KURODA vs JALANDONI 83 PHIL 171

FACTS: Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese
Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a period covering 19433 and 19444 who is now charged before a military Commission
convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his
duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and
prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war" comes before this Court seeking to establish the
illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert
Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military Commission and to permanently prohibit respondents
from proceeding with the case of petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether Military Commission has jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the
Geneva Convention even the Philippine was not a signatory to such treaty?
HELD: Military Commission has jurisdiction to try for the acts committed. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulations of the two
convention form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. These rules and principles were
accepted by the two belligerent nations, United States and Japan, who were signatories of two conventions. Such rules and principles
therefore, form part of the law of our nation even the Philippine was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our
Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of
international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner,
Vs.
Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO
BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICO ARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT
PORT, respondents.
Pedro Serran, Jose G. Lukban, and Liberato B. Cinco for petitioner. Fred Ruiz Castro Federico Arenas Mariano Yengco, Jr., Ricardo A.
Arcilla and S. Melville Hussey for respondents.
MORAN, C.J.:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial
Forces in The Philippines during a period covering 19433 and 19444 who is now charged before a military Commission convened by
the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such
command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the
Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war" comes before this Court seeking to establish the illegality of
Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from
participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military Commission and to permanently prohibit respondents from
proceeding with the case of petitioners.
In support of his case petitioner tenders the following principal arguments.
First. "That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provision of our constitutional law but also our
local laws to say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and
Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and international." Hence
petitioner argues "That in view off the fact that this commission has been empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional law an illegal
order this commission is without jurisdiction to try herein petitioner."
Second. That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the Commission in behalf of the United State
of America of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port who are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines is a diminution of our personality as an independent state and their appointment as prosecutor are a violation of our
Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to practice law in the Philippines.
Third. That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution the United State not being a party in interest in the case.
Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule and regulation governing the trial of accused war
criminals, was issued by the President of the Philippines on the 29th days of July, 1947 This Court holds that this order is valid and
constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva
Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian
who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential
and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor.
Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity
with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.
The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as Commander in chief of all our armed forces as
upheld by this Court in the case of Yamashita vs. Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 664) 1 when we said
War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities incident of war may remain pending which
should be disposed of as in time of war. An importance incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measure by the military command
not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to disciplinary measure those enemies who in their attempt to thwart
or impede our military effort have violated the law of war. (Ex parte Quirin 317 U.S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.) Indeed the power to create a
military commission for the trial and punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. And in the language of a writer a military
commission has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues. This includes the period of an armistice or military occupation
up to the effective of a treaty of peace and may extend beyond by treaty agreement. (Cowles Trial of War Criminals by Military
Tribunals, America Bar Association Journal June, 1944.)
Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect of war namely the trial
and punishment of war criminal through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague
Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It
cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the
generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nation the
United State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention, Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our
nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general
and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as continued inn treaties to
which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the Philippines was under the sovereignty of United
States and thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the
treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligation were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at all our
emergency as a free state entitles us to enforce the right on our own of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against
crimes against our people. In this connection it is well to remember what we have said in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372):
. . . The change of our form government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the
crime of treason committed during then Commonwealth because it is an offense against the same sovereign people. . . .
By the same token war crimes committed against our people and our government while we were a Commonwealth are triable and
punishable by our present Republic.
Petitioner challenges the participation of two American attorneys namely Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port in the prosecution of his
case on the ground that said attorney's are not qualified to practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and the
appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty.
In the first place respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special law and not by the Rules of court
which govern ordinary civil court. It has already been shown that Executive Order No. 68 which provides for the organization of such
military commission is a valid and constitutional law. There is nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel appearing
before said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In facts it is
common in military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor even possessed of
legal training.
Secondly the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that United
States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation should be
allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment of sovereignty it has not been by our
government but by the United State Government which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of her enemies. The least that we
could do in the spirit of comity is to allow them representation in said trials.
Alleging that the United State is not a party in interest in the case petitioner challenges the personality of attorneys Hussey and Port as
prosecutors. It is of common knowledge that the United State and its people have been equally if not more greatly aggrieved b y the
crimes with which petitioner stands charged before the Military Commission. It can be considered a privilege for our Republic that a
leader nation should submit the vindication of the honor of its citizens and its government to a military tribunal of our country.

The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law with jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under the
provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having said petitioner in its custody, this Court will not interfere with the due process of such
Military commission.
For all the foregoing the petition is denied with costs de oficio.
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A.
ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN, respondents.
Alberto N. Hidalgo and Ma. Teresa T. Oledan for petitioner.
The City Legal Officer & Chief, Law Department for Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. and the City Government of Caloocan.

ROMERO, J.:
The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to dispose off the 350 tons of garbage it collects daily and the
growing concern and sensitivity to a pollution-free environment of the residents of Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where
these tons of garbage are dumped everyday is the hub of this controversy elevated by the protagonists to the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) for adjudication.
The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court by Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA for short)
docketed as G.R. No. 107542 against the City Government of Caloocan, et al. In the Resolution of November 10, 1992, this Court
referred G.R. No. 107542 to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition. Docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP
1
No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision promulgated on January 29, 1993 ruled that the LLDA has no power and authority to
issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA now
seeks, in this petition, a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.
On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter2
complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in
Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of
the water content of the surrounding area.
3

On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test sampling of the leachate that seeps from
said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao River. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City
Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as
4
5
required under Presidential Decree No. 1586, and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by
6
Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.
After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on the complaint of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that
the water collected from the leachate and the receiving streams could considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters
since it indicates the presence of bacteria, other than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample during collection or
7
8
handling. On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering the City Government of Caloocan,
Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of
garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.
The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan. However, sometime in August 1992 the dumping
operation was resumed after a meeting held in July 1992 among the City Government of Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force
Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA at the Office of Environmental Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to settle the
problem.
After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14, 1992, the LLDA issued another order reiterating the
December 5, 1991, order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City Government of Caloocan from continuing its
dumping operations at the Camarin area.
On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police, enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by
prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite.

Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on September 17, 1992 with the LLDA, the City Government of
Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with
prayer for the issuance of writ of injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15598. In its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan
sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in
9
Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction.
On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist order. Subsequently, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
126 of Caloocan which, at the time, was presided over by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, the
pairing judge of the recently-retired presiding judge.
The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss on the ground, among others, that under Republic Act No. 3931, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control Law, the cease and desist order issued by it which
is the subject matter of the complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts of the case by the Court of Appeals and not by the
10
Regional Trial Court.
On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order consolidating Civil Case No. C-15598 with Civil Case No. C-15580, an
earlier case filed by the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite entitled "Fr. John Moran, et al. vs. Hon. Macario Asistio." The LLDA, however,
maintained during the trial that the foregoing cases, being independent of each other, should have been treated separately.
On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the consolidated cases an
11
order denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and
all persons acting for and on its behalf, from enforcing or implementing its cease and desist order which prevents plaintiff City of
Caloocan from dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite during the pendency of this case and/or until further orders of the court.
On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for restraining order with the
Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 107542, seeking to nullify the aforesaid order dated October 16, 1992 issued by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 127 of Caloocan City denying its motion to dismiss.
12

The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution on November 10, 1992 referring the case to the Court of Appeals for proper
disposition and at the same time, without giving due course to the petition, required the respondents to comment on the petition and file
the same with the Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from notice. In the meantime, the Court issued a temporary restraining order,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from it, ordering the respondents: (1) Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City to cease and desist from exercising jurisdiction over the case for declaration of
nullity of the cease and desist order issued by the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA); and (2) City Mayor of Caloocan and/or
the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. filed on November 12, 1992 a motion for reconsideration
and/or to quash/recall the temporary restraining order and an urgent motion for reconsideration alleging that ". . . in view of the
calamitous situation that would arise if the respondent city government fails to collect 350 tons of garbage daily for lack of dumpsite (i)t
is therefore, imperative that the issue be resolved with dispatch or with sufficient leeway to allow the respondents to find alternative
solutions to this garbage problem."
13

On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution directing the Court of Appeals to immediately set the case for hearing for the
purpose of determining whether or not the temporary restraining order issued by the Court should be lifted and what conditions, if any,
may be required if it is to be so lifted or whether the restraining order should be maintained or converted into a preliminary injunction.
The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on November 27, 1992, at 10:00 in the morning at the Hearing Room, 3rd Floor, New
14
Building, Court of Appeals. After the oral argument, a conference was set on December 8, 1992 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning where
the Mayor of Caloocan City, the General Manager of LLDA, the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representative and the
Secretary of DILG or his duly authorized representative were required to appear.
It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until December 15, 1992 to finish its study and review of respondent's technical plan
with respect to the dumping of its garbage and in the event of a rejection of respondent's technical plan or a failure of settlement, the
parties will submit within 10 days from notice their respective memoranda on the merits of the case, after which the petition shall be
15
deemed submitted for resolution. Notwithstanding such efforts, the parties failed to settle the dispute.
On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that: (1) the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction on appeal
to try, hear and decide the action for annulment of LLDA's cease and desist order, including the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction in relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake Development Authority has no power and
authority to issue a cease and desist order under its enabling law, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive

Order
No. 927, series of 1983.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the preliminary injunction issued in the said case was set aside; the
cease and desist order of LLDA was likewise set aside and the temporary restraining order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or
the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City
was lifted, subject, however, to the condition that any future dumping of garbage in said area, shall be in conformity with the procedure
and protective works contained in the proposal attached to the records of this case and found on pages 152-160 of the Rollo, which
was thereby adopted by reference and made an integral part of the decision, until the corresponding restraining and/or injunctive relief
is granted by the proper Court upon LLDA's institution of the necessary legal proceedings.
Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, now docketed as G.R. No. 110120,
with prayer that the temporary restraining order lifted by the Court of Appeals be re-issued until after final determination by this Court of
the issue on the proper interpretation of the powers and authority of the LLDA under its enabling law.
16

On July, 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government
of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, effective as of this
date and containing until otherwise ordered by the Court.
It is significant to note that while both parties in this case agree on the need to protect the environment and to maintain the ecological
balance of the surrounding areas of the Camarin open dumpsite, the question as to which agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over
the matter remains highly open to question.
The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local government unit, pursuant to the general welfare provision
17
of the Local Government Code, to determine the effects of the operation of the dumpsite on the ecological balance and to see that
such balance is maintained. On the basis of said contention, it questioned, from the inception of the dispute before the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, the power and authority of the LLDA to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in the
Barangay Camarin over which the City Government of Caloocan has territorial jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of Caloocan on the theory that Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 984,
otherwise known as the Pollution Control law, authorizing the defunct National Pollution Control Commission to issue an ex-parte cease
and desist order was not incorporated in Presidential Decree No. 813 nor in Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, the LLDA is instead required
"to institute the necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any
project, plan or program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the Authority."
The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned ruling of the Court of Appeals, contending that, as an
administrative agency which was granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers and functions by Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendatory laws, Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, it is invested with the power and authority
to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of Executive Order No. 927 series of 1983 which
provides, thus:
Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Executive Order and its implementing rules and
regulations only after proper notice and hearing.
(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which such
discontinuance must be accomplished.
(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of
pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal
system or parts thereof.
(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke, suspend or modify any permit issued under this Order whenever the
same is necessary to prevent or abate pollution.
(g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this
Executive Order and its implementing rules and regulations and the orders and decisions of the Authority.

The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and totally disregarded the above provisions of Executive Order No.
927, series of 1983, which granted administrative quasi-judicial functions to LLDA on pollution abatement cases.
In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are applicable in this case, and the corresponding overlapping
jurisdiction of government agencies implementing these laws, the resolution of the issue of whether or not the LLDA has the authority
and power to issue an order which, in its nature and effect was injunctive, necessarily requires a determination of the threshold
question: Does the Laguna Lake Development Authority, under its Charter and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the
complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan
which is allegedly endangering the health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the sanitation and quality of the water in the
area brought about by exposure to pollution caused by such open garbage dumpsite?
The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that requires control, if not prohibition, of the operation of a
business establishment is essentially addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of
18
Section 16 of Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987, has assumed the powers and functions of the defunct National Pollution
Control Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the
Office of the DENR Secretary now assumes the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to
19
adjudication of pollution cases.
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases
where the special law provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative
agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared
20
national policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding
21
provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the
prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA,
by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious
effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared
policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by
local government offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans,
22
programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region.
In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan
City, filed its letter-complaint before the LLDA, the latter's jurisdiction under its charter was validly invoked by complainant on the basis
of its allegation that the open dumpsite project of the City Government of Caloocan in Barangay Camarin was undertaken without a
clearance from the LLDA, as required under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act. No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive
Order No. 927. While there is also an allegation that the said project was without an Environmental Compliance Certificate from the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case was recognized by the
Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR when the latter acted as intermediary at the meeting among the representatives of
the City Government of Caloocan, Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to discuss the possibility of
re-opening the open dumpsite.
Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down to the following issue: Does the LLDA have the power and
authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented
in this case, enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.
The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin
open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant
23
environment laws, cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic
Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify
24
order requiring the discontinuance or pollution." (Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA
to makewhatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-parte cease and desist order" in a language, as
suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct National Pollution Control Commission
under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it
would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of the power to issue the order in question when the power
"to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.

Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not expressly conferred by law, there is jurisprudence
25
enough to the effect that the rule granting such authority need not necessarily be express. While it is a fundamental rule that an
administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative
26
agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its
express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the
authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper
agency.
27

In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et al., the Court ruled that the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB) has the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an
establishment exceeding the allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the country. The ponente, Associate Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano, declared:
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because stopping
the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made
to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and
sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution control statute
and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety,
health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the
police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of
protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. . . .
The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public interests" gives vitality to the statement on ecology
embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony
of nature.
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with
the declared policy of the state "to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
28
them." It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference
29
Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human right.
The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure under the circumstances of the
case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued
by the LLDA been complied with by the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would have
been necessary.
The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon the LLDA the means of directly enforcing such
orders, has provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to institute "necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence
to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance
from the LLDA."
Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in the regulation of all projects initiated in the
Laguna Lake region, whether by the government or the private sector, insofar as the implementation of these projects is concerned. It
was meant to deal with cases which might possibly arise where decisions or orders issued pursuant to the exercise of such broad
powers may not be obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of its laudabe objective. To meet such contingencies, then the writs
of mandamus and injunction which are beyond the power of the LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper courts.
Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna Lake region and its surrounding provinces, cities and towns
are concerned, the Court will not dwell further on the related issues raised which are more appropriately addressed to an administrative
agency with the special knowledge and expertise of the LLDA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July 19, 1993 enjoining the City
Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan from dumping their garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GREGORIO PERFECTOR, defendant-appellant.
Alfonso E. Mendoza and the appellant in behalf of the latter. Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, punishing "Any person
who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .," is still in force.
About August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero, discovered that certain documents which
constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies, had disappeared from his office. Shortly
thereafter, the Philippine Senate, having been called into special session by the Governor-General, the Secretary for the Senate
informed that body of the loss of the documents and of the steps taken by him to discover the guilty party. The day following the
convening of the Senate, September 7, 1920, the newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article reading
as follows:
Half a month has elapsed since the discovery, for the first time, of the scandalous robbery of records which were kept and
preserved in the iron safe of the Senate, yet up to this time there is not the slightest indication that the author or authors of the crime will
ever be discovered.
To find them, it would not, perhaps, be necessary to go out of the Sente itself, and the persons in charge of the investigation of
the case would not have to display great skill in order to succeed in their undertaking, unless they should encounter the insuperable
obstacle of offical concealment.
In that case, every investigation to be made would be but a mere comedy and nothing more.
After all, the perpetration of the robbery, especially under the circumstances that have surrounded it, does not surprise us at all.
The execution of the crime was but the natural effect of the environment of the place in which it was committed.
How many of the present Senators can say without remorse in their conscience and with serenity of mind, that they do not owe
their victory to electoral robbery? How may?
The author or authors of the robbery of the records from the said iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example
of certain Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery.
The Philippine Senate, in its session of September 9, 1920, adopted a resolution authorizing its committee on elections and
privileges to report as to the action which should be taken with reference to the article published in La Nacion. On September 15, 1920,
the Senate adopted a resolution authorizing the President of the Senate to indorse to the Attorney-General, for his study and
corresponding action, all the papers referring to the case of the newspaper La Nacion and its editor, Mr. Gregorio Perfecto. As a result,
an information was filed in the municipal court of the City of Manila by an assistant city fiscal, in which the editorial in question was set
out and in which it was alleged that the same constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. The defendant Gregorio Perfecto
was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
During the course of the trial in the Court of First Instance, after the prosecution had rested, the defense moved for the dismissal
of the case. On the subject of whether or not article 256 of the Penal Code, under which the information was presented, is in force, the
trial judge, the Honorable George R. Harvey, said:
This antiquated provision was doubtless incorporated into the Penal Code of Spain for the protection of the Ministers of the
Crown and other representatives of the King against free speech and action by Spanish subjects. A severe punishment was prescribed
because it was doubtless considered a much more serious offense to insult the King's representative than to insult an ordinary
individual. This provision, with almost all the other articles of that Code, was extended to the Philippine Islands when under the
dominion of Spain because the King's subject in the Philippines might defame, abuse or insult the Ministers of the Crown or other
representatives of His Majesty. We now have no Ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority in the Philippines representing the
King of Spain, and said provision, with other articles of the Penal Code, had apparently passed into "innocuous desuetude," but the
Supreme Corut of the Philippine Islands has, by a majority decision, held that said article 256 is the law of the land to-day. . . .
The Helbig case is a precedent which, by the rule of stare decisis, is binding upon this court until otherwise determined by proper
authority.
In the decision rendered by the same judge, he concluded with the following language:

In the United States such publications are usually not punishable as criminal offense, and little importance is attached to them,
because they are generally the result of political controversy and are usually regarded as more or less colored or exaggerated. Attacks
of this character upon a legislative body are not punishable, under the Libel Law. Although such publications are reprehensible, yet this
court feels some aversion to the application of the provision of law under which this case was filed. Our Penal Code has come to us
from the Spanish regime. Article 256 of that Code prescribes punishment for persons who use insulting language about Ministers of the
Crown or other "authority." The King of Spain doubtless left the need of such protection to his ministers and others in authority in the
Philippines as well as in Spain. Hence, the article referred to was made applicable here. Notwithstanding the change of sovereignty, our
Supreme Court, in a majority decision, has held that this provision is still in force, and that one who made an insulting remark about the
President of the United States was punishable under it. (U.S. vs. Helbig, supra.) If it applicable in that case, it would appear to be
applicable in this case. Hence, said article 256 must be enforced, without fear or favor, until it shall be repealed or superseded by other
legislation, or until the Supreme Court shall otherwise determine.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds the defendant guilty as charged in the information and under article 256 of
their Penal Code sentences him to suffer two months and one day ofarresto mayor and the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and
to pay the costs of both instances.
The fifteen errors assigned by the defendant and appellant, reenforced by an extensive brief, and eloquent oral argument made
in his own behalf and by his learned counsel, all reduce themselves to the pertinent and decisive question which was announce d in the
beginning of this decision.
It will be noted in the first place that the trial judge considered himself bound to follow the rule announced in the case of United
1
States vs. Helbig (R. G. No. 14705, not published). In that case, the accused was charged with having said, "To hell with the President
and his proclamations, or words to that effect," in violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. He was found guilty in a judgment rendered
by the Court of First Instance of Manila and again on appeal to the Supreme Court, with the writer of the instant decision dissenting on
two principal grounds: (1) That the accused was deprived of the constitutional right of cross-examination, and (2) that article 256 of the
Spanish Penal Code is no longer in force. Subsequently, on a motion of reconsideration, the court, being of the opinion that the Court of
First Instance had committed a prejudicial error in depriving the accused of his right to cross-examine a principal witness, set aside the
judgment affirming the judgment appealed from and ordered the return of the record to the court of origin for the celebration of a new
trial. Whether such a trial was actually had, is not known, but at least, the record in the Helbig case has never again been elevated to
this court.
There may perchance exist some doubt as to the authority of the decision in the Helbig case, in view of the circumstances above
described. This much, however, is certain: The facts of the Helbig case and the case before us, which we may term the Perfecto case,
are different, for in the first case there was an oral defamation, while in the second there is a written defamation. Not only this, but a
new point which, under the facts, could not have been considered in the Helbig case, is, in the Perfecto case, urged upon the court.
And, finally, as is apparent to all, the appellate court is not restrained, as was the trial court, by strict adherence to a former decision.
We much prefer to resolve the question before us unhindered by references to the Helbig decision.
This is one of those cases on which a variety of opinions all leading to the same result can be had. A majority of the court are of
the opinion that the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, has had the effect of repealing so much of article 256 of the Penal Code as
relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the information and the facts, the defendant is neither guilty of a violation
of article 256 of the Penal Code, nor of the Libel Law. The view of the Chief Justice is that the accused should be acquitted for the
reason that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute a violation of article 156 of the Penal Code. Three members of the
court believe that article 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and
is inconsistent with democratic principles of government.
Without prejudice to the right of any member of the court to explain his position, we will discuss the two main points just
mentioned.
1. Effect of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, on article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. The Libel Law, Act No. 277, was
enacted by the Philippine Commission shortly after organization of this legislative body. Section 1 defines libel as a "malicious
defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, or public theatrical exhibitions, tending to blacken
the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural deffects of one who is
alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule." Section 13 provides that "All laws and parts of laws now in force,
so far as the same may be in conflict herewith, are hereby repealed. . . ."
That parts of laws in force in 1901 when the Libel Law took effect, were in conflict therewith, and that the Libel Law abrogated
certain portion of the Spanish Penal Code, cannot be gainsaid. Title X of Book II of the Penal Code, covering the subjects of calumny
and insults, must have been particularly affected by the Libel Law. Indeed, in the early case of Pardo de Tavera vs. Garcia Valdez
([1902], 1. Phil., 468), the Supreme Court spoke of the Libel Law as "reforming the preexisting Spanish law on the subject
of calumnia and injuria." Recently, specific attention was given to the effect of the Libel Law on the provisions of the Penal Code,
dealing with calumny and insults, and it was found that those provisions of the Penal Code on the subject of calumny and insults in
which the elements of writing an publicity entered, were abrogated by the Libel Law. (People vs. Castro [1922], p. 842, ante.)
The Libel Law must have had the same result on other provisions of the Penal Code, as for instance article 256.

The facts here are that the editor of a newspaper published an article, naturally in writing, which may have had the tendency to
impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation of members of the Philippine Senate, thereby possibly exposing them to public hatred,
contempt, or ridicule, which is exactly libel, as defined by the Libel Law. Sir J. F. Stephen is authority for the statement that a libel is
indictable when defaming a "body of persons definite and small enough for individual members to be recognized as such, in or by
means of anything capable of being a libel." (Digest of Criminal Law, art. 267.) But in the United States, while it may be proper to
prosecute criminally the author of a libel charging a legislator with corruption, criticisms, no matter how severe, on a legislature, are
within the range of the liberty of the press, unless the intention and effect be seditious. (3 Wharton's Criminal Law, p. 213 1.) With these
facts and legal principles in mind, recall that article 256 begins: Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any
Minister of the Crown or other person in authority," etc.
The Libel Law is a complete and comprehensive law on the subject of libel. The well-known rule of statutory construction is, that
where the later statute clearly covers the old subject-matter of antecedent acts, and it plainly appears to have been the purpose of the
legislature to give expression in it to the whole law on the subject, previous laws are held to be repealed by necessary implication. (1
Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, p. 465.) For identical reasons, it is evident that Act No. 277 had the effect so much of this
article as punishes defamation, abuse, or insults by writing.
Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected article 256, but as to this point,
it is not necessary to make a pronouncement.
2. Effect of the change from Spanish to Amercian sevoreignty over the Philippine son article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code.
Appellant's main proposition in the lower court and again energetically pressed in the appellate court was that article 256 of the Spanish
Penal Code is not now in force because abrogated by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and
because inconsistent with democratic principles of government. This view was indirectly favored by the trial judge, and, as before
stated, is the opinion of three members of this court.
Article 256 is found in Chapter V of title III of Book II of the Spanish Penal Code. Title I of Book II punishes the crimes of treason,
crimes that endanger the peace or independence of the state, crimes against international law, and the crime of piracy. Title II of the
same book punishes the crimes of lese majeste, crimes against theCortes and its members and against the council of ministers, crimes
against the form of government, and crimes committed on the occasion of the exercise of rights guaranteed by the fundamental laws of
the state, including crime against religion and worship. Title III of the same Book, in which article 256 is found, punishes the crimes of
rebellion, sedition, assaults upon persons in authority, and their agents, and contempts, insults, injurias, and threats against persons in
authority, and insults, injurias, and threats against their agents and other public officers, the last being the title to Chapter V. The first
two articles in Chapter V define and punish the offense of contempt committed by any one who shall be word or deed defame, abuse,
insult, or threathen a minister of the crown, or any person in authority. The with an article condemning challenges to fight duels
intervening, comes article 256, now being weighed in the balance. It reads as follows: "Any person who, by word, deed, or writing, shall
defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or
by reason of such performance, provided that the offensive minister or person, or the offensive writing be not addressed to him, shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor," that is, the defamation, abuse, or insult of any Minister of the Crown of the Monarchy of
Spain (for there could not be a Minister of the Crown in the United States of America), or other person in authority in the Monarchy of
Spain.
It cannot admit of doubt that all those provisions of the Spanish Penal Code having to do with such subjects as treason, lese
majeste, religion and worship, rebellion, sedition, and contempts of ministers of the crown, are not longer in force. Our present task,
therefore, is a determination of whether article 256 has met the same fate, or, more specifically stated, whether it is in the nature of a
municipal law or political law, and is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the characteristics and
institutions of the American Government.
It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are
totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.
(American Insurance Co. vs. Canter [1828], 1 Pet., 511; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S.,
542; Roa vs. Collector of Customs [1912], 23 Phil., 315.) Mr. Justice Field of the United States Supreme Court stated the obvious when
in the course of his opinion in the case of Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn, supra, he said: "As a matter of
course, all laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions and Constitution of the new government
are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power and the latter is involved in the former to
the United States, the laws of the country in support of an established religion or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel
and unusual punishments, and he like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect." To quote
again from the United States Supreme Court: "It cannot be admitted that the King of Spain could, by treaty or otherwise, impart to the
United States any of his royal prerogatives; and much less can it be admitted that they have capacity to receive or power to exercise
them. Every nation acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold it subject to the Constitution and laws of its own government,
and not according to those of the government ceding it." (Pollard vs. Hagan [1845], 3 Hos., 210.)
On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military Commander dated May 28, 1898, and
by proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and providing
for the punishment of crime were nominally continued in force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of things. But
President McKinley, in his instructions to General Merritt, was careful to say: "The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's
territory is the severance of the former political relation of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power." From that day
to this, the ordinarily it has been taken for granted that the provisions under consideration were still effective. To paraphrase the

language of the United States Supreme Court in Weems vs. United States ([1910], 217 U. S., 349), there was not and could not be,
except as precise questions were presented, a careful consideration of the codal provisions and a determination of the extent to which
they accorded with or were repugnant to the "'great principles of liberty and law' which had been 'made the basis of our governmental
system.' " But when the question has been squarely raised, the appellate court has been forced on occasion to hold certain portions of
the Spanish codes repugnant t democratic institutions and American constitutional principles. (U.S. vs. Sweet [1901], 1 Phil., 18;
U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 273; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 533; Weems vs. U.S., supra.)
The nature of the government which has been set up in the Philippines under American sovereignty was outlined by President
McKinley in that Magna Charta of Philippine liberty, his instructions to the Commission, of April 7, 1900. In part, the President said:
In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which they are authorized to prescribe, the Commission should bear
in mind that he government which they are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical
views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures adopted should be made
to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the
indispensable requisites of just and effective government. At the same time the Commission should bear in mind, and the people of the
Islands should be made plainly to understand, that there are certain great principles of government which have been made the basis of
our governmental system, which we deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom, and of which they
have, unfortunately, been denied the experience possessed by us; that there are also certain practical rules of government which we
have found to be essential to the preservation of these great principles of liberty and law, and that these principles and these rules of
government must be established and maintained in their islands for the sake of their liberty and happiness, however much they may
conflict with the customs or laws of procedure with which they are familiar. It is evident that the most enligthened thought of the
Philippine Islands fully appreciates the importance of these principles and rules, and they will inevitably within a short time command
universal assent.
The courts have naturally taken the same view. Mr. Justice Elliott, speaking for our Supreme Court, in the case of United
States vs. Bull ([1910], 15 Phil., 7), said: "The President and Congress framed the government on the model with which American are
familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the protection of individual rights and
privileges."
Therefore, it has come with somewhat of a shock to hear the statement made that the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the
people of the Philippine Islands and their customs, habits, and prejudices, to follow the language of President McKinley, demand
obeisance to authority, and royal protection for that authority.
According to our view, article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish
officials who were the representatives of the King. With the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government,
as set up in the Philippines. It was in no sense a continuation of the old, although merely for convenience certain of the existing
institutions and laws were continued. The demands which the new government made, and makes, on the individual citizen are likewise
different. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him
only with bated breath. "In the eye of our Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal rights
with every other man. We have no rank or station, except that of respectability and intelligence as opposed to indecency and ignorance,
and the door to this rank stands open to every man to freely enter and abide therein, if he is qualified, and whether he is qualified or not
depends upon the life and character and attainments and conduct of each person for himself. Every man may lawfully do what he will,
so long as it is notmalum in se or malum prohibitum or does not infringe upon the qually sacred rights of others." (State vs. Shepherd
[1903], 177 Mo., 205; 99 A. S. R., 624.)
It is true that in England, from which so many of the laws and institutions of the United States are derived, there were once
statutes of scandalum magnatum, under which words which would not be actionable if spoken of an ordinary subject were made
actionable if spoken of a peer of the realm or of any of the great officers of the Crown, without proof of any special damage. The Crown
of England, unfortunately, took a view less tolerant that that of other sovereigns, as for instance, the Emperors Augustus, Caesar, and
Tiberius. These English statutes have, however, long since, become obsolete, while in the United States, the offense of scandalum
magnatum is not known. In the early days of the American Republic, a sedition law was enacted, making it an offense to libel the
Government, the Congress, or the President of the United States, but the law met with so much popular disapproval, that it was soon
repealed. "In this country no distinction as to persons is recognized, and in practice a person holding a high office is regarded as a
target at whom any person may let fly his poisonous words. High official position, instead of affording immunity from slanderous and
libelous charges, seems rather to be regarded as making his character free plunder for any one who desires to create a senation by
attacking it." (Newell, Slander and Libel, 3d ed., p. 245; Sillars vs. Collier [1890], 151 Mass., 50; 6 L.R.A., 680.)
Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of
government. The gulf which separates this article from the spirit which inspires all penal legislation of American origin, is as wide as that
which separates a monarchy from a democratic Republic like that of the United States. This article was crowded out by implication as
soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands. Penalties out of all proportion to the gravity of the offense,
grounded in a distorted monarchical conception of the nature of political authority, as opposed to the American conception of the
protection of the interests of the public, have been obliterated by the present system of government in the Islands.1awph!l.net
From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against executive officials, although
its terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a

government based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the
people but it is an agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect and obedience when they are
acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and
obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official
position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks.
The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Ministers of the Crown have
no place under the American flag.
To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for different reasons, that the judgment
should be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.
Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ARAULLO, C.J., concurring:
I concur with the dispositive part of the foregoing decision, that is, with the acquittal of the accused, for the sole reason that the
facts alleged in the information do not constitute a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code; for although that article is in force with
respect to calumny, injuria, or insult, by deed or word, against an authority in the performance of his duties or by reason thereof, outside
of his presence, it is repealed by the Libel Law in so far as it refers to calumny, injuria, or insult committed against an authority by
writing or printing, as was that inserted in the said information.
ROMUALDEZ, J., concurring:
I concur with the result. I believe that the responsibility of the accused has not been shown either under article 256 of the Penal
Code or under the Libel Law.
I am of the opinion that article 256 of the Penal Code is still in force, except as it refers to "Ministers of the Crown," whom we do
not have in our Government, and to calumny, injuria, or insult, by writing or printing, committed against an authority in the performance
of his duties or by reason thereof, which portion was repealed by the Libel Law.
Johnson, Street, Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur.