FIRST DIVISION

Spouses JOSEPHINE
160762
MENDOZA GO & HENRY GO,
Petitioners,

G.R. No.
Present:
Panganib

an, CJ,
Chair
person,
YnaresSantiago,
- versus Martinez,

AustriaCallejo,

Sr., and
ChicoNazario, JJ
Promulgat
ed:
LEONARDO YAMANE,
Respondent.
May 3, 2006
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- ----- -- -- -- x

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, CJ:

roperty purchased by spouses during the existence

of their marriage is presumed to be conjugal in

nature. This presumption stands, absent any clear,

categorical, and convincing evidence that the property is
paraphernal. Conjugal property cannot be held liable for
the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless
some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to
the conjugal partnership.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the November
22,

2002

Decision[2] and

the

September

17,

2003

Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV

No. 60939. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed
from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale dated August 12, 1981 and the Final Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale dated August 26, 1982 are declared NULL and
VOID.[4]

The CA denied reconsideration in its September

17, 2003 Resolution.
The Facts

The undisputed factual findings of the CA are as

follows:
Involved in the suit is a 750 square meters (sic) parcel of lot
located at Res. Sec. K, Baguio City, registered in the name of
Muriel Pucay Yamane, wife of Leonardo Yamane, [respondent]
herein, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12491.
As a result of a motion for execution of a charging lien filed
by Atty. Guillermo F. De Guzman in Civil Case No. 1841,
entitled Florence Pucay De Gomez, Elsie Pucay Kiwas and Muriel
Pucay Yamane v. Cypress Corporation, which said counsel handled
for the plaintiffs therein, hereinafter collectively referred to as the
Pucay sisters, the subject property was levied to satisfy the lien for

attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000. The said property was

scheduled to be sold at public auction on August 11, 1981.
Four days prior to the auction sale, [respondent] filed a ThirdParty Claim with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff to stop the public
auction on the ground that the subject property is conjugal property
and, therefore, should not be held answerable for the personal
obligation of the Pucay sisters. However, the Sheriff proceeded with
the auction sale despite [respondents] protest. The subject property
was sold to spouses Josephine [and] Henry Go (or [petitioners]) as
highest bidder. No redemption having been made during the oneyear period, a Final Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was eventually
issued on August 26, 1982 conveying and transferring the said
property to [petitioners].
On September 4, 1984, [respondent] filed a Complaint with
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, docketed as Civil Case No.
417-R, against [petitioners] and Sheriff Melgar for annulment and
cancellation of auction sale upon the same ground stated in the
abovementioned
third-party
claim. Citing
the Order of
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch V in LRC Case No.
2288, which ordered the cancellation of TCT No. 12491 and directed
the Register of Deeds to issue new title in the name of Josephine
Go x x x, [petitioners] moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
of res judicata. In the Order dated November 28, 1984, the motion
was denied by the trial court.
In their Answer filed on December 10, 1984, [petitioners]
denied the material allegations of the complaint and interposed the
following special affirmative defenses: that the cause of action was
barred by prior judgment; that [respondent] has not pursued any
lawful remedy to annul the execution proceeding; that there is no
flaw or irregularity in the auction sale; and that since the execution
sale was made in accordance with Section 21, Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court, it is deemed final and any irregularity
committed in the course thereof will not vitiate its validity.
On December
28,
1984,
Muriel
likewise
lodged
a Complaint for Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 505-R,
against [petitioners] and Atty. Guillermo De Guzman alleging, in gist,
fraud, misrepresentation, manipulation and unlawful acts of the
defendants in causing the levy of the subject property with an

estimated commercial value of P200,000 as against a charging lien

in the amount of P10,000.
In its May 27, 1985 Order, the trial court ordered the joint
hearing of Civil Cases Nos. 417-R and 505-R. OnAugust 30, 1985,
Muriel was declared non-suited for failure to appear in the hearing
despite due notice. As a consequence, Civil Case No. 505-R was
dismissed on October 15, 1985.[5]

In its Decision[6] dated March 25, 1998, the Regional

Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 4, held that the
subject parcel of land was the paraphernal property of
the late Muriel Pucay Yamane -- spouse of respondent -and was not their conjugal property. The appearance of
his name on the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was
deemed to be merely descriptive of the civil status of the
registered owner, his late wife. Hence, finding that he
had no legal standing to question the auction sale or to
pray

for

its

annulment

or

cancellation,

the

RTC

dismissed the case for lack of merit.

Upon receipt of the RTC Decision on April 8, 1998,

respondent filed a Motion,[7] in which he prayed that he

be allowed to file his Motion for Reconsideration of the

Decision, on or before May 30, 1998. The trial court
granted[8]his Motion; received

the

Motion

for

Reconsideration,[9] which was filed on May 28, 1998;

and eventually denied it in its Order dated June 5, 1998.
[10]

He then elevated the matter to the CA on June 15,

1998.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA reversed the RTCs Decision. The Sheriffs

Certificate of Sale dated August 12, 1981, and the Final
Sheriffs Certificate of Sale dated August 26, 1982, were
declared null and void.

According to the appellate court, property acquired

during marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless the

exclusive funds of one spouse are shown to have been

used for the purpose. That the land was acquired during
the spouses coverture was sufficiently

established by the TCT and the Deed of Absolute

Sale, both indicating that Muriel Pucay Yamane was
married to Leonardo Yamane; and by the undisputed
testimony of the previous owner, Eugene Pucay. Because
of petitioners failure to establish that the land in
question

had

been acquired

by

Muriel

using

her

exclusive funds, the CA concluded that the contested

land was conjugal property.

The appellate court further held thus:

x x x [T]he disputed property being a conjugal property of
[respondent] and his wife, and absent any showing of some
advantage or benefit that accrued to their conjugal partnership from
the transaction between the Pucay sisters and Atty. De Guzman, the
public auction sale of the subject property in favor of [petitioners] is
null and void.[11]

Hence, this Petition.[12]

Issues

Petitioners submit the following issues for our

consideration:
I.

The Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking cognizance of the

appeal and in not dismissing the same, despite the fact that
the respondent failed to perfect his appeal within the 15-day
reglementary period set by the Rules of Court.

II.

The Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the subject

property as conjugal property, despite the existence of clear
evidence showing that the subject property is the exclusive
paraphernal property of Muriel who, even during her lifetime,
always claimed the said property as her own exclusive
paraphernal property and not as property co-owned with her
husband, the respondent herein.

III.

The Court of Appeals, assuming, ex grati argumenti, that the

subject property is conjugal property between respondent and
Muriel, gravely erred in ruling that the same cannot answer for
the charging lien of Atty. Guillermo de Guzman in Civil Case
No. 1841.[13]

In the main, they posit two issues. They raise, first,

the procedural question of whether the CA erred in
giving

due

course

to

respondents

lapsed

appeal;

and, second, the substantive issue of whether the subject

property is conjugal or paraphernal.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Procedural Issue:
Whether Respondents Appeal
Should Be Given Due Course

Petitioners contend that the CA erred in giving due

course to the appeal filed by respondent beyond the 15day reglementary period.

Concededly, he received a copy of the RTC Decision

on April 8, 1998. He had, therefore, until April 23, 1998,
within which to file an appeal. Prior to the latter date,
however, he moved that his new counsel be allowed to
file a motion for reconsideration on May 30, 1998. It
was

eventually

filed

on May

28,

1998,

but

was

denied. Respondent

subsequently

filed a

Notice

of

Appeal on June 15, 1998. By this time, the original

period to appeal had expired. It should be clear that the
Rules

prohibit

an

extension

to

file

motion

for

reconsideration.[14]

The perfection of an appeal in the manner and

within the period prescribed by the Rules of Civil
Procedure is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional;
and the lapse of the appeal period of fifteen days
deprives a court of the jurisdiction to alter a final
judgment.[15]

There have been exceptions, however, in which the

Court dispensed with technical infirmities and gave due
course to tardy appeals. In some of those instances, the
presence of any justifying circumstance recognized by

law -- such as fraud, accident, mistake or excusable

negligence -- properly vested the judge with discretion to
approve or admit an appeal filed out of time. [16] In other
instances, lapsed appeals were allowed in order to serve
substantial justice, upon consideration of a) matters of
life, liberty, honor or property; b) the existence of special
or compelling circumstances; c) the merits of the case;
d) causes not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence

of the party that would be favored by the suspension of

the rules; e) the failure to show that the review being
sought was merely frivolous and dilatory; and f) the fact
that the other party would not be unjustly prejudiced.[17]

Indeed, in some exceptional cases, the Court has

allowed the relaxation of the rules regulating the
reglementary periods of appeal. These exceptions were
cited in Manila Memorial Park Cemetery v. CA,[18] from
which we quote:
In Ramos vs. Bagasao, the Court excused the delay of four
days in the filing of the notice of appeal because the questioned
decision of the trial court had been served upon appellant Ramos at
a time when her counsel of record was already dead. The new
counsel could only file the appeal four days after the prescribed
reglementary period was over. InRepublic vs. Court of Appeals, the
Court allowed the perfection of an appeal by the Republic despite
the delay of six days to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice since
the Republic stood to lose hundreds of hectares of land already titled
in its name and had since then been devoted for public
purposes. In Olacao vs. National Labor Relations Commission, a
tardyappeal was accepted considering that the subject matter in
issue had theretofore been judicially settled with finality in another
case, and a dismissal of the appeal would have had the effect of the
appellant being ordered twice to make the same reparation to the
appellee.[19]

We believe that a suspension of the Rules is similarly

warranted in the present controversy. We have carefully
studied the merits of the case and noted that the review
being sought has not been shown to be merely frivolous
and

dilatory. The

Court

has

come

to

the

conclusion that the Decision of the RTC, Branch 4 (in

Civil Case No. 417-R), must be set aside. It would be far
better and more prudent to attain the ends of justice,
rather than to dispose of the case on technicality and
cause grave injustice in the process. Thus, we would
rather excuse a technical lapse and afford respondent a
review of the case on appeal.
Substantive Issue:
Paraphernal or Conjugal?

The purchase of the property had been concluded in

1967, before the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988.[20] Accordingly, the transaction was aptly covered

by the then governing provisions of the New Civil

Code. On the latter basis, therefore, we shall resolve the
issue of the nature of the contested property.

Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that

all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
theconjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.[21] As
a conditio sine qua non for the operation of this article in
favor

of

invokes

the conjugal
the

partnership,[22] the

presumption

must

first

party

who

prove

that

the property was acquired during the marriage.[23]

In

other

words,

the

presumption

in

favor

of

conjugality does not operate if there is no showing

of when the

property

alleged

to

be conjugal

was

acquired.[24] Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted

only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing
evidence.[25] There must be strict proof of the exclusive

ownership of one of the spouses,[26] and the burden of

proof rests upon the party asserting it.[27]

The CA committed no error in declaring that the

parcel of land belonged to the conjugal partnership of
Spouses Muriel and Leonardo Yamane. They acquired it
from

Eugene

Pucay

on February

27,

1967,[28] or

specifically during the marriage.[29] We then follow the

rule that proof of the acquisition of the subject property
during a marriage suffices to render the statutory
presumption operative. It is clear enough that the
presently disputed piece of land pertains to the conjugal
partnership.

Petitioners

concede

that

the

property

was

acquired during the subsistence of the marriage of

Muriel to respondent.[30] Nonetheless, they insist that it
belonged exclusively to her for the following reasons:

First. Respondent never denied nor opposed her

claim in Civil Case No. 505-R, which she had filed during
her lifetime; or in AG-GR Sp. No. 01616 (entitled Muriel
Pucay Yamane v. Josephine Go), that the disputed parcel
of land was her exclusive paraphernal property. They
allege that his failure to file a denial or opposition in
those cases is tantamount to a judicial admission that
militates against his belated claim.

Second. The Deed of Absolute Sale of the property

is in the sole name of Muriel. Petitioners posit that, had
the spouses jointly purchased this piece of land, the
document should have indicated this fact or carried the
name of respondent as buyer.

Third. The failure of respondent to redeem the

parcel of land within the redemption period after the
auction sale indicated that he was not its co-owner.

We will discuss the three arguments seriatim.

Unilateral Declaration

Respondents interest cannot be prejudiced by the

claim of Muriel in her Complaint in Civil Case No. 505-R
that the subject parcel of land was her paraphernal
property. Significantly,

the

nature

of a

property

--

whether conjugal or paraphernal -- is determined by law

and not by the will of one of the spouses. [31] Thus, no
unilateral declaration by one spouse can change the
character of a conjugal property.[32]

Besides, the issue presented in Civil Case No. 505R was not the nature of the subject piece of land being
levied upon, but whether Atty. Guillermo de Guzman was
entitled to a charging lien. In that case, Muriel claimed
that she had not officially retained him as counsel, and
that no lawyer-client relationship had been established
between them.[33]

Deed and Title in the

Name of One Spouse

Further, the mere registration of a property in the

name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature.
[34]

Hence, it cannot be contended in the present case

that, simply because the title and the Deed of Sale

covering the parcel of land were in the name of Muriel

alone, it was therefore her personal and exclusive

property. In

concluding that it was paraphernal, the trial courts

reliance on Stuart v. Yatco[35] was clearly erroneous.

As stated earlier, to rebut the presumption of the

conjugal nature of the property, petitioners must present
clear and convincing evidence. We affirm and quote
below, for easy reference, the relevant dispositions of the
CA:
x x x. We are unable to go along with [petitioners] contention
that the subject property was acquired by Muriel with her exclusive
funds. Mere registration of the contested property in the name of the
wife is not sufficient to establish the paraphernal nature of the
property. This reminds Us of the teaching in the recent case
of Diancin v. Court of Appeals, that all the property acquired by the
spouses, regardless of in whose name the same is registered,
during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife. To quote:
As a general rule, all property acquired by the
spouses, regardless of in whose name the same is
registered, during the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. In the
case at bar, the fishpond lease right is not paraphernal
having been acquired during the coverture of the marriage
between Matilde and Tiburcio, which was on April 9,
1940. The fact that the grant was solely in the name of
Matilde did not make the property paraphernal property.

What was material was the time the fishpond lease right was
acquired by the grantee, and that was during the lawful
existence of Matildes marriage to Tiburcio.
x x x [T]his presumption is rebuttable, but only with
strong, clear and convincing evidence. The burden of
proving that the property belongs exclusively to the wife
rests upon the party asserting

it. Mere assertion of the propertys paraphernal nature is

not sufficient.

The record as well as the foregoing established jurisprudence

lead us to conclude that the contested property was indeed acquired
during the marriage of herein [respondent] and Muriel. To prove that
it is nonetheless paraphernal property, it is incumbent upon
[petitioners] to adduce strong, clear and convincing evidence that
Muriel bought the same with her exclusive funds. [Petitioners] failed
to discharge the burden. Nowhere in the evidence presented by
them do We find any indication that the land in question was
acquired by Muriel with her exclusive funds. The presumption not
having been overthrown, the conclusion is that the contested land is
conjugal property.[36]

Non-Redemption
After the Auction Sale

The non-redemption of the property by respondent

within the period prescribed by law did not, in any way,
indicate the absence of his right or title to it. Contrary
to petitioners allegation, the fact is that he filed a ThirdParty Claim[37] with the sheriff, upon learning of the levy
and impending auction sale. This fact was specifically
admitted by petitioners.[38] Respondent claimed that the

parcel of land was conjugal, and that he could not

answer for the separate obligation of his wife and her
sisters.[39] Notwithstanding his claim, the disputed piece
of land was sold at a public auction on August 11,
1981. Consequently issued were a Sheriffs Certificate
of Sale dated August 12, 1981, and a Final Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale dated August 26, 1982.[40]

Likewise,

in

his

Opposition

(Answer)

to

the

Petition in LRC File Adm. Case No. 2288,[41] respondent

raised the issue of the conjugal nature of the property
and reserved his right to file an independent action to
annul the auction sale. In its March 30, 1983 Order,
[42]

however, Branch 5 of the RTC of Baguio City did not

rule on either the actual ownership or the nature of the

parcel of land. Rather, it granted the Petition to issue a

new certificate of title in favor of Petitioner Josephine

Mendoza

Go. It

found

that,

under

Section

75

of

Presidential Decree 1529, respondent had no legal

standing to question the auction sale, because he was
not the registered owner of the property. Instead, his
right to prove his claim in a separate and independent
action was upheld.[43] Thus, he instituted the present
case for annulment and cancellation of the auction sale.
The foregoing points clearly explain the failure of
respondent

to

redeem

the

property. Misplaced

is

petitioners emphasis on his failure to do so within the

period required by law, because redemption in this case
would have been inconsistent with his claim that the sale
was invalid.[44] Redemption would have served as an
implied admission of the regularity of the sale and

estopped him from later impugning its validity on that

ground.[45]

Since petitioners have failed to present convincing

evidence

that

the

property

is

paraphernal,

the

presumption that it is conjugal therefore stands. The

next question before us is, whether the charging lien of
Atty. de Guzman may be properly enforced against the
piece of land in question.

Charging Lien Not Chargeable

Against Conjugal Property

It is indisputable that the services of Atty. de

Guzman

were

acquired

during

the

marriage

of

respondent and Muriel. The lawyers legal services were

engaged to recover from Cypress Corporation (in Civil

Case No. 1841) the balance of the purchase price of the

sale of the exclusive property of Muriel and her sisters.
[46]

The recovery was done during the marriage.[47]

The CA elucidated on this matter as follows:

x x x. The contract or transaction between Atty. De
Guzman and the Pucay sisters appears to have been incurred for
the exclusive interest of the latter. Muriel was acting privately for her
exclusive interest when she joined her two sisters in hiring the
services of Atty. De Guzman to handle a case for them. Accordingly,
whatever expenses were incurred by Muriel in the litigation for her
and her sisters private and exclusive interests, are her exclusive
responsibility and certainly cannot be charged against the contested
conjugal property.
Even on the remote assumption that the conjugal property
could be held liable, levy on execution of the same property should
still be denied in accordance with the ruling in Luzon Surety Co., Inc.
v. De Garcia that before a conjugal property could be held liable for
the obligation contracted by a spouse, there must be a showing of
some advantage or benefit that accrued to the conjugal
partnership. Concededly, the burden is on the [petitioners] to prove
that the services rendered by Atty. De Guzman in handling Civil
Case No. 1841 for the Pucay sisters had, somehow, redounded to
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of herein [respondent] and
Muriel. This onus, [petitioners], however, failed to discharge.[48]

We find no reason to deviate from the CAs

findings, which are amply supported by evidence. The
expenses incurred by Muriel for

the recovery of the balance of the purchase price of her

paraphernal property are her exclusive responsibility.
[49]

This piece of land may not be used to pay for her

indebtedness, because her obligation has not been

shown to be one of the charges against the conjugal
partnership.[50] Moreover, her rights to the property are
merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.

Under the New Civil Code, a wife may bind the

conjugal partnership only when she purchases things
necessary for the support of the family, or when she
borrows money for that purpose upon her husbands
failure to deliver the needed sum;[51] when administration
of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by
the courts[52] or by the husband;[53] or when the wife gives

moderate donations for charity.[54] Failure to establish

any of these circumstances in the present case means
that the conjugal asset may not be bound to answer for
Muriels personal obligation.

The power of the court in executing judgments

extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to
the judgment debtor alone.[55] In this case, therefore, the
property -- being conjugal in nature -- cannot be levied
upon.[56]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed

Decision

and

Resolution AFFIRMED.

petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Costs

against

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson, First
Division

WE

C O N C U R:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIAMARTINEZ

Associate Justice
Associate
Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

NAZARIO

MINITA V. CHICO-

Associate Justice

Associate

Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant

to

Section

13,

Article

VIII

of

the

Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above

Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

[1]
[2]

[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]

[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]

[13]
[14]
[15]

[16]
[17]

[18]
[19]
[20]

[21]

Rollo, pp. 8-22.

Annex L of Petition; id. at 62-72. Penned by Justice Rebecca
de Guia-Salvador and concurred in by Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico
(Division chairperson) and Regalado E. Maambong (member).
Annex N of Petition; id. at 82.
Assailed CA Decision, p. 10; id. at 71.
Id. at 1-3; id. at 62-64.
Annex
A
of
petitioners
Memorandum; rollo,
unnumbered. Penned by acting Presiding Judge Robert T.
Cawed.
Rollo, p. 53.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 55-57.
Id. at 58.
Assailed CA Decision, p. 10; rollo, p. 71.
This case was deemed submitted for decision on January 5,
2005, upon this Courts receipt of petitioners Memorandum,
signed by Atty. Emiliano L. Gayo. Respondents Memorandum,
signed by Atty. Albert A. Umaming, was received by the Court
on December 22, 2004.
Petitioners Memorandum, p. 11; rollo, unnumbered.
RULES OF COURT, Rule 41, Sec. 3.
J.
FERIA
AND
M.C.
NOCHE, CIVIL
PROCEDURE
ANNOTATED, Vol. 2, 163 (2001); Neypes v. CA, GR No.
141524, September 14, 2005.
Catubay v. NLRC, 330 SCRA 440, April 12, 2000.
Dela Cruz v. Sison, GR No. 142464, September 26,
2005; Barnes v. Hon. Padilla, 461 SCRA 533, June 28, 2005
(citing Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 540, June 20,
2003 and Aguam v. CA, 332 SCRA 784, May 31, 2000).
344 SCRA 769, November 15, 2000.
Id. at 777, per Vitug, J.
M. STA. MARIA, JR., PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
LAW, 94 (3rd ed., 1999).
The provision is reproduced in Article 116 of the Family
Code, which states: All property acquired during the marriage,
whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted
or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to
be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.

[22]
[23]

[24]
[25]
[26]

[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]

[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]

[41]

[42]
[43]
[44]

[45]

[46]
[47]
[48]

Flora v. Prado, 420 SCRA 396, January 20, 2004.

Acabal v. Acabal, 454 SCRA 555, March 31, 2005; Jocson v.
CA, 170 SCRA 333, February 16, 1989.
Phil. National Bank v. CA, 153 SCRA 435, August 31, 1987.
Wong v. IAC, 200 SCRA 792, August 19, 1991.
Ching v. CA, 423 SCRA 356, February 23, 2004; Francisco v.
CA, 359 Phil. 519, November 25, 1998.
Tan v. CA, 339 Phil. 423, June 10, 1997.
Annex P of the Petition; rollo, p. 87.
See Annex 2-A of respondents Comment, p. 2; rollo, p. 148.
See petitioners Memorandum, p. 22; rollo, unnumbered.
Villanueva v. CA, 427 SCRA 439, April 14, 2004.
Id.
See Annex C of Petition; rollo, pp. 34-38.
Acabal v. Acabal, supra note 20 (citing Mendoza v. Reyes, 124
SCRA 154, August 17, 1983 and Bucoy v. Paulino, 23 SCRA 248,
April 26, 1968).
4 SCRA 1143, April 27, 1962.
Assailed CA Decision, pp. 7-8; rollo, pp. 68-69.
Third Party Claim dated August 3, 1981; rollo, pp. 135-136.
See Answer dated December 7, 1984, p. 2; rollo, p. 29.
See Complaint dated August 31, 1984, p. 3; rollo, p. 25.
Annex 1-F of Respondents Comment; rollo, pp. 141142. The third Whereas clause states that the sale was made
in accordance with Rule 39, Section 17 of the Rules of Court;
Article 161 of the Civil Code; and Fulgencio v. Gatchalian, 21
Phil. 252, January 23, 1912.
In re: Petition for the Issuance of New Title, filed by
Josephine Mendoza Go against Muriel Pucay Yamane and
Leonardo Yamane before the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial
Region of Baguio City, Branch V.
Annex 2-A of respondents Comment; rollo, pp. 147-150.
Id. at 2-3; rollo, pp. 148-149.
Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 563, June
30, 1987.
Perez v. CA, 464 SCRA 89, July 22, 2005; Aclon v. CA, 387
SCRA 415, August 20, 2002; Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 151 SCRA 563, June 30, 1987.
See Reply dated June 9, 2004, p. 1; rollo, p. 241.
Id.
Assailed CA Decision, p. 9; rollo, p. 70.

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[50]

A. TOLENTINO, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE

ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILS., Vol. I, 456 (1990).
CIVIL CODE, Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be
liable for the following:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which constitute
a charge upon property of either spouse or of the partnership;
(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the
separate property of either the husband or the wife; major repairs shall not be
charged to the partnership;
(4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of both
husband and wife, and of legitimate children of one of the spouses;
(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or
other course.

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[53]
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[56]

Id., Art. 115.

Id., Arts. 167, 178 and 196.
Id., Art. 168.
Id., Art. 174.
Republic v. Enriquez, 166 SCRA 608, October 21, 1988; Wong
v. IAC, 200 SCRA 792, August 19, 1991.
Johnson and Johnson (Phils.) v. CA, 330 Phil. 856, September
23, 1996.