CITIZENSHIP IN THE PHILIPPINES

Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child, born
of a Filipino mother and an alien father, followed the citizenship of the father unless, upon reaching the age of
majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article
IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of
Philippine citizenship. However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within
which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election
should be made upon reaching the age of majority. The age of majority then commenced upon reaching
twenty-one (21) years. In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of
Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to
the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was,
in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that
the election should be made within a reasonable time after attaining the age of majority. The phrase reasonable
time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age
of majority.
The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time that person reached the age of majority until he
finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the
requirement of electing upon reaching the age of majority.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right
to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude.
(Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, Bar Matter No. 914, Oct. 1,
1999, En Banc [Kapunan])

Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has
nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited private respondents
application for an alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on
September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988.
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In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be EXPRESS. Petitioners
contention, that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her Australian
passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar v. COMELEC (185 SCRA 703 [1990])
and in the more recent case of Mercado v. Manzano and COMELEC (G.R. No. 135083, 307 SCRA 630, May 26,
1999).
In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that he is an American did not mean that he is
no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
And, in Mercado v. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent Manzano was
registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American
passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were
just assertions of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport
and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not

militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship,
the same must be express. As held by this Court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien
certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of ones citizenship. The
application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian
passport, as in the case of Mercado v. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before
she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship she was an
Australian and a Filipino, as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another
country has not been included as a ground for losing ones Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did
not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioners claim that respondent must go through the process of
repatriation does not hold water.
(Valles v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543, Aug. 9, 2000, En Banc [Purisima])

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may x x x reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.
Commonwealth Act No. 63 enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a
former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
(Frivaldo
v.
COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727, June 28, 1996, En Banc [Panganiban]; Antonio Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No.
142840, May 7, 2001, En Banc [Kapunan])
NATURALIZATION is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a
mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63 (An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or
Reacquired [1936]). Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship
must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
REPATRIATION, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship
due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces (Section 4, C.A. No. 63); (2) service in the armed forces of the allied
forces in World War II (Section 1, Republic Act No. 965 [1953]); (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United
States at any other time (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 2630 [1960]); (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien
(Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 8171 [1995]); and (5) political and economic necessity (Ibid).
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, REPATRIATION simply consists of the taking
of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry
of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic (314 SCRA 438 [1999]), we held:
[P]arenthetically, under these statutes (referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630), the person desiring to
reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to
do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the
civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other
hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino. (Antonio Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, En Banc
[Kapunan])

R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on October 23, 1995, is an act providing for the repatriation (a)
of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born
Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
(Gerardo Angat v. Republic, G.R. No. 132244, Sept. 14, 1999 [Vitug])

Under Section 1 of P.D. No. 725, dated June 5, 1975, amending C.A. No. 63, an application for
repatriation could be filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization, chaired by the Solicitor General with
the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency as the
other members. Although the agency was deactivated by virtue of President Corazon C. Aquinos Memorandum of
March 27, 1987, it was not, however, abrogated. The Committee was reactivated on June 8, 1995. Hence, the
application should be filed with said Agency, not with the Regional Trial Court. (Gerardo Angat v. Republic,
G.R. No. 132244, Sept. 14, 1999 [Vitug])
REPATRIATION results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other
hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruzs case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of
the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which
provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces
of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil
Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance
shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the
Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed
to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a
Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status
before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioners contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an
act to regain his citizenship is untenable. [T]he term natural-born citizen was first defined in Article III, Section 4
of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Section 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen
from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not
considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973 (the date of
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution), of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine
citizenship. Those naturalized citizens were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not
Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform
an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After
defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the
enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those
who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized
Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily

is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in the said enumeration of a separate category for persons
who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefore is clear: as to such persons,
they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship
and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not
required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a
natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House
of Representatives. (Antonio Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, En Banc [Kapunan])
DUAL CITIZENSHIP arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may
arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a
state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
DUAL ALLEGIANCE, on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the
result of an individuals volition. (Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630, May 26, 1999, En Banc [Mendoza])

In including Section 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional

Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain
their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the
phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) (Local Government Code) must
be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who
must, x x x, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificate of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws
of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from
the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign
citizenship. That is of no moment. (Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, 307 SCRA 630, May 26, 1999
[Mendoza])

1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of
jus soli;
2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers
country such children are citizens of that country;
3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
(Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, 307 SCRA 630, May 26, 1999 [Mendoza])
Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the
resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the
same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971]). He insists that
the same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew.
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e., the principle of res judicata generally does
not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca v. Republic (51 SCRA 248
[1973]), an exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine
of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:

1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof,
and
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the
weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent
official findings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier or simpler. (Valles v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA
543, Aug. 9, 2000, En Banc [Purisima])