Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Pleadings
1. Manner of making allegations in pleadings
Rule 6
Section 1. Pleadings defined.
Pleadings are the written statements of the respective claims and
defenses of the parties submitted to the court for appropriate
judgment.
Sec. 2. Pleadings allowed.
The claims of a party are asserted in a complaint, counterclaim, crossclaim, third (fourth, etc.) party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention.
The defenses of a party are alleged in the answer to the pleading
asserting a claim against him. An answer may be responded to by a
reply.
Sec. 12. Bringing new parties.
When the presence of parties other than those to the original action is
required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a
counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought
in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be obtained.
Rule 7, Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping.
The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint
or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a)
that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
the CA ruling.
Petitioner alleged that since it is a corporation the certification against
forum shopping may be signed by a natural person authorized to do
so. In such case petitioner argues that their counsel of record has that
authority to execute the certification on behalf of the corporation
considering that under the Rules of Court counsels authority to
represent his client is presumed.
ISSUE: W/N the pleading filed by the petitioner has complied with
Revised Circular no. 28-91?
Mondragon failed to pay for the rental arrears and to open the
irrevocable domestic letter of credit. CDC sent s letter to Mondragon
demanding compliance with all its obligations under the Compromise
Agreement. In view of Mondragons failure to comply, CDC sent
another letter informing Mondragon of the cancellation and
termination of the Compromise Agreement and demanding it to
vacate all the leased premises.
Estate.
Ultimately, the decisive test in forum shopping is the possible vexation
caused to the courts and litigants by the filing of actions based on the
same or related issues in different fora.
The vexation to the courts in this case is evident. There is a high risk
of conflict between the decisions of the RTC Branches 58 and 60
regarding their respective civil cases. A decision by one branch of
court will constitute res judicata in the other case pending before the
other branch of court. Alternatively, if the RTC Branch 60 exercised its
jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief, then it would have to
restrain the execution proceedings in the RTC Branch 58. Thus,
interference with the proceedings in another court would ensue.
KAUNLARAN v. UY (LEA)
However, the merits of the petition justify the relaxation of the rule on
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, for from a review of
the records Loreta has not proven by preponderance of evidence that
she was deceived into signing the documents required for the release
of the proceeds of the loan.
ATENEO DE NAGA v. MANALO (NADIA)
was authorized to file the petition for certiorari for the primary
petitioner, ADNU.
The Court of Appeals, unconvinced by petitioners arguments and the
documents they presented, issued a resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration insofar as petitioners are concerned but granting it
relative to Fr. Tabora.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition
for certiorari insofar as petitioners are concerned for lack of proper
verification and certification against forum shopping. Specifically, the
problem in this case is not the lack of verification and certification but
the adequacy of one executed by only one of three petitioners in the
Court of Appeals, invoking substantial compliance.
Applying the foregoing to the instant petition, this Court finds that, at
the minimum, the lone signature of Fr. Tabora is sufficient to fulfill the
verification requirement. Undoubtedly, Fr. Tabora, whose acts as
president of petitioner ADNU are in issue, is a real party-in-interest.
As ADNUs president and himself a party to the instant case, Fr.
Tabora has sufficient knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in their petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals.
His signature, therefore, is sufficient assurance that the allegations in
their petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, not
merely speculative.
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Ater the filing of Civil Case but before the service of summons upon
the defendants (herein private respondents), the claims of the
offended parties (plaintiffs in Civil Case) were amicably settled and
individually executed and signed a "Release Of Claim," the contents
of which substantially reads as follows:
For the sole consideration of . . ., the receipt whereof is hereby
acknowledged, (I), (We) . . . for myself, my heirs, representatives,
successors and assigns do hereby forever release, discharge E. and
absolve Atty. Enrique Pimentel, Leticia Fideldia & F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc.
of and from all actions, claims and demands whatsoever that now
exist or may hereafter develop and particularly on account of all
known, unknown and unanticipated injuries and damages arising out
of and in consequence of the accident/illness occurring on or about
July 9, 1984 at about 6:00 P.M. along the North Expressway, San
Fernando, Pampanga when I sustained serious physical injuries while
riding as a passenger of a Toyota Corona Sedan with Plate No. CFR447 was hit and bumped by a Mit. Lancer Sedan with Plate No. NLL979 driven by Atty. Enrique E. Pimentel and owned by Leticia
Fideldia.
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed
the complaint against private respondents
Petitioners claim that the respondent court, in dismissing the civil case
for damages on the sole basis of the "releases of claims," had denied
them procedural due process as they were not afforded the
opportunity to refute, assail, and overcome their/probative value
Private respondents maintain that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in not considering their letter as their responsive
pleading and in consequently declaring them in default.
Under the factual setting of the case, the trial court ought to have
considered the letter of respondent Enrique E. Pimentel as a
responsive pleading even if it lacks the formalities required by law.
Undoubtedly, the letter made mention of the fact that the parties
mutually settled the case, which allegation may be deemed as an
averment of an affirmative defense and if proven in a preliminary
hearing pursuant to Section 5, Rule l6, would constitute a meritorious
defense of private respondents which would bar petitioners from
recovering damages from the former as the claim or demand set forth
in plaintiffs' (petitioners') pleading had been paid or extinguished.
Pleadings as well as remedial laws should be liberally construed in
order that the litigant may have ample opportunity to prove their
respective claims, and possible denial of substantial justice, due to
technicalities, may be avoided (Cabutin, et al. v. Amacio, 170 SCRA
750 [1989], citing Quibuyen v. CA, 9 SCRA 741 [1963]). Litigations
should as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on
technicality (Fonseca v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 40 [1988], citing
A-One Feeds, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 590, 594 [1980]).
Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
Petitioners can not now question the validity and/or veracity of the
releases of claims on the allegation that the same were executed on
their belief that what they received were only partial settlements and
that they could not have released them "forever from all actions
arising from such vehicular accident." If they did not release their
claims against, respondents forever, why did they cause the dismissal
of the criminal case against Enrique Pimentel?
When petitioners executed the releases of claims, Civil Case No.
5210 for damages had already been filed by petitioners as plaintiffs
against private respondents as defendants. With the subsequent
execution of the releases of claims by petitioners, all claims and
demands of petitioners as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5210 which "had
been filed in connection with the above (vehicular) accident," were
fully and finally compromised, settled and forever.
2. Initiatory Pleadings
a). Complaints
an action for ill gotten wealth are complied with by the petitioner
hence petitioner is not anymore entitled to a bill of particulars.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the disputed resolution.
RULING: YES. A complaint as a concise statement of the ultimate
facts constituting the plaintiffs cause or causes of action. Like all other
pleadings allowed by the Rules of Court, the complaint shall contain in
a methodical and logical form a plain, concise and direct statement of
the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for his claim, omitting the
statement of mere evidentiary facts. The complaint should inform the
defendant of all the material facts on which the plaintiff relies to
support his demand; it should state the theory of a cause of action
which forms the bases of the plaintiffs claim liability.
The rules on pleading speak of 2 kinds of facts: Ultimate facts and
evidentiary facts.
Ultimate facts are the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of
action while evidentiary fact are those which are necessary for
determination of the ultimate facts; they are the premises upon which
conclusions of ultimate facts are based.
In the complaint this court ruled that they are mere conclusions of law
Page 10 of 24
DOCTRINE: Complaint must allege the ultimate facts upon which the
plaintiff bases his cause of action.
FACTS: Relita P. de los Santos (de los Santos) then Corporate
Secretary issued a Secretarys Certificate which certified that in a
special meeting of the Board of Directors of Quilts and All, Inc. (Quilts)
its President, Mr. Senen B. Dizon (Dizon) was authorized and
empowered to mortgage in favor of Metrobank, a property belonging
to Quilts. On the basis of this Secretarys Certificate, Metrobank
restructured Dizons existing personal loan in the amount of
P700,000.00 secured by his house and lot at Angeles City and the
property owned by Quilts. Aside from the mortgage lien, the
Secretarys Certificate was likewise annotated on a TCT. More than a
year later, Metrobank received a letter from Atty. Villanueva, Quilts
counsel offering the amount of P200,000.00 for the cancellation of the
mortgage on the property owned by Quilts because, allegedly, Mr. &
Mrs. Senen Dizon had left the Philippines, leaving several creditors.
Metrobank refused the offer since the amount offered did not
approximate the appraised value of the mortgaged property.
Atty. Trinidad, Quilts new counsel wrote Metrobank. Counsel wrote
Metrobank reiterating the mortgage cancellation. In addition, counsel
claimed that the alleged special meeting could not have taken place
for lack of the requisite number of directors present to constitute a
quorum since the Chairman and 2 other members of the Board of
Directors were abroad on that date.
Quilts filed a complaint against Metrobank, Dizon and de los Santos
for annulment and cancellation of mortgage. Metrobank moved to
dismiss the complaint based on 1) lack of jurisdiction and 2) failure to
state a cause of action. The RTC granted the motion.
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ultimate facts. In the case of Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. vs. First
Farmers Milling Co., Inc., it was held that Although it is averred that
the defendants acts were done in bad faith, the Complaint does not
contain anyaverment of facts showing that the acts were done in the
manner alleged. Such a bare statement neither establishes any right
or cause of action on the part of the plaintiff-appellant. It is a mere
conclusion of law not sustained by declarations of facts, much less
admitted by defendants-appellees. It does not, therefore, aid in
anywise the complaint in setting forth a cause of action.
The SC agreed with Metrobank that the complaint does not contain
allegations that Metrobank had prior knowledge of, or could have
known with the exercise of due diligence, that the recitals in the
Secretarys Certificate were false. The complaint does not even allege
specific overt acts which show that Metrobank acted in conspiracy
with its co-defendants to defraud Quilts.
On the other hand, Metrobank cannot be faulted for relying on the
Secretarys Certificate. It did so in good faith, unaware of any flaw and
on the presumption that the ordinary course of business had been
followed and that the Corporate Secretary had regularly performed
her duties.
MATHAY v. CONSOLIDATED BANK (LEA)
DOCTRINE: A class suit did not lie in an action for recovery of real
property where separate portions of the same parcel were occupied
and claimed individually by different parties to the exclusion of each
other, such that the different parties had determinable, though
undivided interests, in the property in question.
FACTS: smael Mathay, et.al. were former stockholders of
Consolidated Mines Inc. Petitioners filed a case for a class suit
against CMI containing six causes of action. Petitioners alleged that
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matter of this suit was several, not common or general in the sense
required by the statute. Each one of the appellants and the CMI
stockholders had determinable interest; each one had a right, if any,
only to his respective portion of
the stocks. No one of them had any right to, or any interest in, the
stock to which another was entitled.
b). Amended and Supplemental Complaints
Rule 10
Section 1. Amendments in general.
Pleadings may be amended by adding or striking out an allegation or
the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a
party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any
other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may
speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the
most expeditious and inexpensive manner.
Sec. 2. Amendments as a matter of right.
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time
before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at
any time within ten (l0) days after it is served.
Sec. 3. Amendments by leave of court.
Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial
amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave
may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made
with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in
this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice
to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
Page 13 of 24
could not be allowed, as the same is substantial and has the effect of
changing the theory of the case. Garcia is not an indispensable party
was accepted, but that the INC was not amenable to your proposal to
an undervaluation of the total consideration. In their letter, petitioners
claimed that the INC had not really accepted the offer, adding that,
prior to their receipt of the aforementioned reply they had already
contracted with Carissa Homes and Development & Properties, Inc.
for the sale of the said properties due to the absence of any response
to their offer from INC.
Maintaining that a sale had been consummated, INC demanded that
the corresponding deed be executed in its favor. Petitioners refused.
so with leave of court. Thus, the CA concluded that the RTC had not
acted with grave abuse of discretion in admitting INCs Amended
Complaint. The CA also held that the Amended Complaint did not
substantially alter private respondents cause of action, since
petitioners were not being asked to answer a legal obligation different
from that stated in the original Complaint.
ISSUE: WON CA gravely erred in holding that the respondent Judges
admission of INCs Amended Complaint was proper.
HELD: SC sustained the Court of Appeals.
INC filed a civil suit for specific performance and damages against
petitioners and Carissa Homes and Development & Properties, Inc.
Petitioners filed therein a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper
venue and lack of capacity to sue.
Carissa Homes filed its answer to the complaint.
Pending resolution of petitioners Motion to Dismiss, INC negotiated
with Carissa Homes which culminated in the purchase of the subject
properties of Carissa Homes by INC.
INC filed an Amended Complaint, dropping Carissa Homes as one of
the defendants and changing the nature of the case to a mere case
for damages.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Strike Out Amended Complaint,
contending that the complaint cannot be amended without leave of
court, since a responsive pleading has been filed.
An order denying petitioners Motion to Strike Out Amended
Complaint was rendered by the trial court.
CA ruled that although private respondent could no longer amend its
original Complaint as a matter of right, it was not precluded from doing
Where some but not all the defendants have answered, plaintiffs may
amend their
Complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted
solely against the non-answering defendants, but not as to claims
asserted against the other defendants.It is clear that plaintiff (herein
private respondent) can amend its complaint once, as a matter of
right, before a responsive pleading is filed. Contrary to the petitioners
contention, the fact that Carissa had already filed its Answer did not
bar private respondent from amending its original Complaint once, as
a matter of right, against herein petitioners.
Indeed, where some but not all the defendants have answered,
plaintiffs may amend their Complaint once, as a matter of right, in
respect to claims asserted solely against the non-answering
defendants, but not as to claims asserted against the other
defendants.
After a responsive pleading has been filed, an amendment may be
rejected when the defense is substantially altered since such
amendment does not only prejudice the rights of the defendant but
also delays the action; Amendments to pleadings are generally
favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice.The
rationale for the aforementioned rule is in Section 3, Rule 10 of the
Page 17 of 24
The amendment did not prejudice the petitioners or delay the action.
Au contraire, it simplified the case and tended to expedite its
disposition. The Amended Complaint became simply an action for
damages, since the claims for specific performance and declaration of
nullity of the sale have been deleted.
Raycor Air filed a motion for leave to intervene alleging' it has a direct
and immediate interest on the subject matter of the litigation such that
it will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the
judgment'. There was no opposition to the motion and the intervention
complaint was admitted by the lower court. Metrobank filed its Answer
To The Intervention Complaint.
RTC allowed the motion to intervene suit despite the agreement
between Metrobank and Uniwide. Metrobank filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals
contending that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in allowing, per the intervention suit to
survive despite the dismissal of the main action and also in admitting
the amended complaint in intervention.
her name. They contend that Emilia O'Laco breached the trust when
she sold the land to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila.
Petitioner-spouses deny the existence of any form of trust relation.
They aver that Emilia O'Laco actually bought the property with her
own money; that she left the Deed of Absolute Sale and the
corresponding title with respondent-spouses merely for safekeeping;
that when she asked for the return of the documents evidencing her
ownership, respondent-spouses told her that these were misplaced or
lost, then Court of First Instance of Manila granted her petition.
Finding no trust relation between the parties, the trial court dismissed
the complaint together with the counterclaim. Court of Appeals set
aside the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether the plaintiff may be allowed to amend his complaint
to correct the defect if the amendment does not actually confer
jurisdiction on the court in which the action is filed, i.e., if the cause of
action was originally within that court's jurisdiction.
the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the
issue framed in the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the subject matter, on
the other hand, is conferred by law and does not depend on the
consent or objection or the acts or omissions of the parties or any one
of them. The law which conferred jurisdiction on the Court of Agrarian
Relations, now transferred to the appropriate Branch of the RTC,
concerning agricultural lands, is PD 946.
Indeed amendment to pleadings are generally favored and should be
liberally construed however, where the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case, it is evident that the amendment of the
complaint could not be allowed so as to confer jurisdiction upon the
court over said property.
It being apparent that the Court of Agrarian Relations has no
jurisdiction over the lot aside from the fact that said court has already
been abolished by BP 129 the issue as to its territorial jurisdiction has
become moot and academic.
The order of the respondent judge admitting the First Amended
Complaint including therein the questioned lot which is a residential lot
not falling within the ambit of PD 27 hence, beyond CARs jurisdiction.
The term excess of jurisdiction signifies that the court, board or officer
has jurisdiction over a case but oversteps such jurisdiction while
acting thereon.
SM v. CA (TUGS)
SHOEMART V. CA
DOCTRINE
A supplemental pleading supplies deficiencies in aid of an original
pleading, not to entirely substitute the latter.
FACTS
Anson Emporium Corporation (Anson) leased from Shoemart, Inc.
(Shoemart) a portion of the building known as the Makati Arcade
consisting of 374 square meters of store area at its ground floor and
678 square meters at its second floor, for a period of two (2) years
starting said date at a monthly rental of P18,842.00 with a stipulation
that: "after termination of the lease for any reason whatsoever, if the
Owner shall permit the tenant to remain in possession of the leased
premises, it is expressly understood and agreed that the lease shall
be on a month to month basis in the absence of a written agreement
to the contrary."
Anson remained in possession after the two year period but on an
increased rental of P34,622.00. Four years later Shoemart terminated
the month to month lease and gave notice to Anson to vacate not later
than August 31, 1977. Notwithstanding the notice and demand, Anson
continued to stay on, thus the complaint for ejectment filed with the
then MTC of Makati.
In its answer, Anson raised the defenses that (1) the lease did not
express the true intention and real agreement of the parties, the true
one being that its stay was guaranteed by Shoemart for a maximum
period of twenty-four (24) years and (2) assuming that the lease had
expired, it still cannot be ejected until a longer term is fixed in
accordance with Article 1673 in relation to Article 1687 of the Civil
Code.
Page 22 of 24
After were on their way, Shoemart asked for and was granted leave to
file supplemental complaint which alleged that the rental of all the
tenants of the premises had been increased effective January 1, 1979
to P45,142.00 which Anson refused to pay.
ISSUE
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