VESSEL IMPACT

Scope

This section provides guidance for the assessment of safety case content with respect to vessel
collisions, from hazard identification through to consequence determination, including risk
management measures. Interfaces with other sections are identified.
2

Assessment of Adequacy of Demonstration

The evaluation of risk that might stem from each major accident hazard is to be assessed by
identification of the factors that might result in an adverse combination of a hazard source and an
initiator [causal chains], together with identification and evaluation of escalation paths that might
result [consequence chains].
Two broad hazard sources can be identified and divided into a number of different vessel types
thus:
Attendant vessels
Passing vessels
For a major accident to be realised, these Hazard Sources need an Initiator. For vessel collisions,
the following broad categories of Initiator are proposed:
Positioning Failure
Navigational Failure
Procedural Failure
Human Error
Evaluation of risk will need consideration of the likelihood and consequence factors:
Frequency
Consequence
The usual measures are employed in controlling the hazard:
Inherent Safety
Prevention through
Procedures
Personnel
High Visibility

 Incident Reporting and Analysis

Detection
Control through
Quality Assurance
Operating envelope
Procedures
Fenders/barriers
Mitigation
Platform ESD system
Pipeline subsea ESD valve
Shock resistant plant
Physical protection
Structural integrity
Robustness
Redundancy
Reserve strength
Double hulls
Emergency Response
3

Depth of Assessment

This section gives guidance on the depth of assessment required to determine the adequacy of the
demonstration that measures have been or will be taken to ensure compliance with the relevant
statutory provisions.
Where relevant sections of the safety case are consistent with the good practice identified in the
assessment sheets, there will usually be no need for an assessor to probe into the details of the
application of this practice. However, this may be a suitable issue to follow-up through inspection.
4. The assessor should examine the adequacy of the hazard identification, risk evaluation and
management in conjunction with the contents of the Categorisation Table below:
Vessel Impact
Source of Hazard

Initiators

Risk Evaluation

Risk Management

Performance

Measures

Standards

HS1 - Loss of

G1 - Attendant and

Integrity

Passing Vessels

Frequency

Inherent Safety

Structure
Process
Pipelines
Wells
HS2 - Fatalities

F4 - Subsea

G2 - Failures

Facilities,

of Workforce
Positional

Exclusion zone

Navigational
Procedural
Human Error
F1 - Likelihood

Prevention

Factors (including
historic data)
F5 - Verification,
Testing and
Inspection
F6 - SBVs,
Communcations
and Procedures
F7 - SBVs, Visual
& Radar, Platform
Mounted Radar,
Automated
Systems
F8 - Procedures
[including Vessel
Contracting and
Suitability,
Platform
Operations,
Inspections,
Marine
Operations and

Combined
Operations]
Consequences
F2 - Loss of
Integrity to
Installation
Systems
[structural,
process,
pipelines, wells]
F3 - Fatalities to

Mitigation

Workforce
F9 - Physical
Protection
F10 - Robust
Structure, Plant
and Equipment

HS1 Loss of Integrity, Process, Pipelines, Wells

HS2 Fatalities of Workforce
1. Confirmation should be obtained that the risks to the workforce, integrity of the structure, the
topside process and safety related equipment, pipelines and wells from all foreseeable attendant
and passing vessel collisions are or will be controlled to ensure compliance with the relevant
provisions. This is achieved by a multidisciplinary approach using assessment sheets contained in
the relevant sections.
2. There are likely to be differing company standards used in demonstration and each should be
examined for equivalence with general ALARP principles.
3. Relevant Legislation, ACOP and Guidance includes:
Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005
Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc) Regulations 1996
Assessment Principles for Offshore Safety Cases [APOSC]
4. Specific Technical Issues:

For passing vessels there should be time to take some form of emergency action and assessment
should, in the main, be carried out in line with that in Section 10 Emergency Response. Attendant
vessels may provide a more instantaneous vessel collision and hence it is expected that
appropriate robustness is built into the installation engineering and safety systems.
5. Other Related Assessment Sheets in this Section are:
F1

Likelihood Factors [including historic data]

F2

Loss of Integrity to Installation Systems

F3

Fatalities to Workforce

F4

Subsea Facilities, Exclusion Zone

F5

Verification, Inspection, Testing

F6

SBVs, Communications, and Procedures

F7

SBVs visual and radar, platform mounted radar, automated systems

F8

Procedures - including Vessel contracting, vessel suitability, platform, operations,

inspections, marine operations & combined operations

F9

Physical protection

F10

Robust Structure, plant and equipment

6. Cross-Referenced Sections and Sheets are:

Sheet 2.2.1.G14

Boat Impact

Sheet 2.2.2.G5

Collision/Grounding

Sheet 2.2.4.F8

Ship Collision

Section 2.4.3

Human and Organisational Factors

Section 2.1.2

Risk Assessment (including Human Vulnerability)

G1 Attendant and Passing Vessels

1. Confirmation should be obtained that the all foreseeable attendant vessels have been identified
and that particular passing vessels that may be in the vicinity of the installation have been
identified.
2. The adequacy of vessel identification process can only be assessed on an individual basis.
Typical vessels may include:
Attendant vessels
Standby vessels
Supply vessels
Multi-purpose vessels

 MODUs
Semis
Jack-ups
Drill ships
Accommodation units
Shuttle tankers
Heavy lift vessels
Anchor handling vessels
Diving support vessels
Survey vessels
Well intervention vessels
Tugs
Barges
Multi-role vessels [standby and supply]
Pipe lay
Counter pollution vessels
Passing vessels
All of the above [when headed for other installations]
Merchant vessels, including:
Ferries
Fishing craft
Pleasure crafts
Naval craft
Submarines
Further consideration will be required where installations are located in known shipping routes.
3. Relevant Legislation, ACOP and Guidance includes:
Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005
Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc) Regulations 1996
Assessment Principles for Offshore Safety Cases [APOSC]
4.

Specific Technical Issues:

None
5.

Other Related Assessment Sheets in this Section are:

None
6.

Cross-Referenced Sections and Sheets are:

None

G2 Failures: Positional, Navigational, Procedural, Human Error

1. For a major accident to be realised, the collision of passing and attendant vessels is caused by
a failure on those vessels. For vessel collisions, the following broad categories of Initiator are
proposed:
Positioning Failure
DP failure
Mooring failure
Extreme weather
Installation moves
Weather vaning
Navigational Failure
Watchkeeping failure
Navigation equipment failure
Navigation aids failure
Mechanical failure
Control system failure
Power failure
Procedural Failure
Incorrect/Inappropriate
Not correctly applied
Human Error
Commission/Omission/Fatigue

Specific assessment and guidance on these failures for passing vessels are outside the scope of
this document. However, some control can be expected on reducing the risk for initiators for
attendant vessels.
OGUK Guidelines for Ship/Installation Collision Avoidance, OP013,2010
OGUK Common guidelines for safe management of offshore supply and anchor handling
operations (North West European Area) Issue 2, OPO20, 2009
Offshore operations notice no 14, Guidance on Coast Protection Act 1949 - consent to locate
and the marking of offshore installations, 2009
Offshore operations notice no 61, Management of collision risk - Radio communication
between offshore installations, their standby vessels and merchant ships, 2003
2. The above guidelines are generic in nature and treatment of the initiators for individual
platforms and platform layouts should be assessed.
3. Relevant Legislation, ACOP and Guidance includes:
Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005
Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc) Regulations 1996
Assessment Principles for Offshore Safety Cases [APOSC]
4. Specific Technical Issues:
Initiators for attendant vessels will be vessel, company and installation specific. Assessment should
seek out this information.
5. Other Relevant Assessment Sheets in this Section are:
F5 Verification, Testing & Inspection
F6 SBVs, Communications, and Procedures
F7 SBVs Visual and Radar, Platform Mounted Radar, Automated Systems
F8 Procedures - Including Vessel Contracting, Vessel Suitability, Platform Operations,
Inspections, Marine Operations & Combined Operations
6. Cross Referenced Sections and Sheets are:
Section 2.2.2 Stability - Maritime Integrity
Section 2.2.3 Position Keeping System failures
Section 2.3.4 Emergency Response
Section 2.4.3 Human and Organisational Factors

F1 Likelihood Factors (including historical data)

1. Confirmation should be obtained that the likelihood of vessel collisions has been derived from a
recognised model or from a local marine traffic survey.
Use of software, COAST, CRASH, COLLIDE, MAN
Shipping surveys
Historic data
2. Where the hazard identification process listed above has not been used, judgement as to the
adequacy can only be assessed on an individual basis.
Further consideration will be required on an installation specific basis.
Installation location, particularly when sited near known shipping routes
No dedicated standby vessel
Vessel control and speed
Point of contact with installation
Vessel orientation
3. Relevant Legislation, ACOP and Guidance includes:
Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005
Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc) Regulations 1996
Assessment Principles for Offshore Safety Cases [APOSC]
4. Specific Technical Issues:
None
5. Other Related Assessment Sheets in this Section are:
None
6. Cross-Referenced Sections and Sheets are:
None

F2 Loss of Integrity to Installation Systems

F3 Fatalities to Workforce

1. Confirmation should be obtained that all consequences of a vessel collision have been
considered. The consequences may involve many disciplines and a multidisciplinary approach
should have been used.
2. Where a multidisciplinary approach has not been used, the adequacy should be judged by
examining the completeness of the technical consequences documented.
3. Relevant Legislation, ACOP and Guidance includes:
Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005
Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc) Regulations 1996
Assessment Principles for Offshore Safety Cases [APOSC]
4. Specific Technical Issues:
Injuries to people
Direct contact
Strong vibration
Loss of structural integrity
Direct contact
Strong vibration
Large relative deformation
Loss of stability
Direct contact
Strong vibration
Large relative deformation
Loss of position
Direct contact
Loss of containment
Loss of other safety critical equipment
Loss of EER
5. Other Related Assessment Sheets in this Section are:
F9

Physical Protection

F10

Robust Structure, Plant and Equipment

6. Cross-Referenced Sections and Sheets are:

Sheet 2.2.2.G5

Collision/Grounding

Sheet 2.3.4.F8

Ship Collision

Section 2.4.3 Human and Organisational Factors

Section 2.1.2 Risk Assessment (including Human Vulnerability)
7. Lead Assessment Section for this Sheet:
OSD5.5
8. Team responsible for authoring and updating this sheet:
OSD5.3

F4 Subsea Facilities, Exclusion Zone

1. Confirmation should be obtained that, where appropriate in design cases only, subsea facilities
have been considered in the concept selection thus providing inherent safety by eliminating the
need for surface facilities. Where surface facilities are provided confirmation should be obtained
that the safety system acknowledges the management of appropriate exclusion zone.
2. Not applicable.
3. Relevant Legislation, ACOP and Guidance includes:
Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005
Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc) Regulations 1996
Assessment Principles for Offshore Safety Cases [APOSC]
4. Specific technical issues:
None
5. Other Related Assessment Sheets in this Section are:
None
6. Cross-Referenced Sections and Sheets are:
Section 2.4.1 Wells Risk evaluation and management
Section 2.4.3 Human and Organisational Factors

F5 Verification, Testing and Inspection

1. Confirmation should be obtained that procedures and equipment for the prevention of collisions
follow the requirements of the recognised guidance/codes of practice below:
OGUK Guidelines for Ship/Installation Collision Avoidance 2010
OGUK Emergency Response & Rescue Vessel Survey Guidelines Issue 5, HS009, 2008
OGUK Emergency Response & Rescue Vessel Management Guidelines Issue 4, HS008,
2008
OGUK Common Guidelines for the Safe Management of Offshore Supply and Anchor
Handling Operations (North WestEuropean Area) Issue 2, OP020, 2009
Guidance & ACOP to the Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire & Explosion &
Emergency Response) Regulations 1995 (L65)
Further guidance can be obtained from:
OTO 1999 052 Effective Collision Risk Management for Offshore Installations
Offshore Operations Notice ON61 Management of Collision Risk Radio communication
between offshore installations, their standby vessels and merchant ships, 2003
2. Where standard or guidance other than that listed above has been used, judgement as to the
adequacy of the detection system can only be assessed on an individual basis.
Alternative/additional measures may be required for other types of field arrangement or when
standby vessel sharing is agreed.
3. Relevant Legislation, ACOP and Guidance includes:
Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005
Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc) Regulations 1996
Assessment Principles for Offshore Safety Cases [APOSC]
4. Specific Technical Issues:
None
5. Other Related Assessment Sheets in this Section are:
F7 SBVs Visual & Radar, Platform Mounted Radar, Automated Systems
F8 Procedures [Including Vessel Contracting, Vessel Suitability, Platform Operations, Inspection,
Marine Operations and Combined Operations]
6. Cross-Referenced Sections and Sheets are:
Section 2.3.4 Emergency Response
Section 2.4.3 Human and Organisational Factors

F6 SBVs, Communications and Procedures

9. Confirmation should be obtained that procedures and equipment for the prevention of collisions
follow the requirements of the recognised guidance/codes of practice below:
UKOOA Guidelines for Ship/Installation Collision Avoidance 2003
UKOOA Guidelines for Survey of Vessels Standing by Offshore Installations 2001
UKOOA Guidelines for the Management & Operation of Vessels Standing by Offshore
Installations 2001
UKOOA Guidelines for the Safe Management & Operation of Offshore Support Vessels 2002
Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response)
Regulations 1995 ACOP & Guidance L65
Further guidance can be obtained from:
OTO 1999 052 Effective Collision Risk Management for Offshore Installations
10. Where standard or guidance other than that listed above has been used, judgement as to the
adequacy of the detection system can only be assessed on an individual basis.
Alternative/additional measures may be required for other types of field arrangement or when
standby vessel sharing is agreed.
11. Relevant Legislation, ACOP and Guidance includes:
Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005
Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc) Regulations 1996
Assessment Principles for Offshore Safety Cases [APOSC]
12. Specific Technical Issues:
None
13. Other Related Assessment Sheets in this Section are:
F7

SBVs Visual & Radar, Platform Mounted Radar, Automated Systems

F8

Procedures [Including Vessel Contracting, Vessel Suitability, Platform Operations,

Inspection, Marine Operations and Combined Operations]

14. Cross-Referenced Sections and Sheets are:
Section 2.3.4 Emergency Response
Section 2.4.3 Human and Organisational Factors

F7 SBVs, Visual and Radar, Platform Mounted Radar, Automated Systems

1. Confirmation should be obtained that detection equipment, operation and procedures follow the
requirements of the recognised guidance/codes of practice below:
UKOOA Guidelines for Ship/Installation Collision Avoidance 2003
UKOOA Guidelines for the Management & Operation of Vessels Standing by Offshore
Installations 2001
L65 Guidance & ACOP to the Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and
Emergency Response) Regulations 1995
Further guidance can be obtained from:
OTO 1999 052 Effective Collision Risk Management for Offshore Installations
OTO 97 058 Performance of Standby Vessel Radar
2. Where standards or guidance other than that listed above has been used, judgement as to the
adequacy of the detection system can only be assessed on an individual basis.
Alternative/additional measures may be required for other types of field arrangement or when
standby vessel sharing is agreed.
3. Relevant Legislation, ACOP and Guidance includes:
Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005
Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc) Regulations 1996
Assessment Principles for Offshore Safety Cases [APOSC]
4. Specific Technical Issues:
None
5. Other Related Assessment Sheets in this Section are:
F5

Verification, Testing & Inspection

F6

SBVs, Communications & Procedures

F8

Procedures [Including Vessel Contracting, Vessel Suitability, Platform Operations,

Inspection, Marine Operations and Combined Operations]

6. Cross-Referenced Sections and Sheets are:
Section 2.3.4 Emergency Response

Section 2.4.3 Human and Organisational Factors

F8 Procedures (including Vessel Contracting, Vessel Suitability, Platform Operations,

Inspections, Marine Operations and Combined Operations)
1. Confirmation should be obtained that the control of collision risks follow the requirements of the
recognised guidance/codes of practice below:
UKOOA Guidelines for Ship/Installation Collision Avoidance 2003
UKOOA Guidelines for the Safe Management & Operation of Offshore Support Vessels 2002
UKOOA Guidelines for Survey of Vessels Standing by Offshore Installations 2001
L65 Guidance & ACOP to the Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and
Emergency Response) Regulations 1995
Further guidance can be obtained from:
OTO 1999 052 Effective Collision Risk Management for Offshore Installations
2. Where standard or guidance other than that listed above has been used, judgement as to the
adequacy of the detection system can only be assessed on an individual basis.
Alternative/additional measures may be required for other types of field arrangement or when
standby vessel sharing is agreed.
3. Relevant Legislation, ACOP and Guidance includes:
Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005
Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc) Regulations 1996
Assessment Principles for Offshore Safety Cases [APOSC]
4. Specific Technical Issues:
None
5. Other Related Assessment Sheets in this Section are:
F5 Verification, Testing & Inspection
F6 SBVs, Communications & Procedures
F7 SBVs Visual & Radar, Platform Mounted Radar, Automated Systems
6. Cross-Referenced Sections and Sheets are:
Section 2.3.4 Emergency Response
Section 2.4.3 Human and Organisational Factors

F9 Physical Protection
1. Confirmation should be obtained that all Safety Critical Elements [SCEs] within zones
vulnerable to impact from attendant vessels are properly protected against damage due to direct
impact, large relative deformations and strong vibrations. Examples of such SCEs are:
Risers [possibly including associated ESD valves]
Conductors
Caissons
Escape routes and other EER related items
There is no specific guidance about what constitutes adequate protection, although some of the
analysis techniques used in Section 3 Loss of Structural Integrity may be used to demonstrate
strength through design.
2. Due to the lack of guidance at present, adequacy can only be assessed on an individual basis.
Further consideration will be required where damage to SCEs is tolerated on the basis that other
safeguards are in place. This may require discussion with other topic teams.
3. Relevant Legislation, ACOP and Guidance includes:
Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005
Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc) Regulations 1996
Assessment Principles for Offshore Safety Cases [APOSC]
4. Specific Technical Issues:
None
5. Other Related Assessment Sheets in this Section are:
F2

Loss of Integrity to Installation Systems

6. Cross-Referenced Sections and Sheets are:

Section 2.2.1 Loss of Structural Integrity
Section 2.3.1 Loss of Containment - Process
Section 2.3.2 Loss of Containment - Pipelines
Section 2.4.1 Wells Risk evaluation and management
Section 2.3.4 Emergency Response

F10 Robust Structure, Plant and Equipment

1. Confirmation should be obtained that the safety critical plant and equipment in the installation
can sustain the large displacements and strong vibrations resulting from reasonably foreseeable
collisions from attendant vessels [see Section 3 Loss of Structural Integrity].
For structures there is limited authoritative guidance in this area:
ON 27 Status of Technical Guidance on Design, Construction and Certification
Also two main methods are currently available:
Qualitative through techniques such as Walkdown
Quantitative by structural analysis coupled to survival criteria for the plant and equipment
2. Due to the lack of guidance at present, adequacy can only be assessed on an individual basis.
3. Relevant Legislation, ACOP and Guidance includes:
Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005
Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc) Regulations 1996
Assessment Principles for Offshore Safety Cases [APOSC]
4. Specific Technical Issues:
None
5. Other Related Assessment Sheets in this Section are:
F2

Loss of Integrity of Installation Systems

6. Cross-Referenced Sections and Sheets are:

Section 2.2.1 Loss of Structural Integrity
Section 2.3.1 Loss of Containment - Process
Section 2.3.2 Loss of Containment - Pipelines
Section 2.4.1 Wells - Risk evaluation and management