Compilation by: Mark Gabriel B.

Maranga

Insular Government v. Aldecoa

19 Phil. 505
FACTS:
In 1907, the government demanded from Aldecoa and Co., the possession of a
piece of land which had been formed by the action of the sea. Aldecoa and
company claimed ownership on the ground that the adjacent land was theirs,
and that their erection of a wall was responsible for the forming of the new
parcel of land.
HELD:
The land produced by the action of the sea is of public ownership and cannot
therefore be acquired by any private person or entity inasmuch as same belongs
to the state. Furthermore, the company did not ask government permission to
set up the wall.
(Article 420)
Government v. Cabangis
53 Phil. 112
FACTS:
In 1896, A owned a parcel of land, but because of the action of the waves of
Manila Bay, part of said land was gradually submerged in the sea. It remained
submerged until 1912 when the government decided to make the necessary
dredging to reclaim the land from the sea. As soon as the land had been
recovered A took possession of it.
ISSUE: the ownership of the reclaimed land.
HELD:
The government owns the reclaimed land in the sense that it has become
property of public dominion, because in letting it remain submerged, A may be
said to have abandoned the same. Having become part of the sea or the
seashore, it became property for public use. When the government took steps to
make it land again, its status as public dominion remained unchanged;
therefore, A is not entitled to the land.
Government v. Cabangis
53 Phil. 112
FACTS:
In 1896, A owned a parcel of land, but because of the action of the waves of
Manila Bay, part of said land was gradually submerged in the sea. It remained

You cant fall if you dont climb. But there is no joy in living your whole life on the ground

submerged until 1912 when the government decided to make the necessary
dredging to reclaim the land from the sea. As soon as the land had been
recovered A took possession of it.
Issue: the ownership of the reclaimed land.
HELD:
The government owns the reclaimed land in the sense that it has become
property of public dominion, because in letting it remain submerged, A may be
said to have abandoned the same. Having become part of the sea or the
seashore, it became property for public use. When the government took steps to
make it land again, its status as public dominion remained unchanged;
therefore, A is not entitled to the land.
Maneclang v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Facts:
Adriano Maneclang in this case filed a complaint for quieting of title over a
certain fishpond located within the 4 parcels of land belonging to them
situated in Pangasinan but the trial court dismissed it by saying that the body of
water is a creek constituting a tributary to Agno River therefore public in
nature and not subject to private appropriation. They appealed it to the IAC
which affirmed the aforementioned decision. Hence, this review on certiorari.
However, after having been asked to comment to the case thereon, they
manifested their lack of interest and the parties to the case (the complainant
and the awardee in the public bidding Maza) decided to amicably settle the case
saying that judgment be rendered and that the court recognize the
ownership of the petitioners over the land the body of water found
within their titled properties.
They say that there would be no benefit since the NIA already constructed a
dike and no water now gets in and out of the land.
Issue:
Whether or not the fishpond is public in nature.
Ratio:
Yes. A creek is defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea.
It is a property belonging to the public domain and is not susceptible to
private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.

Compilation by: Mark Gabriel B. Maranga

The mere construction of the dikes by NIA nor its conversion to a fishpond
altered or changed the nature of the creek as property of the public domain.

of one of the parties of the fishpond in dispute which was found to be originally
a creek forming a tributary of the Agno River.

The compromise agreement is null and void and of no legal effect because it is
contrary to law and public policy.

Republic v. Lat Vda. de Castillo

GR 69002, Jan. 30, 1988

Second Division, Fernan (J): 4 concur

Facts:
Adriano Maneclang, et.al., petitioners, filed before the then CFI Pangasinan
(Branch XI) a complaint for quieting of title over a certain fishpond located
within 4 parcels of land belonging to them situated in Barrio Salomague,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, and the annulment of Resolutions 38 and 95 of the
Municipal Council of Bugallon, Pangasinan. On 15 August 1975, the trial court
dismissed the complaint upon a finding that the body of water traversing the
titled properties is a creek constituting a tributary of the Agno River (therefore
public in nature and not subject to private appropriation); and held that
Resolution 38, ordering an ocular inspection of the Cayangan Creek situated
between Barrios Salomague Sur and Salomague Norte, and Resolution 95
authorizing public bidding for the lease of all municipal ferries and fisheries were
passed by the members of the Municipal Council of Bugallon, Pangasinan in the
exercise of their legislative powers.
Manaclang appealed said decision to the IAC, which affirmed the same on 29
April 1983. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari. Before the respondents
were able to comment on the petition, the petitioners manifested that for lack of
interest on the part of respondent Alfredo Maza, the awardee in the public
bidding of the fishpond, as the parties desire to amicably settle the case by
submitting to the Court a Compromise Agreement praying that
judgment be rendered recognizing the ownership of the petitioners over the land
the body of water found within their titled properties. The Supreme Court
dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and set aside the Compromise
Agreement and declare the same null and void for being contrary to law and
public policy.
1. Stipulations null and void for being contrary to law and public policy
The stipulations contained in the Compromise Agreement partake of the nature
of an adjudication of
Maneclang v. Intermediate Appellant Court, the Supreme Court declared as null
and void the compromise agreement between the parties since the stipulations
contained therein partake of the nature of an adjudication of ownership in favor

You cant fall if you dont climb. But there is no joy in living your whole life on the ground

Lots which had always formed part of a lake, washed and inundated by the
waters thereof are not subject to registration, being outside the commerce of
men. Since the lots are of public domain (Art. 502, par. 4, Civil Code), the
registration court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate said lots as private
property, hence res judicata does not apply.
Republic vs Lat vda de Castillo et al.
G.R. No. L-69002 June 30, 1988
Facts:
In 1951, the late Modesto Castillo applied for the registration of two parcels of
land, Lots 1 and 2, located in Banadero, Tanauan, Batangas, as the true and
absolute owner of the land with the improvements thereon, which was issued to
him by the Register of Deeds of Batangas. He was married to Amanda Lat.
By virtue of an instrument dated in March 1960, the two parcels of land with
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) were consolidated and divided into Lots 1 to 9
which was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). After the death of
Modesto Castillo on August 31, 1960, Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo, et al.,
executed a deed of partition and assumption of mortgage in favor of Florencio L.
Castillo, et al., as a result of which Original Certificate of Title was cancelled,
and in lieu thereof, new transfer certificates of title (TCT) were issued to the
following appellants-defendants.
The Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. 2044 with the lower court for
the annulment of the certificates of title issued to defendants Amanda Lat Vda.
de Castillo, et al., as heirs/successors of Modesto Castillo, and for the reversion
of the lands covered thereby (Lots 1 and 2, Psu-119166) to the State.
It was alleged that said lands had always formed part of the Taal Lake and being

Compilation by: Mark Gabriel B. Maranga

of public ownership, it could not be the subject of registration as private

property.
They alleged in their answer that the Government's action was already barred
by the decision of the registration court; that the action has prescribed; and that
the government was estopped from questioning the ownership and possession
of appellants.
The then Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, decided that the
Register of Deeds of Batangas to order the cancellation of the OCT in the name
of Modesto Castillo and the subsequent TCT issued over the property in the
names of the defendants. Lots Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-19166 are hereby
declared public lands belonging to the state. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
Defendants appealed their case. The Court of Appeals, in a decision promulgated
on April 26,1984, reversed and set aside the appealed decision, and dismissed
the complaint.
Issue:
The sole issue raised in this case is whether or not the decision of the Land
Registration Court involving shore lands constitutes res adjudicata.
Held:
There is no question that one of the requisites of res judicata is that the court
rendering the final judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter
(Ramos v. Pablo, 146 SCRA 24 [1986]; that shores are properties of the public
domain intended for public use (Article 420, Civil Code) and, therefore, not
registrable.
Thus, it has long been settled that portions of the foreshore or of the territorial
waters and beaches cannot be registered. Their inclusion in a certificate of title
does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title
upon the registrant (Republic v. Ayala y Cia, 14 SCRA, 259 [1965], citing the
cases of Dizon, et al. v. Bayona, et al., 98 Phil. 943; and Dizon, et al. v.
Rodriguez, et al., 13 SCRA 704).

You cant fall if you dont climb. But there is no joy in living your whole life on the ground

But an important bone of contention is the nature of the lands involved in this
case.
Petitioner contends "that "Lots 1 and 2, PSU-119166 had always formed part of
the Taal Lake, washed and inundated by the waters thereof. Consequently, the
same were not subject to registration, being outside the commerce of men; and
that since the lots in litigation are of public domain (Art. 502), par. 4 Civil Code)
the registration court (of 1951) did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate said lands
as private property, hence, res judicata does not apply. (Rollo, pp. 37-38).
The Government presented both oral and documentary evidence.
Lakeshore land or lands adjacent to the lake, like the lands in question must be
differentiated from foreshore land or that part of the land adjacent to the sea
which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides
(Castillo, Law on Natural Resources, Fifth Edition, 1954, p. 67).
Such distinction draws importance from the fact that accretions on the bank of a
lake, like Laguna de Bay, belong to the owners of the estate to which they have
been added (Gov't. v. Colegio de San Jose, 53 Phil. 423) while accretion on a
sea bank still belongs to the public domain, and is not available for private
ownership until formally declared by the government to be no longer needed for
public use (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).
But said distinction will not help private respondents because there is no
accretion shown to exist in the case at bar. On the contrary, it was established
that the occupants of the lots who were engaged in duck raising filled up the
area with shells and sand to make it habitable.
The defense of long possession is likewise not available in this case because, as
already ruled by this Court, mere possession of land does not by itself
automatically divest the land of its public character (Cuevas v. Pineda, 143
SCRA 674 [1968]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the April 26,1984 Decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court is hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED and the February 6,1976

Compilation by: Mark Gabriel B. Maranga

Decision of the then Court of First Instance of Batangas is hereby AFFIRMED and
REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

Santos v. Moreno
L-15829, Dec. 4, 1967
FACTS: Ayala y Cia owned a big tract of land in Macabebe, Pampanga, the
Hacienda San Esteban. To provide access to different parts of the property, the
Company dug interlinking canals, which through erosion, gradually acquired the
characteristics of rivers. The company sold part of the Hacienda to Santos, who
closed some of the canals and converted them into fi shponds. The residents of
the surrounding barrios (now barangays) complained
that the closure deprived them of their means of transportation,
as well as of their fi shing grounds.
Issue: May the canals be ordered open?
HELD: No, because said canals are of private ownership.
Reason: The said streams, considered as canals of which they originally were
are of private ownership. Under Art. 420, canals constructed by the State and
devoted to use are of public ownership. Conversely, canals constructed by
private persons within private lands and devoted exclusively for private use
must be of private ownership.
Hilario v. City of Manila
L-19570, Apr. 27, 1967
FACTS: Sand and gravel were extracted by agencies of the City of Manila from
the San Mateo River banks of the Hilario Estate in the province of Rizal. When
Hilario sued for indemnity, it was alleged that river banks are of public
ownership.
Issue: Are they really of public ownership?
HELD: River banks are of public ownership; hence, no indemnity need be given.
Reason: The bed of a river is of public dominion, hence also the banks since
they are part of the bed. While it is true that in Art. 638 on easements on river
banks, the law speaks of both public and private river banks, still these private
river banks refer to those already existing prior to the Law of Waters of Aug. 3,
1866.

You cant fall if you dont climb. But there is no joy in living your whole life on the ground

Jacinto v. Director of Lands [G.R. No. 26374. December 31, 1926.]

En Banc, Ostrand (J): 7 concur
Facts: During the period from 1911 to 1913, sales certificates were issued by
the Bureau of Lands to Frank W. Carpenter for more than 100 lots of the Tala
and Piedad Friar Lands states located in Novaliches, Caloocan, Rizal including
the lots 670, 690, 691, 695, 696, 697 698, 699, 700, 701, 950, 951, 952, 953,
954, 955, 956, 957, and 1050. The total area of the land covered by the sales
certificates being over 1,490 hectares and the purchase price amounting to
about P56,600, of which amount Carpenter up to the year 1923, had paid
in installments the sum of P16,272. Under a judgment rendered against
Carpenter in the CFI of Manila (Civil Case 24607), execution was levied upon all
of his right, title and interest in the lots purchased together with the
improvements thereon, and on 16 November 1923, the sheriff of Rizal sold the
property to Nicanor Jacinto. The sheriffs sale was registered in the Bureau of
Lands, assignments of the Bureau of Lands sales certificates were duly
recorded, and certificates of assignment were issued and delivered to Nicanor
Jacinto in September 1924.
On 31 March 1925, the Metropolitan Water District instituted proceedings in the
CFI Rizal for the condemnation of certain parcels of land situated in the
municipality of Caloocan for the construction of an earth dam and a first-class
highway 3 kilometers long, in connection with the so-called Angat Water Works
Project, and on the same date the CFI Rizal issued an order authorizing the
Metropolitan Water District to take possession of said parcels of land upon
deposit with the provincial treasurer of the sum of P3,000 as the provisional
value, fixed by the court, of the parcels so to be condemned. By virtue of this
order, the
Metropolitan Water District entered into occupation of the land and began the
construction of permanent improvements thereon. Copies of the complaint as
well as of the order of 31 March 1925, were filed with the register of deeds of
the Province of Rizal on 11 February 1926, to be recorded as notices of lis
pendens. The lots enumerated above were included in the land sought to be
expropriated and Nicanor Jacinto was made a party defendant in the
proceedings. He admitted the existence of the right of condemnation and the
necessity
for the expropriation, but demanded the sum of P64,839.33 as indemnity for the
expropriation. As the actual purchase price to be paid by the purchaser from the
Government only amounts to P13,725, including interest, the Metropolitan
Water District considered Jacintos demand excessive and declined to pay the
claim. In the month of July 1926, the applicant tendered payment to the
Director of Lands of the sum of P4,650 to
cover the remaining balance of the sales price of the lots in question and
demanded a corresponding deed of conveyance for said lots. The Director of
Lands, upon the advice of the Attorney-General, rejected the tender and refused

Compilation by: Mark Gabriel B. Maranga

to execute and deliver the instrument of conveyance demanded from him.

Applicant filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Director of Lands
to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the applicant for the lots
enumerated belonging to the Tala Friar Lands Estate in Novaliches. The
Supreme Court ordered the Director of Lands to receive the balance of the
purchase money for any or all of the lots in question if and when payment
thereof is tendered by Jacinto, and denied the petition as to the execution of
deeds of conveyance; without costs.
1. Proprietary rights, except that of occupation, not affected by
condemnation proceedings
The proprietary rights, except the right of occupation, are not affected by the
condemnation proceedings until the title has passed to the plaintiff and that
does not occur until the award of compensation or damages has been satisfied.
2. Petition for a writ of mandamus not proper remedy to compel a
conveyance
Mandamus is not the proper remedy to enforce purely contract rights, such as
that in the present case sought to be enforced. (18 R. C. L., 121; Quiogue vs.
Romualdez, 46 Phil., 337.)
3. Land is patrimonial property of the Government; Duty to execute
deeds of conveyance devolved upon the Governor-General
The writ cannot issue in the present case unless it appears that the Director of
Lands unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specially
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. (Section 222, Code
of Civil Procedure.) The land in question is private or patrimonial property of the
Philippine Government and we can find no law specially enjoining upon the
Director of Lands the duty to execute deeds of conveyance to purchasers of
such lands; on the contrary, that duty, under section 567 of the
Administrative Code, appears to devolve upon the Governor-General.
4. Director of Land has duty to receive purchase money payable under
Act 1120
By section 14 of Act No. 1120 the Director of Lands is charged with the duty of
receiving the purchase money payable under that Act and may therefore be
compelled by mandamus to receive, as a purely ministerial act, such purchase
money when tendered.
Jacinto vs. Director of Lands
49 Phil. 853

You cant fall if you dont climb. But there is no joy in living your whole life on the ground

Friar lands under the Friar Lands Law (Act No. 1120). They are intended to be
sold to actual settlers and occupants.
City of Manila v. Gerardo Garcia, et al.
L-26053, Feb. 21, 1967
FACTS: The City of Manila is the owner of parcels of land forming one area in
Malate, Manila. Shortly after liberation, several persons entered upon these
premises without the Citys knowledge and consent, built houses of second class
materials, and continued to live there till action was instituted against them. In
1947, the presence of the squatters having been discovered, they were then
given by then Mayor Valeriano Fugoso written permits each labeled a lease
contract. For their occupancy, they were charged nominal rentals. In 1961, the
premises were needed by the City to expand the Epifanio de los Santos
Elementary School. When after due notice the squatters refused to vacate, this
suit was instituted to recover possession. Defense was that they were tenants.
HELD: They are squatters, not tenants. The mayor cannot legalize forcible entry
into public property by the simple expedient of giving permits, or for that
matter, executing leases. Squatting is unlawful and the grant of the permits
fosters moral decadence. The houses are public nuisances per se and they can
be summarily abated, even without the aid of the courts. The squatters can
therefore be ousted.
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) v. CA
495 SCRA 591 (2006)
FACTS: The term ports under Art. 420(1) of the Civil Code includes seaports
and airports.
HELD: The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a port, constructed by
the State.
Manila International Airport Authority vs CAGR No. 155650, July 20,
2006, 495 SCRA 591
Facts:
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is the operator of the Ninoy
International Airport located at Paranaque City. The Officers of Paranaque City
sent notices to MIAA due to real estate tax delinquency. MIAA then settled some
of the amount. When MIAA failed to settle the entire amount, the officers of
Paranaque city threatened to levy and subject to auction the land and buildings
of MIAA, which they did. MIAA sought for a Temporary Restraining Order from

Compilation by: Mark Gabriel B. Maranga

the CA but failed to do so within the 60 days reglamentary period, so the

petition was dismissed. MIAA then sought for the TRO with the Supreme Court a
day before the public auction, MIAA was granted with the TRO but unfortunately
the TRO was received by the Paranaque City officers 3 hours after the public
auction. MIAA claims that although the charter provides that the title of the land
and building are with MIAA still the ownership is with the Republic of the
Philippines. MIAA also contends that it is an instrumentality of the government
and as such exempted from real estate tax. That the land and buildings of MIAA
are of public dominion therefore cannot be subjected to levy and auction sale.
On the other hand, the officers of Paranaque City claim that MIAA is a
government owned and controlled corporation therefore not exempted to real
estate tax.

public policy. Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the airport
land and buildings from public use, these properties remain to be of public
dominion and are inalienable. As long as the land and buildings are for public
use the ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines.

Issues:
Whether or not MIAA is an instrumentality of the government and not a
government owned and controlled corporation and as such exempted from tax.

Issue:
The court ruled that the Executive Proclamation No. 219 classified these lands
as a national reserve and it appears that the said property was never released
for public disposition. At the time of the petitioners predecessors occupancy,
the land remained inalienable. For a public dominion to be subject for a
registration proceeding, the government should exercise a positive act to reclassify inalienable land to alienable for proper disposition. In an application for
a land registration of a property of public domain, the applicant for land
registration must secure a certification from the government that the land
claimed (1) has been possessed in the concept of an owner for more than 30
years and (2) alienable and disposable. Moreover, action to recover property of
public domain never prescribes.

Whether or not the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion
and thus cannot be the subject of levy and auction sale.
Ruling:
Under the Local government code, government owned and controlled
corporations are not exempted from real estate tax. MIAA is not a government
owned and controlled corporation, for to become one MIAA should either be a
stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation for its capital is
not divided into shares. It is not a non-stock corporation since it has no
members. MIAA is an instrumentality of the government vested with corporate
powers and government functions. Under the civil code, property may either be
under public dominion or private ownership. Those under public dominion are
owned by the State and are utilized for public use, public service and for the
development of national wealth. The ports included in the public dominion
pertain either to seaports or airports. When properties under public dominion
cease to be for public use and service, they form part of the patrimonial
property of the State. The court held that the land and buildings of MIAA are
part of the public dominion. Since the airport is devoted for public use, for the
domestic and international travel and transportation. Even if MIAA charge fees,
this is for support of its operation and for regulation and does not change the
character of the land and buildings of MIAA as part of the public dominion. As
part of the public dominion the land and buildings of MIAA are outside the
commerce of man. To subject them to levy and public auction is contrary to

You cant fall if you dont climb. But there is no joy in living your whole life on the ground

Heirs of Palanca vs Republic

FACTS
Petitioners acquired 2 pieces of lands by inheritance and in a court decision they
were declared as owners in fee simple. 23 years later the Republic filed a
petition to annul the judgment and cancel the decree of registration and title
and to reverse the property to the State as unclassified forest lands.

Cuevas vs. Pineda, 143 SCRA 674

FACTS:

The private respondents filed a complaint with the respondent court for
"Quieting Of Title With A Prayer For A Writ of Preliminary Injunction." They
alleged that they are the heirs of the late Celestina Igaya and, as such, are
the owners of two adjoining parcels of land, located in Pasong Carga, Talon,
Las Pinas since 1924, as evidenced by tax declaration

October, 1977, petitioners had caused the preparation of a table surveyplan wherein the private respondents' two (2) lots were subdivided into
three (3) lots.

District Land Officer, Claudio C. Batiles (one of the defendants in the

complaint), hastily granted said applications, resulting in the issuance of
free patents to petitioners Cuevas and Roxas.

As a result, private respondents filed a protest with Bureau of Lands against

the issuance of said free patents. Moreover, they question the jurisdiction of

Compilation by: Mark Gabriel B. Maranga

the Bureau of Lands, which they had just invoked claiming that it is the
courts and not the administrative tribunal that should settle the issue.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court has jurisdiction over the complaint of the
private respondents
HELD:
NO. The respondent court has no jurisdiction over the compliant of the private
respondents. The respondents implored the authority of the Bureau of Lands
when they filed their administrative proceeding. They cannot, now, reject said
authority by claiming that since the Bureau had already issued free patents, the
land has become private and the agency had no jurisdiction at the time they
filed their protest. Before a litigant can bring a matter to court which has been
passed upon by the Director of Lands it is necessary that he first exhaust all the
remedies in the administrative branch of the government, we find no law
expressly requiring such a prerequisite before the courts could acquire
jurisdiction. Orderly procedure requires that the Bureau of Lands, on a matter
within its competence and expertise, should first resolve the issues before it.
(Mere possession of land does not by itself automatically divest it of its public
character. )
Ancheta v. GuerseyDalayyon
490 SCRA 140 (2006)
As it now stands, Art. XII, Secs. 7 and 8 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or
to lands of the
public domain. (Parity Rights Amendment of 1946)
MWSS v. Court of Appeals
143 SCRA 623 (1986)
The City of Dagupan (hereinafter referred to as the CITY) filed a complaint
against the former National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (hereinafter
referred to as the NAWASA), now the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System (hereinafter referred to as MWSS), for recovery of the ownership and
possession of the Dagupan Waterworks System. NAWASA interposed as one of
its special defenses R.A. No. 1383 which vested upon it the ownership,
possession and control of all waterworks systems throughout the Philippines and

You cant fall if you dont climb. But there is no joy in living your whole life on the ground

as one of its counterclaims the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred

for necessary and useful improvements amounting to P255,000.00. Judgment
was rendered by the trial court in favor of the CITY on the basis of a stipulation
of facts. The trial court found NAWASA to be a possessor in bad faith and hence,
not entitled to the reimbursement claimed by it. NAWASA appealed to the then
Court of Appeals and argued in its lone assignment of error that the CITY should
have been held liable for the amortization of the balance of the loan secured by
NAWASA for the improvement of the Dagupan Waterworks System. The
appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. MWSS, successor-ininterest of the NAWASA, appealed to this Court raising the sole issue of whether
or not it has the right to remove all the useful improvements introduced by
NAWASA to the Dagupan Waterworks System, notwithstanding the fact that
NAWASA was found to be a possessor in bad faith. In support of its claim for
removal of said useful improvements, MWSS argues that the pertinent laws on
the subject, particularly Articles 546, 547 and 549 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, do not definitely settle the question of whether a possessor in bad
faith has the right to remove useful improvements.
The Supreme Court held
xxx Does a possessor in bad faith have the right to remove useful
improvements? The answer is clearly in the negative. Recognized authorities on
the subject are agreed on this point. Article 449 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines provides that he who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land
of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity. As a
builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever useful improvements it had made
without right to indemnity.
(Santos v. Mojica, Jan. 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 703).
Moreover, under Article 546 of said code, only a possessor in good faith shall be
refunded for useful expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed; and
under Article 547 thereof, only a possessor in good faith may remove useful
improvements if this can be done without damage to the principal thing and if
the person who recovers the possession does not exercise the option of
reimbursing the useful expenses. The right given a possessor in bad faith is to
remove improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury or mere
pleasure, provided the thing suffers no injury thereby and the lawful possessor
does not prefer to retain them by paying the value they have at the time he
enters into possession.
MWSS v. CA [G.R. No. L-54526. August 25, 1986.]
Second Division, Feria (J): 4 concur, 1 took no part

Compilation by: Mark Gabriel B. Maranga

Facts:
The City of Dagupan filed a complaint against the former National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), now the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System (MWSS), for recovery of the ownership and possession of the
Dagupan Waterworks System. NAWASA interposed as one of its special defenses
RA 1383 which vested upon it the ownership, possession and control of all
waterworks systems throughout the Philippines and as one of its counterclaims
the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred for necessary and useful
improvements amounting to P255,000.00. Judgment was rendered by the trial
court in favor of the city on the basis of a stipulation of facts. The trial court
found NAWASA to be a possessor in bad faith and hence not entitled to the
reimbursement claimed by it. NAWASA appealed to the then Court of Appeals
and argued in its lone assignment of error that the city should have been held
liable for the amortization of the balance of the loan secured by NAWASA for the
improvement of the Dagupan Waterworks System. The appellate court affirmed
the judgment of the trial court. MWSS, successor-in interest of the NAWASA,
appealed (petition for review on certiorari) to the Supreme Court raising the sole
issue of whether or not it has the right to remove all the useful improvements
introduced by NAWASA to the Dagupan Waterworks System, notwithstanding
the fact that NAWASA was found to be a possessor in bad faith.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court, with costs
against MWSS.
Possessor in bad faith does not have the right to remove useful
improvements
Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that he who builds,
plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or
sown without right to indemnity. As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost
whatever useful improvements it had made without right to indemnity (Santos
vs. Mojica, Jan. 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 703).
Only possessor in good faith has right to be refunded for useful
expenses with right of retention until reimbursed; or removal of useful
improvements without damage to the principal thing
Under Article 546 of said code, only a possessor in good faith shall be refunded
for useful expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed; and under
Article 547 thereof, only a possessor in good faith may remove useful
improvements if the can be done without damage to the principal thing and if
the person who recovers the possession does not exercise the option of
reimbursing the useful expenses.

You cant fall if you dont climb. But there is no joy in living your whole life on the ground

Possessor in bad faith has right to remove improvements for pure

luxury or mere pleasure, provided such suffers no injury thereby
The right given a possessor in bad faith is to remove improvements applies only
to improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided the thing suffers no
injury thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying
the value they have at the time he enters into possession (Article 549, Id.).
Republic v. Southside Homeowners Assn., Inc.
(502 SCRA 587 [2006]),
the Supreme Court informed: the President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resouces, may designate by proclamation
any tract/s of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the
Republic or any of its branches, or for quasi-public uses or purposes. In the
same decision, the Court posited that lands of the public domain classifi ed
as a military reservation remains as such until, by presidential fiat or
congressional act, the same is released from such classifi cation, and declared
open to disposition. Art. XII, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution forbids private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain,
except thru lease for a limited period.
Republic v. Southside Homeowners Association
Inc. (SHAI) G.R. No. 156951 & 173408, Sep. 22,
2006
FACTS:
Proclamation No 423 which established a military reservation known as Fort
William McKinley later renamed Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, was issued
by former President Carlos Garcia. Areas specified in the Proclamation were
withdrawn from sales and settlements and were reserved for military purposes.
Several presidential proclamations would later be issued excluding certain
defined areas from the operation of Proclamation 423. What is mainly sought to
be declared as a nullity in this petition is the title over the parcels of land that
are referred to as JUSMAG housing are in Fort Bonifacio being occupied by
active and retired military officers and their families. SHAI , a non-stock
corporation organized mostly by wives of AFP military officers, was able to
secure title in its name over the bulk, if not the entire, JUSMAG area. The TCT
was issued by the Rizal Registry on the basis of a notarized deed of sale
purportedly executed by then Land Management Bureau Director Abelardo Palad

Compilation by: Mark Gabriel B. Maranga

Jr. The investigation conducted by the DOJ, however, reported land scams at
the FBMR and also finding that the signature of Palad was forged
In 1993, then Pres Ramos ordered the OSG to institute an action towards the
cancellation of TCT 15084 in SHAIs name as well as the title acquired by the
Navy Officers Village Association (NOVA) over a bigger parcel of land within the
reservation.
ISSUE:
Whether the land sold was alienable.
HELD:
NO. As regards the issue of inalienability, the Court upheld the contention of the
Republic that the JUSMAG area is inalienable, the same having not effectively
been separated from the military reservation and declared as alienable and
disposable. Until a given parcel of land is released from its classification as part
of the military reservation zone and reclassified by law or by presidential
proclamation as disposable and alienable, its status as part of a military
reservation remains, even if incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than
as a military camp or for defense. SHAI had not pointed to any proclamation or
legislative act for that matter segregating the property from the reservation and
classifying the same as alienable lands of public domain. Furthermore, the
Constitution also forbids private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable public land except through lease for a limited period. The whole
conveyance process was also suspicious since the whole process was
accomplished only in one day.

HELD:
NO. The Real Property Tax liability of the IFPC is only on portions leased out to
private entities. PFDA is not a GOCC but is actually an instrumentality of the
national government exempt from Real Property Tax. Given this, it will only be
subject to Real Property Tax on the portions of the IFPC which is leased to
private entities. It is not a GOCC since a GOCC must satisfy two requirements:
(i) capital stock divided into shares and (ii) authorized to distribute
dividends/profits. PFDA does have capital stock but the same is not divided into
shares and neither is it a non-stock corporation because it does not have
members.
(Note: This was the same decision reached in MIAA vs. Paranaque (July 20,
2006) and again in MIAA vs. Pasay (April 2, 2009) where the property in
question was the airport premises. In those cases, the Court additionally
provided that other examples of government instrumentalities vested with
corporate powers or what are know as government corporate entities are
Philippine Ports Authority, BSP and University of the Philippines.)
Chavez v. Public Lands Authority
415 SCRA 403
(2003)
FACTS:
Contracts of individuals who, not being personally disqualified to hold alienable
lands of the public domain, have been able to acquire in good faith, reclaimed
portions of
the subject property from AMARI Coastal Bay Development Corporation.
ISSUE: Should said contracts be duly-respected and upheld?

Phil Fisheries Dev't Authority vs Central Board of Assessment Appeals

638 SCRA 644
FACTS:
Petitioner owned the Iloilo Fishing Port Complex which was on reclaimed land
and consisted of a breakwater, landing quay, water and fuel oil supply system,
refrigeration building, market hall and a municipal shed. Petitioner then leased
portions of the IFPC to private firms engaged in the fishing business. Iloilo city
then assessed the entire IFPC for Real Property Tax.
ISSUE:
Is the entirety of the IFPC subject to the Real Property Tax?

You cant fall if you dont climb. But there is no joy in living your whole life on the ground

HELD:
Yes. In instances where the successor-in-interest is itself a corporate entity, the
constitutional proscription would stand, but if the corporation has introduced
structures or permanent improvements thereon, such structures or
improvements, when so viewed, as having been made in good faith, could very
well be governed by the new Civil Code.
The approval of the contracts, in the case at bar, clearly and unambigously
attested to the fact that the lands in question were no longer intended for
public use or public service. When the conversion activity such as coproduction, joint venture or production-sharing agreements is authorized by the
Government thru a law, the qualified party to the agreement may own the
converted product or part of it, when so provided in the agreement. If there is
any doubt as to the object of the prestation in this case, the Supreme Court

Compilation by: Mark Gabriel B. Maranga

opined that the interpretation which would render the contract valid is to be
favored.

Francisco Chavez v. NHA, et al.

GR 164527, Aug. 15, 2007

Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, the Supreme Court held that submerged
lands are part of the States inalienable natural resources and classified as
property of public dominion.

FACTS: Presidential Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 jointly with the special
patents have classifi ed the reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable and
open to disposition or concession as they would be devoted to units for Smokey
Mountain beneficiaries.

Chavez v. Public Lands Authority

415 SCRA 403 (2003)

Issue: Because said lands are no longer intended for public use or service, shall
those lands form part of the patrimonial properties of the State?

The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to

undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling
functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore
lands are concerned.

HELD: Yes, under Art. 422 of the new Civil Code. The lands are classifi ed as
patrimonial parties of the NHA in the case at bar, and ready for disposition when
the titles are registered in its name by the Register of Deeds.

PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of

77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156
hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI.

Francisco Chavez v. NHA, et al.

GR 164527, Aug. 15, 2007

ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.

HELD:
No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred
to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban
on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands
comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name
of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the
public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer
is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to
AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay,
such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than
agricultural lands of the public domain.

You cant fall if you dont climb. But there is no joy in living your whole life on the ground

FACTS:
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, filed an instant
petition raising constitutional issues on the JVA entered by National Housing
Authority and R-II Builders, Inc.
On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum order No.
(MO) 161 approving and directing implementation of the Comprehensive and
Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. During this time,
Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo, Manila, are being made residence of
many Filipinos living in a subhuman state.
As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn the dumpsite
into low-cost housing project, thus, Smokey Mountain Development and
Reclamation Project (SMDRP), came into place. RA 6957 (Build-OperateTransfer Law) was passed on July 1990 declaring the importance of private
sectors as contractors in government projects. Thereafter, Aquino proclaimed
MO 415 applying RA 6957 to SMDRP, among others. The same MO also
established EXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution and evaluation of the plan,
respectively, to be assisted by the Public Estates Authority (PEA).
Notices of public bidding to become NHAs venture partner for SMDRP were
published in newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the
bidding process. Then-President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint
Venture Agreement with RBI.
Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for
eventual
development
into
a
low
cost
housing
complex
and
industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to fully finance the development of

Compilation by: Mark Gabriel B. Maranga

Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the land at the Manila Bay
Area. The latter together with the commercial area to be built on Smokey
Mountain will be owned by RBI as enabling components. If the project is
revoked or terminated by the Government through no fault of RBI or by mutual
agreement, the Government shall compensate RBI for its actual expenses
incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate of return not exceeding that stated
in the feasibility study and in the contract as of the date of such revocation,
cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be agreed upon by both parties.
To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the
project involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction of
temporary housing units for the current residents on the cleared and levelled
site. Phase II involves the construction of a fenced incineration area for the onsite disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.
Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA
was amended and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design changes
and additional work to be done to successfully implement the project. The
original 3,500 units of temporary housing were decreased to 2,992. The
reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40 hectares to 79
hectares, which was supported by the issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by
President Ramos. The revision also provided for the 119-hectare land as an
enabling component for Phase II of the project.
Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the
establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey
Mountain necessary. On August 1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be
later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33.
On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement
whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent
agreements. During this time, NHA reported that 34 temporary housing
structures and 21 permanent housing structures had been turned over by RBI.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power and
authority to reclaim lands of the public domain as this power is vested
exclusively in PEA as claimed by petitioner
2. Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and authority
by DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands
3. Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and
submerged lands considered as alienable and outside the commerce of
man

You cant fall if you dont climb. But there is no joy in living your whole life on the ground

4. Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no
declaration that said lands are no longer needed for public use
5. Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands
6. Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done by public
bidding
7. Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution
to acquire lands of public domain
8. Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose all information
related to the SMDRP
9. Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant position
HELD:
1. Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily responsible
for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for
and on behalf of the National Government. This does not mean that it
shall be responsible for all. The requisites for a valid and legal
reclamation project are approval by the President (which were provided
for by MOs), favourable recommendation of PEA (which were seen as a
part of its recommendations to the EXECOM), and undertaken either by
PEA or entity under contract of PEA or by the National Government
Agency (NHA is a government agency whose authority to reclaim lands
under consultation with PEA is derived under PD 727 and RA 7279).
2. Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the DENR is deemed to
have granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project
for the DENR is one of the members of the EXECOM which provides
reviews for the project. ECCs and Special Patent Orders were given by
the DENR which are exercises of its power of supervision over the
project. Furthermore, it was the President via the abovementioned MOs
that originally authorized the reclamation. It must be noted that the
reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed first in the Philippine
President.
3. The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable via MO 415
issued by President Aquino and Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by
President Ramos.
4. Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands have been deemed
to be no longer needed for public use as stated in Proclamation No. 39
that these are to be disposed to qualified beneficiaries. Furthermore,
these lands have already been necessarily reclassified as alienable and
disposable lands under the BOT law.
5. Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA can acquire
property rights and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of
them as it may deem appropriate.

Compilation by: Mark Gabriel B. Maranga

6. There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a public bidding of the

right to become its joint venture partner in the Smokey Mountain
Project. It was noted that notices were published in national
newspapers. The bidding proper was done by the Bids and Awards
Committee on May 18, 1992.
7. RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor can
be paid a portion as percentage of the reclaimed land subject to the
constitutional requirement that only Filipino citizens or corporation with
at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same. In addition, when the
lands were transferred to the NHA, these were considered Patrimonial
lands of the state, by which it has the power to sell the same to any
qualified person.
8. This relief must be granted. It is the right of the Filipino people to
information on matters of public concerned as stated in Article II, Sec.
28, and Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
9. When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had already been terminated
by virtue of MOA between RBI and NHA. The properties and rights in
question after the passage of around 10 years from the start of the
projects implementation cannot be disturbed or questioned. The
petitioner, being the Solicitor General at the time SMDRP was
formulated, had ample opportunity to question the said project, but did
not do so. The moment to challenge has passed.
Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Southeast Mindanao
Gold Mining Corp.
492 SCRA 355 (2006)
FACTS:
Mining operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation are within the full control
of the State thru the Executive Branch pursuant to Sec. 5 of RA 7942. Here,
the State can either directly undertake the Art. 420 CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES 58 exploration, development, and utilization of the area or it can
enter into agreements with qualified entities.
ISSUE:
What is the extent or scope of power of administration, over mineral lands and
minerals vested on the Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences?
HELD:
This includes the power to prescribe terms and conditions in granting
exploration permits to qualified entities. Exploration permits are strictly granted
to entities or individuals possessing the resources and capability to undertake

You cant fall if you dont climb. But there is no joy in living your whole life on the ground

mining operations. Nonetheless, the State may not be precluded from

considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it is only plausible remedy in sight
to the gnawing complexities generated by the so-called gold rush.
PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (PNOC-EDC) v VENERACION
G.R. No. 129820
November 30, 2006
FACTS:
This case involves the conflicting claims of the petitioner Philippine National Oil
Corporation-Energy Development Corporation and the respondent over the
mining rights over Block 159 of the Malangas Coal Reservation, Alicia,
Zamboanga del Sur.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
*RED of the DENR Office in Zamboanga City: ruled in favor of VENERACION and
ordered the PNOC to amend its Mineral Production Sharing Agreement [MPSA]
by excluding therefrom Block 159 *DENR secretary: dismissed the appeal on the
ground that petitioner's right to appeal had already prescribed.Section 50 of
Presidential Decree No. 463 provides therefore for a five-day reglementary
period from the receipt of the order or decision of the Director. *DENR secretary
(motion for reconsideration): reversed the Decision, dated 4 October 1994, and
gave due course to the MPSA of the petitioner. *DENR secretary (2nd motion for
reconsideration): ruled that the Orders issued by the RED have already become
final and executory when the petitioner failed to file its appeal five days after it
had received the Orders. *MAB (took cognizance pursuant to the Philippine
Mining Act): filed its appeal beyond the five-day prescriptive period provided
under Presidential Decree No. 463, which was then the governing law on the
matter.
ISSUES:
(1) whether or not the petitioner has already lost its right to appeal the RED's
Order dated 12 April 1993; and
(2) whether or not the petitioner acquired a preferential right on mining rights
over Block 159.
HELD: *On propriety of appeal: The correct mode of appeal would have been to
file a petition for review under Rule 43, before the Court of Appeals.
Nevertheless, this Court has taken into account the fact that these cases [which

Compilation by: Mark Gabriel B. Maranga

provided the doctrine] were promulgated after the petitioner filed this appeal on
4 August 1997, and decided to take cognizance of the present case.
(1) YES, the right to appeal is lost. Petitioner's insistence that the 30-day
reglementary period provided by Section 61 of Commonwealth Act No. 137, as
amended, applies, cannot be sustained by this Court. By providing a five-day
period within which to file an appeal on the decisions of the Director of Mines
and Geo-Sciences, Presidential Decree No. 463 unquestionably repealed Section
61 of Commonwealth Act No. 137.
Nor can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of technicality must yield to the
broader interest of substantial justice. The right to appeal is not part of due
process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.
In the instant case, petitioner failed to state any compelling reason for not filing
its appeal within the mandated period. Instead, the records show that after
failing to comply with the period within which to file their motion for
reconsideration on time, they again failed to file their appeal before the Office of
the DENR Secretary within the time provided by law.
(2) NO, Even if petitioner had not lost its right to appeal, it cannot claim any
mining rights over Block 159 for failure to comply with the legal requirements.
SEC. 15. Government Reserved Land. Lands reserved by the Government for
purposes other than mining are open to prospecting. Any interested party may
file an application therefore with the head of the agency administering said land,
subject always to compliance with pertinent laws and rules and regulations
covering such reserved land. Such application shall be acted upon within thirty
(30) days. In such cases, the compensation due the surface owner shall accrue
equally to the agency administering the reserved land and the Bureau of
Mines.
The law enumerates the following requirements:
(1) a prospecting permit from the agency that has jurisdiction over the area, in
this case, the OEA;
(2) an exploration permit from the BMGS;
(3) if the exploration reveals the presence of commercial deposit, the permitee
applies before the BMGS for the exclusion of the area from the reservation;
(4) granting by the president of the application to exclude the area from the
reservation; and
(5) a mining agreement approved by the DENR Secretary.

You cant fall if you dont climb. But there is no joy in living your whole life on the ground

In this case, petitioner complied with the first requirement and obtained a
prospecting permit from the OEA. In its correspondence with the petitioner, the
OEA, however, advised the petitioner on two separate occasions to obtain a
"prospecting permit" from the BMGS, although the OEA was probably referring
to an exploration permit. The petitioner did not apply for an exploration permit
with the BMGS, nor would the BMGS have granted petitioner an exploration
permit because when petitioner wrote to the BMGS informing the latter of its
intention to enter into an MPSA with the DENR over Block 159, the BMGS
informed the petitioner that the respondent's claim over Block 159 had already
preceded that of the petitioner. The advice given by the BMGS was justified
since at that time, the respondent already had a pending application for the
exclusion of Block 159 from the Malangas Coal Reservation. Thereafter, the
petitioner filed his MPSA application, without complying with the second, third
and fourth requisites. Since it ignored the sound advice of the OEA and the
BMGS, the government agencies concerned, and stubbornly insisted on its
incorrect procedure, petitioner cannot complain now that its MPSA was revoked
for failure to comply with the legal requirements.
OBITER DICTA:
(1) Decisions of the Supreme Court on mining disputes have recognized a
distinction between
(1) the primary powers granted by pertinent provisions of law to the then
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (and the bureau directors) of an
executive or administrative nature, such as "granting of license, permits, lease
and contracts, or approving, rejecting, reinstating or cancelling applications, or
deciding conflicting applications," and
(2) controversies or disagreements of civil or contractual nature between
litigants which are questions of a judicial nature that may be adjudicated only by
the courts of justice.
(2) Findings of fact by the Mines Adjudication Board, which exercises appellate
jurisdiction over decisions or orders of the panel of arbitrators, shall be
conclusive and binding on the parties, and its decision or order shall be final and
executory. But resort to the appropriate court, through a petition for review by
certiorari, involving questions of law, may be made within thirty days from the
receipt of the order or decision of the Mines Adjudication Board.