GUTIERREZ VS HOUSE OF REPRESENATATIVES

EN BANC
MA.
GUTIERREZ

MERCEDITAS

N.

G.R. No. 193459

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -

THE
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE
ON
JUSTICE,
RISA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM,
FELIPE
PESTAO,
EVELYN
PESTAO,
RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY
GENERAL
OF
BAGONG
ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN
MANANZAN,
CO-CHAIRPERSON
OF
PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARYGENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG
PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA,
ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLES LAWYERS
(NUPL);
FERDINAND
R.
GAITE,
CHAIRPERSON,
CONFEDERATION
FOR
UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT
OF GOVERNMENT

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,*
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.

EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY

RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS (LFS),
Respondents.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.,
Respondent-Intervenor.
Promulgated:
February 15, 2011
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for certiorari and prohibition the Resolutions of
September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice (public respondent).
Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010 (the fourth Monday of July, in accordance with Section 15,
Article VI of the Constitution) or on July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe
and Evelyn Pestao (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint[1] against petitioner, upon the endorsement of Party-List
Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.[2]

A day after the opening of the 15th Congress or on July 27, 2010, Atty. Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary General of the House of
Representatives, transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr.[3] who, by Memorandum of August
2, 2010, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.[4]

On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia,
Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint[5] against petitioner with a resolution of
endorsement by Party-List Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, Teodoro Casio, Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio Tinio
and Emerenciana de Jesus.[6] On even date, the House of Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress. By letter still of even date,[7] the Secretary General transmitted the Reyes groups
complaint to Speaker Belmonte who, by Memorandum of August 9, 2010,[8] also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the
Order of Business.

On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the Committee on Rules, [9] instructed Atty.
Artemio Adasa, Jr., Deputy Secretary General for Operations, through Atty. Cesar Pareja, Executive Director of the Plenary Affairs
Department, to include the two complaints in the Order of Business, [10] which was complied with by their inclusion in the Order of
Business for the following day, August 11, 2010.

On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred both
complaints to public respondent.[11]

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form, which
complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time.

Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published on September 2, 2010.

On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September 1, 2010 Resolution of public
respondent. Public respondent refused to accept the motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the
notice for her to file an answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55 members of
public respondent.

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints, which both allege culpable
violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,[12] sufficient in substance. The determination of the sufficiency of substance
of the complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of whether
valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to file
an answer to the complaints within 10 days.[13]

Six days following her receipt of the notice to file answer or on September 13, 2010, petitioner filed with this Court the present
petition with application for injunctive reliefs. The following day or on September 14, 2010, the Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct
the issuance of a status quo ante order[14] and to require respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days. The Court subsequently,
by Resolution of September 21, 2010, directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file in 10 days its Comment on the petition

The Baraquel group which filed the first complaint, the Reyes group which filed the second complaint, and public respondent
(through the OSG and private counsel) filed their respective Comments on September 27, 29 and 30, 2010.

Speaker Belmonte filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene dated October 4, 2010 which the Court granted by Resolution of
October 5, 2010.

Under an Advisory[15] issued by the Court, oral arguments were conducted on October 5 and 12, 2010, followed by petitioners
filing of a Consolidated Reply of October 15, 2010 and the filing by the parties of Memoranda within the given 15-day period.

The petition is harangued by procedural objections which the Court shall first resolve.

Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They argue that public respondent was not
exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was
exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature,[16] and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary
investigation.[17]

These same arguments were raised in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives.[18] The argument that impeachment
proceedings are beyond the reach of judicial review was debunked in this wise:
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S.
Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedlygranted to the U.S. Supreme Court and
is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided
for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the
power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with
respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S.
Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our
Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases,
provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article
XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the
impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and
may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise
judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the
people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride."
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in
the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the
sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v.
Carr, "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through
the power of judicial review.
xxxx

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over
congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled that it is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution
or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Taada v. Angara, in seeking
to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the
petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives
withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral
Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that the
resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to
judicial review. In Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the
petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Taada v. Cuenco, it held that
although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract
from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral
Commission, it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of
whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy
the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of
the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act
beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.[19] (citations omitted; italics in the original; underscoring
supplied)

Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded certiorari jurisdiction[20] of this
Court reflects, includes the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.[21]

In the present case, petitioner invokes the Courts expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil actions of certiorari
and prohibition as procedural vehicles. The Court finds it well-within its power to determine whether public respondent committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives that could translate as
lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court.

Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding the
supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.[22]

Respondents do not seriously contest all the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review, as they only assert that
the petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the course of the proceedings before public respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed the present petition[23] on
September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the determination of the sufficiency of form and substance of the two complaints.

An

aspect

of

the

case-or-controversy

requirement

is

the

requisite

of ripeness.[24] The question of ripeness is especially relevant in light of the direct, adverse effect on an individual by the challenged
conduct.[25] In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on, inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two
complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House
(Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation.

The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to
invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional
limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one year.

And so the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issue whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed Resolutions. Petitioner basically anchors her claim on alleged
violation of the due process clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) and of the one-year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the Constitution.

Due process of law

Petitioner alleges that public respondents chairperson, Representative Niel Tupas, Jr. (Rep. Tupas), is the subject of an
investigation she is conducting, while his father, former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by her with violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken by her office against Rep. Tupas and
his father influenced the proceedings taken by public respondent in such a way that bias and vindictiveness played a big part in
arriving at the finding of sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints against her.

The Court finds petitioners allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of merit, there being hardly any indication
thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality does not suffice.[26]

The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself. So GMCR, Inc.
v. Bell Telecommunications Phils.[27] teaches:
First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the three
members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone
of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required
concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority
decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision.
Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone
does not speak and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body x x x. [28]

In the present case, Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in fact, vote and merely presided over the proceedings
when it decided on the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints.[29]

Even petitioners counsel conceded during the oral arguments that there are no grounds to compel the inhibition of Rep.
Tupas.
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Well, the Committee is headed by a gentleman who happened to be a respondent in the
charges that the Ombudsman filed. In addition to that[,] his father was likewise a respondent in
another case. How can he be expected to act with impartiality, in fairness and in accordance with law
under that matter, he is only human we grant him that benefit.
JUSTICE MORALES:
Is he a one-man committee?

JUSTICE CUEVAS:
He is not a one-man committee, Your Honor, but he decides.
JUSTICE MORALES:
Do we presume good faith or we presume bad faith?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
We presume that he is acting in good faith, Your Honor, but then (interrupted)
JUSTICE MORALES:
So, that he was found liable for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
does that mean that your client will be deprived of due process of law?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
No, what we are stating, Your Honor, is that expectation of a client goes with the
Ombudsman, which goes with the element of due process is the lack of impartiality that may be
expected of him.
JUSTICE MORALES:
But as you admitted the Committee is not a one-man committee?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MORALES:
So, why do you say then that there is a lack of impartiality?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Because if anything before anything goes (sic) he is the presiding officer of the committee as
in this case there were objections relative to the existence of the implementing rules not heard, there
was objection made by Congressman Golez to the effect that this may give rise to a constitutional
crisis.
JUSTICE MORALES:
That called for a voluntary inhibition. Is there any law or rule you can cite which makes
it mandatory for the chair of the committee to inhibit given that he had previously been found
liable for violation of a law[?]
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
There is nothing, Your Honor. In our jurisprudence which deals with the situation whereby
with that background as the material or pertinent antecedent that there could be no violation of the
right of the petitioner to due process. What is the effect of notice, hearing if the judgment cannot come
from an impartial adjudicator.[30] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner contends that the indecent and precipitate haste of public respondent in finding the two complaints sufficient in
form and substance is a clear indication of bias, she pointing out that it only took public respondent five minutes to arrive thereat.

An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se an indication of bias, however. So Santos-Concio v.
Department of Justice[31] holds:
Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly
attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For ones prompt dispatch may be anothers undue
haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the paramount and constant consideration, with
particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case.
The presumption of regularity includes the public officers official actuations in all phases of
work. Consistent with such presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present contradictory
evidence other than a mere tallying of days or numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to
discharge. The swift completion of the Investigating Panels initial task cannot be relegated as shoddy
or shady without discounting the presumably regular performance of not just one but five state
prosecutors.[32] (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner goes on to contend that her participation in the determination of sufficiency of form and substance was
indispensable. As mandated by the Impeachment Rules, however, and as, in fact, conceded by petitioners counsel, the participation
of the impeachable officer starts with the filing of an answer.
JUSTICE MORALES:
Is it not that the Committee should first determine that there is sufficiency in
form and substance before she is asked to file her answer (interrupted)
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MORALES:
During which she can raise any defenses she can assail the regularity of the
proceedings and related irregularities?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Yes. We are in total conformity and in full accord with that statement, Your
Honor, because it is only after a determination that the complaint is sufficient in form and
substance that a complaint may be filed, Your Honor, without that but it may be asked, how
is not your action premature, Your Honor, our answer is- no, because of the other violations
involved and that is (interrupted).[33] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Rule III(A) of the Impeachment Rules of the 15 th Congress reflects the impeachment procedure at the Committee-level,
particularly Section 5[34] which denotes that petitioners initial participation in the impeachment proceedings the opportunity to file
an Answer starts after the Committee on Justice finds the complaint sufficient in form and substance. That the Committee refused
to accept petitioners motion for reconsideration from its finding of sufficiency of form of the impeachment complaints is apposite,
conformably with the Impeachment Rules.

Petitioner further claims that public respondent failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints
on the basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its own Impeachment Rules.[35]

The claim fails.

The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an exponent of the express
constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of Representatives which committed such determinative function to public
respondent. In the discharge of that power and in the exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated determinable standards as
to the form and substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential considerations behoove the Court to respect the compliance by
the House of its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any contravention of the minimum constitutional
guidelines.

Contrary to petitioners position that the Impeachment Rules do not provide for comprehensible standards in determining
the sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that
there must be a verified complaint or resolution,[36] and that the substance requirement is met if there is a recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee.[37]

Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of sufficiency of form and substance
of an impeachment complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the organic law, as Section 3(2), Article
XI of the Constitution basically merely requires a hearing. [38] In the discharge of its constitutional duty, the House deemed that a
finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment complaint is vital to effectively carry out the impeachment
process, hence, such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules.

Petitioner urges the Court to look into the narration of facts constitutive of the offenses vis--vis her submissions disclaiming
the allegations in the complaints.

This the Court cannot do.

Francisco instructs that this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislature. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. x x x x Clearly, the issue calls upon this
court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power[.][39] Worse, petitioner urges the
Court to make a preliminary assessment of certain grounds raised, upon a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
complaints, which involve matters of defense.

In another vein, petitioner, pursuing her claim of denial of due process, questions the lack of or, more accurately, delay in the
publication of the Impeachment Rules.

To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010, public respondent provisionally adopted
the Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules,
admittedly substantially identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of general circulation.[40]

Citing Taada v. Tuvera,[41] petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules was
published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise
tacks her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.

Public respondent counters that promulgation in this case refers to the publication of rules in any medium of information,
not necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation.[42]

Differentiating Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations [43] which held that the
Constitution categorically requires publication of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, public respondent explains that the
Impeachment Rules is intended to merely enable Congress to effectively carry out the purpose of Section 3(8), Art. XI of Constitution.

Blacks Law Dictionary broadly defines promulgate as

To publish; to announce officially; to make public as important or obligatory. The formal act of
announcing a statute or rule of court. An administrative order that is given to cause an agency law or
regulation to become known or obligatory.[44] (emphasis supplied)

While promulgation would seem synonymous to publication, there is a statutory difference in their usage.

The Constitution notably uses the word promulgate 12 times.[45] A number of those instances involves the promulgation of
various rules, reports and issuances emanating from Congress, this Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as well as other
constitutional offices.

To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms promulgate and publish, the case of the Judiciary is in
point. In promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in
all courts, the Court has invariably required the publication of these rules for theireffectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is
concerned, however, promulgation means the delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.[46]

Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution contains a similar provision directing Congress to promulgate its rules for the
canvassing of the certificates in the presidential and vice presidential elections. Notably, when Congress approved its canvassing
rules for the May 14, 2010 national elections on May 25, 2010,[47] it did not require the publication thereof for its effectivity. Rather,
Congress made the canvassing rules effective upon its adoption.

In the case of administrative agencies, promulgation and publication likewise take on different meanings as they are part
of a multi-stage procedure in quasi-legislation. As detailed in one case,[48] the publication of implementing rules occurs after their
promulgation or adoption.

Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understoodthat is, to make
known. Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall be generally understood. Between the restricted
sense and the general meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be
used.[49]

Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict promulgation to publication, the former should be understood to
have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment
Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision
to the clerk of court for filing and publication.

It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not
prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the
dictates of the Constitution.

Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but one avenue for Congress to make known its
rules. Jurisprudence emphatically teaches that
x x x in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any
basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the
basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not
within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. In the words of Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to
exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as
well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.[50] (italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated so as categorically as it did in
the case of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, per Neri. Other than promulgate, there is no other single formal term in
the English language to appropriately refer to an issuance without need of it being published.

IN FINE, petitioner cannot take refuge in Neri since inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of
procedure. Significantly notable in Neri is that with respect to the issue of publication, the Court anchored its ruling on
the 1987 Constitutions directive, without any reliance on or reference to the 1986 case of Taada v. Tuvera.[51] Taada naturally
could neither have interpreted a forthcoming 1987 Constitution nor had kept a tight rein on the Constitutions intentions as
expressed through the allowance of either a categorical term or a general sense of making known the issuances.

From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, then Commissioner, now retired Associate Justice Florenz
Regalado intended Section 3(8), Article XI to be the vehicle for the House to fill the gaps in the impeachment process.
MR. REGALADO. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have decided to put in an additional section because, for
instance, under Section 3 (2), there is mention of indorsing a verified complaint for impeachment by any citizen
alleging ultimate facts constituting a ground or grounds for impeachment. In other words, it is just like a
provision in the rules of court. Instead, I propose that this procedural requirement, like indorsement of a
complaint by a citizen to avoid harassment or crank complaints, could very well be taken up in a new section 4
which shall read as follows: THE CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES ON IMPEACHMENT TO
EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES THEREOF. I think all these otherprocedural requirements could
be taken care of by the Rules of Congress.[52] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The discussion clearly rejects the notion that the impeachment provisions are not self-executing. Section 3(8) does not, in
any circumstance, operate to suspend the entire impeachment mechanism which the Constitutional Commission took pains in
designing even its details.
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different
principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a

manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one
more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are selfexecuting. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than nonself-executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to
the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to
pass the needed implementing statute.[53](emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectivity
of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases
where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution would already run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-day period of publication prior to the effectivity of
the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would already violate the Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment complaints
pending the completion of the publication requirement.

Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on impeachment is aimed at effectively carry[ing]
out the purpose of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when the House deemed it proper
to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation of early filing and in
keeping with the effective implementation of the purpose of the impeachment provisions. In other words, the provisional adoption
of the previous Congress Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the avowed purpose.

Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely aid or supplement
the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given retroactive application to pending actions. It
is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise
from, procedural laws.[54] In the present case, petitioner fails to allege any impairment of vested rights.

It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the rights of witnesses are
involved, impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the
offender.[55]

Even Neri concedes that the unpublished rules of legislative inquiries were not considered null and void in its
entirety. Rather,
x x x [o]nly those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and
void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed
in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid
and effective.[56] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner in fact does not deny that she was fully apprised of the proper procedure. She even availed of and invoked certain
provisions[57] of the Impeachment Rules when she, on September 7, 2010, filed the motion for reconsideration and later filed the
present petition. The Court thus finds no violation of the due process clause.

The one-year bar rule

Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.

Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010
or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15 th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second
impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.

On the other hand, public respondent, respondent Reyes group and respondent-intervenor submit that the initiation starts
with the filing of the impeachment complaint and ends with the referral to the Committee, following Francisco, but venture to
alternatively proffer that the initiation ends somewhere between the conclusion of the Committee Report and the transmittal of the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. Respondent Baraquel group, meanwhile, essentially maintains that under either the
prevailing doctrine or the parties interpretation, its impeachment complaint could withstand constitutional scrutiny.

Contrary to petitioners asseveration, Francisco[58] states that the term initiate means to file the complaint and take initial
action on it.[59] The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint
moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking initial action of said complaint. The initial
action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.

Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J. that no second verified impeachment may be accepted
and referred to the Committee on Justice for action[60] which contemplates a situation where a first impeachment complaint had
already

been

referred. Bernas

and

Regalado,

who

both

acted

as amici

curiae in Francisco,

affirmed

that

the

initiating includes the act of taking initial action on the complaint.

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional
Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third[61] of the members
of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be
filed against the same official within a one year period.[62] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

act

of

The Court, in Francisco, thus found that the assailed provisions of the 12th Congress Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings Sections 16[63] and 17[64] of Rule V thereof clearly contravene Section 3(5) of Article XI since they g[a]ve the term
initiate a meaning different from filing and referral.[65]

Petitioner highlights certain portions of Francisco which delve on the relevant records of the Constitutional Commission,
particularly Commissioner Maambongs statements[66] that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint.

Petitioner fails to consider the verb starts as the operative word. Commissioner Maambong was all too keen to stress that the
filing of the complaint indeed starts the initiation and that the Houses action on the committee report/resolution is not part of that
initiation phase.

Commissioner Maambong saw the need to be very technical about this, [67] for certain exchanges in the Constitutional
Commission deliberations loosely used the term, as shown in the following exchanges.
MR. DAVIDE. That is for conviction, but not for initiation. Initiation of impeachment proceedings still
requires a vote of one-fifth of the membership of the House under the 1935 Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. A two-thirds vote of the membership of the House is required to initiate proceedings.
MR. DAVIDE. No. for initiation of impeachment proceedings, only one-fifth vote of the membership of the
House is required; for conviction, a two-thirds vote of the membership is required.
xxxx
MR. DAVIDE. However, if we allow one-fifth of the membership of the legislature to overturn a report of the
committee, we have here Section 3 (4) which reads:
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.
So, necessarily, under this particular subsection, we will, in effect, disallow one-fifth of the members of the
National Assembly to revive an impeachment move by an individual or an ordinary Member.
MR. ROMULO. Yes. May I say that Section 3 (4) is there to look towards the possibility of a very liberal
impeachment proceeding. Second, we were ourselves struggling with that problem where we are faced with just a
verified complaint rather than the signatures of one-fifth, or whatever it is we decide, of the Members of the
House. So whether to put a period for the Committee to report, whether we should not allow the Committee to
overrule a mere verified complaint, are some of the questions we would like to be discussed.
MR. DAVIDE. We can probably overrule a rejection by the Committee by providing that it can be overturned
by, say, one-half or a majority, or one-fifth of the members of the legislature, and that such overturning will not
amount to a refiling which is prohibited under Section 3 (4).
Another point, Madam President. x x x[68] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

An apparent effort to clarify the term initiate was made by Commissioner Teodulo Natividad:
MR. NATIVIDAD. How many votes are needed to initiate?
MR. BENGZON. One-third.
MR. NATIVIDAD. To initiate is different from to impeach; to impeach is different from to convict. To
impeach means to file the case before the Senate.

MR. REGALADO. When we speak of initiative, we refer here to the Articles of Impeachment.
MR. NATIVIDAD. So, that is the impeachment itself, because when we impeach, we are charging him with
the Articles of Impeachment. That is my understanding.[69] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Capping these above-quoted discussions was the explanation of Commissioner Maambong delivered on at least two occasions:
[I]
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the
amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not really
initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that
the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee
resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the
initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings
of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution,
and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body
which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on
Style could help in rearranging the words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with
me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings
on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already
decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.[70] (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
[II]
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My
reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only with keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules
of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of its provision, that on page 2, Section 3
(3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: to initiate impeachment proceedings and the comma (,)
and insert on line 19 after the word resolution the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter i in
impeachment and replace the word by with OF, so that the whole section will now read: A vote of at least onethird of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of
impeachment OF the committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the United
States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always
carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words Articles of Impeachment are mentioned
on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified complaint of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will
mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping
with the uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress.
Thank you, Madam President.[71] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To the next logical question of what ends or completes the initiation, Commissioners Bernas and Regalado lucidly explained
that the filing of the complaint must be accompanied by the referral to the Committee on Justice, which is the action that sets the
complaint moving. Francisco cannot be any clearer in pointing out the material dates.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section
3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint was filed by former President Estrada against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2,
2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed
by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23,
2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.[72] (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

These clear pronouncements notwithstanding, petitioner posits that the date of referral was considered irrelevant
in Francisco. She submits that referral could not be the reckoning point of initiation because something prior to that had already
been done,[73] apparently citing Bernas discussion.

The Court cannot countenance any attempt at obscurantism.

What the cited discussion was rejecting was the view that the Houses action on the committee report initiates the
impeachment proceedings. It did not state that to determine the initiating step, absolutely nothing prior to it must be
done. Following petitioners line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House steps
done prior to the filing would already initiate the impeachment proceedings.

Contrary

to

petitioners

emphasis

on

impeachment complaint,

what

the

Constitution

mentions

is

impeachment

proceedings. Her reliance on the singular tense of the word complaint[74] to denote the limit prescribed by the
Constitution goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural sense.[75]

The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the
candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the
matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring
the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed,
more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there should only be
ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer
rekindle the candle.

A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism both illusive and illusory.

For one, it puts premium on senseless haste. Petitioners stance suggests that whoever files the first impeachment complaint
exclusively gets the attention of Congress which sets in motion an exceptional once-a-year mechanism wherein government resources
are devoted. A prospective complainant, regardless of ill motives or best intentions, can wittingly or unwittingly desecrate the entire
process by the expediency of submitting a haphazard complaint out of sheer hope to be the first in line. It also puts to naught the
effort of other prospective complainants who, after diligently gathering evidence first to buttress the case, would be barred days or
even hours later from filing an impeachment complaint.

Placing an exceedingly narrow gateway to the avenue of impeachment proceedings turns its laudable purpose into a laughable
matter. One needs only to be an early bird even without seriously intending to catch the worm, when the process is precisely
intended to effectively weed out worms in high offices which could otherwise be ably caught by other prompt birds within the ultralimited season.

Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part of the actual complainants, injured party or principal
witnesses who, by mere happenstance of an almost always unforeseeable filing of a first impeachment complaint, would be brushed
aside and restricted from directly participating in the impeachment process.

Further, prospective complainants, along with their counsel and members of the House of Representatives who sign, endorse
and file subsequent impeachment complaints against the same impeachable officer run the risk of violating the Constitution since
they would have already initiated a second impeachment proceeding within the same year. Virtually anybody can initiate a second or
third impeachment proceeding by the mere filing of endorsed impeachment complaints. Without any public notice that could charge
them with knowledge, even members of the House of Representatives could not readily ascertain whether no other impeachment
complaint has been filed at the time of committing their endorsement.

The question as to who should administer or pronounce that an impeachment proceeding has been initiated rests also on the
body

that

administers

the

proceedings

prior

to

the

impeachment

trial. As

gathered

from

Commissioner

Bernas

disquisition[76] in Francisco, a proceeding which takes place not in the Senate but in the House[77] precedes the bringing of an
impeachment case to the Senate. In fact, petitioner concedes that the initiation of impeachment proceedings is within the sole and
absolute control of the House of Representatives.[78] Conscious of the legal import of each step, the House, in taking charge of its own
proceedings, must deliberately decide to initiate an impeachment proceeding, subject to the time frame and other limitations imposed
by the Constitution. This chamber of Congress alone, not its officers or members or any private individual, should own up to its
processes.

The Constitution did not place the power of the final say on the lips of the House Secretary General who would otherwise be
calling the shots in forwarding or freezing any impeachment complaint. Referral of the complaint to the proper committee is not done
by the House Speaker alone either, which explains why there is a need to include it in the Order of Business of the House. It is the
House of Representatives, in public plenary session, which has the power to set its own chamber into special operation by referring
the complaint or to otherwise guard against the initiation of a second impeachment proceeding by rejecting a patently
unconstitutional complaint.

Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that shall be decided without debate, but any
debate thereon is only made subject to the five-minute rule.[79] Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice that a motion to refer a
matter or question to a committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only as to the propriety of the
referral.[80] With respect to complaints for impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment
complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records and further debate show that an impeachment complaint filed against
the same impeachable officer has already been referred to the said committee and the one year period has not yet expired, lest it
becomes instrumental in perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second impeachment proceeding. Far from being mechanical,
before the referral stage, a period of deliberation is afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three
session days within which to make the proper referral.

As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines. The
Constitution states that [a] verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.

In the present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the allegedly belated referral of the first
impeachment complaint filed by the Baraquel group. For while the said complaint was filed on July 22, 2010, there was yet then no
session in Congress. It was only four days later or on July 26, 2010 that the 15th Congress opened from which date the 10-day
session period started to run. When, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, Speaker Belmonte directed the Committee on Rules to
include the complaint in its Order of Business, it was well within the said 10-day session period.[81]

There is no evident point in rushing at closing the door the moment an impeachment complaint is filed. Depriving the people
(recall that impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic) of reasonable access to the limited political vent
simply prolongs the agony and frustrates the collective rage of an entire citizenry whose trust has been betrayed by an impeachable
officer. It shortchanges the promise of reasonable opportunity to remove an impeachable officer through the mechanism enshrined in
the Constitution.

But neither does the Court find merit in respondents alternative contention that the initiation of the impeachment proceedings,
which sets into motion the one-year bar, should include or await, at the earliest, the Committee on Justice report. To public
respondent, the reckoning point of initiation should refer to the disposition of the complaint by the vote of at least one-third (1/3) of
all the members of the House.[82] To the Reyes group, initiation means the act of transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the
Senate.[83] To respondent-intervenor, it should last until the Committee on Justices recommendation to the House plenary.[84]

The Court, in Francisco, rejected a parallel thesis in which a related proposition was inputed in the therein assailed provisions
of the Impeachment Rules of the 12thCongress. The present case involving an impeachment proceeding against the Ombudsman
offers no cogent reason for the Court to deviate from what was settled in Franciscothat dealt with the impeachment proceeding against
the then Chief Justice. To change the reckoning point of initiation on no other basis but to accommodate the socio-political
considerations of respondents does not sit well in a court of law.
x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine, which is
really "adherence to precedents," mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then another case involving
exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner. This doctrine is one of policy grounded on
the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo
stated in his treatise The Nature of the Judicial Process:
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the
opposite way between another. "If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect
the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite
principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for
the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of
resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my
rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to
have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the courts.[85]

As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed
on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step
in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is
filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.[86]

Allowing an expansive construction of the term initiate beyond the act of referral allows the unmitigated influx of successive
complaints, each having their own respective 60-session-day period of disposition from referral. Worse, the Committee shall conduct
overlapping hearings until and unless the disposition of one of the complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution for
impeachment or the overriding[87] of a contrary resolution (as espoused by public respondent), or the House transmits the Articles of
Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group),[88] or the Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House plenary
regardless of the recommendation (as posited by respondent-intervenor). Each of these scenarios runs roughshod the very purpose
behind the constitutionally imposed one-year bar. Opening the floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series of steps operating in
unison under one proceeding.

The Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining only one impeachment proceeding in a year. Petitioner
concededly cites Justice Adolfo Azcunas separate opinion that concurred with the Francisco ruling.[89] Justice Azcuna stated that the
purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its
principal task [of] legislation, with main reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission, that reads:
MR. ROMULO. Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only to protect public officials who, in
this case, are of the highest category from harassment but also to allow the legislative body to do its work which is
lawmaking. Impeachment proceedings take a lot of time. And if we allow multiple impeachment charges on the
same individual to take place, the legislature will do nothing else but that.[90] (underscoring supplied)

It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the element of time, and not the number of
complaints. The impeachable officer should defend himself in only one impeachment proceeding, so that he will not be precluded
from performing his official functions and duties. Similarly, Congress should run only one impeachment proceeding so as not to leave
it with little time to attend to its main work of law-making. The doctrine laid down in Francisco that initiation means filing andreferral
remains congruent to the rationale of the constitutional provision.

Petitioner complains that an impeachable officer may be subjected to harassment by the filing of multiple impeachment
complaints during the intervening period of a maximum of 13 session days between the date of the filing of the first impeachment
complaint to the date of referral.

As pointed out during the oral arguments[91] by the counsel for respondent-intervenor, the framework of privilege and layers of
protection for an impeachable officer abound. The requirements or restrictions of a one-year bar, a single proceeding, verification of
complaint, endorsement by a House member, and a finding of sufficiency of form and substance all these must be met before
bothering a respondent to answer already weigh heavily in favor of an impeachable officer.

Aside from the probability of an early referral and the improbability of inclusion in the agenda of a complaint filed on the 11th
hour (owing to pre-agenda standard operating procedure), the number of complaints may still be filtered or reduced to nil after the
Committee decides once and for all on the sufficiency of form and substance. Besides, if only to douse petitioners fear, a complaint
will not last the primary stage if it does not have the stated preliminary requisites.

To petitioner, disturbance of her performance of official duties and the deleterious effects of bad publicity are enough
oppression.

Petitioners claim is based on the premise that the exertion of time, energy and other resources runs directly proportional to the
number of complaints filed. This is non sequitur. What the Constitution assures an impeachable officer is not freedom from arduous
effort to defend oneself, which depends on the qualitative assessment of the charges and evidence and not on the quantitative aspect
of complaints or offenses. In considering the side of the impeachable officers, the Constitution does not promise an absolutely smooth
ride for them, especially if the charges entail genuine and grave issues. The framers of the Constitution did not concern themselves
with the media tolerance level or internal disposition of an impeachable officer when they deliberated on the impairment of
performance of official functions. The measure of protection afforded by the Constitution is that if the impeachable officer is made to
undergo such ride, he or she should be made to traverse it just once. Similarly, if Congress is called upon to operate itself as a
vehicle, it should do so just once. There is no repeat ride for one full year. This is the whole import of the constitutional safeguard of
one-year bar rule.

Applicability of the Rules

on Criminal Procedure

On another plane, petitioner posits that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own
Impeachment Rules, the same rules she earlier chastised.

In the exercise of the power to promulgate rules to effectively carry out the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution, the House promulgated the Impeachment Rules, Section 16 of which provides that the Rules of Criminal Procedure
under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before the House.

Finding that the Constitution, by express grant, permits the application of additional adjective rules that Congress may
consider in effectively carrying out its mandate, petitioner either asserts or rejects two procedural devices.

First is on the one offense, one complaint rule. By way of reference to Section 16 of the Impeachment Rules, petitioner
invokes the application of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that [a] complaint or information

must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses. To petitioner, the two
impeachment complaints are insufficient in form and substance since each charges her with both culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust. She concludes that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its
own rules.

Petitioner adds that heaping two or more charges in one complaint will confuse her in preparing her defense; expose her to the
grave dangers of the highly political nature of the impeachment process; constitute a whimsical disregard of certain rules; impair her
performance of official functions as well as that of the House; and prevent public respondent from completing its report within the
deadline.

Public respondent counters that there is no requirement in the Constitution that an impeachment complaint must charge only
one offense, and the nature of impeachable offenses precludes the application of the above-said Rule on Criminal Procedure since the
broad terms cannot be defined with the same precision required in defining crimes. It adds that the determination of the grounds for
impeachment is an exercise of political judgment, which issue respondent-intervenor also considers as non-justiciable, and to which
the Baraquel group adds that impeachment is a political process and not a criminal prosecution, during which criminal prosecution
stage the complaint or information referred thereto and cited by petitioner, unlike an impeachment complaint, must already be in the
name of the People of the Philippines.

The Baraquel group deems that there are provisions[92] outside the Rules on Criminal Procedure that are more relevant to the
issue. Both the Baraquel and Reyes groups point out that even if Sec. 13 of Rule 110 is made to apply, petitioners case falls under
the exception since impeachment prescribes a single punishment removal from office and disqualification to hold any public office
even for various offenses. Both groups also observe that petitioner concededly and admittedly was not keen on pursuing this issue
during the oral arguments.

Petitioners claim deserves scant consideration.

Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory application of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in carrying out the relevant
constitutional provisions, which prerogative the Constitution vests on Congress, and without delving into the practicability of the
application of the one offense per complaint rule, the initial determination of which must be made by the House [93] which has yet to
pass upon the question, the Court finds that petitioners invocation of that particular rule of Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice
it to state that the Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an article of
impeachment, assembled in one set known as the Articles of Impeachment. [94] It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint
need not allege only one impeachable offense.

The second procedural matter deals with the rule on consolidation. In rejecting a consolidation, petitioner maintains that
the Constitution allows only one impeachment complaint against her within one year.

Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to consolidate. Its chairperson Rep. Tupas stated that
[c]onsolidation depends on the Committee whether to consolidate[; c]onsolidation may come today or may come later on after
determination of the sufficiency in form and substance, and that for purposes of consolidation, the Committee will decide when is
the time to consolidate[, a]nd if, indeed, we need to consolidate.[95] Petitioners petition, in fact, initially describes the consolidation
as merely contemplated.[96]
Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet order a consolidation, the Court will not venture
to make a determination on this matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or anticipatory.[97]
Even

if

the

Court

assumes

petitioners

change

of

stance

that

the

two

impeachment

complaints

were deemed consolidated,[98] her claim that consolidation is a legal anomaly fails. Petitioners theory obviously springs from her
proceeding = complaint equation which the Court already brushed aside.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 of public
respondent, the House of Representatives Committee on Justice, are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order issued
by the Court on September 14, 2010 is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

DEMETRIA VS ALBA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987
DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, M.P., ORLANDO S. MERCADO, M.P., HONORATO Y. AQUINO, M.P.,
ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, M.P., DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, M.P., OSCAR F. SANTOS, M.P., ALBERTO G. ROMULO, M.P., CIRIACO R.
ALFELOR, M.P., ISIDORO E. REAL, M.P., EMIGDIO L. LINGAD, M.P., ROLANDO C. MARCIAL, M.P., PEDRO M. MARCELLANA,
M.P., VICTOR S. ZIGA, M.P., and ROGELIO V. GARCIA. M.P., petitioners,
vs.
HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the MINISTER OF THE BUDGET and VICTOR MACALINGCAG in his capacity as the
TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FERNAN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is the constitutionality of the first paragraph of
Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977."

Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan
Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and
as taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for" 1 listed the grounds relied upon in this
petition as follows:
A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977' INFRINGES UPON THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW BY
AUTHORIZING THE ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEYS.
B. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 IS REPUGNANT TO THE CONSTITUTION AS IT FAILS TO
SPECIFY THE OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF FUNDS ARE TO BE
MADE.
C. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 ALLOWS THE PRESIDENT TO OVERRIDE THE
SAFEGUARDS, FORM AND PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN APPROVING
APPROPRIATIONS.
D. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DECREE AMOUNTS TO AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO
THE EXECUTIVE.
E. THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF BY THE BUDGET MINISTER AND THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF THEIR AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION. 2
Commenting on the petition in compliance with the Court resolution dated September 19, 1985, the Solicitor General, for the public
respondents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners, who were allegedly merely begging an advisory opinion from the Court, there
being no justiciable controversy fit for resolution or determination. He further contended that the provision under consideration was
enacted pursuant to Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution; and that at any rate, prohibition will not lie from one branch
of the government to a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility.
On February 27, 1986, the Court required the petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment. This, they did, stating, among others, that
as a result of the change in the administration, there is a need to hold the resolution of the present case in abeyance "until
developments arise to enable the parties to concretize their respective stands." 3
Thereafter, We required public respondents to file a rejoinder. The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss, setting
forth as grounds therefor the abrogation of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution of March
25, 1986, which has allegedly rendered the instant petition moot and academic. He likewise cited the "seven pillars" enunciated by
Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) 4 as basis for the petition's dismissal.
In the case of Evelio B. Javier v. The Commission on Elections and Arturo F. Pacificador, G.R. Nos. 68379-81, September 22, 1986, We
stated that:
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute between the petitioner and
the private respondents both of whom have gone their separate ways could be a convenient justification for
dismissing the case. But there are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to
dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms
that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case
has become moot and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government. The
citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are
times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible
according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it
nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged
right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
It is in the discharge of our role in society, as above-quoted, as well as to avoid great disservice to national interest that We take
cognizance of this petition and thus deny public respondents' motion to dismiss. Likewise noteworthy is the fact that the new
Constitution, ratified by the Filipino people in the plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, carries verbatim section 16[5], Article VIII of
the 1973 Constitution under Section 24[5], Article VI. And while Congress has not officially reconvened, We see no cogent reason for
further delaying the resolution of the case at bar.
The exception taken to petitioners' legal standing deserves scant consideration. The case of Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, et al.,
110 Phil. 331, is authority in support of petitioners' locus standi. Thus:

Again, it is well-settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in
consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws
providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer
of the state for the purpose of administering anunconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds which
may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Although there are some decisions to the contrary, the prevailing view
in the United States is stated in the American Jurisprudence as follows:
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the
constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but
also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by
taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public
moneys. [ 11 Am. Jur. 761, Emphasis supplied. ]
Moreover, in Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 and Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333, We said that as regards taxpayers' suits, this
Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not.
The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution
is readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading thereof. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment.
On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:
Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime
Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commis ions may by
law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical under the 1973 Constitution.
However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those of the constitutional commissions considerable
flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds
for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional
body concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified,
i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from
another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the
President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are
to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not
only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers,
but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
"For the love of money is the root of all evil: ..." and money belonging to no one in particular, i.e. public funds, provide an even greater
temptation for misappropriation and embezzlement. This, evidently, was foremost in the minds of the framers of the constitution in
meticulously prescribing the rules regarding the appropriation and disposition of public funds as embodied in Sections 16 and 18 of
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Hence, the conditions on the release of money from the treasury [Sec. 18(1)]; the restrictions on
the use of public funds for public purpose [Sec. 18(2)]; the prohibition to transfer an appropriation for an item to another [See. 16(5)
and the requirement of specifications [Sec. 16(2)], among others, were all safeguards designed to forestall abuses in the expenditure of
public funds. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 puts all these safeguards to naught. For, as correctly observed by petitioners, in view of the
unlimited authority bestowed upon the President, "... Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for the enactment of unfunded
appropriations, results in uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses accountability for budgetary performance and entrenches the
pork barrel system as the ruling party may well expand [sic] public money not on the basis of development priorities but on political
and personal expediency." 5 The contention of public respondents that paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. 1177 was enacted pursuant
to Section 16(5) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution must perforce fall flat on its face.
Another theory advanced by public respondents is that prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government against a coordinate
branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility.
Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations," Vol. 1, Eight Edition, Little, Brown and Company, Boston,
explained:

... The legislative and judicial are coordinate departments of the government, of equal dignity; each is alike supreme
in the exercise of its proper functions, and cannot directly or indirectly, while acting within the limits of its
authority, be subjected to the control or supervision of the other, without an unwarrantable assumption by that
other of power which, by the Constitution, is not conferred upon it. The Constitution apportions the powers of
government, but it does not make any one of the three departments subordinate to another, when exercising the
trust committed to it. The courts may declare legislative enactments unconstitutional and void in some cases, but
not because the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity to the legislative. Being required to declare what the
law is in the cases which come before them, they must enforce the Constitution, as the paramount law, whenever a
legislative enactment comes in conflict with it. But the courts sit, not to review or revise the legislative action, but to
enforce the legislative will, and it is only where they find that the legislature has failed to keep within its
constitutional limits, that they are at liberty to disregard its action; and in doing so, they only do what every private
citizen may do in respect to the mandates of the courts when the judges assumed to act and to render judgments or
decrees without jurisdiction. "In exercising this high authority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are
only the administrators of the public will. If an act of the legislature is held void, it is not because the judges have
any control over the legislative power, but because the act is forbidden by the Constitution, and because the will of
the people, which is therein declared, is paramount to that of their representatives expressed in any law." [Lindsay
v. Commissioners, & c., 2 Bay, 38, 61; People v. Rucker, 5 Col. 5; Russ v. Com., 210 Pa. St. 544; 60 Atl. 169, 1
L.R.A. [N.S.] 409, 105 Am. St. Rep. 825] (pp. 332-334).
Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to
interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the
duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do as void. This is the essence of judicial
power conferred by the Constitution "in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Section
1 of the 1935 Constitution; Art. X, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution,
and Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution] and which power this Court has exercised in many instances. *
Public respondents are being enjoined from acting under a provision of law which We have earlier mentioned to be constitutionally
infirm. The general principle relied upon cannot therefore accord them the protection sought as they are not acting within their
"sphere of responsibility" but without it.
The nation has not recovered from the shock, and worst, the economic destitution brought about by the plundering of the Treasury by
the deposed dictator and his cohorts. A provision which allows even the slightest possibility of a repetition of this sad experience
cannot remain written in our statute books.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is hereby declared null and
void for being unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.

Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez vs. The House Of Representatives Committee On Justice, et.al.
G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011
Carpio, Morales, J.:
Doctrine: x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. As pointed out in Francisco, the
impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because
something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or
beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for
action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
Facts: On July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, et.al. (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint
against petitioner. On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes et.al. (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint.
Both impeachment complaints were endorsed by different Party-List Representatives.
On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the Committee on Rules, instructed the Deputy
Secretary General for Operations to include the two complaints in the Order of Business, which was complied with by their inclusion
in the Order of Business for the following day.
On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints
to public respondent.
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it
considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time.
Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published on September 2, 2010.
On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September 1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent. Public
respondent refused to accept the motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice for her to file an
answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55 members of public respondent.
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation
of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance. The determination of the sufficiency of substance of the
complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of whether valid
judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to file an
answer to the complaints within 10 days.

Issue: When is impeachment deemed initiated? (Does the present impeachment complaint violate the one-year bar rule under the
Constitution?)

Held: The one-year bar rule. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four
days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second
impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.
Following petitioners line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House steps done

prior to the filing would already initiate the impeachment proceedings.

Contrary to petitioners emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is impeachment proceedings. Her
reliance on the singular tense of the word complaint to denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the basic rule of
statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural sense.
The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the candle
of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick
alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the complaint
to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one
lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in
a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.
Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that shall be decided without debate, but any debate
thereon is only made subject to the five-minute rule. Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice that a motion to refer a matter or
question to a committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only as to the propriety of the referral. With respect to
complaints for impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment complaint to the Committee on
Justice where official records and further debate show that an impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable officer has
already been referred to the said committee and the one year period has not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in perpetrating
a constitutionally prohibited second impeachment proceeding. Far from being mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of
deliberation is afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three session days within which to make the
proper referral.
As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines. The Constitution
states that [a] verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon
a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.

x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment
proceeding is not initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior
to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning.
Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action.
This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.

Allowing an expansive construction of the term initiate beyond the act of referral allows the unmitigated influx of successive
complaints, each having their own respective 60-session-day period of disposition from referral. Worse, the Committee shall conduct
overlapping hearings until and unless the disposition of one of the complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution for
impeachment or the overriding[ of a contrary resolution (as espoused by public respondent), or the House transmits the Articles of
Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group), or the Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House plenary
regardless of the recommendation (as posited by respondent-intervenor). Each of these scenarios runs roughshod the very purpose

behind the constitutionally imposed one-year bar. Opening the floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series of steps operating in
unison under one proceeding.

PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ
PHILCONSA vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994
Facts:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of
Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed
budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the pork
barrels allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the
said bill to the President for consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act NO. 7663,
entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY
ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (GAA of 1994). On the
same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he
imposed certain conditions, as follows:
Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994 GAA. And that
appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign
Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative
Code of 1987.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds in
the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs),
Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).
The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on
the Use of Fund, which requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well
as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on the Specific Prohibition which states that the said Modernization Fund shall not be used for
payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers

6.
New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds.
7.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress.
Issue:

whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b)
Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units
(CAFGUS) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) are constitutional; whether or not the veto of the special provision in the
appropriation for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional
Held:

The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process. There is, therefore, sound
basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its
use is a violation of the Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act)
and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done
in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special
provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their
income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by virtue
of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the one-fund policy (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm,
P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and Managements
Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is unconstitutional. The Special
Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road
maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the formulary
embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an appropriate provision. Being directly related to and
inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the
President without also vetoing the said item.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of Fund for the AFP modernization program that the President must
submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the congressional or legislative veto.
However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special

Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being inappropriate provisions,
Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of the trainer planes and
armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of
laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of
said special provision is therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed
by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special Provision that
would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000
CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such
purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commanderin-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGUs to be amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations to the Supreme Court,
constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures
shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or
inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take necessary and proper steps to carry into
execution the law. These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.

BELGICA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

710 SCRA 1 Political Law Constitutional Law Local Government Invalid Delegation
Legislative Department Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lumpsum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to
the latest Priority Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40 million for hard projects (infrastructure projects like
roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for soft projects (scholarshipgrants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT
development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for the realignment
of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two
sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential
Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by
Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles.
Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-government organizations)
which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to ghost projects.
An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:

a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other
hand, implements the laws this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but
under the pork barrel system, whats happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate
as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to a clear act of implementing the law they enacted a violation of the
principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF
or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds
go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator
concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people legislative power but
only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by
Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war
or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a
violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two
houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the
Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be
inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now
identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by
the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which
effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the
LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the
members of the house of representatives, whats happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC
and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national officer)
meddles with the affairs of the local government and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local
autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund
on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29
(1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any
appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD
1993), which amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a
special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which
the President may direct;

(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the
Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated
therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.