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CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE vs. ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO (A.C. No.

4921 ,March 6, 2003)


FACTS:
Carmelita Zaguirre and Alfredo Castillo met in 1996 when they became officemates at NBI during the time
when Alfredo Castillo was preparing to take his Bar Examinations. Castillo courted Zaguirre and
representing himself as a single man promised to marry her. On May 10, 1997, Castillo was admitted as a
member of the Philippine Bar, it was also during those days when Zaguirre found out that the former was
already married when the wife confronted her about their relationship.
On September 10, 1997, Castillo, already a lawyer, executed an affidavit admitting that he had a
relationship with Zaguirre and that he recognizes that the unborn child in her womb was his own and
further that he is willing to sign the childs birth certificate and to provide for the childs necessities for
living.
On December 09, 1997, Zaguirre birthed Aletha Jessa and on that same perios, Castillo started to refuse
recognizing the child and giving her any form of support contending that he never courted Zaguirre. He
likewise contended that Zaguirre knew all along that he was already married and that she has been
seeing other men and that he executed the aforementioned affidavit to save her from embarrassment.
After due hearing, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Alfred Castillo guilty of immoral
conduct and recommends that he be meted the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty imposed is proper.

HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court agreed with the findings and recommendation of the IBP. Respondent violated
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the same Code.
The qualification of having a good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain ones good standing in the
profession; it is a continuing requirement to the practice of law and therefore admission to the bar does
not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning his
mental or moral fitness before he became a lawyer. This is because his admission to practice merely
creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the qualifications to become a lawyer.
His conduct is not only immoral, but grossly immoral. It is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards of morality
required of every lawyer. Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement
recognizing and undertaking to support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness
on his part which is highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to selfstultification.
The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
or good demeanor.

Quirino Tomlin II vs. Atty. Salvador N. Moya II (A.C. 6971)


FACTS:
Atty. Salvador Moya II allegedly issued seven postdated checks to Quirino Tomlin II as partial payment
for the P600,000.00 that the former borrowed from the latter. When Tomlin realized that all the said
checks were dishonoured by the bank, he made several demands to Moya but the latter still refused to
pay his debt. Thereafter, the complainant filed seven counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 to
the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan as well as an instant case for disbarment against Moya.
In the Report and Recommendation dated March 31, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner noted that
respondent failed to file an answer and/or position paper despite several requests for extension, in
disregard of the orders of the IBP. Moreover, it was observed that the pending criminal action against
respondent does not pose a prejudicial question to the resolution of the issues in the present
administrative case. Hence, it was recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for one year.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Moya is guilty of Gross Misconduct and violation or the Code of Professional
Responsibility

RULING:
Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are
expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and
[19]
fair dealing. In so doing, the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured.
Lawyers
may be disciplined whether in their professional or in their private capacity for any conduct that is
[20]
wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.
Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his
profession or private capacity is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment
because good character is an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for the
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continuance of such privilege.
In the present case, respondent admitted his monetary obligations to the complainant but offered no
justifiable reason for his continued refusal to pay. Complainant made several demands, both verbal and
written, but respondent just ignored them and even made himself scarce. Although he acknowledged his
financial obligations to the complainant, respondent never offered nor made arrangements to pay his
debt. On the contrary, he refused to recognize any wrongdoing nor shown remorse for issuing worthless
[22]
checks, an act constituting gross misconduct.
Respondent must be reminded that it is his duty as a
lawyer to faithfully perform at all times his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. As
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part of his duties, he must promptly pay his financial obligations.
The Supreme Court held that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years as
recommended by the IBP commensurate under the circumstances. The dispositive part of its judgment
states that Atty. Salvador N. Moya II is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two years, effective
immediately, with a warning that any further infraction by him shall be dealt with most severely.

JOHN SIY LIM vs. ATTY. CARMELITO A. MONTANO A.C. No. 5653
FACTS:
This is an administrative case with complainant John Siy Lim charging respondent Atty. Montano with
gross misconduct relative to his filing of Civil Case No. C-19928. Complainant alleged that respondent
filed the complaint in the said civil case out of malice, indicating that it involves the same parties, the
same causes of action and relief prayed for as that of Civil Case No. C-14542.
In respondents comment, he denied the allegations against him. While he admitted filing the civil case
stated herein as a counsel for plaintiff therein, he asserted that it was not filed with malicious intent.
Moreover, while the new case involved the same party, it was for a different cause of action and relief,
and, as such, the principle of res judicata did not apply. He further explained that the complaint in Civil
Case No. C-14542 was for declaratory relief or reformation of instrument, while Civil Case No. 19928 was
for annulment of title. He accepted the case based on "his professional appreciation that his client had a
good case." In his reply, the complainant stressed that the respondent was guilty of forum shopping; Civil
Case No. C-19928 was nothing but a revivalof the old complaint; and "the lame excuse of the respondent
that the present case is an action in rem while the other case is an action in personam" did not merit
consideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated Canon 12 of Code of Professional Responsibility and is liable of
forum shopping.
HELD:
In this case, it is clear that respondent is guilty of forum shopping. By his own admission, he was aware
that Civil Case No. C-14542 was already final and executory when he filed the second case (Civil Case
No. C-19928). His allegation that he "was not the original counsel of his clients" and that "when he filed
the subsequent case for nullity of TCT, his motive was to protect the rights of his clients whom he
believed were not properly addressed in the prior case for reformation and quieting of title," deserves
scant consideration. As a responsible member of the bar, he should have explained the effect of such
final and executory decision on his clients rights, instead of encouraging them to file another case
involving the same property and asserting the same rights.
The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of res judicata,
runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to exert
every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. By his
actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04 of the Code, as well as a lawyers
mandate "to delay no man for money or malice." While we rule that the respondent should be sanctioned
for his actions, we also note that the power to disbar should be exercised with great caution, to be
imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer
as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment should never be decreed where any
lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired. Thus, the Court imposed upon the respondent a penalty
of suspension from practice of law for six month.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., and BEN A. NICOLAS vs. Atty. MACARIO D. ARQUILLO
A.C. No. 6632.

Facts:
Atty. Macario D. Arquillo represented opposing parties in one a case before the before the National Labor
Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch in San Fernando, La Union. Herein, complainants
accuse Atty. Arquillo of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and/or violation of his oath as attorney by
representing conflicting interests. The case was filed with the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline which
found Atty. Arquillo guilty of the charge and recommended a penalty of suspension for 6 months. The
governors of the IBP increased the penalty for 2 years.

Issue:
Whether

or

not

the

acts

of

Arquillo

merits

his

suspension

from

the

practice

of

law.

Held:
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
their dealings and transactions with their clients. Corollary to this duty, lawyers shall not represent
conflicting interests, except with all the concerned clients written consent, given after a full disclosure of
the facts. When a lawyer represents two or more opposing parties, there is a conflict of interests, the
existence of which is determined by three separate tests:
1. when, in representation of one client, a lawyer is required to fight for an issue or claim, but is also
duty-bound to oppose it for another client;
2. when the acceptance of the new retainer will require an attorney to perform an act that may
injuriously affect the first client or, when called upon in a new relation, to use against the first one
any knowledge acquired through their professional connection; or
3. when the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of an attorneys duty to
give undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
dealing in the performance of that duty.
An attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is a hornbook doctrine grounded on public policy
that a lawyers representation of both sides of an issue is highly improper. The proscription applies
when the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter, however slight such
conflict may be. It applies even when the attorney acts from honest intentions or in good faith.
In accordance with previous rulings from this court Atty. Arquillo is suspended for 1 year from the
practice of law.

EPIFANIA Q. BANTOLO vs. ATTY. EGEMDIO B. CASTILLON, JR. (A.C. 6589)


FACTS:
Atty. Egemdio Castillon is a lawyer and one of the defendants in a case involving a parcel of land in
[2]
Valderrama, Antique. The case was decided in favor of Epifania Bantolo and her co-plaintiffs, and
thereafter, a writ of execution was issued, by virtue of which, Castillon and his party were ejected from the
property. However, Castillon et al., subsequently entered the disputed property and harvested the palay
[3]
planted therein. Castillon were prompted to move for defendants to be declared in contempt of court
because of their open defiance and willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the court, which were
[4]
abetted by the acts of Atty. Egmedio Castillon who is an officer of the court.
In the Report and Recommendation (Report) dated 17 March 2004, the fact that the respondent lost his
case in the trial court does not necessarily support the charge of willingly promoting or ruing any
groundless, false or unlawful suit or giving aid, or consenting to the same.
Recognizing that the findings of the trial court and the appellate court with respect to respondents
contumacious acts as final and conclusive, it was found that respondent committed an act which
constitutes a breach of his sworn promise to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities. Furthermore, the Report noted respondents attempts to thwart the instant
disbarment proceedings, to wit: i) attempt to mislead the Commission on Bar Discipline by representing
that the proceedings relative to the contempt charges against him are still pending when in fact they had
already been terminated; ii) placing too much emphasis on the alleged lack of personality of the
complainant to file the disbarment complaint; and iii) failure to notify the Commission of his change of
[12]
address.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is correct to impose a penalty of disbarment

HELD:
No, the supreme penalty of disbarment is not proper in the instant case. The rule is that disbarment is
meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court. While the Court will not hesitate to remove an erring lawyer from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers when the evidence calls for it, it will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will
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suffice to accomplish the desired end.
A close examination of the facts of this case reveals that the basis of the act for which the court found to
be contumacious is a claim of ownership over the subject property, and thus arose from an emotional
attachment to the property which they had possessed prior to their dispossession as a consequence of
the decision in Civil Case No. 1345. Respondents subsequent acts, however, including those which
were found to be contumacious, as well as his actuations in the instant case, merit disciplinary sanctions,
for which is recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1) month.
Respondents defiance of the writ of execution is a brazen display of disrespect of the very system which
he has sworn to support. Likewise, his various attempts to delay and address issues inconsequential to
the disbarment proceedings had necessarily caused delay, and even threatened to obstruct the
investigation being conducted by the IBP.
In the case of respondent, the Court finds that a months suspension from the practice of law will provide
him with enough time to purge himself of his misconduct and will give him the opportunity to retrace his
steps back to the virtuous path of the legal profession.

ATTY. MARTIN T. SUELTO v. NELSON A. SISON et al.


465 SCRA 29 (2005)
FACTS:
Respondents Sison brothers negotiated for the sale of their 3 parcels of land to their co-respondent
Santos Land Development Corporation (the corporation). In the series of negotiations, Atty. Danilo A.
Basa, one of two retained counsel of the corporation, was present in order to incorporate whatever the
parties agreed upon in the draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and the Deed of Absolute Sale
they were going to forge.
The parties agreed to conclude and sign the MOA prepared by Atty. Basa whereon the Sisons had in fact
affixed their signatures but since Atty. Basa was at the time out of the country, the corporation asked its
other retained counsel, petitioner Atty. Martin Suelto to give the MOA a final look.
Atty. Suelto inputed in the MOA the names of the respective spouses of the Sisons. He also made some
amendments and prepared a Joint Affidavit of Clarification and Confirmation (Joint Affidavit).
A pertinent provision in the MOA prepared by Atty. Basa, which was retained in the final MOA, called for
the retention by the corporation of 10% of the total purchase price for taxes, notarial and attorneys fees
and other fees and charges and incidental expenses. There was, however, no agreement on the amount
of notarial fees to be paid or taken from the 10% retained amount.The Sisons and the corporation affixed
their signatures on the MOA, as finalized by Atty. Suelto who notarized it. They also executed 3 Deeds of
Absolute Sale which were notarized by the Sisons counsel Atty. Agudo.
The corporation received from Atty. Suelto a Statement of Account addressed to it, for the account of the
Sisons, wherein Atty. Suelto indicated the billing for the preparation and notarization of the MOA and for
the final preparation of the Deeds of Absolute Sale. The Sisons denied their obligation to pay Atty. Suelto
his legal fees. As Atty. Suelto failed to collect his fees, he filed a complaint before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) for Collection of Sum of Money and Attorneys Fees against the Sisons. The RTC ruled in
favor of Atty. Suelto and ordered the Sisons to pay him his legal fees. The Court of Appeals (CA),
however, reversed the decision of RTC, noting the provision in the MOA regarding the retention of the 10%
selling price by the buyer corporation to be applied to expenses including notarial and attorneys fees.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Atty. Suelto is entitled to receive payment from the Sisons for his legal services
HELD:
The Sisons were willing to pay for the notarial fees to be charged to the 10% retained amount of
the purchase price, if the lawyer notarizing it is one of their choice.
The CAs presumption that the notarial fees had been paid with the return by the corporation to the
Sisons of the balance of the 10% retained purchase is thus incongruous with the clearly established fact
that Atty. Sueltos notarial fees had not been paid.
The MOA provision that notarial fees relative to the sale, among other expenses, would be charged to the
10% retained purchase price bears no qualification whatsoever, however, on which lawyer whether of
the Sisons or of the corporation would perform notarial services for the provision to apply.
The Sisons, having agreed in the MOA, which is the law between them and the corporation, to charge
notarial fees from the retained 10% of the purchase price, but the balance thereof having been returned
to them without Atty. Sueltos notarial fees being settled, they are under obligation to settle the same, at
a reasonable amount of course.
The RTCs determination of the amount of P100,000.00 as fair and reasonable notarial fees, inclusive of
actual litigation cost, under the circumstances reflected above, merits the Courts approval.

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