SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 102706. January 25, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v. LEON LUMILAN,
ANTONIO GARCIA and FRED ORBISO, accused-appellants.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision1 dated September 20, 1990 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 16, in Criminal Case No.
955, finding accused-appellants Leon Lumilan and Antonio Garcia guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of murder, two (2) counts of
frustrated murder, and three (3) counts of attempted murder, under an
Information charging them and accused Fred Orbiso2 with the crime of
Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms Used in Murder, in violation of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866.
The Information3 reads as follows:
"The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FRED ORBISO,
LEON LUMILAN and ANTONIO GARCIA of the crime of
QUALIFIED ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS USED IN
MURDER, in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed
as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of October 1987, in the
municipality of Ilagan, Province of Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the herein accused, not being
authorized or allowed by the law to keep, possess
and carry firearms, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession
and under their control and custody, firearms without
first having obtained the necessary permit and/or
license to possess the same, and that on the
1
2
3

occasion of such possession, the herein accused with

treachery did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to kill suddenly and
unexpectedly and without giving them chance to
defend themselves, fired [sic] at and shoot Meliton
Asuncion, Modesto Roque, and Eliong dela Cruz
inflicting upon them gunshot wounds which directly
caused their deaths; and further inflicting on the same
occasion gunshot wounds upon Jerry Palomo, Romeo
Pacho, Nolasco Estrada, Mario Palomo and Simeon
Pacano, which injuries would ordinarily cause the
death of the said Jerry Palomo, Romeo Pacho,
Nolasco Estrada, Mario Palomo and Simeon Pacano,
thus performing all the acts of execution which should
have produced the crime of murder with respect to the
last named victims as a consequence, but
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of their will, that is, by the timely and
able medical assistance rendered to the said Jerry
Palomo, Romeo Pacho, Nolasco Estrada, Mario
Palomo and Simeon Pacano which prevented their
deaths.
CONTRARY TO LAW."4
Upon being arraigned, appellants Leon Lumilan and Antonio Garcia entered
the plea of "not guilty."
The evidence of the prosecution reveals that in the early evening of October
12, 1987, Meliton Asuncion, Modesto Roque, Eliong dela Cruz, Jerry Palomo,
Simeon Pacano, Benito Alonzo, Nolasco Estrada, Mario Palomo and Romeo
Pacho were drinking liquor inside the house of Policarpio Palomo when it was
sprayed with bullets. The successive gunshots emanated from the fence
about six (6) meters away from where they were drinking, killing Meliton
Asuncion, Modesto Roque, and Eliong dela Cruz and seriously wounding
Jerry Palomo, Simeon Pacano, Nolasco Estrada, Mario Palomo and Romeo
Pacho. Prosecution eyewitness Simeon Pacano was hit in the left leg causing
him to fall on his face. When the firing ceased, he remained in the said
position pretending to be dead, as he recognized accused Fred Orbiso who
entered the house and checked the bodies of the victims for survivors.
4

Pacano also claims to have also recognized appellants Leon Lumilan and
Antonio Garcia who joined Orbiso inside the house. They were purportedly
after a certain Ben Estrada who was the barangay captain of Gayong-Gayong
Sur, Ilagan, Isabela.5
Prosecution eyewitness Benito Alonzo corroborated the eyewitness account of
Simeon Pacano on the shooting incident. Benito Alonzo recalled that they
were drinking at the house of Policarpio Palomo when successive gunshots
were fired by three persons outside the fence of Palomos house. He identified
appellants Leon Lumilan and Antonio Garcia as two of the alleged assailants.6
Both Lumilan and Garcia interposed the defense of alibi. Appellant Garcia
testified that he was in the company of Atty. Benjamin Olalia who stood as
sponsor in the wedding of the daughter of a certain Hilario Lagua in GayongGayong Sur, Ilagan, Isabela. They had late lunch at the house of Hilario
Lagua and stayed there until 4:00 oclock in the afternoon. Thereafter, Garcia
and Atty. Olalia returned to the latters house in Osmenia, Ilagan, Isabela,
together with Martin Lagua, Juan Lorenzo, Felix Aguda, Romeo Callo, Rodrigo
Junio, a driver, and two other individuals. They spent the rest of the day at the
house of Atty. Olalia who corroborated Garcias testimony.7 On the other hand,
appellant Lumilan testified that he was in Alibagu, Ilagan, Isabela the whole
day of October 12, 1987.8
After an assessment of the evidence, the trial court declared that no proof
beyond reasonable doubt was adduced by the prosecution to justify the
conviction of appellants for Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms Used in
Murder. However, the trial court convicted the appellants for Murder,
Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder as it ruled that:
"x x x The eyewitness account of Simeon Pacano which was
corroborated by Benito Alonzo can not be discounted. Both
testified in a straitforward and candid manner, leaving no doubt as
to their veracity.
"x x x
5
6
7
8

"From the evidence adduced, it is clear that the accused moved in

concert, driven by a pre-conceived design that made each of them
is (sic) liable in equal degree with the others for each of the three
killings and for wounding five others. x x x
"As heretofore alluded to, the killing and wounding of the victims
constituted the crime of Murder, Frustrated Murder and Attempted
Murder, qualified by treachery. x x x
"In view of the eyewitness account of Pacano and Alonzo, the
defense of alibi interposed by the (sic) both accused can not hold
water.
"What crime or crimes were committed?
"1. There is no sufficient evidence to prove Illegal Possession
of Firearms.
2. Relative to the death of Meliton Asuncion, Modesto Roque and
Eliong dela Cruz, the crime committed was Murder.
3. Relative to the injuries sustained by Jerry Palomo and Simeon
Pacano, the crime committed was Frustrated Murder while as to
Romeo Pacho, Nolasco Estrada, and Mario Palomo, the crime
committed is Attempted Murder.
[4]. As to the charge of Illegal Possession of Firearms, no
evidence has been adduced to p[rove the charge. The guns
were never presented.
x x x."9
Accordingly, appellants were meted out the following penalties:
"WHEREOF, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the
accused Antonio Garcia and Leon Lumilan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of 1) MURDER as defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code in
conjunction with Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code and in view
of the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances
attending the commission of the crime, hereby sentences Antonio
9

Garcia and Leon Lumilan to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION

PERPETUA on three counts each for the killing of Meliton
Asuncion, Modesto Roque and Eliong dela Cruz; 2)
FRUSTRATED MURDER and are sentenced to a prison term of 8
years and 20 days as minimum to 14 years, 10 months, and 21
days as maximum on two counts each for the wounding of Jerry
Palomo and Simeon Pacano and; 3) ATTEMPTED MURDER and
are sentenced to a prison term of 5 years as minimum to 8 years
and 21 days as maximum on three counts each for the wounding
of Nolasco Estrada, Mario Palomo and Romeo Pacho, and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased MELITON ASUNCION
damages in the amount of P30,000.00, moral damages of
P10,000.00 each, actual damages of P4,150.00 and lost earning
of P27,000.00 for one year as farmer; the deceased MODESTO
ROQUE damages of P30,000.00, moral damages of P10,000.00
each actual damages of P8,00.00 and lost earning of P10,000.00
for one year as farmer; and the deceased ELIONG DELA CRUZ,
damages of P30,000.00 and moral damages of P10,000.00 each;
for the wounding of SIMEON PACANO and JERRY PALOMO,
moral damages of P10,000.00 each and actual damages of
P11,550.00 for JERRY PALOMO; and for an attempt on the life of
NOLASCO ESTRADA and MARIO PALOMO, an actual damages
of P100.00 for NOLASCO ESTRADA and actual damages of
P200.00 and lost earning of P 10,500.00 for one year as farmer
for MARIO PALOMO, with costs.
SO ORDERED"10
Appellants file a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the
trial court in its Resolution11 dated October 24, 1991. Hence, the instant
appeal.
Appellants Leon Lumilan and Antonio Garcia raise the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE
GUILT OF APPELLANTS WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II

1
1

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT GIVING

CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE OF APPELLANTS.
The important first question We must answer is whether or not appellants may be properly convicted of
murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder under an Information that charges them with qualified
illegal possession of firearms used in murder in violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1866, as amended12
At the time the trial court promulgated its judgment of conviction in September 1990, it had already been
six (6) months since We held in People v. Tac-an13 that the unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm
or ammunition, whether or not homicide or murder resulted from its use, on one hand, and murder or
homicide, on the other, are offenses different and separate from and independent of, each other 14 . While
the former is punished under a special law, the latter is penalized under the Revised Penal Code.
Consequently, the prosecution for one will not bar prosecution for the other, and double jeopardy will not
lie15
Tac-an was reiterated in People v. Tiozon16 , People v. Caling17 , People v. Jumamoy18 , People v.
Deunida19 , People v. De Gracia20 , People v. Tiongco21 , People v. Fernandez22 , People v. Somooc23 and
People v. Quijada24 .
Under Sec. 7 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court, double jeopardy lies when after the accused has
pleaded to the first offense charged in a valid complaint or information and he is subsequently convicted
or acquitted or the case against him is dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by
a court of competent jurisdiction, he is prosecuted for a second offense or any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof or any other offense, which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2

It cannot be said that murder or homicide necessarily includes or is necessarily included in qualified illegal
possession of firearms used in murder or homicide. To state otherwise is to contradict Tac-an and its
progeny of cases where We categorically ruled out the application of double jeopardy in the simultaneous
prosecution for murder or homicide and qualified illegal possession of firearms used in murder or
homicide against same accused involving the same fatal act.
Sec. 4, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that an accused may not be convicted of an
offense other than that with which he is charged in the Information, unless such other offense was both
established by evidence and is included in the offense charged in the Information. Since murder or
homicide neither includes or is necessarily included in qualified illegal possession of firearms used in
murder or homicide, the trial court may not validly convict an accused for the former crime under an
Information charging the latter offense. Conversely, an accused charged in the Information with homicide
or murder may not be convicted of qualified illegal possession of firearms used in murder or homicide, for
the latter is not included in the former. As We have amplified in Quijada:
"The unequivocal intent of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866 is to respect
and to preserve homicide or murder as a distinct offense penalized under the
Revised Penal Code and to increase the penalty for illegal possession of firearm
where such firearm is used in killing a person. Its clear language yields no intention of
the lawmaker to repeal or modify, pro tanto, Articles 248 and 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, in such a way that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of homicide
or murder, either of these crimes, as the case may be, would only serve to aggravate the
offense of illegal possession of firearm and would not anymore be separately punished.
Indeed, the words of the subject provision are palpably clear to exclude any suggestion
that either of the crimes of homicide and murder, as crimes mala in se under the Revised
Penal Code, is obliterated as such and reduced as a mere aggravating circumstance in
illegal possession of firearm whenever the unlicensed firearm is used in killing a person.
The only purpose of the provision is to increase the penalty prescribed in the first
paragraph of Section 1reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetuato
death, seemingly because of the accuseds manifest arrogant defiance and contempt of
law in using an unlicensed weapon to kill another, but never, at the same time, to absolve
the accused from any criminal liability for the death of the victim.
Neither is the second paragraph of Section 1 meant to punish homicide or murder with
death if either crime is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, i.e., to consider
such use merely as a qualifying circumstance and not as an offense. That could not have
been the intention of the lawmaker because the term penalty in the subject provision is
obviously meant to be the penalty for illegal possession of firearm and not the penalty for
homicide or murder. x x x
xxx
Evidently, the majority did not x x x create two offenses by dividing a single offense
into two. Neither did it resort to the unprecedented and invalid act of treating the original
offense as a single integrated crime and then creating another offense by using a
component crime which is also an element of the former. The majority has always
maintained that the killing of a person with the use of an illegally possessed
firearm gives rise to two separate offenses of (a) homicide or murder under the
Revised Penal Code, and (b) illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form."25
Since Quijada, however, many changes have been introduced to Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 1866 by Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 829426 . Said section now reads:

"Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of

Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture
of Firearms or Ammunition.The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and
a fine of not less than Fifteen Thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low
powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar
firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended
to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition; Provided, that no other
crime was committed.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty Thousand pesos
(P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which
includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as
caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such
as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing
capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other
crime was committed by the person arrested.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the
crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat, such violation shall
be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion, or insurrection, sedition or attempted
coup detat.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other
responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall
willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation
or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of
the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed
firearms or firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in
the course of their employment.
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any
licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor." 27
Without doubt, the foregoing amendments blur the distinctions between murder and homicide, on one
hand, and qualified illegal possession of firearms used in murder or homicide, which we have enunciated
beginning in Tac-an and culminating in Quijada.
In People v. Molina28 , We already declared that the intent of Congress to treat as a single offense the
illegal possession of firearms and the commission of murder or homicide with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, is clear from the unequivocal wording of the third paragraph of Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as
amended by R.A. No. 8294, which reads:
"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance."

2
2
2

Where an accused uses an unlicensed firearm in committing homicide or murder, he may no longer be
charged with what used to be the two separate offenses of homicide or murder under the Revised Penal
Code and qualified illegal possession of firearms used in homicide or murder under P.D. No. 1866. As
amended by R.A. No. 8294, P.D. No. 1866 now mandates that the accused will be prosecuted only for the
crime of homicide or murder with the fact of illegal possession of firearms being relegated to a mere
special aggravating circumstance. To obviate any doubt, R.A. No. 8294 expressly restricts the filing of an
information for illegal possession of firearms to cases where no other crime is committed. Thus, illegal
possession of firearms may now be said to have taken a dual personality: in its simple form, it is an
offense in itself, but when any killing attends it, illegal possession of firearms is reduced to a mere
aggravating circumstance that must be alleged in the information in order to be appreciated in the
determination of the criminal liability of the accused.
Now We observe that the Information charging appellants with Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms
Used in Murder, violates Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, which obliterated the
now obsolete concept of qualified illegal possession of firearms or illegal possession of firearms in its
aggravated form, i.e., where the penalty for illegal possession is increased to reclusion perpetua or death
by the attendance of homicide or murder. In fact, qualified illegal possession of firearms, which used to be
a distinct offense, no longer exists in our statute books.
We come to the conclusion, thus, that whether considered in the light of our ruling in Tac-an and its
progeny of cases or in the context of the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 8294 to P.D. No. 1866, the
Information charging appellants with Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms Used in Murder, is defective,
and their conviction for Murder, Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder, is irregular.
The decisive question, however, is: do such defect in the Information and the irregular conviction of
appellants, invalidate the criminal proceedings had in the trial court?
No. Appellants waived their right to quash the Information, and they effectively defended themselves
against the charges for murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder.
The Information in the instant case reads:
"The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FRED ORBISO, LEON LUMILAN and
ANTONIO GARCIA of the crime of QUALIFIED ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS
USED IN MURDER, in violaiton of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 12th day of October 1987, in the municipality of
Ilagan, Province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the herein accused, not being authorized or allowed by
the law to keep, possess and carry firearms, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession and under their
control and custody, firearms without first having obtained the necessary
permit and/or license to possess the same, and that on the occasion of
such possession, the herein accused with treachery did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill suddenly and
unexpectedly and without giving them a chance to defend themselves,
fired [sic] at and shoot Meliton Asuncion, Modesto Roque, and Eliong de
la Cruz inflicting upon them gunshot wounds which directly caused their
deaths; and further inflicting on the same occasion gunshot wounds upon
Jerry Palomo, Romeo Pacho, Nolasco Estrada, Mario Palomo and
Simeon Pacano which injuries would ordinarily cause the death of the
said Jerry Palomo, Romeo Pacho, Nolasco Estrada, Mario Palomo and
Simeon Pacano, thus performing all the acts of execution which should
have produced the crime of murder with respect to the last named

victims as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason

of causes independent of their will, that is, by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to the said Jerry Palomo, Romeo Pacho, Nolasco
Estrada, Mario Palomo and Simeon Pacano which prevented their
deaths.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
While the Information specifically states that appellants are being accused of the crime of Qualified Illegal
Possession of Firearms Used in Murder in violation of P.D. No. 1866, its text is so worded that it describes
at least three (3) crimes:
Illegal Possession of Firearms
"the herein accused, not being authorized or allowed by the law to keep,
possess and carry firearms, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in their possession and under their control and custody,
firearms without first having obtained the necessary permit and/or license
to possess the same, and"
Murder
"that on the occasion of such possession, the herein accused with
treachery did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent
to kill suddenly and unexpectedly and without giving them a chance to
defend themselves, fired [sic] at and shoot Meliton Asuncion, Modesto
Roque, and Eliong de la Cruz inflicting upon them gunshot wounds which
directly caused their deaths; and"
Frustrated/Attempted Murder
"further inflicting on the same occasion gunshot wounds upon Jerry
Palomo, Romeo Pacho, Nolasco Estrada, Mario Palomo and Simeon
Pacano which injuries would ordinarily cause the death of the said Jerry
Palomo, Romeo Pacho, Nolasco Estrada, Mario Palomo and Simeon
Pacano, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have
produced the crime of murder with respect to the last named victims as a
consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of their will, that is, by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to the said Jerry Palomo, Romeo Pacho, Nolasco
Estrada, Mario Palomo and Simeon Pacano which prevented their
deaths."
The Information is undeniably duplicitous. Sec. 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a
complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in cases where the law prescribes a
single punishment for various offenses. Duplicity or multiplicity of, charges is a ground for a motion to
quash under Sec. 2 (e), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court. The accused, however, may choose not
to file a motion to quash and be convicted of as many distinct charges as are alleged in the information
and proved during the trial.29 In the same vein, failure to interpose any objection to the defect in the
information constitutes waiver.30

2
3

In the instant case, appellants did not file any motion to quash the Information. More significantly, the bulk
of the evidence that they presented during the trial was intended to disprove their complicity in the
murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder of the victims. Appellants were undeniably defending
themselves, not so much with the charge of qualified illegal possession in mind, as it was common
knowledge even in the beginning of the trial that no weapon was retrieved from the crime scene and it
was evident that the prosecution was never going to present any weapon in evidence against them, but
with the full awareness that they were as well and more vigorously being prosecuted for murder,
frustrated murder and attempted murder.
As such, appellants cannot pretend that the Information did not fully apprise them of the charges against
them as to cause them surprise in the event of conviction. The appellation of the crime charged as
determined by the provincial fiscal may not exactly correspond to the actual crimes constituted by the
criminal acts described in the Information to have been committed by the accused, but what controls is
the description of the said criminal acts and not the technical name of the crime supplied by the provincial
fiscal31 . Since appellants defended themselves not only against the offense of Qualified Illegal
Possession of Firearms Used in Murder as specified in the Information, but also, and more seriously
against the crimes of Murder, Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder as described in the body of the
Information, it cannot be said that their conviction for the latter crimes is infirm and invalid.
This now leads us to the main business of every criminal appeal: the determination of the liability of
appellants for the crimes they have been convicted of.
The appeal is meritorious. Appellants must be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The trial court found appellants guilty of three (3) counts of murder, two (2) counts of frustrated murder,
and three (3) counts of attempted murder on the strength of the direct testimonies of prosecution
eyewitnesses Simeon Pacano and Benito Alonzo.
Simeon Pacano testified, thus:
"Q And while you and the persons you mentioned were drinking, do you recall if there
was anything unusual which happened?
A There was, sir. That was the time when I heard a gun report.
Q And from what direction did the gun report emanate?
A Outside the fence, sir. On the road outside the fence or road leading to Salindingan.
x

xx

Q And do you know what happened to youand your companions when as you stated you
heard firings?
A I know, sir, because my companionsdied during that incident.
Q Who of your companions died?
A Meliton Asuncion, Modesto Roque, andEliong dela Cruz. Three of them, sir.
Q About you, did you suffer anyinjuries or not?

A Yes, sir.
Q What part of your body was hit?
A My left leg, sir. (Witness pointedto his left leg which was already amputated).
Q Besides you and three others whosenames you mentioned as having died, do you
know if any of your other companionssuffered any injury or inmjuries?
A Romeo Pacho was injured, sir.Francisco Macugay and the two brothers of Policarpio
Palomo, Mario Palomo andOly Estrada.
xxx
Q And while you were in that positionas you have stated face downwrd on the ground, do
you know what laterhappened?
A When I was in that position, sir,face downward, I heard no gun reports and that was the
time that one of thegunmen went to the place where we were and that was the time that I
was able torecognize him.
Q What did that gunman whom yourecognized do, if he did anything?
A He turned us around, sir, to see ifwe were already dead.
Q And can you tell the Court who isthe person you recognized?
A Fred Orbiso.
Q Will you look into the personsinside the courtroom who are seated there in the benches
and tell the Court ifthat Fred Orbiso is here in Court or not?
A He is not in Court.
Q And after you recognized Fred Orbisoas you stated, what else happened?
A What I heard, sir, that othercompanion of the gunman said that they are looking for Boy
Estrada.
xxx
Q And you said that persons enteredincluding the person you earlier recognized. Did you
come to know how manypersons entered?
A I remember, sir.
Q How many of them?
A Three (3), sir.

Q Now, you recognized one of them asFred Orbiso. About the other persons, were you
able to recognize them ornot?
A I also recognized them, sir.
Q Can you tell the Court the name orthe persons whom you recognized other than Fred
Orbiso?
A Manong Tony Garcia. (Witness pointedto a man seated at the third row of the benches
of the Court, and when asked, hegave his name as Antonio Garcia).
Q About the third person?
A The man seated beside AntonioGarcia, sir.
Q What is his name?
A That I know is Leon Lumilan.(Witness pointed to a man seated beside Antonio Garcia,
and when asked, he gavehis name as Leon Lumilan." 32
And Benito Alonzo corroborated him in this wise:
"Q What was that unusual incident thathappened?
A While we were drinking inside thehoudse, we heard gun reports firing at the door of the
house of Poling.
xxx
Q You stated that while you wereinside the house of Poling Policarpio you heard gun
reports. Are you in apsition to tell the Court from what direction did these gun reports
come oremanate?
A It is possible, sir.
Q Where did the firing emanate ororiginate?
A Coming from the gate of the fence ofMang Poling and the other firings took place on
the fence because there werethree(3) persons who fired.
Q How did you come to know that therewere three (3) persons who fired?
A I can see the flame of the firingscoming from the firearms going toward us.
Q Are you in a position to tell theCourt if you were able to identify these three (3)
persons?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please name the persons?

A Leon Lumilan, Tony Garcia, and FredOrbiso, sir.

Q You have mentioned as one of thepersons you saw that evening as Leon Lumilan.
Please look around the courtroomand tell the Court if that person is here now in the
courtroom?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please stand and point to the Courtthe persons of Leon Lumilan and that of Antonio
Garcia.
A That is Leon Lumilan,sir. (Thewitness pointing to a man in the courtroom and when
asked, he gave his name asHermenegildo Lumilan). And that is Tony Garcia. (The
witness pointing to anotherman in the courtroom and when asked, he gave his name as
Antonio Garcia)."33
This Court does not ordinarily interfere with the trial courtsjudgment on the trustworthiness of witnesses.
However, when there appear onrecord, as in this case, facts or circumstances of real weight which might
havebeen overlooked or misapprehended,34We can not shirk from our dutyto apply the law and render
justice.
We entertain serious doubt as to whether prosecution eyewitnessSimeon Pacano did see the assailants.
He testified that he was about to leavethe house of Policarpio Palomo together with Romeo Pacho at
around 7:00 oclockin the evening when successive gunshots emanated from the fence which was moreor
less six (6) meters away from the doorway of the house. He was hit in theleft leg and fell to the ground on
his face as he felt terrible pain that almostimmobilized him. After the firing had ceased and while he was in
the saidposition pretending to be dead , the alleged assailants entered the premises. Herecognized Fred
Orbiso when the latter turned the bodies of the victims toascertain if they were already dead. He also
claimed to have seen appellantsenter the premises35and noticed appellant Lumilan holding anarmalite
rifle.36
A nexus of logically related circumstances, however, renderPacanos testimony as doubtful. First, it was
already 7:00 oclock in the eveningwhen the shooting incident occurred. It was dark outside the house of
PolicarpioPalomo where he was shot near the doorway. Inside the house, the only source oflight was the
illumination coming from the two improvised kerosene lamps made ofbottle and wick. One was placed on
the second floor while the other was placedat the groundfloor inside the house where they were
drinking.37
Pacano admitted that he did not notice the presence of theassailants on the other side of the
fence.38Likewise, no evidencewas shown that he actually saw the assailants while they were in the act
offiring their guns.

3
3
3
3
3
3

Second, the incident occurred so fast and he was admittedlyvery afraid. He pretended to be dead by
closing his eyes and holding his breath,avoiding any sign of life, so to speak, to avoid detection by the
assailantswhen they entered the premises and inspected the bodies for survivors. 39
Third, after the shooting incident, Pacano was treated in theIsabela Provincial Hospital for six (6) days
after which he was transferred tothe National Orthopedic Hospital in Manila. Upon his discharge on
December 8,1987, he returned to Ilagan, Isabela and since then stayed in the house ofBonifacio Uy who
was the OIC Mayor of Ilagan, Isabela. On March 2I, 1988, morethan five (5) months after the incident,
Pacano executed his sworn statement40before the Ilagan, Isabela police authoritiesimplicating appellants
and Fred Orbiso.41It is true that initialreluctance to volunteer information regarding the crime due to fear of
reprisalis common enough that it has been judicially declared as not affecting a
witnesscredibility.42However, Pacano can not really claim to beafraid for his life inasmuch as he was under
the custody of then OIC MayorBonifacio Uy after the shooting incident. During the political rally
ofBonifacio Uy on January 16, 1988 in Centro Ilagan, Isabela, Pacano evendelivered a speech implicating
Fred Orbiso, Leon Lumilan, Antonio Garcia, JuanLorenzo and Martin Lagua, who were identified with the
camp of Uys opponents asthe authors of the shooting incident on October 12, 1987. 43
We also can not subscribe reliability to the testimony ofprosecution eyewitness Benito Lorenzo. First, he
claims to have recognizedappellants and Fred Orbiso with the help of the light of the flames coming outof
their respective firearms when they were firing them.44This is patently unbelievable, considering thathe
was drinking liquor inside the house of Policarpio Palomo when the shootingoccurred. It was already 7:00
oclock in the evening and the only light therecame from inside the house, not outside.
Second, Benito Alonzo went to the police authorities on October13, 1987 to give his sworn statement
regarding the shooting incident the daybefore. In said sworn statement 45, Alonzo categorically
admittedthat he did not see the assailants. However, he suspected Atty. Benjamin Olalia,whom he
allegedly had a misunderstanding over the latters cow, and his men asperpetrators of the crime
considering that they were the only persons who wentto their barangay in Gayong-Gayong Sur on
October 12, 1987 armed with longfirearms. He stated that he saw Atty. Olalia together with other
personsincluding appellants Lumilan and Garcia at the house of Hilario Lagua at about4:00 oclock of the
same date attending the wedding of Laguas son. Upon seeingappellant Lumilan and two others whom he
did not know carrying armalite rifles,he left the place and proceeded to the house of Policarpio Palomo.
This isolatedcircumstance is certainly not sufficient to hold appellants liable for theshooting incident.
In the light of all the foregoing, this Court is constrained toacquit the appellants on the ground of
reasonable doubt. The constitutionalpresumption of innocence in favor of the appellants was not overturned by theevidence adduced by the prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of Branch 16 of theRegional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela in Criminal Case
No. 995 is REVERSED andSET ASIDE. The accused-appellants, Leon Lumilan and Antonio Garcia, are

3
4
4
4
4
4
4

herebyACQUITTED on the ground that their alleged guilt was not proven beyondreasonable doubt.
Costsdeofficio.
SO ORDERED.

Nature: Automatic review of a decision of RTC Makati 1998

?
Sharon (eldest of 5 children) was then 11 yrs old when she was first raped by
her stepdad, Eleuterio Dimapilis, whom she calls Papa. He and Sharons mother are
live-in partners.
?
Sharon was raped 5 times, 3 instances happened w/in Mkt jurisdiction, 1
happened in Sta. Ana Mla and the last in FTI, Taguig. In every instance, while Sharons
mother and aunt were not around, Dimapilis would order the other children to play
outside the house. After which, he would approach Sharon, command her to disrobe;
he would then insert his finger into her vagina and probe his male organ into hers.
Mustering enough courage to finally tell her mother, the latter merely shrugged off her
story and said it was merely lambing on the part of Dimapilis. It was only when her
Lola Violy overheard her story that she was brought to NBI and examined by a medicolegal officer. The latter noted in Sharons private organ a healed superficial hymenal
laceration at 3 oclock position.
?
Dimapilis denied all charges and invoked defense of alibi saying that in all
instances, he was outside driving his jeepney and that the only reason why Sharon is
accusing him of such is because of her Lola Violys aversion towards him.
?
RTC Mkt, for the 3 counts done in its jurisdiction, found Dimapilis guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and imposing upon him DEATH penalty in each
case.
HELD:
?
Even though the info filed against him failed to allege the specific dates of
commission of the 3 counts of rape, info is still legally viable as long as it distinctly
states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive
thereof. In the crime of rape, the time of its commission is not a material ingredient of
the offense. It is sufficient that Sharon was able to give info as near to the actual date
at w/c the offenses are committed as the info or complaint will permit. The narration she
gave was made in a manner better than that w/c can generally be expected of a young
and innocent girl of 13 yrs of age. No ill-motive has been attributed to the complainant
for making the accusation and no decent girl would go through the trouble of exposing
herself to the humiliation of trial and public scandal for so humiliating an offense as rape
except for a strong motive to seek justice.
?
The defense of alibi will not hold for it is not sufficient to show that he was at
some other place at the time of the commission but it should be proved that it has been
likewise physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at that time.
?
The first incident of rape was committed when the victim was only 11 yrs old,
making the offense statutory rape. The death penalty is imposed when the victim is
under 18 yrs of age and the offender is the common law sp of the parent of the victim.
Ordinarily, the case would have thus meant the imposition of the mandatory death
penalty. Quite fortunately for the defendant Dimapilis, he would be spared of such. The

relnship between appellant and his victim- the victim is the daughter of appellants
common-law sp by the latters previous relnship w/ another man, is a qualifying
circumstance that has not been properly alleged in the given info. It is a qualifying
aggravating circumstance, as per Sec 11 of RA 7659, which cannot be proved unless
alleged w/c was a technical flaw committed by the prosecution w/c the Court cannot
ignore. It constrains the Court to reduce the penalty of death imposed by RTC to
reclusion perpetua.
?
Decision affirmed with modification.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 127903. July 9, 1998]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ESTEBAN

VICTOR y PENIS, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Before the Court for automatic review is the judgment handed down in this case by
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, on December 16, 1996 finding
accused-appellant Esteban Victor y Penis guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape and sentencing him to suffer supreme penalty of death, as well as to pay the
corresponding civil liability to the victim. i[1]
Appellant was charged with rape in complaint dated August 8, 1996, which
somewhat faultily but sufficiently alleges:
That sometime in June 1996 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused by
means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously undress said Raquel Villanueva, a minor, 15 years of age, stepdaughter,
and put himself on top of her, and thereafter have carnal knowledge with the
undersigned complainant against her will and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.ii[2]

At this arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty.iii[3] Thereafter, the trial of the case proceeded and, as already stated, a
condemnatory decision was eventually rendered therein, with the following dispositive
portion:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, Esteban Victor
y Penis, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined in and

penalized by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences the said
accused to suffer the penalty of DEATH. The accused is ordered to indemnify Raquel
Villanueva (in) the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
The accused is further ordered to pay the costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.iv[4]

The evidence adduced by the prosecution successfully establishes that complainant

Raquel Villanueva is the daughter of the common-law wife of herein appellant. Both the
said complainant and appellant lived in the same house located at Phase IV, Urban 2,
Payatas, Quezon City, since complainant's biological father was estranged from her
mother. Sometime in June 1996, while the mother of Raquel was at work in the factory
where she was employed, appellant entered Raquel's room while she was folding
clothes and unceremoniously poked a fan knife (balisong) at her. He ordered her to
take off her clothes and lie on the floor. Out of fear, she complied.
Thereafter, appellant took off his clothes and placed himself on top of complainant.
He then held her legs, spread them apart, inserted his penis into her genitalia and
proceeded to make the pumping motions of the sexual act. The rape lasted for about
ten minutes. Appellant warned Raquel not to tell her parents about ten minutes.
Appellant warned Raquel not to tell her parents about the incident. Terrified by his
threats and constant presence in the house, since he was jobless and usually drunk,
she maintained her silence. She was admittedly only fifteen years old then. v[5]
However, after that sexual assault, appellant continued to take indecent liberties
with the person of the victim in the following days, sometimes by touching her private
parts. To put an end to such molestation, Raquel decided to work as a housemaid for
one of their neighbors. It was only then that she finally gathered enough courage to
report the incident to her employer who sympathetically accompanied her to the police
stationvi[6]
Raquel was referred on August 6, 1996 to the Philippine National Police
(PNP)Crime Laboratory Services in Quezon City. She was initially interview and,
thereafter, a medical and genital examination was conducted on her by Dr. Rosalyn O.
Cosidon. This medicolegal officer later testified in this case and told the trial court that
the victim was no longer a virgin when so examined. Dr. Cosidon attested that in her
examination, she found a shallow, healed hymenal laceration at 2 oclock and two deep,
healed laceration at 5 and 9 o'clock in the victim's genitalia vii[7]
Appellant, on the other hand, denied the accusations made against him. At first, he
alleged that during the month of June 1996, and even about two years before that,
Raquel was staying in the house of her aunt in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. He later
corrected himself to admit that she was actually staying with him in their Quezon City
residence for more than a year before June 1996. He averred that he could not do such
a thing to Racquel since he considered and treated her as his stepdaughter. He claimed
that, possibly, the case was filed against him as a sort of reprisal for the times when he
reprimanded Raquel in the past, although such scoldings were "not grave." Aside from
that, he could not give any other reason why she made this accusation against him
since their "relationship" was "good." viii[8]

In this appellate review, appellant interposes a lone assignment of error, namely,

that the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape.ix[9] It is his contention that the evidence for the prosecution is replete with serious
inconsistencies and his conviction should be reversed.
In an attempt to discredit the veracity of complaint's account of the incident,
appellant contends that there is an inconsistency between her testimony at the trial and
her declaration before the representatives of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD). He asserts that, in open court, the victim testified that she that
she was raped only once but in her previous statement in the DSWD, she declared that
she was repeatedly raped by appellant since she was twelve years old. Dr. Cosidon
declared that in the interview in the DSWD, there were intimidations to this effect, but
neither the prosecution nor the defense subsequently followed up this aspect,
apparently because it arose from an informal interview of a young victim still erratic from
the trauma of her experience. The imputed inconsistency is, therefore, more apparent
than real.
A review of the records actually shows that the victims made no such declaration in
the DSWD. Appellants aforestated argument is premised solely upon an unsigned and
unidentified statement written in longhand on what appears to be a draft of a
mimeographed formx[10] appended to a request for laboratory/medical examination of the
victims,xi[11] and stating: "Since patient was 12 y/o she was raped repeatedly by suspect."
That handwritten phrase was neither made nor signed by the victim, hence she is not
bound by it.xii[12] The authorship thereof was never established, thus it cannot be given
any probative value nor used to impeach the victim. In fact, that form letter on which it
is written contains many other writings and scribbling in different penmanship, with
some of the writings having been either intercalated or subsequently canceled.
Further, even if those words be considered as a statement of the victim relayed to
the writer, it will not only be hearsay but substantially it cannot discredit her testimony.
Even an affidavit o a witness carries less weight than testimonial evidence of the same
affiant at the trial, considering that such judicial declarations are more precise and
elaborate than those stated in extrajudicial statements which are often inaccurate and
incomplete.xiii[13] With much more reason should the cryptic and unidentified statement in
question be disregarded.
The Solicitor General, on his part, posits that even assuming that the victim did
make that statement in the DSWD, when she later declared in court that she was raped
by appellant once in June 1996, she simply meant that the forcible sexual congress
happened only once on said date. That statement in court cannot be extrapolated to
mean that it was the only occasion when appellant raped her. Thus viewed, even
indulging appellant in his postulation, there is actually no irreconcilable inconsistency.
More importantly, all these quibblings are unavailing against and do not detract from the
proven fact that appellant did rape the victim in June 1996.
Furthermore, appellants posture was contradicted by the joint affidavit of two social
workers of the DSWD, Remedios Jazmin and Hope Bernardes, who narrated therein
how such sexual depredations of appellant were brought to the attention of the
authorities. The pertinent parts of their declaration appear as follows:

2. Na, noong mga alas 10:00 ng umaga petsa 06 ng Agosto 1996, mayroon
dinadala na dalawang mga dalagita na magkapatid na ang mga pangalan nila ay
MARILYN VILLANUEVA, 13 taon gulang, at RAQUEL VILLANUEVA, 15 taong gulang,
pawang mga nakatira sa Urban Poor, Phase 4, Payatas, Quezon City at ito ay dinala
nila SPO4 AURORA VILLANUEVA, ng Station 6, Central Police District Command na
isang personnel ng Womens Desk sa nasabing station.
3. Na ayon sa policewoman na nagdala sa mga bata doon sa aming opisina,
iyong bata ay pinagsamantalahan daw ng kanilang amain (stepfather) o ni rape sila
kaya sila ay lumayas sa kanilang bahay.
4. Na, dahil dito iyong nasabing mga bata ng aming tanungin kong ano ang totoo
nangyari sa kanila, sinabi sa amin nang dalawang magkapatid na sila daw ay hinalay
ng stepfather nila na ang pangalan ay ESTEBAN VICTOR at sila ay paulit-ulit daw
hinihipuan sa kanilang maselang bahagi ng katawan, kong wala iyong kanilang Nanay
sa loob ng bahay nila (Emphasis ours).xiv[14]

Appellant also desperately claims that Raquel was being coached by someone in
court when she was under cross-examination. That ascription is completely without
bases. It was drawn solely from the fact that the defense counsel made this
manifestation during the trial: "may I Make a manifestation that the witness is talking
with somebody here in this Courtroom and is gazing (at) somebody." xv[15] As pointed out
by the Solicitor genera, That "somebody" whom Raquel was gazing at could have been
appellant himself, as manifested by the public prosecutor on the same occasion. xvi[16]
Of crucial importance in a rape case, especially when the life of an accused may be
held forfeit, is the determination of the credibility both of the victim herself and her
version as to how the crime charged was committed. For these, we must perforce
repose almost total reliance on the finding and conclusions of the trial court.
Additionally, we have jurisprudential guidelines distilled from judicial experience as
touchstones for our own evaluation of the evidence which, ex debito justitiae, we
analyze.
The finding of trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, given
the clear advantage of a trial judge over an appellate magistrate in the appreciation of
testimonial evidence. In this connection, it is well entrenched that the trial court is in the
best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies because of its
unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct
and attitude under grueling examination. These are the most significant factors in
evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth. xvii[17]
The emphasis, gesture and inflection of the voice are potent aids in understanding
the testimony of witnesses. The trial court has the opportunity and is presumed to take
advantage of these aids in weighing the testimony of the witnesses. But as they cannot
be incorporated into the record, this Court has no assistance in the examination of the
testimony and must, therefore, rely upon the good judgment of the lower court. xviii[18]
Thus, in the absence of any showing that the trail court's calibration of credibility was
flawed, we are bound by its assessment. xix[19]
Furthermore, it is a reputable precept that testimonies of rape victims who are
young or of tender age are credible. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity

was abused deserves full credit. xx[20] Courts usually lend credence to the testimony of
young girl especially where the facts point to her having been a victim of sexual assault.
For sure, the victim would not make public the offense, undergo the trouble and
humiliation of a public trail and endure the ordeal of testifying to all its gory details if she
had not in fact been raped, for no decent Filipina would publicly admit she had been
raped unless it was the truth. As a rule, a victim of rape will not come out in the open if
her motives were not to obtain justice. xxi[21] The willingness of the complainant to face
police investigators and to submit to physical examination is a mute but eloquent
testimony of the truth of her complaint. xxii[22]
With the foregoing teachings in mind, and in the context of the evidence of record,
we are satisfied that the court a quo prudently and conscientiously discharged its duties
as a trier of fact and an arbiter of law. We quote its pertinent findings with excerpts from
the victim's testimony, which vividly illustrate that the mode of her presentation and the
substance thereof justify our acceptance of the conclusion and verdict of the trial court,
to wit:
Culled from the evidence and after a judicious and cursory examination of the
evidence especially the testimony of Raquel, the Court firmly believes that the incident
complained of as narrated by Raquel actually took place during the month of June
1996. The Court keenly observed the demeanor of Raquel while testifying and she
testified in a straightforward and forthright manner, bereft of any artificialities that
would impair her credibility. The spontaneous and categorical testimony of Raquel can
easily be deduced from the portion of her testimony as follows:
"PROSECUTION: (to the witness)
Q

Madam Witness, do you know a person by the name of Esteban Victor?

Yes, sir.

If said person is inside the courtroom, will you be able to point to him?

Yes, sir. He is the one.

(Witness pointed to a person wearing yellow T-shirt who, when asked of his name,
answered Esteban Victor).

Since when have you known him?

Long time ago because he and his three-year old son were living in our place at Phase
IV, Urban 2, Payatas, Quezon City, sir.

Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court why he and his son were living in your house?

Because my mother is the girlfriend of the accused, sir.

xxx
PROSECUTION: (to the witness)
Q

Are you aware if your mother and the accused were legally married?

They were not married, sir.

Sometime in the month of June 1996, do you remember where you were at daytime?

Yes, sir I was inside our house folding clothes, sir.

Was there any unusual incident that took place?

Yes, sir. We were three in the house at that time, Esteban Victor and his son Jobet
w(ere) playing outside the room when Esteban Victor entered my room.

When Esteban Victor entered your room, what happened next?

He ordered me to undress, sir.

When so ordered by Esteban Victor to undress, what did you do?

I followed him because he (was) threatening me by pointing a bladed weapon at my

neck, sir.

After undressing what happened next, if any?

He also undress(ed) himself and he told me to lie on the floor, sir.

Did you follow his order?

Yes, sir, because he was holding a bladed weapon.

What else happened after that?

He held both my legs and spread them and went on top of me, sir.

After he went on top of you, what happened next, if any?

He inserted his private organ into my private organ, sir.

And as he inserted his private organ into your private organ, what happened next, if
any?

I was trying to resist by pushing him away from me but I was not able to do so, sir.

While he inserting his private organ into your private organ, what did you feel, if any?

I felt pain in my private organ, sir.

When the accused successfully entered (sic) his private organ into your private organ,
what movement did he do, if any?

(The witness answered by placing her right hand of top of her left hand upwards and
downwards.)

While the accused was on top of you, and inserted his private organ into your private
organ making an upward and downward movement, what else was he doing?

He was mashing my breast and kissing my neck, sir.

Madam Witness, would you be able to tell this Honorable Court how long a time in terms
of minutes or hours was the accused on top of you?

More or less, ten minutes, sir.

After that ten minutes, what happened next, if any?

He ordered me to wear my clothes and threatened me not to report the incident

to father and mother, sir."xxiii[23]

In stark contrast to the convincing recital of facts in complainant's testimony is the

evasive and illogical stance adopted by appellant who could offer only bare denials.
Denial, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive and
credible testimony of the prosecution witnesses that the accused committed the crime. xxiv
[24]
As between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a bare
denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. xxv[25] A mere denial constitutes
self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight
than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. xxvi[26] As
against the positive identification by the private complainant, mere denials of the
accused cannot prevail to overcome conviction by the trial court. xxvii[27]
Appellant also failed to establish any unworthy or ill motive which induced or
impelled the victim to falsely accuse him of the capital offense of rape. The is nothing in
the record which would lead us to conclude that she had any improper motive against
appellant. It is settled that where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or
improper motive why a prosecution witness would testify falsely against an accused or
falsely implicate him in a heinous crime, the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. xxviii
[28]

In imposing the capital punishment on appellant, the court below rationalized as

follows:
The use of the accused of a bladed weapon in order to have carnal knowledge
with Raquel is sufficient evidence to establish the presence of "force and intimidation,"
an essential element of the crime of rape. Added to this is the relationship of the
accused and Raquel wherein the accused, by accused's own admission, is the
stepfather of Raquel, and in light of the prevailing doctrine that relationship may
substitute for "force and intimidation," as the stepfather exercises "moral ascendancy
and influence" over the stepdaughter, the Court is overwhelmingly convinced that the
prosecution was able to clearly establish that the carnal knowledge of June 1996 was
without the consent of Raquel. x x x."xxix[29]

Although he claimed otherwise, the lower court found that appellant was not legally
married to complainant's mother and, strictly speaking, is not really the victim's
stepfather. However, this does not, in principle, completely divest him of some degree of
moral ascendancy over her. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the element of force
or intimidation is nonetheless duly established and supplied by appellant's use of a
deadly bladed weapon to threaten, coerce and compel submission to his satyric desires
by the hapless complainant.
Along the same vein, the trial court justified the death sentence pursuant to the
amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 to Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, which now further provides:
xxx

xxx

xxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:
1.
When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law

spouse of the parent of the victim. (Italics supplied)

xxx

xxx

xxx

The lower court, however, erred in categorizing the award of P50,000.00 to the
offended party as being in the nature of moral damages. We have heretofore explained
in People vs. Gementiza.xxx[30] that the indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil
liability ex delicto for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing
judicial policy and aside from other proven actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual
or compensatory damages in civil law. It is not to be considered as moral damages
thereunder, the latter being based on different jural foundations and assessed by the
court in the exercise of sound discretion.
One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape continue
unabated and the legislative response has been in the form of higher penalties. The
Court believes that, on like considerations, the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect
should follow the same direction. Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of
rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the
death penalty is authorized by the present amended law,xxxi[31] the indemnity for the victim
shall be in the increased amount of less than P75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to
the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuation over time,
but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous
crimes against chastity.
From all the foregoing considerations, therefore, and the People having established
the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt, his conviction and the penalty imposed
must be sustained. Four members of this Court maintain their position that Republic Act
No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional; but they
nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority of the Court that the law is constitutional
and the death penalty should be imposed in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, The judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No. Q-96-67321
imposing the death penalty on accused-appellant Esteban Victor y Penis is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the modification that the amount awarded to the offended party should
be increased to P75,000.00 and considered as actual, and not moral, damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the
revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning
power.
SO ORDERED.

ii

iii

iv

vi

vii

viii

ix

xi

xii

xiii

xiv

xv

xvi

xvii

xviii

xix

xx

xxi

xxii

xxiii

xxiv

xxv

xxvi

xxvii

xxviii

xxix

xxx

xxxi