Abdula vs Guiani

A petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the

warrant of arrest issued by herein respondent Japal
guiani, then presiding judge of Branch 14 of RTC of
Cotabato City, was filed before the Supreme Court.
A complaint for murder was filed but was dismissed by
the provincial prosecutor on the gorund that there was
no prima facie case for murder again a number of
accused (6). However, he recommended the filing of an
information for murder against one of the respondents
(accused) only before the sala of the respondent judge
Guiani. Guiani returned the case to the provincial
prosecutor for further investigation since there was no
necessary resolution required under the Rules of Court
to show how the investigating prosecutor arrived at
such a conclusion (charging only one of the 8
respondent-accused). Upon the return of the records of
the case, it was assigned for reinvestigation to another
prosecutor who then recommended the filing of
charges against 5 accused, 2 of whom are herein
petitioners.
On January 2, 1995, an information was filed against
petitioner-spouses and 3 others. The following day,
January 3, respondent Judge issued a warrant for the
arrest of petitioners. On January 4, petitioners filed an
urgent Ex-Parte motion for the setting aside of saide
warrant of arrest. On January 11, a petition for review
was filed with the DOJ. Despite said filing, respondent
judge did not act upon petitioners pending Motion to
Set Aside the Warrant of Arrest.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
praying the warrant of Arrest be set aside and declared
void ab initio.
Issue: WON the Warrant of Arrest should be set aside
and declared void ab initio.
Held: Section 2, Art. III, 1987 Constititution: The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and NO SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT
OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE
CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE
AFTER EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION OF
THE COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES HE MAY
PRODUCE and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
It must be stressed that the 1987 Constitution requires
the judge to determine probable cause "personally," a
requirement which does not appear in the
corresponding provisions of our previous constitutions.
This emphasis evinces the intent of the framers to
place a greater degree of
responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed
under previous Constitutions. What the Constitution
underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility
of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence
of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine
the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting

documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the

existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof
he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Ho vs. People 41 summarizes existing jurisprudence on
the matter as follows:
Lest we be too repetitive, we only wish to emphasize
three vital matters once more: First, as held in Inting,
the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor
is for a purpose different from that which is to be made
by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to
believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged and should be held for trial is what the
prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand,
determines whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a
necessity for placing him under immediate custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
Second, since their objectives are different, the judge
cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in
finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. The judge must decide
independently. Hence, he must have supporting
evidence, other than the prosecutor's bare report, upon
which to legally sustain his own findings on the
existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue
an arrest order. This responsibility of determining
personally and independently the existence or
nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no
less than the most basic law of the land.
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire
records of the case during the preliminary investigation
be submitted to and examined by the judge. What is
required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient
supporting documents (such as the complaint,
affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of
witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if any)
upon which to make his independent judgment or, at
the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the
prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The
point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the
prosecutor's recommendation, as Respondent Court did
in this case.
In the case at bench, respondent admits that he issued
the questioned warrant as there was "no reason for
(him) to doubt the validity of the certification made by
the Assistant Prosecutor that a preliminary
investigation was conducted and that probable cause
was found to exist as against those charged in the
information filed." The statement is an admission that
respondent relied solely and completely on the
certification made by the fiscal that probable cause
exists as against those charged in the information and
issued the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole
basis of the prosecutor's findings and
recommendations. He adopted the judgment of the
prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause
as his own. CONSEQUENTLY, THE WARRANT OF ARREST
SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID.

People v. Doria
Members of the PNP Narcotics Command received
information that one Jun [Doria] was engaged in
illegal drug activities, so they decided to entrap and
arrest him in a buy-bust operation. He was arrested.
They frisked him but did not find the marked bills on
him, and upon inquiry, he revealed that he left it at the
house of his associate Neneth [Gaddao], so he led
the police team to her house.
The team found the door open and a woman inside the
house. Jun identified her as Neneth, and she was
asked by SPO1 Badua about the marked money as PO3
Manlangit looked over her house [he was still outside
the house]. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit
noticed a carton box under the dining table. One of the
box s flaps was open, and inside it was something
wrapped in plastic, and it appeared similar to the
marijuana earlier sold to him by Jun. His suspicion
aroused, so he entered the house and took hold of the
box. He peeked inside the box and saw 10 bricks of
what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. SPO1
Badua recovered the marked bills from Neneth and
they arrested her. The bricks were examined and they
were found to be dried marijuana leaves.
Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with
violation of RA 6425 [Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972],
Section 4 [Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution
and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs] in relation to
Section 21 [Attempt and Conspiracy]. RTC convicted
them.
ISSUE AND HOLDING
WON RTC correctly found that the box of marijuana was
in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid. NO
RATIO
Re: warrantless arrest
Gaddao s warrantless arrest was illegal because she
was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged
identification made by Doria. Doria did not point to her
as his associate in the drug business, but as the person
with whom he left the marked bills. This identification
does not necessarily mean that Gaddao conspired with
Doria in pushing drugs. If there is no showing that the
person who effected the warrantless arrest had
knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to
the perpetration of the criminal offense, the arrest is
legally objectionable.
Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, the
search of her person and home and the subsequent
seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be
deemed legal as an incident to her arrest.
Plain view issue
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a
right to be in the position to have that view are subject
to seizure even without a search warrant and may be
introduced in evidence.
Requisites
a. The law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can
view a particular area

b.

The discovery of the evidence in plain view is

inadvertent

c.

It is immediately apparent to the officer that

the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure

An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly

exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when the object
is inside a closed container. Where the object seized
was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in
plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a
warrant. If the package is such that an experienced
observer could infer from its appearance that it
contains the prohibited article, then the article is
deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent
to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject
to seizure.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he
was sure that the contents of the box were marijuana
because he himself checked and marked the said
contents. On cross-examination, however, he admitted
that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana
because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buybust marijuana." Each of the ten bricks of marijuana
in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper
and placed inside plastic bags-- white, pink or blue in
color. PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on crossexamination that the contents of the box could be
items other than marijuana. He did not know exactly
what the box contained that he had to ask appellant
Gaddao about its contents. It was not immediately
apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box
was marijuana; hence, it was not in plain view and its
seizure without the requisite search warrant was in
violation of the law and the Constitution. It was fruit of
the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and
never considered by the trial court.
The fact that the box containing about 6 kilos of
marijuana was found in Gaddao s house Gaddao does
not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the
crime charged.
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
what is material is the submission of proof that the sale
took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller
and the presentation of the drug as evidence in court.
Prosecution established the fact that in
consideration of the P1,600.00 he received,
Doria sold and delivered 970 grams of
marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer
Prosecution failed to prove that Gaddao
conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the
sale of said drug
DORIA SENTENCED TO SUFFER RECLUSION
PERPETUA + 500K FINE. GADDAO ACQUITTED
Manalili v. CA

This is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of

CAs decision in affirming TCs decision on convicting
Manalili of Illegal possession of prohibited drug
violating RA 6425.Police operatives Espiritu, Lumabas
and driver Enriquez conducted surveillance along the
front of Kalookan Cemetery based on the information
that drug addicts were roaming around in the area, saw
a man who appeared to be high on drugs and
introduced themselves as policemen. Said man
avoided them and tried to resist, when they asked
what the man was holding in his hand, the man held
out his wallet and allowed Espiritu to examine it, who
found what he suspected to be crushed mj leaves. The
man was brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit and turned
out to be Manalili. The substance found on Manalilis
wallet was sent to NBI Foresic Chemistry Section and
was confirmed as mj.Manalilis version of the story was
that early afternoon he was riding in a tricycle when 3
policemen stopped the tricycle and informed them of
the suspected possession of mj, the policemen bodily
searched both Manalili and the driver and upon finding
nothing illegal on their persons, let the driver go but
brought Manalili along to the police station. Manalili
while on the way to the station saw a neighbor whom
he signaled to follow them and when he was again
searched in the station, he was asked to strip his pants
where they found nothing illegal. Said neighbor then
asked the policemen to let Manalili go seeing as they
had not found anything illegal but Manalili was put on a
cell who was brought to a fiscal later that day and was
told not to say anything despite his saying that the
policemen had not found mj on his person. Said tricycle
driver and neighbor testified on court as to how the 2
searches yielded nothing illegal on Manalilis person.
Issues:
W/N evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk is
admissible.2.
W/N Manalilis actions constituted a waiver of his
rights.
W/N the evidence is sufficient to prove Manalilis guilt.
Ruling:
I. In Terry vs Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the
vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to
stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him and pat
him for weapons: W)here a police officer observes an
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where
in the course of investigating this behavior he
identified himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial
stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable
fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct
a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which
might be used to assault him. Such a search is a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and
any weapon seized may properly be introduced in
evidence against the person from whom they were

taken. It did not, however abandon the rule that the

police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the
warrant procedure, excused only by exigent
circumstances.
As People vs Lacerna enumerated 5 recognized
exceptions to the rule against warrantless searches
and seizures: 1) search incidental to lawful arrest; 2)
search of moving vehicles; 3) seizure in plain view; 4)
customs search; 5) waiver of the accused of his rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures. From
Espiritus experience as a member of the Anti
-Narcotics Unit of Caloocan City Police, Manalilis
suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts
who were high.
II. SGs contention that Manalili effectively waived the
inadmissibility of the evidence illegally obtained when
he failed to raise this issue or object during trial. A
valid waiver of right against unreasonable searches
and seizures require the concurrence of these
requisites: 1) the right to be waived existed; 2) the
person waiving it had knowledge; and 3) he/she had
actual intention to relinquish the right. In this case
however, it is deemed that Manalili has waived such
right for failure to raise its violation before the trial
court, at the earliest opportunity possible. Issues not
raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on
appeal.
III. Manalilis contention that the charge was trumped
up to extort money and testimonies of the arresting
officers were
inconsistent, it held that the trial courts assessment of
the credibility of the witnesses particularly when
affirmed by CA is accorded great weight and respect as
it had opportunity to observe their demeanor and
deportment as they testified before it. The elements of
illegal possession of mj are: a) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be
a prohibited drug; b) such possession is not authorized
by law; and c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug. The substance found on
Manalilis wallet was identified as mj which was
prohibited and knowingly without authority.
Considering that he was high and tried to avoid and
resist, such behavior clearly shows that he knew he
was holding mj and it was prohibited by law.

People v. Leila Johnson

Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58
years old, a widow, and a resident of Ocean Side,
California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who
was naturalized as an American on 16 June 1968 and
had since been working as a registered nurse, taking
care of geriatric patients and those with Alzheimer's
disease, in convalescent homes in the United States.
On 16 June 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit
her son's family in Calamba, Laguna. She was due to
fly back to the United States on July 26. On July 25, she
checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the
traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino International

Airport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next

day, 26 June 1998. At around 7:30 p.m. of that day,
Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16
of the NAIA departure area. Her duty was to frisk
departing passengers, employees, and crew and check
for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraban
goods, and explosives. When she frisked Johnson, a
departing passenger bound for the United States via
Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard on
the latter's abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson
explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she
had just undergone an operation as a result of an
ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation,
Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4
Reynaldo Embile, saying "Sir, hindi po ako
naniniwalang panty lang po iyon." She was directed to
take Johnson to the nearest women's room for
inspection. Ramirez took Johnson to the rest room,
accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Embile stayed
outside. Inside the women's room, Johnson was asked
again by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach
was and Johnson gave the same answer she had
previously given.
Ramirez then asked her "to bring out the thing under
her girdle." Johnson brought out three plastic packs,
which Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the
women's room. The confiscated packs contained a total
of 580.2 grams of a substance which was found by NBI
Chemist George de Lara to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu." Embile took Johnson and the
plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security
Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area of the NAIA, where
Johnson's passport and ticket were taken
and her luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her
personal belongings were itemized. Johnson was
charged for the possession of 3 plastic bags of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug,
weighing a total of 580.2 grams; a violation of 16 of
RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by RA
7659.
On 14 May 1999, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110,
Pasay City, found Johnson guilty and sentenced her to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Johnson
appealed.
Issue: Whether the extensive search made on Johnson
at the airport violates her right against unreasonable
search and seizure.
Held: The constitutional right of the accused was not
violated as she was never placed under custodial
investigation but was validly arrested without warrant
pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of tie
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that
"A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person: (a) when in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b)
when an offense has in fact just been committed and
person to be arrested has committed it; and xxx." The
circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused
falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above
cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected
to custodial investigation is far from being accurate.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her

during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired

legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and
seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property
to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition
is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nation's airports.
Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely
pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage
as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to
x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the
presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are
conducted to determine what the objects are. There is
little question that such searches are reasonable, given
their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed,
travelers are often notified through airport public
address systems, signs, and notices in their airline
tickets that they are subject to search and, if any
prohibited materials or substances are found, such
would be subject to seizure.
These announcements place passengers on notice that
ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless
searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures. The packs of methamphetamine
hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a
valid warrantless search, they are admissible in
evidence against Johnson. Corollarily, her subsequent
arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified
since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery
of "shabu" in her person in flagrante delicto.
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drug Board
and PDEA
NOTE: This is consolidated with Laserna vs DDB and
PDEA ( G.R. No. 158633 ) and Pimentel vs COMELEC (
G.R. No. 161658 )
In 2002, RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Sec 36 thereof
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office, students of secondary and tertiary
schools, officers and employees of public and private
offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors
office with certain offenses. On 23 Dec 2003, COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and
regulations on the mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office in connection with the May
10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections.
Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election
in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for
candidates for senators in addition to those already
provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin
the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes

a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a
candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the
Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC,
by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a
senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to
undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional
qualification that all candidates for senator must first
be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no
provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress
or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements
of candidates for senator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 is an
amendment to the Constitution on the qualifications of
Senators.
HELD: Pimentels contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec.
36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a
law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no
effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all
laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts
with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined
functions, the three departments of government have
no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of
the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed.
The provision [n]o person elected to any
public office shall enter upon the duties of his office
until he has undergone mandatory drug test. Is not
tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC
cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering
election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to
implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on
candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a
candidate for senator to meet such additional
qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without
such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic
process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise
specified in the Constitution.