gave t hemthe ri ght to
wi n and procure all metal s and mi neral s inmy ki ngdoms .
On this basi s Rhodes persuaded the Bri ti sh Gover nment to grant a charter
to the BSAC- i ncl udi ng powers of government and admi ni strati on-whi ch, as
Bri ti sh officials made cl ear, he woul d need Lobengul a s permi ssi on to execute.
Rhodesia 23
I n fact the most si gni fi cant powers arrogated by the company to itself, especi al l y
the ri ght to admi ni ster the settl ers and thei r probl ems and to have a Bri ti sh
Resi dent appoi nted, werenot di scl osed to the ki ng, whi l e hi s opposi ti on to t hem
was kept f romthe Bri ti sh Gover nment . Equal l y hi s efforts to abrogate the
concessi on on the advi ce of hi s counci l (fully wi thi n hi s soverei gn ri ghts) wer e
not reveal ed to the Bri ti sh authori ti es unti l after the grant of the charter in
October 1889. Decepti on, col l usi on and conf usi on of company and Cr own
i nterests thus pl ayed a si gni fi cant part in the establ i shment of European pres-
ence inthe terri tory. I t was repl aced intimeby vi ol ence when they fel t powerf ul
enough tochange their status f romguests to overl ords.
The occupati on of Mashonal and on 12 Sept ember 1890 was surrounded by
si mi l ar hypocri sy. The Bri ti shGover nment was aware of Lobengul a s obj ecti ons
to i t , yet mai ntai ned the pretence that the pi oneer col umn was movi ng wi th the
l egal l y requi red consent of Lobengul a. At Fort Sal i sbury, as Pal l ey poi nts out, a
fraudul ent annexati on ceremony was enacted by the settl ers (i t is re- enacted
annual l y by t hem, and unti l recentl y was cal l ed Occupat i on Day ). I t was
wi thout l egal basi s in the concessi on or charter, and was not ratified by the
Bri ti sh Gover nment . Thereafter the company proceeded to do preci sel y what
the Col oni al Secretary, Lord Knut sf ord, had warned i t agai nst-to govern
[Lobengul a s] country wi thout hi s permi ssi on . It appoi nted an Admi ni strator ,
a pol i ti cal supervi sor (Dr J ameson) and an of f i cer- i n- command of the pol i ce. I t
was not unti l May 1891, to deal wi th a threatened Boer trek i nto Mashonal and,
and inspi teof Lobengul a s opposi ti on, that Bri tai n decl ared a protectorate over
the whol e of Mashonal and.
There is an addi ti onal poi nt of l ess l egal si gni fi cance to those above (si nce
Bri tai n recogni zed Lobengul a as the soverei gn of the whol e of Mashonal and) ,
but i mportant in human t er ms to the i nhabi tants of the area. As Lawrence
Vambe s book i ndi cates, the Shona peopl e l i vi ng outsi de the areas wi thi n easy
reach of Mat abel e rai di ng parti es di d not consi der themsel ves subj ect to Loben-
gul a. Consequentl y thei r fri endl y atti tude to the smal l pi oneer group, who
appeared no di fferent f romother purel y t emporary i ncursi ons of whi te hunters
and traders, turned to resentment when they f ound themsel ves bei ng evi cted
f romthei r ancestral homes and forced i nto l abouri ng for t hem. Thi s resentment
can in part be measured by the events of thei r vi ol ent resi stance to settl er
occupati on-usual l y referred to as the rebel l i on of 1897.
Company admi ni strati on, whi ch has been correctl y descri bed as pol i ti cal l y
i rresponsi bl e , thus achi eved ef f ecti ve control over the whol e of Mashonal and
by earl y 1892, l argel y as a resul t of a consi stent refusal of the Bri ti sh Gover n-
ment to assert authori ty to prevent i t and an equal l y consi stent readi ness to
agree tothe demands of the settl ers. The pattern of i mperi al weakness was thus
earl y establ i shed, and the fol l owi ng years served onl y to emphasi ze the supre-
macy of settl er i nterests. Company l egi sl ati on and admi ni strati on, apparentl y
beyond the concern or control of Bri tai n, effecti vel y turned l ocal Af ri can
atti tudes f romsurpri se, through resentment, to a determi nati on to resi st the
uni nvi ted Europeans. The provocati on i ncl uded extraordi nary harshness by
company offi ci al s, often part-ti mers, in thei r deal i ngs wi th the Af ri can popul a-
ti on, especi al l y the Shonas, who di d not have the protecti on of Lobengul a. I n
addi ti on, the exi stence of t wo apparentl y soverei gn authori ti es (Lobengul a de
j ure and the company de facto) wi thi n the same ki ngdommade a cl ash i nevi t-
abl e. European settl ers woul d not tol erate the di sl ocati on caused by rai di ng
impis, and the Matabel e resented company sei zure of thei r cattl e even if i t was
mi staken. The settl ers, confi dent then, as now, of thei r l i nks wi th the mor e
powerf ul south, presented the i mpl i cati ons of col oni al rul e and of a settl er
economy to the Afri cans wi th no concessi ons at al l .
As a parti cul arl y bad exampl e of this atti tude the extraordi nary case, in
Mar ch 1892, of a dawn pol i ce attack on Ngome s vi l l age (a headman of
Chi ef Mangwende) in Mashonal and may be ci ted. Maxi mguns and a seven-
pounder wer e used by Captai n Lendy to pui i i sh the kraal for havi ng struck a
settl er who demanded to search the kraal , havi ng accused men f romthe kraal of
theft. No evi dence was produced, nor was arrest and trial consi dered. Twent y-
one men wer e ki l l ed, f orty-seven head of cattl e taken. Thi s was the new
admi ni strati on of Dr J ameson, whi ch Rhodes commended for mai ntai ni ng the
di gni ty of the l aw . An equal l y stri ki ng i l l ustrati on was the summar y puni sh-
ment by fiftyl ashes in publ i c and a fine of six goats and three head of cattl e, in
Mar ch 1893, on a headman at Amanda s kraal for rej ecti ng a demand to send
some of his boys towor k and sayi ng his men wer e not goi ng to wor k for whi te
men , and that he woul d fi re on the pol i ce if they came .
Yet the eventual l y vi ol ent Shona reacti on to the occupati on surpri sed the
settl ers-partl y because they mi sunderstood the peopl e and thei r cul ture, and
partl y because of thei r sel f-decepti on regardi ng the grati tude they expected the
Shona to showfor thei r l i berati on f romthe Ndebel e. Thi s propensi ty to
bel i eve their own propaganda has repeated i tsel f in the hi story of Rhodesi a-
most recentl y in the total shock suffered by the settl ers when the Pearce
Commi ssi on di scovered that Afri cans di d not approve a consti tuti onal pl an
whi ch they had no part in maki ng, whi ch l eft power in the hands of an illegal
mi nori ty government and promi sed l i ttl echange inthei r l ot.
The first armed conflict
Af ri can rebel l i on, however, was not the start of vi ol ent conf rontati on between
the communi t i es. The contradi cti on i nherent in the status of the company and
Lobengul a had fi rst to be settl ed. Thi s became all the mor e vital when i t was
real i zed that Ndebel e rai ds ki l l edShonas, who had now become essenti al l abour
for f arms and mi nes, and thus an asset to be protected. Thi s, of course, was not
what the company sai d in def endi ng i ts acti ons, but i t laid the stress, rather, on
i ts mi ssi onary and humani tari an concern. By Sept ember 1893, Dr J ameson was
confi dent that wi th the ai d of a strong group of vol unteers hi s pol i ce force coul d
defeat the ki ng. Company doubts over the expense of the operati on wer e
assuaged by Rhodes personal promi se of &50,000 to meet the initial costs, and
the expectati on that the booty of Matabel e l and, gol d cl ai ms and cattl e woul d
provi de suffi ci ent reward for the vol unteers.
The Matabel e wer e suddenl y represented as a severe threat in the Cape and
Bri ti sh press, and an excuse for war was sought. I t proved in the event that the
Matabel e were not prepared for war, and wi thi n a mont h of the i nvasi on, as
Sel ous col ourful l y procl ai med, the fai r-hai red descendants of the northern
Rhodesia 25
pi rates are inpossessi on of the great ki ng s kraal and the cal f of the bl ack cow
has fled i nto the wi l derness . The Mat abel e ki ngdomwas destroyed by a
brilliant if ruthl ess pre- empti ve stri ke, executed by the combi ned forces of the
settl ers and the I mperi al Bechuanal and Border Pol i ce. Bri tai n chose not to
annex the terri tory, but appoi nted the company to admi ni ster i t , to avoi d
expense to Bri tai n and offence to Rhodes and whi te feel i ngs in Sout h Af ri ca. As
Pal l ey poi nts out, onl y where Rhodes wi shes cut across i mperi al pol i cy was the
Bri ti sh Gover nment firm. Even the extraordi nary debacl e of the J ameson rai d,
hi ghl i ghti ng the company s l ack of responsi bi l i ty, fai l ed to shake the govern-
ment out of i ts negl ectful atti tude. The bi tterness caused by the rai d and the
treacherous acti ons whi l e Lobengul a was seeki ng peace provi ded a Mat abel e
paral l el to the feel i ngs of the Shona and led to a mi ghty effort to end the
col oni al penetrati on.
I n t er ms of i ts agreement wi th the Vi ctori a vol unteers, and despi te the l egal
prohi bi ti ons of the Matabel e Order in Counci l , the company encouraged a
veri tabl e l and rush . I mmi grati on was encouraged and the permanent settl ement
of the l and, whi ch was supposed to awai t the deci si on of an i mperi al -control l ed
l and commi ssi on, proceeded wi th haste. The techni que of the settl er- managed
fait accompli (cf. the Uni l ateral Decl arati on of I ndependence in 1965) was
al ready well establ i shed. J ameson s provi si onal acts of government wer e not
chal l enged, and the Matabel e were di spossessed of thei r l ands, to be al l ocated
reserves in areas strange to t hemand, in the opi ni on of the Bri ti sh Deput y
Commi ssi oner in 1897, badl y watered, sandy and unfi t for settl ement . For the
Matabel e, the possessi on of cattl ehad a spi ri tual as well as a materi al val ue. They
were equal l y ruthl essl y depri ved of both in the face of equal l y i neffecti ve
saf eguards (cf. Mason s Birth of a Dilemma). The Mat abel e l ost four-fi fths of
thei r cattl e, and those remai ni ng wer e put i nto the hands of company- f avoured
i ndi vi dual s i nstead of bei ng returned to the peopl e. Further l osses were caused
by an outbreak of ri nderpest. As Mason says: Mat abel e soci ety was di srupted
by teari ng out one of the most bi ndi ng strands inthe whol e fabri c. Gover nment
in Matabel el and, duri ng the post- 1891 war peri od, amount ed to f rank mi l i tary
despoti smby J ameson s whi te pol i ce (cf. Ranger). Thi s, combi ned wi th the
l i cence (especi al l y wi th regard to l abour recrui ti ng) granted to Matabel e
nati ve pol i ce, themsel ves recrui ted f romf ormer impis and much resented by
thei r fel l owNdebel e, produced ferti l e soil for rebel l i on.
Resistance to conquest
The opportuni ty to act was provi ded by the Boer capture of the J ameson
rai ders, whi ch depri ved the settl ers of thei r i mmedi at e mi l i tary protecti on.
Whi tes were general l y convi nced that the nati ves are happy , under the
same sel f-del usi on whi ch makes the Rhodesi an way of l i fe acceptabl e to
otherwi se reasonabl y humane peopl e. So on 24 Mar ch 1896, the Ndebel e
abandoned soft words . . . and came to Bul awayo wi th assegai s in thei r hands .
By the eveni ng of 30 Mar ch not a whi te man was l eft al i ve in the outl yi ng
districts of Matabel el and, and by mi d- Apri l Bul awayo was al most enti rel y
surrounded. Ranger s Revolt in Southern Rhodesia provi des the most compl ete
expl anati on and descri pti on to date of this ri si ngand the paral l el moves by the
Shona. It al so bri ngs out the full tragedy of the si tuati on-the rati onal i ty f rom
thei r poi nt of vi ew of the sl aughter of whi te men and women by the Ndebel e,
and the consequent vi ol ence of whi te revenge and reacti on- concl udi ng that
there was l i ttl e to choose between the savagery withwhi ch both si des conduct -
ed the fi ghti ng . The same wor k expl ai ns the great si gni fi cance and rel evance of
the Afri can past to thi s era of physi cal resi stance (whi ch was by far the strongest
and bl oodi est in the hi story of earl y Af ri can resi stance to ni neteenth-century
col oni al i sm).
The Matabel e l eadershi p i ncl uded mi l i tary l eaders ( Mkwat i , Mti ni , Nya-
manda, Nkomo, Uml ugul u, Si kombo, Mpot shwana and Somabul ana) and such
spi ri tual l eaders as Si ganyamatshe and Mwabani of Matoj eni . I n Mashonal and
the l eaders i ncl uded Chi quaqua, Makoni , Mangwende, Mchemwa, Mashan-
ganyi ka, Mashi angombi and Nyandor o on the mi l i tary si de and Bonde Tshi wa,
Manyanga Wamponga, Ni anda ( Nehanda) Gumpor eshumba (the Kagubi
medi um, often synonymousl y referred to as Murenga ) , the maj or spi ri tual
l eaders and organi zers. Parti cul arl y i mportant was the organi zati on and co-
ordi nati on of the rebel l i on by the pri ests of the Mwar i and the Ml i mo cul ts,
whose roots lay deep in the f ormer greatness of Zi mbabwe and had penetrated
Matabel e soci ety. The contemporary si gni fi cance of this feature of resi stance i s
el oquentl y expressed in Si thol e s novel Obed Mutezo.
The company and settl ers eventual l y suppressed the rebel l i on, wi th consi d-
erabl e i mperi al mi l i tary ai d. The Matabel e (inpart) accepted a negoti ated peace
withRhodes at the f amous Mot opo I ndaba, and of ten new I ndunas appoi nted
after the peace, six wereex-rebel l eaders, i ncl udi ng Uml ugul u, one of the chi ef
adversari es of the whi tes. The Shona rebel l i on took at l east a further year to
suppress and was by compari son feroci ousl y deal t wi th, l i ttl e quarter bei ng
gi ven to rebel l eaders or thei r fol l owers. The l eadershi p was ei ther hunted down
and ki l l ed, or tried (as in the case of Nahenda and the much- f eared Kagubi
medi um) and executed. Pol i ti cal compromi se then as now was not seri ousl y
contempl ated by the settl ers.
I t is i nteresti ng to note the conti nui ng spi ri tual and cul tural aspect of
Af ri can resi stance, so obvi ous in the 1890s, i ncl udi ng the constant references
back to ancestral spi ri ts. As a guerri l l a fi ghter on trial in Rhodesi a in 1968
expl ai ned hi msel f: We are goi ng to fulfil the ai ms of the war we abandoned in
1897. Al t hough Rhodesi an Europeans count themsel ves as the uphol ders of
Western ci vi l i zati on above all el se, i t i s i nteresti ng to note that they have f ound
i t acceptabl e and useful to try to enlist the spirit medi ums in thei r fi ght agai nst
the recent resurgence of Afri can cul ture and i ndependence.
The establishment of Rhodesia
It i s i roni c that these rebel l i ons, whose chal l enge to the whi tes was the most
f ormi dabl e, and the scal e of organi zati on the greatest of any of the east, central
and southern Afri can resi stance were so unsuccessful in achi evi ng ei ther thei r
maj or obj ecti ve (the removal of the settl ers) or thei r subsi di ary unstated obj ec-
ti ves (the repl acement of company withi mperi al rul e, and the i mprovement of
the status of the i ndi genous popul ati on). For despi te the upri si ng and the
[Phuiii 44A Photo 'Picou ]
An ancient civilization-the Zimbabwe ruins.
seri ous defects reveal ed in company admi ni strati on, Bri tai n retai ned the BSAC
as i ts del egated government , ensuri ng the pattern of whi te settl er domi nati on
whi ch sti l l characteri zes the terri tory.
By 1897, despi te the J ameson rai d, the rebel l i ons and the cri ti ci smthey
brought upon hi m, Rhodes name was officially adopted and used to descri be
the i mperi al venture whi ch sti l l consti tutes Rhodesi a.
One questi on i s dramati cal l y rai sed by the events outl i ned above. How
coul d the company and the settl ers, regardi ng t hemsel ves then, as thei r succes-
sors do now, as not onl y technol ogi cal l y and mi l i tari l y superi or, but moral l y
superi or to the Afri can ci vi l i zati on they conf ronted, i ndul ge in such obvi ous
di shonesty and brutal i ty? Afri can resi stance ki l l ed al most a tenth of thei r
number , i ncl udi ng women and chi l dren; and the great mi neral weal th whi ch they
had been expecti ng di d not materi al i ze-the company fai l ed to pay a di vi dend
unti l the admi ni strati on was fi nal l y handed over to the settl ers. Yet they mai n-
tai ned thei r gri p, and whenever they fel t i t was threatened took whatever steps
seemed necessary toretai n i t.
Part of the answer may lie in the ni neteenth-century spirit of European
adventure, part in the very strong feel i ngs of raci al supremacy. But equal l y
i mportant may be thei r extraordi nary life styl e. Thi s was an i mmedi at e product
of the toughness of thei r paci fi cati on of the Af ri can popul ati on and the total
di sl ocati on wrought by the taki ng of Af ri can l and. It gave a sense of rel ati ve
weal th and securi ty, in contrast to the Af ri cans poverty and total i nsecuri ty.
A parti al i l l ustrati on of this are the words of Bi shop Abel Muzor ewa, speaki ng
at a conf erence inOxf ord in 1972. when he sai d:
As I speak to you, I wi sh I had some chai ns around my hands, because thi s is how I feel .
Whet her I aminthe best hotel of Oxf ord or London or NewYor k or anywhere inthe worl d,
whether I si t on the desk of a graduate school . whether I have 5,000 in my bank, I feel a
sl ave inthe country of my bi rth.
Throughout the hi story of the settl er occupati on i t has been possi bl e for whi tes
to i mpose this humi l i ati on upon bl acks, apparentl y wi th pri de, and certai nl y
wi thout regret.
The sense of the unquesti oned ri ght to do this can be demonstrated by
some quotati ons f romwhi te l eaders at i mportant stages of Rhodesi an hi story.
Rhodes admi red Angl o- Saxon cul ture and bel i eved that : We are the fi nest race
inthe worl d . . . and . . . the mor e of the worl d we i nhabi t the better i t is for the
human race. Sir Godf rey Huggi ns, who led whi te Rhodesi ans through thei r
most secure and prosperous years (1933-53), expressed what may be regarded as
the cl assi c descri pti on of the Rhodesi an i deal for the rel ati onshi p between the
races : 1
The Europeans in this country can be l i kened to an i sl and of whi te in a sea of bl ack, wi th
the arti san and the tradesmen f ormi ng the shores and the professi onal cl asses the hi ghl ands
inthe centre. I s the nati ve to be al l owed to erode away the shores and gradual l y attack the
hi ghl ands? To permi t this woul d mean that the l eaven of ci vi l i zati on woul d be removed
f romthe country, and the bl ack man woul d i nevi tabl y revert to a barbari an worse than
before.
1. Quotation from Bulawayo Chronicle, p. 15, of 31 March 1938, reproduced by Bowman
Rhodesia 29
And fi nal l y, the illegal Uni l ateral Decl arati on of I ndependence (UD1)-the
ul ti mate rati onal i zati on of the Rhodesi an way of life-in November 1965 was
eul ogi zed by I an Smi t h as fol l ows :
To us has been gi ven the pri vi l ege of bei ng the fi rst Western nati on in the past t wo decades
to have the determi nati on to say so far and no further . . . we have struck a bl owfor the
preservati on of j usti ce, ci vi l i zati onand Chri sti ani ty.
These atti tudes are well descri bed inthe Rhodesi an novel s of Dori s Lessi ng and
inher i ntroducti on to L. Vambe s book; in books wri tten by whi te supporters
of UDI ; and are most unambi guousl y expressed in the Hansard reports of the
Rhodesi an l egi sl ature over many years.
We have observed the somewhat dubi ous f oundati ons of Rhodesi a. We
must now exami ne the government of the terri tory in rel ati on to I an Smi th s
descri pti on.
Havi ng assi sted in the destructi on of Afri can pol i ti cal power in the war
agai nst Lobengul a and the suppressi on of the revol ts in 1896-97, Bri tai n en-
sured that power was transferred to the company and the settl ers. The Constitu-
tional Law and History of Southern Rhodesia 1888-1965 by Pal l ey sets this out
cl earl y, and expl ai ns (p. 155) that
By the end of 1898 therefore the future structure of government had been laid down. The
maj or i nsti tuti ons, i nstruments of admi ni strati on, and l egi sl ati ve pol i ci es, most of whi ch
wer e to endure unti l the present day, were ai reddy in exi stence. The representati ve pri nci pl e
had been i ntroduced by the creati on of a Legi sl ati ve Counci l wi th a mi nori ty of el ected
member s and, al though the Legi sl ati ve Counci l had no executi ve responsi bi l i ti es, i t was
acknowl edged that thi s was but the f i rst step towards responsi bl e government . A franchi se
couched in non- di scri mi natory l anguage, but wi th property and monet ary qual i fi cati ons
and the addi ti onal requi rement of l i teracy that woul d, in ef f ect, excl ude the maj ori ty of
Af ri cans, was laid down. A Nati ve Affai rs Depart ment responsi bl e for governmental
rel ati ons wi th Afri cans was establ i shed. l n ur bmareas muni ci pal i ti es had been created and
l egi sl ati onprovi di ng for the control of Af ri cans insuch areas had been enacted. I n so far as
l and was concerned, the Reserve systemhad been i ntroduced. All thi s was done at a time
when Bri tai n had compl ete control of l egi sl ati on: i ndeed the maj or l egi sl ati ve measures
provi di ng the f ramework for future admi ni strati on and pol i cy had been enacted by Order
inCounci l and Hi gh Commi ssi oner s Procl amati on. These provi si ons had been made si nce
Bri tai n had deci ded that Southern Rhodesi a shoul d fol l owthe general pattern set by the
Sout h Af ri can col oni es and woul d eventual l y become part of a whi te sel f -governi ng Sout h
Afri can federati on.
Every step of Rhodesi an hi story si nce then has been shaped by the deci si on
menti oned in the last sentence above. For al most si xty years the whi te settl ers
have entrenched and strengthened the structure with littleregard to the protests
of the powerl ess maj ori ty. Afri can opposi ti on was arti cul ate, as i s descri bed in
Ml ambo s Struggle ,for ci Birtlzriglzt, Ranger s The African Voice in Soutlzern
Rhodesiu, Shamuyari ra s Crisis in Rhodesia and Si thol e s Africa11 Nationalism. I t
was based however, on t wo assumpti ons whi ch have proved i ncreasi ngl y fal se,
i .e. that the settl er government woul d fairly consi der Af ri can opi ni on, and that
Bri tai n, the responsi bl e authori ty, woul d exerci se ef f ecti ve control in the i nterest
of Afri cans.
Consolidation
The basi c t hemes inthe process by whi ch whi te power was consol i dated wer e as
fol l ows :
1. Whi t e l and control through unequal tenure and al l ocati on of l and.
2. Whi t e executi ve and admi ni strati ve (as opposed to representati ve) govern-
ment of theAfri can maj ori ty, combi ned withgovernment responsi bi l i ty to an
excl usi vel y whi te el ectorate.
3. Whi t e control over the potenti al economi c power of l abour. Thi s was ensured
by whi te monopol y of skills by restri cti ng trai ni ng and educati on to whi tes,
combi ned wi th control and over bargai ni ng power through trade uni on
l egi sl ati onwhi ch di scri mi nated agai nst the organi zati on of bl ack workers.
4. Whi t e retenti on of pol i ti cal power (referred to as ' responsi bl e' by whi te
Rhodesi an pol i ti ci ans) toensure the conti nui ty of (1) to (3).
The benefi ts thi s systembri ngs towhi tes, pl us the fact that they i nhabi t, as they
l argel y do, the hi ghl and areas of a country with an al most perfect cl i mate,
makes i t easi er to expl ai n, if not to understand, why thei r acti ons deny the
Chri sti an ethi c they purport to uphol d and rej ect the democrati c i deal s of
government of the ci vi l i zati on they cl ai mto def end. I t al so expl ai ns how they
can commi t treason agai nst the Cr own and country they emoti onal l y admi re
and whence the maj ori ty of t hemori gi nate. The process of mai ntai ni ng pol i ti cal
power has i nevi tabl y produced an addi ti onal but now very characteri sti c feature
of the ' Rhodesi an way of life'-a systemof authori tari an government as
i nhumane if not as savage as any di ctatorshi p exi sti ng.
Rhodesi a shares wi th Sout h Afri ca, and unti l recentl y the Portuguese
Af ri can terri tori es, the further evi l that i ts oppressi on is di rected al most
excl usi vel y agai nst the bl ack maj ori ty. Thi s limits and stunts the l i ves even of
the whi tes who bel i eve they are i ts benefi ci ari es and who, like others who
have tol erated i nhumane government , are apparentl y bl i nded and desensi ti zed
by the systemthey hel p to perpetuate. Si nce i nhumani ty i nevi tabl y produces an
energeti c human reacti on (no matter how l ong del ayed)-the ' Rhodesi an era'
has added a new feature to the hi story of Zi mbabwe: the efforts and i deal s of
those struggl i ng to l i berate themsel ves and the country of a pol i ti cal system
whose del i berate perpetuati on consti tutes a seri ous twenti eth-century rel apse
f romhuman progress.
2 Land
The pol i ti cal and economi c subservi ence of the Af ri can popul ati on is di rectl y
l i nked wi th thei r di spossessi on of the l and. Weal t h in Rhodesi a was not to be
f ound in a mi neral bonanza of gol d or di amonds, but in l and. For some time
after the whol esal e l and- grabbi ng by the Pi oneer Col umn and the war of 1893,
the si tuati on remai ned uncl ear. The BSAC hoped to recover i ts costs, and to
profi t f romthe sal e of l and. Settl ers resented bei ng asked to pay for what they
bel i eved they had f ought for and won f romthe Afri cans.
I t was thi s i ssue whi ch was at stake in the case brought before the Bri ti sh
Pri vy Counci l for deci si on in 1919. The court havi ng hel d that the l and bel onged
to the Cr own, the excl usi ve, uni nhabi ted and i ndependent control of govern-
ment , whi ch woul d ensure control of the l and, became the pri me ai mof the
settl ers. I ndeed Rhodesi ans sti l l see f ormal i nternati onal recogni ti on of thei r
excl usi ve control of government as thei r fi rst pri ze , despi te the fact that they
have enj oyed ef f ecti ve settl er government si nce 1923, and uni l ateral l y sought to
l egal i ze i t in 1965. Afri cans natural l y resented the Pri vy Counci l s conf i rmati on
of the expropri ati on of thei r l ands, as Ml ambo expl ai ns fully in hi s chapter on
the l and questi on. The reserves, seen by some as a mi ni mal protecti on of
Af ri can l and ri ghts, merel y provi ded the l egi ti mi zati on of the process of removi ng
Afri cans forci bl y f romgood to poor l and. Thi s appropri ati on di d not end in
the ni neteenth century. Whenever i t became desi rabl e to adj ust in the whi te
i nterest, whether for mi neral expl oi tati on or some f ormof rati onal i zati on ,
Afri cans wer e moved. I ndeed a Rhodesi an Sel ect Parl i amentary Commi t t ee on
Resettl ement reveal ed in 1960 that between 1936 and 1959, 11 3, 000 Af ri cans had
been compul sori l y moved f romEuropean f armi ng areas, at the cost of mi l l i ons
of pounds of badl y needed money bei ng spent for i deol ogi cal rather than
producti ve purposes .
Many thousands of l andl ess Af ri cans conti nue to l i ve on what became
whi te l and, provi di ng a basi c i ncome in rent, and a cheap l abour suppl y to the
whi te f armer. Thi s i s possi bl e because the often huge estates are l argel y
uncul ti vated by whi te owners, and the presence of Af ri cans i s vi tal . One of the
earl i est l egi sl ati ve acts (1894) was to i mpose a hut tax on Af ri cans, to force t hem
to enter the money economy, to wor k for whi tes in home, factory, f armand
mi ne. Yet many Afri cans wer e not made aware (as for exampl e by bei ng gi ven
compensati on) of the fact that they had l ost thei r ancestral l and.
The Tangwena case
Si nce 1964, at Gaeresi Ranch, the Rhodesi an Front authori ti es have been tryi ng
to remove the Tangwena peopl e and thei r chi ef Rekayi . The Tangewena coun-
try; in the mount ai ns of I nyanga, is ri ch agri cul tural l and, and not surpri si ngl y
250, 000 acres of i t was sol d in 1905 (wi thout the knowl edge of the i nhabi tants)
by the BSAC to the Angl o- French Matabel el and Company. The latter ceded
part to the Gaeresi Ranch Company. The Tangwena were not made aware of
this al i enati on unti l 1965, when the manager of the ranch deci ded inthe i nterests
of economi c f armi ng to extend his fenci ng to encompass t hem. Thi s coi nci ded
wi th the death of the Tangwena chi ef and the el ecti on of Rekayi as his successor.
The whi te f armer wi shed to rati onal i ze by reduci ng the Af ri can popul ati on now
i ncl uded, and offered l abour contracts to some Tangwena, expecti ng the rest to
move to whi chever reserve the Di stri ct Commi ssi oner prescri bed. Her e,
however, somethi ng excepti onal happened : Rekayi and hi s peopl e woul d not
move. Many Afri cans have protested at si mi l ar moves, none wi th such di gni ty
and determi nati on.
After l egi ti mate but vi gorous protest to the authori ti es-even as far as
the Secretary for I nternal Affai rs-Rekayi was gi ven the standard treatment
afforded to Afri can chi efs who assert thei r peopl e s ri ghts : he was di smi ssed.
Nei ther he nor his peopl e accepted thi s. They physi cal l y resi sted evi cti on. They
chal l enged i ts l egal i ty successful l y in the l awcourts on the grounds that, under
the Land Apport i onment Act, Af ri cans who had l i ved upon Cr own l and before
i ts al i enati on are protected squatters , and coul d be removed onl y by a govern-
mental deci si on in the f ormof a procl amati on. The Rhodesi an Appel ate Di vi -
si on underl i ned that the Cr own s argument on the l aw woul d l ead not onl y to
absurdi ty but to mani fest i nj usti ce. The case had by then (J une 1968) become
notori ous and even the whi te press (the Rhodesi an Herakl) pl eaded that the
authori ti es (by now the illegal Smi t h rgi me) shoul d fol l ow the humane
course . . . and accept a suggesti on ( made ori gi nal l y by Rekayi ) that they buy
the l and and i ncorporate i t i nto the adj acent Tri bal Trust l ands-gi vi ng the
tri be i ts l and and the company i ts money.
Fol l owi ng i nstead the tradi ti on of whi te governmental deal i ngs with Afri-
can l and, the authori ti es i ssued a procl amati on in 1969 orderi ng the Tangwena
to l eave. Legal acti on was f ol l owed by bul l dozers, and eventual l y by pol i ce and
sol di ers. I n a qui te extraordi nary manner the Tangwena have, however, mai n-
tai ned thei r stand and, when moved, return. By every peaceful means, Rekayi
and hi s peopl e conti nue to conf ront the authori ti es on thi s absol utel y basi c
i ssue. I t is a hi stori c epi sode in the greater process of l i berati on. Thi s may be
conf i rmed by the unaccust omed degree of restrai nt exerci sed by the rgi me.
There is sti l l no compromi se on the supremacy of white economi c i nterest,
whatever the consequences may be in terms of human mi sery, but the r gi me
hesi tates to use the full panopl y of i ts destructi ve and restri cti ve powers. Thi s
may be due to i ts awareness of worl d attenti on f ocused upon i t , or partl y
perhaps to a grudgi ng admi rati on of the overwhel mi ng moral effect produced
by thi s Afri can l eader in rags. Equal l y, however, i t may be attri buted to a mor e
Machi avel l i an and merel y tacti cal move to deal rel ati vel y mi l dl y (i f the evi cti on
of over 250 fami l i es, the destructi on of thei r houses and crops, and the vi rtual
Rhodesia 33
ki dnappi ng of thei r chi l dren can be so descri bed) wi th thi s symbol i c yet peri ph-
eral opposi ti on, at a timewhen Rhodesi an l eaders are seeki ng a settl ement wi th
Bri tai n and i nternati onal recogni ti on by the West ern worl d at l east.
The conf rontati on i s fully descri bed in The Ousting of the Tangwena,
publ i shed by the I nternati onal Def ence and Ai d Fund. I f the statistics of
di stri buti on are the bones of the l and probl emin Rhodesi a, the Tangwena may
be seen as i l l ustrati ngi ts f l esh- and- bl ood real i ty.
The physical division
The purel y statistical pi cture of l and di stri buti on starkl y i l l ustrates the rel ati ve
status of bl ack and whi te. I n 1969, l and segregati on as between whi te and bl ack
was wri tten i nto the new consti tuti on and so gi ven the f undament al l egal status
i t had al ways emoti onal l y enj oyed in Rhodesi a as a whi te man s country . The
l and was di vi ded al most exactl y between Af ri cans (44. 94 mi l l i on acres) and
Europeans (44. 95 mi l l i on acres). The Rhodesi an Front congratul ated i tsel f on
i ts absol ute fai rness, for i t had i ncreased the area of the Tri bal Trust l and
al l ocated to Af ri cans. However , al most 5 mi l l i on Af ri cans woul d share the
Af ri can l and (theoreti cal l y 67. 9 persons per square mi l e), whi l e l ess than a
quarter of a mi l l i on Europeans woul d share the European l and (theoreti cal l y
3. 2 persons per square mile). The new arrangement i ncreased the pre- 1969
European share of l and, and reduced the gl obal amount of Af ri can l and by
reduci ng the Afri can Purchase Area (where bl acks coul d own l and) and abol i sh-
i ng and redi stri buti ng on strictlyraci al l i nes the unreserved l and f ormerl y open
to all races. Even compared wi th the earl i est peri od of whi te l and hunger, the
1969 di stri buti on is a gross i nj usti ce. I n 1904, the Land Commi ssi on had set
asi de Afri can reserves whi ch wereto be i nal i enabl e. The area of these reserves
was 38, 871 square mi l es, the Afri can popul ati on 268, 618, that is 6. 8 persons per
square mile, ten ti mes as much space per person as was al l otted in 1969.
I t is possi bl e to argue that al though l and pol i ci es pri or to 1969 wer e
i ntended to protect European vested i nterests, the purpose was economi c rather
than raci st. When the nati ve reserves wer e fi rst establ i shed, the Af ri cans
practi sed subsi stence agri cul ture and di d not requi re access to markets. Espe-
cially in Mashonal and, they preferred l i ght soils near thei r tradi ti onal hill
refuges, to the heavy l oams and cl ay soils that coul d be mechani cal l y cul ti vated.
The Nati ve Commi ssi oners who r ecommended that the reserves be created no
doubt mi scal cul ated the rapi d i ncrease in the Af ri can popul ati on, f romaround
200, 000 in 1890 to over 4. 5 mi l l i on in 1969. Kay suggests that by 1925, The
l i on s share of the better parts of the country had been secured for Europeans
before pol i ti cal cri teri aassumed a promi nent rol e in l and apporti onment. Even
if that be true, and one accepts the myt h that Af ri cans di d not protest, the harsh
truth is that, by the late 1950s (cf. Yudel man s study in 1964), and even mor e so
by the late 1960s, i t was cl ear that the di vi si on was unfai r and outdated, and
that i t was retardi ng not onl y Af ri can but nati onal progress. Yet the fact that
Land Tenure Act was passed in 1969 and def ended by the Rhodesi an Front partl y
on the basi s the Carter report of 1925 (see bel ow) demonstrates perfectl y that i t
exi sts toprotect whi te i nterests.
The reserves wer e ori gi nal l y i ntended toprotect Af ri cans agai nst the whol e-
sal e al i enati on of thei r l and. When the settl ers wer e gi ven pol i ti cal control in
1923 and i nsti tuted what they call responsi bl e government , the reserves wer e
about 21 mi l l i on acres. Accordi ng to the 1923 consti tuti on, al i enati on of
reserved l and requi red Bri ti sh consent. Outsi de the reserves, Afri cans theoreti -
cal l y enj oyed the ri ght to hol d l and on the same t er ms as whi tes. Thei r econo-
mic posi ti on l argel y precl uded thi s. By 1925, Europeans had bought 31 mi l l i on
acres, Afri cans onl y 45, 000 acresdespi t e thei r anxi ety to i ncrease thei r hol d-
i ng. But the mer e possi bi l i ty that bl acks mi ght buy worri ed whi tes. I n 1925 the
Carter Commi ssi on set up by the Bri ti sh Gover nment submi tted i ts report
approvi ng the di vi si on of the l and and stati ng inter alia that i t is better that the
poi nts of contact inthis respect between the races shoul d be reduced . Thi s view
was supported by mi ssi onari es who were concerned by the Af ri can s economi c
weakness, and the combi nati on of argument s persuaded the Bri ti sh Gover nment
to al l owthe enactment of the Land Apport i onment Act (1930).
Thi s l awmay ri ghtl y be regarded as the f oundati on stone of t he Rhodesi an
way of l i fe. I ts retenti on was basi c to the el ectoral success of the Rhodesi an
Front Party in 1962, and i t i s entrenched as the Land Tenure Act in the 1969
consti tuti on. It is i roni c to note that, al though the initial negoti ati ons had been
undertaken wi th a Conservati ve government , the final approval of this l egi sl a-
ti on was gi ven by the Labour col oni al secretary, Si dney Webb (or Lord Pass-
fieldas he then was), who assured the Rhodesi an pri me mi ni ster of the timethat
he fully recogni zes the si nceri ty of your ai m, namel y, to i mprove the condi ti on
of the nati ve . I n The Africun Voice N i Southern Rhodesia, Ranger shows how in
thi s, as other maj or deci si ons affecti ng t hem, bl ack vi ews were l argel y i gnored.
The qualitative division
The Land Apport i onment Act di d not initiate the di vi si on of l and i nto bl ack
and whi te (that after all had come wi th the reserves); what i t di d do was to
consol i date the di vi si on and i mpose a f undamental l y i nferi or status upon the
bl ack semi -ci ti zens of thi s f ree enterpri se economy. Under the Act, Afri cans
wer e al l ocated part of the l and of Rhodesi a, but onl y l and in the Purchase
Area ( nowabout 10per cent) can be bought . Such purchase provi ded Afri cans
with the onl y possi bi l i ty of compet i ng wi th whi tes in the capi tal i st economy.
The remai ni ng l and, now referred to as the Tri bal Trust l ands, i s occupi ed
communal l y. I ts onl y source of f unds for devel opment is the Rhodesi an
Gover nment , whose economi c phi l osophy is f ree enterpri se and whose pol i ti cal
future does not depend upon votes of the i nhabi tants of the Tri bal Trust l ands. I n
the whi te area, on the contrary, all l and can be purchased and owned i ndi vi du-
al l y, sol d, and used to rai se capi tal or for any of the other purposes that l and
can serve. Afri cans cannot own property or l i ve i n whi te areas, except on speci al
t er ms, and whi tes are si mi l arl y precl uded f roml i vi nginbl ack areas. 1
I nequal i ty is not conf i ned to the l egal tenure of l and. The country was
di vi ded up, not haphazardl y, but with care over a l ong peri od, to ensure the
1. M. Yudel man, Afri cans on the Move, Oxf ord. Oxf ord Uni versi ty Press. 1964, provi des a very
full anal ysi s of the l and questi on, and Arri ghi rel ates i t to the Rhodesi an si tuati onas a whol e. See
al sothe Rhodesian Joiirnal of Econoiizics.
Rhodesia 35
best possi bl e condi ti ons to whi tes who are born in Rhodesi a or are i gnorant or
sel fi sh enough to i mmi grate there. On numer ous occasi ons Af ri cans wer e
removed in ci rcumstances si mi l ar to those in t he Tangwend case. Mi ni ng ri ghts
hel d by Europeans may l ead to the di spl acement of Afri cans even in what are
nomi nal l y thei r own areas.
Apart f romtenure and scal e, Af ri cans suffer other di sadvantages :
The mai n roads and rai l way l i nes wer e pl anned onl y in rel ati on to whi te
areas.
Ur ban cent res, and hence i ndustry and associ ated acti vi ti es are concentrated
inwhi te areas.
I n rel ati on to soil fertility and rai nfal l , the better agri cul tural l and i s predo-
mi nantl y in whi te areas. By and l arge whi tes have al most as much ' good'
l and as ' bad' l and, whi l e Af ri can l and is three-quarters ' bad' and onl y a
quarter ' good' .
Economic subjugation
The Af ri can maj ori ty has been pl aced in an economi cal l y weak posi ti on f rom
whi ch i t i s vi rtual l y i mpossi bl e torecover unl ess f undament al changes are made.
I t has been cut off f romthe economi c power whi ch goes with l and ownershi p,
and i ts ability to compet e and achi eve power by other means has been further
l essened by a del i berate pol i cy of restri cti ng opportuni ti es for educati on,
trai ni ng, enterpri se and col l ecti ve bargai ni ng.
The mi nori ty pursues this pol i cy not onl y because of a di rect desi re to
ensure a mass of semi -ski l l ed l abour but al so because of a real awareness that
experi ence, sel f -conf i dence and sel f-respect in any field i s i nextri cabl y l i nked
wi th the danger of a concerted Af ri can demand for pol i ti cal power. The
corol l ary of del i beratel y fostered Af ri can i nferi ori ty i s the perpetuati on of whi te
superi ori ty. There i s a vi ci ous ci rcl e in whi ch whi te oppressi on of the Afri can
produces a depressed condi ti on among Af ri cans, whi ch in turn is used to j usti fy
the maj ori ty' s conti nued oppressi on. The spi ri tual depressi on, mental col oni za-
ti on, mut ual suspi ci on and apathy, whi ch resul ts have not been wi thout thei r
pol i ti cal ef f ect upon the Af ri can. The physi ol ogi cal ef f ects have been buttressed
by acti on to prevent any consi stent pol i ti zati on and consol i dati on of the
maj ori ty. Thi s expl ai ns in part the scal e and brutal i ty of the suppressi on of
the 1890s, as well as the destructi on of tradi ti onal structures, and thei r repl ace-
ment by dependent and compl i ant i nsti tuti ons. It has hel ped to ensure that
Afri can reacti on to mi nori ty rul e has been sl ower and l ess vi gorous than mi ght
be expected. It hel ps to expl ai n the remarkabl e fact that a handf ul of whi tes
mai ntai n control over 5 mi l l i on Af ri cans. Equal l y i t shows why the t hemes of
sel f-respect, sel f-rel i ance and a harkeni ng back to pre- occupati on tradi ti ons i s
i ncreasi ngl y i mportant to both the pol i ti cal and mi l i tary resi stance of the
nati onal i st movement .
Apportionment of land under the Land Tenure Act (1969).
Korkore
Shona
Zezuru
Shona
Ndebele
Karanga
African peoples.
u Semi-extensive livestock farming
Extensive livestock farming
Unsuitable for farming
a
Natural farming regions.
Humid and sub-arid
L - 1 Miid sub-arid
0 Mild sub-arid, sub-arid
l l l l l l l i r[mSub-arid, arid
fe] Arid, sub-desert
1 -
1 - 1 Arid
Sub-arid
Bio-climatic regions.
Railways (1974).
Tsetse fly infested areas (1964).
Salisbury 0
0 Bulawayo
3 Education
Discrimination
Educati on in Rhodesi a typi fi es a combi nati on of del i berate di scri mi nati on and
subtl e management , pol i ti cal ruthl essness and professi onal di l i gence, whi ch
conf uses both the practi ti oners and the vi cti ms of mi nori ty government , and
outsi de observers of the phenomenon. Whi t e Rhodesi ans and thei r apol ogi sts
will cl ai mthat they provi de one of the best educati onal systems in Afri ca and
the devel opi ng worl d. Thi s cl ai mmay be defensi bl e if i t i s l i mi ted to Rhodesi an
Af ri can pri mary educati on and i f the exi stence of a paral l el and compl etel y
separated Rhodesi an educati on depart ment for Europeans i s i gnored. The si tua-
ti on is di fferent if secondary educati on i s consi dered. It i s at thi s l evel that a
del i beratel y di scri mi natory educati onal systembecomes most apparent. It
shoul d be remembered that the franchi se i s l i nked to educati onal qual i fi ca-
ti ons whi ch i ncreases the i mportance of educati on. The educati onal system
trai ns Af ri cans to provi de effi ci ent servi ce at l ower l evel s whi l e ensuri ng for
Europeans a superi ori ty desi gned to conf i rma raci al myt hol ogy in whi ch they
are cast as a perpetual l eadershi p l i te who al one can ensure conti nued
standards of ci vi l i zati on.
The facts are as fol l ows. There are t wo separate educati on departments, the
Af ri can and the European, whi ch i ncl udes Asi an and col oureds. Gover nment
spendi ng on the educati on of a European chi l d i s ten t i mes that on an Af ri can
chi l d. Over 75 per cent of government spendi ng in the Af ri can sector i s on
pri mary school i ng. (I n 1972 about $15. 5 mi l l i on, out of about $20 mi l l i on. )
Secondary school i ng onl y became avai l abl e to Af ri cans in 1940. Educati on for
Europeans has been compul sory si nce the 1930 Educati on Act, but i t i s sti l l onl y
vol untary for Afri cans. Onl y a fracti on of teachers in Af ri can educati on
(in 1972, 1, 137 out of 18, 537) have equi val ent qual i fi cati ons to those requi red
for all teachers in European educati on. For Af ri cans, but not for Europeans,
as the 1974 Lewi s report on Af ri can pri mary educati on makes cl ear for many
years to come pri mary educati on must be termi nal for a maj ori ty, al bei t a de-
creasi ng maj ori ty of pupi l s . Onl y 50 per cent of the Af ri can chi l dren who manage
to compl ete pri mary school will be f ound pl aces in the secondary sectors, and
most (37. 5 per cent) of t hemwill have to make do wi th onl y t wo years of
vocati onal educati on, whi ch i s not the case for European chi l dren.
By a mor e i ndi rect devi ce another basi c characteri sti c of the Rhodesi an
system suppl ements this di scri mi nati on and pl ural i ty in educati on. The
compul sory segregati on of the races by the Land Apport i onment ( now Land
Tenure) Act, whi ch has become axi omati c and accepted, by Europeans at l east,
as the natural Rhodesi an order of thi ngs, means that Afri can chi l dren cannot
in any case attend school s in European areas wi thout express government per-
mi ssi on. The maj ori ty of secondary school s are in the urban areas whi ch are all
desi gnated European, The achi evements in Af ri can educati on have been made
as a resul t of professi onal i smand subtl e management in an area whi ch never
rai sed the bogey of ski l l ed or hi ghl y educated Af ri cans, and whi ch was never
seen as cl ashi ng with government i nterests. I roni cal l y i t makes the Rhodesi an
maj ori ty mor e educated than wer e Af ri cans inthe f ormer col oni al terri tori es of
east and central Afri ca on the eve of thei r i ndependence.
Di scri mi nati on is mor e cl earl y reveal ed when i t is real i zed that whi l e
European educati on i s al most excl usi vel y a government responsi bi l i ty (in 1967
83 per cent of whi te chi l dren went to government school s), Af ri can educati on
by contrast is even now essenti al l y subsi di zed by government . Al t hough
Rhodesi an Front pol i cy has been to reduce mi ssi on educati on, whi ch has
become pol i ti cal l y l ess acceptabl e to whi te government , churches sti l l pl ay a
consi derabl e rol e, and where mi ssi on school s have been taken f romchurch they
have general l y been made the responsi bi l i ty not of the government , but of the
l ocal Af ri can rural counci l s. I n 1967, 90 per cent of Afri can chi l dren wer e in
mi ssi on and non- government school s. The rural areas are poor and the counci l s
not onl y i nexperi enced in educati on but by their nature subordi nate and
dependent upon the mi nori ty government . Thus an Af ri can rural communi t y
needi ng a school must fi rst fi nd the money to bui l d the school before they can
expect assi stance f romthe State. No si mi l ar si tuati on prevai l s for Europeans.
The standard whi te Rhodesi an response and j usti fi cati onfor this si tuati on woul d
be to poi nt to the fact that total government spendi ng on Af ri can educati on is
as much as, if not mor e than, that on European school i ng, and woul d add that
the Europeans contri bute by far the l argest share of i ncome- t ax revenue. Thus
Af ri can educati on probl ems mi ght be seen as a l ogi cal resul t of the fact that
the government i s responsi bl e onl y tothe whi te el ectorate.
The same atti tude must account for the Rhodesi an Front s new pol i cy for
Af ri can educati on announced in 1966. Thi s pegged government spendi ng
arbi trari l y at 2 per cent of the GNP. All excess costs, capi tal and runni ng, must
be borne by the Afri cans or chari ti es di rectl y. No si mi l ar pol i cy exi sts for
European educati on. Pl aci ng responsi bi l i ty for educati on di rectl y upon the
Af ri can rural communi t y- where most Af ri can chi l dren l i ve-i s al so, of course,
a feature of the Sout h Afri can Bant u educati on system.
To i l l ustratethe fact that the Rhodesi an Gover nment i s fully aware of the
grossl y di scri mi natory nature of educati on in the country, reference can be
made to the answer gi ven by the Rhodesi an Front Mi ni ster of Educati on in
1967, to the suggesti on that all chi l dren shoul d recei ve equal educati onal
opportuni ty. To gi ve Af ri can chi l dren equal compul sory educati on i t was
esti mated that the i mmedi at e capi tal cost woul d have been E250 mi l l i on, wi th
Rhodesia 45
runni ng costs at E154 mi l l i on per year. The di scri mi nati on and di storti on
i nherent in this systemi s brought home when i t i s poi nted out that in 1967 the
gross domesti c product (GDP) was onl y E366. 4 mi l l i on !
The mi ni ster def ended hi s rej ecti on of another call for an equal share of
the educati onal budget in 1969, by poi nti ng out that thi s woul d mean that E98
l ess per year woul d be spent on each European chi l d, and onl y E9 extra on
each Afri can chi l d. He concl uded: The benefi t to the Af ri can woul d not be
great but the ef f ect on the European woul d be di sasterous. Her e agai n an
essenti al l i nk wi th pol i cy in other areas must be noted. European educati on of
such a superi or nature i s regarded as essenti al if whi te i mmi grants are to be
attracted and retai ned. Thus, not onl y are Af ri can chi l dren subj ected to a
di storted system, Af ri can workers are al so excl uded f rommovi ng up i nto ski l l ed
j obs reserved for whi te i mmi grants.
Some educational statistics
I n 1964 onl y 60 per cent of Afri can chi l dren between 7 and 16were attendi ng
school . I n 1962, 47 per cent of all Afri can mal es over 16, and 59 per cent of all
Af ri can f emal es over 16had never been to school . I n 1967 the fi gures on school
l eavers showed that 88. 8 per cent of the Europeans had had over ten years of
school i ng, but onl y 0. 48 per cent of Af ri cans; 97. 7 per cent of Af ri cans had
between one and seven years of school i ng (78. 13 per cent between one and fi ve
years) while there wer e no European chi l dren in thi s category. The Af ri can
educati onal pyrami d, consi sti ng of a consi derabl e base of pri mary pupi l s and
reduci ng at the secondary l evel to a very narrowpeak, is al most i denti cal wi th
that inSout h Afri ca. Thi s and other paral l el s are i l l ustrated in the Def ence and
Ai d pamphl et Rhodesi+South Ajrica s Sixth Province by J ohn Sprack. I n
1971- 72 I an Smi t h tol d the worl d how happy hi s Afri cans wer e, and hi s
government sought worl d approval under the proposal s agreed upon between
hi mand Sir Alec Dougl as- Home. Educati onal expendi ture was then as shown
inTabl e 1.
TABLE 1. Government estimates of total spent on primary and secondary education 1971/72
Amount spent
Number Rhodesian Pounds sterling per student in
dollars pounds sterling
African 747,537 21,400,000 12,412,000 L16.60
European
Indian and coloured
58503 18,732,000 10,864.560 f160.70
8,994
The quality of African education
Af ri can educati on not onl y recei ves l ess money but has al ways been qual i tati ve-
ly i nferi or. Expendi ture i s concentrated on pri mary and vocati onal school i ng.
The very earl i est statement of pol i cy ( 1 899) spoke of provi di ng Af ri cans with a
systemati c trai ni ng in househol d wor k or agri cul ture ; Rhodesi an Front pol i cy
i s to gear the Afri can educati onal output to the j ob opportuni ti es whi ch
Europeans are wi l l i ng to offer to Af ri cans .
Ref erence was made above to the new pol i cy for educati on adopted in 1966
as i t affected mi ssi on school s, and arbi trari l y pegged spendi ng on Af ri can
educati on at 2 per cent of the GNP. I t also expl i ci tl y i ndi cated that Afri can
educati on shoul d concentrate on basi c educati on and not on gi vi ng opportuni -
ti es for hi gher educati on.
Operated on a non-raci al basi s, such a pol i cy mi ght well wi n the approval
of many concerned with educati on in devel opi ng countri es; i ndeed, l ooked at
outsi de i ts pol i ti cal context, the present pr ogr amme coul d offer a great deal . But
i t cannot be so di vorced f romi ts context. The fact is that Afri cans are offered
an i nferi or system, whi l e Europeans recei ve educati onal advantages whi ch few
devel oped countri es can boast.
Tabl e 2 shows data for the year ended 30 J une 1972 whi ch wer e submi tted
in 1973 in separate reports on European and Afri can educati on. All amount s
are expressed in Rhodesi an dol l ars (El = $(R)2).
TABLE 2
European African
Total expendi ture $21,388,451
Per capi ta expendi ture per chi l d:
Average total pri mary and secondary $309.25
Pri mary $189.47
Secondary (i ncl udi ng techni cal incase of Europeans) $398.72
Enrol ments : 69.162
Pri mary 41,075
Secondary 28,075
Pri mary 1 : 28.57
Secondary 1 : 19. 21
Teacher/ pupi l rati o :
$19,9 i 2,435
$27.48
$19.58
$159.59
724,44
695,452
29,012
1 : 41 2 8
1 :26.18
Note: No figures for teacher:pupil ratios are Bivcn in the .4frican report The very inferior qualifications required of teachers. Fhortage
of equipment. and the considerahle variationh in school administration make the ntio less significant. The figures quoted represent
[he most generous eFtimates.
Primary and secondary education
A new pol i cy for an extended secondary educati on for Af ri cans was pl anned
for 1974, to enabl e 50 per cent of Af ri can pri mary school l eavers to go on to
secondary school . But thi s percentage is based on the number s who compl ete
pri mary school , not on the pri mary- school i ntake. Furt hermore, onl y
12.5 per cent of these pri mary- school l eavers are provi ded wi th academi c
secondary school i ng for four further years, at the academi c (Fl) school s, and
onl y a fracti on of these go on for a further t wo years and the possi bi l i ty of
uni versi ty educati on. Rhodesi an Front cl osure of non- government school s
African teachers protest.
effecti vel y reduced F1 school s f rom100 in 1972 to 99 in 1974. The bul k
(37. 5 per cent) of thi s 50 per cent whi ch i s abl e to conti nue at school i s
offered onl y t wo years non- academi c educati on in so-cal l ed j uni or secondary
(F2) school s. It is here that there has been an expansi on of Af ri can
educati on, f romt went y- one F2 school s in 1971 to f orty- one in 1972.
Ful l pri mary educati on was tohave been provi ded under the 1966 pol i cy. It
i ntroduced school f ees on a sl i di ngscal e, f romL2. 85 per annumfor the fi rst year
of pri mary school to9 per annuminsecondary school . The practi cal effect was
to reduce pri mary school enrol ment as f ol l ows: 701, 627 in 1968, 699, 133 in
1969, 694, 875 in 1970. Ful l educati on is avai l abl e onl y for those whose parents
can pay full f ees. The maj or effort inAf ri can educati on has been in the pri mary
sector. The Afri can popul ati on i s growi ng at over 3. 4 per cent per annum,
doubl i ng i tsel f every twenty years (1961, 3, 550, 000; 1970 (esti mated), 4, 818, 000).
I n 1963 there wer e 590, 795 pri mary pl aces; in 1972, onl y 695, 432. Bet ween 1970
and 1972, the number of Af ri can pri mary school s decreased f rom3, 224 to 3, 219.
The contrast between Afri can and European educati on i s hi ghl i ghted by
the fact that compul sory educati on for the latter ensures that dropouts are rare
unti l the final year of secondary school . European school l eavers are thus ei ther
academi cal l y (al most 50 per cent for uni versi ty) or techni cal l y qual i fi ed, whereas
Afri cans are forced out by educati onal bottl enecks at vari ous stages of un-
qual i fi cati on. Thus the cohort whi ch entered Af ri can educati on in 1966 at
grade I , 122, 590 had been reduced to the 53, 018 who entered standard 5 in 1972.
I n that year the F1 (academi c) school s enrol l ed onl y 8, 099 i nto f ormI , whi l e in
f ormV and f ormXI (where uni versi ty admi ssi on qual i fi cati on coul d be
achi eved) there wer e onl y 292 and 221 Afri can pupi l s respecti vel y.
Whi l e European educati on is al most enti rel y state, in 1972 Af ri can
educati on was sti l l l eft essenti al l y to chari ty and sel f-hel p. Onl y 84 of the
3, 219 pri mary school s wer e government and onl y 25 of 140secondary school s
(17 of 99 FI and 8 of 41F2) wer e stateschool s.
Teachers qual i fi cati ons are al so si gni fi cantl y worse in the Afri can sector.
I n 1972 of 18, 538 teachers in that sector, 11, 874 had no mor e than the T4
(2years i nfant teacher trai ni ng) qual i fi cati on. Whereas all teachers in European
educati on are qual i fi ed and certi fi cated, onl y 1, l O8 Af ri can educati on teachers
wer e qual i fi ed (but not certi fi cated), and al most hal f (481) of these wer e empl oyed
inmi ssi on school s. I ndeed inthe same year t here wer e sti l l 264 untrai ned teachers
inAfri can educati on. Further contrasts ari se f romthe fact that whi l e European
educati on i s a uni f orm, standardi zed system, there wer e seven di fferent
recogni zed ki nds of school for Afri cans pl us 297 unai ded f armschool s.
Technical education and apprenticeship
There is a l ong- standi ng pol i cy and practi ce of restri cti ng techni cal educati on,
whet her through di rect trai ni ng in school s or through i ndenture as apprenti ces.
Gover nment l abour pol i cy has consi stentl y di scouraged the entry of Afri cans
i nto ski l l edtrades, despi te recurri ng shortages. The standard Rhodesi an response
to a shortage of ski l l ed l abour bei ng a campai gn for whi te i mmi grants. Thi s is
most recentl y exampl ed by the announcement in J anuary 1974 of a massi ve
Rhodesia 49
1 mi l l i on i mmi grants promot i on dri ve, partl y in response to a manpower
shortage inthe manuf acturi ng i ndustry duri ng 1973.
The 1959 Apprenti ceshi p Act made i t l egal l y possi bl e for Af ri cans to be
apprenti ced. Progress however has been sl ow, due to a combi nati on of rel uctance
on the part of empl oyers, and resi stance by the whi te domi nat ed ski l l ed trade
uni ons. Si nce 1969 there has been no br eakdown on a raci al basi s of i ndentured
apprenti ces but pri or fi gures showi ng the number of regi stered apprenti ces for
1962- 69 wereas fol l ows :
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
436
371
378
445
378
396
498
531
10
9
8
7
9
5
17
49
Si nce apprenti ces are expected to have had ten years of educati on the vast
maj ori ty of Afri cans are automati cal l y excl uded. I ndeed post- 1966 government
pol i cy on vocati onal educati on may be expl ai ned in t er ms of a rati onal i zati on
of a systembased upon the acceptance of a very l arge semi -ski l l ed l abour
reservoi r. Thi s may be qui te sensi bl e and fair for a devel opi ng country, in
Rhodesi a i ts faul t l i es in the fact that semi -ski l l ed status is reserved for
Af ri cans. The establ i shment in 1968 of a speci al Apprenti ceshi p Trai ni ng and
Ski l l ed Manpower Devel opment Authori ty to meet the shortfal l in apprenti ces
whi ch was noted by a Rhodesi an Front Parl i amentary Sel ect Commi t t ee in 1964
has achi eved very l i ttl e. I n part thi s is due to empl oyers rel uctance to meet the
cost of trai ni ng, and preference for ei ther ready-trai ned i mmi grants, brought in
at government expense or j ob f ragmentati on whereby the semi -ski l l ed can be
empl oyed at l ower rates. Whi t e ski l l ed trade uni ons adopt a contradi ctory
approach, whi ch can onl y be expl ai ned by thei r raci al atti tudes. They encourage
i mmi grati on, but oppose di rect trai ni ng or energeti c apprenti ceshi p pr ogr ammes
for Afri cans inthe same breath as they rej ect j ob f ragmentati on.
A cl assi c exampl e of the destructi veness of raci al fears on the nati onal
economy i s the fate of the Luveve Col l ege, whi ch was establ i shed in 1961 to
provi de di rect trai ni ng for bl acks, rather patroni si ngl y, i ts obj ecti ves wer e to
demonstrate Af ri cans capaci ty for trai ni ng in moder n techni cal occupati on,
and, mor e practi cal l y, to trai n apprenti ces by gi vi ng t hema t wo- year ful l -ti me
course. Despi te remarkabl e resul ts, the col l ege was cl osed in 1964, on the basi s
that apprenti ceshi p trai ni ng had become non- raci al , renderi ng i t unnecessary.
Despi te cl ear evi dence that this was not so, and that apprenti ces are urgentl y
needed, the government refuses to re-establ i sh the col l ege.
I n the field of admi ni strati ve trai ni ng the same pattern prevai l s. The
tentati ve scheme to recrui t Af ri cans i nto the ci vi l servi ce, i ntroduced by
Whi t ehead was del i beratel y reversed by the Rhodesi an Front .
Arrest.
Rhodesia 51
Agai n the l i nks between pol i cy in educati on and other areas, in thi s case
i ndustri al rel ati ons are si gni fi cant. The structure of the Rhodesi an trade uni on
movement as establ i shed by l aw, is upon essenti al l y raci al l i nes-thi nl y di sgui sed
as ski l l ed(whi tes) and unski l l ed (bl acks). The resul t i s a pri vi l eged whi te arti san
cl ass who pl ace their i nterest in pri vi l ege above the l ong- termi nterest of uni ty
of l abour.
Compar e Chapter I VinPeter S. Harri s Black Industrial Workers in Rhodesia
(1974); several studi es in the Rhodesian Journal of Economics; F. M. Nehwat i ,
The Effect of Racial Discrimination on the African Worker in Southern Rhodesia.
University education
Uni versi ty educati on is uni que in Rhodesi a in bei ng non- raci al . But the educa-
ti onal background vi ti ates any benefi ci al effects thi s mi ght be expected to have.
I n 1972, 978 students wer e regi stered at the Uni versi ty of Rhodesi a: 510 Eur o-
peans, 400 Afri cans and 78 other races . I n that year al most 2,000 Rhodesi ans
wer e reported to have gone to uni versi ty, whi l e 5, 140 appropri atel y qual i fi ed
Europeans l eft school . The pri vi l eged qual i ty of educati on for whi te Rhodesi ans
emerges cl earl y f romthe fact apart f r omthose attendi ng uni versi ty in Rhodesi a,
there wer e 1, 908 Rhodesi ans recei vi ng government assi stance for study at seven
Sout h Af ri can whi te uni versi ti es. Thus, di scounti ng any whi te students not
recei vi ng grants, about 50 per cent of qual i fi ed whi te school l eavers can expect
a uni versi ty educati on, a pri vi l ege enj oyed by fewsoci eti es.
4 Basic economic
data
Contrary to the i mpressi ons gi ven by the Rhodesi an Front the country' s econo-
my is tragi cal l y weak. As Arri ghi and Sutcl i ffe have brought out in thei r studi es,
as a resul t of the del i berate underdevel opment of the Af ri can popul ati on and
thei r areas, stagnati on has been reached and i t i s worseni ng. One of the most
si gni fi cant factors is the rapi d decl i ne in the producti vi ty of the peasant sector,
that is the Tri bal Trust l ands. I n these areas over 60 per cent (3. 2 mi l l i on in
1972) of the popul ati on l i ve, yet they consi stentl y contri buted onl y 8 per cent to
the nati onal i ncome between 1960 and 1967. The raci al i st pattern of soci ety,
depressi ng Afri can devel opment , has meant the whol e economy must suffer in
the l ong run. I ndustri al i zati on has been di scouraged, and there seems l i ttl e
prospect of change-especi al l y si nce past raci al pol i ci es have not onl y been
conf i rmed but strengthened by Rhodesi a Front l egi sl ati on such as the Land
Tenure Act. Onl y by maki ng the l arge areas of unused, potenti al l y arabl e l and
inEuropean areas avai l abl e tothe rapi dl y- growi ng Af ri can rural popul ati on can
the mai n probl ems be tackl ed. These i ncl ude the devel opment of vi abl e secon-
dary i ndustry, the wi thdrawal of pressure on ecol ogi cal l y deteri orati ng soils to
rehabi l i tate t hem, the re-l ocati on of a l arge proporti on of Af ri can l and i nto
vi abl e hol di ngs. The posi ti on in Af ri can agri cul ture i s not onl y stagnant but
dangerous- i n 1972 a very smal l safety margi n of f ood suppl i es was noted-i n
1969 onl y 8 per cent surpl us (a good year), in 1968 (a bad year) reduced to
1. 5 per cent. A profi l e of esti mated producti vi ty in the Af ri can rural areas
between 1946 and 1970 is shown inTabl e 3.
TABLE 3
Cr ops Population Productivity Period 1
194650
195 1-55
195660
1961-65
196670
1. The period 1946-50 was taken as a hase.
Source: Dunlop, Rhodesian Journai of Economrcs, 1972
1 O0
112
130
160
20 1
1 O0
107
125
156
199
1 O0
105
104
103
101
.
TABLE 4. Working population
Non-African African
Employed as
Total
Employed as
Total
population percentage population percentage
of total of total
1962-64
1965
1966
1967
1968
240, 500 36. 5 3, 750, 000 16.3
239, 700 37. 3 4, 000, 000 15.6
245, 000 36. 5 4.130, 000 14.9
250, 400 36. 3 4, 260, 000 14. 2
260, 300 36. 3 4, 400, 000 13.9
Source- G. Kay. in Rhodesia: o Human Geogruphj, London, University of London Press, 1970, points out that, at the 1962-64 level
of African employment. 718,800 jobs were needed in 1968: the actual numbers available were 100.000 short.
Attempts have been made to expl ai n away Af ri can unempl oyment in Rho-
desi a in t er ms of the fact that many are economi cal l y i nacti ve (probabl y
supported by the rural subsi stence economy) rather than unempl oyed. I n fact
over 3 mi l l i on Af ri cans have to exi st in the rural househol d sector. On the
economi cal l y i nacti ve thesi s i t has been suggested that i f, as was the case in
1969, there were 592, 000 adul t mal es i nacti ve when onl y 731, 000 Afri cans wer e
empl oyed, i t was a si tuati on whi ch meri ts very much cl oser i nvesti gati on .
Hawki ns, How much Af ri can Empl oyment ? inRhodesi an J ournal of Economi cs,
1972, notes that the i ncrease of the Af ri can rural househol d sector between
1965 and 1970 was over 600, 000 whereas the number of Afri cans empl oyed
i ncreased by onl y 89, 000. The GNP duri ng thi s peri od averaged 5 per cent per
annumgrowth. The actual per capi ta growt h has been referred to as no mor e
than 0. 4 per cent because the economi c expansi on by- passed the maj ori ty of the
peopl e. I n fact, as Tabl e 5, based on Hawki ns, deri ved f romthe August 1972
Di gest of Stati sti cs shows cl earl y, there was a decl i ne in the proporti on of the
Af ri can popul ati on inthe money economy si nce 1958.
TABLE 5. Africans in the money economy
195x 1965 1971
Population
Employed
Percentage employed
3, 390, 000 4, 260, 000 5, 3 10,000
652. 000 654, 000 781, 000
19. 2 15. 4 14. 7
The pi cture is a repeti ti on of that f ound in other sectors of the Rhodesi an
si tuati on, the Afri cans f ormi ng the l arge number s at the bot t omof the di stri bu-
ti on pyrami d-thi s timeof the standard of l i vi ng.
The shortage of Af ri can l abour inEuropean agri cul ture persi sts despi te the
l arge number of unempl oyed. Bet ween 1964 and 1971 j obs for Afri cans in
European agri cul ture i ncreased by 3. 5 per cent, el sewhere by 35. 4 per cent. The
average wage on the f arms was $(R)124 (62) whi ch, worki ng on the assumpti on
that each adul t worker has three dependants and aper capi ta i ncome in the
Rhodesia 55
subsi stence economy at $(R)25 per annum, makes the $(R)125 subsi stence
i ncome superi or to the agri cul tural wage, especi al l y in the l i ght of the rel ati ve
unpl easantness of empl oyment on a whi te f arm. It shoul d al so be noted that
fi gures for 1965 showed average annual earni ngs for Af ri can empl oyees on
f arms at approxi matel y $(R)140 (70), i ndi cati ng a decl i ne over the years. At
the same time the average earni ngs of a European f armworker were 1,364.
The wage gap between the groups has in fact grown consi stentl y.
The 10: 1 rati o of European to Af ri can i ncome i s in fact not consi stent
throughout the economy, bei ng much greater in some sectors (agri cul ture and
mi ni ng) than others. Accordi ng to fi gures quoted by Nhandar a in the Rhodesia
Herald in Mar ch 1973 domesti c servants and Af ri can agri cul tural workers
(449,259 of the 765,250 total in 1969) wer e pai d in 1971 an average annual wage
of $(R)260 and $(R)131 respecti vel y.
The total number empl oyed in the di fferent sectors of the economy on the
basi s of the 1969 census fi gures is as shown i n<Tabl e 6.
TABLE 6
ASricans Europeans Coloured Asians Totdl
Agriculture and forestry
Mining and quarrying
Manufacturing
Electricity, gas and water
Construction
Finance, insurance and real estate
Wholesale and retail, trade, restaurants
Transport, storage and communications
Services
Others
and hotels
271,246
47,821
87,161
4,199
41.264
2.573
45,727
15,254
178.01 3
72,692
765,950
4,376
3.109
15,405
1,366
6.556
6.523
17,234
9,941
28,116
571
93,197
~~
91 9
68 8
1,185 387
61 7
444 64
17 15
752 1,117
387 90
761 321
114 50
3,880 2,068
~ _ _
275,722
5 1,006
104,138
5,633
48,328
9.128
64,830
25,672
207,211
73,427
865,095
Thus of 865,095 peopl e empl oyed in 1969, 765,950 wer e Afri cans. Thei r
share of the i ncome ' taken home' is nothi ng near the l arge percentage they
consti tute of the whol e. Sutcl i ffe shows thi s in hi s Stagnation and Inequality
whi ch i s the source of Tabl e 7.
TABLE 7. White proportion of population and personal income
Percentage Percentage share Percentage Percentage share
population personal income population personal income
'iear of total o toial Year o total OS total
1946 3.8 49.4 1960 6.2 61.2
1950 4.8 58.2 1965 5.1 58.1
1955 5.4 59.5 1968 4.8 56.5
Tabl e 8, based on Mswaka, i ndi cates what percentage of the total wages
earned went to the Afri can empl oyed, and what percentage they wer e of the
total empl oyed.
TABLE 8
Africans African .4frican .4fricun
Y C U employed share of Yeur employed sh.ire of
oftotal) wages (O,.) (O$ of total) wager (00)
1954 89. 6 38. 5 1961 87. 7 37. 3
1955 89. 3 38. 5 i 963 87. 3 39. 8
1957 88. 6 37. 5 1965 87. 7 41. 4
1958 88. 0 37. 0 1968 87. 4 41. 2
I n 1973 the poverty dat umline was esti mated at $(R)60 per mont h, i . e.
$(R)720 per annum. I n J une 1972 the esti mated di stri buti on of cash wages to
Afri cans was as fol l ows :
345,410 recei ved under $(R)10 per mont h ($(R)120 per annum) ;
172,610 recei ved f rom$(R)10-20 per mont h ($(R)120-240 per annum) ;
25 1,270 recei ved f rom$(R)20-50 per mont h ($( R)240-600 per annum) ;
63,170 recei ved f rom$(R)50-90 per mont h ($(R)600- 1,080 per annum) ;
9,270 recei ved f rom$(R)90-150 per mont h ($(R)l,OSO-1,800 per annum) ;
3, 800 recei ved over $(R)150 per mont h ($(R)1,800 per annum).
The contri buti on of i ndustri al sectors to GDP (in mi l l i ons of pounds) i s
shown inTabl e 9.
The pi cture of the economy is one of consi derabl e danger, made all the
mor e dangerous by the fact that i t i s unobserved or unheeded by the governi ng
mi nori ty. The pressure upon rural l and i s i mmense, and can onl y be rel eased by
redi stri buti on of resources and the i ntegrati on of the maj ori ty i nto the economy.
A speci al aspect of the probl emhas been the i mpact of i nternati onal economi c
TABLE 9
1959-61 196244 1965 1966 1967 1968
African agriculture and rural
household services 20. 0 74. 0 24. 6 27. 2 31. 8
European agriculture 38. 2 44. 7 47. 0 45. 3 45. 9
Mining and quarrying 18. 3 17.3 24.1 23.1 23. 0
Manufacturing 45. 4 54. 6 66. 6 60. 8 65. 8
Construction 19. 6 14. 8 15.9 15. 8 17. 4
139. 7 157. 9 175. 7 172.1 182. 5 Others (including domestic service)
281. 2 313. 3 353. 4 344. 3 366. 4
_ _ _ _ _ ~ _ _ ~
29. 91
34. 71
22. 2
79. 0
23.1
201. 0
389. 9
1. The year I968 was a drought year.
Source: G. Kay. Rhodesia: a Human Geographr, London, University of London Press, 1977
Rhodesia 51
TABLE 10. Empl oyment invari ous sectors 1962481
Agri-
cul ture
Year and l evel Mi ni ng
Manul ac- Con>- Domest i c
turi ng tructl on servi ce
Other Total
bervi ces
Non-Afri cans
i 96244
Level
1965
Level
1966
Levei
1967
Level
1968
Level
4.510
1 O0
4, 420
98
4, 440
99
4, 030
90
4, 000
88
Af ri cans (thousands)
1962-64 258. 1
Level 1 O0
1965 372. 5
Level 105
1966 262. 2
Level 103
1967 34 1
Level 94
1968 239. 9
Level 93
2, 640
1 O0
2, 800
106
2, 930
111
2.990
i 13
3, 040
115
41. 7
1 O0
41. 5
1 O0
42. 7
102
43. 5
104
44.1
106
15, 010
1 O0
15, 970
106
15.770
105
16, 330
108
17.350
116
65. 4
68. 9
67. 2
72. 4
78. 4
1 O0
105
103
111
120
5, 050
1 O0
5, 060
103
5, 200
103
5, 300
105
5, 920
117
29. 5 92. 1
30 89. 3
31. 2 89. 4
32. 4 90. 6
38. 1 92. 9
1 O0 1 O0
102 97
105 97
110 98
129 101
60, 490 87, 700
1 O0 1 O0
61, 050 89, 300
101 1 o2
60, 960 89, 300
101 1 o2
62, 150 90, 800
103
64, 190 94, 500
106
125. 1 612. 3
1 O0 1 O0
121. 8 624
97 I o2
122. 3 615
98 1 O0
125.1 605
1 O0 99
128. 6 622
1 o2 101
I. Wi t h changes i n l evel of empl oyment taki ng 1967-64 as base, (Based on G. Kay, Rhodesia
Uni versi ty of London Press, 1970.)
a Hunian Geography, London.
sancti ons. I t has often been sai d and i t is undoubtedl y true that the maj or
i mpact of thi s (as i ndeed of any economi c probl emari si ng in Rhodesi a) i s made
to fall upon the Afri can maj ori ty. I t i s al so of course possi bl e to anal yse the
i ncreased pressure and the erosi on of the air of affl uence as a means ei ther to
force the mi nori ty to real i ze change i s necessary, or al ternati vel y to bri ng the
maj ori ty to a poi nt where they seek to overthrowthe systeminlieuof ref orm.
5 Labour
Havi ng taken the l and, the settl ers requi red l abour to wor k i t, extract the
mi neral s and man i ndustry. (Logi c was sacri fi ced to sel f-i nterest in that all
mi neral ri ghts inthe reserves, whi ch wer e set up for the sol e and excl usi ve use
and occupati on of nati ves coul d be l egal l y expl oi ted onl y by Europeans. ) Ini ti ai
Af ri can refusal to enter the whi te economy l ed to some of the earl i est confl i cts.
The hut tax, copi ed f romthe Cape Provi nce, was i mposed (at f our t i mes the
rate) together wi th a tax on pol ygamous marri age. Af ri cans had to fi nd money
to pay these taxes, and so wer e forced to enter a money economy. Once
i nvol ved, however, the whi te government s have made every effort to restri ct the
power whi ch coul d come wi th l abour.
A gr iculture
Her e agai n one fi nds a dual systemoperati ng. On the one hand the Af ri can
rural areas, where tradi ti onal peasant, essenti al l y subsi stence, f armi ng is typi cal ,
and on the other the hi ghl y devel oped European control l ed i ndustri al sector
(whi ch i ncl udes l arge-scal e ranchi ng and pl antati ons). Af ri can peasants must
engage, at l east i ntermi ttentl y in the i ndustri al sector to survi ve. European
f armers operate on an enti rel y di fferent scal e, as i ndi cated by the fact that in
1965 there were 5,700 whi te f armers hol di ng 36.8 mi l l i on acres, whi l e in the
Af ri can Tri bal Trust l ands and Purchase Areas there wer e 608,000 bl ack
f armers worki ng 43.6 mi l l i on acres (1970). I n the Tri bal Trust l ands the average
annual gross output per fami l y i s about 250; hence 40 to 50 per cent of the men
must seek empl oyment int owns to suppl ement fami l y i ncome.
Average Af ri can earni ngs are about one- tenth of those of Europeans. The
fi gures gi ven inTabl e 11 were publ i shed in the J ohannesburg Firzunckl Muil in
1973.
TABLE i I. Average earni ngs inRhodesi an dol l ars inRhodesi a 1965-71 1
Yea1 Whi t e African Di f f erence Year Whi t e African Di f f erence
1965 2,576 246 2,330 1969 2,971 280 2,691
1966 2,664 255 2,409 1970 3,112 298 2,814
1967 2,722 262 2,460 1971 3,387 315 3,072
1968 2,836 272 2,564 1972 3,632 332 3,300
1. NRJ2 =fl (1969).
The rati o of Afri can to non- Af ri can earni ngs vari es f romsector to sector,
but i s worst in agri cul ture, where about 40 per cent of Afri cans are empl oyed.
I n 1971thei r average annual earni ngs (of whi ch 35 per cent was pai d in ki nd)
were $(R)124, representi ng an 8. 9 per cent reducti on in real earni ngs si nce 1962.
The rati o of Af ri can to European earni ngs in the di fferent sectors was as
shown inTabl e 12.
Tabl e 12
I 963 1971 1963 I971
Mi ni ng 1: 12.3 1 : 13.6 Transport 1: 5. 3 1: 5. 4
Manuf acturi ng 1 : 7. 4 1 : 7. 8 Agri cul ture 1 : 20. 5 1 : 22.6
Constructi on 1 : 8. 7 1: 7.7
I n 1967, the 605, 000 Afri cans empl oyed in the i ndustri al sector earned an
annual average of &138, whi l st the 90, 900 Europeans, Asi ans and Col oureds
earned an average of 1, 361.
Thus, l i vi ng standards are very di fferent, wi th Europeans in a domi nant
posi ti on. Si nce 1958, moreover, the number of Afri cans empl oyed in i ndustry
has decreased whi l e the total Afri can popul ati on i ncreased. Bet ween 1969 and
1973, the total number of Af ri cans in empl oyment rose by 197, 000 (cf. over
330, 000 mal e Afri cans l eft school duri ng the same peri od). The annual per
capita ri se in GNP, 0. 4 per cent, i s amongst the l owest in the worl d, but the
i mpl i cati ons are hi dden f rommost whi tes because, in a very real sense, they
i nhabi t an enti rel y di fferent economi c worl d f romthe Af ri cans.
Why are Af ri cans, who provi de the overwhel mi ng proporti on of l abour to
the system, in so depri ved a condi ti on? The whi te Rhodesi an s short answer
woul d probabl y be to contrast hi s i nherent superi ori ty and i ndustri ousness wi th
the i nferi ori ty and l azi ness of the Af ri can. Thi s thesi s i s wort h i nvesti gati ng. See
George Kay s Rhodesia : u Humun Geogruphjj, Ml ambo s Rhodesia : the British
Dilemma (1971), F.M. Nehwati s The Effect of Racial Discrimination on the
African Worker in Southern Rhodesia (1967), D. G. Cl arke s Domestic Workers
in Rhodesia: the Economics of Muster and Servant and Contract Workers and
Underdevelopment in Rhodesia ( Mambo Occasi onal Papers) ( 1974), G. Arri ghi s
Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective and The Political Economy of Rhodesia,
W. J. Barber s The Economji of British Central Africa, R. B. Sutcl i ffes Stagnation
and Inequality in Rhodesia (1971) and P. S. Harri s Black Industrial Workers in
Rhodesia.
Africans forced into a money economy
I n Rhodesia: u Human Geogriphj., George Kay states that
i t was wi del y bel i eved by Europeans that excessi ve physi cal exerti on in the tropi cs mi ght be
harmf ul to thei r heal th, and Sout h Af ri can experi ence and the sl ave trade had demonstrat-
ed possi bi l i ti es of usi ng Af ri cans as l abourers.
Rhodesia 61
The real l y expl oi tabl e weal th, once whi tes had taken the l and, was thus Af ri can
l abour. But i t took many years of economi c pressure combi ned with a constant-
ly growi ng body of l aws (i ncl udi ng a Compul sor y Labour Act duri ng the
Second Wor l d War ) to force Afri can l abour to ser ve the whi te economy at the
rates, in the pl aces and on the condi ti ons determi ned by the whi tes (cf.
D. G. Cl arke, Settl er I deol ogy and Af ri can Underdevel opment in Post - war
Rhodesi a , Rhodesi an J ournal of Economics, Vol. 8, 1974).
Afri cans di d not at fi rst desi re money. Apart f romthose tempted to stay by
the rare, generous and consi derate empl oyer, they worked onl y l ong enough to
obtai n the mi ni mun to pay taxes and buy a fewnecessi ti es. Wages wer e
neverthel ess kept l owby a combi nati on of del i berate pol i cy, l owproducti vi ty,
paternal i sm(f ood and housi ng provi ded by empl oyers) and the assumpti on that
Afri cans shoul d rely on the r eser ves for thei r l i vi ng. As the Af ri can popul ati on
grew, a l abour surpl us f ormed. The l owwage pol i cy conti nued. Af ri can l abour
coul d not organi ze, i t l acked educati on and trai ni ng to devel op ski l l s, and i ts
uni ty was undermi ned as in Sout h Afri ca by the vast i mportati on of Af ri cans
f romel sewhere in Afri ca. Mi grant (contract) l abour has thus been a basi c
el ement of the Af ri can l abour si tuati on in Rhodesi a. The dual i ty must agai n be
noted, bl acks in the whi te systemare there onl y temporari l y and for speci fi c
purposes. They are not a permanent , i ntegral part of i t, because when they are
no l onger needed must return to thei r own system. There they and thei r
probl ems are deal t withby the separate government i mposed upon t hem(inthe
f or mof the I nternal (f ormerl y Nati ve) Affai rs Depar t ment bby the mi nori ty
el ected admi ni strati on. Afri can realities are in this way excl uded f r omthe
experi ence of most whi tes enj oyi ng the fantasy of the fantasti c Rhodesi an way
of l i fe. How successful l y decepti ve this dual systemi s can be measured by the
confi dent asserti ons of whi te Rhodesi an pol i ti ci ans, that our Af ri cans are the
happi est .
Racialism and labour unity
The pol i ci es outl i ned have tended to provi de conf i rmati on of the typi cal
European vi ew of the Af ri can worker as unski l l ed and unrel i abl e. Thi s is
preci sel y what must be expected when trai ni ng i s del i beratel y restri cted, and
mi grati on (f romforei gn country or reserve) is encouraged. I n spi te of thi s,
in1972, the Rhodesi an Rai l ways (a l arge and comparati vel y good empl oyer wi th
the strongest Af ri can trade uni on) reveal ed that onl y 30 per cent of i ts
13, 149 strong Af ri can wor k force had been empl oyed for less than ten years.
The si tuati on rei nforces prej udi ce, obstructs the rati onal devel opment of
organi zed l abour and i ndeed perverts normal trade uni on practi ces, such as the
cl osed- shop , i nto raci al l y based j ob-reservati on . The whi te arti san i s aut o-
mati cal l y el evated by his col our, i nto a manageri al rol e, over Af ri cans. Thus the
prospect of worki ng- cl ass uni ty overri di ng the expl oi tati on of l abour i s vi rtual l y
nil. I n fact whi te arti san pressure, (inthe wake of the 1929 depressi on revel ati on
of the prospect of whi tes bei ng reduced to manual l abour) pressed for l egal
protecti on to be added to the soci al and economi c barri ers, whi ch kept bl acks
f romeconomi c power. (See D. G. Cl arke s Settl er I deol ogy and Af ri can Under -
f
[Phrmi 4.4.4 Photo)Picou ]
Living quarters of African agricultural workers.
Rhodesia 63
devel opment in Post war Rhodesi a , and P. S. Harri s Ten Popul ar Myt hs
Concerni ng the Empl oyment of Labour in Rhodesi a , both in the Mar ch 1974
Rhodesian Journal of Economics.)
Industrial Conciliation Act (1934)
An I ndustri al Conci l i ati on Act was passed in 1934. Gr ay, in The Titio Nati ons,
summed i t up as f ol l ows:
I t s effect was to i ntroduce a moder n and progressi ve met hod of i ndustri al conci l i ati on for
European wage- earners and empl oyees, whi l e l eavi ng the mass of the l abour force under
the Master and Servants Act, whi ch resembl ed the l egi sl ati onof El i zabethan Engl and.
Thi s had t wo resul ts, as Kay poi nts out. There was little possi bi l i ty of an
Af ri can mi ddl e cl ass emergi ng. Secondl y, there has been rel ati vel y l i ttl e confl i ct
between whi te arti sans, cl eri cal workers ( whose good sal ari es make themmaj or
benefi ci ari es of the system) and empl oyers. The i denti ty of whi te i nterests has
meanwhi l e survi ved all opposi ti on and hel d i ntact. Whi t e uni ty is well i l l ustrated
by the ability to survi ve the traumati c expul si on the Lord Mal vern, Whi t ehead,
Uni ted Federal Party style of professi onal , patri ci an l eadershi p, and the take-
over by the popul i st Rhodesi an Front l eadershi p supported by a combi nati on of
whi te arti sans, the i nfl ated bureaucracy of the powerf ul ci vi l servi ce and weal thy
tobacco f armers. Establ i shed commer ce and professi onal s l abel l ed i t the
Cowboy Cabi net , but in the fi nal anal ysi s j udged i t best to j oi n t hemrather
than upset the pri vi l ege whi ch i s thei r common bond. Many proposal s for ref orm
have f oundered on this sol i dari ty.
The 1934 I ndustri al Conci l i ati on Act (whi ch has the same ti tl e as i ts Sout h
Af ri can predecessor of 1924) establ i shes a dual systemin l abour rel ati ons by the
si mpl e devi ce of defi ni ng an empl oyee as any person engaged by an empl oyer
to perf ormwor k. . . but shal l not i ncl ude a nati ve-surel y the perfect exampl e
of turni ng a person i nto a non- person. Whi t e trade uni ons then f ormed i ndus-
trial counci l s withwhi te empl oyers and made bargai ns for thei r mut ual benefi t
whi ch of course excl uded non- empl oyees , that i s Af ri cans.
Labour relations between Africans and whites
The l abour rel ati ons of unski l l ed Af ri can wor ker swho consti tute the vast
maj ori ty of Afri can wor ker sar e thus regul ated pri mari l y by the Mast er and
Servants Act (1901) passed to cover bodi l y l abour in domesti c servi ce, mi ni ng,
agri cul ture, husbandry, trade, manuf acture and handi crafts. The servant who
absents hi msel f wi thout l eave f romhis master s house or premi ses. . . is i ntoxi -
cated, refuses to obey any command of hi s master. . . is abusi ve or i nsul ti ng,
ei ther by l anguage or conduct to hi s master or hi s master s wife or chi l dren is
l i abl e to cri mi nal prosecuti on. The Af ri cans (Regi strati on and I denti fi cati on)
Act (1957) penal i zes any Af ri can who enters the servi ce of another empl oyer
whi l e under an exi sti ng contract whi l e, under the Af ri can Labour Regul ati ons
Act, any Afri can l abourer who wi thout l awful cause deserts or absents hi msel f
f romhi s pl ace of empl oyment or fails to carry out the t er ms of hi s contract is
al so l i abl e to cri mi nal prosecuti on. Puni shment s under the Afri can J uveni l es
Empl oyment Act i ncl ude whi ppi ng for defaul ti ng j uveni l es.
Bet ween 1962 and 1965, 1,047 Afri cans wer e prosecuted under the Labour
Regul ati ons Act: between 1960 and 1965, 13,166 Af ri cans, 4 Europeans,
1 Asi an and 1 Col oured wer e prosecuted under the Mast er and Servants rul es;
and between 1965 and 1969, 3,506 Afri cans were convi cted for deserti on or
i nsubordi nati on. The statute, like so many others in Rhodesi a, i s couched in
l argel y non-raci al t er ms, but is used to mai ntai n a di scri mi natory economi c
real i ty. Thi s can be i l l ustrated by contrasti ng these statistics wi th those for the
cr i me of non- payment of wages, an equal l y non- raci al offence, for whi ch
between 1960 and 1965; 508 Europeans, 88 Col oureds and Asi ans and 61 Afri cans
wer e prosecuted. I nci dental l y, the i denti ty of whi te empl oyer has f ound i ts
way i nto col l oqui al l anguage, wher e the wor d baas ( meani ng overseer or em-
pl oyer) is now used toref er to any whi te man.
Negotiating structures
The 1934 I ndustri al Conci l i ati on Act was amended in 1959, ostensi bl y to enabl e
Af ri can parti ci pati on innegoti ati ons on l abour rel ati ons. An earl i er amendment
of 1945 had made the appl i cati on of agreements made by the I ndustri al Coun-
ci l s to certai n Afri can workers opti onal , but, in practi ce, whi te trade uni oni sts
di d not do much about such appl i cati on. Fol l owi ng a stri ke of Af ri can rai l way
workers in 1945, Labour Boards were establ i shed in 1947. On these boards in
pl ace of di rect negoti ati ons whi te ci vi l servants or other nati ve experts
(i ncl udi ng whi te housewi ves) woul d di scuss wi th empl oyers thei r r ecommenda-
ti ons for mi ni mumcondi ti ons to appl y toAfri can workers inall i ndustri es except
agri cul ture and domesti c servi ce, where si gni fi cantl y, the maj ori ty of Afri cans
were empl oyed (see Tabl e 13). Advi sory I ndustri al Boards sti l l negoti ate condi -
ti ons for a l arge proporti on of bl ack workers, represented by empl oyees
appoi nted by the Mi ni ster of Labour and Soci al Wel f are inhi s di screti on.
TABLE 13. Empl oyment of Af ri cans by economi c sector
1961 I968
Number Percentage Number Percentage
Mi ni ng 49,000 8 41,000 I
Manuf acturi ng 184,000 29 121,000 20
624,000 10 623,000 1 O0
Agri cul ture 249.000 40 239,000 38
Other 143,000 ~ 23 220.000 35
~ ~
By forbi ddi ng the regi strati on of trade uni ons whi ch are f ormed or exi st for
purposes of furtheri ng the i nterests of i ts member s on a basi s of race or col our
Rhodesia 65
the l awexcl uded the regi strati on of uni ons whi ch coul d represent unski l l ed
workers- who wer e al most excl usi vel y Af ri can. A trade uni on must sati sfy the
regi strar that i t is representati ve , that i t does not exi st to further the i nterests
of i ts member s on a basi s of race or col our, and that no exi sti ng trade uni on has
been regi stered to represent the i ndustri al i nterests of the same i ndustri al area.
Far f rombei ng a bar to raci al i smin i ndustri al rel ati ons, thi s anti -raci al
wordi ng operati ng in the context of Rhodesi an realities is desi gned, and
succeeds, as a means to protect the entrenched power of the whi te ski l l ed
worker. I n practi ce l ong- standi ng European uni ons wer e operati ng when the
1959 Act was i ntroduced. Thei r pri vi l eges wer e preserved by the voti ng provi -
si ons in f avour of skilled l abour (see bel ow), and thei r excl usi ve ri ght to
negoti ate was preserved by the provi si ons excl udi ng new uni ons in the area
(i nevi tabl y Af ri can and unski l l ed) f romregi strati on. Once regi stered the uni on
bargai ns excl usi vel y for all workers in the i ndustry, whether member s or not.
An I ndustri al Counci l i s f ormed wi th the rel evant regi stered empl oyers organi za-
ti on, and thei r agreements bi nd all parti es. I ndustri al boards operate ini ndustri es
where there i s no representati ve empl oyee organi zati on (sati sfactory to the
regi strar), or where the regi stered trade uni on chooses to negoti ate thi s way.
Thei r recommendat i ons, if acceptabl e to the mi ni ster, are publ i shed as Empl oy-
ment Regul ati ons and are then bi ndi ng, The I ndustri al Conci l i ati on Act
consol i dated in 1959 was accuratel y descri bed by Franci s Nehwat i as the mai n
basti on of i ndustri al aparthei d .
First- and second-class trade unionists
Uni ons whi ch are not regi stered can pl ay no effecti ve part in i ndustri al negoti a-
ti ons. Unski l l ed Af ri cans can choose i nferi or status in a whi te- domi nated uni on
or become member s of one whi ch is non-regi stered and so i neffecti ve. Member s
of the regi stered uni ons have voti ng ri ghts graded in proporti on to skill, and an
unski l l ed (bl ack) vote counts a maxi mumof one-thi rd of a ski l l ed (whi te) vote.
Any uni on attempti ng to gi ve equal voti ng ri ghts can be ordered to amend i ts
consti tuti on under pai n of de-regi strati on. The trade uni ons wer e forced to
organi ze on an i ndustry- by- i ndustry basi s, and the ski l l ed top of each i ndustry
control l ed most of the voti ng power. No general uni on of unski l l ed workers
organi zed hori zontal l y was al l owed. Once agai n the si gni fi cance of the i ntri cate
l i nk- up between educati on, l and, l abour, weal th and pol i ti cal power is obvi ous.
Europeans hol d a monopol y of skills and mani pul ate educati on, apprenti ceshi p,
trade uni ons and the l egi sl ature tomai ntai n thei r posi ti on.
The powers of the Regi strar under the I ndustri al Conci l i ati on Act inregard
to trade uni on affai rs (see bel ow) are as arbi trary as those of the Mi ni stry of
I nternal Affai rs. He has sol e di screti on to regi ster uni ons or not, and power to
cancel regi strati on on the grounds that a uni on i s not representati ve (the rel ati ve
cri teri abei ng nowhere defi ned) or that i t i s i nvol ved in pol i ti cal acti vi ti es. Thus
in 1968, the Regi strar de-regi stered f our I ndustri al Counci l s that i ncl uded a
l arge Af ri can representati on, so effecti vel y denyi ng col l ecti ve bargai ni ng
machi nery to some 17, 000 Afri cans. T. E. Mswaka esti mates that, because they
were empl oyed in agri cul ture, forestry, domesti c servi ce, government servi ce,
educati on and heal th, 62 per cent of Afri cans wer e excl uded al together in 1968
f rombargai ni ng machi nery provi ded under the I ndustri al Conci l i ati on Act.
The act was amended in 1964 to prohi bi t the use of trade uni on f unds,
servi ces or facilities for pol i ti cal purposes or any pol i ti cal organi zati on. I n 1967
Afri can uni ons were f orbi dden to accept fi nanci al assi stance f romi nternati onal
trade uni on organi zati ons or f romnati onal trade uni ons in other countri es, and
thei r member s were f orbi dden to travel abroad. Trade uni oni sts i nevi tabl y
became i nvol ved in pol i ti cal acti vi ty, and many were consequentl y affected by
vari ous l aws whi ch i nhi bi t cri ti ci sm, especi al l y by Afri can nati onal i sts. The ri ght
to stri ke bei ng the fi nal measure of the power of l abour, is cl osel y control l ed in
Rhodesi a. The I ndustri al Conci l i ati on Act restri cts i t for regi stered and un-
regi stered uni ons al i ke, to a last resort after a l ong and compl ex process of
negoti ati on and conci l i ati on. Stri kes are illegal in all essenti al servi ces, and
whenever an exi sti ng i ndustri al agreement i s unexpi red. Amendment of the act
in1971 subj ected the whol e matter to di rect presi denti al di screti on, enabl i ng hi m
to decl are any stri ke (i ncl udi ng a l egal stri ke) to be contrary to the publ i c
i nterest. By further amendment s he may al so i nterfere and rewri te agreements
made by the I ndustri al Counci l s, when he deems i t i n the publ i c i nterest.
Thi s l evel of pol i ti cal sensi ti vi ty and reacti on to i ndustri al acti on i s not new to
Rhodesi a. The l awcontrol l i ng trade uni ons is to be f ound as much in the field
of securi ty l egi sl ati on-the Law and Order (Mai ntenance) Act-as in i ndustri al
l aw. The prohi bi ti on of Sunday meeti ngs f romwhi ch regi stered trade uni ons are
i mmune, has been a sever e restri cti onon unregi stered uni ons acti vi ti es. Stri kes
inessenti al servi ces, and any attempt toorgani ze t hemcoul d consti tute sabotage
under this act, attracti ng severe penal ti es i ncl udi ng death, made worse by provi -
si ons transferri ng the burden of proof to the accused, once the pol i ce in their
di screti on took a seri ous vi ewof a stri ke.
Employment and freedom of movement
The Afri can Affai rs Act and the Afri can (Regi strati on and I denti fi cati on) Act of
1957 restri ct f reedomof movement and entry to (whi te) i ndustri al areas. Under
Afri can ( Urban Areas) Accommodat i on and Regi strati on l aws unempl oyed
Af ri cans are al l owed onl y a l i mi ted peri od to seek wor k, and ri sk prosecuti on
for contraveni ng the pass l aws if they attempt to seek wor k wherever they wi sh.
I t has been seen, above, how executi ve government has gr own i ncreasi ngl y
authori tari an. Control in thi s, as in other areas of government , i s the response
to the chal l enge to excl usi vel y whi te pri vi l ege. The 1973 amendment s to the
I ndustri al Conci l i ati on Act wer e opposed by empl oyers and trade uni ons, yet i ts
purpose i s control to the Rhodesi an way of l i fe , and was unambi guousl y
brought out by a Rhodesi an Front member of parl i ament supporti ng the
l aw-on the basi s that i t was to protect the present and the future of the worki ng
man (int er ms of the party) [si c] on whi ch we f ought the el ecti on and that is the
permanent establ i shment of the European in thi s country . Remember i ng that
man in this context means whi te man , this typi fi es the obj ecti ve of mi nori ty
government management of l abour rel ati ons-the protecti on of the economi c
superi ori ty of the European.
6 White political
power at
Non-representative rule
The basi s of government in Rhodesi a i s as dual i sti c as those el ements seen
above. For the European there i s democrati c, parl i amentary government . based
on the Bri ti sh model . Agai n, in f ormi t i s non- raci al , the franchi se bei ng based
on cri teri a of educati on and weal th. I n fact, the economi c desti tuti on of the
Af ri can maj ori ty ef f ecti vel y excl udes i t f romthe system. Af ri can parti ci pati on in
the Assembl y bei ng l i mi ted to a fi xed mi nori ty of bl ack member s of parl i ament
(16 of 60). Ei ght of these are el ected by an el ectoral col l ege of chi efs, headmen
and counci l l ors. Ei ght are el ected by the ti ny proporti on who qual i fy for the
separate, Af ri can voters Rol l (2,980 voted in the J ul y 1974 el ecti on. ) Af ri cans
are not however wi thout a government ; they are admi ni stered separatel y by a
speci al government department, enti rel y control l ed by whi tes, responsi bl e onl y
to the whiteel ected government , and maki ng no pretence at bei ng representati ve
of the Af ri can maj ori ty.
The white mi nori ty government rul es Af ri cans through i ts Mi ni stry of
I nternal Affai rs (formerl y Nati ve Affai rs), through the agency of Di stri ct Com-
mi ssi oners and chi efs and headmen. It operates on the assumpti on that Af ri cans
are non- urban, and that the urban bl ack prol etari at i s a transi tory phenomenon.
Consequentl y Afri cans in t owns i nhabi t a f ormof admi ni strati ve l i mbo
(enj oyi ng, at the most , an advi sory rel ati onshi p wi th the whi te muni ci pal i ti es
whi ch manage the bl ack townshi ps) because they are away f romthe area where
the systemassumes t hemto be for purposes of government . I n fact as seen
above, Afri cans are vital to the European economy in both the urban areas and
on whi te f arms. Wei nri ch demonstrates in Black and White Elites in Rural
Rhodesia the si gni fi cance of the cont emporary real i ty of demographi c di stri bu-
ti on to this system. Separati on has so far been pursued l ess ri gi dl y and l ess
consi stentl y than inSout h Af ri ca, but wi th si mi l ar consequences.
I n the 1930s 50 per cent of Europeans l i ved in rural areas, thi s percentage
has now fal l ento l ess than 25. Ther e i s now onl y one whi te per square milein
European rural areas, that i s they are out numbered ei ghty to one. Most of the
popul ati on in whi te t owns i s bl ack: the urban rati o between the groups, in
An African beer hall.
Rhodesia 69
1964 was three Afri cans to one whi te. I n the rural areas, however, the Af ri can
mal e popul ati on mai nl y consi sts of the very young and the very ol d, si nce most
of the men between 20 and 45 have to wor k in t owns to make a l i vi ng. Thi s has
of course di mi ni shed the possi bi l i ty of the countrysi de produci ng l ocal Af ri can
l eaders, and so further faci l i tatedEuropean domi nance.
Apart f romsome attempts at mul ti raci al i smduri ng the late 1950s, whi te
Rhodesi a has al ways been governed in accordance wi th the raci al i st phi l osophy
formal l y i ncorporated by the Rhodesi an Front ini ts 1969 consti tuti on.
Virtual exclusion of blacks from the vote
The voters roll was kept al most excl usi vel y whi te between 1898 and 1969by
usi ng vari ous devi ces to restri ct the vote to whi tes rather than by di rect raci al
excl usi on. The qual i fi cati ons for havi ng a vote in 1898 wer e l i teracy pl us an
i ncome of 550 per annumand the ownershi p of 75 wort h of property or a
mi ni ng cl ai m. These qual i fi cati ons wereenj oyed by very fewAfri cans. Yet there
has been an al most paranoi d fear of f l oods of Af ri can voters , and the
qual i fi cati ons wer e repeatedl y rai sed.
I n 1908, for exampl e, onl y about fifty voters were nati ves . But in 1912 the
i ncome and property qual i fi cati ons wer e doubl ed, and the l i teracy test was made
mor e di ffi cul t-pri mari l y to excl ude Af ri kaners rather than Af ri cans who wer e
al ready excl uded by the fi nanci al qual i fi cati ons. I n 1919 the whi te el ectorate was
doubl ed when women obtai ned the vote and a wifecoul d qual i fy on the basi s of
her husband s fi nanci al status.
I n 1928 there wer e 62 Afri can and 22, 000 European voters.
When i t was proposed, under the Land Apport i onment Act, that Af ri cans
shoul d be enabl ed to own f arms, an attempt was made to rai se the property
qual i fi cati on to E500. Thi s was stopped by the Bri ti sh Gover nment . Under a
new rul e i ntroduced in 1937, property or communal l y hel d l and was excl uded in
assessi ng qual i fi cati on for voti ng ri ghts. Thi s excl uded many Af ri cans who hi red
property f romEuropeans in urban l ocati ons . Ol d age pensi oners wer e exempt ed
f romthe property condi ti on in 1939 but there wer e (and sti l l are) no Af ri can
ol d age pensi oners.
I n 1939, there wer e 24, 626 voters, of whom39 wer e Af ri can.
Vari ous proposal s to limit or excl ude Af ri can voters wer e put f orward,
i ncl udi ng one whi ch proposed to adopt the Hertzog scheme operati ng in Sout h
Afri ca under whi ch, i nstead of havi ng Af ri can voters at all, t wo whi tes woul d
represent Af ri can i nterests inparl i ament.
The pri me mi ni ster of what was then Southern Rhodesi a, Sir Godf rey
Huggi ns (Lord Mal vern) reverted to thi s proposal after the Second Wor l d War
and tri ed to press i t on the Bri ti sh Gover nment , al though recal l i ng that such
moves must now be taken careful l y wi thout creati ng a further uproar in the
Uni ted Nati ons organi zati on . At the 1948 el ecti on there wer e 136 regi stered
Afri can voters. I n order to hel p i nduce Bri tai n to accept the proposed Federa-
ti on of Nort hern and Southern Rhodesi a and Nyasal and (whi ch i t di d in 1953)
the pri me mi ni ster dropped hi s proposal regardi ng Af ri can voters and the
common voters rol l . But in the 1951 El ectoral Act, he i ncreased the qual i fi ca-
l i ons agai n: i ncome f romE100 to E240, property f romE150 to E500, pl us an
ability to read and writeEngl i sh. Thi s effecti vel y reduced the number of Af ri can
voters in1951 f rom453 to 380. Yet his al l eged determi nati on to mai ntai n ... [the]
common voters rol l was a qual i ty whi ch commended hi mand his pl an for
federati on tomany.
Bri tai n was pl edged toensure the survi val of the common voters rol l . When
I an Smi th and the Rhodesi an Front abol i shed i t in 1969. they were merel y doi ng
what thei r predecessors had often tri ed for, but fai l ed to achi eve. I n Europem
Politics iii Southern Rhodesin Leys is parti cul arl y i nstructi ve on this poi nt. By
November 1956 there wer e 560 Afri can and 52, 184 European voters. I n spi te of
thi s, the Tredgol d Commi ssi on was set up to make recommendat i ons on the
franchi se inorder to ensure that government i s pl aced and remai ns inthe hands
of ci vi l i zedand responsi bl e peopl e .
I n common witha number of Rhodesi an parl i amentary commi ssi ons, this
commi ssi on produced a critical assessment and i deas for ref orm. It noted that
representati on was raci al infact though not inname, and that the qual i fi cati ons
for the franchi se are fi xed so hi gh that, in ef f ect, the Afri can is vi rtual l y
excl uded , and suggested arrangements for a qual i fi ed franchi se that woul d have
al l owed some Af ri can i nfl uence on the l egi sl ature. The commi ssi on s r ecommen-
dati ons were l argel y i gnored. I nstead, the 1957 El ectoral Act i ncreased the
number of Afri can voters, but ensured that they coul d never exceed 20 per cent
of the vote; i t was hoped in this way to precl ude any threat to mi nori ty whi te
voters for many years, and perhaps permanentl y.
By November . 1961 there were 5, 127 Af ri can voters in a el ectorate of
88. 820.
The Federation (1953-63)
The Federati on of Rhodesi a and Nyasal and was f ormed on 3 Sept ember 1953.
Af ri cans in Nort hern Rhodesi a and Nyasal and hoped. to gai n nati onal
i ndependence, and feared the power, inthe Federati on, of the 220, 000 Europeans
in Southern Rhodesi a. I n 1960, an i nqui ry i nto the federal consti tuti on, set up
under Lord Monckt on, concl uded that the Federati on coul d not survi ve unl ess
i t was modi f i ed suffi ci entl y to make i t acceptabl e to the peopl e of the
consti tuent terri tori es. I n 1961, Nyasal and obtai ned representati ve government .
I n 1962 a predomi nantl y Af ri can government was f ormed inNorthern Rhodesi a.
Fi nal l y, the Federati on was di ssol ved on 31 December 1963. Nyasal and became
Mal awi and Northern Rhodesi a became Zambi a.
It i s difficult to assess the exact si gni fi cance for Rhodesi an pol i ti cs of the
peri od of the Federati on (I 953-63). General l y, rel ati ons between bl acks and
whi tes, whi ch i s sti l l the heart of the Rhodesi an probl em, wer e unchanged
despi te the new l i beral i smcal l ed Partnershi p . However , the peri od made i ts
own speci fi c contri buti on to the col oni al mental i ty. It led to a sense of resent-
ment at the i ngrati tude of the Af ri can for whi te magnani mi t y. Thi s t heme
reappears timeand agai n, not merel y in the chatter of whi te soci ety, but at the
hi ghest pol i ti cal l evel , as successi ve ref orms are questi oned or rej ected by
Af ri can opi ni on.
Rhodesia 71
Federated brethren
Partnershi p symbol i zed the new era, and both Rhodesi an whi tes and many
outsi de observers bel i eved i t i nvol ved a real change. I n fact, in both the pri vate
and the publ i c l evel , whi te Federal l i beral i smwas l argel y a f aade.
Bef ore Federati on i t woul d have been uncommon for any whi te, apart f rom
mi ssi onari es or the uncommonl y genteel , to address or ref er toAf ri cans in other
than essenti al l y unfri endl y t er ms : kaffi r , munt (a corrupti on of the Bant u
wor d for person), nati ve , boy Cj uveni l e or adul t) or gi rl (the f emi ni ne
equi val ent). Federati on, however, was to bri ng basi c pol i ti cal and economi c
advantages, but at the pri ce of adopti ng mor e l i beral soci al and personal
atti tudes towards Af ri cans. Pol i ti ci ans l earned the necessary patter, but the
average whi te Rhodesi an made i t sardoni cal l y cl ear that hi s use of the t er m
Af ri can was no betrayal of the common convi cti on that all Af ri cans are
kaffi rs , i l l ustrated by exaggerated phrases such as our bel oved Federated
Afri can brethren . But once the Federati on ended, all coul d return to the
rel axed j argon of raci al i smand superi ori ty to mat ch the return to overt raci al
pol i ti cs. Thi s hel ps to expl ai n bl ack and whi te responses to the much- t al ked- of
l i beral i smand changes that wer e supposed to characteri ze the peri od of the
Federati on.
The symbol i c admi ssi on of Af ri can representati ves, fi rst to the Federal
Assembl y and, under the 1961 consti tuti on, to the Rhodesi an Assembl y pro-
vi ded a f aade of mul ti raci al i sm. I t di d not sati sfy the i ncreasi ngl y consci ous
Af ri can masses but di d hel p inenl i sti ng some outsi de support for cont emporary
Rhodesi a as bei ng at l east somewhat l ess reacti onary than Sout h Af ri ca. Afri can
l eaders became mor e and mor e suspi ci ous of what wer e al l eged to be schemes
for peaceful change and i mprovement , seei ng in t hema thi nl y di sgui sed deter-
mi nati on to mai ntai n the status quo; and this Af ri can rej ecti on l ed in turn to
whi te di si l l usi onment and reacti on in a vi ci ous ci rcl e of i ncreasi ngl y vi ol ent
conf rontati on (cf. Leys European Politics ill Southern Rhodesia, Gray s Tirso
Natiom and Ml ambo s Strugglefr a Birthright).
The i dea of Federati on had been unpopul ar withAfri cans inall of the three
terri tori es i nvol ved. The di scovery of copper inNort hern Rhodesi a in 1928 was
one of the factors whi ch led whi tes to press for a uni on of Nort hern and
Southern Rhodesi a. The Bri ti sh Gover nment refused to sancti on uni on but
eventual l y accepted Federati on. Thi s cauti on at l east made i t easi er to di smantl e
the Federati on when this became i nevi tabl e. A Labour government made the f i rst
move in 1951 and the Federati on was set up by a Conservati ve government in
1953. There i s an i nteresti ng paral l el here. Huggi ns and Wel ensky (the whi te
l eaders of Southern and Nort hern Rhodesi a respecti vel y) warned the Bri ti sh
Gover nment of the i ncreasi ngl y raci st i nfl uence on Southern Rhodesi a of Sout h
Af ri ca, whi ch had el ected a raci st Af ri kaner Gover nment in 1948 and, to
counteract thi s, urged Bri ti sh acceptance of a l i beral Federati on. I an Smi th s
supporters have often tri ed si mi l ar arguments. The 1953 arrangement, as Bow-
man poi nts out, gave Rhodesi a compl ete control over i ts i nternal affai rs (i n-
cl udi ng Af ri can admi ni strati on), whi l e gai ni ng ef f ecti ve economi c control of the
north . The Afri can presence in the Assembl y was l i mi ted to six out of the
thi rty-fi ve member s, Huggi ns sayi ng that i t woul d be difficult to fi nd six Afri-
cans inthe Federati on suffi ci entl y compet ent for the task.
Partnershi p was to be a feature of the new pol i ti cal arrangements. . Whi te
Rhodesi ans approved t hemby 25, 570 to 14, 750 in a ref erendum; the 2. 4 mi l l i on
Af ri cans, apart f romthe 429 who had votes, wer e not consul ted. Partnershi p was
defi ned by Huggi ns int er ms of j uni or and seni or partners, and as a j uni or in this
case the nati ve gradual l y works hi msel f up in the busi ness or mor e graphi cal l y
int er ms of the ri der and the horse .
Whi t e pol i ti cal and economi c domi nance remai ned unchanged in the Fed-
erati on. Mi nor concessi ons made in 1953 wer e soon undermi ned. The Federal
Assembl y was i ncreased wi thout a pro rcztu i ncrease of bl ack member s. The
Af ri can Affai rs Board that was to have been the wat chdog of bl ack i nterests
became a rubber st amp for deci si ons made by whi te pol i ti cal parti es.
The terri tori al government of Southern Rhodesi a retai ned the mai n respon-
sibility for Afri cans l i vi ng in the terri tory, but i ts revenue was much reduced
under the federal system. Federal spendi ng, on the other hand, meant a l arge
i ncrease in f unds for schemes that mai nl y benefi ted whi tes. The gi be bamba
zonke (snatch everythi ng) was the i roni c t ermused by whi tes who di d not l i ve
in Sal i sbury, for the capi tal and i ts bureaucrats-capi tal of both Southern
Rhodesi a and the Federati on, monopol i zi ng anythi ng that was wort h havi ng.
Whi t e prosperi ty conti nued. Bet ween 1938 and 1956, after taki ng account
of i nfl ati on the average i ncrease inthe real i ncomes of Europeans was esti mated
at 30 per cent. Bet ween 1954 and 1963, federal revenue f romSouthern Rhodesi a
was substanti al l y l ess than federal expendi ture in the terri tory (cf. Bowman) .
Nyasal and was al so a benefi ci ary, but to a l esser degree. Nort hern Rhodesi an
copper was expl oi ted, and the f ormer Bri ti sh col oni al pol i cy i nsi sti ng on the
pri macy of Afri can i nterests was sacri fi cedtopay for whi te Rhodesi a s prosperi ty
(cf. Hazel wood s study of the economi c background to Federati on).
Symbolic desegregation
Some nomi nal concessi ons wer e made to mul ti raci al i smduri ng the peri od of
Federati on. They di d littleto change the structure, or gi ve any real promi se of
further change. Symbol i c mul ti raci al i sm, merel y rei nforced whi te prej udi ce and
awareness of thei r pri vi l eges, wi thout achi evi ng any substanti al change in the
bal ance of power. FewAf ri cans were appoi nted to the ci vi l servi ce; when the
Rhodesi an Front came to power , there was no probl emin el i mi nati ng t hem
wi thout causi ng any di sl ocati on. Desegregati on in educati on appl i ed onl y to the
l i te f ri ngest he uni versi ty, and some expensi ve pri vate school s. Speci al exemp-
ti ons al l owed i mportant Af ri can vi si tors to use hotel s (whi ch wer e excl usi vel y
whi te), or al l owed Af ri can advocates i nto chambers near the l awcourts. The
average whi te Rhodesi an, his wife and chi l dren conti nued to be segregated
f romcontact wi th ordi nary bl ack peopl e except in master and servant
rel ati onshi ps.
The Southern Rhodesi an wi ng of the Federal Party di d suggest one real l y
si gni fi cant change : the repeal of the Land Apport i onment Act. However , this
was after certai n l i beral amendment s had gi ven Afri cans some openi ngs in the
Separateness.
Racism and apartheid in southern Africa I4
economy and in soci ety. The trend was rapi dl y checked and the hypocrasy of
the whol e exerci se reveal ed. The experi ment in fl exi bl e government whi ch
consi sted in granti ng concessi ons to Afri cans whi l e reassuri ng whi tes that
control woul d be preserved by i ncreasi ng authori tari an measures if necessary,
was pushed to i ts l ogi cal concl usi on, and i nevi tabl e fai l ure. Whi t e voters had
been persuaded to accept ref orm, an i mproved status for Af ri cans, and the
possi bi l i ty that some day the 1961 consti tuti on mi ght enabl e Af ri cans to
domi nat e parl i ament. On the other hand, the Uni ted Federal Party demonstrated
to t he same voters that bl ack peti ti ons for equal i ty shoul d be deal t with by
gaggi ng the peti ti oners. Whi tes real i zed what was real l y at stake-the good life
under perpetual mi nori ty government . I n 1962, they therefore el ected the
Rhodesi an Front , pl edged to mai ntai n this posi ti on at whatever cost. The
Rhodesi an Front represented a coal i ti on of the f ormer Domi ni on Party and
el ements of the f ormer Uni ted Federal Party.
Intransigence or transition
The Federati on (incommon wi th cont emporary Rhodesi a) had to face a basi c
questi on. Di d the economi c advantage of the enfranchi sed fewmake i t worth
whi l e to face the growi ng di ssati sfacti on of the unf ranchi sed many? The maj ori ty
wer e forced to rely progressi vel y upon extra-parl i amentary organi zati on and
demonstrati on, unconsti tuti onal acti on, and finally vi ol ence. Fortunatel y for the
peopl e of Zambi a and Mal awi , the fi nal deci si on lay wi th Bri tai n-whi ch
through the Devl i n and the Monckt on commi ssi ons defi ned the t er ms of the
probl em, and then warned that the threateni ng raci al expl osi on coul d be
prevented onl y by force, or el se by the admi ssi on of the maj ori ty to government .
Bri tai n was confi dent enough of i ts own power and Af ri can support to ensure
maj ori ty rul e in Northern Rhodesi a and Nyasal and. Tragi cal l y for Rhodesi a,
i t had no such conf i dence ini ts ability in Southern Rhodesi a, and the scene was
set for the whi te settl ers to fi nd thei r own sol uti on inthei r own stronghol d.
7 Soft constitution
and hard
government
The possi bi l i ty of al l owi ng change f rommi nori ty to maj ori ty rul e, to progress
by a pre-establ i shed, mechani cal consti tuti onal process ( no matter how sl ow)
was offered in 1961, when a new consti tuti on was arranged between Bri tai n and
the whi te Rhodesi an Gover nment . On the face of i t , the new consti tuti on offered
a great deal as an obj ecti ve, gradual sol uti on to the raci al confl i ct. I t was,
however. rej ected by the Afri can nati onal i st party, the Nati onal Democrat i c
Party (NDP), whi ch had burgeoned in proporti on to the growi ng number of
unkept whi te promi ses of ref ormwhi ch accompani ed i ncreased authori tari an
government , i ncl udi ng the banni ng of i ts predecessor, the Afri can Nati onal
Congress (ANC).
The soft constitution
Why was this rej ected? The i mmedi at e pol i ti cal context of the 1961consti tuti on
was the Federati on, then bei ng propel l ed by whi te hopes towards total i ndepen-
dence, on the basi s, as we have seen, of mul ti raci al i sm whi ch was essenti al l y
mi nori ty rul e. The I 961 i ntegral consti tuti onal restrai nts, especi al l y the Decl ara-
ti on of Human Ri ghts. however. promi sed to provi de a mor e efficient and
obj ecti ve control of settl er rul e than the unpredi ctabl e rel i ance on i mperi al
i nterventi on. Thus whi tes began to stress the i dea of soverei gn i ndependence as
the answer to. ensure thei r f reedomof acti on. I t is obvi ous that the whi te
concessi on to mul ti raci al i smwer e i ntended to create the si tuati on in whi ch
Bri tai n woul d, in Huggi ns earl i er words, come to trusti ng the Europeans. . .
suffi ci entl y to hand over 6, 000, 000 pri mi ti ve peopl e to a Parl i ament domi nat ed
by l ocal Europeans . The 1961 consti tuti on was i ndeed sol d to whi te Rhodesi ans
as the mi ni mumcost of total i ndependence.
I ndependence means f reedomto do what they will, and thei r will wi th the
i nterests of Afri cans (after seventy years experi ence of the sort we have traced)
was unl i kel y to attract Afri can support. I n 1961 as i ndeed in 1971, Rhodesi an
Afri cans coul d not see the desi rabi l i ty of consenti ng to what woul d amount to
thei r transfer to excl usi ve soverei gn settl er control , whether the settl ers wer e led
by l i beral Whi t ehead or *i l l i beral Smi th. Of course, once agai n Af ri can
opi ni on was i gnored, though a massi ve and i mpressi vel y organi zed ' ref erendum'
was hel d by the NDP among the unenf ranchi sed. Cl osel y watched by pol i ce and
pol i ce reservi sts, i t managed thi s massi ve peaceful demonstrati on. The resul t
was 372, 546 agai nst the 1961 consti tuti on, 471 in f avour. The total number of
enfranchi sed votes was 63, 795: 21, 846 agai nst 41, 949 inf avour.
Thi s j udgement of Afri can l eaders, refl ecti ngthe vi ews of thei r rank and fi l e
has been proved hi ghl y responsi bl e to the maj ori ty consti tuency they represen-
ted. First the consti tuti on i tsel f kept pol i ti cal power where i t had al ways been, in
European hands. I t reduced the prospect of change by i ncreasi ng franchi se
requi rements, requi ri ng hi gher educati onal or economi c qual i fi cati ons. These
qual i fi cati ons, as we have seen, are sti l l zones of guarded pri vi l ege, whi ch a
whi te el ected government woul d extend to Afri cans at i ts peri l . The gesture of
granti ng i mmedi atel y fi fteenAfri can seats in an assembl y of si xty-fi ve was onl y
a wel come surpri se because Afri cans had not entered the Southern Rhodesi an
l egi sl ati ve at all before. Thei r presence, however. was symbol i c, they coul d
expect tobe al l owed to debate whi te power, not share i t.
Rhodesi a in 1961was a country characteri zed by raci al di scri mi nati on and,
as will be expl ai ned bel ow, the most authori tari an l aws di rected pri mari l y
agai nst Afri can aspi rati ons. The 1961 consti tuti on, al though i t i ncl uded a Bill of
Ri ghts as a gesture towards future equal i ty and the rul e of l aw, contai ned an
extraordi nary provi si on that l eft all exi sti ng repressi ve and di scri mi natory l egi s-
l ati on i ntact. I t in fact set the seal of approval upon the syst emof mi nori ty
government whi ch precl udes any change for the better for the overwhel mi ng
maj ori ty of Af ri cans. Equal l y i t offered no change f romthe dual systemof
government . Fi nal l y any change whi ch mi ght come woul d have to come not
f romthe operati on of the l aw, but f romthe goodwi l l of whi te peopl e seeki ng to
make progressi ve change.
Afri cans di d not bel i eve that the Europeans woul d make such changes.
Thei r fathers had taken Afri can l and and cattl e wi thout compensat i on. Thei r
ki th and ki n and made settl i ng' excursi ons' to Rhodesi a to growweal thy, whi l e
they deni ed the ri ght of economi c competi ti on to the i ndi genous peopl e and had
then reti red to the comf ort of thei r al ternati ve homes. Any doubt that they
coul d not be rel i ed upon to initiate progressi ve change was di spel l ed when in
1965 they destroyed the very consti tuti on whi ch offered even tentati ve change,
and under whi ch they had sol emnl y sought power by el ecti on.
Hard government
Apart f romspeci fi c i nadequaci es of the 1961consti tuti on, we shoul d note some
detai l s of the machi nery of arbi trary government , whi ch was created duri ng the
' l i beral ' era of pri me mi ni sters Todd and Whi t ehead, both as a reassurance to
whi tes, and mor e speci fi cal l y as the i mmedi at e response to the growi ng Afri can
nati onal i st organi zati on. The latter coul d not be accomodat ed wi thi n the whi te
system, therefore i t woul d be repressed. I n 1948, to the great surpri se of whi tes,
a wi despread and peaceful stri ke of Af ri can workers took pl ace : the response
was the Subversi ve Acti vi ti es Act of 1950, i ntroduci ng the power to ban meet -
i ngs, establ i sh a secret pol i ce and ban any di ssemi nati on of i deas, undermi ni ng
Rhodesia 71
consti tuti onal democrati c government . I n 1955 the Publ i c Order Act was i ntro-
duced by Todd and in 1956 i ts powers to detai n and restri ct wi thout trial wer e
used by hi mto ban meeti ngs and detai n, wi thout tri al , over 200 member s of the
ANC Yout h League, who had organi zed a bus boycott.
It i s i roni c and perhaps a cause for opt i mi sm, and a cel ebrati on of man s
ability to l earn and change, to note that in 1971 under l aws di rectl y deri vi ng
f romthe same powers, Mr Todd and hi s daughter, now convi nced opponent s of
mi nori ty government , wer e themsel ves arbi trari l y detai ned. For a personal
account of this experi ence see J udi th Todd s The Ri ght to say No.
The banni ng power was resorted to in 1958 agai nst nati onal i st attempts to
spread their i deas f romurban to rural areas. ( The sensi ti vi ty of the mi nori ty
government to rural pol i ti cal acti vi ty is a recurrent and i ncreasi ngl y domi nant
t heme in the hi story of Af ri can opposi ti on. ) I n 1959 t here was an emergency
throughout the Federati on and a concerted effort to destroy the growi ng
nati onal i st cri ti ci sm. Wi despread detenti on created a vi rtual nati onal i st pol i ti cal
symposi umin Khami pri son outsi de Bul awayo and enduri ng l i nks between
Af ri can nati onal i sts, many of whominRhodesi a spent the succeedi ng decade in
detenti on, whi l e thei r Zambi an and Mal awi an col l eagues have been struggl i ng
wi th the newprobl ems of creati ng nati ons out of the col oni al past.
Repressi ve l egi sl ati on came to a peak in 1959-60. Whi t ehead sought to
destroy the ANC, whi ch he descri bed as the canker in our body pol i ti c, and
took wi de powers of arbi trary government . The Unl awf ul Organi zati ons Act,
the Preventi ve Detenti on Act were passed in 1959, together wi th amendment s to
the Nati ve Affai rs Act. I n 1960 came the Emergency Powers Act and that basi c
i nstrument of the Rhodesi an Gover nment , the Law and Order (Mai ntenance)
Act. I ts effect has been to produce at t i mes a vi rtual l y comat ose condi ti on in
Rhodesi an Afri can pol i ti cs, wi th detenti on, restri cti ons, l ong- t ermempri son-
ment and executi on bei ng the whi te answer to the call for the transfer of power.
The Lawand Order (Mai ntenance) Act i s a cl assi c exampl e of port mant eau
persecuti on. I t i nterferes wi th al most every ci vi l ri ght in the book. I n addi ti on i t
destroys the procedural guarantees of the rul e of l awwhi ch support t hem(such
as the presumpti on of the i nnocence of the accused).
Perhaps the onl y thi ng that can be sai d in i ts f avour is that i t was at the
timeof i ts i ntroducti on so shocki ng that i t led the Chi ef J usti ce of the Federa-
ti on, Sir Robert Tredgol d, a whi te Rhodesi an of pi oneer stock to condemn i t
openl y. I n his book Rhodesia that was MI. Life he descri bes i t as an anthol ogy
of horrors , whi ch made emergency government the ordi nary l awof the l and ,
turni ng Rhodesi a i nto a pol i ce state. Thi s he defi ned as a state in whi ch the
pol i ce and the executi ve are gi ven or assume compl ete control over all pol i ti cal
acti vi ty. The condemnat i on was shared by the predomi nantl y whi te l egal pro-
fessi on. Mor e si gni fi cant, however, i s the fact that Tredgol d al one acted l ogi c-
al l y, gi ven his opi ni on that the act effecti vel y made pol i ti cal puppets of all offi cers
of the court, and resi gned his posi ti on inprotest.
The act has al so been descri bed aptl y as 34 pages descri pti ve of what
Afri cans cannot do, and what will happen to t hemif they do . I t empower s the
executi ve to ban meeti ngs and attendance at meeti ngs, to ban publ i cati ons, to
order up to fi ve years of restri cti on of l i berty wi thout tri al . I t al l ows and
prescri bes arrest and search wi thout warrant, mi ni mumsentences for vague and
Salisbury-capital of Rhodesia.
Rhodesia 79
wi del y defi ned offences such as i nti mi dati on (three years), possessi on of any
of f ensi ve weapon or materi al (twenty years), or of any ar ms of war wi th i ntent
to endanger the mai ntenance of l awin Rhodesi a (compul sory death sentence
unti l 1969, now thi rty years). Capi tal puni shment (or thi rty years) and a fi ve-year
mi ni mumsentence is prescri bed for any act of terrori smor sabotage . . . done
withi ntent toendanger the mai ntenance of Law and Order inRhodesi a . . . or in
a nei ghbouri ng terri tory (the latter to catch guerri l l as operati ng agai nst Sout h
Afri ca or Portugal ).
We shoul d note that the possessi on of arms of war or offensi ve weapons
(whi ch coul d i ncl ude a stone) is an offence if a certai n i ntenti on exi sts: but the
l aws presume such does exist unl ess the accused proves the contrary- beyond a
reasonabl e doubt . Thus the heavy burden of proof normal l y on the prosecuti on
i s pl aced upon the accused. Thi s means in effect that any Afri can caught in
ci rcumstances whi ch the securi ty forces consi der suspi ci ous is very l i kel y to be
f ound gui l ty if prosecuted. It i ntroduced terrori st government i nto Rhodesi a
well inadvance of guerri l l a war whi ch i s condemned by the rgi me for empl oyi ng
terrori sm.
The act is used al most excl usi vel y agai nst Afri cans despi te i ts non- di scri mi -
natory l anguage. Al so, in rel ati on to terrori smand sabotage the defi ni ti on of
the latter is so wi de that agai n, combi ned wi th the pl aci ng of a presumpti on of
i ntenti on upon the accused, the deci si on of guilt or i nnocence has been taken
f romthe j udge al most enti rel y, and gi ven to those who deci de toprosecute.
I t is cl ear that Afri cans are precl uded f romi nfl uenci ng government by
parti ci pati on inthe l egi sl ature. Under vari ous l aws they are equal l y di scouraged
f romadopti ng even modest non- vi ol ent or i ndustri al acti on to i nfl uence govern-
ment . Protest by the Afri can masses. of whatever vari ety, is dangerous to
mi nori ty rul e and i s deal t with under what is essenti al l y emergency l aw, so
boycotts and stri kes woul d cl earl y consi tutue sabotage under the act, and
coul d be met withthe death sentence or thi rty years.
Thus a pattern of repressi ve l aws emerges.
First, normal pol i ti cal opposi ti on inthe l egi sl ature is al together precl uded.
Secondl y, the extra-parl i amentary process of pol i ti cal di scussi on and
debate are ei ther total l y banned (as inthe rural areas i t has been al most wi thout
i nterrupti on si nce 1959), or made precari ous, as in the urban areas where
regul ati ng offi cers have unfettered di screti on to di sal l owpol i ti cal gatheri ngs,
between l ong peri ods of total ban. Emergency government in whi ch pol i ti cal
f reedomi s the excepti on rather than the rul e is the nor mfor Rhodesi a- and i t
has the approval of the whi te mi nori ty.
Thi rdl y, pol i ti cal organi zati ons are not merel y harassed by prosecuti on of
thei r offi cers for pol i ti cal statements, and restri cti on or detenti on wi thout rea-
son, but are total l y banned. The Afri can Nati onal Congress (ANC), the NDP,
ZAPU and ZANU wer e all banned total l y and thei r assets sei zed. The present
Af ri can Nati onal Counci l -i n many ways to be regarded as somethi ng of a
pol i ti cal mutati on in Rhodesi a politics-is under constant threat of a si mi l ar
fate. I ts hi story of l oss of offi cers i nto detenti on, restri cti on and pri son (despi te
i ts overt, non- vi ol ent stand much cri ti ci zed by mor e radi cal opponent s wi thi n
and especi al l y beyond Rhodesi a s borders) is i denti cal to the experi ence of
previ ous movement s.
Fourthl y, havi ng cl osed ever y other avenue of pol i ti cal pressure for change,
the authori ti es have provi ded a panopl y of l aws desi gned onl y to suppress the
vi ol ent opposi ti on that they have thus created. Communal puni shment and
enforced concentrati on of rural peopl e in ' def ended vi l l ages' are devi ces onl y
needed by armi es of occupati on and infact used by the pi oneers. Mi l i tari l y, this
i s exactl y the posi ti on inparts of Rhodesi a, and pol i ti cal l y i t has al ways been the
general condi ti on.
Nor is t here today the same si mul ati on of normal i ty. The Afri can has l ong
known the taste of forceful government . The whi tes wer e gi ven a strong, but to
t hem, pal atabl e taste of i t, wi th the vi gourous censorshi p of thei r press for
mont hs after UDI . For t hemi t merel y created the exci ti ng real i ty of the
emergency, for they wer e not much concerned that cri ti ci smof UD1 was
suppressed. Rhodesi a has in fact had government by emergency powers si nce
shortl y before UD1 in November 1965. I t is si gni fi cant that i t has hardl y
touched whi tes, and perhaps equal l y si gni fi cant that for Afri cans the di fference
has been one of degree onl y-and that l i mi ted toextreme si tuati ons.
The real change, whi ch has occurred si nce 1971 parti cul arl y, is that in some
parts of Rhodesi a the state of vi ol ence has turned to a state of war- whi ch has
become two- si ded. So f reedomto move at will has now begun to be l i mi ted by
vi ol ence for whi te men, women and chi l dren, as i t has al ways been for Afri can
men, women and chi l dren.
The devel opment of securi ty l aws to provi de a negati ve answer to the
Af ri can demand for change is traced indetai l inPal l ey' s arti cl eon ' Lawand the
Unequal Soci ety' in Vol ume 12 of Race, in 1970- 71 in Chapter 3 of Bowman' s
Politics in Rhodesi a, Ml ambo' s Struggle .for a Birthright, Chapters XII1and I X.
Sout h Afri can l egi sl ati ve paral l el s are i ndi cated in Sprack' s South Africa's Sixth
Province.
Government and African leadership
We have read above of an emergi ng Afri can l eadershi p duri ng the federal years,
and si nce the break- up of the Federati on. The nati onal i sts who made and ran
the ANC have, despi te the harassment of the past twenty years, survi ved many
of thei r oppressors, especi al l y whi tes, many of whompl ayed thei r oppressi ve
rol es and moved on tonew pl aces, or went back tothei r own countri es.
Peopl e and names are i mportant in a pol i ti cal process such as that whi ch
has been goi ng on in Rhodesi a. Cont emporary official hi stori es in the country
excl ude the names of all nati onal i st l eaders, partl y as a matter of pol i cy, partl y
because under the l aws provi di ng for thei r detenti on wi thout tri al , i t is unl awf ul
to publ i sh thei r names. Never t hel ess the names of J oshua Nkomo, Ndabani ngi
Si thol e, and thei r past and present fel l owdetai nees ( some detai ned for a decade
or more) such as Dan Madzi mbamut o, Wi l l i e Musar ur wa, Mor t on Mal i anga,
Mi chael Mawema, J osi ah Chi namano, Cl emMuchadi , Robert Mugabe, Enos
and Lazarus Nkal a, Edson Si thol e are now (despi te thei r di fferi ng status,
l oyal ti es and approaches to the probl em) establ i shed, undyi ng member s in the
growi ng gl owof the nati onal i st movement . Thei r successors or compatri ots,
pursui ng the cause of maj ori ty rul e, whether by peaceful means i nsi de the
Rhodesia 81
country, such as Abel Muzor ewa, Canaan Banana, El l i ot Gabel l ah, Henr y
Kachi dza; mi l i tari l y in exile such as the late Herbert Chi tepo, J ason Moyo,
J ames Chi kerema, J oseph Msi ka, Nat han Shamuyari ra, George Si l undi ka or
many others pursui ng the same goal by rati onal argument and publ i cati on
before the f orumof the Uni ted Nati ons or the wi der audi ence of worl d opi ni on,
have l i kewi se carved that cause and a pl ace i nto the future of Zi mbabwe. The
maj ori ty of the l eaders named are teachers, pri ests or l awyers. All, and many
other nati onal i st personal i ti es, hol d uni versi ty degrees-often the resul t of
enforced study in the i sol ati on of detenti on, or in exi l e. Yet most of t hem,
qual i fi ed t hough they are for a professi onal comf ortabl e l i fe, are i nvol ved in
pol i ti cal struggl e for change, whi ch is now a war of l i berati on.
Mi l i tary mi ght has never been far bel owthe surface of the rel ati onshi p
between the races in Rhodesi a. Neverthel ess, while the Rhodesi an si tuati on
descri bed above suggests that i t woul d be difficult to achi eve peaceful change, a
further exami nati on of the reasons for force as a maj or feature i s desi rabl e.
Clarification of the conflict
The 1961 consti tuti on was desi gned to provi de a neutral and i f necessary i rresi s-
tiblemachi ne to achi eve maj ori ty rul e.
1 . Ti mi ng. It was too l ate. Bl acks knew whi te government was mutabl e. Whi tes
were l osi ng fai thinthei r ability to control deci si ons in Bri tai n concerni ng the
l ocal bl ack popul ace by sweet words and strong acti on, and sought refuge in
soverei gnty and absol ute i ndependence.
2. Content. I t asserted the val ue and l egi ti macy of equal ri ghts and non-
di scri mi nati on for all, but l eft the actual granti ng of the ri ghts to the
maj ori ty to the di screti on of the pri vi l eged mi nori ty. I t al l owed i nsuffi ci ent
parl i amentary responsi bi l i ty to the maj ori ty to evoke a response. I t gave
i nsuffi ci ent power to the l awcourts or the Consti tuti onal Counci l , whi ch
coul d have pl ayed educati onal and persuasi ve rol es in refereei ng peri pheral
but cruci al di sputes in a transfer process. I n fact for a whi l e the courts
became the si ngl e l egi ti mate and al most- equal arena for open battl e between
t he mi nori ty government and bl ack nati onal i sts, and sharpened the i ssues
(see Reg. Austi n, Pol i ti cs in the Court s , Venture, October 1965). What ever
i ts i nherent qual i ti es, the fact that i t was dependent on whi te management
made i t unworkabl e. The exerci se coul d be compar ed wi th appoi nti ng the
manager and maj or sharehol der of a perfectl y heal thy firmto the task of
l i qui dati ng i t.
3. Met hod of producti on. Afri can acceptance of the 1961 consti tuti on was the
key to the smal l chance i t may have had of success. The fact that the NDP
was onl y cal l ed in at the final stages to sancti on i t , and not to negoti ate i t,
reduced this chance to vi rtual l y nil. The t er ms of the consti tuti on are set out
in abbrevi ated f ormin Appendi x 6. They have been defi ni ti vel y anal ysed in
Pal l ey, and deal t wi th mor e bri efl y but adequatel y in several works wri tten
si nce 1961, i ncl udi ng Bowman, Ml ambo, Si thol e and Shamuyari ra.
I ts mai n defects wer e as fol l ows :
8 Civil war
Landmarks
AFRICAN REJECTION OF THE 1961 CONSTITUTION AND MINORITY RULE
Shortl y after the Af ri can rej ecti on of the 1961 consti tuti on came the deci si on
toinitiatechimurenga (the war of l i berati on) (1963), al though armed confl i ct on
any scal e f ol l owed onl y after a phoney war peri od of al most seven years.
The 1961 rej ecti on i s not, in thi s writers vi ew, gi ven suffi ci ent recogni ti on
as the fi rst posi ti ve, mass asserti on of Afri can opi ni on in Southern Rhodesi a
si nce the 1890s. I t is open to specul ati on that, had the Uni ted Federal Party
under Whi t ehead been el ected, l i beral i zati on mi ght have prevented ar med con-
frontati on. Thi s is possi bl e, but the combi nati on of Whi t ehead s record of
authori tari an l egi sl ati on and the mi nori ty i nsti nct for pri vi l ege preservati on
make i t debatabl e. The flexibility of i ndi vi dual Af ri can l eaders, and thei r
remarkabl e humani t y, pati ence and wi l l i ngness to seek sol uti ons, are not
deni ed. However , the si gni fi cance of the rej ecti on, i t is suggested, l i es in the fact
that i t represents a deep and wi del y, if not expl i ci tl y, fel t state of f undament al
nati onal awakeni ng. The ri ft in the nati onal i st movement (between ZAPU and
ZANU), whi ch f ol l owed in 196S64 has been vari ousl y attri buted to personal -
i ti es, tri bal i smand di fferences over tacti cs. I ts bi tterness and vi ol ence, whi ch
shocked nati onal i st supporters and opponent s al i ke, is possi bl y the consequence
of a cl ari fyi ng of this 1961 awakeni ng and determi nati on to bri ng oppressi on to
an end once and for all.
THE MINORITY ELECT THE RHODESIAN FRONT TO PERPETUATE MINORITY
GOVERNMENT
The second el ement in bri ngi ng about conf rontati on was the el ecti on of the
Rhodesi an Front. I ts party pri nci pl es ( Appendi x 1 ) wer e di ametri cal l y opposed
to those of the 1961 consti tuti on, and the 1962 resul t was to all i ntents and
purposes the cl eari ng of the decks for the acti on whi ch commenced on
I I November 1965. Her e agai n. this anal ysi s may be cri ti ci zed for bei ng too
si mpl i sti c. After all. there wer e sti l l the post- 1 962 whi te- bl ack nati onal i st cl ashes
in the courts. the removal of Wi nst on Fi el d (the fi rst Rhodesi an Front pri me
mi ni ster). the i ntermi nabl e negoti ati ons wi th the Bri ti sh Gover nment to fi nd a
consti tuti onal path to i ndependence. Agai n, however, i t is submi tted that this
acti vi ty (where i t was not a consci ous tacti cal exerci se to el i mi nate the uncom-
mi tted. or to fool the Bri ti sh Government), was mor e a matter of the whi tes
comi ng to t er ms wi th the contradi cti ons of thei r own deepl y emoti onal deci si on.
Rebel l i on i nvol ved several changes in thei r i mage of themsel ves (whi ch
federati on had inany case confused), though not of the essenti al s of their val ue
structure.
First, they had to return to the overt i mage of themsel ves as raci al l y
superi or. t hough many of t hemhad never come to t er ms wi th partnershi p and
this was a mi nor probl em. Second, and perhaps most di ffi cul t. was thei r need to
accept that the whi te patri ci ans-the weal thy and the professi onal l eaders of
the Uni ted Federal Party who had gui ded t hemsi nce at l east 1923-were
di spensabl e and must be di spl aced. The establ i shment s mi stake had been to pay
mor e than l i p-servi ce to the subtl e raci al sl ogan advancement on meri t, when
thei r voters had an ol d-establ i shed gut feel i ng that whi te i s ri ght . The
Rhodesi an Front cabi net was (see above) descri bed deri si vel y by some of i ts
cri ti cs as a group of cowboys . Yet that i s exactl y where i ts attracti on for the
whi te el ectorate l i es. They speak (preferabl y in a fewni neteenth- century phrases
pronounced in that vowel - pi nched accent), the same l anguage, pol i ti cal and
col l oqui al , as thei r supporters.
EMOTIONAL CONDITIONING FOR REBELLION
I n thei r senti mental i ty for Bri ti sh Royal ty, especi al l y i ts most Vi ctori an i mage,
Rhodesi ans are wi thout equal . Thi s hel ps to expl ai n the rebel s i nsi stence, for
f i ve years that they remai ned l oyal . An i nteresti ng aspect of thei r treason was
the way in whi ch the t er m UDI (to descri be the i mpendi ng rebel l i on) was
broadcast, pri nted, di scussed and re-di scussed unti l i t became literally a house-
hol d wor d, and no l onger a descri pti on for a dubi ous acti vi ty. Perhaps the
greatest tri bute to Rhodesi an Front psychol ogi cal condi ti oni ng i s to be f ound in
the vi rtual l y worl d- wi de acceptance of the descri pti on Uni l ateral (as opposed to
I l l egal ) Decl arati on of I ndependence, even by those who formal l y regard i ts
illegality as unquesti onabl e. (See, for a humer ous but accurate descri pti on of whi te
rebel soci ety, Punch, 17 November 1970. )
BRITAINS NON-ASSERTION OF L E G A L AUTHORITY
The bui l d- up to rebel l i on provi ded several cl assi cal exampl es of that sel f -
decepti on whi ch makes possi bl e for whi te Rhodesi ans what seems extraordi nary
shortsi ghtedness to others. One of these was the 1964 UD1 ref erendumamongst
whi tes, in whi ch the Rhodesi an Front sought support for i ndependence, but
promi sed not to treat a Yes deci si on as a mandat e for illegal acti on. I n fact i t
Rhodesia 85
decl ared i ndependence al most exactl y one year later wi th, si gni fi cantl y, no real
protest f romthe mi nori ty.
On 3 November 1965, J an Smi t h apparentl y tri cked the Rhodesi an gover-
nor i nto si gni ng a document decl ari ng an emergency. After hol di ng i t for t wo
days he gazetted i t , and restri cted or detai ned a number of Af ri can nati onal i st
pol i ti ci ans and one whi te (one of thei r l egal advi sers Leo Baron).
Li ti gati on was toconti nue thereafter, but si nce that date Rhodesi a has been
governed under Emergency Regul ati ons, addi ti onal to those exi sti ng in the Law
and Order (Mai ntenance) Act, and the rel evance of courts was reduced even
further.
The decl arati on of i ndependence on 1 1 November 1965 was descri bed by
I an Smi th as an opportuni ty to stri ke a bl owfor the preservati on of j usti ce,
ci vi l i zati onand Chri sti ani ty . Bri gadi er Skeen, speaki ng as the Rhodesi an Front
appoi nted hi gh commi ssi oner in London shortl y before the rebel l i on, gave a
cl earer i ndi cati on of thei r obj ecti ves and thei r determi nati on
, , .to control the rate of African political advancement to power till time and education
have made it a safe possibility. Moreover we wished to have the power to retard it. should
that advancement outstrip the capability of the African to govern wisely and fairly. We
could not say five, ten. fifty or even ;i thousand years. It could not be forced, it had to
develop in accordance with the character and nature of the African and his hitherto
unproved qualities of democratic behaviour.
For these reasons the 1961 consti tuti on l ost i ts pl ace as the basi s of government .
I ts di spl acement was sudden and cl ear, but the response of t he l egal soverei gn
(Bri tai n) was compl ex, hi ghl y sophi sti cated and physi cal l y non- exi stent. Conse-
quentl y opposi ti on to thi s effort to achi eve the permanent re- establ i shment of
the Rhodesi an way of l i fe was mi ni mal . J n parti cul ar the fact of the Bri ti sh
Labour government s advance publ i c noti ce to Smi t h that the rebel l i on woul d
not be suppressed by force seemed to cl ear yet another potenti al l y acti ve
parti ci pant and opponent (Bri tai n) f romthe combat zone.
CONFRONTATION CLARIFIED
The i mportance of this opti ng out of the never present but l egal soverei gn has
been to mai ntai n the rel evant si mpl i ci ty and cl ari ty, i nternati onal l y speaki ng. of
the conf rontati on. Apart f romthe overt mi l i tary and economi c support of Sout h
Afri ca and (unti l recentl y) Portugal ; the i ndi rect commerci al support of some
sectors of i nternati onal busi ness ; and occasi onal , but i mportant, l apses such as
the breach of sancti ons whi ch permi tted chr ome exports f romRhodesi a to the
Uni ted States under the Byrd Amendment , the confl i ct has been i sol ated to the
real contestants : the Afri can maj ori ty and the whi te mi nori ty.
Sancti ons have not defeated the illegal authori ti es, but they have proved
that to seek to establ i sh a new soverei gn State in the mi d- twenti eth century
based on the practi ces and i deas of raci al supremacy will not be accepted by the
worl d communi t y. That truth, where i t has sunk i n, has proved to be a new and
bitter one for many Rhodesi an whi tes, and i ts l essons are of wi der si gni fi cance.
Thi s is provi ded that the i nternati onal communi t y s commi t ment s to i nterna-
ti onal economi c sancti ons are seen for the mut ed and l i mi ted experi ment wi th
enf orcement machi nery.
THE 'KITH A N D KIN' SETTLEMENTS, 1966- 71
Si gni fi cant non- events, in t er ms of the basi c probl emof Rhodesi a, are the
attempts by vari ous Bri ti sh governments to reach a ' settl ement' on Rhodesi a
excl usi vel y wi th the rebel s. They may be seen as a resurgence of the Bri ti sh
habi t of trusti ng the good fai th and basi c decency of the mi nori ty-despi te
seventy years of settl er rul e, and the rebel l i on! I n thi s sense they i ncreased the
resol ve of the mi l i tary wi ngs of the l i berati on movement s to i gnore Bri ti sh
i nvol vement as an i rrel evancy. Perhaps thei r greatest i mportance l i es in the
cri ti ci smthey evoked outsi de of the Bri ti sh context in the Uni ted Nati ons,
and especi al l y inAfri ca, renewi ng i nternati onal consci ousness and awareness of
the conti nui ng probl em. Together wi th the Rhodesi an Front' s constant exten-
si on of authori tari an government , such as i ts determi nati on in 1968 to execute
captured guerri l l a fi ghters, i t hel ped -to escal ate mandat ory sancti ons to the
status of vi rtual uni versal i ty. One of these efforts, however (the last to date in
1971), can be si ngl ed out as a separate l andmark.
W A R A N D PEARCE
I f Af ri cans, as argued above, had deci ded in 1961 not to tol erate any further
Angl o- Rhodesi an efforts made wi thout consul ti ng t hem, i t took a further ten
years of resi stance, and restrai ned but determi ned demonstrati on, to prove this
was a real i ty to Bri tai n. I t i s possi bl e that this truth has even begun to dawn
upon the mi nori ty government .
The agreement and consti tuti on proposed by I an Smi t h and Sir Alec
Dougl as- Home. Bri ti sh Forei gn Secretary, in 197 1, after di scussi ons between
Smi t h and the Bri ti sh negoti ator Lord Goodman (see Appendi x 2) i nvol ved the
same basi c i deas as the 1961 consti tuti on: (a) the initial retenti on of excl usi ve
power in the hands of the whi te mi nori ty; (b) the ' revi ew' (not removal ) of the
extraordi nary stock of securi ty and di scri mi natory l aws ; (c) a vi rtual guarantee
that (i f matters ever devel oped so far and power was handed over to the
maj ori ty) whi tes woul d al ways enj oy, at l east, di sproporti onate pol i ti cal repre-
sentati on in the l egi sl ature. Furt hermore, gi ven the economi c and soci al posi -
ti on they have created for themsel ves, combi ned wi th the protecti on of the
establ i shed ri ghts whi ch the Decl arati on of Ri ghts woul d gi ve agai nst future
(but not exi sti ng or past) governments acts, whi ch mi ght sel ecti vel y (because
they are excl usi vel y whi te) reduce these pri vi l eges, whi tes coul d l ook f orward to
permanent consti tuti onal l y protected pri vi l eges.
Mor e si gni fi cantl y, i t was a product of the thesi s that a new order for the
terri tory can be created for the peopl e, and not by the peopl e or thei r represen-
tati ves.
Rhodesi an negoti ati ons wi th Bri tai n, in spi te of rebel l i on, shoul d be seen
agai nst a background of conti nui ng sancti ons and i nternati onal pressures.
Successful negoti ati on woul d achi eve thei r ' fi rst pri ze' -recogni zed i ndependence.
The exerci se of the Pearce Commi ssi on i nvol ved no l ess than a total
reversal of several basi c tenets of Rhodesi an Front pol i cy both before and after
UDI , i ncl udi ng the f undamental one that soverei gnty had been taken in 1965,
and Bri tai n had no further pl ace wi thi n Rhodesi a' s boundari es. The Pearce
Rhodesia 87
Commi ssi on was i nstructed to di scover, by an unusual process of meeti ngs and
consul tati ons, whether the Rhodesi an peopl e as a whol e (i ncl udi ng, for the
fi rst ti me, the whol e Afri can popul ati on and not onl y an educati onal l y or
economi cal l y qual i fi ed fracti on of it) accepted the settl ement proposed. Apart
f rombei ng a new exerci se for Bri tai n (though i t must be remembered that the
Afri can masses wer e asked in 1961 by thei r own nati onal i st l eaders whom
generati ons of Rhodesi ans had decl ared non-representati ve and thugs) the
Pearce Commi ssi on al so created an hi stori cal oddi ty in the pol i ti cal life of the
country. It brought Afri can pol i ti cal , as opposed to mi l i tary, acti vi ty back to
the surface. The Law and Order (Mai ntenance) Act had (as Pal l ey has shown in
her arti cl es inRace) been al most total l y successful insupressi ng normal pol i ti cal
acti vi ty, i ncl udi ng di scussi on among Af ri cans. Pol i ti cs between the races had
been reduced to sporadi c, unspectacul ar and l argel y unsuccessful Af ri can
guerri l l a i ncursi ons and counter- i nsurgency operati ons between 1966 and 1971.
Thi s had created a vacuum, conveni entl y filled by the I nternal Affai rs Depart -
ment and the chi efs, whi ch duti ful l y convi nced whi tes and anyone el se who woul d
listenthat Afri cans wer e happy, and woul d be del i ghted wi th mi nori ty rul e for
ever. Duri ng the Pearce exerci se, pol i ti cal meeti ngs wer e al l owed, peopl e coul d
tal k pol i ti cs-al bei t still cauti ousl y-and they were encouraged to do the
i mpossi bl e, toopenl y criticizethe whi te proposal s. Open pol i ti cs have conti nued
to grow.
None of the securi ty l aws, however, wer e suspended, prosecuti ons
proceeded, and detenti ons and restri cti ons reappeared as the i nstruments of
whi te- bl ack pol i ti cs. But the new nati onal i sts in the Af ri can Nati onal Counci l
( ANC) (see Appendi x 3) took the opportuni ty despi te havi ng l earnt that the ri sks
( many wer e ex-detai nees) of pol i ti cal opposi ti on were, wi th obvi ous di fferences,
aki n to those of mi l i tary opposi ti on. Not onl y di d they arti cul ate a resoundi ng
No to the proposal s, they re- opened a new front in the struggl e by liftingthe
moral e of the maj ori ty to great hei ghts, f romthe depths of a peri od of depres-
si on. They offered the prospect of conti nued and open defi ance of the degrada-
ti on of mi nori ty rul e to al most the whol e Af ri can popul ati on not onl y by war in
remote areas, but by dai l y peaceful conf rontati on in the urban areas. Li ke
other nati onal i st organi zati ons, the ANC is banned f r omthe Tri bal Trust l and.
At the same time(i ndeed the coi nci dence l ed to al l egati ons of ANC col l usi on) a
renewed mi l i tary onsl aught took pl ace by ZANLA, the mi l i tary wi ng of ZANU,
shocki ng the mi nori ty, as i t swept guerri l l a war i nto the north-east provi nce of
Rhodesi a.
Thi s escal ati on f romsporadi c to concerted guerri l l a war, based upon the
i deal of a peopl e s war, marks the most dramati c frui ti on to date of the Af ri can
deci si on in 1961 to fi ndthei r own sol uti on to col oni al i sm. I ts basi s appears f rom
the pol i ci es of ZANU, ZAPU and FROLI ZI (see Appendi xes 4, 5 and 6) and
i ts devel opment is well descri bed in Wi l ki nson s study and the other materi al
referred to inthe bi bl i ography.
The full circle
I n spi te of whi te Rhodesi an i nabi l i ty or unwi l l i ngness to appreci ate the real
dangers i nherent in a full scal e raci al conf rontati on, by the end of 1974 thei r
nei ghbours, bl ack and whi te, were determi ned, for vari ous reasons to ensure that
change shoul d be brought about by l ess vi ol ent means. The l eaders of Bot swana,
Mozambi que, Tanzani a and Zambi a were concerned to avoi d the human and
economi c di sl ocati on of a prol onged confl i ct. They were al so aware (inthe light
of recent experi ences inAngol a) that the transfer of power mi ght be del ayed by
di suni ty wi thi n the Af ri can maj ori ty, and wer e i mpressed by the apparent uni ty
of the Afri can maj ori ty expressed through the ANC, wi thi n the country. South
Afri ca expressed equal horror at the possi bi l i ty of i ntensi fi ed confl i ct, and must
have been addi ti onal l y aware that the achi evement of maj ori ty rul e by a mi l i tary
vi ctory over a settl er government by means of an Afri can ar med revol uti on,
woul d create speci al probl ems for itself. The combi nati on produced a seri es of
hi stori c events in December 1974. Smi t h, cl earl y i nfl uenced by Sout h Afri ca,
rel eased the detai ned ZANU and ZAPU l eaders, and permi tted the presi dent of
the ANC to travel wi th t hemto Lusaka. There tal ks wi th l eaders of adj acent
Af ri can States resul ted in an agreement to uni fy the four exi sti ng nati onal i st
parti es ( ANC, FROLI ZI , ZANU and ZAPU) i nto a si ngl e, new Af ri can Nati onal
Counci l . I ts basi c pol i cy was cl earl y outl i ned by i ts presi dent, Abel Muzor ewa,
at the Conf erence of Commonweal t h Pri me Mi ni sters inApri l 1975.
Commi t t ed, wi thout reservati on to the achi evement of (the) pri nci pl e (of i mmedi at e sel f-
determi nati on on the basi s of maj ori ty rul e), the A. N. C. . . . has dedi cated itself to make
every effort to attai n i ts end by peacef ul negoti ati on. I n doi ng so the A.N.C. i s equal l y
commi t t ed, aware and consci ous that fai l ure to achi eve sel f -determi nati on by negoti ati on
i nevi tabl y i nvol ves a re-i ntensi fi ed ar med struggl e as the onl y al ternati ve.
Detente Fe i nsi sted] must be understood as the sol e al ternati ve to a prol onged ar med
struggl e. I t has been brought about by the emergence of the i ncreasi ngl y effecti ve mi l i tary
struggl e for l i berati on.
Thus the essence of these devel opments in the Afri can maj ori ty s attempt to
achi eve power i s a real i zati on that uni ty i s vital to the task, and t hough peaceful
negoti ati on is desi red i t i s real i zed that conti nued readi ness for ar med conf ronta-
ti on i s essenti al .
Whi t e skill, experi ence and ruthl essness in managi ng the maj ori ty cannot,
however, be overcome by decl arati ons. The di vi si on and di sorgani zati on of the
Af ri can maj ori ty and thei r l eaders has been and conti nues to be the basi c
i nstrument of mi nori ty government . I ts capabi l i ty for attempted expl oi tati on of
di suni ty at this stage may be exampl ed by the assassi nati on of Herbert Chi tepo
and the al l egati ons that Rev. Si thol e had pl otted to assassi nate his ANC
col l eagues. Rumour , l i es and hal f-truths, combi ned wi th the other ruthl ess
met hods of a pol i ce state are likely to remai n a pri me weapon for the
mai ntenance of whi te rul e and pri vi l ege.
The si tuati on has now been reached where, for the f i rst time si nce
Lobengul a s rei gn, a whi te authori ty recogni zes ( no matter how rel uctantl y,
hesi tantl y and inbad fai thone may suspect i t is) that negoti ati ons for the future
must be wi th Afri cans, and agreements must be made wi th Afri cans. Equal l y, and
cl earl y connected, i s the fact that (agai n for the fi rst timesi nce 1896-97) the same
whi tes have been forced to real i ze the mi l i tary threat of the maj ori ty.
9 The liberation
struggle
Pol i ti cal vi ol ence is mi stakenl y thought by many to be a recent phenomenon in
Rhodesi a. As we have seen i t has al ways been the basi s of whi te domi nati on.
The mi nori ty al ways resi stedseeki ng the l egi ti mi zati on of thei r rul e by ei ther the
el ectoral consent of the maj ori ty or the i ntegrati on of the maj ori ty i nto thei r
system. The peri od of paci fi cati on , after the Ndebel e and Shona resi stance of
the 1890s had been crushed, depended essenti al l y on the fact that for vari ous
reasons the maj ori ty sought to come to t er ms wi th whi te rul e. The end of that
peri od came in 1961. and gradual l y pol i ti cal vi ol ence has gr own, and has
become mor e cl ear ini ts obj ecti ves.
Thi s phase may mor e properl y be regarded as appropri ate to a study of
Zi mbabwe than Rhodesi a .
A general poi nt whi ch may be made i s that pol i ti cal nati onal i st ar med
resi stance, in common wi th non- vi ol ent nati onal i st pol i ti cs has had to face the
parti cul arl y i ntractabl e probl emin opposi ng Rhodesi a of fi ndi ng i ts real
enemy and cl ari fyi ng i ts real ai m. It is understandabl e that in Rhodesi a the
rebel l i ous settl er systemis the oppressor, and the task is to assist or persuade
the i mperi al power, Bri tai n, to control and re-establ i sh a path to f reedom. Thus
both nati onal i st politics and pol i ti cal vi ol ence (and as Ml ambo s book shows
there was a great deal of pol i ti cal ri oti ng in the days when Af ri can nati onal i st
parti es wer e operati ng at a pol i ti cal l evel in the earl y 1960s) was and sti l l is
ai med at achi evi ng change by Bri ti sh i nterventi on. On practi cal grounds this
assumes that in spi te of her surrender of mi l i tary control to the whi tes in 1923
Bri tai n is capabl e of physi cal control in Rhodesi a. Unti l 1965 Bri tai n poi nted
out that t he l egi ti macy of Rhodesi a and i ts post-1 923 sel f - government woul d
make i nterventi on unconventi onal inthe Bri ti sh consti tuti onal sense.
I n 1965 I an Smi th and the Rhodesi an Front destroyed l egi ti macy , and
provi ded the perfect scenario for an end to mi nori ty rul e, in the ni cest possi bl e
way , that i s the resumpti on of physi cal control by Bri tai n. Unti l the rebel l i on,
l egi ti macy and normal i ty had been the settl ers greatest asset, hence the
frustrated furore of the Rhodesi an economi c- patri ci an establ i shment at Smi th s
bl under.
Why di d Bri tai n not i ntervene? Among other expl anati ons, the most
chari tabl e i s that Bri tai n was thus provi di ng a peri od of timeto enabl e whi t es to
grasp the realities of a changed worl d. Once Rhodesi an whi tes real i zed thei r
i sol ati on, ref orms woul d fol l owand bl ack aspi rati ons sati sfi edwi th a mi ni mum
of di sl ocati on. Peaceful change through the newl y created Uni ted Nati ons
machi nery woul d cl ai mi ts fi rst vi ctory and Bri tai n the credi t for empl oyi ng i t to
sol ve her most difficult Af ri can col oni al probl em. The rebi rth of open nati onal -
i st pol i ti cs in Rhodesi a in the conti nued post- Pearce acti vi ty of the Afri can
Nati onal Counci l shoul d be seen wi thi n this f ramework. Raci al conf rontati on
woul d gi ve way to negoti ati ons. compr omi se and a l i beral consensus soci ety.
Thi s pattern. if i t were successful , woul d in many ways repeat the Bri ti sh
decol oni zati on of i ts t wo whi te mi nori ty terri tori es, Kenya and Zambi a. The
assumpti on is that in the final anal ysi s Rhodesi an settl er col oni al i smis no
di fferent, and that whi tes can be made to bel i eve that wi thout power thei r l i ves,
thei r pri vi l eges will sti l l be essenti al l y Rhodesi an . Littlehas happened to suggest
that this i s possi bl e or that Leys 1959 anal ysi s of the si tuati on (a sol uti on of
the country s maj or probl ems is f undamental l y i mpossi bl e wi thi n t he system. To
sol ve t hemi s to change it), is no l onger correct. The chances of this type of
negoti ated settl ement were reduced by the type of whi te government I an Smi t h
represents. I t i s not the l i beral patri ci an government of earl i er t i mes, but a whi te
popul i st government gai ni ng much of i ts support f romthe whi te arti sans and
l ower mi ddl e cl ass. It i s they who fear most an arrangement whi ch they feel
woul d sel l out their i nterest inan artificially hi gh status and standard of l i vi ng.
The si tuati on coul d however be anal ysed di fferentl y : that the confl i ct of the
1970s was a conti nuati on of a war agai nst conquest and that therefore Bri ti sh
responses wer e i rrel evant si nce the l egi ti macy of both settl er rul e and Bri ti sh
col oni al rul e were rej ected. Thi s anal ysi s led ZANU to rej ect the concept of
Bri ti sh responsi bi l i ty or the restri cted ai mof endi ng raci al di scri mi nati on. The
goal then becomes nati onal l i berati on. I nherent in this approach is the i dea
that Zi mbabwe can onl y be achi eved by a peopl e s war, resul ti ng in a total
col l apse of the exi sti ng system, and of the pol i ti cal doctri ne whi ch is seen as a
part of i t.
The pol i cy of the other maj or nati onal i st group ZAPU was si mi l ar in i ts
anal ysi s regardi ng revol uti on as not onl y i nevi tabl e but necessary to the
achi evement of soci al i sminthe future Zi mbabwe. Li kewi se the ai ms and obj ects
of FROLI ZI referred to the establ i shment of a peopl e s army , to overthrow
Bri ti sh col oni al capi tal i sm and the establ i shment of an i ndependent soci al i st
economy .
10 The liberation
campaigns
1966 -74
Nati onal i st pol i ti cal vi ol ence commenced as earl y as 1961 and was di rected as
much, if not mor e, agai nst bl acks i denti fi ed wi th the settl er systemas whi tes
themsel ves, often taki ng the f ormof petrol bomb attacks. Obvi ous targets wer e
Af ri can pol i ce r eser ve vol unteers and Af ri can member s of parl i ament. The
Rhodesi an Front s extensi on of the l awand order l egi sl ati onin 1962 was l argel y
j usti fi ed as i ntended to stemthis vi ol ence. After the establ i shment of ZANU,
consi derabl e vi ol ence occurred between i t and ZAPU in 1963. I n 1964 pl ans for
establ i shi ng fi ghti ng zones were laid by both parti es, and a peri od of contest
between the nati onal i sts and the Rhodesi an Speci al Branch devel oped. I n the
same year the ZANU Crocodi l e Commando attacked the pol i ce camp at
Nyanyadzi . and made a road- bl ock attack. ki l l i ng a whi te f armer. ZANU
groups, trai ned mai nl y in Ghana, attempted wi thout success to infiltrateduri ng
1965. ZAPU groups suffered much the same fate, general l y bei ng arrested
shortl y after enteri ng the country. The years 1964 and 1965 show how vital in
the suppressi on of this acti vi ty was the rol e of the new l aws. There were 6,754
convi cti ons under the Law and Order (Mai ntenance) Act duri ng thi s peri od.
The i dea that ei ther whi te moral e woul d be broken by these di sturbances, or
that Bri tai n woul d i ntervene proved to be unf ounded.
The illegal decl arati on of i ndependence was well prepared for in securi ty
t er ms, and l i ttl e organi zed response occurred. Tacti cs fol l owi ng the rebel l i on
appear to have been based upon Bri tai n s conf usi ng i ndi cati on that i t woul d
onl y i ntervene mi l i tari l y if l awand order broke down in Rhodesi a. Thi s
concentrated upon demonstrati ve acti on mor e l i kel y to be news- wort hy than to
seri ousl y i nvol ve the l ocal popul ati on agai nst the rgi me. Recrui tment and
i nfi l trati onconti nued, however, and some attacks achi eved consi derabl e publ i ci -
ty. Amongst these was the ki l l i ng of another whi te f armer and his wife in the
Hartl ey district in May 1966. I n August 1967 ZAPU and the Sout h Af ri can
Nati onal Congress ( SAANC) announced a mi l i tary al l i ance, and l ater that year
a seri es of heavy engagements occurred between ANC- ZAPU groups and Rho-
desi an forces. One consequence of these was Sout h Af ri can parami l i tary rei n-
f orcement for Smi th. whi ch has been a si gni fi cant contri buti on not onl y in
mi l i tary t er ms but al so inthe boost i t provi ded towhi te moral e.
Throughout 1968 sporadi c fi ghti ng and i nfi l trati on conti nued at a l evel
whi ch cl earl y worri ed the mi nori ty government , but i t was contai ned. Ambi -
ti ous cl ai ms on behal f of the l i berati on forces were frequentl y proved to be no
mor e than cl ai ms. But securi ty acti on tended to produce a remarkabl e confi -
dence among the whi tes, and no noti ceabl e opti mi smamong Afri cans. Thi s was
despi te the obvi ous and novel devel opment-that ci vi l war was open, and that
whi tes and bl acks inthe securi ty forces were bei ng ki l l ed, i ncl udi ng a noti ceabl e
number of South Afri cans.
The year of the new Smi t h consti tuti on (1969) sawno i nsurgent confl i ct.
Duri ng 1970, a severe cri si s of l eadershi p i nterrupted ZAPU s acti vi ti es, whi ch
had opened inJ anuary wi th a successful attack on a South Afri can Pol i ce camp.
Neverthel ess i nfi l trati onconti nued ; as was later shown. especi al l y in the north-
eastern border areas, the i nvol vement and i ntegrati on of the rural peopl e had
become a conti nuous process.
Smi th s new republ i c and the reasserti on of basi c racialist government no
doubt hel ped to keep Afri can di ssati sfacti on al i ve. but the events of 1971 sawa
sti mul ati on of Afri can pol i ti cal moral e f roman unusual source. A mi stake by
I an Smi th, combi ned wi th a Bri ti sh i ni ti ati ve, produced a revi val of acti vi ty and
a readi ness to stand up and be counted amongst Afri cans whi ch mi ght other-
wisehave been del ayed for some years.
The Pearce Commi ssi on s Test of Acceptabi l i ty was at f i rst much cri ti -
ci sed by Af ri can nati onal i sts. I n part this was an obj ecti on on pri nci pl e to the
i dea of an al i enconsti tuti on, created wi thout Afri can parti ci pati on and consi d-
ered as a possi bl e basi s for settl ement by Bri tai n. I n part i t was a refl ecti on of
wel l - f ounded di strust of the Bri ti sh and the Rhodesi ans. compounded by the
fact that the chai rman of the commi ssi on, Lord Pearce, had been a member of
the Pri vy Counci l whi ch had heard the case of Dani el Madzi mbamut o agai nst
the Rhodesi an Gover nment , brought essenti al l y to test the consti tuti onal i ty of
the rebel rgi me. The court had f ound the rebel s to be i l l egal . Lord Pearce had
taken an opposi te vi ew and di ssented f romthe maj ori ty. (His status as
somethi ng of a hero among Rhodesi ans was rapi dl y termi nated by his later
j udgement that the settl ement was unacceptabl e to Afri cans. ) The commi ssi on s
task was hi stori c si nce onl y Afri can l eaders had previ ousl y consul ted Afri can
opi ni on. I ts fi ndi ng i s l ess so, t hough a soverei gn mi nori ty- rul ed Rhodesi a,
recogni zed by the maj or Western States (whi ch an acceptabl e settl ement may
have achi eved), woul d be a mi l i tari l y and economi cal l y stronger opponent than
the present rgi me.
The exerci se di d, however, recharge Afri can pol i ti cal enthusi asm, and
moral e was boosted by this but unexpected political vi ctory. The year 1972 thus
mar ked a turni ng poi nt in moral e and was subsequentl y seen as the start of a
newgueri l l a offensi ve. ZAPU i ntroduced the wi despread use of l andmi nes in
1973 rather than i ndul ge inconfrontati onal battl es, causi ng a nui nber of casual -
ti es to mi l i tary and ci vi l i an personnel and i nhi bi ti ng movement consi derabl y.
Meanwhi l e, operati ng inco- operati on wi th FRELI MO in Mozambi que, ZANU
succeeded inestabl i shi ng bases of operati on deep i nsi de the north- east provi nce.
I n December 1972 a seri es of hi t- and- run rai ds were ai med parti cul arl y at
unpopul ar l ocal whi te f armers. These attacks have caused wi despread al armand
have led to counteracti on by the authori ti es mor e sever e than any si nce 1897.
Rhodesia 93
Attacks have al so been di rected agai nst government agents. district commi ssi on-
ers. l and i nspectors (one of whomwas taken pri soner of war and rel eased in
Dar es Sal aammuch later), headmen and thei r messengers. The Front for the
Li berati on of Zi mbabwe (FROLI ZI ) l i kewi se organi zed rai ds i nto Rhodesi a,
causi ng casual ti es and penetrati ng ri ght i nto Sal i sbury. Ur ban acti on has not ,
however, been undertaken.
The rgi me has responded to these attacks by attempti ng to i sol ate the
l ocal popul ati on f romthe guerri l l as. Emphasi s has, however, been on negati ve
measures, such as the i mposi ti on of communal puni shment of l ocal communi -
ti es suspected of not reporti ng guerri l l as. Thi s has taken the f ormof fi nes and
cattl e sei zures. I n addi ti on some areas have been total l y i sol ated in a massi ve
attempt to create greater terror of offi ci al repri sal s among a popul ati on whi tes
bel i eve are moti vated pri mari l y by fear of heavi l y ar med gueri l l as. Thus chur-
ches, school s and busi nesses inthe Chi weshe Tri bal Trust were forced to cl ose.
Peopl e wer e i nterrogated and resettl ed in other areas. Protected vi l l ages,
photographs of whi ch show bui l di ngs resembl i ng the concentrati on camps the
l i berati on movement s cl ai mthey are, have been hasti l y bui l t and peopl e settl ed
int hem. The Law and Order (Mai ntenance) Act has provi ded i ts contri buti on
in the f ormof an amendment maki ng the harbouri ng, assi sti ng or fai l i ng to
report the presence of guerri l l as an offence, puni shabl e by death.
Attempts to ref ormthe systemor to abol i sh i nequal i ty are nowher e in
evi dence. I n the meanwhi l e the ci vi l war has reached si gni fi cant proporti ons in
terms of ki l l i ng, the number s si nce December 1973 bei ng in the regi on of 300.
The maj ori ty are guerri l l as, the other mai n casual ti es bei ng Af ri can ci vi l i ans,
whi te and bl ack securi ty forces and whi te ci vi l i ans. inthat order.
On the one hand t he rgi me has not yet made real concessi ons as a resul t of
these acti ons. On the other an air of i nsecuri ty and unaccust omed nervousness
has apparentl y crept i nto the rgi me s behavi our.
Though Smi th s constant restri cti on and detenti on of Bi shop Muzor ewa s
offi ci al s inthe ANC suggests he l acks any real i ntenti on to change. neverthel ess
his tal ki ng, even if onl y to buy ti me, i s a contradi cti on of the basi c tenets of
Rhodesi an Front thi nki ng and woul d seemto i ndi cate that the fi ghti ng has at
least posed some di l emmas for the whi te popul ati on.
Mor e si gni fi cant are Smi th s mi scal cul ati ons, for exampl e the cl osi ng of the
border wi th Zambi a inJ anuary 1973 to force that country to prevent guerri l l as
operati ng f romi ts terri tory. Zambi a, despi te further cost and i nconveni ence
(and next tothe Afri cans of Rhodesi a the illegal rebel l i on has cost Zambi a mor e
than any other State), refused ei ther topromi se tocurb the i nsurgent operati ons
or, when Smi t h cl i mbed down, to re- open the border.
The mi l i tary confl i ct in Rhodesi a has been qui te extensi vel y wri tten on. A
very full account of the scal e of earl y stages, up to late 1973, i s to be f ound in
Kees Maxey s The Figlit for Zinibab\i.e. Ml ambo in Struggle for a Birthright
provi des a parti cul arl y useful account and expl anati on of the ski rmi shes before
1966. i ncl udi ng the i nternal probl ems of the nati onal i st movement s, as does
Shamuyari ra inhis Crisis in Rhodesia. Wi l ki nson s Insurgency in Rhodesia 1957-73
i s a very thorough and conci se account and assessment. Ndabani ngi Si thol e s
1. A self-publication available from 48 St Thomas Road. Brentwood, Essex (United Kingdom).
1968 edi ti on of African Nationalism sets out a compl ete pol i ti cal expl anati on of
the movement , i ncl udi ng the use of force. I ssues of the ZAPU and ZANU
i nf ormati on offi ces, Zimbabwe Review and Zimbabwe News, and the parti es
programmes, set out thei r obj ecti ves and acti vi ti es f romtime to time. The
settl ers atti tudes and expl anati ons are well document ed especi al l y in vari ous
publ i cati ons of the Rhodesi an Mi ni stry of I nf ormati on. Li ke most such works
they tend to emphasi ze the horrors of the war4xcl usi vel y those caused by
guerri l l as-and assume the reasons for the confl i ct are communi sm and i nti mi -
dati on of the maj ori ty by a fewhool i gans; they di smi ss or do not consi der the
possi bi l i ty of di scontent wi th the system. Other studi es of this sort i ncl ude Shay
and Vermaak s The Silent War; A. J. A. Pecks Rhodesia Accuses and
Mi chael Morri s s Terrorism : Southern Africa.
1 1 Sanctions
The mandat ory economi c sancti ons i mposed by the Securi ty Counci l , at the
i nvi tati on of the Uni ted Ki ngdom, were a part of a l ong pol i ti cal process
concerni ng the rel ati onshi p between Europe, especi al l y West ern Europe, and
Afri ca. Unti l the emergence of i ndependent States in most of Afri ca the Rhode-
si an probl emwas not seen as bei ng uni que but as part of a wi der col oni al
probl emwhi ch i ncl uded such future States as Ghana. J oshua Nkomo in 1958
was an acti ve member of the Al l - Af ri can Peopl es Movement , and was i ndeed
engaged ini nternati onal i zi ng the probl emwhen the Af ri can Nati onal Congress
was banned in 1959.
These earl y efforts aroused consi derabl e outsi de i nterest in the Af ri can case
inRhodesi a, maki ng the later process of organi zi ng i nternati onal opi ni on much
easi er.
I n the Uni ted Nati ons, Chapter XI of the Charter was i nterpreted as
empoweri ng the General Assembl y to supervi se and to criticize col oni al admi -
ni steri ng powers. Rhodesi a was a matter of Uni ted Nati ons concern l ong before
the whi te rebel l i on. Bri tai n s mai n concern had been to emphasi ze the fact of
establ i shed sel f - government in Southern Rhodesi a t o showher own l ack of
authori ty and consequentl y to expl ai n that her i nabi l i ty to i mprove the si tuati on
reduced her responsi bi l i ty for the peopl e and for the terri tory. The i ssue was one
of consi derabl e controversy in Bri ti shpol i ti cs, and i ndeed Bri ti sh (Conservati ve
government) pol i cy inthe Uni ted Nati ons ledtothe resi gnati on of Sir Hugh Foot
(later Lord Caradon) as the Bri ti sh permanent representati ve.
Awareness of the probl emat the Uni ted Nati ons was therefore consi der-
abl e by the time Smi t h made his illegal bi d for i ndependence. Bri tai n has
i nsi sted that i ndependence coul d be granted to the mi nori ty on the basi s of the
fi ve pri nci pl es agreed between the Conservati ve government and the Rhode-
si ans, namel y :
1. Uni mpeded progress tomaj ori ty rul e.
2. Guarantees agai nst retrogressi ve amendment of the consti tuti on.
3. An i mmedi at e i mprovement inthe pol i ti cal status of the Af ri can popul ati on.
4. Progress towards endi ng raci al di scri mi nati on.
5. Bri tai n s need to be sati sfi ed that any basi s proposed for i ndependence was
acceptabl e tothe peopl e of Rhodesi a as a whol e.
The sei zure of i ndependence and the conti nui ty of pol i cy guaranteed by the
Rhodesi an Front cl earl y breached all of these pri nci pl es. Yet i t must be remem-
bered that the purpose of the sancti ons pol i cy, as enunci ated and practi sed by
Bri tai n (and endorsed by most member s of the Uni ted Nati ons) was to do what
Bri tai n had fai l ed to do duri ng over seventy years of i mperi al control -to
persuade Rhodesi ans to transfer power to Afri cans by a peaceful reformi st
process. Bri tai ns abj urati on of the use of force agai nst Smi t h was not restri cted
to the posi ti ve i nterventi on of Bri ti sh armi es. It i ncl uded the negati ve protecti on
agai nst i nternati onal force by the use of t he veto whi ch Bri tai n possessed at the
Securi ty Counci l . That speci fi c power toveto the use of Uni ted Nati ons force has
in fact been used by Bri tai n on Rhodesi a s behal f on a number of occasi ons.
Sancti ons were i mposed in the hope that enough whi te peopl e woul d rally
behi nd a l i beral or moderat e l eader, who woul d then negoti ate a settl ement
provi di ng for uni mpeded progress towards maj ori ty rul e. I n t er ms of whi te
Rhodesi an realities the emergence of this moderati on was unl i kel y and has not
happened to date. I n fact el ecti ons hel d si nce UD1 have conf i rmed whi te
support for the pol i ci es of the Rhodesi an Front. Sancti ons in any case never
came near to bei ng total .
I n November 1965 Bri tai n itself i mposed a total economi c break wi th the
Rhodesi ans, but sought no mor e than a recommendat i on f r omthe Uni ted
Nati ons that Member States do l i kewi se-as many di d (Securi ty Counci l resol u-
ti ons 216 and 217, 1965). Onl y in December 1966, over a year l ater, were
mandat ory sancti ons i mposed, and then onl y on sel ected products, the most
i mportant of whi ch was oi l . I n Apri l 1966 i t appeared that oil was getti ng
through to the Umt al i refi nery vi a the Mozambi que port of Bei ra, so creati ng
a si tuati on consti tuti ng a threat to peace (Securi ty Counci l resol uti on 221,
1966). I n December 1966 after I an Smi t h had rej ected Bri tai n s proposed settl e-
ment , Bri tai n sought and obtai ned the authori ty to use force on the hi gh seas to
prevent the del i very of oil to Bei ra where such del i very was suspected to be in
breach of sancti ons. A mi nor l andmark in i nternati onal peace- keepi ng by the
Uni ted Nati ons was made, t hough the effect was mi ni mal on Rhodesi a
(Securi ty Counci l resol uti on 232, 1966). Adequat e suppl i es of oil were by then
comi ng i nto Rhodesi a vi a Loureno Mar ques in Mozambi que, and South
Af ri can ports, inrespect of whi ch no such authori ty to pol i ce sancti ons breaches
was sought or gi ven. The mandat ory sancti ons covered most Rhodesi an exports,
whi ch Uni ted Nati ons Member States wer e requi red not to i mport.
A report of the Speci al Commi t t ee on the Si tuati on wi th Regard to the
I mpl ementati on of the Decl arati on on the granti ng of I ndependence to Col oni al
Countri es and Peopl es ( A/ 9623, Part v) descri bes how sancti ons wer e evaded :
Si nce 1965, forei gn economi c i nterests have provi ded the illegal rgi me wi th the mechani sm
to evade Uni ted Nati ons sancti ons. Fi rst, through thei r i nterl ocki ng i nterests. compani es in
Eur ope and the Uni ted States can i nvest inSouthern Rhodesi a through thei r subsi di ari es in
South Afri ca. Si nce Sout h Afri ca co- operates wi th Southern Rhodesi a in many ways, i t i s
di ffi cul t to detect forei gn i nvestments channel l ed through Sout h Af ri ca. Thr ough this
compl ex process, Southern Rhodesi a has been abl e to evade Uni ted Nati ons sancti ons.
Second, the preval ence of forei gn economi c i nterests in the economy of Southern
Rhodesi a enabl es the illegal rgi me to pass to the compani es the burden of sustai ni ng the
economy and empl oyment l evel s. Thr ough a seri es of acti ons taken under the Emergency
Rhodesia 97
Powers Regul ati ons (1969). the illegal r gi me has been abl e to insist that profi ts, except for
certai n Sout h Af ri can subsi di ari es, cannot be repatri ated. Thi s has compel l ed forei gn
compani es to rei nvest thei r profi ts in Southern Rhodesi a. Furt hermore, the compani es are
not al l owed to di smi ss empl oyees wi thout the permi ssi on of the Mi ni ster of Labour , thus
enabl i ng empl oyees, especi al l y Europeans, to conti nue to be empl oyed by the forei gn
compani es even if they are not maki ng any contri buti on to the producti ve process of the
company. Thr ough a process of preventi ng thei r unempl oyment , the illegal rgi me has
therefore been abl e to shi el dthe European popul ati on f r omfeel i ngthe burden of sancti ons.
Al though such compul sory empl oyment shoul d reduce the profi ts of the compani es, the
compani es have mi ni mi zed the l oss of profi t by di smi ssi ng Af ri can empl oyees and by
refusi ng to i ncrease the sal ari es of worki ng Af ri cans.
In 1973 the illegal r gi me turned to forei gn economi c i nterests to i ncrease publ i c
revenue. I n order to avoi d al i enati ng the Europeans by i ncreasi ng i ncome and property
taxes, a non- resi dent sharehol ders tax at the rate of 15 per cent on taxabl e profi ts was
i mposed on subsi di ary compani es in Southern Rhodesi a. The rgi me expected to rai se
$(R)6.5 mi l l i on inrevenue f romthi s tax in 1975.
I n May 1968, soon after the Bri ti sh Pri vy Counci l had conf i rmed the conti nued
exi stence of Bri tai n s l egal authori ty inthe terri tory, I an Smi t h demonstrated his
soverei gnty and power. He threatened his own j udges, through his Attorney-
General , and warned t hemthat thei r acceptance of the Pri vy Counci l j udgement
woul d be i gnored. Accordi ngl y, despi te the fact that royal pardons had been
granted to certai n Afri cans sentenced to death, and despi te the l egal pretence
that Rhodesi a (and her j udges) were sti l l l oyal to the Cr own, the appeal based
on the pardons was refused. Fol l owi ng this I an Smi t h asserted his authori ty and
executed fi ve Af ri cans, sentenced after the rebel l i on. The gesture angered Uni ted
Nati ons member s and occasi oned Securi ty Counci l resol uti on 253 of 1968 whi ch
i mposed comprehensi ve mandat ory sancti ons, requi ri ng Uni ted Nati ons Mem-
ber States to cease i mporti ng any goods f romRhodesi a. The attempt to i ntro-
duce force agai nst the r gi me was pressed by Af ri can States but successful l y
resi stedby Bri tai n.
Thus i t took t wo and a hal f years for a bl anket prohi bi ti on upon trade wi th
Rhodesi a tobe i ntroduced.
The i mposi ti ons of sancti ons di d create severe di ffi cul ti es for Rhodesi a,
borne as we have seen, pri mari l y by Af ri cans, but suffi ci ent to reduce the profi ts
of l egi ti mate Rhodesi an traders severel y whi l e creati ng new profi teers. The
argument i s somet i mes heard that sancti ons have thus harmed those they wer e
meant to hel p. Nati onal i st l eaders have all made i t cl ear that they regard sanc-
ti ons as a smal l pri ce topay for hasteni ng maj ori ty rul e. Though l i vi ngstandards
in Rhodesi a have in fact been mai ntai ned si nce 1965-average earni ngs havi ng
ri sen for Af ri cans f rom$(R)246 to $(R)359 and for Europeans f rom$(R)2, 576
to $(R)3,901 (1973)-real growt h has been stunted compared wi th nei ghbouri ng
States. Thi s i s cl earl y i l l ustratedby T. Curti n in hi s anal ysi s of the economy in
his South of the Sahara ( Europa Publ i cati ons, 1975, p. 662) f romwhi ch the
fol l owi ng fi gures are taken :
Comparat i ve growt h ( 1964/ 65 = 100).
E.xports (1973)
Rhodesi a
Kenya
Mal awi
Tanzani a
Zambi a
110
264
252
156
148
Manilfartiiring production (1973)
Rhodesi a 166
Kenya 175
Zambi a 184
School enrolments (all races, 1971)
Rhodesi a 105
Kenya 159
Mal awi 111
Zambi a 300
Education budget (1971) (1968: 100)
Rhodesi a 142
Kenya 207
Zambi a 168
Manilfacturing enzploynzent (1971)
Rhodesi a 149
Kenya 175
Mal awi 400
Perhaps the most i mportant effect of sancti ons has been to deny to the
Southern Rhodesi an mi nori ty the cl ai ms of l egi ti macy. Not a si ngl e State has
recogni zed the illegal rgi me.
Appendixes
1 The 1961
constitution
The Legislative Assembly
A Legi sl ati ve Assembl y consi sti ng of si xty-fi ve member s, of whomfi fty-one were Eur opean,
thi rteen Af ri can and one Asi an. The whol e of Rhodesi a was di vi ded i nto fifty consti tuenci es
and al so i nto fi fteenel ectoral di stri cts, each of whi ch el ected one member to the Assembl y.
The franchise
All persons 21 years of age and over wer e el i gi bl efor the vote. Two regi sters were compi l ed
for each consti tuency and el ectoral di stri ct, namel y an A roll and a B rol l . The
qual i fi cati ons for these rol l s were as f ol l ows :
A ROLL
i . I ncome of at l east E795 for each of the t wo previ ous years, or ownershi p of i mmovabl e
property wort h not l ess than El , 650; or
3. A Standard VI educati on and ei ther (a) an i ncome of a l east E528 for each of the two
previ ous years or (b) ownershi p of i mmovabl e property wort h not l ess than E1, 000; or
3. A FormI Veducati on and ei ther (a) an i ncome of not l ess than E330 for each of the two
previ ous years or (b) ownershi p of i mmovabl e property wort h not l ess than E550; or
4. Appoi nt ment to the offi ceof Chi ef or Headman.
B ROLL
1. I ncome at the rate of not l ess than E264 per annum(E22 per mont h) duri ng the six
mont hs pri or to enrol ment or ownershi p of i mmovabl e property wort h not l ess than
E495; or
2. A For mI I educati on and ei ther (a) an i ncome at the rate of not l ess than E132 per
annum(El l per mont h) duri ng the six mont hs pri or to enrol ment or (b) ownershi p of
i mmovabl e property wort h at l east E275.
Persons over the age of 30 were al so el i gi bl efor regi strati on on the B roll, subj ect to the
f ol l owi ng qual i fi cati ons :
i . A Standard VI educati on and ei ther (a) an i ncome at the rate of at l east E132 per annum
(El 1 per mont h) duri ng the six mont hs pri or to enrol ment ; or (b) ownershi p of i mmov-
abl e property worth not l ess than E275 ; or
2. An i ncome at the rate of E198 per annum(E16 10s. Od. per mont h) duri ng the six mont hs
pri or to enrol ment or ownershi p of property worth at l east E385.
All kraal heads wi th f ol l owi ngs of twenty or mor e heads of fami l i es, and mi ni sters of
rel i gi on who coul d not fulfil the above qual i fi cati ons were automati cal l y enti tl ed to enrol -
ment on the B rol l .
Each voter had t wo votes, one in his consti tuency and one in an el ectoral di stri ct.
Under a syst emof cross-voti ng the total number of B roll votes cast in any consti tuency
coul d not exceed 25 per cent of the A roll votes inthat consti tuency. By means of a speci al
f ormul a, B roll votes coul d be deval ued to mai ntai n the 25 per cent limit.
Si mi l arl y, inthe el ectoral di stri cts, A roll votes coul d not exceed 25 per cent of the B
roll votes.
The purpose of this systemwas to ensure that A roll voters domi nat e the fifty
consti tuenci es and B roll voters domi nat e the fi fteenel ectoral di stri cts.
The Declaration of Rights
The Decl arati on of Ri ghts, embodi ed inthe consti tuti on, prescri bed the f undament al ri ghts
and f reedoms to be enj oyed by the peopl e of Southern Rhodesi a. Several ri ghts are l i mi ted
by vari ous savi ng cl auses, especi al l y the f ol l owi ng:
1. The Decl arati on di d not appl y to l aws inforce before I November 1962.
2. The provi si on that no wri tten l awshal l contai n any document ary provi si on whi ch
prej udi ces persons of a parti cul ar descri pti on by race, tri be, col our or creed is qual i fi ed
by reference to speci al ci rcumstances appertai ni ng to persons of that or any other
descri pti on , the stage of soci al or economi c devel opment reached by the vari ous
persons affected and the state for the timebei ng of the economy of Southern Rhode-
si a.
3. The Decl arati on coul d be overri dden on grounds of publ i c safety, i nterest or order,
moral i ty or heal th.
4. Laws appl i ed duri ng a state of emergency coul d not be hel d to be i nconsi stent wi th the
Decl arati on.
The Constitutional Council
A Consti tuti onal Counci l consi sti ng of el even member s el ected by an el ectoral col l ege and a
chai rman appoi nted by the Governor to exami ne Bills before the Legi sl ati ve Assembl y and
report whether any proposed l egi sl ati on woul d be i nconsi stent wi th the Decl arati on of
Ri ghts. Draf t regul ati ons under Acts of parl i ament were al so subj ect to scruti ny of the
counci l . I t al so had the ri ght to r ecommend changes to exi sti ngl aws.
All these f uncti ons were advi sory and recommendat i ons coul d be overrul ed by the
Legi sl ati ve Assembl y.
2 1971 settlement
proposals
The 1971 settl ement proposal s i nvol ved:
1. Retai ni ng the 1969consti tuti on.
2. Appoi nti ng a commi ssi on to make r ecommendat i ons regardi ng di scri mi natory i egi sl a-
ti on and a Decl arati on of Ri ghts whose t er ms coul d be enf orced inl aw. However , under
the proposal s, attempts to r emove raci al di scri mi nati on were to be subj ect to veto if the
government consi dered that there were overri di ng consi derati ons , and the Decl arati on
of Ri ghts (al ready subj ect to numer ous excepti ons and provi sos) coul d be rendered
l argel y i neffectual si mpl y by the suspensi on of ri ghts after the decl arati on of a state of
emergency.
3. The possi bi l i ty of eventual pol i ti cal pari ty.
4. Maki ng the amendment of the consti tuti on subj ect to:
(a) a two- thi rds maj ori ty of all the member s of the House of Assembl y and the Senate,
(b) the affi rmati ve votes of a maj ori ty of the whi te representati ves and a maj ori ty of the
Whi l e bei ng i ntended to guard agai nst possi bl e future retrogressi ve measures, these
procedures coul d al so be used to bl ock progressi ve l egi sl ati on.
voti ng separatel y, and
bl ack representati ves i nthe House of Assembl y.
Pal l ey suggests that, under these proposal s, maj ori ty rul e woul d not be attai ned unti l the
year 2053 at the earl i est.
3
Rhodesian Front
Principles
1. The Party affi rms i ts l oyal ty tothe I ndependent Count ry of Rhodesi a.
2. The Party vi ews the Nati onal Fl ag as the onl y and excl usi ve symbol of our I ndependent
3. The Party will ensure that the Gover nment of Rhodesi a remai ns permanentl y in
4. Engl i sh will remai n the official l anguage of the Count ry.
5. The Party will preserve a strong and prosperous State based upon the f undament al
Rhodesi an Nati on.
responsi bl e hands.
pri nci pl es whi ch affect a sound soci ety, i ncl udi ng :
(i) recogni ti on of the f ami l y as the basi s of soci ety;
(ii) the ri ght of all i ndi vi dual s, wi thi n the f r amewor k of the l aw, to pri vate ownershi p,
f reedomof worshi p, f reedomof speech. f reedomof associ ati on and opportuni ty to
devel op thei r abi l i ti es to the full and to recei ve reward and recogni ti on enti rel y on
meri t;
(i i i ) total opposi ti on to Communi smand Communi st i c I deol ogi es.
thi s end will encourage to the ut most Eur opean i mmi grati on.
6. The Party will ensure the permanent establ i shment of the Eur opean in Rhodesi a and to
7. The Party will uphol d the pri nci pl e of the Land Tenure Act.
8. The Party will uphol d the pri nci pl e of the preservati on of the Tri bal Trust l ands and
will promot e thei r devel opment .
9. The Party opposes compul sory i ntegrati on and bel i eves that the peaceful Co-exi stence
of peopl e can onl y be achi eved when communi t i es have the ri ght and opportuni ty to
preserve thei r own i denti ti es, tradi ti ons and cust oms, and therefore recogni ses the
obl i gati on of Gover nment and respecti ve communi t i es where necessary to ensure the
provi si on of such separate facilities as will make thi s possi bl e.
10. The Party will ensure that l awand order are mai ntai ned.
11. The Party will promot e the full economi c devel opment of Rhodesi a and to thi s end will
12. The Party will encourage and sti mul ate pri vate enterpri se, subj ect to the ri ght of the
13. The Party will stri ve to create condi ti ons in whi ch all i nhabi tants of Rhodesi a may
14. The Party will ensure the Gover nment honours i ts obl i gati ons in the payment of
seek the co- operati on of all her peopl e.
State to i ntervene when necessary inthe i nterests of the Count ry.
attai n reasonabl e standards of housi ng, heal th, soci al servi ces and empl oyment .
pensi ons.
Rhodesia 105
15. The Party will protect the standards of skilled workers against exploitation by cheap
16. The Party recognises the desirability of consultation and co-operation with other States
labour.
in the solution of common problems.
Rhodesian Front Headquarters,
Salisbury.
23 October 1969.
4 ZAPU:
the partys
ideological
concept
i . Proceedi ng f r omhi stori cal and cont emporary evi dence, the Party i s convi nced that the
present systemof life in Zi mbabwe is capi tal i st i n practi ce and ori entati on. The sol e
moti ve for the penetrati on and settl ement of the Bri ti sh settl ers f r om1890 on was to
survey, sei ze and expl oi t the resources of Zi mbabwe- t he l and, mi neral s, other natural
resources and the l abour of i ts peopl e-for the benefi t of j ust a f ew, in accordance wi th
the system.
The mi l i tari st met hod of the so-cal l ed pi oneer col umn in 1890, the Chartered
Bri ti sh Sout h Af ri can Company, the enactment of the l and sei zure l aws-the Land
Apport i onment Act i n 1930 ( nowthe Land Tenure Act), the pri vi l eged wage structure
for the whi tes, the negl i gence and l ater throttl i ng of Af ri can educati on, the i mposi ti on
of the so-cal l ed Law and Order Act and mi nori ty rul e itself, are all devi ces of a si ngl e
machi nery to establ i sh and mai ntai n a capi tal i st way of life by the Bri ti sh settl ers in
Zi mbabwe.
2. The Party i s equal l y convi nced that what came as Bri ti sh raci smhas become whi te
raci smfor the condi ti ons of Zi mbabwe. Whi t e raci smi s a compound devi ce toprotect
the capi tal i st pri vi l ege of the whi te communi t y as well as an atti tude for degradi ng and
undermi ni ng the human di gni ty of the bl ack man.
3. The Party is convi nced beyond doubt that capi tal i smand the whi te raci smof the
Eur opean settl ers are the t wo basi c evils faci ng the peopl e of Zi mbabwe today. They
are the root causes of the order of di shonesty preval ent t oday, and therefore of the l ack
of harmoni ous rel ati ons among the Zi mbabwe peopl e.
4. A revol uti on is not onl y i nevi tabl e inZi mbabwe, but necessary. To destroy capi tal i sm,
raci smand all thei r devi ces or apparatuses i t must be an ar med revol uti on. To prevent
thei r resurgence at any other future stage i t must be a peopl e s ar med revol uti on. The
revol uti on must mean and resul t i na compl et e and t horough change of the systemof
life.
5. The Party is convi nced that soci al i smis the better systemof life and must therefore
prevai l and be the order of life in Zi mbabwe. The Party concei ves soci al i smas the
sei zure and retenti on by the peopl e through thei r State of the basi c means of produc-
ti on-the l and and all i ts natural resources, all i ndustry, transport and communi ca-
ti ons, fi nanci al i nsti tuti ons (banks), external and i nternal trade and soci al servi ces.
6. Wi thi n i ts soci al i st concept, the Party mai ntai ns that l and, water, air and other natural
resources are natural gifts toall peopl e and therefore must be retai ned and shared by
t hemall. As such, these means of l i vel i hood cannot be sol d for a pri ce nor be bargai ned
for inthese t er ms but for the servi ces inthei r i mpr ovement or di stri buti on.
Rhodesia 107
7. I t i s the standpoi nt of the Party in i ts soci al i st concept that profi t i s the mai nstay of all
exchange, bargai ns or trade and i s not per se a contradi cti on to soci al i sm. Profi t must
nei ther be expl oi tati ve nor used for the benefi t of a f ew; i t must serve all the peopl e
who put thei r l abour i nto producti on.
8. The retenti on and use of all the means of producti on by and for the peopl e t hrough
thei r State shoul d not i mpl y the negati on of pri vate ownershi p of property. Owner shi p
of pri vate property and ownershi p of the means of producti on are t wo di fferent
meani ngs. There will be personal pri vate ownershi p of property as the j ust earni ngs of
one s l abour.
9. The Party regards a sense of duty, hard wor k, di l i gence and honesty as the f oundati ons
of soci al i smand, inthe same sense, i t regards l azi ness as the arch enemy of soci al i sm.
10. Al ongsi de l and, water and air as the natural gifts to ail the peopl e, the Party mai ntai ns
that knowl edge, through educati on, and power , through government , cannot be the
monopol y of i ndi vi dual s or a fewpeopl e. Every Zi mbabwean has the ri ght to these and
they must be shared by all as well.
O n the constitution and government
1. The Consti tuti on of the State of the Zi mbabwe peopl e shal l decl are soci al i smas the
systemof l i fe, or the prevai l i ng order in the country. For an appropri ate refl ecti on of
thi s, the State shoul d be cal l ed: The Peopl e s Democrat i c Republ i c of Zi mbabwe.
2. The Consti tuti on shal l l ay down that i t i s treasonabl e for anyone or any group of
i ndi vi dual s to i ndul ge in acti vi ti es, di rect or i ndi rect, cal cul ated to undermi ne or defeat
the peopl e s soci al i st systemof life.
3. The Consti tuti on shal l enshri ne the uni versal l y accepted human ri ghts, wi th parti cul ar
regard for the saf eguardi ng of the soci al i st lifeof the Zi mbabwe peopl e.
Political ri ghts shall include: the ri ght of every member of the State to parti ci pate in
all acti vi ti es for the wel fare of the State, inaccordance wi th one s abi l i ty. f reedomof the
press and wri ti ng, f reedomtoel ect one s government .
Econoni i c ri ghts shall i ncl ude: the ri ght to wor k ; f reedomf r omexpl oi tati on, the
ri ght of l i vi ngaccordi ng to one s wor k, protecti on of one s pri vate property;
Soci al ri ghts: the ri ght to educati on and the devel opment of one s tal ent, the ri ght
to medi cal servi ces, the ri ght to ol d- age and di sabl ement pensi ons, the ri ght to cul ture,
the ri ght to marry accordi ng to the mut ual choi ce of the i ndi vi dual s, concerned pol i ga-
my shal l be di scouraged, the ri ght to one s life.
4. Gover nment must rest on the three pi l l ars of power : the l egi sl ature to make l aws : the
executi ve to admi ni ster : the j udi ci ary to i nterprete and enf orce the l aw.
The consti tuti on shal l provi de, wi thi n the ai ms of the systemof the State. for no
i nterference of one branch inanother wi thi n thei r respecti ve fi el ds. but wi th an emphasi s
on the fact that the l egi sl ature i s the supr eme organ of the State.
5. The l egi sl ature shal l resul t f r omthe el ecti on machi nery of the Party, f r omthe branch
ri ght up to i ts congress. I n short, the l egi sl ature must be an enl argement of the Peopl e s
Counci l el ected by the Party s congress.
The presi dent of the Party shal l be the presi dent of the State and he shal l appoi nt
hi s mi ni sters f r omthe l egi sl ature, but present thei r names to the l egi sl ature for approval .
The Peopl e s Counci l and Secretari at of the Party shal l mai ntai n the Party.
6. The consti tuti on shal l l ay down the obl i gati on for everyone but the di sabl ed to def end
the country and the soci al i st systemof life.
Racism and apartheid in southern Africa
108
O n the programme of economic revolution
The Party notes :
(a) that the Zi mbabwe peopl e l ack the necessary techni cal know- how to bri ng about thei r
economi c prosperi ty:
(b) that Zi mbabwe l acks suffi ci ent capi tal to set up all requi red i ndustry or to expl oi t all
the resources :
(c) that Zi mbabwe l acks basi c i ndustri es for the compl ete manuf acture of all i ts requi re-
ment s ;
(d) that economi c l i fe inZi mbabwe, as well as i ndustry, commer ce and marketi ng, are all
tied to forei gn capi tal and trade;
(e) that for i ts exports and i mports, Zi mbabwe is at the mercy of the capi tal i st monopol i sts
for transportati on and communi cat i on ;
(I) that for whatever products i t mi ght market , Zi mbabwe shoul d take i nto cogni zance the
threat of substi tute products offsetti ngconventi onal products.
Notwi thstandi ng the above- ment i oned di ffi cul ti es, the Party equal l y notes that the greatest
danger to an i ndependent peopl e, thei r economy and country, i s i mportati on of forei gn
capi tal goods or i nvestments, because through t heml i es the trappi ngs of t er ms whi ch
harness the economy tothe di ctates of forei gn trade and i nterests.
The fi rst pri nci pl e of the Zi mbabwe peopl e in thei r economi c revol uti on towards
soci al i smis stri ct sel f-rel i ance, on the basi s of l ocal l y avai l abl e resources (both human and
materi al ). in the creati on of sel f-generati ng capi tal for the f oundati on of capi tal - produci ng
i ndustri es.
5 Constitution
of ZANU
Preamble
Proud of our Zi mbabwe cul ture, tradi ti ons and our Af ri can personal i ty;
Remembering that si nce the comi ng of the whi te man i nto this country we, the Af ri can
peopl e, have been depri ved of our God- gi ven ri ghts of f reedomand i ndependence ;
Condemning the undemocrati c state the al i en whi te- mi nori ty settl ers have created in Zi m-
babwe whi ch has resul ted inthe oppressi on and suppressi on of our peopl e;
Desiring to l i veinl i berty and equal i ty as a Zi mbabwe peopl e in a soci ety organi zed under
democrati c l awand j usti ce and dedi cated to the promot i on of the general wel f are;
We the representati ves of the peopl e of Zi mbabwe i nCongress here at Gwel o assembl ed on
the 22nd May, 1964, do hereby in the si l ent presence of our dead and before our l i vi ng
ci ti zens and those yet to be born inaugurate the Zimbabwe African National Union and grant
unt o oursel ves this consti tuti on for the l i berati on of our country f r ombondage and for the
establ i shment of a Nationalist, Socialist, Pan-Africanist. Democratic Republ i c inZi mbabwe.
Part I. N a m e
The name of this Nati onal i st Party shal l be The Zi mbabwe Af ri can Nati onal Uni on
(ZANU) herei n after referred to as the Party .
Part II. Aims and objectives
1 . To wage a rel entl ess struggl e agai nst the undemocrat i c settl er rgi me inZi mbabwe.
2. To establ i sh a democrati c state in Zi mbabwe in whi ch the government shal l be created
through One man-One vote and remai n at all t i mes responsi bl e to the peopl e.
3. To pr omot e nati onal consci ousness and the uni ty of all our peopl e in pursuance of our
ai ms and obj ecti ves.
4. To stri ve for the promot i on of the soci al , educati onal and cul tural wel fare of the Af ri can
peopl e.
5. To reconstruct Zi mbabwe s economy and evol ve a soci al i sti c pattern in whi ch the
country s resources are fully tapped for the common benefi t of all the peopl e of
Zi mbabwe incl ose col l aborati on wi th the rest of the Af ri can conti nent.
6. To co- operate wi th other progressi ve organi zati ons wi thi n Zi mbabwe whose pol i ci es,
ai ms and obj ecti ves are not inconfl i ct wi th those of the Party.
7. To engage ful l y in the Pan- Af ri can struggl e for the compl et e l i qui dati on of Settl eri sm,
Col oni al i sm, Neo- Col oni al i smand I mperi al i smin Afri ca and to real i ze the compl ete
uni fi cati on of the Af ri can conti nent.
8. To co- operate wi th all nati onal i st l i berati on movement s in Afri ca and el sewhere whose
ai ms, obj ects and pol i ci es are not inconfl i ct wi th those of the Party.
9. To pursue the pol i cy of posi ti ve non- al i gnment inour external rel ati ons.
6 The African
National Council
The African National Council manifesto under
the banner of unity, March 1972
Salutation!
A R E AFRICAN NATIONALISTS PEOPLE?
Brothers and si sters, we wel come you here on this occasi on. Al t hough we are the ones who
shoul d be real l y wel comed by you for i t i s because of your cry, peti ti ons and demands that
we responded by setti ng the Af ri can Nati onal Counci l in a vi abl e structure. Thi s new
organi zati on, like the ol d ones, will be referred to, by outsi ders, as an Af ri can Nati onal i st
Organi zati on. The term Af ri can Nati onal i st has unpl easant connotati ons to many peopl e
wi th cl osed mi nds.
We want to affi rmthat we are nothi ng but nor mal human bei ngs who have an i nnate
desi re for f reedomand j usti ce to all peopl e. We have organi zed oursel ves so that wi th a
common voi ce our cry can be heard and our aspi rati ons can be reached.
Thi s cry, to many, will have an undesi rabl e sound. They will regard us as dangerous
creatures who shoul d be wat ched and prevented f r omacti ng freel y. We here decl are that
we are si mpl y creatures made inthe i mage of God and, therefore, His chi l dren who need to
be l i berated, nothi ng more- nothi ng l ess.
Onl y as we are fully l i berated can we fulfil the purpose for whi ch we were created.
Dedication
On thi s tenth day of Mar ch 1972, at Hi ghfi el d, Sal i sbury, We here assembl ed, cl ai mi ng no
more than to be hei rs to the Peopl e s Struggl e whi ch has ceasel essl y been waged si nce the
i mposi ti on of al i en rul e in 1890, i nthe name of Al mi ght y God, who, inHis l ove and mercy,
created all peopl e and races in His i mage, do hereby procl ai m, consti tute and decl are the
AFRI CAN NATI ONAL COUNCI L to be the one sol e voi ce and i nstrument of the
Af ri can masses of Zi mbabwe and all peopl e of goodwi l l , i n thei r j ust and nor mal struggl e
for nati onal emanci pati on f r omthe yoke of a raci st and oppressi ve mi nori ty rul e.
Accordi ngl y, the Af ri can Nati onal Counci l is born today as a resul t of the need and
demands of pri mari l y the Af ri can peopl e and other raci al groups of this country. And we
here and now summon every Af ri can in this l and, young or ol d, ri ch or poor, educated or
uneducat ed, chi ef or subj ect, and those member s of other races dedi cated to the establ i sh-
ment of human brotherhood, to recogni ze the trumpet we here sound and to ral l y around
us, so that together, we conti nue our arduous j ourney to Zi mbabwe ina Chri sti an and non-
vi ol ent manner .
1. Thi s Counci l bel i eves i nthe power of the uni ty of the Af ri can masses in the i mperati ve
need for the opposi ti on of those el ements or forces whi ch seek to sow the seeds of
di vi si on among our peopl e. Di vi ded we will remai n sl aves and strangers in the l and of
our bi rth. Uni ted t hough we may suffer, we shal l toi l , but wi th di gni ty, unti l we are free.
We shoul d, therefore, be warned that our worst enemi es are those who seek to di vi de us
and those who l abour tokeep us inperpetual oppressi on, be they bl ack or whi te.
2. We bel i eve inthe i nvi nci bi l i ty of number s of the masses of men and women of goodwi l l
inRhodesi a and that the Af ri can Nati onal Counci l i s trul y a grass-roots organi zati on in
i ts very scope, membershi p and spi ri t.
3. We bel i eve i n a government that will establ i sh and promot e the sancti ty and practi ce of
the essenti al human f reedoms of consci ence. of expressi on, associ ati on, rel i gi on, assem-
bl y and movement of all peopl e i rrespecti ve of col our, race or creed.
4. We bel i eve i nnon- raci al i sm, the uni versal brotherhood of man under the f atherhood of
God. Thi s means forced segregati on and forced i ntegrati on vi ol ate the pri nci pl e of f ree
choi ce of associ ati on.
5. We bel i eve ina non- vi ol ent, peacef ul , orderl y but permanent and conti nui ng struggl e to
be waged wi thi n the Lawand for the establ i shment of a consti tuti onal government .
6. We bel i eve that true peace and har mony among all peopl e and economi c stabi l i ty of thi s
country can onl y be assured for all timeby the establ i shment of ' the government of the
peopl e, by the peopl e and for the peopl e' .
7. We bel i eve that the ri ghts and property of the mi nori ty shoul d be protected; we do not,
however, bel i eve i nthe mi nori ty' s amassi ng of soci al , pol i ti cal and economi c pri vi l eges
at the expense of the f reedomof the maj ori ty.
Declaration
The Af ri can Nati onal Counci l sol emnl y dedi cates itself to stri ve for the real i zati on of those
uni versal human ri ghts conceded to the ci ti zens in all democrati c and j ust soci eti es. Thi s
bei ng so.
1. We shal l not waver or prevari cate in our demand for the creati on, in this country, of a
j ust soci al order; but shal l stri ve toachi eve this j usti ce whi ch i s l ong overdue.
2. We shal l not devi ate f romour j ust demand for uni versal adul t suf f rage.
3. We shal l never concede to the fal l acy that there is any j usti fi cati onfor raci al and other
f orms of di scri mi nati on as bet ween one human bei ng agai nst another. Thus, we shal l
conti nue to oppose raci al bi gotry, rel i gi ous i ntol erance, cl ass arrogance, the i di ocy of
tri bal i smand undeserved economi c pri vi l eges. And we shal l stri ve to create a nati on
where bl ack and whi te can l i ve as chi l dren of the One Al mi ghty God.
4. We shal l never compr omi se wi th the si n of greed whi ch is the mai n characteri sti c of a
mi nori ty-control l ed economy; but will conti nue to promot e a fair and free parti ci pati on
of each and every ci ti zenof thi s our mot her l and-ri ch i nnatural resources.
5. We shal l forever abhor the conti nued deni al , under the pretext of ' preservati on of
West ern Chri sti an ci vi l i zati on' . of the masses' demand for l egi ti mate sel f -determi nati on.
Rhodesia 113
6. We shal l never support nor respect a systemwhi ch l ays emphasi s on Law and Or der at
the expense of chari ty, j usti ce and human di gni ty; but will conti nue to cal l upon the
consci ence of this country to i nfl uence the establ i shment of l awand order wi th j usti ce.
7. We shal l requi re and desi re nothi ng l ess t han self determi nati on.
External relations
We decl are our sol i dari ty wi th those i nternati onal organi zati ons dedi cated to the peaceful
creati on and preservati on of the basi c uni versal human ri ghts and the brot herhood of man
under the Fat herhood of God.
Challenge to the nation
Havi ng stated our bel i efs and decl arati ons we now chal l enge all peopl e of this country-
Af ri cans, Asi ans, Col oureds and Europeans- who si ncerel y and honestl y seek a genui ne
peace and mut ual understandi ng toj oi n us.
Onl y as we wor k together can we bri ng our country out of i ts present pol i ti cal
deadl ock.
We chal l enge the peopl e of thi s country to come out of the current pol i ti cal dr eam-
worl d by real i zi ng that what has been cal l ed peace and happi ness and good race
rel ati ons are, infact, repressed fear, restl ess si l ence, f orced tol erance and hi dden hatred of
one another.
We call and call agai n to make peopl e awar e that our race rel ati ons are deteri orati ng
and that they will conti nue to do so unti l all di scri mi natory l egi sl ati on in thi s l and has been
r emoved.
We chal l enge our Rhodesi an whi tes to real i ze the si mpl e soci o- psychol ogi cal fact that
no one shoul d expect l ove f roma person he hates; or expect respect f r oma person he
di srespects; or expect admi rati on f r oma person he despi ses, nor l oyal ty f r oma person
whomhe does not l ove.
We fi nal l y and parti cul arl y di rect this chal l enge to the Europeans of Rhodesi a that
now is the day to si t down wi th us and, in peaceful negoti ati ons, try and fi nd a mutual l y
agreeabl e f ormul a for achi evi ng raci al har mony. Thi s is absol utel y necessary for soci al
stabi l i ty, economi c growt h and a secure future for ali of us and our chi l dren.
Ti me for such negoti ati ons i s fast runni ng out. Bel i eve it! Thi s i s the day that
ci rcumstance and fate or, as we want to express i t , God has l edus all.
I f we want to be bl essed and not cursed by our chi l dren and chi l dren s chi l dren we
have no timetol ose.
We chal l engi ngl y remi nd our Af ri can peopl e that whatever posi ti on we hol d, or status
we enj oy we are all condemned as BLACK PEOPLE in this country. All are treated as
second if not thi rd cl ass ci ti zens. We therefore feel very sad when we see some of our peopl e
and hear about thei r behavi our whi ch poi nts out to the fact that they have lost the purpose
and goal and are l i vi ng and fi ghti ng for thei r own st omachs and self i nterests i nstead of
l i berati on for all whi ch shoul d be every sane person s goal .
We have seen si gns of these ki nds of peopl e who are bought to wor k out di vi si on, to
wor k out frustrati on, to wor k out embarrassment and to work out perpetual sl avery of the
Afri cans. Shame!
We chal l enge our Af ri can peopl e tostop ful fi l l i ngthe accusati on that the worst enemy
of Af ri cans are Af ri cans themsel ves and i nstead become our own l i berators, by stoppi ng all
sorts of trai torous acti ons agai nst the Af ri can Uni ted Fronts for l i berati on and l abour for
the common goal of i ndependence.
We call our Af ri can peopl e to prai se. and congratul ate our fathers-the chi efs-for
thei r courageous stand and true representati on of thei r peopl e whi ch they di spl ayed duri ng
the test of Acceptabi l i ty of the Angl o- Rhodesi an Settl ement Proposal s. We trust this is the
begi nni ng of a new day i nRhodesi a for Af ri cans.
We chal l enge the cl ergy of thi s country to stop preachi ng the usel ess and archai c
doctri ne of pi e in the sky and start vi gorousl y to preach a whol e gospel for the whol e
man . To teach our peopl e that pol i ti cs i s not a di rty game , but that what makes pol i ti cs
di rty i s the ki nd of peopl e who pl ay pol i ti cs and how they parti ci pate in i t. That the
defi ni ti on of pol i ti cs is the sci ence and art of governi ng peopl e and that there can never be
any evi l in that ki nd of sci ence or art. There is no vi rtue inparti ci pati ng or not parti ci pat-
i ng in pol i ti cs, but Chri sti ans must be i nvol ved when the pol i ti cal systemdi sturbs peopl e
and churches such as inthe case of the Land Tenure Act.
We chal l enge our Af ri can peopl e to be purpose- centred rather than personal i ty-
centred.
We chal l enge our Af ri can peopl e to real i ze that, whi l e we have chosen a peaceful and
l ovi ng met hod of approach, inUNI TY we have mor e than a bomb can achi eve. Theref ore,
be UNI TED, be Uni ted unti l UNI TY i s strength and strength becomes POWER.
7 The const it ut ion
of FROLIZI
Preamble
The Front for the Li berati on of Zi mbabwe (FROLI ZI ) i s the Zi mbabwe peopl e s pol i ti cal
and mi l i tary i nstrument for nati onal l i berati on, born of the i mperati ve for nati onal uni ty
among all Zi mbabweans and dedi cated to a protracted ar med revol uti onary struggl e agai nst
the true enemy of the peopl e of Zi mbabwe, i .e. the capi tal i st i mperi al i st and col oni al
settl ers inZi mbabwe.
Section I
AIMS AND OBJECTS
1. To uni te all the peopl e of Zi mbabwe in order to resol utel y struggl e to overt hrowBri ti sh
col oni al capi tal i smin our country.
2. To establ i sh and devel op an i ndependent soci al i st economy based upon the ownershi p
and control of l and, capi tal , and all the means of producti on and di stri buti on of weal th
by the masses.
3. To establ i sh and guarantee Uni versal Adul t Suf f rage, one man one vote, as the basi s of
government ina f ree Zi mbabwe.
4. To establ i sh a common, free and compul sory educati onal systemfor al l , and free heal th
servi ces.
5. To establ i sh a revol uti onary peopl e s ar my.
6. To bui l d and devel op our nati onal cul ture and heri tage, i .e. l anguages, nor ms, etc.-and
to ensure the equal i ty, uni ty and fraterni ty of all Zi mbabweans.
7. To establ i sh and guarantee the peopl e s consti tuti onal and human ri ghts through a
peopl e s l egal system.
8. To devel op and strengthen sol i dari ty wi th revol uti onary movement s. organi zati ons and
government s in Af ri ca, Asi a, Sout h and Nor t h Ameri ca, the Carri bean I sl ands and
el sewhere.
8
Zimbabwe
declaration
of unity, Lusaka,
Republic
of Zambia,
7 December 1974
1, ZANU, ZAPU, FROLI ZI and ANC hereby agree touni te in the ANC.
2. The parti es recogni se the ANC as the uni fyi ng force of the peopl e of Zi mbabwe.
3. (a) They agreed to consol i date the l eadershi p of the ANC by the i ncl usi on i nto i t of the
presi dents of ZANU, ZAPU and FROLI ZI under the chai rmanshi p of the presi dent
of the ANC ;
(b) ZAPU, ZANU and FROLI ZI shal l each appoi nt three other persons to j oi n the
enl arged ANC executi ve.
4. The enl arged ANC executi ve shal l have the fol l owi ng functi ons :
(a) to prepare for any conf erence for the transfer of power to the maj ori ty that mi ght
(b) toprepare for the hol di ng of a congress wi thi n 4 mont hs at whi ch:
be cal l ed;
(i) a revi sed ANC Consti tuti on shal l be adopt ed;
(ii) the l eadershi p of the uni ted peopl e of Zi mbabwe shal l be el ected;
(i i i ) a Statement of Pol i cy for the ANC shal l be consi dered;
(c) To organi se the peopl e for such conf erence and congress.
Zi mbabweans to rally behi nd the ANC under i ts enl arged executi ve.
structures i nto the ANC before the congress to be hel d wi thi n 4 mont hs.
of struggl e unti l the total l i berati on of Zi mbabwe.
5. The l eaders of the ZAPU, ZANU and FROLI ZI cal l upon thei r supporters and all
6. ZAPU, ZANU and FROLI ZI will take steps to mer ge thei r respecti ve organs and
7. The l eaders recogni se the i nevi tabi l i ty of conti nued ar med struggl e and all other f orms
ABEL TENDEKAYI M U Z O R E W A
Presi dent of ANC
JOSHUA MQABUKO N K O M O
Presi dent of ZAPU
NDABANINGI SITHOLE
Presi dent of ZANU
JAMES ROBERT DAMBAZA CHIKEREMA
Presi dent of FROLI ZI
STATE HOUSE,
LUSAKA.
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