EN BANC

G.R. No. L-11390

March 26, 1918

EL BANCO ESPAOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
VICENTE PALANCA, administrator of the estate of Engracio Palanca
Tanquinyeng, defendant-appellant.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted upon March 31, 1908, by "El Banco Espanol-Filipino" to
foreclose a mortgage upon various parcels of real property situated in the city of Manila.
The mortgage in question is dated June 16, 1906, and was executed by the original
defendant herein, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, as security for a debt
owing by him to the bank. Upon March 31, 1906, the debt amounted to P218,294.10 and
was drawing interest at the rate of 8 per centum per annum, payable at the end of each
quarter. It appears that the parties to this mortgage at that time estimated the value of the
property in question at P292,558, which was about P75,000 in excess of the
indebtedness. After the execution of this instrument by the mortgagor, he returned to
China which appears to have been his native country; and he there died, upon January
29, 1810, without again returning to the Philippine Islands.
As the defendant was a nonresident at the time of the institution of the present action, it
was necessary for the plaintiff in the foreclosure proceeding to give notice to the
defendant by publication pursuant to section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An
order for publication was accordingly obtained from the court, and publication was made
in due form in a newspaper of the city of Manila. At the same time that the order of the
court should deposit in the post office in a stamped envelope a copy of the summons and
complaint directed to the defendant at his last place of residence, to wit, the city of
Amoy, in the Empire of China. This order was made pursuant to the following provision
contained in section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure:
In case of publication, where the residence of a nonresident or absent defendant is
known, the judge must direct a copy of the summons and complaint to be forthwith
deposited by the clerk in the post-office, postage prepaid, directed to the person to be
served, at his place of residence
Whether the clerk complied with this order does not affirmatively appear. There is,
however, among the papers pertaining to this case, an affidavit, dated April 4, 1908,
signed by Bernardo Chan y Garcia, an employee of the attorneys of the bank, showing
that upon that date he had deposited in the Manila post-office a registered letter,
addressed to Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, at Manila, containing copies of the
complaint, the plaintiff's affidavit, the summons, and the order of the court directing
publication as aforesaid. It appears from the postmaster's receipt that Bernardo probably
used an envelope obtained from the clerk's office, as the receipt purports to show that the
letter emanated from the office.

The cause proceeded in usual course in the Court of First Instance; and the defendant not
having appeared, judgment was, upon July 2, 1908, taken against him by default. Upon
July 3, 1908, a decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. In this decision it was
recited that publication had been properly made in a periodical, but nothing was said
about this notice having been given mail. The court, upon this occasion, found that the
indebtedness of the defendant amounted to P249,355. 32, with interest from March 31,
1908. Accordingly it was ordered that the defendant should, on or before July 6, 1908,
deliver said amount to the clerk of the court to be applied to the satisfaction of the
judgment, and it was declared that in case of the failure of the defendant to satisfy the
judgment within such period, the mortgage property located in the city of Manila should
be exposed to public sale. The payment contemplated in said order was never made; and
upon July 8, 1908, the court ordered the sale of the property. The sale took place upon
July 30, 1908, and the property was bought in by the bank for the sum of P110,200.
Upon August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court.
About seven years after the confirmation of this sale, or to the precise, upon June 25,
1915, a motion was made in this cause by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate
of the original defendant, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, wherein the
applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default of July 2, 1908, and the
judgment rendered upon July 3, 1908, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent
thereto. The basis of this application, as set forth in the motion itself, was that the order
of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.
At the hearing in the court below the application to vacate the judgment was denied, and
from this action of the court Vicente Planca, as administrator of the estate of the original
defendant, has appealed. No other feature of the case is here under consideration than
such as related to the action of the court upon said motion.
The case presents several questions of importance, which will be discussed in what
appears to be the sequence of most convenient development. In the first part of this
opinion we shall, for the purpose of argument, assume that the clerk of the Court of First
Instance did not obey the order of the court in the matter of mailing the papers which he
was directed to send to the defendant in Amoy; and in this connection we shall consider,
first, whether the court acquired the necessary jurisdiction to enable it to proceed with
the foreclosure of the mortgage and, secondly, whether those proceedings were
conducted in such manner as to constitute due process of law.
The word "jurisdiction," as applied to the faculty of exercising judicial power, is used in
several different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority
of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of
relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property
which is the subject to the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its
powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the
actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.
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Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court
and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal
process exerted over the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from
a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual
custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein,
under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized
and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the potential
power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the
jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the
property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its
progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we
term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of
land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual
physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be
owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in
favor of the petitioner against all the world.
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a
proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly
speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The
expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with reference to
certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as
responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action
quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an
individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having
for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether
by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus
designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the
parties.
In speaking of the proceeding to foreclose a mortgage the author of a well known
treaties, has said:
Though nominally against person, such suits are to vindicate liens; they proceed upon
seizure; they treat property as primarily indebted; and, with the qualification abovementioned, they are substantially property actions. In the civil law, they are styled
hypothecary actions, and their sole object is the enforcement of the lien against the res;
in the common law, they would be different in chancery did not treat the conditional
conveyance as a mere hypothecation, and the creditor's right ass an equitable lien; so, in
both, the suit is real action so far as it is against property, and seeks the judicial
recognition of a property debt, and an order for the sale of the res. (Waples, Proceedings
In Rem. sec. 607.)

It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is
made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such.
This, however, does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear
the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference to the
principles governing actions in rem.
There is an instructive analogy between the foreclosure proceeding and an action of
attachment, concerning which the Supreme Court of the United States has used the
following language:
If the defendant appears, the cause becomes mainly a suit in personam, with the added
incident, that the property attached remains liable, under the control of the court, to
answer to any demand which may be established against the defendant by the final
judgment of the court. But, if there is no appearance of the defendant, and no service of
process on him, the case becomes, in its essential nature, a proceeding in rem, the only
effect of which is to subject the property attached to the payment of the defendant which
the court may find to be due to the plaintiff. (Cooper vs. Reynolds, 10 Wall., 308.)
In an ordinary attachment proceeding, if the defendant is not personally served, the
preliminary seizure is to, be considered necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the
court. In this case the lien on the property is acquired by the seizure; and the purpose of
the proceedings is to subject the property to that lien. If a lien already exists, whether
created by mortgage, contract, or statute, the preliminary seizure is not necessary; and
the court proceeds to enforce such lien in the manner provided by law precisely as
though the property had been seized upon attachment. (Roller vs. Holly, 176 U. S., 398,
405; 44 L. ed., 520.) It results that the mere circumstance that in an attachment the
property may be seized at the inception of the proceedings, while in the foreclosure suit
it is not taken into legal custody until the time comes for the sale, does not materially
affect the fundamental principle involved in both cases, which is that the court is here
exercising a jurisdiction over the property in a proceeding directed essentially in rem.
Passing now to a consideration of the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance in a
mortgage foreclosure, it is evident that the court derives its authority to entertain the
action primarily from the statutes organizing the court. The jurisdiction of the court, in
this most general sense, over the cause of action is obvious and requires no comment.
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if acquired at all in such an action, is
obtained by the voluntary submission of the defendant or by the personal service of
process upon him within the territory where the process is valid. If, however, the
defendant is a nonresident and, remaining beyond the range of the personal process of
the court, refuses to come in voluntarily, the court never acquires jurisdiction over the
person at all. Here the property itself is in fact the sole thing which is impleaded and is
the responsible object which is the subject of the exercise of judicial power. It follows
that the jurisdiction of the court in such case is based exclusively on the power which,
under the law, it possesses over the property; and any discussion relative to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant is entirely apart from the case.
The jurisdiction of the court over the property, considered as the exclusive object of such
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 2

action, is evidently based upon the following conditions and considerations, namely: (1)
that the property is located within the district; (2) that the purpose of the litigation is to
subject the property by sale to an obligation fixed upon it by the mortgage; and (3) that
the court at a proper stage of the proceedings takes the property into custody, if
necessary, and expose it to sale for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt. An
obvious corollary is that no other relief can be granted in this proceeding than such as
can be enforced against the property.
We may then, from what has been stated, formulated the following proposition relative
to the foreclosure proceeding against the property of a nonresident mortgagor who fails
to come in and submit himself personally to the jurisdiction of the court: (I) That the
jurisdiction of the court is derived from the power which it possesses over the property;
(II) that jurisdiction over the person is not acquired and is nonessential; (III) that the
relief granted by the court must be limited to such as can be enforced against the
property itself.
It is important that the bearing of these propositions be clearly apprehended, for there are
many expressions in the American reports from which it might be inferred that the court
acquires personal jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by publication and notice;
but such is not the case. In truth the proposition that jurisdiction over the person of a
nonresident cannot be acquired by publication and notice was never clearly understood
even in the American courts until after the decision had been rendered by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the leading case of Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S. 714; 24 L.
ed., 565). In the light of that decision, and of other decisions which have subsequently
been rendered in that and other courts, the proposition that jurisdiction over the person
cannot be thus acquired by publication and notice is no longer open to question; and it is
now fully established that a personal judgment upon constructive or substituted service
against a nonresident who does not appear is wholly invalid. This doctrine applies to all
kinds of constructive or substituted process, including service by publication and
personal service outside of the jurisdiction in which the judgment is rendered; and the
only exception seems to be found in the case where the nonresident defendant has
expressly or impliedly consented to the mode of service. (Note to Raher vs. Raher, 35 L.
R. A. [N. S. ], 292; see also 50 L .R. A., 585; 35 L. R. A. [N. S.], 312
The idea upon which the decision in Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) proceeds is that the
process from the tribunals of one State cannot run into other States or countries and that
due process of law requires that the defendant shall be brought under the power of the
court by service of process within the State, or by his voluntary appearance, in order to
authorize the court to pass upon the question of his personal liability. The doctrine
established by the Supreme Court of the United States on this point, being based upon
the constitutional conception of due process of law, is binding upon the courts of the
Philippine Islands. Involved in this decision is the principle that in proceedings in rem or
quasi in rem against a nonresident who is not served personally within the state, and who
does not appear, the relief must be confined to the res, and the court cannot lawfully
render a personal judgment against him. (Dewey vs. Des Moines, 173 U. S., 193; 43 L.
ed., 665; Heidritter vs. Elizabeth Oil Cloth Co., 112 U. S., 294; 28 L. ed., 729.)

Therefore in an action to foreclose a mortgage against a nonresident, upon whom service

has been effected exclusively by publication, no personal judgment for the deficiency
can be entered. (Latta vs. Tutton, 122 Cal., 279; Blumberg vs. Birch, 99 Cal., 416.)
It is suggested in the brief of the appellant that the judgment entered in the court below
offends against the principle just stated and that this judgment is void because the court
in fact entered a personal judgment against the absent debtor for the full amount of the
indebtedness secured by the mortgage. We do not so interpret the judgment.
In a foreclosure proceeding against a nonresident owner it is necessary for the court, as
in all cases of foreclosure, to ascertain the amount due, as prescribed in section 256 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, and to make an order requiring the defendant to pay the
money into court. This step is a necessary precursor of the order of sale. In the present
case the judgment which was entered contains the following words:
Because it is declared that the said defendant Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y
Limquingco, is indebted in the amount of P249,355.32, plus the interest, to the 'Banco
Espanol-Filipino' . . . therefore said appellant is ordered to deliver the above amount etc.,
etc.
This is not the language of a personal judgment. Instead it is clearly intended merely as a
compliance with the requirement that the amount due shall be ascertained and that the
evidence of this it may be observed that according to the Code of Civil Procedure a
personal judgment against the debtor for the deficiency is not to be rendered until after
the property has been sold and the proceeds applied to the mortgage debt. (sec. 260).
The conclusion upon this phase of the case is that whatever may be the effect in other
respects of the failure of the clerk of the Court of First Instance to mail the proper papers
to the defendant in Amoy, China, such irregularity could in no wise impair or defeat the
jurisdiction of the court, for in our opinion that jurisdiction rest upon a basis much more
secure than would be supplied by any form of notice that could be given to a resident of
a foreign country.
Before leaving this branch of the case, we wish to observe that we are fully aware that
many reported cases can be cited in which it is assumed that the question of the
sufficiency of publication or notice in a case of this kind is a question affecting the
jurisdiction of the court, and the court is sometimes said to acquire jurisdiction by virtue
of the publication. This phraseology was undoubtedly originally adopted by the court
because of the analogy between service by the publication and personal service of
process upon the defendant; and, as has already been suggested, prior to the decision of
Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) the difference between the legal effects of the two forms of
service was obscure. It is accordingly not surprising that the modes of expression which
had already been molded into legal tradition before that case was decided have been
brought down to the present day. But it is clear that the legal principle here involved is
not effected by the peculiar language in which the courts have expounded their ideas.
We now proceed to a discussion of the question whether the supposed irregularity in the
proceedings was of such gravity as to amount to a denial of that "due process of law"
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which was secured by the Act of Congress in force in these Islands at the time this
mortgage was foreclosed. (Act of July 1, 1902, sec. 5.) In dealing with questions
involving the application of the constitutional provisions relating to due process of law
the Supreme Court of the United States has refrained from attempting to define with
precision the meaning of that expression, the reason being that the idea expressed therein
is applicable under so many diverse conditions as to make any attempt ay precise
definition hazardous and unprofitable. As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it
may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the
following conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed
with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be
lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the
subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard;
and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard,
we observe that in a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the
nonresident owner, prescribing the time within which appearance must be made, is
everywhere recognized as essential. To answer this necessity the statutes generally
provide for publication, and usually in addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the
defendant, if his residence is known. Though commonly called constructive, or
substituted service of process in any true sense. It is merely a means provided by law
whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of judicial
proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect
it. In speaking of notice of this character a distinguish master of constitutional law has
used the following language:
. . . if the owners are named in the proceedings, and personal notice is provided for, it is
rather from tenderness to their interests, and in order to make sure that the opportunity
for a hearing shall not be lost to them, than from any necessity that the case shall assume
that form. (Cooley on Taxation [2d. ed.], 527, quoted in Leigh vs. Green, 193 U. S., 79,
80.)
It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance
that the absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the
publication may never in fact come to his hands, and the chances that he should discover
the notice may often be very slight. Even where notice is sent by mail the probability of
his receiving it, though much increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address
to which it is forwarded as well as upon the regularity and security of the mail service. It
will be noted, furthermore, that the provision of our law relative to the mailing of notice
does not absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every event, but
only in the case where the defendant's residence is known. In the light of all these facts,
it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law,
to be considered absolutely necessary.
The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of
notification which may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always

assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely
held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been
instituted for its condemnation and sale.
It is the duty of the owner of real estate, who is a nonresident, to take measures that in
some way he shall be represented when his property is called into requisition, and if he
fails to do this, and fails to get notice by the ordinary publications which have usually
been required in such cases, it is his misfortune, and he must abide the consequences. (6
R. C. L., sec. 445 [p. 450]).
It has been well said by an American court:
If property of a nonresident cannot be reached by legal process upon the constructive
notice, then our statutes were passed in vain, and are mere empty legislative declarations,
without either force, or meaning; for if the person is not within the jurisdiction of the
court, no personal judgment can be rendered, and if the judgment cannot operate upon
the property, then no effective judgment at all can be rendered, so that the result would
be that the courts would be powerless to assist a citizen against a nonresident. Such a
result would be a deplorable one. (Quarl vs. Abbett, 102 Ind., 233; 52 Am. Rep., 662,
667.)
It is, of course universally recognized that the statutory provisions relative to publication
or other form of notice against a nonresident owner should be complied with; and in
respect to the publication of notice in the newspaper it may be stated that strict
compliance with the requirements of the law has been held to be essential. In Guaranty
Trust etc. Co. vs. Green Cove etc., Railroad Co. (139 U. S., 137, 138), it was held that
where newspaper publication was made for 19 weeks, when the statute required 20, the
publication was insufficient.
With respect to the provisions of our own statute, relative to the sending of notice by
mail, the requirement is that the judge shall direct that the notice be deposited in the mail
by the clerk of the court, and it is not in terms declared that the notice must be deposited
in the mail. We consider this to be of some significance; and it seems to us that, having
due regard to the principles upon which the giving of such notice is required, the absent
owner of the mortgaged property must, so far as the due process of law is concerned,
take the risk incident to the possible failure of the clerk to perform his duty, somewhat as
he takes the risk that the mail clerk or the mail carrier might possibly lose or destroy the
parcel or envelope containing the notice before it should reach its destination and be
delivered to him. This idea seems to be strengthened by the consideration that placing
upon the clerk the duty of sending notice by mail, the performance of that act is put
effectually beyond the control of the plaintiff in the litigation. At any rate it is obvious
that so much of section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure as relates to the sending of
notice by mail was complied with when the court made the order. The question as to
what may be the consequences of the failure of the record to show the proof of
compliance with that requirement will be discussed by us further on.

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The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the
clerk to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as
amounts to a denial of due process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if
proved, would not avoid the judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a
newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires.
This in our opinion is all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings.
It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a difference
whether it be viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due
process of law. In the matter of jurisdiction there can be no distinction between the much
and the little. The court either has jurisdiction or it has not; and if the requirement as to
the mailing of notice should be considered as a step antecedent to the acquiring of
jurisdiction, there could be no escape from the conclusion that the failure to take that step
was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the application of the idea of due process of
law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so rigorous. The jurisdiction being
once established, all that due process of law thereafter requires is an opportunity for the
defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, it would
seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that
in applying the requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect upon the
purposes of the provision which is supposed to have been violated and the principle
underlying the exercise of judicial power in these proceedings. Judge in the light of these
conceptions, we think that the provision of Act of Congress declaring that no person
shall be deprived of his property without due process of law has not been infringed.
In the progress of this discussion we have stated the two conclusions; (1) that the failure
of the clerk to send the notice to the defendant by mail did not destroy the jurisdiction of
the court and (2) that such irregularity did not infringe the requirement of due process of
law. As a consequence of these conclusions the irregularity in question is in some
measure shorn of its potency. It is still necessary, however, to consider its effect
considered as a simple irregularity of procedure; and it would be idle to pretend that even
in this aspect the irregularity is not grave enough. From this point of view, however, it is
obvious that any motion to vacate the judgment on the ground of the irregularity in
question must fail unless it shows that the defendant was prejudiced by that irregularity.
The least, therefore, that can be required of the proponent of such a motion is to show
that he had a good defense against the action to foreclose the mortgage. Nothing of the
kind is, however, shown either in the motion or in the affidavit which accompanies the
motion.
An application to open or vacate a judgment because of an irregularity or defect in the
proceedings is usually required to be supported by an affidavit showing the grounds on
which the relief is sought, and in addition to this showing also a meritorious defense to
the action. It is held that a general statement that a party has a good defense to the action
is insufficient. The necessary facts must be averred. Of course if a judgment is void upon
its face a showing of the existence of a meritorious defense is not necessary. (10 R. C. L.,
718.)

The lapse of time is also a circumstance deeply affecting this aspect of the case. In this
connection we quote the following passage from the encyclopedic treatise now in course
of publication:
Where, however, the judgment is not void on its face, and may therefore be enforced if
permitted to stand on the record, courts in many instances refuse to exercise their quasi
equitable powers to vacate a judgement after the lapse of the term ay which it was
entered, except in clear cases, to promote the ends of justice, and where it appears that
the party making the application is himself without fault and has acted in good faith and
with ordinary diligence. Laches on the part of the applicant, if unexplained, is deemed
sufficient ground for refusing the relief to which he might otherwise be entitled.
Something is due to the finality of judgments, and acquiescence or unnecessary delay is
fatal to motions of this character, since courts are always reluctant to interfere with
judgments, and especially where they have been executed or satisfied. The moving party
has the burden of showing diligence, and unless it is shown affirmatively the court will
not ordinarily exercise its discretion in his favor. (15 R. C. L., 694, 695.)
It is stated in the affidavit that the defendant, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y
Limquingco, died January 29, 1910. The mortgage under which the property was sold
was executed far back in 1906; and the proceedings in the foreclosure were closed by the
order of court confirming the sale dated August 7, 1908. It passes the rational bounds of
human credulity to suppose that a man who had placed a mortgage upon property worth
nearly P300,000 and had then gone away from the scene of his life activities to end his
days in the city of Amoy, China, should have long remained in ignorance of the fact that
the mortgage had been foreclosed and the property sold, even supposing that he had no
knowledge of those proceedings while they were being conducted. It is more in keeping
with the ordinary course of things that he should have acquired information as to what
was transpiring in his affairs at Manila; and upon the basis of this rational assumption we
are authorized, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to presume that he did have, or
soon acquired, information as to the sale of his property.
The Code of Civil Procedure, indeed, expressly declares that there is a presumption that
things have happened according to the ordinary habits of life (sec. 334 [26]); and we
cannot conceive of a situation more appropriate than this for applying the presumption
thus defined by the lawgiver. In support of this presumption, as applied to the present
case, it is permissible to consider the probability that the defendant may have received
actual notice of these proceedings from the unofficial notice addressed to him in Manila
which was mailed by an employee of the bank's attorneys. Adopting almost the exact
words used by the Supreme Court of the United States in Grannis vs. Ordeans (234 U. S.,
385; 58 L. ed., 1363), we may say that in view of the well-known skill of postal officials
and employees in making proper delivery of letters defectively addressed, we think the
presumption is clear and strong that this notice reached the defendant, there being no
proof that it was ever returned by the postal officials as undelivered. And if it was
delivered in Manila, instead of being forwarded to Amoy, China, there is a probability
that the recipient was a person sufficiently interested in his affairs to send it or
communicate its contents to him.
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Of course if the jurisdiction of the court or the sufficiency of the process of law
depended upon the mailing of the notice by the clerk, the reflections in which we are
now indulging would be idle and frivolous; but the considerations mentioned are
introduced in order to show the propriety of applying to this situation the legal
presumption to which allusion has been made. Upon that presumption, supported by the
circumstances of this case, ,we do not hesitate to found the conclusion that the defendant
voluntarily abandoned all thought of saving his property from the obligation which he
had placed upon it; that knowledge of the proceedings should be imputed to him; and
that he acquiesced in the consequences of those proceedings after they had been
accomplished. Under these circumstances it is clear that the merit of this motion is, as we
have already stated, adversely affected in a high degree by the delay in asking for relief.
Nor is it an adequate reply to say that the proponent of this motion is an administrator
who only qualified a few months before this motion was made. No disability on the part
of the defendant himself existed from the time when the foreclosure was effected until
his death; and we believe that the delay in the appointment of the administrator and
institution of this action is a circumstance which is imputable to the parties in interest
whoever they may have been. Of course if the minor heirs had instituted an action in
their own right to recover the property, it would have been different.

unaffected by the disposition which the court made of this case; and the fact that the
bank may have violated such an obligation can in no wise affect the validity of the
judgment entered in the Court of First Instance.

It is, however, argued that the defendant has suffered prejudice by reason of the fact that
the bank became the purchaser of the property at the foreclosure sale for a price greatly
below that which had been agreed upon in the mortgage as the upset price of the
property. In this connection, it appears that in article nine of the mortgage which was the
subject of this foreclosure, as amended by the notarial document of July 19, 1906, the
parties to this mortgage made a stipulation to the effect that the value therein placed upon
the mortgaged properties should serve as a basis of sale in case the debt should remain
unpaid and the bank should proceed to a foreclosure. The upset price stated in that
stipulation for all the parcels involved in this foreclosure was P286,000. It is said in
behalf of the appellant that when the bank bought in the property for the sum of
P110,200 it violated that stipulation.

In the case where that language was used an attempt was made to annul certain
foreclosure proceedings on the ground that the affidavit upon which the order of
publication was based erroneously stated that the State of Kansas, when he was in fact
residing in another State. It was held that this mistake did not affect the validity of the
proceedings.

It has been held by this court that a clause in a mortgage providing for a tipo, or upset
price, does not prevent a foreclosure, nor affect the validity of a sale made in the
foreclosure proceedings. (Yangco vs. Cruz Herrera and Wy Piaco, 11 Phil. Rep., 402;
Banco-Espaol Filipino vs. Donaldson, Sim and Co., 5 Phil. Rep., 418.) In both the cases
here cited the property was purchased at the foreclosure sale, not by the creditor or
mortgagee, but by a third party. Whether the same rule should be applied in a case where
the mortgagee himself becomes the purchaser has apparently not been decided by this
court in any reported decision, and this question need not here be considered, since it is
evident that if any liability was incurred by the bank by purchasing for a price below that
fixed in the stipulation, its liability was a personal liability derived from the contract of
mortgage; and as we have already demonstrated such a liability could not be the subject
of adjudication in an action where the court had no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. If the plaintiff bank became liable to account for the difference between the
upset price and the price at which in bought in the property, that liability remains

In connection with the entire failure of the motion to show either a meritorious defense to
the action or that the defendant had suffered any prejudice of which the law can take
notice, we may be permitted to add that in our opinion a motion of this kind, which
proposes to unsettle judicial proceedings long ago closed, can not be considered with
favor, unless based upon grounds which appeal to the conscience of the court. Public
policy requires that judicial proceedings be upheld. The maximum here applicable is non
quieta movere. As was once said by Judge Brewer, afterwards a member of the Supreme
Court of the United States:
Public policy requires that judicial proceedings be upheld, and that titles obtained in
those proceedings be safe from the ruthless hand of collateral attack. If technical defects
are adjudged potent to destroy such titles, a judicial sale will never realize that value of
the property, for no prudent man will risk his money in bidding for and buying that title
which he has reason to fear may years thereafter be swept away through some occult and
not readily discoverable defect. (Martin vs. Pond, 30 Fed., 15.)

In the preceding discussion we have assumed that the clerk failed to send the notice by
post as required by the order of the court. We now proceed to consider whether this is a
proper assumption; and the proposition which we propose to establish is that there is a
legal presumption that the clerk performed his duty as the ministerial officer of the court,
which presumption is not overcome by any other facts appearing in the cause.
In subsection 14 of section 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that there is
a presumption "that official duty has been regularly performed;" and in subsection 18 it
is declared that there is a presumption "that the ordinary course of business has been
followed." These presumptions are of course in no sense novelties, as they express ideas
which have always been recognized. Omnia presumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta
donec probetur in contrarium. There is therefore clearly a legal presumption that the
clerk performed his duty about mailing this notice; and we think that strong
considerations of policy require that this presumption should be allowed to operate with
full force under the circumstances of this case. A party to an action has no control over
the clerk of the court; and has no right to meddle unduly with the business of the clerk in
the performance of his duties. Having no control over this officer, the litigant must
depend upon the court to see that the duties imposed on the clerk are performed.
Other considerations no less potent contribute to strengthen the conclusion just stated.
There is no principle of law better settled than that after jurisdiction has once been
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 6

required, every act of a court of general jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been
rightly done. This rule is applied to every judgment or decree rendered in the various
stages of the proceedings from their initiation to their completion (Voorhees vs. United
States Bank, 10 Pet., 314; 35 U. S., 449); and if the record is silent with respect to any
fact which must have been established before the court could have rightly acted, it will
be presumed that such fact was properly brought to its knowledge. (The Lessee of
Grignon vs. Astor, 2 How., 319; 11 L. ed., 283.)
In making the order of sale [of the real state of a decedent] the court are presumed to
have adjudged every question necessary to justify such order or decree, viz: The death of
the owners; that the petitioners were his administrators; that the personal estate was
insufficient to pay the debts of the deceased; that the private acts of Assembly, as to the
manner of sale, were within the constitutional power of the Legislature, and that all the
provisions of the law as to notices which are directory to the administrators have been
complied with. . . . The court is not bound to enter upon the record the evidence on
which any fact was decided. (Florentine vs. Barton, 2 Wall., 210; 17 L. ed., 785.)
Especially does all this apply after long lapse of time.
Applegate vs. Lexington and Carter County Mining Co. (117 U. S., 255) contains an
instructive discussion in a case analogous to that which is now before us. It there
appeared that in order to foreclose a mortgage in the State of Kentucky against a
nonresident debtor it was necessary that publication should be made in a newspaper for a
specified period of time, also be posted at the front door of the court house and be
published on some Sunday, immediately after divine service, in such church as the court
should direct. In a certain action judgment had been entered against a nonresident, after
publication in pursuance of these provisions. Many years later the validity of the
proceedings was called in question in another action. It was proved from the files of an
ancient periodical that publication had been made in its columns as required by law; but
no proof was offered to show the publication of the order at the church, or the posting of
it at the front door of the court-house. It was insisted by one of the parties that the
judgment of the court was void for lack of jurisdiction. But the Supreme Court of the
United States said:
The court which made the decree . . . was a court of general jurisdiction. Therefore every
presumption not inconsistent with the record is to be indulged in favor of its jurisdiction.
. . . It is to be presumed that the court before making its decree took care of to see that its
order for constructive service, on which its right to make the decree depended, had been
obeyed.
It is true that in this case the former judgment was the subject of collateral , or indirect
attack, while in the case at bar the motion to vacate the judgment is direct proceeding for
relief against it. The same general presumption, however, is indulged in favor of the
judgment of a court of general jurisdiction, whether it is the subject of direct or indirect
attack the only difference being that in case of indirect attack the judgment is
conclusively presumed to be valid unless the record affirmatively shows it to be void,

while in case of direct attack the presumption in favor of its validity may in certain cases
be overcome by proof extrinsic to the record.
The presumption that the clerk performed his duty and that the court made its decree
with the knowledge that the requirements of law had been complied with appear to be
amply sufficient to support the conclusion that the notice was sent by the clerk as
required by the order. It is true that there ought to be found among the papers on file in
this cause an affidavit, as required by section 400 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
showing that the order was in fact so sent by the clerk; and no such affidavit appears.
The record is therefore silent where it ought to speak. But the very purpose of the law in
recognizing these presumptions is to enable the court to sustain a prior judgment in the
face of such an omission. If we were to hold that the judgment in this case is void
because the proper affidavit is not present in the file of papers which we call the record,
the result would be that in the future every title in the Islands resting upon a judgment
like that now before us would depend, for its continued security, upon the presence of
such affidavit among the papers and would be liable at any moment to be destroyed by
the disappearance of that piece of paper. We think that no court, with a proper regard for
the security of judicial proceedings and for the interests which have by law been
confided to the courts, would incline to favor such a conclusion. In our opinion the
proper course in a case of this kind is to hold that the legal presumption that the clerk
performed his duty still maintains notwithstanding the absence from the record of the
proper proof of that fact.
In this connection it is important to bear in mind that under the practice prevailing in the
Philippine Islands the word "record" is used in a loose and broad sense, as indicating the
collective mass of papers which contain the history of all the successive steps taken in a
case and which are finally deposited in the archives of the clerk's office as a memorial of
the litigation. It is a matter of general information that no judgment roll, or book of final
record, is commonly kept in our courts for the purpose of recording the pleadings and
principal proceedings in actions which have been terminated; and in particular, no such
record is kept in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. There is, indeed, a
section of the Code of Civil Procedure which directs that such a book of final record
shall be kept; but this provision has, as a matter of common knowledge, been generally
ignored. The result is that in the present case we do not have the assistance of the recitals
of such a record to enable us to pass upon the validity of this judgment and as already
stated the question must be determined by examining the papers contained in the entire
file.
But it is insisted by counsel for this motion that the affidavit of Bernardo Chan y Garcia
showing that upon April 4, 1908, he sent a notification through the mail addressed to the
defendant at Manila, Philippine Islands, should be accepted as affirmative proof that the
clerk of the court failed in his duty and that, instead of himself sending the requisite
notice through the mail, he relied upon Bernardo to send it for him. We do not think that
this is by any means a necessary inference. Of course if it had affirmatively appeared that
the clerk himself had attempted to comply with this order and had directed the
notification to Manila when he should have directed it to Amoy, this would be
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 7

conclusive that he had failed to comply with the exact terms of the order; but such is not
this case. That the clerk of the attorneys for the plaintiff erroneously sent a notification to
the defendant at a mistaken address affords in our opinion very slight basis for supposing
that the clerk may not have sent notice to the right address.
There is undoubtedly good authority to support the position that when the record states
the evidence or makes an averment with reference to a jurisdictional fact, it will not be
presumed that there was other or different evidence respecting the fact, or that the fact
was otherwise than stated. If, to give an illustration, it appears from the return of the
officer that the summons was served at a particular place or in a particular manner, it will
not be presumed that service was also made at another place or in a different manner; or
if it appears that service was made upon a person other than the defendant, it will not be
presumed, in the silence of the record, that it was made upon the defendant also (Galpin
vs. Page, 18 Wall., 350, 366; Settlemier vs. Sullivan, 97 U. S., 444, 449). While we
believe that these propositions are entirely correct as applied to the case where the person
making the return is the officer who is by law required to make the return, we do not
think that it is properly applicable where, as in the present case, the affidavit was made
by a person who, so far as the provisions of law are concerned, was a mere intermeddler.
The last question of importance which we propose to consider is whether a motion in the
cause is admissible as a proceeding to obtain relief in such a case as this. If the motion
prevails the judgment of July 2, 1908, and all subsequent proceedings will be set aside,
and the litigation will be renewed, proceeding again from the date mentioned as if the
progress of the action had not been interrupted. The proponent of the motion does not
ask the favor of being permitted to interpose a defense. His purpose is merely to annul
the effective judgment of the court, to the end that the litigation may again resume its
regular course.
There is only one section of the Code of Civil Procedure which expressly recognizes the
authority of a Court of First Instance to set aside a final judgment and permit a renewal
of the litigation in the same cause. This is as follows:
SEC. 113. Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or legal
representative from the judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against him through
his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; Provided, That application
thereof be made within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six months after such
judgment, order, or proceeding was taken.
An additional remedy by petition to the Supreme Court is supplied by section 513 of the
same Code. The first paragraph of this section, in so far as pertinent to this discussion,
provides as follows:
When a judgment is rendered by a Court of First Instance upon default, and a party
thereto is unjustly deprived of a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, and the Court of First Instance which rendered the judgment has finally
adjourned so that no adequate remedy exists in that court, the party so deprived of a
hearing may present his petition to the Supreme Court within sixty days after he first

learns of the rendition of such judgment, and not thereafter, setting forth the facts and
praying to have judgment set aside. . . .
It is evident that the proceeding contemplated in this section is intended to supplement
the remedy provided by section 113; and we believe the conclusion irresistible that there
is no other means recognized by law whereby a defeated party can, by a proceeding in
the same cause, procure a judgment to be set aside, with a view to the renewal of the
litigation.
The Code of Civil Procedure purports to be a complete system of practice in civil causes,
and it contains provisions describing with much fullness the various steps to be taken in
the conduct of such proceedings. To this end it defines with precision the method of
beginning, conducting, and concluding the civil action of whatever species; and by
section 795 of the same Code it is declared that the procedure in all civil action shall be
in accordance with the provisions of this Code. We are therefore of the opinion that the
remedies prescribed in sections 113 and 513 are exclusive of all others, so far as relates
to the opening and continuation of a litigation which has been once concluded.
The motion in the present case does not conform to the requirements of either of these
provisions; and the consequence is that in our opinion the action of the Court of First
Instance in dismissing the motion was proper.
If the question were admittedly one relating merely to an irregularity of procedure, we
cannot suppose that this proceeding would have taken the form of a motion in the cause,
since it is clear that, if based on such an error, the came to late for relief in the Court of
First Instance. But as we have already seen, the motion attacks the judgment of the court
as void for want of jurisdiction over the defendant. The idea underlying the motion
therefore is that inasmuch as the judgment is a nullity it can be attacked in any way and
at any time. If the judgment were in fact void upon its face, that is, if it were shown to be
a nullity by virtue of its own recitals, there might possibly be something in this. Where a
judgment or judicial order is void in this sense it may be said to be a lawless thing, which
can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it
exhibits its head.
But the judgment in question is not void in any such sense. It is entirely regular in form,
and the alleged defect is one which is not apparent upon its face. It follows that even if
the judgment could be shown to be void for want of jurisdiction, or for lack of due
process of law, the party aggrieved thereby is bound to resort to some appropriate
proceeding to obtain relief. Under accepted principles of law and practice, long
recognized in American courts, a proper remedy in such case, after the time for appeal or
review has passed, is for the aggrieved party to bring an action to enjoin the judgment, if
not already carried into effect; or if the property has already been disposed of he may
institute suit to recover it. In every situation of this character an appropriate remedy is at
hand; and if property has been taken without due process, the law concedes due process
to recover it. We accordingly old that, assuming the judgment to have been void as
alleged by the proponent of this motion, the proper remedy was by an original
proceeding and not by motion in the cause. As we have already seen our Code of Civil
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 8

Procedure defines the conditions under which relief against a judgment may be
productive of conclusion for this court to recognize such a proceeding as proper under
conditions different from those defined by law. Upon the point of procedure here
involved, we refer to the case of People vs. Harrison (84 Cal., 607) wherein it was held
that a motion will not lie to vacate a judgment after the lapse of the time limited by
statute if the judgment is not void on its face; and in all cases, after the lapse of the time
limited by statute if the judgment is not void on its face; and all cases, after the lapse of
such time, when an attempt is made to vacate the judgment by a proceeding in court for
that purpose an action regularly brought is preferable, and should be required. It will be
noted taken verbatim from the California Code (sec. 473).
The conclusions stated in this opinion indicate that the judgment appealed from is
without error, and the same is accordingly affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, and Avancea, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., dissenting:
I dissent. It will not make me long to state my reasons. An immutable attribute the
fundamental idea of due process of law is that no man shall be condemned in his
person or property without notice and an opportunity of being heard in his defense.
Protection of the parties demands a strict and an exact compliance with this
constitutional provision in our organic law and of the statutory provisions in
amplification. Literally hundreds of precedents could be cited in support of these
axiomatic principles. Where as in the instant case the defendant received no notice and
had no opportunity to be heard, certainly we cannot say that there is due process of law.
Resultantly, "A judgment which is void upon its face, and which requires only an
inspection of the judgment roll to demonstrate its want of vitality is a dead limb upon the
judicial tree, which should be lopped off, if the power so to do exists. It can bear no fruit
to the plaintiff, but is a constant menace to the defendant." (Mills vs. Dickons, 6 Rich [S.
C.], 487.)
________________________________________
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 111397

August 12, 2002

HON. ALFREDO LIM and RAFAELITO GARAYBLAS, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO REYES and BISTRO PIGALLE,
INC., respondents.
CARPIO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated March 25, 1993,2 and its Resolution dated July 13, 19933 which denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration. The assailed Decision sustained the orders dated December
29, 1992, January 20, 1993 and March 2, 1993, 4 issued by Branch 36 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila. The trial courts orders enjoined petitioner Alfredo Lim ("Lim"
for brevity), then Mayor of Manila, from investigating, impeding or closing down the
business operations of the New Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant owned
by respondent Bistro Pigalle Inc. ("Bistro" for brevity).
The Antecedent Facts
On December 7, 1992 Bistro filed before the trial court a petition5 for mandamus and
prohibition, with prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction,
against Lim in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila. Bistro filed the case because
policemen under Lims instructions inspected and investigated Bistros license as well as
the work permits and health certificates of its staff. This caused the stoppage of work in
Bistros night club and restaurant operations.6 Lim also refused to accept Bistros
application for a business license, as well as the work permit applications of Bistros
staff, for the year 1993.7
In its petition, Bistro argued that Lims refusal to issue the business license and work
permits violated the doctrine laid down this Court in De la Cruz vs. Paras,8 to wit:
"Municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. They may be
regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business."
Acting on Bistros application for injunctive relief, the trial court issued the first assailed
temporary restraining order on December 29, 1992, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, respondent and/or his agents and representatives are ordered to refrain
from inspecting or otherwise interfering in the operation of the establishments of
petitioner (Bistro Pigalle, Inc.)." 9
At the hearing, the parties submitted their evidence in support of their respective
positions. On January 20, 1993, the trial court granted Bistros application for a writ of
prohibitory preliminary injunction. The dispositive portion of the trial courts order
declared:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Petitioners application for a writ of
prohibitory preliminary injunction is granted, and Respondent, and any/all persons acting
under his authority, are and (sic) ordered to cease and desist from inspecting,
investigating and otherwise closing or impeding the business operations of Petitioner
Corporations establishments while the petition here is pending resolution on the merits.
Considering that the Respondent is a government official and this injunction relates to
his official duties, the posting of an injunction bond by the Petitioners is not required.

The Case
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 9

On the other hand, Petitioners application for a writ of mandatory injunction is hereby
denied, for to grant the same would amount to granting the writ of mandamus prayed for.
The Court reserves resolution thereof until the parties shall have been heard on the
merits."10
However, despite the trial courts order, Lim still issued a closure order on Bistros
operations effective January 23, 1993, even sending policemen to carry out his closure
order.
On January 25, 1993, Bistro filed an "Urgent Motion for Contempt" against Lim and the
policemen who stopped Bistros operations on January 23, 1993. At the hearing of the
motion for contempt on January 29, 1993, Bistro withdrew its motion on condition that
Lim would respect the courts injunction.
However, on February 12, 13, 15, 26 and 27, and on March 1 and 2, 1993, Lim, acting
through his agents and policemen, again disrupted Bistros business operations.
Meanwhile, on February 17, 1993, Lim filed a motion to dissolve the injunctive order of
January 20, 1993 and to dismiss the case. Lim insisted that the power of a mayor to
inspect and investigate commercial establishments and their staff is implicit in the
statutory power of the city mayor to issue, suspend or revoke business permits and
licenses. This statutory power is expressly provided for in Section 11 (l), Article II of the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila and in Section 455, paragraph 3 (iv) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The trial court denied Lims motion to dissolve the injunction and to dismiss the case in
an order dated March 2, 1993, the dispositive portion of which stated:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby orders:
(1) The denial of respondents motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction or the dismissal of the instant case;
(2) Petitioner-corporation is authorized to remove the wooden cross-bars or any other
impediments which were placed at its establishments, namely, New Bangkok Club and
Exotic Garden Restaurant on February 12, 1993 and February 15, 1993, respectively, and
thereafter said establishments are allowed to resume their operations;
(3) All the other petitioners are allowed to continue working in the aforenamed
establishments of petitioner-corporation if they have not yet reported; and
(4) The hearing on the contempt proceedings is deferred to give sufficient time to
respondent to elevate the matters assailed herein to the Supreme Court." 11
On March 10, 1993, Lim filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus against Bistro and Judge Wilfredo Reyes. Lim claimed that
the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction.

On March 25, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision.12 In a
resolution dated July 13, 1993, the Court of Appeals denied Lims motion for
reconsideration.13
On July 1, 1993, Manila City Ordinance No. 7783 14 took effect. On the same day, Lim
ordered the Western Police District Command to permanently close down the operations
of Bistro, which order the police implemented at once. 15
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In denying Lims petition, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion since it issued the writ after hearing on the basis of the
evidence adduced.
The Court of Appeals reasoned thus:
"x x x. A writ of preliminary injunction may issue if the act sought to be enjoined will
cause irreparable injury to the movant or destroy the status quo before a full hearing can
be had on the merits of the case.
A writ of preliminary injunction, as an ancillary or preventive remedy, may only be
resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests and for no other
purpose during the pendency of the principal action. It is primarily intended to maintain
the status quo between the parties existing prior to the filing of the case.
In the case at bar, We find that the respondent Judge did not act improvidently in issuing
the assailed orders granting the writ of preliminary injunction in order to maintain the
status quo, while the petition is pending resolution on the merits. The private respondent
correctly points out that the questioned writ was regularly issued after several hearings,
in which the parties were allowed to adduce evidence, and argue their respective
positions.
The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is within the limits of the sound exercise
of discretion of the court and the appellate court will not interfere, except, in a clear case
of abuse thereof. x x x.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and is accordingly
DISMISSED."16
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues:
1. "DID RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING HIS SAID
ASSAILED ORDERS OF DECEMBER 29, 1992, JANUARY 20, 1993 AND MARCH
2, 1993?"

CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 10

2. "DID RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERRORS

IN RENDERING ITS ASSAILED DECISION OF MARCH 25, 1993 AND ITS
ASSAILED RESOLUTION OF JULY 13, 1993?"

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the prohibitory preliminary injunction.
We uphold the findings of the Court of Appeals.

3. "DID SAID CIVIL CASE NO. 92-63712 AND SAID CA-G.R. SP NO. 30381
BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC WHEN THE NEW BANGKOK CLUB AND
THE EXOTIC GARDEN RESTAURANT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT WERE
CLOSED ON JULY 1, 1993 PURSUANT TO ORDINANCE NO. 7783?"

The authority of mayors to issue business licenses and permits is beyond question. The
law expressly provides for such authority. Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila, reads:

The Ruling of the Court

"Sec. 11. General duties and powers of the mayor. The general duties and powers of the
mayor shall be:

The petition is without merit.

Considering that the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 7783 was not raised before the
trial court or the Court of Appeals, and this issue is still under litigation in another
case,17 the Court will deal only with the first two issues raised by petitioner.
Validity of the Preliminary Injunction
Bistros cause of action in the mandamus and prohibition proceedings before the trial
court is the violation of its property right under its license to operate. The violation
consists of the work disruption in Bistros operations caused by Lim and his subordinates
as well as Lims refusal to issue a business license to Bistro and work permits to its staff
for the year 1993. The primary relief prayed for by Bistro is the issuance of writs of
mandatory and prohibitory injunction. The mandatory injunction seeks to compel Lim to
accept Bistros 1993 business license application and to issue Bistros business license.
Also, the mandatory injunction seeks to compel Lim to accept the applications of
Bistros staff for work permits. The writ of prohibitory injunction seeks to enjoin Lim
from interfering, impeding or otherwise closing down Bistros operations.
The trial court granted only the prohibitory injunction. This enjoined Lim from
interfering, impeding or otherwise closing down Bistros operations pending resolution
of whether Lim can validly refuse to issue Bistros business license and its staffs work
permits for the year 1993.
Lim contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the prohibitory injunction.
Lim relies primarily on his power, as Mayor of the City of Manila, to grant and refuse
municipal licenses and business permits as expressly provided for in the Local
Government Code and the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. Lim argues that the
powers granted by these laws implicitly include the power to inspect, investigate and
close down Bistros operations for violation of the conditions of its licenses and permits.
On the other hand, Bistro asserts that the legal provisions relied upon by Lim do not
apply to the instant case. Bistro maintains that the Local Government Code and the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila do not expressly or impliedly grant Lim any
power to prohibit the operation of night clubs. Lim failed to specify any violation by
Bistro of the conditions of its licenses and permits. In refusing to accept Bistros
business license application for the year 1993, Bistro claims that Lim denied Bistro due
process of law.

x x x.
(l) To grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes and to revoke the
same for violation of the conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts
prohibited by law or municipal ordinances are being committed under the protection of
such licenses or in the premises in which the business for which the same have been
granted is carried on, or for any other reason of general interest." (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 455 (3) (iv) of the Local Government Code provides:
"Sec. 455. Chief Executive, Powers, Duties and Compensation: xxx.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the
general welfare of the City and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the
City Mayor shall:
(3) x x x.
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of
the condition upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law
or ordinance." (Emphasis supplied)
From the language of the two laws, it is clear that the power of the mayor to issue
business licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to suspend,
revoke or even refuse to issue the same. However, the power to suspend or revoke these
licenses and permits is expressly premised on the violation of the conditions of these
permits and licenses. The laws specifically refer to the "violation of the condition(s)" on
which the licenses and permits were issued. Similarly, the power to refuse to issue such
licenses and permits is premised on non-compliance with the prerequisites for the
issuance of such licenses and permits. The mayor must observe due process in exercising
these powers, which means that the mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice and
opportunity to be heard.
True, the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate private commercial
establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses and permits. However,
the mayor has no power to order a police raid on these establishments in the guise of
inspecting or investigating these commercial establishments. Lim acted beyond his
authority when he directed policemen to raid the New Bangkok Club and the Exotic
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 11

Garden Restaurant. Such act of Lim violated Ordinance No. 7716 18 which expressly
prohibits police raids and inspections, to wit:
"Section 1. No member of the Western Police District shall conduct inspection of food
and other business establishments for the purpose of enforcing sanitary rules and
regulations, inspecting licenses and permits, and/or enforcing internal revenue and
customs laws and regulations. This responsibility should be properly exercised by Local
Government Authorities and other concerned agencies." (Emphasis supplied)
These local government officials include the City Health Officer or his representative,
pursuant to the Revised City Ordinances of the City of Manila, 19 and the City Treasurer
pursuant to Section 470 of the Local Government Code. 20
Lim has no authority to close down Bistros business or any business establishment in
Manila without due process of law. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised Charter of
the City of Manila and the Local Government Code. There is no provision in these laws
expressly or impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down private commercial
establishments without notice and hearing, and even if there is, such provision would be
void. The due process clause of the Constitution requires that Lim should have given
Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions of its licenses
and permits.
The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be exercised in
accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process
and equal protection of the law.21 Such power cannot be exercised whimsically,
arbitrarily or despotically. In the instant case, we find that Lims exercise of this power
violated Bistros property rights that are protected under the due process clause of the
Constitution.
Lim did not charge Bistro with any specific violation of the conditions of its business
license or permits. Still, Lim closed down Bistros operations even before the expiration
of its business license on December 31, 1992. Lim also refused to accept Bistros license
application for 1993, in effect denying the application without examining whether it
complies with legal prerequisites.
Lims zeal in his campaign against prostitution is commendable. The presumption is that
he acted in good faith and was motivated by his concern for his constituents when he
implemented his campaign against prostitution in the Ermita-Malate area. However,
there is no excusing Lim for arbitrarily closing down, without due process of law, the
business operations of Bistro. For this reason, the trial court properly restrained the acts
of Lim.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in upholding the trial courts orders. The
sole objective of a writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the
merits of the case can be heard fully. It is generally availed of to prevent actual or
threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be disposed of. 22 In the instant case, the
issuance of the writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction did not dispose of the main
case for mandamus. The trial court issued the injunction in view of the disruptions and

stoppage in Bistros operations as a consequence of Lims closure orders. The injunction

was intended to maintain the status quo while the petition has not been resolved on the
merits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP NO. 30381 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
_____________________________________________
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 93891 March 11, 1991
POLLUTION
ADJUDICATION
vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
SOLAR
CORPORATION, respondents.

BOARD, petitioner
TEXTILE

FINISHING

RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:p
Petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board ("Board") asks us to review the Decision and
Resolution promulgated on 7 February 1990 and 10 May 1990, respectively, by the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G R. No. SP 18821 entitled "Solar Textile Finishing
Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board." In that Decision and Resolution, the Court
of Appeals reversed an order of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 77, in
Civil Case No. Q-89-2287 dismissing private respondent Solar Textile Finishing
Corporation's ("Solar") petition for certiorari and remanded the case to the trial court for
further proceedings.
On 22 September 1988, petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar
immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source
installations which were discharging untreated wastewater directly into a canal leading to
the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The Order signed by Hon. Fulgencio Factoran,
Jr., as Board Chairman, reads in full as follows:
Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation with plant and place of business at 999
General Pascual Avenue, Malabon, Metro Manila is involved in bleaching, rinsing and
dyeing textiles with wastewater of about 30 gpm. being directly discharged untreated
into the sewer. Based on findings in the Inspections conducted on 05 November 1986
and 15 November 1986, the volume of untreated wastewater discharged in the final out
fall outside of the plant's compound was even greater. The result of inspection conducted
on 06 September 1988 showed that respondent's Wastewater Treatment Plant was noted
unoperational and the combined wastewater generated from its operation was about 30
gallons per minute and 80% of the wastewater was being directly discharged into a
drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River by means of a by-pass and the
remaining 20% was channelled into the plant's existing Wastewater Treatment Plant
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 12

(WTP). Result of the analyses of the sample taken from the by-pass showed that the
wastewater is highly pollutive in terms of Color units, BOD and Suspended Solids,
among others. These acts of respondent in spite of directives to comply with the
requirements are clearly in violation of Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 and
Section 103 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations and the 1982 Effluent
Regulations.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 7 of P.D. 984 and Section 38 of its Implementing
Rules and Regulations, respondent is hereby ordered to cease and desist from utilizing its
wastewater pollution source installation and discharging its untreated wastewater directly
into the canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River effective immediately upon receipt
hereof and until such time when it has fully complied with all the requirements and until
further orders from this Board.
SO ORDERED. 1
We note that the above Order was based on findings of several inspections of Solar's
plant:
a. inspections conducted on 5 November 1986 and 12 November 1986 by the National
Pollution Control Commission ("NPCC"), the predecessor of the Board ; 2 and
b. the inspection conducted on 6 September 1988 by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources ("DENR").
The findings of these two (2) inspections were that Solar's wastewater treatment plant
was non-operational and that its plant generated about 30 gallons per minute of
wastewater, 80% of which was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to
the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The remaining 20% of the wastewater was being
channeled through Solar's non-operational wastewater treatment plant. Chemical analysis
of samples of Solar's effluents showed the presence of pollutants on a level in excess of
what was permissible under P.D. No. 984 and its Implementing Regulations.
A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26 September 1988. A Writ of
Execution issued by the Board was received by Solar on 31 March 1989.
Meantime, Solar filed a motion for reconsideration/appeal with prayer for stay of
execution of the Order dated 22 September 1988. Acting on this motion, the Board
issued an Order dated 24 April 1989 allowing Solar to operate temporarily, to enable the
Board to conduct another inspection and evaluation of Solar's wastewater treatment
facilities. In the same Order, the Board directed the Regional Executive Director of the
DENR/ NCR to conduct the inspection and evaluation within thirty (30) days.
On 21 April 1989, however, Solar went to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 77, on petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against the Board, the
petition being docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2287.
On 21 July 1989, the Regional Trial Court dismissed Solar's petition upon two (2)
grounds, i.e., that appeal and not certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as

well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the Board's subsequent
Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and
academic.
Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals which, in the Decision here
assailed, reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that
court for further proceedings. In addition, the Court of Appeals declared the Writ of
Execution null and void. At the same time, the Court of Appeals said in the dispositive
portion of its Decision that:
. . .. Still and all, this decision is without prejudice to whatever action the appellee
[Board] may take relative to the projected 'inspection and evaluation' of appellant's
[Solar's] water treatment facilities. 3
The Court of Appeals, in so ruling, held that certiorari was a proper remedy since the
Orders of petitioner Board may result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that
while the case might be moot and academic, "larger issues" demanded that the question
of due process be settled. Petitioner Board moved for reconsideration, without success.
The Board is now before us on a Petition for Review basically arguing that:
1. its ex parte Order dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution were issued in
accordance with law and were not violative of the requirements of due process; and
2. the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects of a petition
for certiorari.
The only issue before us at this time is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar had been denied due process by the
Board.
Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to
issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima
facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the
pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC
(now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends that the reports before it concerning the
effluent discharges of Solar into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River provided prima
facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982 Effluent Code.
Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex
parte order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life,
public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life." In the instant case,
according to Solar, the inspection reports before the Board made no finding that Solar's
wastewater discharged posed such a threat.
The Court is not persuaded by Solar's contention. Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984
authorized petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders under the following
circumstances:
P.D. 984, Section 7, paragraph (a), provides:
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 13

(a) Public Hearing. . . . Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima facie
evidence that the discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public
health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life, or exceeds the allowable standards
set by the Commission, the Commissioner may issue an ex-parte order directing the
discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension or cessation of operation of the
establishment or person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a
prior public hearing. The said ex-parte order shall be immediately executory and shall
remain in force until said establishment or person prevents or abates the said pollution
within the allowable standards or modified or nullified by a competent court. (Emphasis
supplied)

(a) Fresh Surface Water

We note that under the above-quoted portion of Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984, an ex
parte cease and desist order may be issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes
discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or
welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed
"the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." On the one hand, it is not essential that the
Board prove that an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to
animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is
enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed "the allowable standards
set by the [NPCC]." In respect of discharges of wastes as to which allowable standards
have been set by the Commission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist order
when there is prima facieevidence of an establishment exceeding such allowable
standards. Where, however, the effluents or discharges have not yet been the subject
matter of allowable standards set by the Commission, then the Board may act on anex
parte basis when it finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater or material
involved presents an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare or to
animal or plant life." Since the applicable standards set by the Commission existing at
any given time may well not cover every possible or imaginable kind of effluent or waste
discharge, the general standard of an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or
welfare, or to animal and plant life" remains necessary.

(Emphases supplied)

Upon the other hand, the Court must assume that the extant allowable standards have
been set by the Commission or Board precisely in order to avoid or neutralize an
"immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life.''

b) pH 6-8.5 b) pH 9.3 8.7

Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 4 sets out the maximum permissible levels
of physical and chemical substances which effluents from domestic wastewater treatment
plants and industrial plants" must not exceed "when discharged into bodies of water
classified as Class A, B, C, D, SB and SC in accordance with the 1978 NPCC Rules and
Regulations." The waters of Tullahan-Tinejeros River are classified as inland waters
Class D under Section 68 of the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations 5 which in part
provides that:
Sec. 68. Water Usage and Classification. The quality of Philippine waters shall be
maintained in a safe and satisfactory condition according to their best usages. For this
purpose, all water shall be classified according to the following beneficial usages:

Classification Best usage

xxx xxx xxx
Class D For agriculture, irrigation, livestock
watering and industrial cooling and
processing.
xxx xxx xxx

The reports on the inspections carried on Solar's wastewater treatment facilities on 5 and
12 November 1986 and 6 September 1988 set forth the following Identical finding:
a. For legal action in [view of] implementing rules and regulations of P.D. No. 984 and
Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982. 6
Placing the maximum allowable standards set in Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of
1982 alongside the findings of the November 1986 and September 1988 inspection
reports, we get the following results:
"Inland November September
Waters 1986 1988
(Class C & D 7 Report 8 Report 9
Station 1 Station 1
a) Color in 100 a) Color units 250 125
platinum (Apparent
cobalt Color)

c) Tempera- 40 c) Temperature
ture in C (C)
d) Phenols in 0.1 d) Phenols in
mg./1. mg.1
e) Suspended 75 e) Suspended 340 80
solids in solids in
mg./1. mg./1.
f) BOD in 80 f) BOD (5-day) 1,100 152
mg./1. mg./1
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 14

g) oil/Grease 10 g) Oil/Grease
h) Detergents 5 h) Detergents 2.93
in mg./1/" mg./1. MBAS
i) Dissolved 0
oxygen, mg./1.
j) Settleable 0.4 1.5
Matter, mg./1.
k) Total Dis 800 610
solved Solids
mg./1.
l) Total Solids 1,400 690
mg./1.
m) Turbidity
NTU / ppm, SiO 3 70
The November 1986 inspections report concluded that:
Records of the Commission show that the plant under its previous owner, Fine Touch
Finishing Corporation, was issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing
same to cease and desist from conducting dyeing operation until such time the waste
treatment plant is already completed and operational. The new owner Solar Textile
Corporation informed the Commission of the plant acquisition thru its letter dated March
1986 (sic).
The new owner was summoned to a hearing held on 13 October 1986 based on the
adverse findings during the inspection/water sampling test conducted on 08 August
1986. As per instruction of the Legal Division a re- inspection/sampling text should be
conducted first before an appropriate legal action is instituted; hence, this inspection.
Based on the above findings, it is clear that the new owner continuously violates the
directive of the Commission by undertaking dyeing operation without completing first
and operating its existing WTP. The analysis of results on water samples taken showed
that the untreated wastewater from the firm pollutes our water resources. In this
connection, it is recommended that appropriate legal action be instituted immediately
against the firm. . . . 10
The September 1988 inspection report's conclusions were:
1. The plant was undertaking dyeing, bleaching and rinsing operations during the
inspection. The combined wastewater generated from the said operations was estimated

at about 30 gallons per minute. About 80% of the wastewater was traced directly
discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros river by means of a
bypass. The remaining 20% was channeled into the plant's existing wastewater treatment
plant (WTP).
2. The WTP was noted not yet fully operational- some accessories were not yet installed.
Only the sump pit and the holding/collecting tank are functional but appeared seldom
used. The wastewater mentioned channeled was noted held indefinitely into the
collection tank for primary treatment. There was no effluent discharge [from such
collection tank].
3. A sample from the bypass wastewater was collected for laboratory analyses. Result of
the analyses show that the bypass wastewater is polluted in terms of color units, BOD
and suspended solids, among others. (Please see attached laboratory resul .) 11
From the foregoing reports, it is clear to this Court that there was at least prima
facie evidence before the Board that the effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded
the maximum allowable levels of physical and chemical substances set by the NPCC and
that accordingly there was adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and desist order
issued by the Board. It is also well to note that the previous owner of the plant facility
Fine Touch Finishing Corporation had been issued a Notice of Violation on 20
December 1985 directing it to cease and refrain from carrying out dyeing operations until
the water treatment plant was completed and operational. Solar, the new owner, informed
the NPCC of the acquisition of the plant on March 1986. Solar was summoned by the
NPCC to a hearing on 13 October 1986 based on the results of the sampling test
conducted by the NPCC on 8 August 1986. Petitioner Board refrained from issuing an ex
parte cease and desist order until after the November 1986 and September 1988 reinspections were conducted and the violation of applicable standards was confirmed. In
other words, petitioner Board appears to have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to
enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very
casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the TullahanTinerejos River, presumably loath to spend the money necessary to put its Wastewater
Treatment Plant ("WTP") in an operating condition.
In this connection, we note that in Technology Developers, Inc. v. Court of appeals, et
al., 12 the Court very recently upheld the summary closure ordered by the Acting Mayor
of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, of a pollution-causing establishment, after finding that the
records showed that:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining
whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of
the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the then National Pollution Control
Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements, now the Environmental
Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must
be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its
inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny the
application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 15

appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the
residents of the community from the emission in the operation of the business.
2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February l6, 1989, called the attention of petitioner to
the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the
air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in the area," so that petitioner
was ordered to stop its operation until further orders and it was required to bring the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution permit.
(Annex A-2, petition)
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of
Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through
channels (Annex A-B, petition).. . .
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was
made by Marivic Guina who in her report of December 8, 1988 observed that the fumes
emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no
proper air pollution device has been installed. (Annex A-9, petition)
xxx xxx xxx
6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then
National Pollution Control Commission on December 15,1987, the permit was good only
up to May 25,1988 (Annex A-12, petition). Petitioner had not exerted any effort to
extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution and
prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community."
In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was issued not by a local
government official but by the Pollution Adjudication Board, the very agency of the
Government charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of a particular
industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and
regulatory provisions.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like
that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and
untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be
made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such
orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those
which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution
control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the
exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general
welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life,
commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the
ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting
vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. The

Board's ex parte Order and Writ of Execution would, of course, have compelled Solar
temporarily to stop its plant operations, a state of affairs Solar could in any case have
avoided by simply absorbing the bother and burden of putting its WTP on an operational
basis. Industrial establishments are not constitutionally entitled to reduce their capitals
costs and operating expenses and to increase their profits by imposing upon the public
threats and risks to its safety, health, general welfare and comfort, by disregarding the
requirements of anti- pollution statutes and their implementing regulations.
It should perhaps be made clear the Court is not here saying that the correctness of the ex
parte Order and Writ of Execution may not be contested by Solar in a hearing before the
Board itself. Where the establishment affected by an ex parte cease and desist order
contests the correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must hold a
public hearing where such establishment would have an opportunity to controvert the
basis of such ex parte order. That such an opportunity is subsequently available is really
all that is required by the due process clause of the Constitution in situations like that we
have here. The Board's decision rendered after the public hearing may then be tested
judicially by an appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 7(c) of P.D.
No. 984 and Section 42 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations. A subsequent public
hearing is precisely what Solar should have sought instead of going to court to seek
nullification of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution and instead of appealing to the
Court of Appeals. It will be recalled the at the Board in fact gave Solar authority
temporarily to continue operations until still another inspection of its wastewater
treatment facilities and then another analysis of effluent samples could be taken and
evaluated.
Solar claims finally that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy as the
questioned Order and Writ of Execution issued by the Board were patent nullities. Since
we have concluded that the Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within the lawful
authority of petitioner Board, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition
for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the
Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is given DUE COURSE and the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 7 February 1990 and its Resolution dated 10 May 1990 in
A.C.-G.R. No. SP 18821 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Order of petitioner Board dated 22
September 1988 and the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court dated
21 July 1989, are hereby REINSTATED, without prejudice to the right of Solar to
contest the correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a
public hearing before the Board.
__________________________________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46496

February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and

NATIONAL
WORKERS
BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 16

vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION,
INC., respondents.

4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer

union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal.
(281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)

LAUREL, J.:

5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority
rule and elective representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5,
Commonwealth Act No. 213.)

The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the

above-entitled case has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons
stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the majority
opinion of this Court:
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion
o que no sea para una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las
partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo fijado para el pago de los salarios segun costumbre
en la localidad o cunado se termine la obra;
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya
colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus
tarbajos por haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de
ser empleados u obreros de la misma;
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus
osbreros sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se
niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro forzoso,
no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley
No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos
obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado
deser empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of
the judgement rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to
the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of
leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the
members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the
records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a
scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his
CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re
supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically
prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the
Philippine Army.

6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of
dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable
in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of
American origin where the industrial peace has always been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for
discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National
Workers' Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with
the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and
offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and
effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered herein.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration
of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the
motion for a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the
opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the
Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the
respondent labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in the interest
of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly procedure in cases of
this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of the powers of the Court
of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which should be
observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of
the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have
found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their
union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during
the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of
opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident
that these statements and expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically
stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an
administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not
intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 17

is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only
cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial
Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and
dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of
disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the determination of
disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive
and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate,
decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or
affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them,
subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103
(section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and
settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or
lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of
labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between landlords and tenants or farmlaborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of farm-laborers
involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the
Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and
certified by the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor
as existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the sake of public interest.
(Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing,
endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable
agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the
Philippines, it shall investigate and study all industries established in a designated
locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting
for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a
maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to
landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the
settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose,
or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration
in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in
agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which
is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673,
promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to joint out that the Court of
Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had
occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by
technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms
and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem
just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted
to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or
agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or
determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling

the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.)
And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially
regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this
Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the
Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely
ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials
and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In
the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82
Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the
rudimentary requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468,
56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court inEdwards vs. McCoy, 22
Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of
the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or
persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or
consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This
principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited
power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of
Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G.
1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland
Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81
Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate
to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations
Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products,
6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of
this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of
technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent
inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860;
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 18

S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct.
220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative
procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial
evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83
Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence
Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by
confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the
latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not,
however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that
purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of
facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for
the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report
and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of
Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under
its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of
the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and
functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such
delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section
10, ibid.)

discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this
avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of
Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National
Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated
by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further
alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial
avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of due
diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in
the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of
such far reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein." We have considered the
reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By and large, after
considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice
would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the
documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the
main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and
under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not
entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the
motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of
this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it
reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.
_________________________________________

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of
work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming
before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory
authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with the
right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory
authority.

SECOND DIVISION

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

PUNO, J.:

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that,
except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's
Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a
factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the
by respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of
material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically

G.R. No. 153166 December 16, 2005

TERESITA L. VERTUDES,1 Petitioner,
vs.
JULIE BUENAFLOR and BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Respondents.
DECISION

Before us is a petition for review by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to review and set aside the decision2 and resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), which affirmed the decision of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) finding
petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and dismissing her from government service.
Petitioner Teresita L. Vertudes was a fingerprint examiner at the Alien Registration
Division of the Bureau of Immigration (BI). In a facsimile letter 4 dated July 27, 1998, a
certain Peng Villas, a news editor of the Philippine Weekly Newspaper, referred to then
BI Commissioner Rufus Rodriguez the complaints of private respondent Julie Buenaflor,
Amy Cosino and Manuelito Lao, against petitioner.
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 19

According to Villas, private respondent Buenaflor complained of having been convinced

by petitioner into paying the total amount of P79,000.00 in exchange for the processing
of her visa, passport and other travel documents for Japan. Private respondent delivered
to petitioner Security Bank (SB) Check Nos. 0014797 and 0014798 in the amounts
of P30,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively, and cash worth P29,000.00. However, no
visa was delivered. Private respondent insisted that petitioner return her money, to no
avail.
Villas also referred to Commissioner Rodriguez the complaint of Lao who allegedly told
him that he paidP60,000.00 to petitioner in exchange for a Chinese Visa and a passport
for Taiwan. Likewise, Villas referred Cosinos complaint that the latter collected from
Virfinia Dumbrique, Jaime Santos Flores and Mariano Evangelista, the amounts
of P20,000.00 each, upon petitioner's word that they would be in exchange for tourist
visas. Both Lao and Cosino claimed that the promised passport and visas did not
materialize and despite many requests for the return of the amounts paid to petitioner,
she refused to comply. Allegedly, "Vertudez threatened them that they cannot force her
to pay back the said amount as she has the back up [of] higher BID officials."

respondent and petitioner to appear before him on October 15, 1998 for the formal
investigation of the case. It appears that in the meantime, Villas died and private
respondent personally took on the instant complaint with the BI for Grave Misconduct
against petitioner, docketed as Administrative Charge No. 0004. Lao and Cosino filed
their respective complaint-affidavits9 with the BI which became the subject of another
administrative case against petitioner.10
On August 21, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Re: Personnel Order
No. RBR-98-60) with Motion to Dismiss.11 On September 2, 1998, petitioner filed a
Manifestation with Urgent Prayer to Resolve Motion to Dismiss, 12 averring that the
complaint instituted by Villas in behalf of private respondent was a harassment case
against her. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the instant action on the ground that in
addition to the instant administrative case, private respondent had personally filed her
complaint-affidavit "of similar nature and character" with the Manila City Prosecutor's
Office, docketed as 98-H-44000-1, and with the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as
OMB-98-1701.
Private respondent narrated the pertinent events in her complaint-affidavit13 as follows:

Acting upon Villas' letter, Commissioner Rodriguez issued a memorandum, directing

the petitioner to submit a sworn written explanation. In her sworn written
memorandum,6 petitioner assailed the credibility of Villas. She alleged that Villas was
not a member of the National Press Club as he claimed to be. She averred that the sum
ofP50,000.00, as evidenced by SB Check Nos. 0014797 and 0014798, was extended to
her by private respondent Buenaflor as a loan. She was constrained to borrow money
from private respondent and other close friends when her brother became seriously ill.
However, she claimed that she had fully settled her obligation to private respondent
through installment. She also claimed that private respondent was the one engaged in
illegal recruitment through the use of falsified or forged passports. Private respondent
was allegedly using petitioners name in dealing with some immigration officials and
employees to expedite the processing of the documents of her (private respondents)
clients. Petitioner allegedly informed said officers and employees that she was not
connected to private respondent in any way. Private respondent allegedly resented this
"abrupt disassociation." Also, her repeated refusal to "escort" private respondent's clients
who were leaving for abroad using falsified travel documents allegedly led private
respondent to threaten her that she could easily use SB Check Nos. 0014797 and
0014798 as evidence to file charges against petitioner by making it appear that she
(private respondent) gave the money because of petitioner's promise to facilitate her
travel to Japan. Petitioner denied having received the sum of P29,000.00 from private
respondent, contending that such claim is "pure falsehood because of the absence of
document to prove the alleged receipt." As regards the complaints of Lao and Cosino,
petitioner denied having met or known said persons.
Finding petitioners explanation "unsatisfactory and [her] defense weak," Commissioner
Rodriguez issued Personnel Order No. RBR 98-60,7 preventively suspending her for
sixty (60) days pending the investigation of the case. The instant case was assigned to
Special Prosecutor Norberto dela Cruz, who issued a subpoena 8 ordering private

1. That I met Ms. Teresita Vertudes, an employee of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, Intramuros, Manila sometime in the middle part of 1996;
2. That from that time on, we became friends because we come from the same region and
that she used to tell us that she is capable of deploying job applicants to Japan;
3. That during one of those times that I dropped by her office, she intimated to me that a
group of Immigration Officers are scheduled to leave for Japan for training and that she
was the one who received a call from a Japanese Consul;
4. That Ms. Teresita Vertudes asked me if I am interested in going to Japan because she
will find a way to accommodate me and I told her that I am deeply interested but my
problem was that my passport was left in Bacolod City and she volunteered to work-out
[and] facilitate the processing of my passport and visa and that [all] I need to do is give
her my picture which I did;
5. That she even added that she has a brother in Japan who could also help me find a job
and I will be going there along with her son, Jimmy V[e]rtudes Santos. She showed to
me her son's passport and application for a Visa, copies of which are attached and
marked as Annexes "A", "B" and "C";
6. That according to Ms. Vertudes I will be receiving a salary of one lapad per day as a
factory worker and that should I accept to her offer, all that will be required of me is to
give her the amount of P80,000.00;
7. That on December 24, 1997 Ms. Vertudes received from me Security Bank Check No.
0014797 in the amount ofP30,000.00 which she was able to encash and likewise Security
Bank Check No. 0014798 in the amount ofP20,000.00 x x x Annexes "D" and "E";

CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 20

8. That on February 8, 1998, because of her insistence and persistence that I should
deliver the balance ofP30,000.00 to her so that I could leave in a week's time, I was
forced to produce the said amount by requesting a friend to pawn my jewelry in the
amount of P29,000.00 and the aforesaid amount was handed to Ms. Vertudes in the
presence of Ms. Joy Gutierrez at her office in (BID), Intramuros, Manila;

4.4. During that period, Ms. Buenaflor and me became close friends because she
frequently visited me in my office at General Services Division and would even stay
thereat while processing documents and waiting for their release. In fact, she often took
her lunch and merienda with me and sometimes, with the other employees of our
division;

9. That after that last payment, I have been asking her as to when I am suppose[d] to
leave because I was already prepared to leave and have in fact told my relatives and
friends that I will be leaving soon for Japan but she did not stop making promises;

4.5. Sometime in the third week of December 1997, I was informed by my relatives in
our hometown that my brother, Mariano "Dido" Vertudes was seriously ill and was
thereafter confined on December 22, 1997 at Gingoog General Hospital located at
Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental;

10. That upon the advi[c]e of a lawyer and to be able to know once and for all whether I
could still leave, I requested my lawyer to write a letter to Ms. Vertudes for her to refund
the sums of money which I delivered to her in the total amount of P79,000.00 for the
processing of my Passport and Visa for job deployment abroad but she did not even
answer the letter and neither called up my lawyer to explain her side; letter is attached as
Annex "E";
11. That for Ms. Teresita Vertudes' failure to make good her promise to deploy me after
receiving the amount ofP79,000.00 in consideration of a job placement in Japan, I hereby
charge her for the crime of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa; x x x
Annexed to private respondent's complaint-affidavit were: a) the affidavit of a certain
Jessilyn Gutierrez14 who attested that she accompanied private respondent in going to the
office of petitioner and she was with private respondent when the latter delivered to
petitioner the checks amounting to P50,000.00 and cash worthP29,000.00 for private
respondent's job placement to Japan; b) copies of the passport and application for a visa
of petitioner's son, to prove that petitioner showed these documents to her so she would
believe that she would be going to Japan with petitioner's son; c) copies of SB Check
Nos. 0014797 and 0014798, to prove petitioner's receipt of the total amount
of P50,000.00 from private respondent; and d) letter of private respondent's counsel to
petitioner demanding the refund of P79,000.00 from petitioner.
On October 15, 1998, petitioner, accompanied by her counsel, and private respondent
appeared before Special Prosecutor dela Cruz for the formal investigation of the
case.15 The second hearing took place on October 27, 1998, during which, petitioner
submitted her Counter-Affidavit16 and the affidavits of her witnesses. Her version was:

4.6. The type of illness of my brother required extensive treatment and medication; and
for this reason, they requested for financial assistance to defray the expenses therefor;
4.7. Since I was then in financial distress, I was constrained to borrow money with
interests from Ms. Buenaflor and other close friends of mine. As a kind gesture on the
part of Ms. Buenaflor she extended to me a loan in the total amount of P50,000.00 as
represented by Security Bank check nos. 0014797 and 0014798 in the respective
amounts of P30,000.00 and P20,000.00 (citation omitted);
4.8. It is however our agreement that I would pay the amount of P50,000.00 with the
additional amount ofP10,000.00 representing the interests therefore for a total
of P60,000.00;
4.9. We further agreed that I would pay my financial obligation to Ms. Buenaflor on or
before the last day of May 1998 from December 1997 on installment basis;
4.10. With the aforementioned amount of P50,000.00 loaned to me by Julie Buenaflor
and the other amounts x x x from other friends, I was able to contribute the total amount
of P100,000.00 for the treatment and hospitalization of my brother. It was, however, to
no avail because my brother died on January 6, 1998;
4.11. Pursuant to our agreement, I was able to pay Ms. Buenaflor on installment basis the
total amount ofP60,000.00 at my earlier indicated address on the following dates:
DATE AMOUNT
February 28, 1998 P15,000.00

4.1. I first met Ms. Buenaflor sometime in 1996 when I was still assigned at the General
Services Division of the Bureau of Immigration;

March 31, 1998 15,000.00

4.2. At that time, Ms. Buenaflor represented to me that she was connected with a travel
agency assigned to process/facilitate documents of their clients in the Buereau of
Immigration;

May 30, 1998 15,000.00

4.3. Indeed, I saw Ms. Buenaflor processing and making follow-ups of documents in the
different Divisions/Departments of the Bureau of Immigration similar to what were
being done by the representatives of other travel agencies transacting business therewith;

April 30, 1998 15,000.00

4.12. I tendered the said payments to Ms. Buenaflor at my residence on the dates earlier
enumerated in the presence of my housemaids, Eliza Compo and Jocelyn Reyes; x x x
Petitioner averred that private respondent misrepresented to her (petitioner's) son, Jimmy
Santos, Jr., that she (private respondent) would facilitate his travel to and employment in
Japan. She also assailed the credibility of private respondent by accusing her of using
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 21

several passports under different names. Attached to petitioner's counter-affidavit were:

a) a copy of a passport application in the name of Honna Sumadia Araneta showing the
photographs of private respondent; b) referral slip of the Pasay City Police Station and
the sworn statement of a certain Armando Gambala charging private respondent with
Estafa and Illegal Recruitment;17 c) affidavits of petitioner's son, Jimmy Santos, Jr., 18 and
a certain Enrico Tuazon, showing that they likewise filed a case for Estafa and Illegal
Recruitment against private respondent; and d) a copy of the Certificate of Business
Name and Certification19 issued by Prudential Bank, to prove that private respondent
misstated the address of her business establishment. Petitioner also submitted to Special
Prosecutor dela Cruz the Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay20 of her two housemaids,
Eliza Compo and Jocelyn Reyes, to prove that she had fully paid her obligation to private
respondent. Likewise, she submitted the handwritten joint sworn statement 21 of Ernesto
V. Cloma and Jhun M. Romero, media practitioners, to prove that Villas asked for
petitioners forgiveness before he died, admitting that he only sent his letter dated July
27, 1998 to Commissioner Rodriguez in consideration of the amount given by private
respondent.

The order quoted the pertinent portion of Special Prosecutor dela Cruz's resolution, viz:

On the same hearing, the parties agreed to submit the instant case for resolution.22 Thus,
in his Resolution dated November 12, 1998, 23 Special Prosecutor dela Cruz found
petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and recommended her dismissal from the service.

Respondent's claim that the present complaint is pure harassment by the complainant is
completely bereft of credence. What benefit or advantage would the complainant achieve
in fabricating charges against the respondent?

Meantime, the case instituted by private respondent with the Office of the Ombudsman
was referred to the Office of the City Prosecutor, thus:
After evaluation, the undersigned finds that the charges imputed against the respondent
are not office relatedand that the administrative aspect of the case had already been
undertaken by the Bureau of Immigration.
In view thereof, it is respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be referred to
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.24 (emphases supplied)
Petitioner filed a Motion to Re-open25 with the BI, contending that the finding of the
Ombudsman that "the charges imputed against [petitioner] are not office related" clearly
shows that she is not administratively liable for grave misconduct. She moved for the reopening of the case "to allow her to adduce further evidence mainly based on the
findings of the Ombudsman." The motion, however, was denied for lack of merit.26
On January 12, 1999, Commissioner Rodriguez issued an order, adopting the resolution
of Special Prosecutor dela Cruz, viz:
WHEREFORE, respondent Teresita L. Vertudez is hereby found liable for grave
misconduct under PD No. 807 and the Administrative Code of 1987. Accordingly, she is
ordered dismissed from the service effective immediately with forfeiture of all benefits
under the law, with prejudice to her reinstatement in this Bureau and all its branches.
SO ORDERED.

27

After carefully weighing and evaluating the versions of the complainant and the
respondent, this Office is more incline[d] to give credence to complainant's declarations
that she was indeed duped by the respondent into parting with the hard-earned money
of P79,000.00 on the promise of the respondent that she would secure a passport and visa
for the complainant to Japan.
Respondent's alibi that the said amount was a loan from the complainant, who is her
friend, is highly unbelievable. Complainant does not appear to be a rich person who
would so easily part with such big amount of money without any security without any
hope or assurance of being re-paid.
The fact that complainant paid P79,000.00 to the respondent so she could get a passport
and a visa to work in Japan as a factory worker clearly showed that she was desperately
in need of a job. For her to give such amount to the respondent as an unsecured loan is
extremely incredulous.

If the complainant filed this complaint, it was because she was wronged by the
respondent.
Likewise, respondent's allegation that the P50,000.00 she received from the complainant
was a loan because she (respondent) was then in a financial distress and she needed
money to help her sick brother in the province was belied by her own son, Jimmy V.
Santos, Jr., who declared in his Affidavit that sometime in December 1997, he
gave P50,000.00 to the complainant so that the latter could obtain a tourist visa for him
to Japan. Why should the respondent bother to get a P50,000.00 loan from the
complainant to assist her ailing brother when she could readily obtain this amount from
her own son?
As to respondent's assertion that she was able to pay the P50,000.00 to the complainant,
there is nothing to support such payment. The statements of her two (2) maids -- Eliza
C[o]mpo and Jocelyn Reyes -- in theirSinumpaang Salaysay that respondent paid to the
complainant the total amount of P60,000.00 during the months of February 1998 to May
1998 cannot be believed. Being the housemaids of the respondent, it is but natural and to
be expected of these persons to come to the aid of their employe[r]. 28
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial,29 reiterating her
argument in her Motion to Re-open. Again, the motion was denied.30 Subsequently, the
assailed order of dismissal was affirmed by then Department of Justice Secretary Serafin
Cuevas.31
Petitioner appealed to the CSC,32 raising the issues of lack of due process and lack of
substantial evidence. On November 19, 1999, the CSC dismissed petitioner's appeal. It
held, in part, that:
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 22

A careful study of the records in the light of the arguments of appellant reveals that the
requirements of due process have been duly observed in the proceedings had in this case.

evidence to support the finding that petitioner is an illegal recruiter, thus, warranting her
removal from public service.36

xxx

On February 12, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA found
that "petitioner was given more than ample opportunity to ventilate her defense and
disprove the charges leveled against her, hence, there can be no denial of her right to due
process."37 Moreover, it held that "there is more than substantial evidence proving the
charge of grave misconduct against petitioner." 38 The CA ratiocinated that:

As to the second issue, the Commission finds substantial evidence to prove that
respondent receive[d] money in exchange for her services in facilitating the issuance of
passport and visa of Julie Bernardo (sic).
The complaint-affidavit of Julie Buenaflor is reproduced in part as follows: x x x
In the absence of any improper motive or malice on the part of the witness to foist said
charges on respondent, the Commission is inclined to give credence to the statements of
witness Bernardo (sic). In fact Vertudez has admitted that she received money from
Buenaflor but argued that the money was a mere loan. However, if this were true,
Buenaflor should have demanded for a collateral, considering the amount involved.
Vertudez failed to present any evidence that she gave any security in return for said loan
which makes her version highly incredible. x x x33
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration34 of the CSC's Resolution, to no avail. The
CSC held:
In so far as Vertudez'[s] illegal recruitment activities are concerned, the Commission
finds the existence of clear substantial evidence to establish the same. Evidence
presented all point to the fact that Vertudez solicited money from BI clients in return for
a visa to Japan. The witnesses against Vertudez include Peng Villas (Deceased), Julie
Buenflor (sic), Amy Cosino, Virginia Lubriano, Manuelito Lao and Jaime Santos Flores.
The affidavits of said witnesses all speak of the modus operandi of Vertudez at the BI,
where she approaches BI clients and offers them a visa, passport and an employment
contract in exchange for P120,000.00. In the case of witness Julie Buenaflor, she
testified that respondent assured her of a visa, a passport and a job in Japan for a fee
of P80,000.00 and that Vertudez after getting paid failed to fulfill her promise.
It is observed that Vertudez seeks to destroy the credibility of witness Buenaflor by
implying that the former has a pending case for illegal recruitment and estafa. Records,
however, show that the charges against witness Buenaflor all came up after Vertudez
was formally charged by the BI and that such charges have no reasonable connection
with her administrative case pending before the Commission. In this regard, "There
being nothing in record to show that witnesses were actuated by any improper motive,
their testimony shall be entitled to full faith and credit." (People v. Flores, 252 SCRA
31)35
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA, raising the issues of: a)
whether or not the BI and CSC violated petitioner's right to due process; b) whether or
not respondents erred in finding that the alleged illegal recruitment activity of the
petitioner had a direct relation to and connected with the performance of her duties and
responsibilities as an employee of the BI; and c) whether or not there is substantial

In the proceedings a quo, it was established that petitioner, indeed, received and
encashed the two (2) checks given by private respondent in the total amount of
Php50,000.00. This fact, therefore, gives credence to the claim of private respondent that
she gave petitioner two (2) checks in consideration of the latter's promise to facilitate her
employment abroad. This being the case, the burden was shifted to petitioner to refute
this established fact through equally weighty and competent evidence.
Now, petitioner admitted having received, and encashed, the two checks from private
respondent but offered the excuse that the same was extended to her as a loan. Aside
from her testimony and that of her household helpers to prove this assertion, no other
independent and unbiased evidence was offered to prove the fact of loan. As it is, her
theory of loan stands on flimsy ground and is not sufficient enough to overthrow the fact
established by complainant. This considering that it is highly improbable and even
contrary to human experience for a person to loan a huge amount of money as
Php50,000.00 without any document evidencing such loan nor a collateral to secure its
payment. Note even that the two checks were made payable to "cash," a bearer
instrument, and was not even crossed on its face, hence, can be encashed by any person
holding the negotiable instrument. If, indeed, private respondent gave the two checks to
petitioner as a clean loan (without any collateral) without any separate document
embodying their loan agreement, the latter should have at least been made the payee of
the checks and a memorandum written at the back of the check to the effect that it is
being extended as a loan, in order to protect the interest of the lender. This is
conventional business practice which is altogether absent in the case at bar, hence,
petitioner's theory of loan must necessarily crumble.39
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,40 contending that the CA failed to resolve
the issue of whether petitioner's alleged illegal recruitment activities are directly
connected with her duties and responsibilities as a Fingerprint Examiner of the BI. This
motion was denied.41
Undaunted, petitioner filed this petition, summing up the issues as follows:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT MAY REVIEW
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 58766;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS RESOLVED THE SECOND
ISSUE RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED BEFORE IT;

CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 23

3. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE

FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF GRAVE MISCONDUCT;
4. WHETHER OR NOT A PROMISE TO FACILITATE EMPLOYMENT OF
ANOTHER ABROAD CONSTITUTES GRAVE MISCONDUCT[;]
5. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS ACCORDED DUE PROCESS;
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACT CONSTITUTING GRAVE MISCONDUCT MUST
HAVE A DIRECT RELATION TO THE FUNCTION OF THE PUBLIC OFFICE
HELD BY RESPONDENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES; AND
7. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED ACT COMMITTED BY THE PETITIONER
IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO ANY OF HER FUNCTIONS AS FINGERPRINT
EXAMINER AT THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION.42
The petition is denied.
We shall first resolve the issue of due process. Petitioner contends that the essential
requirements of due process as laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations43 and Doruelo v. COMELEC44 were violated in the case at bar. First, she
contends that she was denied of her right to a full hearing when she was not accorded the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against her, as provided under Section 48,
par. 5, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. She allegedly raised this
issue in her appeal before the CSC.45
The argument is unmeritorious.
We have explained the meaning of the right to cross-examination as a vital element of
due process as follows:
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial
litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative
tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process.
However, the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by
conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where
a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail
himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony
given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the
record.46 (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot argue that she was deprived of due process simply
because no cross-examination took place. Nothing on record shows that petitioner asked
for cross-examination during the formal investigation conducted by Special Prosecutor
dela Cruz. Notably, two hearings were conducted, during which, both private respondent
and petitioner appeared. During the hearing dated October 27, 1998, both parties agreed
to submit the case for resolution after petitioner submitted her counter-affidavit and the
affidavits of her witnesses. In fact, when petitioner filed her Motion to Re-open the case
with the BI, she did not question the lack of cross-examination during the investigation

proceedings. She merely based her motion on the order of the Office of the Ombudsman
finding the charge against her as "not office related." In the same pleading, she admitted
that "[a]s early as October 27, 1998, the instant administrative action has been submitted
for resolution after the contending parties have submitted their respective evidence"
and that her move for the re-opening of the administrative case was merely "to allow her
to adduce further evidence mainly based on the findings of the Office of the
Ombudsman." Again, in her Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial of
Commissioner Rodriguez's order of dismissal, she merely reiterated her arguments in her
Motion to Re-open. She never complained that she was deprived of her right to crossexamination during the investigation of Special Prosecutor dela Cruz. The right to crossexamination being a personal right, petitioner must be deemed to have waived this right
by agreeing to submit the case for resolution and not questioning the lack of it in the
proceedings before the BI.
More importantly, it is well-settled that the essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 47 This was clearly satisfied in the
case at bar. Records show that petitioner not only gave her sworn written explanation of
the charges against her during the initial stage of the investigation, she also submitted: a)
a sworn counter-affidavit refuting the charges against her, with all the attached annexes
as evidence; b) a Motion to Re-open the case with the BI; c) a Motion for
Reconsideration and/or New Trial with the BI; d) an Appeal to the CSC; e) a Motion for
Reconsideration with the CSC; f) an Appeal to the CA; g) a Motion for Reconsideration
with the CA; and h) the instant petition for review.
Second, petitioner contends that Commissioner Rodriguez violated the principle that "the
tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate
in arriving at a decision" when his denial of her Motion to Re-open and his order finding
her guilty of grave misconduct were based exclusively on the resolution of Special
Prosecutor dela Cruz.48
This argument is likewise unavailing.
There is nothing essentially wrong in the head of a bureau adopting the recommendation
of a subordinate. Section 47, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the chief
of bureau or office or department the power to delegate the task of investigating a case to
a subordinate.49 What due process demands is for the chief of the bureau to personally
weigh and assess the evidence which the subordinate has gathered and not merely to rely
on the recommendation of said investigating officer. 50
In the case at bar, the order of Commissioner Rodriguez enjoys the disputable
presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. That his decision quotes
the resolution of Special Prosecutor dela Cruz does not necessarily imply that he did not
personally examine the affidavits and evidence presented by the parties. Petitioner's bare
assertion that Commissioner Rodriguez did not personally examine the evidence, without
more, is not sufficient to overcome this presumption.
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 24

Third, petitioner contends that the CSC did not have basis in finding: a) that the
affidavits of "Peng Villas (Deceased), Julie Buenaflor, Amy Cosino, Virginia Lubriano,
Manuelito Lao and Jaime Santos Flores x x x all speak of the modus operandi of
Vertudez at the BI" as these affidavits were not submitted to the CSC; and b) that
petitioner "solicited money from BI clients" inasmuch as private respondent never
alleged that she was a BI client. Moreover, the CSC's finding that private respondent
"testified that respondent assured her of a visa, a passport and a job in Japan for a fee
of P80,000.00 and that Vertudez, after getting paid, failed to fulfill her promise" is not
supported by the complaint-affidavit of private respondent which merely stated that
petitioner "volunteered to work-out and facilitate the processing of [private respondent's]
passport and visa" and that petitioner "has a brother in Japan who could also help
[private respondent] find a job." 51 Petitioner also assails the failure of the BI and CSC to
consider the handwritten joint sworn statement of media practitioners Cloma and
Romero and the joint affidavit of the housemaids of petitioner, Compo and Reyes. 52
Again, these arguments fail to impress.
It is settled that only questions of law are entertained in petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.53 It is not the function of this Court, in
a petition under Rule 45, to scrutinize, weigh and analyze evidence all over
again.54 Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like
the BI and the CSC, are accorded not only respect but even finality if such findings are
supported by substantial evidence.55Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise. 56
In the case at bar, we note that contrary to petitioner's stance, the affidavits of Lao and
Cosino do appear in the records of the CSC.57 In any case, the affidavits of Villas,
Cosino, Lubriano, Lao and Flores are of little relevance to the case at bar. If any, they are
merely corroborating evidence. Note that it was only in the CSC's resolution on
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration that said affidavits were mentioned. These
affidavits were not used as basis for the decision rendered by the BI, the main decision of
the CSC denying the appeal of petitioner and the decision of the CA. We find the
unanimous finding of guilt of the BI, the CSC and the CA amply supported by the
following evidence on record: a) the complaint-affidavit of private respondent; b) the
affidavit of Jessilyn Gutierrez; c) copies of the passport and application for a visa of
petitioner's son; d) copies of SB Check Nos. 0014797 and 0014798; and e) letter of
private respondent's counsel to petitioner demanding from petitioner the refund of
theP79,000.00 that private respondent paid to petitioner.
As to the other contentions, we note that in addition to the self-serving quotations of
petitioner from the complaint-affidavit of private respondent, said complaint-affidavit
categorically alleged that petitioner told private respondent that the latter would "be
receiving a salary of one lapad per day as a factory worker and that should [she] accept
[petitioner's] offer, all that [would] be required of [her was] to give [petitioner] the
amount of P80,000.00." Private respondent also categorically alleged that she was

charging petitioner for her "failure to make good her promise to deploy [her] after
receiving the amount of P79,000.00 in consideration of a job placement in Japan." Thus,
contrary to petitioner's stance, the assailed findings of the CSC are supported by private
respondent's complaint-affidavit.
Moreover, it is well-settled that it is not for the appellate court to substitute its own
judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses. Administrative decisions on matters within their jurisdiction
are entitled to respect and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion,
fraud or error of law. None of these vices has been shown in this case. 58
We shall now proceed to the other issue: whether petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct
warranting her removal from government service.
Citing Sarigumba v. Pasok,59 petitioner contends that "[m]isconduct, warranting
removal from office of a public officer, must have a direct relation to and connected with
the performance of official duties, amounting either to maladministration or willful,
intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office." Since the BI is a
government agency principally responsible for the administration and enforcement of
immigration, citizenship and alien admission and registration laws, "by no stretch of
imagination" can there be a direct relation between the function of a fingerprint examiner
and the alleged promise to facilitate private respondent's employment abroad. 60Petitioner
also capitalizes on the allegation of private respondent in her complaint-affidavit that she
and petitioner "became friends" to contend that the acts being imputed against her are
personal and not office-related.61
These arguments lack merit.
The allegations in private respondents complaint-affidavit indicate that petitioner used
her position as a BI employee to assure private respondent that she could facilitate
petitioner's deployment to Japan. Private respondent alleged that "during one of those
times that [she] dropped by [petitioner's] office, [petitioner] intimated to [her] that a
group of Immigration officers [were] scheduled to leave for Japan for training and
that [petitioner] was the one who received a call from a Japanese Consul." Petitioner
"asked [private respondent] if [she was] interested in going to Japan
because [petitioner] will find a way to accommodate [her]."
Even petitioner's own admissions show that her position as an employee of the BI may
be utilized in connection with illegal recruitment. In her memorandum to Commissioner
Rodriguez, as reiterated in her counter-affidavit, petitioner alleged that private
respondent was engaged in illegal recruitment and "was using [petitioner's] name in
her dealings with some immigration officials and employees, presumably to
expedite the processing of the documents belonging to her clients." Petitioner
likewise claimed that she "declined [private respondent's] proposal that [she] 'escort'
some of [private respondent's] clients who would be leaving for foreign countries
but with falsified travel documents." Private respondent even told her that the
"proposed scheme could easily be done because being an employee of this Bureau,
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 25

[petitioner has] several connections not only at the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA) but also in Mactan International Airport."
That her position is designated as "fingerprint examiner" is not determinative of the issue
of whether the charge against her is work-related. The allegations in the complaint
against petitioner and her own admissions show that her duties go beyond her job title
and that the charge against her is connected with her position as an employee of the BI.
Finally, petitioner contends that "a promise to find a way to accommodate private
respondent and a representation that petitioner has a brother who could help private
respondent find a job are not misconduct warranting the dismissal of petitioner from
office" but, "[a]t most," only "entitle[s] private respondent to civil indemnity." Petitioner
contends that the CA's finding that petitioner merely made a "promise to facilitate"
private respondent's employment abroad, as distinguished from the CSC's finding that
petitioner committed "shameful illegal recruitment activities," practically absolved
petitioner from the charge of grave misconduct.
This argument deserves scant consideration.
Misconduct has been defined as an intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a
rule
of
law
or
standard
of
behavior,
especially
by
a
government official.62 As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must
be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.63 Corruption, as an element of grave
misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and
wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for
another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.64 An act need not be tantamount
to a crime for it to be considered as grave misconduct as in fact, crimes involving moral
turpitude are treated as a separate ground for dismissal under the Administrative Code. 65
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot downplay the charges against her. Whether the
charges against petitioner satisfy the elements of illegal recruitment to make her
criminally liable for such crime is not the issue at bar. At the very least, petitioner was
found to have taken advantage of her position as an employee of the BI to falsely
promise, for pecuniary gain, the facilitation of private respondent's travel to Japan,
including the processing of her passport, visa and other travel documents. Worse, she
was found to have refused to reimburse the amounts paid to her by private respondent
even when the promised passport, visa, and travel documents did not materialize.
Undoubtedly, these acts involve "corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of established rule." Under Section 23(c), Rule XIV the Omnibus Civil Service
Rules and Regulations, these acts constitute a grave offense for which petitioner must
suffer the penalty of dismissal.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
February 12, 2002 and Resolution dated April 16, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58766
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

____________________________________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-68288 July 11, 1986
DIOSDADO
GUZMAN,
ULYSSES
URBIZTONDO,
and
ARIEL
RAMACULA, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY and DOMINGO L. JHOCSON in his capacity as
President of National University,respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of
respondent National University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they
describe as their school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In
their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they allege:
1) that respondent University's avowed reason for its refusal to re-enroll them in their
respective courses is "the latter's participation in peaceful mass actions within the
premises of the University.
2) that this "attitude of the (University) is simply a continuation of its cavalier if not
hostile attitude to the student's exercise of their basic constitutional and human rights
already recorded in Rockie C. San Juan vs. National University, S.C. G.R. No. 65443
(1983) and its utter contempt for the principle of due process of law to the prejudice of
petitioners;" and
3) that "in effect petitioners are subjected to the extreme penalty of expulsion without
cause or if there be any, without being informed of such cause and without being
afforded the opportunity to defend themselves. Berina v. Philippine Maritime Institute
(117 SCRA 581 [1983]).
In the comment filed on September 24, 1986 for respondent University and its President
pursuant to this Court's requirement therefor 1 , respondents make the claim:
1) that "petitioners' failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is
due to their own fault and not because of their allegedexercise of their constitutional and
human rights;"
2) that petitioner Urbiztondo, sought to re-enroll only on July 5, 1986 "when the
enrollment period was already closed;"
3) that as regards petitioner Guzman, his "academic showing" was "poor", "due to his
activities in leading boycotts of classes"; that when his father was notified of this
development sometime in August, 1982, the latter had demanded that his son "reform or
else we will recall him to the province"; that Guzman was one of the petitioners in G.R.
No. 65443 entitled "Rockie San Juan, et al. vs. National University, et al.," at the hearing
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 26

of which on November 23, 1983 this Court had admonished "the students involved (to)
take advantage and make the most of the opportunity given to them to study;" that
Guzman "however continued to lead or actively participate in activities within the
university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that
disturbed or disrupted classes therein;" that moreover, Guzman "is facing criminal
charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Crim.
Case No. 066446) in connection with the destruction of properties of respondent
University on September 12, 1983 ", and "is also one of the defendants in Civil Case No.
8320483 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila entitled 'National University, Inc. vs.
Rockie San Juan et al.' for damages arising from destruction of university properties

protest or grievance petitioner Guzman may have would be ventilated in a lawful and
peaceful manner.

4) that as regards petitioner Ramacula, like Guzman "he continued to lead or actively
participate, contrary to the spirit of the Resolution dated November 23, 1983 of this ...
Court (in G.R. No. 65443 in which he was also one of the petitioners) and to university
rules and regulations, within university premises but without permit from university
officials in activities that disturbed or disrupted classes;" and

2) asserted that "neither the text nor the context of the resolution 2 justifies the
conclusion that "petitioners' right to exercise their constitutional freedoms" had thereby
been restricted or limited; and

5) that petitioners have "failures in their records, (and) are not of good scholastic
standing. "
Respondents close their comment with the following assertions, to wit:
1) By their actuations, petitioners must be deemed to have forfeited their privilege, if
any, to seek enrollment in respondent university. The rights of respondent university, as
an institution of higher learning, must also be respected. It is also beyond comprehension
why petitioners, who continually despise and villify respondent university and its
officials and faculty members, should persist in seeking enrollment in an institution that
they hate.
2) Under the circumstances, and without regard to legal technicalities, it is not to the best
interest of all concerned that petitioners be allowed to enroll in respondent university.
3) In any event, petitioners' enrollment being on the semestral basis, respondents cannot
be compelled to enroll them after the end of the semester.
On October 2, 1984 this Court issued a resolution reading as follows:
... Acting on the Comment submitted by respondent, the Court Resolved to NOTE the
same and to require a REPLY to such Comment. The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a
MANDATORY INJUNCTION, enjoining respondent to allow the enrolment of
petitioners for the coming semester without prejudice to any disciplinary proceeding to
which any or all of them may be subjected with their right to lawful defense recognized
and respected. As regards petitioner Diosdado Guzman, even if it be a fact that there is a
pending criminal charge against him for malicious mischief, the Court nonetheless is of
the opinion that, as above-noted, without prejudice to the continuation of any
disciplinary proceeding against him, that he be allowed to resume his studies in the
meanwhile. As shown in Annex 2 of the petition itself, Mr. Juan P. Guzman, father of
said petitioner, is extending full cooperation with petitioners to assure that whatever

Petitioners' REPLY inter alia

1) denied that Urbiztondo attempted to enroll only on July 5, 1984 (when enrollment was
already closed), it being alleged that "while he did try to enroll that day, he also
attempted to do so several times before that date, all to no avail, because respondents ...
persistently refused to allow him to do so" respondents' ostensible reason being that
Urbiztondo (had) participated in mass actions ... within the school premises," although
there were no existing disciplinary charge against petitioner Urbiztondo" at the time;

3) alleged that "the holding of activities (mass action) in the school premises without the
permission of the school ... can be explained by the fact that the respondents persistently
refused to issue such permit repeatedly sought by the students. "
On November 23, 1984, this Court promulgated another resolution, this time reading as
follows:
... The Court, after considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised in
the petition for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction as well as the respondents' comment on the petition and the reply
of counsel for petitioners to the respondents' comment, Resolved to (a) give DUE
COURSE to the petition; (b) consider the respondents' comment as ANSWER to the
petition; and (c) require the parties to file their respective MEMORANDA within twenty
(20) days from notice. ... .
Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the
fact that they had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not
petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in activities within the university
premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or
disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation,
slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of University
authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for damages and a criminal case
for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish
sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is
the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly published rule of theirs by
which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing.
Under the Education Act of 1982, 5 the petitioners, as students, have the right among
others "to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue
their course therein up to graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, or violation
of disciplinary regulations." 6Petitioners were being denied this right, or being
disciplined, without due process, in violation of the admonition in the Manual of
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 27

Regulations for Private Schools 7 that "(n)o penalty shall be imposed upon any student
except for cause as defined in ... (the) Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations
as duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted." 8 This
Court is therefore constrained, as in Berina v. Philippine Maritime Institute, 9 to declare
illegal this act of respondents of imposing sanctions on students without due
investigation.
Educational institutions of course have the power to "adopt and enforce such rules as
may be deemed expedient for ... (its) government, ... (this being)" incident to the very
object of incorporation, and indispensable to the successful management of the
college." 10 The rules may include those governing student discipline. Indeed, the
maintenance of "good school discipline" is a duty specifically enjoined on "every private
school" by the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools; 11 and in this connection, the
Manual further provides that... The school rules governing discipline and the corresponding sanctions therefor must
be clearly specified and defined in writing and made known to the students and/or their
parents or guardians. Schools shall have the authority and prerogative to promulgate
such rules and regulations as they may deem necessary from time to time effective as of
the date of their promulgation unless otherwise specified. 12
But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural
due process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving
students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions
and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be
summary; and cross-examination is not, 'contrary to petitioners' view, an essential part
thereof. There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands
of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in
writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shag have the
right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3)
they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to
adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the respondents are directed to allow the
petitioners to re-enroll or otherwise continue with their respective courses, without
prejudice to any disciplinary proceedings to which any or all of them may be subjected in
accordance with the standards herein set forth.
SO ORDERED.
______________________________________
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 127980

December 19, 2007

DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC., EMMANUEL SALES, RONALD HOLMES,

JUDE DELA TORRE, AMPARO RIO, CARMELITA QUEBENGCO, AGNES
YUHICO
and
JAMES
YAP, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of Manila, THE
COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL
BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE and ROBERTO VALDES,
JR., respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
NAGTATAGIS sa kasong ito ang karapatang mag-aral ng apat na estudyante na
nasangkot sa away ng dalawang fraternity at ang karapatang akademiko ng isang
pamantasan.
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and
Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the
De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB) 1 Joint Discipline
Board because of their involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner
James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity. This is the
backdrop of the controversy before Us pitting private respondents' right to education visa-vis the University's right to academic freedom.
ASSAILED in this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court are the following: (1) Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
July 30, 1996 dismissing DLSU's petition for certiorariagainst respondent Judge and
private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr.; 2 (2) Resolution of
the CA dated October 15, 1996 denying the motion for reconsideration; 3 (3) Order dated
January 7, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36 Manila granting private
respondent Aguilar's motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction; 4 and (4)
Resolution No. 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 of the Commission on Higher Education
(CHED) exonerating private respondent Aguilar and lowering the penalties for the other
private respondents from expulsion to exclusion.5
Factual Antecedents
Gleaned from the May 3, 1995 Decision of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, two
violent incidents on March 29, 1995 involving private respondents occurred:
x x x From the testimonies of the complaining witnesses, it appears that one week prior
to March 29, 1995, Mr. James Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manang's Restaurant
near La Salle, when he overheard two men bad-mouthing and apparently angry at
Domino Lux. He ignored the comments of the two. When he arrived at his boarding
house, he mentioned the remarks to his two other brods while watching television. These
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 28

two brods had earlier finished eating their dinner at Manang's. Then, the three, together
with four other persons went back to Manang's and confronted the two who were still in
the restaurant. By admission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony, one of the two
was a member of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. There was no rumble or physical
violence then.
After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity
through the intercession of the Student Council. The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was
asking for an apology. "Kailanganng apology" in the words of respondent Aguilar. But
no apology was made.
Then, 5 members of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity went to the tambayan of the Domino
Lux Fraternity in the campus. Among them were respondents Bungubung, Reverente and
Papio. They were looking for a person whose description matched James Yap.
According to them, this person supposedly "nambastos ng brod." As they could not find
Mr. Yap, one of them remarked "Paano ba iyan. Pasensiya na lang."
Came March 29, 1995 and the following events.
Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., Mr. James Yap went out of the campus
using the Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue. As he was about to recross Taft Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten guys were running
towards him. He panicked. He did not know what to do. Then, respondent Bungubung
punched him in the head with something heavy in his hands "parangknuckles."
Respondents Reverente and Lee were behind Yap, punching him. Respondents
Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of him, were also punching him. As he was
lying on the street, respondent Aguilar kicked him. People shouted; guards arrived; and
the group of attackers left.
Mr. Yap could not recognize the other members of the group who attacked him. With
respect to respondent Papio, Mr. Yap said "hindi ko nakita ang mukha niya, hindi ko
nakita sumuntok siya." What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy also running with the
group.
Two guards escorted Mr. Yap inside the campus. At this point, Mr. Dennis Pascual was
at the Engineering Gate. Mr. Pascual accompanied Yap to the university clinic; reported
the incident to the Discipline Office; and informed his fraternity brods at their tambayan.
According to Mr. Pascual, their head of the Domino Lux Fraternity said: "Walang
gagalaw. Uwian na lang."
Mr. Ericson Cano, who was supposed to hitch a ride with Dennis Pascual, saw him under
the clock in Miguel Building. However, they did not proceed directly for home. With a
certain Michael Perez, they went towards the direction of Dagonoy Street because Mr.
Pascual was supposed to pick up a book for his friend from another friend who lives
somewhere in the area.
As they were along Dagonoy Street, and before they could pass the Kolehiyo ng Malate
Restaurant, Mr. Cano first saw several guys inside the restaurant. He said not to mind

them and just keep on walking. However, the group got out of the restaurant, among
them respondents Reverente, Lee and Valdes. Mr. Cano told Mr. Lee: "Ayaw namin ng
gulo." But, respondent Lee hit Mr. Cano without provocation. Respondent Reverente
kicked Mr. Pascual and respondent Lee also hit Mr. Pascual. Mr. Cano and Mr. Perez
managed to run from the mauling and they were chased by respondent Lee and two
others.
Mr. Pascual was left behind. After respondent Reverente first kicked him, Mr. Pascual
was ganged-upon by the rest. He was able to run, but the group was able to catch up with
him. His shirt was torn and he was hit at the back of his head with a lead pipe.
Respondent Lee who was chasing Cano and Perez, then returned to Mr. Pascual.
Mr. Pascual identified respondents Reverente and Lee, as among those who hit him.
Although Mr. Pascual did not see respondent Valdes hit him, he identified respondent
Valdez (sic) as also one of the members of the group.
In fact, Mr. Cano saw respondent Valdes near Mr. Pascual. He was almost near the
corner of Leon Guinto and Estrada; while respondent Pascual who managed to run was
stopped at the end of Dagonoy along Leon Guinto. Respondent Valdes shouted: "Mga
putang-ina niyo." Respondent Reverente hit Mr. Pascual for the last time. Apparently
being satisfied with their handiwork, the group left. The victims, Cano, Perez and
Pascual proceeded to a friend's house and waited for almost two hours, or at around 8:00
in the evening before they returned to the campus to have their wounds treated.
Apparently, there were three cars roaming the vicinity.6
The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner
James Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the
"Domino Lux Fraternity," while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin
Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are
members of "Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity," a rival fraternity.
The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint 7 with the Discipline
Board of DLSU charging private respondents with "direct assault." Similar
complaints8 were also filed by Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and
private respondents Valdes and Reverente. Thus, cases entitled "De La Salle University
and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar (AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung
(AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin Lee
(EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Papio (ABMGT/9251227)" were docketed as Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents
Aguilar, Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints
and requiring them to answer. Private respondents filed their respective answers. 9
As it appeared that students from DLSU and CSB 10 were involved in the mauling
incidents, a joint DLSU-CSB Discipline Board11 was formed to investigate the incidents.
Thus, petitioner Board Chairman Emmanuel Sales sent notices of hearing12 to private
respondents on April 12, 1995. Said notices uniformly stated as follows:
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 29

Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been constituted to
hear and deliberate the charge against you for violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising
from the written complaints of James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.

xxxx

You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19, 1995 at
9:00 a.m. at the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give testimony and
present evidence in your behalf. You may be assisted by a lawyer when you give your
testimony or those of your witnesses.

Third, respondent Reverente told that (sic) the Board that he was at his home at 5:00
p.m. of March 29, 1995. He said that he was given the responsibility to be the paymaster
of the construction workers who were doing some works in the apartment of his parents.
Although he had classes in the evening, the workers according to him would wait for him
sometimes up to 9:00 p.m. when he arrives from his classes. The workers get paid
everyday.

On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide the Board, through the
Discipline Office, with a list of your witnesses as well as the sworn statement of their
proposed testimony.

Respondent Reverente submitted an affidavit, unsigned by the workers listed there,

supposedly attesting to the fact that he paid the workers at the date and time in
question.16

Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to submit the list of
witnesses and the sworn statement of their proposed testimony will be considered a
waiver on your part to present evidence and as an admission of the principal act
complained of.

xxxx

For your strict compliance.13

During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents
interposed the common defense of alibi, summarized by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline
Board as follows:
First, in the case of respondent Bungubung, March 29, 1995 was one of the few instances
when he was picked-up by a driver, a certain Romeo S. Carillo. Most of the time,
respondent Bungubung goes home alone sans driver. But on this particular date,
respondent Bungubung said that his dad asked his permission to use the car and thus, his
dad instructed this driver Carillo to pick-up his son. Mr. Carillo is not a family driver,
but works from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for the Philippine Ports Authority where the elder
Bungubung is also employed.
Thus, attempting to corroborate the alibi of respondent Bungubung, Mr. Carillo said that
he arrived at La Salle at 4:56 p.m.; picked-up respondent at 5:02 p.m.; took the Roxas
Blvd. route towards respondent's house in BF Paraaque (on a Wednesday in Baclaran);
and arrived at the house at 6:15 p.m. Respondent Bungubung was dropped-off in his
house, and taking the same route back, Mr. Carillo arrived at the South Harbor at 6:55
p.m. the Philippine Ports Authority is located at the South Harbor. 14
xxxx
Secondly, respondent Valdes said that he was with his friends at McDonald's Taft just
before 6:00 p.m. of March 29, 1995. He said that he left McDonald at 5:50 p.m. together
to get some medicine at the university clinic for his throat irritation. He said that he was
at the clinic at 5:52 p.m. and went back to McDonald, all within a span of 3 or even 4
minutes.
Two witnesses, a certain Sharon Sia and the girlfriend of respondent Valdes, a certain
Jorgette Aquino, attempted to corroborate Valdez' alibi. 15

Fourth, respondent Aguilar "solemnly sw[ore] that [he] left DLSU at 5:00 p.m. for Camp
Crame for a meeting with some of the officers that we were preparing." 17
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution18 finding
private respondents guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic
expulsion,19 pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.20 The dispositive part of the resolution
reads:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds respondents ALVIN
AGUILAR (AB-BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403),
ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837)
guilty of having violated CHED Order No. 4 and thereby orders their automatic
expulsion.
In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227), the Board acquits
him of the charge.
SO ORDERED.21
Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration 22 before the Office of the
Senior Vice-President for Internal Operations of DLSU. The motions were all denied in a
Letter-Resolution23 dated June 1, 1995.
On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Manila, against
petitioners a petition for certiorariand injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
It was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74122 and assigned to respondent Judge of Branch
36. The petition essentially sought to annul the May 3, 1995 Resolution of the DLSUCSB Joint Discipline Board and the June 1, 1995 Letter-Resolution of the Office of the
Senior Vice-President for Internal Affairs.
The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a TRO 24 directing DLSU, its
subordinates, agents, representatives and/or other persons acting for and in its behalf to
refrain and desist from implementing Resolution dated May 3, 1995 and LetterCONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 30

Resolution dated June 1, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrollment of
Aguilar for the second term of school year (SY) 1995.
Subsequently, private respondent Aguilar filed an ex parte motion to amend his petition
to correct an allegation in paragraph 3.2125 of his original petition. Respondent Judge
amended the TRO26 to conform to the correction made in the amended petition. 27
On June 7, 1995, the CHED directed DLSU to furnish it with copies of the case records
of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121,28 in view of the authority granted to it under
Section 77(c) of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (MRPS).
On the other hand, private respondents Bungubung and Reverente, and later, Valdes,
filed petitions-in-intervention29 in Civil Case No. 95-74122. Respondent Judge also
issued corresponding temporary restraining orders to compel petitioner DLSU to admit
said private respondents.
On June 19, 1995, petitioner Sales filed a motion to dismiss 30 in behalf of all petitioners,
except James Yap. On June 20, 1995, petitioners filed a supplemental motion to
dismiss31 the petitions-in-intervention.
On September 20, 1995, respondent Judge issued an Order 32 denying petitioners'
(respondents there) motion to dismiss and its supplement, and granted private
respondents' (petitioners there) prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The pertinent
part of the Order reads:
For this purpose, respondent, its agents, representatives or any and all other persons
acting for and in its behalf is/are restrained and enjoined from
1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic
expulsion of petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention from the De La Salle
University and the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995, affirming the Resolution dated
May 3, 1995; and
2. Barring the enrolment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in the courses
offered at respondent De La Salle University and to immediately allow them to enroll
and complete their respective courses/degrees until their graduation thereat in accordance
with the standards set by the latter.
WHEREFORE, the ancillary remedy prayed for is granted. Respondent, its agents,
representatives, or any and all persons acting for and its behalf are hereby restrained and
enjoyed from:
1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic
expulsion of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention and the Letter-Resolution dated
June 1, 1995; and
2. Barring the enrollment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in the courses
offered at respondent (De La Salle University) and to forthwith allow all said petitioner
and petitioners-in-intervention to enroll and complete their respective courses/degrees
until their graduation thereat.

The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall take effect upon petitioner and petitioners-inintervention posting an injunctive bond in the amount of P15,000.00 executed in favor of
respondent to the effect that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention will pay to
respondent all damages that the latter may suffer by reason of the injunction if the Court
will finally decide that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention are not entitled thereto.
The motion to dismiss and the supplement thereto is denied for lack of merit.
Respondents are directed to file their Answer to the Petition not later than fifteen (15)
days from receipt thereof.
SO ORDERED.33
Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitioner
DLSU when he attempted to enroll on September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY
1995-1996. Thus, on September 25, 1995, Aguilar filed with respondent Judge an urgent
motion to cite petitioners (respondents there) in contempt of court. 34 Aguilar also prayed
that petitioners be compelled to enroll him at DLSU in accordance with respondent
Judge's Order dated September 20, 1995. On September 25, 1995, respondent Judge
issued35 a writ of preliminary injunction, the relevant portion of which reads:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA that until further orders, you the said DE LA SALLE University as well as
your subordinates, agents, representatives, employees and any other person assisting or
acting for or on your behalf, to immediately desist from implementing the Resolution
dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner and the intervenors in
DLSU, and the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995 affirming the said Resolution of May
3, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrolment of petitioner and
intervenors in the courses offered at DLSU and to allow them to enroll and complete
their degree courses until their graduation from said school. 36
On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari 37 (CAG.R. SP No. 38719) with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the enforcement of respondent Judge's September 20, 1995 Order and writ of
preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995.
On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction.
On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96,
summarily disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private respondents. As for
Aguilar, he was to be reinstated, while other private respondents were to be
excluded.38 The Resolution states:
RESOLUTION 181-96
RESOLVED THAT THE REQUEST OF THE DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY (DLSU),
TAFT AVENUE, MANILA FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE PENALTY OF
EXPULSION IMPOSED ON MR. ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG,
ROBERT R. VALDES, JR., ALVIN LEE AND RICHARD V. REVERENTE BE, AS IT
IS HEREBY IS, DISAPPROVED.
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 31

RESOLVED FURTHER, THAT THE COMMISSION DIRECT THE DLSU TO

IMMEDIATELY EFFECT THE REINSTATEMENT OF MR. AGUILAR AND THE
LOWERING OF THE PENALTY OF MR. JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, MR.
ROBER R. VALDEZ, JR., (sic) MR. ALVIN LEE AND MR. RICHARD V.
REVERENTE FROM EXPULSION TO EXCLUSION. 39
Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again prevented private respondent
Aguilar from enrolling and/or attending his classes, prompting his lawyer to write
several demand letters40 to petitioner DLSU. In view of the refusal of petitioner DLSU to
enroll private respondent Aguilar, CHED wrote a letter dated June 26, 1996 addressed to
petitioner Quebengco requesting that private respondent Aguilar be allowed to continue
attending his classes pending the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of
Resolution No. 181-96. However, petitioner Quebengco refused to do so, prompting
CHED to promulgate an Order dated September 23, 1996 which states:

SO ORDERED.45
On October 28, 1996, petitioners requested transfer of case records to the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) from the CHED. 46 Petitioners claimed that it is
the DECS, not CHED, which has jurisdiction over expulsion cases, thus, necessitating
the transfer of the case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121 to the DECS.
On November 4, 1996, in view of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R.
SP No. 38719 and the automatic lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, private
respondent Aguilar filed an urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction
dated September 25, 1995 before respondent RTC Judge of Manila. 47
On January 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued its questioned order granting private
respondent Aguilar's urgent motion to reiterate preliminary injunction. The
pertinent portion of the order reads:

Acting on the above-mentioned request of Mr. Aguilar through counsel enjoining De La

Salle University (DLSU) to comply with CHED Resolution 181-96 (Re: Expulsion Case
of Alvin Aguilar, et al. v. DLSU) directing DLSU to reinstate Mr. Aguilar and finding the
urgent request as meritorious, there being no other plain and speedy remedy available,
considering the set deadline for enrollment this current TRIMESTER, and in order to
prevent further prejudice to his rights as a student of the institution, DLSU, through the
proper school authorities, is hereby directed to allow Mr. Alvin Aguilar to provisionally
enroll, pending the Commission's Resolution of the instant Motion for Reconsideration
filed by DLSU.

In light of the foregoing, petitioner Aguilar's urgent motion to reiterate writ of

preliminary injunction is hereby granted, and respondents' motion to dismiss is denied.

SO ORDERED.41

Accordingly, private respondent Aguilar was allowed to conditionally enroll in petitioner

DLSU, subject to the continued effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction dated
September 25, 1995 and to the outcome of Civil Case No. 95-74122.

Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner DLSU, through petitioner Quebengco, still
refused to allow private respondent Aguilar to enroll. Thus, private respondent Aguilar's
counsel wrote another demand letter to petitioner DLSU. 42
Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996, private respondent Aguilar, using CHED Resolution No.
181-96, filed a motion to dismiss43 in the CA, arguing that CHED Resolution No. 181-96
rendered the CA case moot and academic.
On July 30, 1996, the CA issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to
dismiss of private respondent Aguilar, disposing thus:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, dismissal of herein petition is hereby directed.
SO ORDERED.44
On October 15, 1996, the CA issued its resolution denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration, as follows:
It is obvious to Us that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 is immediately executory in
character, the pendency of a Motion for Reconsideration notwithstanding.

The writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 is declared to be in force
and effect.
Let a copy of this Order and the writ be served personally by the Court's sheriff upon the
respondents at petitioners' expense.
SO ORDERED.48

On February 17, 1997, petitioners filed the instant petition.

On June 15, 1998, We issued a TRO49 as prayed for by the urgent motion for the
issuance of a TRO50 dated June 4, 1998 of petitioners, and enjoined respondent Judge
from implementing the writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 issued
in Civil Case No. 95-74122, effective immediately and until further orders from this
Court.
On March 27, 2006, private respondent Aguilar filed his manifestation51 stating that he
has long completed his course at petitioner DLSU. He finished and passed all his
enrolled subjects for the second trimester of 1997-1998, as indicated in his transcript of
records52 issued by DLSU. However, despite having completed all the academic
requirements for his course, DLSU has not issued a certificate of completion/graduation
in his favor.
Issues
We are tasked to resolve the following issues:

After considering the Opposition and for lack of merit, the Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby denied.
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 32

1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal authority to review decisions of
institutions of higher learning that impose disciplinary action on their students found
violating disciplinary rules.
2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in expelling private respondents.
2.a Were private respondents accorded due process of law?
2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom?
2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven by substantial evidence?
3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on private respondents is proportionate
to their misdeed.
Our Ruling
Prefatorily, there is merit in the observation of petitioners 53 that while CHED Resolution
No. 181-96 disapproved the expulsion of other private respondents, it nonetheless
authorized their exclusion from petitioner DLSU. However, because of the dismissal of
the CA case, petitioner DLSU is now faced with the spectacle of having two different
directives from the CHED and the respondent Judge CHED ordering the exclusion of
private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr., and the Judge ordering
petitioner DLSU to allow them to enroll and complete their degree courses until their
graduation.
This is the reason We opt to decide the whole case on the merits, brushing aside
technicalities, in order to settle the substantial issues involved. This Court has the power
to take cognizance of the petition at bar due to compelling reasons, and the nature and
importance of the issues raised warrant the immediate exercise of Our jurisdiction. 54 This
is in consonance with our case law now accorded near-religious reverence that rules of
procedure are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when its
rigid application tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court has
the duty to suspend their operation.55
I. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the power of supervision and review over
disciplinary cases decided by institutions of higher learning.
Ang CHED, hindi ang DECS, ang may kapangyarihan ng pagsubaybay at
pagrepaso sa mga desisyong pandisiplina ng mga institusyon ng mas mataas na
pag-aaral.
Petitioners posit that the jurisdiction and duty to review student expulsion cases, even
those involving students in secondary and tertiary levels, is vested in the DECS not in the
CHED. In support of their stance, petitioners cite Sections 4, 56 15(2) &
(3),57 54,58 57(3)59 and 7060 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 232, otherwise known as the
"Education Act of 1982."
According to them, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED the
DECS' power of supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher

learning. They say that unlike B.P. Blg. 232, R.A. No. 7722 makes no reference to the
right and duty of learning institutions to develop moral character and instill discipline
among its students. The clear concern of R.A. No. 7722 in the creation of the CHED was
academic, i.e., the formulation, recommendation, setting, and development of academic
plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher learning. The enumeration of
CHED's powers and functions under Section 8 does not include supervisory/review
powers in student disciplinary cases. The reference in Section 3 to CHED's "coverage" of
institutions of higher education is limited to the powers and functions specified in
Section 8. The Bureau of Higher Education, which the CHED has replaced and whose
functions and responsibilities it has taken over, never had any authority over student
disciplinary cases.
We cannot agree.
On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No. 7722, otherwise known as "An Act
Creating the Commission on Higher Education, Appropriating Funds Thereof and for
other purposes."
Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way for the creation of the CHED, provides:
Section 3. Creation of the Commission on Higher Education. In pursuance of the
abovementioned policies, the Commission on Higher Education is hereby created,
hereinafter referred to as Commission.
The Commission shall be independent and separate from the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) and attached to the office of the President for administrative
purposes only. Its coverage shall be both public and private institutions of higher
education as well as degree-granting programs in all post secondary educational
institutions, public and private.
The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722.
They include the following:
Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission. The Commission shall have the
following powers and functions:
xxxx
n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers and functions as
may be necessary to carry out effectively the purpose and objectives of this Act; and
o) perform such other functions as may be necessary for its effective operations and for
the continued enhancement of growth or development of higher education.
Clearly, there is no merit in the contention of petitioners that R.A. No. 7722 did not
transfer to the CHED the DECS' power of supervision/review over expulsion cases
involving institutions of higher learning.
First, the foregoing provisions are all-embracing. They make no reservations of powers
to the DECS insofar as institutions of higher learning are concerned. They show that the
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 33

authority and supervision over all public and private institutions of higher education, as
well as degree-granting programs in all post-secondary educational institutions, public
and private, belong to the CHED, not the DECS.
Second, to rule that it is the DECS which has authority to decide disciplinary cases
involving students on the tertiary level would render nugatory the coverage of the
CHED, which is "both public and private institutions of higher education as well as
degree granting programs in all post secondary educational institutions, public and
private." That would be absurd.
It is of public knowledge that petitioner DLSU is a private educational institution which
offers tertiar
y degree programs. Hence, it is under the CHED authority.
Third, the policy of R.A. No. 772261 is not only the protection, fostering and promotion
of the right of all citizens to affordable quality education at all levels and the taking of
appropriate steps to ensure that education shall be accessible to all. The law
is likewise concerned with ensuring and protecting academic freedom and with
promoting its exercise and observance for the continued intellectual growth of students,
the advancement of learning and research, the development of responsible and effective
leadership, the education of high-level and middle-level professionals, and the
enrichment of our historical and cultural heritage.
It is thus safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A. No. 7722, its members were
aware that disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary level would continue to
arise in the future, which would call for the invocation and exercise of institutions of
higher learning of their right to academic freedom.
Fourth, petitioner DLSU cited no authority in its bare claim that the Bureau of Higher
Education, which CHED replaced, never had authority over student disciplinary cases. In
fact, the responsibilities of other government entities having functions similar to those of
the CHED were transferred to the CHED.62
Section 77 of the MRPS63 on the process of review in student discipline cases should
therefore be read in conjunction with the provisions of R.A. No. 7722.
Fifth, Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear in stating that "[j]urisdiction over
DECS-supervised or chartered state-supported post-secondary degree-granting
vocational and tertiary institutions shall be transferred to the Commission [On Higher
Education]." This provision does not limit or distinguish that what is being transferred
to the CHED is merely the formulation, recommendation, setting and development of
academic plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher learning, as what
petitioners would have us believe as the only concerns of R.A. No. 7722. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus: Where the law does not distinguish, neither
should we.
To Our mind, this provision, if not an explicit grant of jurisdiction to the
CHED, necessarily includes the transfer to the CHED of any jurisdiction which the

DECS might have possessed by virtue of B.P. Blg. 232 or any other law or rule for that
matter.
IIa. Private respondents were accorded due process of law.
Ang mga private respondents ay nabigyan ng tamang proseso ng batas.
The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system
of rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of
our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire
history.64 The constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law is solemn and inflexible.65
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school
discipline, "[t]here are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy
the demands of procedural due process and these are: that (1) the students must be
informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall
have the right to answer the charges against them and with the assistance if counsel, if
desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the
right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities
to hear and decide the case."66
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to
do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. 67 Notice and hearing is the
bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights
that must be respected even in administrative proceedings.68 The essence of due process
is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of.69So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her
cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due
process.70
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due
process it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on
which a fair decision can be based.71 "To be heard" does not only mean presentation of
testimonial evidence in court one may also be heard through pleadings and where the
opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due
process.72
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the
DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the
opportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their respective
answers. They were also informed of the evidence presented against them as they
attended all the hearings before the Board. Moreover, private respondents were given the
right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 34

considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties before rendering its
resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.

perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene
of the crime."78

Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were not
allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them. This argument was already
rejected in Guzman v. National University73 where this Court held that "x x x the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. And
it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in
courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross
examination is not, x x x an essential part thereof."

On the other hand, the defense of alibi may not be successfully invoked where the
identity of the assailant has been established by witnesses.79 Positive identification of
accused where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part
of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants whose
testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. 80 Well-settled is the
rule that denial and alibi, being weak defenses, cannot overcome the positive testimonies
of the offended parties.81

IIb. Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher learning, possesses academic freedom

which includes determination of who to admit for study.
Ang petitioner DLSU, bilang institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral, ay
nagtataglay ng kalayaang akademiko na sakop ang karapatang pumili ng mga
mag-aaral dito.
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning
academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school
or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free
from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public interest
calls for some restraint.74 According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom
encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1) who
may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted
to study.75
It cannot be gainsaid that "the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a
necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the
school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds
basis in the freedom "what to teach." 76 Indeed, while it is categorically stated under the
Education Act of 1982 that students have a right "to freely choose their field of study,
subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation,"77 such
right is subject to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the
academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its academic
freedom, which includes its free choice of students for admission to its school.

Courts reject alibi when there are credible eyewitnesses to the crime who can positively
identify the accused.82Alibi is an inherently weak defense and courts must receive it with
caution because one can easily fabricate an alibi.83 Jurisprudence holds that denial, like
alibi, is inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive declarations of truthful
witnesses who testified on affirmative matters that accused were at the scene of the crime
and were the victim's assailants. As between categorical testimonies that ring of truth on
one hand and a bare denial on the other, the former must prevail. 84 Alibi is the weakest of
all defenses for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it is for this reason
that it cannot prevail over the positive identification of accused by the witnesses. 85
The required proof in administrative cases, such as in student discipline cases, is neither
proof beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial
evidence. According to Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,86 it means "such
reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."
Viewed from the foregoing, We reject the alibi of private respondents Bungubung,
Valdes Jr., and Reverente.1awphi1They were unable to show convincingly that they
were not at the scene of the crime on March 29, 1995 and that it was impossible for them
to have been there. Moreover, their alibi cannot prevail over their positive identification
by the victims.
We hark back to this Court's pronouncement affirming the expulsion of several students
found guilty of hazing:

IIc. The guilt of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. was
proven by substantial evidence.

No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of respondent

students who have been investigated and found guilty by the Disciplinary Board to have
violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules and standards will certainly undermine
the authority of the administration of the school. This we would be most loathe to do.

Ang pagkakasala ng private respondents na sina Bungubung, Reverente at Valdes,

Jr. ay napatunayan ng ebidensiyang substansyal.

More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic freedom

which has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitution. 87

As has been stated earlier, private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi.
However, in order that alibi may succeed as a defense, "the accused must establish by
clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the

Certainly, private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. do not deserve to
claim a venerable institution as their own, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent
influence on the students currently enrolled, as well as those who come after them. 88 It
must be borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to develop the
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 35

intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes;
nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man.89
As for private respondent Aguilar, however, We are inclined to give credence to his alibi
that he was at Camp Crame in Quezon City at the time of the incident in question on
March 29, 1995. This claim was amply corroborated by the certification that he
submitted before the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, to wit:
CERTIFICATION
TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:
We, the undersigned, hereby declare and affirm by way of this Certification that
sometime on March 29, 1995, at about and between 4:30 P.M. and 5:30 P.M., we were
together with Alvin A. Aguilar, at Kiangan Hall, inside Camp Crame, Quezon City,
meeting in connection with an affair of our class known as Class 7, Batch 89 of the
Philippine Constabulary discussing on the proposed sponsorship of TAU GAMMA PHI
from said Batch '89 affair.
That the meeting was terminated at about 6:30 P.M. that evening and Alvin Aguilar had
asked our permission to leave and we saw him leave Camp Crame, in his car with the
driver.
April 18, 1995, Camp Crame, Quezon City.

90

The said certification was duly signed by PO3 Nicanor R. Faustino (Anti-Organized
Crime CIC, NCR), PO3 Alejandro D. Deluviar (ODITRM, Camp Crame, Quezon City),
PO2 Severino C. Filler (TNTSC, Camp Crame, Quezon City), and PO3 Ireneo M.
Desesto (Supply Center, PNPLSS). The rule is that alibi assumes significance or strength
when it is amply corroborated by credible and disinterested witnesses. 91 It is true that
alibi is a weak defense which an accused can easily fabricate to escape criminal liability.
But where the prosecution evidence is weak, and betrays lack of credibility as to the
identification of defendant, alibi assumes commensurate strength. This is but consistent
with the presumption of innocence in favor of accused.92
Alibi is not always undeserving of credit, for there are times when accused has no other
possible defense for what could really be the truth as to his whereabouts at the crucial
time, and such defense may, in fact, tilt the scales of justice in his favor. 93
III. The penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on private respondents is
disproportionate to their misdeed.
Ang parusang expulsion na ipinataw ng DLSU sa private respondents ay hindi
angkop sa kanilang pagkakasala.
It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in their students as subsumed in
their academic freedom and that "the establishment of rules governing university-student
relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not
merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very
survival."94 This power, however, does not give them the untrammeled discretion to

impose a penalty which is not commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed. If the
concept of proportionality between the offense committed and the sanction imposed is
not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process
question.95
We agree with respondent CHED that under the circumstances, the penalty of expulsion
is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the acts committed by private respondents
Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. Each of the two mauling incidents lasted only for
few seconds and the victims did not suffer any serious injury. Disciplinary measures
especially where they involve suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut significantly into
the future of a student. They attach to him for life and become a mortgage of his future,
hardly redeemable in certain cases. Officials of colleges and universities must be anxious
to protect it, conscious of the fact that, appropriately construed, a disciplinary action
should be treated as an educational tool rather than a punitive measure. 96
Accordingly, We affirm the penalty of exclusion97 only, not expulsion,98 imposed on
them by the CHED. As such, pursuant to Section 77(b) of the MRPS, petitioner DLSU
may exclude or drop the names of the said private respondents from its rolls for being
undesirable, and transfer credentials immediately issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
Resolutions dated July 30, 1996 and dated October 15, 1996, and Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 36, Order dated January 7, 1997 areANNULLED AND SET ASIDE,
while CHED Resolution 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 is AFFIRMED.
Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of completion/graduation in favor of
private respondent Aguilar. On the other hand, it may exclude or drop the names of
private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. from its rolls, and their
transfer credentials immediately issued.
SO ORDERED.
______________________________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 111953 December 12, 1997
HON. RENATO C. CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for Legal
Affairs, HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary, Department
of Transportation and Communications, and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his
capacity as General Manager of Philippine Ports Authority, petitioners,
vs.
UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and
MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION,respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92), limiting the term of
appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation, did the
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 36

Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate respondents' right to exercise their profession
and their right to due process of law?
The PPA was created on July 11, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 505. On
December 23, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued revising the PPA's charter.
Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and supervision of pilots and the pilotage
profession, 1 the PPA promulgated PPA-AO-03-85 2 on March 21, 1985, which embodied
the "Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and
Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports." These rules mandate, inter alia, that aspiring pilots
must be holders of pilot licenses 3 and must train as probationary pilots in outports for
three months and in the Port of Manila for four months. It is only after they have
achieved satisfactory performance 4 that they are given permanent and regular
appointments by the PPA itself 5 to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the age of
70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental or physical unfitness by the PPA General
Manager. 6 Harbor pilots in every harbor district are further required to organize
themselves into pilot associations which would make available such equipment as may
be required by the PPA for effective pilotage services. In view of this mandate, pilot
associations invested in floating, communications, and office equipment. In fact, every
new pilot appointed by the PPA automatically becomes a member of a pilot association
and is required to pay a proportionate equivalent equity or capital before being allowed
to assume his duties, as reimbursement to the association concerned of the amount it paid
to his predecessor.
Subsequently, then PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 0492 7 on July 15, 1992, whose avowed policy was to "instill effective discipline and
thereby afford better protection to the port users through the improvement of pilotage
services." This was implemented by providing therein that "all existing regular
appointments which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the
PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only" and that "all appointments to
harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one
(1) year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the
Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance."
On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots
Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before
the Department of Transportation and Communication, but they were informed by then
DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that "the matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling
PPA's administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Directors as its
governing body."
Meanwhile, on August 31, 1992, the PPA issued Memorandum Order No. 08-92 8 which
laid down the criteria or factors to be considered in the reappointment of harbor
pilot, viz.: (1) Qualifying Factors: 9 safety record and physical/mental medical exam
report and (2) Criteria for Evaluation: 10 promptness in servicing vessels, compliance
with PPA Pilotage Guidelines, number of years as a harbor pilot, average GRT of vessels
serviced as pilot, awards/commendations as harbor pilot, and age.

Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of PPAAO No. 04-92, but Secretary Garcia insisted on his position that the matter was within
the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of the PPA. Compas appealed this ruling to the
Office of the President (OP), reiterating his arguments before the DOTC.
On December 23, 1992, the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the
implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In its answer, the PPA countered that said
administrative order was issued in the exercise of its administrative control and
supervision over harbor pilots under Section 6-a (viii), Article IV of P.D. No. 857, as
amended, and it, along with its implementing guidelines, was intended to restore order in
the ports and to improve the quality of port services.
On March 17, 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs Renato C. Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order
issued earlier. 11 He concluded that PPA-AO No. 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots and,
for all intents and purposes, was not the act of Dayan, but of the PPA, which was merely
implementing Section 6 of P.D. No. 857, mandating it "to control, regulate and supervise
pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district."
On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its
implementing memoranda and circulars, Secretary Corona opined that:
The exercise of one's profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against
wrongful deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due process. In the
limited context of this case. PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference
with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby.
As may be noted, the issuance aims no more than to improve pilotage services by
limiting the appointment to harbor pilot positions to one year, subject to renewal or
cancellation after a rigid evaluation of the appointee's performance.
PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of
their profession in PPA's jurisdictional area. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, as regards the alleged "absence of ample prior consultation" before the issuance
of the administrative order, Secretary Corona cited Section 26 of P.D. No. 857, which
merely requires the PPA to consult with "relevant Government agencies." Since the PPA
Board of Directors is composed of the Secretaries of the DOTC, the Department of
Public Works and Highways, the Department of Finance, and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, as well as the Director-General of the National
Economic Development Agency, the Administrator of the Maritime Industry Authority
(MARINA), and the private sector representative who, due to his knowledge and
expertise, was appointed by the President to the Board, he concluded that the law has
been sufficiently complied with by the PPA in issuing the assailed administrative order.
Consequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages, before Branch 6 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-65673. On
September 6, 1993, the trial court rendered the following judgment: 12
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 37

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this Court hereby rules that:
1. Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted excess jurisdiction and with grave abuse
of discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA
Administrative Order 04-92 including all its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and
Orders;
2. PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and Orders are
declared null and void;
3. The respondents are permanently enjoined from implementing PPA Administrative
Order 04-92 and its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
The court a quo pointed out that the Bureau of Customs, the precursor of the PPA,
recognized pilotage as a profession and, therefore, a property right under Callanta
v. Carnation Philippines, Inc. 13 Thus, abbreviating the term within which that privilege
may be exercised would be an interference with the property rights of the harbor pilots.
Consequently, any "withdrawal or alteration" of such property right must be strictly
made in accordance with the constitutional mandate of due process of law. This was
apparently not followed by the PPA when it did not conduct public hearings prior to the
issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92; respondents allegedly learned about it only after its
publication in the newspapers. From this decision, petitioners elevated their case to this
Court on certiorari.
After carefully examining the records and deliberating on the arguments of the parties,
the Court is convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of
respondents' right against deprivation of property without due process of law.
Consequently, the instant petition must be denied.
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the "due process clause" of
the Constitution, viz.:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, . . .
In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely,
that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of
due process. When one speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be
made between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence, procedural due
process "refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced," while substantive
due process "requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law
would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just." 14 PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be
examined in light of this distinction.
Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No.
04-92 allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby "relevant government

agencies" and the pilots themselves could ventilate their views. They are obviously
referring to the procedural aspect of the enactment. Fortunately, the Court has
maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it has stressed in the recent case
of Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea,15 where it declared that "(a)s long as a party was given the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied
due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process.
Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of."
In the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four
times 16 before the matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this
score, however, fail to persuade. While respondents emphasize that the Philippine Coast
Guard, "which issues the licenses of pilots after administering the pilots' examinations,"
was not consulted, 17 the facts show that the MARINA, which took over the licensing
function of the Philippine Coast Guard, was duly represented in the Board of Directors
of the PPA. Thus, petitioners correctly argued that, there being no matters of naval
defense involved in the issuance of the administrative order, the Philippine Coast Guard
need not be consulted. 18
Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the
validity of the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the
fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its
executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative
body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing. 19
Upon the other hand, it is also contended that the sole and exclusive right to the exercise
of harbor pilotage by pilots is a settled issue. Respondents aver that said right has
become vested and can only be "withdrawn or shortened" by observing the constitutional
mandate of due process of law. Their argument has thus shifted from the procedural to
one of substance. It is here where PPA-AO No. 04-92 fails to meet the condition set by
the organic law.
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property
right. Even petitioner Corona recognized this when he stated in his March 17, 1993,
decision that "(t)he exercise of one's profession falls within the constitutional guarantee
against wrongful deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due
process." 20 He merely expressed the opinion the "(i)n the limited context of this case,
PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful
deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby, and that "PPA-AO 04-95
does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession."
As will be presently demonstrated, such supposition is gravely erroneous and tends to
perpetuate an administrative order which is not only unreasonable but also superfluous.
Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals.
Licensure is "the granting of license especially to practice a profession." It is also "the
system of granting licenses (as for professional practice) in accordance with
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 38

establishment standards." 21 A license is a right or permission granted by some competent

authority to carry on a business or do an act which, without such license, would be
illegal. 22

disciplining and removal of harbor pilots matters which are duplicated in PPA-AO
No. 04-92 and its implementing memorandum order. Since it adds nothing new or
substantial, PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be struck down.

Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they literally have to
pass through the proverbial eye of a needle by taking, not one but five examinations, each
followed by actual training and practice. Thus, the court a quo observed:

Finally, respondents' insinuation that then PPA General Manager Dayan was responsible
for the issuance of the questioned administrative order may have some factual basis; after
all, power and authority were vested in his office to propose rules and regulations. The
trial court's finding of animosity between him and private respondents might likewise
have a grain of truth. Yet the number of cases filed in court between private respondents
and Dayan, including cases which have reached this Court, cannot certainly be
considered the primordial reason for the issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In the absence
of proof to the contrary, Dayan should be presumed to have acted in accordance with law
and the best of professional motives. In any event, his actions are certainly always
subject to scrutiny by higher administrative authorities.

Petitioners (herein respondents) contend, and the respondents (herein petitioners) do not
deny, the here (sic) in this jurisdiction, before a person can be a harbor pilot, he must
pass five (5) government professional examinations, namely, (1) For Third Mate and
after which he must work, train and practice on board a vessel for at least a year; (2) For
Second Mate and after which he must work, train and practice for at least a year; (3) For
Chief Mate and after which he must work, train and practice for at least a year; (4) For a
Master Mariner and after which he must work as Captain of vessel for at least two (2)
years to qualify for an examination to be a pilot; and finally, of course, that given for
pilots.
Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in
pilotage until they retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right. Under the terms of
PPA-AO No. 04-92, "(a)ll existing regular appointments which have been previously
issued by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992
only," and "(a)ll appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall,
henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to renewal
or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance."
It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to
enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a
measure of security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years
of on-the-job training, they would have a license which they could use until their
retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the
new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which
can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance
evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year
terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of their license is now
dependent on a "rigid evaluation of performance" which is conducted only after the
license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term "renewal." It is this preevaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and
constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process
of law.
The Court notes that PPA-AO No. 04-92 and PPA-MO No. 08-92 are already covered by
PPA-AO No. 03-85, which is still operational. Respondents are correct in pointing out
that PPA-AO No. 04-92 is a "surplusage" 23 and, therefore, an unnecessary enactment.
PPA-AO 03-85 is a comprehensive order setting forth the "Rules and Regulations
Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine
Ports." It provides, inter alia, for the qualification, appointment, performance evaluation,

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of
the court a quo dated September 6, 1993, in Civil Case No. 93-65673 is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
____________________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-50908 January 31, 1984
MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA and ENRIQUE D. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
ALFREDO L. JUINIO, ROMEO F. EDU and FIDEL V. RAMOS, respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The validity of an energy conservation measure, Letter of Instruction No. 869, issued on
May 31, 1979 the response to the protracted oil crisis that dates back to 1974 is put
in issue in this prohibition proceeding filed by petitioners, spouses Mary Concepcion
Bautista and Enrique D. Bautista, for being allegedly violative of the due process and
equal protection guarantees 1 of the Constitution. The use of private motor vehicles with
H and EH plates on week-ends and holidays was banned from "[12:00] a.m. Saturday
morning to 5:00 a.m. Monday morning, or 1:00 a.m. of the holiday to 5:00 a.m. of the
day after the holiday." 2 Motor vehicles of the following classifications are exempted: (a)
S (Service); (b) T (Truck); (e) DPL (Diplomatic); (d) CC (Consular Corps); (e) TC
(Tourist Cars). 3 Pursuant thereto, respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, then Minister of Public
Works, Transportation and Communications and respondent Romeo P. Edu, then
Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission issued on June 11, 1979,
Memorandum Circular No. 39, which imposed "the penalties of fine, confiscation of
vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the above-specified vehicles" found
violating such Letter of Instruction. 4 It was then alleged by petitioners that "while the
purpose for the issuance of the LOI 869 is laudable, to wit, energy conservation, the
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 39

provision banning the use of H and EH [vehicles] is unfair, discriminatory, [amounting

to an] arbitrary classification" and thus in contravention of the equal protection
clause. 5 Moreover, for them, such Letter of Instruction is a denial of due process, more
specifically, "of their right to use and enjoy their private property and of their freedom to
travel and hold family gatherings, reunions and outings on week-ends and holidays,"
inviting attention to the fact that others not included in the ban enjoying "unrestricted
freedom." 6 It would follow, so they contend that Memorandum Circular No. 39
imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license is
likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of "undue delegation of
legislative power." 7 It is to be noted that such Memorandum Circular does not impose
the penalty of confiscation but merely that of impounding, fine, and for the third offense
that of cancellation of certificate of registration and for the rest of the year or for ninety
days whichever is longer.
This Court gave due course to the petition requiring respondent to answer. There was
admission of the facts as substantially alleged except, as previously noted, that the ban
starts at 12:00 a.m. rather than 1:00 a.m. of a Saturday or of a holiday and as to the
mention of a Willy's Kaiser jeep being registered in the name of a certain Teresita
Urbina, about which respondents had no knowledge. There was a denial of the
allegations that the classification of vehicles into heavy H and extra heavy (EH) on the
other hand and light and bantam on the other hand was violative of equal protection and
the regulation as to the use of the former cars on the dates specified a transgression of
due process. The answer likewise denied that there was an undue delegation of
legislative power, reference being made to the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code. 8 There was also a procedural objection raised, namely, that what is sought
amounts at most to an advisory opinion rather than an ajudication of a case or
controversy.
Petitioners filed a motion to be allowed to reply to the answer. It was granted. The reply,
considering its exhaustive character serving as its memorandum, stressed anew what it
emphasized as the arbitrary, unreasonable, and oppressive aspects of the challenged
Letter of Instruction and Memorandum Circular No. 39. It disputed what it characterized
as an "erroneous and arbitrary presumption that heavy car owners unnecessarily use and
therefore waste gasoline whenever they drive their cars on week-ends and holidays;" 9 it
stigmatized the ban as defeating its "avowed purpose in the case of the affluent who own
not only heavy limousines but also many small cars [as] they may be compelled to use at
least two small cars;" 10 referred to the high cost of taxis or other public transports for
those "not able to afford expensive small cars [possibly] only one heavy and possible old
model;" 11 cited the case of "many eight cylinder vehicles which because of their weight
have been registered as light but in fact consume more or as much gasoline as the banned
vehicles." 12 Their conclusion is that "the ban imposed, in result and effect is class
legislation." 13
The parties were required to submit memoranda. Respondents did so but not petitioners.
They relied on their reply to the answer as noted, a rather comprehensive pleading.
For reasons to be set forth, this Court holds that the petition cannot prosper.

1. First as to the procedural objection. In the memorandum for respondents, one of the
issues raised was whether "the power of judicial review may be invoked considering the
inadequacy of the record and the highly abstract and academic questions raised by the
petitioners." 14 It is inaccurate to say that the record is inadequate. It does not admit of
doubt that the ban applies to petitioners who are "the registered owners of an eight
cylinder 1969 Buick, and the vendees of a six cylinder Willy's kaiser jeep, which are
both classified as heavy or H." 15 To that extent, therefore, the enforcement of the
assailed Letter of Instruction will amount to a deprivation of what otherwise would be a
valid exercise of a property right. Thus they fall squarely within "the unchallenged rule"
as to who may raise a constitutional question, namely, to quote the language of Justice
Laurel in the leading case of People v. Vera, 16 "that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. 17Moreover,
that rule has been considerably relaxed. 18 The question then is neither abstract nor
academic as contended by respondents.
2. There is, however, this formidable obstacle that confronts petitioners. What they seek
is for this Court to hold that a Letter of Instruction, a regulatory measure precisely
enacted to cope with the serious and grave problem of energy conservation, is void on its
face. Such a task is rendered unusually difficult by what has been referred to by Justice
Laurel in the leading case of Angara v. Electoral Commission 19 as the "presumption of
constitutionality" and by the same jurist in the case of People v. Vera 20 in slightly
different words "a presumption that such an act falls within constitutional limitations."
There is need then for a factual foundation of invalidity. In the language of ErmitaMalate Hotel & Motel Operations Association, Inc. v. City Mayor or Manila: "It admits
of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for
evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face,
which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the
leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., where the American
Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter
thus: 'The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the
police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of
regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of
law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of
this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some
factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.' " 21
3. It is true, of course, that there may be instances where a police power measure may,
because of its arbitrary, oppressive or unjust character, be held offensive to the due
process clause and, therefore, may, when challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding,
be declared void on its face. This is not one of them. A recital of the whereas clauses of
the Letter of Instruction makes it clear. Thus: "[Whereas], developments in the
international petroleum supply situation continue to follow a trend of limited production
and spiralling prices thereby precluding the possibility of immediate relief in supplies
within the foreseeable future; [Whereas], the uncertainty of fuel supply availability
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 40

underscores a compelling need for the adoption of positive measures designed to insure
the viability of the country's economy and sustain its developmental growth; [Whereas],
to cushion the effect of increasing oil prices and avoid fuel supply disruptions, it is
imperative to adopt a program directed towards the judicious use of our energy resources
complemented with intensified conservation efforts and efficient utilization thereof; * *
*." 22That is undeniable is that the action taken is an appropriate response to a problem
that presses urgently for solution. It may not be the only alternative, but its
reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus, to repeat, substantive due process, which
is the epitome of reasonableness and fair play, is not ignored, much less infringed.
4. In the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power, especially so
where the assailed governmental action deals with the use of one's property, the latter is
accorded much leeway. That is settled law. What is more, it is good law. Due process,
therefore, cannot be validly invoked. As stressed in the cited Ermita-Malate Hotel
decision: "To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police
power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers, extending as it does 'to all the great public needs.' It would be, to
paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be
deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health,
public morals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is 'that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to
the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.' " 23
5. The due process question having been disposed of, there is still the objection based on
the equal protection clause to be considered. A governmental act may not be offensive to
the due process clause, but may run counter to such a guarantee. Such is the case when
there is no rational basis for the classification followed. That is the point raised by
petitioners. For them, there is no rational justification for the ban being imposed on
vehicles classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH), for precisely those owned by
them fall within such category. Tested by the applicable standard that must be satisfied
to avoid the charge of a denial of equal protection, the objection of petitioners is shown
to be lacking in merit. Such a classification on its face cannot be characterized as an
affront to reason. A legal norm according to J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure
Administration, 24 "whether embodied in a rule, principle, or standard, constitutes a
defense against anarchy at one extreme and tyranny at the other. Thereby, people living
together in a community with its myriad and complex problems can minimize the
friction and reduce the conflicts, to assure, at the very least, a peaceful ordering of
existence. The Ideal situation is for the law's benefits to be available to all, that none be
placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded
and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the
very essence of the Idea of law. The actual, given things as they are and likely to
continue to be, cannot approximate the Ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach
that it does not take into account the realties of the situation. * * * To assure that the
general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into
the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such

circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the
governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal
was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no
support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all
persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same
manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the
liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle
is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances,
which if not Identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or
charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest." 25
6. Nor does it militate against the validity of the Letter of Instruction just because the ban
imposed does not go as far as it could have and therefore could be less efficacious in
character. That was the solution which for the President expressing a power validly
lodged in him, recommended itself. There was a situation that called for a corrective
measure. He decided that what was issued by him would do just that or, at the very least,
help in easing the situation. That it did not cover other matters which could very well
have been regulated does not call for a declaration of nullity. The President, to
paraphrase Lutz v. Araneta, 26 "is not required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy
of all or none." 27 It is quite obvious then that no equal protection question arises.
7. It may not be amiss to refer to a 1981 American Supreme Court decision, Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Company. 28 Respondent along with several other business
corporations adversely affected involved in the manufacture and utilization of plastic
milk containers filed suit in a Minnesota district court seeking to enjoin enforcement of a
Minnesota statute banning the retail sale of milk in plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable
containers, but permitting such sale in other nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, such
as paperboard, milk cartons. After conducting extensive evidentiary hearings, the
Minnesota court enjoined enforcement of the statute, finding that it violated among
others the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. On certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court reversed, with only Justice Stevens dissenting. The opinion by Justice
Brennan noted that "proponents of the legislation argued that it would promote resource
conservation, ease solid waste disposal problems, and conserve energy." 29 That sufficed
for the Court to conclude "that the ban on plastic nonreturnable milk containers bears a
rational relation to the State's objectives, and must be sustained under the Equal
Protection Clause." 30 It does show that notwithstanding the "new equal protection
approach" with its emphasis on "suspect classification" and "fundamental rights and
interests standard," a concept so ably expounded by professor Gunther, the "rational
relation test" 31 still retains its validity. Not that there could be any objection to the
classification here followed as being in any way susceptible to such a pejorative
expression as "suspect" or that the assailed Letter of Instruction does not qualify under
"the fundamental rights and interests" standard
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 41

8. There was set forth in the petition what were referred to as "other reasonable measures
which the authorities concerned with energy conservation can take immediately, which
are in fact acceptable and obviously called for and should have been done long ago, to
wit: 1. require and establish taxi stands equipped with efficient telephone and
communication systems; 2. strict implementation and observance of cargo truck hours on
main arteries; 3. strict observance of traffic rules; 4. effective solution of traffic problems
and decongestion of traffic through rerouting and quick repair of roads and efficient
operation of double decker buses; 5. rationing of gasoline to avoid panic buying and give
the private car owner the option and responsibility of deciding on the use of his
allocation; 6. allow neon and electrically devised advertising signs only from five o'clock
p.m. to nine o'clock p.m. 7. prohibit immediately the importation of heavy and luxury
cars and seriously re-examine the car manufacturing program." 32 Admittedly, such
measures are conducive to energy conservation. The question before us however is
limited to whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum
Circular No. 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights. It goes no further than that.
The determination of the mode and manner through which the objective of minimizing
the consumption of oil products may be attained is left to the discretion of the political
branches. 33 Absent therefore the alleged infringement of constitutional rights, more
precisely the due process and equal protection guarantees, this Court cannot adjudge
Letter of Instruction No. 869 as tainted by unconstitutionality.
9. It was likewise contended that Memorandum Circular No. 39, issued by the then
respondent Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, and then
respondent Land Transportation Commissioner, imposing the penalties "of fine,
confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of license is likewise unconstitutional,"
petitioners invoking the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. 34 To that extent
that a Letter of Instruction may be viewed as an exercise of the decree-making power of
the President, then such an argument is futile. If, however, viewed as a compliance with
the duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, as a consequence of which
subordinate executive officials may in turn issue implementing rules and regulations,
then the objection would properly be considered as an ultra vires allegation. There is this
relevant excerpt from Teoxon v. Member of the Board of Administrators: 35 "1. The
recognition of the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of the statute, necessarily limited to what is provided for in the
legislative enactment, may be found in the early case of United States v. Barrias decided
in 1908. Then came, in a 1914 decision, United States v. Tupasi Molina, a delineation of
the scope of such competence. Thus: 'Of course the regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law,
and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such
regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the
regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid.'
In 1936, in People v. Santos, this Court expressed its disapproval of an administrative
order that would amount to an excess of the regulatory power vested in an administrative
official. We reaffirmed such a doctrine in a 1951 decision, where we again made clear
that where an administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions

of the Act, 'the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed.' Justice Barrera,
speaking for the Court in Victorias Milling Company, Inc. v. Social Security
Commission, citing Parker as well as Davis did tersely sum up the matter thus: 'A rule is
binding on tile courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and
its scope is within the statutory granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in
agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom * * *. On the other hand,
administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that
finally determine what the law means.' It cannot be otherwise as the Constitution limits
the authority of the President, in whom all executive power resides, to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed. No lesser administrative executive office or agency then can,
contrary to the express language of the Constitution, assert for itself a more extensive
prerogative." 36 It was alleged in the Answer of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza
that Letter of Instruction 869 and Memorandum Circular No. 39 were adopted pursuant
to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. 37 It contains a specific provision as to
penalties. 38 Thus: "For violation of any provisions of this Act or regulations
promulgated pursuant hereto, not hereinbefore specifically punished, a fine of not less
than ten nor more than fifty pesos shall be imposed." 39 Memorandum Circular No. 39
cannot be held to be ultra vires as long as the fine imposed is not less than ten nor more
than fifty pesos. As to suspension of registration, 40 the Code, insofar as applicable,
provides: "Whenever it shall appear from the records of the Commission that during any
twelve-month period more than three warnings for violations of this Act have been given
to the owner of a motor vehicle, or that the said owner has been convicted by a
competent court more than once for violation of such laws, the Commissioner may, in
his discretion, suspend the certificate of registration for a period not exceeding ninety
days and, thereupon, shall require the immediate surrender of the number plates * *
*." 41 It follows that while the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under
the conditions therein set forth is valid under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
the impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory justification. To apply that portion of
Memorandum Circular No. 39 would be ultra vires. It must likewise be made clear that a
penalty even if warranted can only be imposed in accordance with the procedure required
by law. 42
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
The power of the State to restrict the use of certain motor vehicles during stated days and
hours as a fuel-saving measure is to me indubitable. It is anchored on the police power of
the State. For this reason LOI No. 869 cannot be assailed successfully as violative of due
process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution.
There is also no question as to the power of the Commissioner of Land Transportation
and the Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communication to issue
Memorandum Circular No. 39 on June 11, 1979. The circular was necessary to
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 42

implement the LOI. But it does not follow that the circular is completely immune from
the taint of infirmity.
I refer to paragraph 4 of the circular which provides, inter alia, for penalties consisting of
fine and suspension or cancellation of the certificate of registration for owners of motor
vehicles violating the LOI. This portion of the circular is clearly illegal for the LOI is
absolutely and completely devoid of legal sanctions and consequently the implementing
circular cannot prescribe them. It is elementary that only the legislature (or the President
in the exercise of his legislative power) can prescribe penalties. Executive officials
whose task is to enforce the law can prescribe penalties only if they are authorized to do
so within specified limits by the legislature.
It is contended by the respondents that the LOI and the implementing circular were
adopted pursuant to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code Republic Act No.
4136. This contention is utterly baseless.
LOI No. 869 can be compared to a multiple independently targeted ballistic missile. It
tasks various agencies of the government as follows:

Exempted from this prohibition are motor vehicles of the following classifications:
(a) S (Service)
(b) T (Truck)
(c) DPL (Diplomatic)
(d) CC (Consular Corps)
(e) TC (Tourist Cars)
6. The Metro Manila Traffic Management Authority shall, in coordination with the
appropriate ministries, institute traffic flow improvement measures to ensure better
traffic flow. These agencies moreover, shall review the traffic citation system in order to
simplify the application of sanctions for traffic violations.
7. The Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communication shall review the
registration requirements of vehicles with a view to weeding out inefficient motor
vehicles.

1. The Ministry of Energy shall during the period of tight supply, limit as necessary,
sales of fuel products by oil companies and other outlets to all consumers including the
government and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Initially sales shall be limited to
1978 levels. This may be adjusted upward or downward as required to balance supply
with demand and to equitably distribute available supplies. Moreover, the Ministry of
Energy is hereby authorized to set supply priorities and to establish supply allocations
accordingly.

8. The Ministry of National Defense shall prohibit sports activities involving mainly the
use of motor vehicles, watercraft and aircraft, including but not limited to car and
motorcycle rallies, racing and similar events.

2. The Ministry of Local Government and Community Development in cooperation with

the Ministry of Energy shall formulate energy conservation plans and implement the
same through the Bay brigades; moreover, it shall assist in the implementation of other
conservation measures to be instituted by other government agencies.

10. The Metro Manila Commission, in coordination with the appropriate agencies, shall
study the feasibility of designating pedestrian mails and bicycle lanes.

3. The Metro Manila Commission, in coordination with the appropriate government

agencies, shall develop, implement and supervise a program for the implementation of
the Executive Order on the staggering of office hours of both government and private
sectors to achieve optimum use of transportation facilities, as well as to improve traffic
flow.
4. All Ministries, agencies and corporations of the government shall discontinue the use
of airconditioning facilities in offices whom adequate ventilation is available. Any use of
airconditioning facilities by government offices shall be only with prior approval of the
respective ministers and, where allowed temperature shall be kept at a minimum of 78 o
F.
5. The Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications shall prohibit the
use of private motor vehicles under the "H" and "EH" classifications of the LTC on
weekends and holidays starting 0001 hours, Saturday morning, (or the day of the
holiday) until 0500 hours, Monday morning (or the day after the holiday).

9. All government Ministries, agencies and corporations shall limit the use of
government vehicles to essential activities and shall review travel program and schedules
to unnecessary trips.

11. The Ministry of National Defense shall intensify the drive against hoarding or black
marketing of fuel especially of kerosene and diesel and other petroleum products which
from time to time may be short of supply.
12. The Ministry of Energy shall monitor and report on the implementation of the
foregoing measures.
How can it be claimed with a straight face that the LOI was adopted pursuant to R.A.
No. 4136 when nowhere in the LOI is the law mentioned aside from the fact that the
Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communication which is entrusted with
the enforcement of R.A. No. 4136 is only one of the many agencies involved in
conserving energy resources? It is obvious for any one willing to see that R.A. No. 4136
has no relevance to the LOI. Such being the case, the circular which is merely an
accessory to the LOI cannot also be related to R.A. No. 4136.
LOI No. 869 is constitutional but its application pursuant to Memorandum Circular No.
39 is not. For this reason, I vote to grant the petition.

CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 43

I close this dissent with the following observation: the prohibition against the use of
certain vehicles during certain times has not been uniformly and consistently enforced.
We are a nation surrounded by rules but many of which are not enforced or enforced
indifferently. This situation breeds contempt instead of respect for the law. A few rules
that are consistently enforced are better than many which are violated with impunity.
_____________________________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5060

January 26, 1910

THE
UNITED
vs.
LUIS TORIBIO, defendant-appellant.

STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

CARSON, J.:
The evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the trial court that the appellant
slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in
the information, without a permit from the municipal treasure of the municipality
wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act
No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was
slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that
under such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the
slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure. Sections 30, 31, 32,
and 33 of the Act are as follows:
SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal
slaughterhouse except upon permit secured from the municipal treasure. Before issuing
the permit for the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, the municipal
treasurer shall require for branded cattle the production of the original certificate of
ownership and certificates of transfer showing title in the person applying for the permit,
and for unbranded cattle such evidence as may satisfy said treasurer as to the ownership
of the animals for which permit to slaughter has been requested.
SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter has been carabaos shall be granted by the municipal
treasurer unless such animals are unfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes, and in
no event shall a permit be given to slaughter for food any animal of any kind which is
not fit for human consumption.
SEC. 32. The municipal treasurer shall keep a record of all permits for slaughter issued
by him, and such record shall show the name and residence of the owner, and the class,
sex, age, brands, knots of radiated hair commonly know as remolinos or cowlicks, and
other marks of identification of the animal for the slaughter of which permit is issued and
the date on which such permit is issued. Names of owners shall be alphabetically
arranged in the record, together with date of permit.

A copy of the record of permits granted for slaughter shall be forwarded monthly to the
provincial treasurer, who shall file and properly index the same under the name of the
owner, together with date of permit.
SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption
or killing for food at the municipal slaughterhouse any large cattle except upon permit
duly secured from the municipal treasurer, shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten
nor more than five hundred pesos, Philippine currency, or by imprisonment for not less
than one month nor more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court.
It is contended that the proper construction of the language of these provisions limits the
prohibition contained in section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases (1) of
slaughter of large cattle for human consumptionin a municipal slaughter without a
permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) cases of killing of large cattle
for food in a municipal slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from the municipal
treasurer; and it is urged that the municipality of Carmen not being provided with a
municipal slaughterhouse, neither the prohibition nor the penalty is applicable to cases of
slaughter of large cattle without a permit in that municipality.
We are of opinion, however, that the prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to the
slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly
secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) expressly and specifically to the killing for
food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit; and that the
penalty provided in section 33 applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human
consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and
specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without
such permit.
It may be admitted at once, that the pertinent language of those sections taken by itself
and examined apart from the context fairly admits of two constructions: one whereby the
phrase "at the municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken as limiting and restricting both
the word "slaughtered" and the words "killed for food" in section 30, and the words
"slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption" and the words
"killing for food" in section 33; and the other whereby the phrase "at the municipal
slaughterhouse" may be taken as limiting and restricting merely the words "killed for
food" and "killing for food" as used in those sections. But upon a reading of the whole
Act, and keeping in mind the manifest and expressed purpose and object of its
enactment, it is very clear that the latter construction is that which should be adopted.
The Act primarily seeks to protect the "large cattle" of the Philippine Islands against
theft and to make easy the recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners when
lost, strayed, or stolen. To this end it provides an elaborate and compulsory system for
the separate branding and registry of ownership of all such cattle throughout the Islands,
whereby owners are enabled readily and easily to establish their title; it prohibits and
invalidates all transfers of large cattle unaccompanied by certificates of transfer issued
by the proper officer in the municipality where the contract of sale is made; and it
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 44

provides also for the disposition of thieves or persons unlawfully in possession, so as to

protect the rights of the true owners. All this, manifestly, in order to make it difficult for
any one but the rightful owner of such cattle to retain them in his possession or to
dispose of them to others. But the usefulness of this elaborate and compulsory system of
identification, resting as it does on the official registry of the brands and marks on each
separate animal throughout the Islands, would be largely impaired, if not totally
destroyed, if such animals were requiring proof of ownership and the production of
certificates of registry by the person slaughtering or causing them to be slaughtered, and
this especially if the animals were slaughtered privately or in a clandestine manner
outside of a municipal slaughterhouse. Hence, as it would appear, sections 30 and 33
prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human consumption or killing for food at a
municipal slaughterhouse of such animals without a permit issued by the municipal
treasurer, and section 32 provides for the keeping of detailed records of all such permits
in the office of the municipal and also of the provincial treasurer.
If, however, the construction be placed on these sections which is contended for by the
appellant, it will readily be seen that all these carefully worked out provisions for the
registry and record of the brands and marks of identification of all large cattle in the
Islands would prove in large part abortion, since thieves and persons unlawfully in
possession of such cattle, and naturally would, evade the provisions of the law by
slaughtering them outside of municipal slaughterhouses, and thus enjoy the fruits of their
wrongdoing without exposing themselves to the danger of detection incident to the
bringing of the animals to the public slaughterhouse, where the brands and other
identification marks might be scrutinized and proof of ownership required.
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that
construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent
of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a
construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of
the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment.
We are of opinion, therefore, that sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the
slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any
place without the permit provided for in section 30.
It is not essential that an explanation be found for the express prohibition in these
sections of the "killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse" of such animals, despite
the fact that this prohibition is clearly included in the general prohibition of the slaughter
of such animals for human consumption anywhere; but it is not improbable that the
requirement for the issue of a permit in such cases was expressly and specifically
mentioned out of superabundance of precaution, and to avoid all possibility of
misunderstanding in the event that some of the municipalities should be disposed to
modify or vary the general provisions of the law by the passage of local ordinances or
regulations for the control of municipal slaughterhouse.
Similar reasoning applied to the specific provisions of section 31 of the Act leads to the
same conclusion. One of the secondary purposes of the law, as set out in that section, is

to prevent the slaughter for food of carabaos fit for agricultural and draft purposes, and
of all animals unfit for human consumption. A construction which would limit the
prohibitions and penalties prescribed in the statute to the killing of such animals in
municipal slaughterhouses, leaving unprohibited and unpenalized their slaughter outside
of such establishments, so manifestly tends to defeat the purpose and object of the
legislator, that unless imperatively demanded by the language of the statute it should be
rejected; and, as we have already indicated, the language of the statute is clearly
susceptible of the construction which we have placed upon it, which tends to make
effective the provisions of this as well as all the other sections of the Act.
It appears that the defendant did in fact apply for a permit to slaughter his carabao, and
that it was denied him on the ground that the animal was not unfit "for agricultural work
or for draft purposes." Counsel for appellant contends that the statute, in so far as it
undertakes to penalize the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption as food, without
first obtaining a permit which can not be procured in the event that the animal is not unfit
"for agricultural work or draft purposes," is unconstitutional and in violation of the terms
of section 5 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902), which provides that
"no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law."
It is not quite clear from the argument of counsel whether his contention is that this
provision of the statute constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of
the right of eminent domain without providing for the compensation of the owners, or
that it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of the police power of the State. But
whatever may be the basis of his contention, we are of opinion, appropriating, with
necessary modifications understood, the language of that great jurist, Chief Justice Shaw
(in the case of Com. vs. Tewksbury, 11 Met., 55, where the question involved was the
constitutionality of a statute prohibiting and penalizing the taking or carrying away by
any person, including the owner, of any stones, gravel, or sand, from any of the beaches
in the town of Chesea,) that the law in question "is not a taking of the property for public
use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the
power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as
would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the public. All property is
acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the
equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interest of the community."
It may be conceded that the benificial use and exclusive enjoyment of the property of all
carabao owners in these Islands is to a greater or less degree interfered with by the
provisions of the statute; and that, without inquiring what quantum of interest thus passes
from the owners of such cattle, it is an interest the deprivation of which detracts from
their right and authority, and in some degree interferes with their exclusive possession
and control of their property, so that if the regulations in question were enacted for
purely private purpose, the statute, in so far as these regulations are concerned, would be
a violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill relied on be appellant; but we are
satisfied that it is not such a taking, such an interference with the right and title of the
owners, as is involved in the exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain, so as
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 45

to entitle these owners to compensation, and that it is no more than "a just restrain of an
injurious private use of the property, which the legislature had authority to impose."
In the case of Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 84), wherein the doctrine laid down in
Com. vs. Tewksbury (supra) was reviewed and affirmed, the same eminent jurist who
wrote the former opinion, in distinguishing the exercise of the right of eminent domain
from the exercise of the sovereign police powers of the State, said:
We think it is settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society,
that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it
under the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated that is shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their
property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. . . . Rights of property, like all
other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their
enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restrain
and regulations establish by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling
power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.
This is very different from the right of eminent domain, the right of a government to take
and appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it;
which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor.
The power we allude to is rather the police power, the power vested in the legislature by
the constitution, to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth,
and of the subjects of the same.
It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this power than to
mark its boundaries or prescribe limits to its exercise.
Applying these principles, we are opinion that the restrain placed by the law on the
slaughter for human consumption of carabaos fit for agricultural work and draft purpose
is not an appropriation of property interests to a "public use," and is not, therefore, within
the principle of the exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain. It is fact a mere
restriction or limitation upon a private use, which the legislature deemed to be
determental to the public welfare. And we think that an examination of the general
provisions of the statute in relation to the public interest which it seeks to safeguard and
the public necessities for which it provides, leaves no room for doubt that the limitations
and restraints imposed upon the exercise of rights of ownership by the particular
provisions of the statute under consideration were imposed not for private purposes but,
strictly, in the promotion of the "general welfare" and "the public interest" in the exercise
of the sovereign police power which every State possesses for the general public welfare
and which "reaches to every species of property within the commonwealth."
For several years prior to the enactment of the statute a virulent contagious or infectious
disease had threatened the total extinction of carabaos in these Islands, in many sections
sweeping away seventy, eighty, and in some cases as much as ninety and even one

hundred per cent of these animals. Agriculture being the principal occupation of the
people, and the carabao being the work animal almost exclusively in use in the fields as
well as for draft purposes, the ravages of the disease with which they were infected
struck an almost vital blow at the material welfare of the country. large areas of
productive land lay waste for years, and the production of rice, the staple food of the
inhabitants of the Islands, fell off to such an extent that the impoverished people were
compelled to spend many millions of pesos in its importation, notwithstanding the fact
that with sufficient work animals to cultivate the fields the arable rice lands of the
country could easily be made to produce a supply more that sufficient for its own needs.
The drain upon the resources of the Islands was such that famine soon began to make
itself felt, hope sank in the breast of the people, and in many provinces the energies of
the breadwinners seemed to be paralyzed by the apparently hopeless struggle for
existence with which they were confronted.
To meet these conditions, large sums of money were expended by the Government in
relieving the immediate needs of the starving people, three millions of dollars were voted
by the Congress of the United States as a relief or famine fund, public works were
undertaken to furnish employment in the provinces where the need was most pressing,
and every effort made to alleviate the suffering incident to the widespread failure of the
crops throughout the Islands, due in large measure to the lack of animals fit for
agricultural work and draft purposes.
Such measures, however, could only temporarily relieve the situation, because in an
agricultural community material progress and permanent prosperity could hardly be
hoped for in the absence of the work animals upon which such a community must
necessarily rely for the cultivation of the fields and the transportation of the products of
the fields to market. Accordingly efforts were made by the Government to increase the
supply of these animals by importation, but, as appears from the official reports on this
subject, hope for the future depended largely on the conservation of those animals which
had been spared from the ravages of the diseased, and their redistribution throughout the
Islands where the need for them was greatest.
At large expense, the services of experts were employed, with a view to the discovery
and applications of preventive and curative remedies, and it is hoped that these measures
have proved in some degree successful in protecting the present inadequate supply of
large cattle, and that the gradual increase and redistribution of these animals throughout
the Archipelago, in response to the operation of the laws of supply and demand, will
ultimately results in practically relieving those sections which suffered most by the loss
of their work animals.
As was to be expected under such conditions, the price of carabaos rapidly increase from
the three to five fold or more, and it may fairly be presumed that even if the conservative
measures now adopted prove entirely successful, the scant supply will keep the price of
these animals at a high figure until the natural increase shall have more nearly equalized
the supply to the demand.
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 46

Coincident with and probably intimately connected with this sudden rise in the price of
cattle, the crime of cattle stealing became extremely prevalent throughout the Islands,
necessitating the enactment of a special law penalizing with the severest penalties the
theft of carabaos and other personal property by roving bands; and it must be assumed
from the legislative authority found that the general welfare of the Islands necessitated
the enactment of special and somewhat burdensome provisions for the branding and
registration of large cattle, and supervision and restriction of their slaughter for food. It
will hardly be questioned that the provisions of the statute touching the branding and
registration of such cattle, and prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter of diseased cattle
for food were enacted in the due and proper exercise of the police power of the State; and
we are of opinion that, under all the circumstances, the provision of the statute
prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter for human consumption of carabaos fit for work
were in like manner enacted in the due and proper exercise of that power, justified by the
exigent necessities of existing conditions, and the right of the State to protect itself
against the overwhelming disaster incident to the further reduction of the supply of
animals fit for agricultural work or draft purposes.
It is, we think, a fact of common knowledge in these Islands, and disclosed by the
official reports and records of the administrative and legislative departments of the
Government, that not merely the material welfare and future prosperity of this
agricultural community were threatened by the ravages of the disease which swept away
the work animals during the years prior to the enactment of the law under consideration,
but that the very life and existence of the inhabitants of these Islands as a civilized
people would be more or less imperiled by the continued destruction of large cattle by
disease or otherwise. Confronted by such conditions, there can be no doubt of the right
of the Legislature to adopt reasonable measures for the preservation of work animals,
even to the extent of prohibiting and penalizing what would, under ordinary conditions,
be a perfectly legitimate and proper exercise of rights of ownership and control of the
private property of the citizen. The police power rests upon necessity and the right of
self-protection and if ever the invasion of private property by police regulation can be
justified, we think that the reasonable restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by the
provision of the law under discussion must be held to be authorized as a reasonable and
proper exercise of that power.
As stated by Mr. Justice Brown in his opinion in the case of Lawton vs. Steele (152 U.S.,
133, 136):
The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful subject
of discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is universally
conceded to include everything essential to the public safely, health, and morals, and to
justify the destruction or abatement, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be
regarded as a public nuisance. Under this power it has been held that the State may order
the destruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise endangering the lives of passersby; the demolition of such as are in the path of a conflagration; the slaughter of diseased
cattle; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome food; the prohibition of wooden
buildings in cities; the regulation of railways and other means of public conveyance, and

of interments in burial grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to certain

localities; the compulsary vaccination of children; the confinement of the insane or those
afficted with contagious deceases; the restraint of vagrants, beggars, and habitual
drunkards; the suppression of obscene publications and houses of ill fame; and the
prohibition of gambling houses and places where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond
this, however, the State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this
particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not
only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the
protection of such interests. (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128
U. S., 1.) To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it
must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public
interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary
restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is a
proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the
supervision of the court.
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the
statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of
carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or
draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect
the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by
improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy
the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the
community may be measurably and dangerously affected.
Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt., 140), said
(p. 149) that by this "general police power of the State, persons and property are
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right in the legislature to do which no
question ever was, or, upon acknowledge and general principles, ever can be made, so
far as natural persons are concerned."
And Cooley in his "Constitutional Limitations" (6th ed., p. 738) says:
It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in which the police power is
or may be exercised, because the various cases in which the exercise by one individual of
his rights may conflict with a similar exercise by others, or may be detrimental to the
public order or safety, are infinite in number and in variety. And there are other cases
where it becomes necessary for the public authorities to interfere with the control by
individuals of their property, and even to destroy it, where the owners themselves have
fully observed all their duties to their fellows and to the State, but where, nevertheless,
some controlling public necessity demands the interference or destruction. A strong
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 47

instance of this description is where it becomes necessary to take, use, or destroy the
private property of individuals to prevent the spreading of a fire, the ravages of a
pestilence, the advance of a hostile army, or any other great public calamity. Here the
individual is in no degree in fault, but his interest must yield to that "necessity" which
"knows no law." The establishment of limits within the denser portions of cities and
villages within which buildings constructed of inflammable materials shall not be erected
or repaired may also, in some cases, be equivalent to a destruction of private property;
but regulations for this purpose have been sustained notwithstanding this result. Wharf
lines may also be established for the general good, even though they prevent the owners
of water-fronts from building out on soil which constitutes private property. And,
whenever the legislature deem it necessary to the protection of a harbor to forbid the
removal of stones, gravel, or sand from the beach, they may establish regulations to that
effect under penalties, and make them applicable to the owners of the soil equally with
other persons. Such regulations are only "a just restraint of an injurious use of property,
which the legislature have authority" to impose.
So a particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden, where, by a change of
circumstances, and without the fault of the power, that which was once lawful, proper,
and unobjectionable has now become a public nuisance, endangering the public health or
the public safety. Milldams are sometimes destroyed upon this grounds; and churchyards
which prove, in the advance of urban population, to be detrimental to the public health,
or in danger of becoming so, are liable to be closed against further use for cemetery
purposes.
These citations from some of the highest judicial and text-book authorities in the United
States clearly indicate the wide scope and extent which has there been given to the
doctrine us in our opinion that the provision of the statute in question being a proper
exercise of that power is not in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill,
which provide that "no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law," a provision which itself is adopted from
the Constitution of the United States, and is found in substance in the constitution of
most if not all of the States of the Union.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be
affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER,
INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV,
ILOILO CITY, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
CRUZ, J.:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades
"Strike but hear me first!" It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he
challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of
carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of
Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to
circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial movement of carabaos by
transporting carabeef instead; and
WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626
and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to
strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and
carabeef subject of the violation;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the
following:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit,
in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 48

President
Republic of the Philippines
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on
January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1The petitioner sued for
recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his
filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the
court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be
produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority
and also for its presumed validity. 2
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which
upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review
on certiorari.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it
authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across
provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed
without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court
as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should not have been
presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper
exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the
1973 Constitution. 4
While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not
applicable here. The question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication
of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We
imposed the requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however,
this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving
the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have
jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal
or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of
lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain
measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first
instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not
by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing
of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the
hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated
otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the

constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the
issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and
so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no
shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any
other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential
decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was
issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were
faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No.
6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was
unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action,
he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that
were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to
justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to
question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the
grounds was supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a phrase
that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve
resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine
ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in
precise and unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on their
correct interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however,
this rule was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous.
In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was submitted in the Constitutional
Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the
Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by
the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also
conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some
provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and
immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of
the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt
easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times
and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of
due process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of
the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated.
Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were,
to be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of
the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S.
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 49

Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due process and in so
doing sums it all up as nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the
sporting Idea of fair play." 12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise
that that Crown would thenceforth not proceed against the life liberty or property of any
of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they
thereby won for themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is
now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow that King John made at
Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to
all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of
the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair
play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those
who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half
must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed
appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement
each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination
of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment
based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or
useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in
repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally
speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against
official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the
jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our
fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently
declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the
law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the
famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights
of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal
or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty
catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure,
there are a number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example,
bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human
experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact
ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances when the need for expeditions
action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the
immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials,
contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily

destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled
without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16Filthy restaurants may
be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect
the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without
violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of
the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which
both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as
the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the
general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and
is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the
three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The
individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him
even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead from the womb to beyond
the tomb in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is
a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the
property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power
is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin
maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which
call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No.
626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of
carabaos except under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the
reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the
carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on
them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face
of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these
traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had
not taken steps to protect and preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law
regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a
deprivation of property without due process of law. The defendant had been convicted
thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit, and he
appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law was sustained as a
valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then
badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the
reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in
turn had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals
and the consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly,
necessitating more effective measures for the registration and branding of these animals.
The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and
declared in part as follows:
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 50

To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. ...
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the
statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of
carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or
draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect
the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by
improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy
the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the
community may be measurably and dangerously affected.
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao,
as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so
is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure
is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt
that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years
old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the
executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and
preventing their improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the
original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the
second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the
original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on
theslaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with
no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in
one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to
another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the
prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily
circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the
live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should
follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead
meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we
would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the
prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being
transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the
Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and
imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under
the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself,
as forfeited to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated
upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive
order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced
upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the
centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be
validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum
guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken
in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial
only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the
omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought
to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the
petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per
se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense
prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice,
with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is
penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only
but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the
prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the
confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there
authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commissionmay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industrymay see fit, in the case of carabaos."
(Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous
condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and
abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 51

reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe
when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless.
Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall
they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may
choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there
is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore
invalid delegation of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is
violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in
his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation
of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the
officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No.
626-A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who
confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive
order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and
it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been
impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare the executive
order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the
trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence,
for all their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he
saw them, this case would never have reached us and the taking of his property under the
challenged measure would have become afait accompli despite its invalidity. We
commend him for his spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter would have ended
in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of the Constitution, for all its
obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon forgotten
in the limbo of relinquished rights.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the
people to invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on
the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as
weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the
role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by
those who are not afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except
as affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the
petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988
LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MANGKAL, NORMAN A. MESINA,
ALEXANDER R. REGUYAL, JOCELYN P. CATAPANG, ENRICO V.
REGALADO, JEROME O. ARCEGA, ERNESTOC. BLAS, JR., ELPEDIO M.
ALMAZAN, KARL CAESAR R. RIMANDO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION
COMMISSION, respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation
Commission so that it cannot pass upon the validity of the administrative acts of the
latter? Can this Commission lawfully prohibit the examiness from attending review
classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the like three (3) days before the date of the
examination? Theses are the issues presented to the court by this petition for certiorari to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals promulagated on January 13, 1987, in CAG.R. SP No. 10598, * declaring null and void the other dated Ocober 21, 1986 issued by
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32 in Civil Case No. 86-37950 entitled "
Lupo L. Lupangco, et al. vs. Professional Regulation Commission."
The records shows the following undisputed facts:
On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness,"
to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy.
The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions:
No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by,
or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or
university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or
employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions during the three days
immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by
Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission. 1
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year,
filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, a complaint for injuction with a prayer with the
issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 52

latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same
unconstitution.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the
lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution.
In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try
the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to
Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional.
Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for the nullification of the above Order of the lower court. Said petiton
was granted in the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulagated on January 13, 1987,
to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition meritorious the same is hereby GRANTED and the
other dated October 21, 1986 issued by respondent court is declared null and void. The
respondent court is further directed to dismiss with prejudice Civil Case No. 86-37950
for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. No cost in this instance.
SO ORDERED. 2
Hence, this petition.
The Court of Appeals, in deciding that the Regional Trial Court of Manila had no
jurisdiction to entertain the case and to enjoin the enforcement of the Resolution No.
105, stated as its basis its conclusion that the Professional Regulation Commission and
the Regional Trial Court are co-equal bodies. Thus it held
That the petitioner Professional Regulatory Commission is at least a co-equal body with
the Regional Trial Court is beyond question, and co-equal bodies have no power to
control each other or interfere with each other's acts. 3
To strenghten its position, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on National
Electrification Administration vs. Mendoza, 4 which cites Pineda vs. Lantin 5 and
Philippine Pacific Fishing, Inc. vs. Luna, 6 where this Court held that a Court of First
Instance cannot interfere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
two being co-equal bodies.
After a close scrutiny of the facts and the record of this case,
We rule in favor of the petitioner.
The cases cited by respondent court are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the
reason why this Court ruled that the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the
orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission was that this was so provided for by
the law. In Pineda vs. Lantin, We explained that whenever a party is aggrieved by or
disagree with an order or ruling of the Securities and Exchange Commission, he cannot
seek relief from courts of general jurisdiction since under the Rules of Court and
Commonwealth Act No. 83, as amended by Republic Act No. 635, creating and setting
forth the powers and functions of the old Securities and Exchange Commission, his

remedy is to go the Supreme Court on a petition for review. Likewise, in Philippine

Pacific Fishing Co., Inc. vs. Luna, it was stressed that if an order of the Securities and
Exchange Commission is erroneous, the appropriate remedy take is first, within the
Commission itself, then, to the Supreme Court as mandated in Presidential Decree No.
902-A, the law creating the new Securities and Exchange Commission. Nowhere in the
said cases was it held that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other
government agencies. On the contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
The respondent court erred when it place the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the Professional Regulation Commsision in the same category. As alraedy mentioned,
with respect to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the laws cited explicitly
provide with the procedure that need be taken when one is aggrieved by its order or
ruling. Upon the other hand, there is no law providing for the next course of action for a
party who wants to question a ruling or order of the Professional Regulation
Commission. Unlike Commonwealth Act No. 83 and Presidential Decree No. 902-A,
there is no provision in Presidential Decree No. 223, creating the Professional Regulation
Commission, that orders or resolutions of the Commission are appealable either to the
Court of Appeals or to theSupreme Court. Consequently, Civil Case No. 86-37950,
which was filed in order to enjoin the enforcement of a resolution of the respondent
Professional Regulation Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should fall within
the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court. 7
What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the Professional Regulation
Commission is attached to the Office of the President for general direction and
coordination. 8 Well settled in our jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office
of the President may be reviewed by the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial
Court). In Medalla vs. Sayo, 9 this rule was thoroughly propounded on, to wit:
In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by certiorari decisions and/or
resolutions of the Civil Service Commission and of the residential Executive Asssistant
is concerned, there should be no question but that the power of judicial review should be
upheld. The following rulings buttress this conclusion:
The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act arises from a failure to recognize
the most important principle in our system of government, i.e., the separation of powers
into three co-equal departments, the executives, the legislative and the judicial, each
supreme within its own assigned powers and duties. When a presidential act is
challenged before the courts of justice, it is not to be implied therefrom that the
Executive is being made subject and subordinate to the courts. The legality of his acts are
under judicial review, not because the Executive is inferior to the courts, but because the
law is above the Chief Executive himself, and the courts seek only to interpret, apply or
implement it (the law). A judicial review of the President's decision on a case of an
employee decided by the Civil Service Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light
and the bringing of the case to the Courts should be governed by the same principles as
govern the jucucial review of all administrative acts of all administrative officers. 10
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 53

Republic vs. Presiding Judge, CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br. II, 11 is another case in point.
Here, "the Executive Office"' of the Department of Education and Culture issued
Memorandum Order No. 93 under the authority of then Secretary of Education Juan
Manuel. As in this case, a complaint for injunction was filed with the Court of First
Instance of Lanao del Norte because, allegedly, the enforcement of the circular would
impair some contracts already entered into by public school teachers. It was the
contention of petitioner therein that "the Court of First Instance is not empowered to
amend, reverse and modify what is otherwise the clear and explicit provision of the
memorandum circular issued by the Executive Office which has the force and effect of
law." In resolving the issue, We held:
... We definitely state that respondent Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction in Civil Case
No. II-240 (8) because the plaintiff therein asked the lower court for relief, in the form of
injunction, in defense of a legal right (freedom to enter into contracts) . . . . .
Hence there is a clear infringement of private respondent's constitutional right to enter
into agreements not contrary to law, which might run the risk of being violated by the
threatened implementation of Executive Office Memorandum Circular No. 93, dated
February 5, 1968, which prohibits, with certain exceptions, cashiers and disbursing
officers from honoring special powers of attorney executed by the payee employees. The
respondent Court is not only right but duty bound to take cognizance of cases of this
nature wherein a constitutional and statutory right is allegedly infringed by the
administrative action of a government office. Courts of first Instance have original
jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of
pecuniary estimation (Sec. 44, Republic Act 296, as amended). 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
In San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino, 13 We ruled that a judge of the Court of First
Instance has the authority to decide on the validity of a city tax ordinance even after its
validity had been contested before the Secretary of Justice and an opinion thereon had
been rendered.
In view of the foregoing, We find no cogent reason why Resolution No. 105, issued by
the respondent Professional Regulation Commission, should be exempted from the
general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P.
Blg. 129, it is the Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction over the case. The said law
provides:
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of

subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The contention is devoid of merit.
In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as
provided for in Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to be a final order or
ruling which resulted from proceedings wherein the administrative body involved
exercised its quasi-judicial functions. In Black's Law Dictionary, quasi-judicial is
defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers
or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature. To expound thereon, quasi-judicial adjudication would
mean a determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order
which applies to a specific situation . 14 This does not cover rules and regulations of
general applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purely
administrative policies and functions like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the
respondent PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of licensure examinations.
The above rule was adhered to in Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs.
Ferrer. 15 In this case, the issue presented was whether or not the Court of First Instance
had jurisdiction over a case involving an order of the Commission on Elections awarding
a contract to a private party which originated from an invitation to bid. The said issue
came about because under the laws then in force, final awards, judgments, decisions or
orders of the Commission on Elections fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court by way of certiorari. Hence, it has been consistently held that "it is the
Supreme Court, not the Court of First Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to
review on certiorari final decisions, orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections
relative to the conduct of elections and the enforcement of election laws." 16
As to whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction in saidcase, We said:
We are however, far from convinced that an order of the COMELEC awarding a contract
to a private party, as a result of its choice among various proposals submitted in response
to its invitation to bid comes within the purview of a "final order" which is exclusively
and directly appealable to this court on certiorari. What is contemplated by the term
"final orders, rulings and decisions, of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the
Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before
the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the Commission granting the
award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy before it wherein the
parties filed their respective pleadings and presented evidence after which the questioned
order was issued; and that this order of the commission was issued pursuant to its
authority to enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. In short, the COMELEC
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 54

resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasijudicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over
the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final
order reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no
contempt order may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and
exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising
from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
(Emphasis supplied.) 17
One other case that should be mentioned in this regard is Salud vs. Central Bank of the
Philippines. 18 Here, petitioner Central Bank, like respondent in this case, argued that
under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, orders of the Monetary Board are
appealable only to the Intermediate Appellate Court. Thus:
The Central Bank and its Liquidator also postulate, for the very first time, that the
Monetary Board is among the "quasi-judicial ... boards" whose judgments are within the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the IAC; hence, it is only said Court, "to the exclusion
of the Regional Trial Courts," that may review the Monetary Board's resolutions. 19
Anent the posture of the Central Bank, We made the following pronouncement:
The contention is utterly devoid of merit. The IAC has no appellate jurisdiction over
resolution or orders of the Monetary Board. No law prescribes any mode of appeal from
the Monetary Board to the IAC. 20
In view of the foregoing, We hold that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to
entertain Civil Case No. 86-37950 and enjoin the respondent PRC from enforcing its
resolution.
Although We have finally settled the issue of jurisdiction, We find it imperative to
decide once and for all the validity of Resolution No. 105 so as to provide the much
awaited relief to those who are and will be affected by it.
Of course, We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable
purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations."
However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its
face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend
any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review
material, or any tip from any school, collge or university, or any review center or the
like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similar institutions . ... 21
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the
prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future
examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how
the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during
the three days before the examination period.

It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act

arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such
rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown
to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued,
then they must be held to be invalid. 22
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the
examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no
authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the
licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps
needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They
have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors.
They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will
promote their personal growth. As defined in a decision of the United States Supreme
Court:
The term "liberty" means more than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds
of a prison. It means freedom to go where one may choose and to act in such a manner
not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the
promotion of his happiness, to pursue such callings and vocations as may be most
suitable to develop his capacities, and giv to them their highest enjoyment. 23
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom
of the schools concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review
that review schools and centers believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the
standards required before becoming a full fledged public accountant. Unless the means
or methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with
corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their
students. At this juncture, We call attention to Our pronouncement in Garcia vs. The
Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 24 regarding academic
freedom to wit:
... It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It
decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from
outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls
for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of
students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in
a grudging fashion.
Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the
alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized.
Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or
preparation on those last three precious days-when they should be refreshing themselves
with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and
psychological make-up for the examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to
get ride of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the
source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 55

terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict
guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up and if violations are committed,
then licenses should be suspended or revoked. These are all within the powers of the
respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means
the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the
examinations should not be curtailed.
In the light of the above, We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE, the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 10591 and another judgment is hereby rendered
declaring Resolution No. 105 null and void and of no force and effect for being
unconstitutional. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
_________________________________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24693

July 31, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC.,

HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for
prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due
process clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and,
therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such judgment
must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack
against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the
petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members,
Hotel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of
the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued
in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances
of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and
enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock
corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen
(18) members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly
licensed by both national and city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and
giving livelihood to not less than 2,500 person and representing an investment of more
than P3 million."1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by

the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the City
of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There
was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised
charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that
Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per
annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the provision in
the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or
accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or
persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all
times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date
of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the
number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex
would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his
passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has
personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept
and bound together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels,
motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the
Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void
again on due process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive
but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion
of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the
challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance
of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a
dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due process clause
for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the
portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room; that the
provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18
years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common
inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease
any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due
process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive
character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged
ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the
license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of
its investments, there is once again a transgression of the due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment
declaring the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 56

6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain

from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal
circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are
licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions
of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or
constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of
action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper purpose,
which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power and that
only the guests or customers not before the court could complain of the alleged invasion
of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self incrimination, with the assertion that
the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent
Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of
facts dated September 28, 1964, which reads:
1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and
Hotel del Mar Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines,
both with offices in the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and
general manager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident
of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;
2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief
executive of the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful
execution and enforcement of such ordinances;
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and
motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance
No. 4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga,
then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City
Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the
ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three new sections. This
ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the
reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted
with the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of
which is attached hereto as Annex C;
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from
license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in
the City of Manila.1wph1.t

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was
laid on the presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of
showing its lack of conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it,
citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a
memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners
against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the memorandum
for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition, with
citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a
judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and
making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners
association, and referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the
lower court observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the
parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the
case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that without any evidence
submitted by the parties, the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional
grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper the
untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to regulate
motels, and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City
of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent
the preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain
him from enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional
doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against
such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be
allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted standards of
constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to
offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As
was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of
validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly
set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the
necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which
surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the
ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of
the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there
is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity
for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face
which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the
leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the
American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 57

matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of
the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method
of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process
of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation
of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some
factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation
being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and
the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against
the ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally
defective as being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of
protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This
particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard
public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture
and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict
and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,4 extending as it does "to all the great
public needs."5 It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very
purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its
competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the genera
welfare.6 Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of
society.7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor
Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming
increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great
part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine
entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrillseekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of
transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to
fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all
times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the
privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the
increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from
operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of
the city government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from
sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its
approval, ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a
vagrant;8 provide a license tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of public
dance halls;9 prohibiting gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and monte;12prohibiting
playing of panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal holidays; 13 prohibiting the

operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting any person from keeping, conducting or
maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is smoked or otherwise
used,15 all of which are intended to protect public morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the
exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and
other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of such police power
insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial
inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other
applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is
raised to the question of due process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of
due process. It furnishes though a standard to which the governmental action should
conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be
valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and
a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for
that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due
process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds
of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action
marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from
arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. 17 It exacts fealty "to
those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the
light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions
of legal and political thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," 19 decisions based on such a clause
requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our
society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in
slavery to form or phrases.21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet
what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an
arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be deemed
unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction
in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more specific,
the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It
provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found
in the records, and, as has been set forth, none is even attempted here to attach to an
ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due
process requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to
petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 58

features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of
freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the
challenged ordinance for hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the
latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class
motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922 that
municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed for regulating occupations
or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or
enterprises and for revenue purposes only.22 As was explained more in detail in the
above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the
police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and
regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed
a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying
the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable,
oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such
discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might
otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in
the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in
the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in of
licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been
declared unreasonable.23
Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the
doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to
implement the state's police power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm
that the broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities
and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the only
limitation that the tax so levied is for public purposes, just and uniform. 25
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of
Manila in imposing licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that
"much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the
license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police
power measure.26 The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with this
pertinent citation from another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of the
plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of their
lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public
markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage
meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certain conditions is permitted x x
x . And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the community may be deprived of
their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise
of the police power. As was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations which
may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power
embark in these occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result from the legal
exercise of that power."27

Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance
makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of
any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full
payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot
be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the
immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the
explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when
there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable
situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be
unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as
pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs
through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as
understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the
term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the
peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he
pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is
necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good x x x The
liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public
order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power." 28
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the
bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare
may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state x x x To this fundamental
aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing
without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail
over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve
the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal
discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace
and order and happiness for all.29
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of
undue deprivation of freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its
virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way
to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual
relations affected with public interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the
liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed
affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is
wider.32 How justify then the allegation of a denial of due process?
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 59

Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by
invoking the principles of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the
petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the
provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners,
however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name, relationship, age
and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the
necessity for determining whether the companion or companions referred to are those
arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room With
him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso
in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a
motel is dependent upon the discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso which
from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be
charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may
be asked, do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged
vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From Connally v. General
Construction Co.33 toAdderley v. Florida,34 the principle has been consistently upheld
that what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding
or requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the situation before us? A citation
from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about
not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using
common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the
arguments pressed with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of
the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for
constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this
Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted
forthwith. With costs.
_______________________________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 122846

January 20, 2009

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA.

MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S.
LIM, Respondent.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:

With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district as
subject, the Court is confronted anew with the incessant clash between government
power and individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal tension between law and
morality.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,1 the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance
barring the operation of motels and inns, among other establishments, within the ErmitaMalate area. The petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits
those same establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or
"wash up" rates for such abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance
against our sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of
law. The same parameters apply to the present petition.
This Petition2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the
reversal of the Decision3 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals,
challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An Ordinance
Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate
Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar
Establishments in the City of Manila" (the Ordinance).
I.
The facts are as follows:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the
Ordinance.4 The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City
Government to protect the best interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its
constituents in general and the youth in particular.
SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time
admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments
in the City of Manila.
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate
or other similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging
houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging
of room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms
more than twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by owners or managers
of said establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same meaning.
SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of
this ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand
(P5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or both
such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of [a]
juridical person, the president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the operation
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 60

thereof shall be liable: Provided, further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the
same offense, the business license of the guilty party shall automatically be cancelled.
SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent with
or contrary to this measure or any portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed.
SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval.
Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10, 1992.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed
a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order ( TRO)5 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 9 impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila (the City)
represented by Mayor Lim.6 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes
motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in
Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit
customers on a short time basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of
only three hours.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium
Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a
motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention7 on the ground that
the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and
motels in Manila.8 The three companies are components of the Anito Group of
Companies which owns and operates several hotels and motels in Metro Manila.9
On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene. 10 The RTC also
notified the Solicitor General of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of
the Rules of Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff. 11
On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw. 12 The RTC
issued a TRO on January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing
the Ordinance.13 The City filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993 alleging that the
Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.14
On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to
desist from the enforcement of the Ordinance.15 A month later, on March 8, 1993, the
Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the Ordinance is constitutional.
During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the case for
decision without trial as the case involved a purely legal question. 16 On October 20,
1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila
is hereby declared null and void.

Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.17
The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution." 18 Reference was made to the
provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to
needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the
observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could
nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay, the RTC likened the
law to the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,19 where the
legitimate purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be
effected through an inter-province ban on the transport of carabaos and carabeef.
The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.20 The
petition was docketed as G.R. No. 112471. However in a resolution dated January 26,
1994, the Court treated the petition as a petition forcertiorari and referred the petition to
the Court of Appeals.21
Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of
police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which
confers on cities, among other local government units, the power:
[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports.22
The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article
III, Section 18(kk) of the Revised Manila Charter, thus:
"to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety,
the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others
as be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two
hundred pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for
a single offense.23
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the
right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power;
and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality
of the Ordinance.24 First, it held that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or
the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments
that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police
power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method.
The lawful objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities.
There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 61

adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in

general. Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of
Manila, liberty is regulated by law.
TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari. 25 In their
petition and Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before
the Court of Appeals. They contend that the assailed Ordinance is an invalid exercise of
police power.
II.
We must address the threshold issue of petitioners standing. Petitioners allege that as
owners of establishments offering "wash-up" rates, their business is being unlawfully
interfered with by the Ordinance. However, petitioners also allege that the equal
protection rights of their clients are also being interfered with. Thus, the crux of the
matter is whether or not these establishments have the requisite standing to plead for
protection of their patrons' equal protection rights.
Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient
connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's
participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the
principle of separation of powers,26 sparing as it does unnecessary interference or
invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of
government.
The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly
from the Constitution.27The constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates
concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise definition.28 In this jurisdiction,
the extancy of "a direct and personal interest" presents the most obvious cause, as well as
the standard test for a petitioner's standing.29 In a similar vein, the United States Supreme
Court reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional standing
requirements of injury, causation, and redressability in Allen v. Wright.30
Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the
overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the
Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance.31
For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the
overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,32 the United States Supreme
Court wrote that: "We have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of
third parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have
suffered an injury-in-fact, thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the
outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party;
and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own
interests."33 Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise
injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their
continued viability which appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance.
The relative silence in constitutional litigation of such special interest groups in our

nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be
construed as a hindrance for customers to bring suit.34
American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed
standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of
other persons or classes of persons injured by state action. In Griswold v.
Connecticut,35 the United States Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to
challenge a reproductive health statute that would penalize them as accessories as well as
to plead the constitutional protections available to their patients. The Court held that:
"The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely
affected unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of
confidential relation to them."36
An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren,37 wherein the United
States Supreme Court held that a licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the
equal protection claim of a male customer challenging a statutory scheme prohibiting the
sale of beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. The United
States High Court explained that the vendors had standing "by acting as advocates of the
rights of third parties who seek access to their market or function." 38
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the
former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In
overbreadth analysis, challengers to government actionare in effect permitted to raise the
rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech,
the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally
guaranteed rights.39 In this case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a
sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We can see that based on the
allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth.
We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of
their clients to patronize their establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame.
III.
To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the
recent City of Manila ruling, but our 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. 40Ermita-Malate concerned
the City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating personal
information such as name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before they
could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging house. This earlier ordinance was
precisely enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals. A
purpose similar to the annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban
on motels, inns and similar establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. However, the
constitutionality of the ordinance in Ermita-Malate was sustained by the Court.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond
the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 62

ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular
illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle
case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by
these establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about
the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City
of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be
unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must
not be unreasonable.41
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate
admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to
be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local
Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.
A.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in
general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide
enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. 42 Police
power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to
protect itself and its people.43 Police power has been used as justification for numerous
and varied actions by the State. These range from the regulation of dance halls, 44 movie
theaters,45 gas stations46 and cockpits.47 The awesome scope of police power is best
demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nations legal
system, its use has rarely been denied.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by
themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of
the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging
sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. The Bill of Rights stands as a
rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political
majorities animated by his cynicism.
Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due
process or equal protection questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by a due
deference to the co-equal branches of government as they exercise their political
functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executive or legislative actions, yet
another form of caution emerges. If the Court were animated by the same passing fancies
or turbulent emotions that motivate many political decisions, judicial integrity is

compromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the third political branch of
government. We derive our respect and good standing in the annals of history by acting
as judicious and neutral arbiters of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end
than through the development of rigorous and sophisticated legal standards through
which the courts analyze the most fundamental and far-reaching constitutional questions
of the day.
B.
The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as
guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise
definition.48 The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental
encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process
guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations
and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but
distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due
process." Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must
follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. 49 Procedural due process
concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes
an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the
level of formality of a hearing.
If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd
situation of arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities are followed.
Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause.
It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of
life, liberty, or property.50
The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has
reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of
fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now
confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality
though of constitutional due process has not been predicated on the frequency with
which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends
should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process clause
has acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to
determine the proper metes and bounds for its application.
C.
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is
best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S.
Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products.51 Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case
acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a
discrimination against a "discrete and insular" minority or infringement of a
"fundamental right."52 Consequently, two standards of judicial review were established:
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 63

strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political
process, and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by
the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender 53 and
legitimacy.54 Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Craig,55 after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed. 56 While the test may have first
been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since been
applied in all substantive due process cases as well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal
protection challenges.57 Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are
upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. 58 Under intermediate
review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less
restrictive measures is considered.59 Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence
of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less
restrictive means for achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard
for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify
the regulation of fundamental freedoms.60 Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity
of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other
fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. 61 The
United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect
fundamental rights such as suffrage,62 judicial access63 and interstate travel.64
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its
effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by
the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the
petitioners, an injury that would warrant the application of the most deferential standard
the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners
to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons those persons who would be
deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in
question.
Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are
trivial since they seem shorn of political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort
of cherished rights that, when proscribed, would impel the people to tear up their
cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those
"trivial" yet fundamental freedoms which the people reflexively exercise any day
without the impairing awareness of their constitutional consequence that accurately
reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally incorporated as
a fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration
of what may or what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom where the
people do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence as they interact with each other,
their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by them as inherent, without
doing harm or injury to others.

D.
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we
upheld in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of
rights, thus:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include
"the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term
cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen,
but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been
endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common
welfare."[65] In accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his
faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of
liberty.[66]
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the
meaning of "liberty." It said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that
the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed.67[Citations omitted]
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of
sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments "have
gained notoriety as venue of prostitution, adultery and fornications in Manila since they
provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus
became the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers."68 Whether or not this
depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate
sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which is
constitutionally protected69 will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case.
Our holding therein retains significance for our purposes:
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and
interference demands respect. As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the words of
Laski, so very aptly stated:
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his
isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on
which his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his
isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built
out of that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he
surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be a master of
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 64

himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense
free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the
invasion of which should be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded
recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself
it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short
of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.70
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or
impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more
than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel
whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to
wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels
or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces
for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can
legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.
E.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product
and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for
the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. 71 It must also
be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive
of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between
the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even
under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to
private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. 72
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police
power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected. 73 However,
this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power
whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.74
Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising space to
candidates, this Ordinance is a blunt and heavy instrument. 75 The Ordinance makes no
distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons
engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit
activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance
shows it makes no classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to
illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified prohibition.
The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its
longtime home,76 and it is skeptical of those who wish to depict our capital city the

Pearl of the Orient as a modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah for the Third World set.
Those still steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur of Old Manila will have to
accept that Manila like all evolving big cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a
fact of mega cities such as Manila, and vice is a common problem confronted by the
modern metropolis wherever in the world. The solution to such perceived decay is not to
prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive
themselves by offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the
dynamism of individuals that would bring a new grandeur to Manila.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could
in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as
curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work
would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of
existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures
would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate
merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by
merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit
activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from
their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even
apartments.
IV.
We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The
State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its
citizens. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and
whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The
Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well
as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance
rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality
without accommodating innocuous intentions.
The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full
endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this
Court is sworn to protect.77 The notion that the promotion of public morality is a function
of the State is as old as Aristotle.78 The advancement of moral relativism as a school of
philosophy does not de-legitimize the role of morality in law, even if it may foster wider
debate on which particular behavior to penalize. It is conceivable that a society with
relatively little shared morality among its citizens could be functional so long as the
pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation of
different interests.79
To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that "you cannot legislate
morality" is ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi,
that phrase is more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate morality
will fail if they are widely at variance with public attitudes about right and wrong. 80 Our
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 65

penal laws, for one, are founded on age-old moral traditions, and as long as there are
widely accepted distinctions between right and wrong, they will remain so oriented.
Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of
the right-wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the
enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies
not with any more extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral, but
from our recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate,
and protected by the State. Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are under a
moral duty to uphold the Constitution as the embodiment of the rule of law, by reason of
their expression of consent to do so when they take the oath of office, and because they
are entrusted by the people to uphold the law.81
Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to
governance, that prerogative is hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due
process of liberty. And while the tension may often be left to the courts to relieve, it is
possible for the government to avoid the constitutional conflict by employing more
judicious, less drastic means to promote morality.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
is REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9,
is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24153 February 14, 1983
TOMAS VELASCO, LOURDES RAMIREZ, SY PIN, EDMUNDO UNSON,
APOLONIA RAMIREZ and LOURDES LOMIBAO, as component members of
the STA. CRUZ BARBERSHOP ASSOCIATION, in their own behalf and in
representation of the other owners of barbershops in the City of Manila, petitionersappellants,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, City Mayor of Manila, HON. HERMINIO A.
ASTORGA, Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Municipal Board in relation
to Republic Act 4065, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA
and EDUARDO QUINTOS SR., Chief of Police of the City of Manila, respondentsappellees.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the lower court dismissing a suit for declaratory relief
challenging the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, the
contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of
their means of livelihood without due process of law. The assailed ordinance is worded
thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business
of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber

shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located
as long as the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is
the same person." 1 As noted in the appealed order, petitioners-appellants admitted that
criminal cases for the violation of this ordinance had been previously filed and decided.
The lower court, therefore, held that a petition for declaratory relief did not lie, its
availability being dependent on there being as yet no case involving such issue having
been filed. 2
Even if such were not the case, the attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed
out in the brief of respondents-appellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives
behind its enactment are: "(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for
engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by
Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business
of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of
the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers." 3 This Court has been
most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. As far back
as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm made clear
the significance and scope of such a clause, which "delegates in statutory form the police
power to a municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide application by
municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case
been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the progressive view of
Philippine jurisprudence." 5 As it was then, so it has continued to be. 6 There is no
showing, therefore, of the unconstitutionality of such ordinance.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court is affirmed. No costs.
_______________________________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 133640 November 25, 2005
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing business under the name and style, OUR LADY
OF FATIMA BLOOD BANK, FELY G. MOSALE, doing business under the name
and style, MOTHER SEATON BLOOD BANK; PEOPLES BLOOD BANK, INC.;
MARIA VICTORIA T. VITO, M.D., doing business under the name and style,
AVENUE BLOOD BANK; JESUS M. GARCIA, M.D., doing business under the
name and style, HOLY REDEEMER BLOOD BANK, ALBERT L. LAPITAN,
doing business under the name and style, BLUE CROSS BLOOD TRANSFUSION
SERVICES; EDGARDO R. RODAS, M.D., doing business under the name and
style, RECORD BLOOD BANK, in their individual capacities and for and in behalf
of
PHILIPPINE
ASSOCIATION
OF
BLOOD
BANKS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, Respondent.
x ------------------------------------------------ x
G.R. No. 133661
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 66

DOCTORS
BLOOD
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Respondent.

CENTER, Petitioner,

x --------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 139147
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing business under the name and style, OUR LADY
OF FATIMA BLOOD BANK, FELY G. MOSALE, doing business under the name
and style, MOTHER SEATON BLOOD BANK; PEOPLES BLOOD BANK, INC.;
MARIA VICTORIA T. VITO, M.D., doing business under the name and style,
AVENUE BLOOD BANK; JESUS M. GARCIA, M.D., doing business under the
name and style, HOLY REDEEMER BLOOD BANK, ALBERT L. LAPITAN,
doing business under the name and style, BLUE CROSS BLOOD TRANSFUSION
SERVICES; EDGARDO R. RODAS, M.D., doing business under the name and
style, RECORD BLOOD BANK, in their Individual capacities and for and in behalf
of
PHILIPPINE
ASSOCIATION
OF
BLOOD
BANKS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, Respondent.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Before this Court are petitions assailing primarily the constitutionality of Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 7719, otherwise known as the "National Blood Services Act of 1994,"
and the validity of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1995 or the Rules and
Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719.
G.R. No. 133640,1 entitled "Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style,
Our Lady of Fatima Blood Bank, et al., vs. The Secretary of Health" and G.R. No.
133661,2 entitled "Doctors Blood Bank Center vs. Department of Health" are petitions
for certiorari and mandamus, respectively, seeking the annulment of the following: (1)
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719; and, (2) Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series
of 1995. Both petitions likewise pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibitory injunction
enjoining the Secretary of Health from implementing and enforcing the aforementioned
law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations; and, for a mandatory injunction
ordering and commanding the Secretary of Health to grant, issue or renew petitioners
license to operate free standing blood banks (FSBB).
The above cases were consolidated in a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 2,
1998.3
G.R. No. 139147,4 entitled "Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style,
Our Lady of Fatima Blood Bank, et al., vs. The Secretary of Health," on the other hand,
is a petition to show cause why respondent Secretary of Health should not be held in
contempt of court.

This case was originally assigned to the Third Division of this Court and later
consolidated with G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661 in a resolution dated August 4, 1999.5
Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association
of Blood Banks, a duly registered non-stock and non-profit association composed of free
standing blood banks.
Public respondent Secretary of Health is being sued in his capacity as the public official
directly involved and charged with the enforcement and implementation of the law in
question.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law
on
April
2,
1994.
The
Act
seeks
to
provide
an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by
regulating blood banks in the country. It was approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos
on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on August 18,
1994. The law took effect on August 23, 1994.
On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent
Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH).6
Section 7 of R.A. 7719 7 provides:
"Section 7. Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks - All commercial blood banks shall
be phased-out over a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable
to a maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary."
Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides:
"Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. -- The Department shall effect the phasing-out of
all commercial blood banks over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum
period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall be
based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and
public safety."8
Blood banking and blood transfusion services in the country have been arranged in four
(4) categories: blood centers run by the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC),
government-run blood services, private hospital blood banks, and commercial blood
services.
Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have
already been operating commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled
"An Act Regulating the Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the
Establishment and Operation of Blood Banks and Blood Processing Laboratories." The
law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and operation by
licensed physicians of blood banks and blood processing laboratories. The Bureau of
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 67

Research and Laboratories (BRL) was created in 1958 and was given the power to
regulate clinical laboratories in 1966 under Republic Act No. 4688. In 1971, the
Licensure Section was created within the BRL. It was given the duty to enforce the
licensure requirements for blood banks as well as clinical laboratories. Due to this
development, Administrative Order No. 156, Series of 1971, was issued. The new rules
and regulations triggered a stricter enforcement of the Blood Banking Law, which was
characterized by frequent spot checks, immediate suspension and communication of such
suspensions to hospitals, a more systematic record-keeping and frequent communication
with blood banks through monthly information bulletins. Unfortunately, by the 1980s,
financial difficulties constrained the BRL to reduce the frequency of its supervisory
visits to the blood banks.9
Meanwhile, in the international scene, concern for the safety of blood and blood products
intensified when the dreaded disease Acute Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) was
first described in 1979. In 1980, the International Society of Blood Transfusion (ISBT)
formulated the Code of Ethics for Blood Donation and Transfusion. In 1982, the first
case of transfusion-associated AIDS was described in an infant. Hence, the ISBT drafted
in 1984, a model for a national blood policy outlining certain principles that should be
taken into consideration. By 1985, the ISBT had disseminated guidelines requiring AIDS
testing of blood and blood products for transfusion. 10
In 1989, another revision of the Blood Banking Guidelines was made. The DOH issued
Administrative Order No. 57, Series of 1989, which classified banks into primary,
secondary and tertiary depending on the services they provided. The standards were
adjusted according to this classification. For instance, floor area requirements varied
according to classification level. The new guidelines likewise required Hepatitis B and
HIV testing, and that the blood bank be headed by a pathologist or a hematologist.11
In 1992, the DOH issued Administrative Order No. 118-A institutionalizing the National
Blood Services Program (NBSP). The BRL was designated as the central office
primarily responsible for the NBSP. The program paved the way for the creation of a
committee that will implement the policies of the program and the formation of the
Regional Blood Councils.
In August 1992, Senate Bill No. 1011, entitled "An Act Promoting Voluntary Blood
Donation, Providing for an Adequate Supply of Safe Blood, Regulating Blood Banks and
Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for other Purposes" was introduced in
the Senate.12
Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives, House Bills No. 384, 546, 780 and 1978
were being deliberated to address the issue of safety of the Philippine blood bank system.
Subsequently, the Senate and House Bills were referred to the appropriate committees
and subsequently consolidated.13
In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, with the assistance of the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) released its final report of a study
on the Philippine blood banking system entitled "Project to Evaluate the Safety of the

Philippine Blood Banking System." It was revealed that of the blood units collected in
1992, 64.4 % were supplied by commercial blood banks, 14.5% by the PNRC, 13.7% by
government hospital-based blood banks, and 7.4% by private hospital-based blood
banks. During the time the study was made, there were only twenty-four (24) registered
or licensed free-standing or commercial blood banks in the country. Hence, with these
numbers in mind, the study deduced that each commercial blood bank produces five
times more blood than the Red Cross and fifteen times more than the government-run
blood banks. The study, therefore, showed that the Philippines heavily relied on
commercial sources of blood. The study likewise revealed that 99.6% of the donors of
commercial blood banks and 77.0% of the donors of private-hospital based blood banks
are paid donors. Paid donors are those who receive remuneration for donating their
blood. Blood donors of the PNRC and government-run hospitals, on the other hand, are
mostly voluntary.14
It was further found, among other things, that blood sold by persons to blood commercial
banks are three times more likely to have any of the four (4) tested infections or blood
transfusion transmissible diseases, namely, malaria, syphilis, Hepatitis B and Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) than those donated to PNRC. 15
Commercial blood banks give paid donors varying rates around P50 to P150, and
because of this arrangement, many of these donors are poor, and often they are students,
who need cash immediately. Since they need the money, these donors are not usually
honest about their medical or social history. Thus, blood from healthy, voluntary donors
who give their true medical and social history are about three times much safer than
blood from paid donors.16
What the study also found alarming is that many Filipino doctors are not yet fully trained
on the specific indications for blood component transfusion. They are not aware of the
lack of blood supply and do not feel the need to adjust their practices and use of blood
and blood products. It also does not matter to them where the blood comes from. 17
On August 23, 1994, the National Blood Services Act providing for the phase out of
commercial blood banks took effect. On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9,
Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was
promulgated by DOH.
The phase-out period was extended for two years by the DOH pursuant to Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 7719 and Section 23 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Pursuant to said Act, all commercial blood banks should have been phased out by May
28, 1998. Hence, petitioners were granted by the Secretary of Health their licenses to
open and operate a blood bank only until May 27, 1998.
On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed
a petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing
the constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 68

and Regulations. The case was entitled "Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the
name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood Bank," docketed as G.R. No. 133640.
On June 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
and/or status quo ante order.18
In the aforementioned petition, petitioners assail the constitutionality of the questioned
legal provisions, namely, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and Section 23 of
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, on the following grounds: 19
1. The questioned legal provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its
Implementing Rules violate the equal protection clause for irrationally discriminating
against free standing blood banks in a manner which is not germane to the purpose of the
law;
2. The questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing
Rules represent undue delegation if not outright abdication of the police power of the
state; and,
3. The questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing
Rules are unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty.
On May 22, 1998, the Doctors Blood Center filed a similar petition for mandamus with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction before this Court entitled "Doctors Blood Center vs. Department of
Health," docketed as G.R. No. 133661. 20 This was consolidated with G.R. No. 133640.21
Similarly, the petition attacked the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7719 and its
implementing rules and regulations, thus, praying for the issuance of a license to operate
commercial blood banks beyond May 27, 1998. Specifically, with regard to Republic
Act No. 7719, the petition submitted the following questions 22 for resolution:
1. Was it passed in the exercise of police power, and was it a valid exercise of such
power?
2. Does it not amount to deprivation of property without due process?
3. Does it not unlawfully impair the obligation of contracts?
4. With the commercial blood banks being abolished and with no ready machinery to
deliver the same supply and services, does R.A. 7719 truly serve the public welfare?
On June 2, 1998, this Court issued a Resolution directing respondent DOH to file a
consolidated comment. In the same Resolution, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order (TRO) for respondent to cease and desist from implementing and enforcing Section
7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and its implementing rules and regulations until further
orders from the Court.23

On August 26, 1998, respondent Secretary of Health filed a Consolidated Comment on

the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, with
opposition to the issuance of a temporary restraining order.24
In the Consolidated Comment, respondent Secretary of Health submitted that blood from
commercial blood banks is unsafe and therefore the State, in the exercise of its police
power, can close down commercial blood banks to protect the public. He cited the record
of deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1101 which later became Republic Act No. 7719, and
the sponsorship speech of Senator Orlando Mercado.
The rationale for the closure of these commercial blood banks can be found in the
deliberations of Senate Bill No. 1011, excerpts of which are quoted below:
Senator Mercado: I am providing over a period of two years to phase out all
commercial blood banks. So that in the end, the new section would have a provision that
states:
"ALL COMMERCIAL BLOOD BANKS SHALL BE PHASED OUT OVER A
PERIOD OF TWO YEARS AFTER THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT. BLOOD
SHALL BE COLLECTED FROM VOLUNTARY DONORS ONLY AND THE
SERVICE FEE TO BE CHARGED FOR EVERY BLOOD PRODUCT ISSUED
SHALL BE LIMITED TO THE NECESSARY EXPENSES ENTAILED IN
COLLECTING AND PROCESSING OF BLOOD. THE SERVICE FEE SHALL BE
MADE UNIFORM THROUGH GUIDELINES TO BE SET BY THE
DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH."
I am supporting Mr. President, the finding of a study called "Project to Evaluate the
Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking System." This has been taken note of. This is a
study done with the assistance of the USAID by doctors under the New Tropical
Medicine Foundation in Alabang.
Part of the long-term measures proposed by this particular study is to improve laws,
outlaw buying and selling of blood and legally define good manufacturing processes for
blood. This goes to the very heart of my amendment which seeks to put into law the
principle that blood should not be subject of commerce of man.

The Presiding Officer [Senator Aquino]: What does the sponsor say?
Senator Webb: Mr. President, just for clarity, I would like to find out how the
Gentleman defines a commercial blood bank. I am at a loss at times what a commercial
blood bank really is.
Senator Mercado: We have a definition, I believe, in the measure, Mr. President.
The Presiding Officer [Senator Aquino]: It is a business where profit is considered.
Senator Mercado: If the Chairman of the Committee would accept it, we can put a
provision on Section 3, a definition of a commercial blood bank, which, as defined in
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 69

this law, exists for profit and engages in the buying and selling of blood or its
components.
Senator Webb: That is a good description, Mr. President.

Senator Mercado: I refer, Mr. President, to a letter written by Dr. Jaime Galvez-Tan,
the Chief of Staff, Undersecretary of Health, to the good Chairperson of the Committee
on Health.
In recommendation No. 4, he says:
"The need to phase out all commercial blood banks within a two-year period will give
the Department of Health enough time to build up governments capability to provide an
adequate supply of blood for the needs of the nation...the use of blood for transfusion is a
medical service and not a sale of commodity."
Taking into consideration the experience of the National Kidney Institute, which has
succeeded in making the hospital 100 percent dependent on voluntary blood donation,
here is a success story of a hospital that does not buy blood. All those who are operated
on and need blood have to convince their relatives or have to get volunteers who would
donate blood

The experience of Germany, Mr. President is illustrative of this issue. The reason why
contaminated blood was sold was that there were corners cut by commercial blood banks
in the testing process. They were protecting their profits.25
The sponsorship speech of Senator Mercado further elucidated his stand on the issue:

Senator Mercado: Today, across the country, hundreds of poverty-stricken, sickly and
weak Filipinos, who, unemployed, without hope and without money to buy the next
meal, will walk into a commercial blood bank, extend their arms and plead that their
blood be bought. They will lie about their age, their medical history. They will lie about
when they last sold their blood. For doing this, they will receive close to a hundred
pesos. This may tide them over for the next few days. Of course, until the next
bloodletting.
This same blood will travel to the posh city hospitals and urbane medical centers. This
same blood will now be bought by the rich at a price over 500% of the value for which it
was sold. Between this buying and selling, obviously, someone has made a very fast
buck.

If we give the responsibility of the testing of blood to those commercial blood banks,
they will cut corners because it will protect their profit.

Every doctor has handled at least one transfusion-related disease in an otherwise normal
patient. Patients come in for minor surgery of the hand or whatever and they leave with
hepatitis B. A patient comes in for an appendectomy and he leaves with malaria. The
worst nightmare: A patient comes in for a Caesarian section and leaves with AIDS.

In the first place, the people who sell their blood are the people who are normally in the
high-risk category. So we should stop the system of selling and buying blood so that we
can go into a national voluntary blood program.

We do not expect good blood from donors who sell their blood because of poverty. The
humane dimension of blood transfusion is not in the act of receiving blood, but in the act
of giving it

It has been said here in this report, and I quote:

For years, our people have been at the mercy of commercial blood banks that lobby their
interests among medical technologists, hospital administrators and sometimes even
physicians so that a proactive system for collection of blood from healthy donors
becomes difficult, tedious and unrewarding.

"Why is buying and selling of blood not safe? This is not safe because a donor who
expects payment for his blood will not tell the truth about his illnesses and will deny any
risky social behavior such as sexual promiscuity which increases the risk of having
syphilis or AIDS or abuse of intravenous addictive drugs. Laboratory tests are of limited
value and will not detect early infections. Laboratory tests are required only for four
diseases in the Philippines. There are other blood transmissible diseases we do not yet
screen for and there could be others where there are no tests available yet.
A blood bank owner expecting to gain profit from selling blood will also try his best to
limit his expenses. Usually he tries to increase his profit by buying cheaper reagents or
test kits, hiring cheaper manpower or skipping some tests altogether. He may also try to
sell blood even though these have infections in them. Because there is no existing system
of counterchecking these, the blood bank owner can usually get away with many
unethical practices.

The Department of Health has never institutionalized a comprehensive national program

for safe blood and for voluntary blood donation even if this is a serious public health
concern and has fallen for the linen of commercial blood bankers, hook, line and sinker
because it is more convenient to tell the patient to buy blood.
Commercial blood banks hold us hostage to their threat that if we are to close them
down, there will be no blood supply. This is true if the Government does not step in to
ensure that safe supply of blood. We cannot allow commercial interest groups to dictate
policy on what is and what should be a humanitarian effort. This cannot and will never
work because their interest in blood donation is merely monetary. We cannot expect
commercial blood banks to take the lead in voluntary blood donation. Only the
Government can do it, and the Government must do it." 26

CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 70

On May 5, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Expanded Temporary

Restraining Order for the Court to order respondent Secretary of Health to cease and
desist from announcing the closure of commercial blood banks, compelling the public to
source the needed blood from voluntary donors only, and committing similar acts "that
will ultimately cause the shutdown of petitioners blood banks." 27
On July 8, 1999, respondent Secretary filed his Comment and/or Opposition to the above
motion stating that he has not ordered the closure of commercial blood banks on account
of the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued on June 2, 1998 by the Court. In
compliance with the TRO, DOH had likewise ceased to distribute the health advisory
leaflets, posters and flyers to the public which state that "blood banks are closed or will
be closed." According to respondent Secretary, the same were printed and circulated in
anticipation of the closure of the commercial blood banks in accordance with R.A. No.
7719, and were printed and circulated prior to the issuance of the TRO. 28
On July 15, 1999, petitioners in G.R. No. 133640 filed a Petition to Show Cause Why
Public Respondent Should Not be Held in Contempt of Court, docketed as G.R. No.
139147, citing public respondents willful disobedience of or resistance to the restraining
order issued by the Court in the said case. Petitioners alleged that respondents act
constitutes circumvention of the temporary restraining order and a mockery of the
authority of the Court and the orderly administration of justice.29 Petitioners added that
despite the issuance of the temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 133640, respondent,
in his effort to strike down the existence of commercial blood banks, disseminated
misleading information under the guise of health advisories, press releases, leaflets,
brochures and flyers stating, among others, that "this year [1998] all commercial blood
banks will be closed by 27 May. Those who need blood will have to rely on government
blood banks."30 Petitioners further claimed that respondent Secretary of Health
announced in a press conference during the Blood Donors Week that commercial blood
banks are "illegal and dangerous" and that they "are at the moment protected by a
restraining order on the basis that their commercial interest is more important than the
lives of the people." These were all posted in bulletin boards and other conspicuous
places in all government hospitals as well as other medical and health centers. 31
In respondent Secretarys Comment to the Petition to Show Cause Why Public
Respondent Should Not Be Held in Contempt of Court, dated January 3, 2000, it was
explained that nothing was issued by the department ordering the closure of commercial
blood banks. The subject health advisory leaflets pertaining to said closure pursuant to
Republic Act No. 7719 were printed and circulated prior to the Courts issuance of a
temporary restraining order on June 21, 1998. 32
Public respondent further claimed that the primary purpose of the information campaign
was "to promote the importance and safety of voluntary blood donation and to educate
the public about the hazards of patronizing blood supplies from commercial blood
banks."33 In doing so, he was merely performing his regular functions and duties as the
Secretary of Health to protect the health and welfare of the public. Moreover, the DOH is
the main proponent of the voluntary blood donation program espoused by Republic Act

No. 7719, particularly Section 4 thereof which provides that, in order to ensure the
adequate supply of human blood, voluntary blood donation shall be promoted through
public education, promotion in schools, professional education, establishment of blood
services network, and walking blood donors.
Hence, by authority of the law, respondent Secretary contends that he has the duty to
promote the program of voluntary blood donation. Certainly, his act of encouraging the
public to donate blood voluntarily and educating the people on the risks associated with
blood coming from a paid donor promotes general health and welfare and which should
be given more importance than the commercial businesses of petitioners. 34
On July 29, 1999, interposing personal and substantial interest in the case as taxpayers
and citizens, a Petition-in-Intervention was filed interjecting the same arguments and
issues as laid down by petitioners in G.R. No. 133640 and 133661, namely, the
unconstitutionality of the Acts, and, the issuance of a writ of prohibitory injunction. The
intervenors are the immediate relatives of individuals who had died allegedly because of
shortage of blood supply at a critical time.35
The intervenors contended that Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes undue delegation of
legislative powers and unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty. 36
In a resolution, dated September 7, 1999, and without giving due course to the
aforementioned petition, the Court granted the Motion for Intervention that was filed by
the above intervenors on August 9, 1999.
In his Comment to the petition-in-intervention, respondent Secretary of Health stated that
the sale of blood is contrary to the spirit and letter of the Act that "blood donation is a
humanitarian act" and "blood transfusion is a professional medical service and not a sale
of commodity (Section 2[a] and [b] of Republic Act No. 7719). The act of selling blood
or charging fees other than those allowed by law is even penalized under Section 12." 37
Thus, in view of these, the Court is now tasked to pass upon the constitutionality of
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations.
In resolving the controversy, this Court deems it necessary to address the issues and/or
questions raised by petitioners concerning the constitutionality of the aforesaid Act in
G.R. No. 133640 and 133661 as summarized hereunder:
I
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 CONSTITUTES UNDUE
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER;
II
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES
AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE;
III
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 71

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES

AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE;
IV
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES
AND REGULATIONS CONSTITUTE DEPRIVATION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY
AND PROPERTY;
V
WHETHER OR NOT R.A. 7719 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER; and,
VI
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES
AND REGULATIONS TRULY SERVE PUBLIC WELFARE.
As to the first ground upon which the constitutionality of the Act is being challenged, it
is the contention of petitioners that the phase out of commercial or free standing blood
banks is unconstitutional because it is an improper and unwarranted delegation of
legislative power. According to petitioners, the Act was incomplete when it was passed
by the Legislature, and the latter failed to fix a standard to which the Secretary of Health
must conform in the performance of his functions. Petitioners also contend that the twoyear extension period that may be granted by the Secretary of Health for the phasing out
of commercial blood banks pursuant to Section 7 of the Act constrained the Secretary to
legislate, thus constituting undue delegation of legislative power.
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it
is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when
it left the hands of the Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the
administrative body or any other appointee or delegate of the Legislature. 38 Except as to
matters of detail that may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or
promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards, an act of the Legislature, as
a general rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the
discretionary powers delegated to it.39
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself.
It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to
safeguard the health of the people and has mandated several measures to attain this
objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country. The
law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of
Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing
a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. By its provisions,
it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of Health as to its execution, to
be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.

Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate

rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies. 40 The
Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to
execute the provisions of said Act. Section 11 of the Act states:
"SEC. 11. Rules and Regulations. The implementation of the provisions of the Act
shall be in accordance with the rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary,
within sixty (60) days from the approval hereof"
This is what respondent Secretary exactly did when DOH, by virtue of the administrative
bodys authority and expertise in the matter, came out with Administrative Order No.9,
series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719.
Administrative Order. No. 9 effectively filled in the details of the law for its proper
implementation.
Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the phase-out period
for commercial blood banks shall be extended for another two years until May 28, 1998
"based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and
public safety." This power to ascertain the existence of facts and conditions upon which
the Secretary may effect a period of extension for said phase-out can be delegated by
Congress. The true distinction between the power to make laws and discretion as to its
execution is illustrated by the fact that the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. 41
In this regard, the Secretary did not go beyond the powers granted to him by the Act
when said phase-out period was extended in accordance with the Act as laid out in
Section 2 thereof:
"SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy In order to promote public health, it is hereby
declared the policy of the state:
a) to promote and encourage voluntary blood donation by the citizenry and to instill
public consciousness of the principle that blood donation is a humanitarian act;
b) to lay down the legal principle that the provision of blood for transfusion is a medical
service and not a sale of commodity;
c) to provide for adequate, safe, affordable and equitable distribution of blood supply and
blood products;
d) to inform the public of the need for voluntary blood donation to curb the hazards
caused by the commercial sale of blood;
e) to teach the benefits and rationale of voluntary blood donation in the existing health
subjects of the formal education system in all public and private schools as well as the
non-formal system;
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 72

f) to mobilize all sectors of the community to participate in mechanisms for voluntary

and non-profit collection of blood;
g) to mandate the Department of Health to establish and organize a National Blood
Transfusion Service Network in order to rationalize and improve the provision of
adequate and safe supply of blood;
h) to provide for adequate assistance to institutions promoting voluntary blood donation
and providing non-profit blood services, either through a system of reimbursement for
costs from patients who can afford to pay, or donations from governmental and nongovernmental entities;
i) to require all blood collection units and blood banks/centers to operate on a non-profit
basis;
j) to establish scientific and professional standards for the operation of blood collection
units and blood banks/centers in the Philippines;
k) to regulate and ensure the safety of all activities related to the collection, storage and
banking of blood; and,
l) to require upgrading of blood banks/centers to include preventive services and
education to control spread of blood transfusion transmissible diseases."
Petitioners also assert that the law and its implementing rules and regulations violate the
equal protection clause enshrined in the Constitution because it unduly discriminates
against commercial or free standing blood banks in a manner that is not germane to the
purpose of the law.42
What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not
always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class
legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but
classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted.
The classification, however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d) must apply equally to each
member of the class.43
Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act of 1994, was enacted for the
promotion of public health and welfare. In the aforementioned study conducted by the
New Tropical Medicine Foundation, it was revealed that the Philippine blood banking
system is disturbingly primitive and unsafe, and with its current condition, the spread of
infectious diseases such as malaria, AIDS, Hepatitis B and syphilis chiefly from blood
transfusion is unavoidable. The situation becomes more distressing as the study showed
that almost 70% of the blood supply in the country is sourced from paid blood donors
who are three times riskier than voluntary blood donors because they are unlikely to
disclose their medical or social history during the blood screening. 44

The above study led to the passage of Republic Act No. 7719, to instill public
consciousness of the importance and benefits of voluntary blood donation, safe blood
supply and proper blood collection from healthy donors. To do this, the Legislature
decided to order the phase out of commercial blood banks to improve the Philippine
blood banking system, to regulate the supply and proper collection of safe blood, and so
as not to derail the implementation of the voluntary blood donation program of the
government. In lieu of commercial blood banks, non-profit blood banks or blood centers,
in strict adherence to professional and scientific standards to be established by the DOH,
shall be set in place.45
Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the law to create a situation in
which unjustifiable discrimination and inequality shall be allowed. To effectuate its
policy, a classification was made between nonprofit blood banks/centers and commercial
blood banks.
We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons:
One, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely
humanitarian reasons and as a medical service while the latter is motivated by profit.
Also, while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter treats
blood as a sale of commodity.
Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is
germane to the purpose of the law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply
of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a
humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves the
phase out of commercial blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a business
enterprise, and they source their blood supply from paid blood donors who are
considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as shown by the USAIDsponsored study on the Philippine blood banking system.
Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was
not solely to address the peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to
apply only to the existing conditions.
Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.
Having said that, this Court comes to the inquiry as to whether or not Republic Act No.
7719 constitutes a valid exercise of police power.
The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the
people is a primordial governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act
was enacted in the exercise of the States police power in order to promote and preserve
public health and safety.
Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the interference of the State; and,
(b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the objective
sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 46
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 73

In the earlier discussion, the Court has mentioned of the avowed policy of the law for the
protection of public health by ensuring an adequate supply of safe blood in the country
through voluntary blood donation. Attaining this objective requires the interference of
the State given the disturbing condition of the Philippine blood banking system.
In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of the law, the
Legislature deemed it necessary to phase out commercial blood banks. This action may
seriously affect the owners and operators, as well as the employees, of commercial blood
banks but their interests must give way to serve a higher end for the interest of the
public.
The Court finds that the National Blood Services Act is a valid exercise of the States
police power. Therefore, the Legislature, under the circumstances, adopted a course of
action that is both necessary and reasonable for the common good. Police power is the
State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare.47
It is in this regard that the Court finds the related grounds and/or issues raised by
petitioners, namely, deprivation of personal liberty and property, and violation of the
non-impairment clause, to be unmeritorious.
Petitioners are of the opinion that the Act is unconstitutional and void because it
infringes on the freedom of choice of an individual in connection to what he wants to do
with his blood which should be outside the domain of State intervention. Additionally,
and in relation to the issue of classification, petitioners asseverate that, indeed, under the
Civil Code, the human body and its organs like the heart, the kidney and the liver are
outside the commerce of man but this cannot be made to apply to human blood because
the latter can be replenished by the body. To treat human blood equally as the human
organs would constitute invalid classification. 48
Petitioners likewise claim that the phase out of the commercial blood banks will be
disadvantageous to them as it will affect their businesses and existing contracts with
hospitals and other health institutions, hence Section 7 of the Act should be struck down
because it violates the non-impairment clause provided by the Constitution.
As stated above, the State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Thus, persons may be
subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare
of the State and to this fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may
be subordinated.49
Moreover, in the case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v.
Drilon,50 settled is the rule that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield
to the loftier purposes targeted by the government. The right granted by this provision
must submit to the demands and necessities of the States power of regulation. While the
Court understands the grave implications of Section 7 of the law in question, the concern
of the Government in this case, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of

business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of
government regulation.
Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are
subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them
be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time
to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances
may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity.51 This doctrine was
reiterated in the case of Vda. de Genuino v. Court of Agrarian Relations52 where the
Court held that individual rights to contract and to property have to give way to police
power exercised for public welfare.
As for determining whether or not the shutdown of commercial blood banks will truly
serve the general public considering the shortage of blood supply in the country as
proffered by petitioners, we maintain that the wisdom of the Legislature in the lawful
exercise of its power to enact laws cannot be inquired into by the Court. Doing so would
be in derogation of the principle of separation of powers. 53
That, under the circumstances, proper regulation of all blood banks without distinction in
order to achieve the objective of the law as contended by petitioners is, of course,
possible; but, this would be arguing on what the lawmay be or should be and not what
the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of
legislation is not for this Court to pass upon.54
Finally, with regard to the petition for contempt in G.R. No. 139147, on the other hand,
the Court finds respondent Secretary of Healths explanation satisfactory. The statements
in the flyers and posters were not aimed at influencing or threatening the Court in
deciding in favor of the constitutionality of the law.
Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant
belligerence in defiance of the court.55 There is nothing contemptuous about the
statements and information contained in the health advisory that were distributed by
DOH before the TRO was issued by this Court ordering the former to cease and desist
from distributing the same.
In sum, the Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the questioned
provisions of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.
The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond
reasonable doubt.56 Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof,
unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition must
fail.

CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 74

Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of the

National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the
Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality
of the law. As to whether the Act constitutes a wise legislation, considering the issues
being raised by petitioners, is for Congress to determine. 57
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment as follows:
1. In G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, the Court UPHOLDS THE VALIDITY of Section
7 of Republic Act No. 7719, otherwise known as the National Blood Services Act of
1994, and Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. The petitions are DISMISSED. Consequently,
the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on June 2, 1998, is LIFTED.
2. In G.R. No. 139147, the petition seeking to cite the Secretary of Health in contempt of
court is DENIED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION,
NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS
MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA,
BENJAMIN
PAGCU
and
RODULFO
MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred
to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio
Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna,
Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.

Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be
participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those
in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M.,
respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed
demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M.
Salvador of the respondent Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the
parties parties
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass
demonstration at Malacaang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police
Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well as
those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in
the morning of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at
the Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang
(2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section heads. For the PBMEO (1)
Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5)
Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass
demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who
acted as spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and stated
that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed
upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do
with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed
PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the
Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not
unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company,
thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to
the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the
Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration,
who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would
be amounting to an illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked Company
represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor
Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon
meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO
representatives that while all workers may join the Malacaang demonstration, the
workers for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 75

the demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and
3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV:
NO LOCKOUT NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the
Company shall be dismiss; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the officers
shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass demonstration. The union panel
countered that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the Malacaang
demonstration will be held the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the
Company which was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as
follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING
DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers
should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the
second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on
March 4, 1969, respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4,
1969, with the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who
composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to
Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA
providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge
was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr.
(Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed, dated
April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor
Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the
existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass
demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise
of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig
policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it
was not directed against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge
Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner
PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano,
Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin
Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating
the said unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their
status as employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order
(p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell
on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order dated September 15,
1969, on the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked for ten

(10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the
Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.),
respondent Company averred that herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the
order dated September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the
amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days
from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion
for reconsideration; and that because their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days
late, it should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs. Castillo, 1 which held among
others, that a motion for extension of the five-day period for the filing of a motion for
reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp.
61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated
October 11, 1969, in support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73,
rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the motion for
reconsideration of herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the
reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein
petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on
October 24, 1969 and addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear
the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of
Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five (5) days
from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the decision, resolution or
order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for
relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their
motion for reconsideration on time was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake
committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their
counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes "K",
"K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated
October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court,
a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues
posed by the case at bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the
human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 76

civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the

largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person." 2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security
"against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of
small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with
general principles." 3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is
to withdraw "certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to
be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." 4 Laski proclaimed that
"the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by
which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to the
authority it was entitled to exercise." 5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are
included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical
aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the
ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to
talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. 6 And as Justice Douglas
cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are
not safe unless the liberties of all are protected. 7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but
also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his
full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely
in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The
citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental
officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful
sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights
over property rights is recognized. 8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable,
as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing
space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." 9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of
Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an
efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and
powerful, and of oligarchs political, economic or otherwise.

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a
preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and
political institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the
sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a
mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its
object or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive
would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the other
hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent
criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which
the State has the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr.
Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the opinion
inImbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs.
Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs.
Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against
public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women
by whom we shall be governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-ofinterests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated
by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the
danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration
was not a declaration of strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence
temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and
hence violated the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing principles governing a
democratic society, such conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration held
petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacaang was against alleged abuses of some
Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said
demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom expression in
general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular
before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers
of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual
aid protection from what they believe were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the
duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members
fro the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent
firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can
report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more
efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein
respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local
police. Was it securing peace for itself at the expenses of its workers? Was it also
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 77

intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its
workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the more weakened the position of
its laborers the alleged oppressive police who might have been all the more emboldened
thereby subject its lowly employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly
and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and
laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing
only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution the untrammelled enjoyment of
their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or
damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2
o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights.
Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and
death of the firm or its owners or its management. The employees' pathetic situation was
a stark reality abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the
peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the
employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally
affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss
can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken
in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The
wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in
anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been
sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon at once the
shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming
ideal of our enlightened civilization becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice
have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods
that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers,
not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a
violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from
employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the
collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore
inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees,
according to the respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers
the "duty ... to observe regular working hours." The strain construction of the Court of
Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to stage
mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual
tyranny over the mind and life the workers and deserves severe condemnation.
Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender ground.

The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been
legally enjoined by any court, such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom
expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or
strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that the
mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any
industrial dispute although there is concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary
stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in
the demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular
shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage to the
firm will be averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine qua non of an effective
demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union
members as well as their total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the
maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediately action on the
part of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they
raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of
expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the
circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the
participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the
absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of
disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged
police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the company two days in advance of
their projected demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to
counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its
workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union requested it to excuse only
the day-shift employees who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request
the Union reiterated in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of
March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of
human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the
Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass
demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held
against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of
the employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
III. The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the
refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join
the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of
the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of
grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section
4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the
Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the
right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(aCONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 78

1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."

complaint may be referred by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation
and action with a view to disciplining the local police officers involved.

We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of
the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against
alleged police abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of
the employees to engage in such common action to better shield themselves against such
alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the
workers for the morning and regular shift should not participate in the mass
demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of
inhibiting speech." 22

On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the
demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company,"
the respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of
loss actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only mean that the
firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether it lost
expected profits for failure to comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties
were exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that day of the
demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the customers by reason of its
failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or
products were damaged due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary,
the company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers,
cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such savings could have amply
compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason of the
absence of its workers for only one day.

Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at least equal
protection as the concerted action of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint
charging bank president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism an discrimination in the
appointment and promotion of ban employees. 23 We further ruled in the Republic
Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come within the protective mantle of
Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that
union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated," as long as the
concerted activity is for the furtherance of their interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of
respondent Court dated September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly
acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by
the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter should
not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without
previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present
who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the
following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a
violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)"
(p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from
joining the mass demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised against
the local police, were more important to them because they had the courage to proceed
with the demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to
them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the
demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a
family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their
demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But management
was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free speech,
free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the
workers proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it
thereby concedes that the evidence of such abuses should properly be submitted to the
corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such

IV. Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as
well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of
the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and
consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise
assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the
Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the wellbeing and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the
other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford
protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the
State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these
constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional
safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the
Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of
the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the
exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective
bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is
most unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very
governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed to
keep faith with its avowed mission its raison d'etre as ordained and directed by the
Constitution.
V. It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the
court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no
rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional
liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality
of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual,
who is convicted by final judgment through a forced confession, which violated his
constitutional right against self-incrimination; 25or who is denied the right to present
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 79

evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, 26even
after the accused has already served sentence for twenty-two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these
constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights
and aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been
subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic human rights of the
laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned
orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such
freedoms are imperative on all public offices including the courts 28 as well as private
citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by
mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations exercising a purely
delegate legislative power, when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the
untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of
the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the
printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to
be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be
rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these
guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the
period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a
contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he
cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the
required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay
for competent legal services. 28-a
VI. The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of
its order or writ should filed within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the
arguments in support of said motion shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of
filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of
procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative
delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from
notice on September 22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days
late. Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a
Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat
the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the
inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule
governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases,
promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The
answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the
foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by
the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional
government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and

regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and
superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations
procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule
as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional
rights affected,' but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment
thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule,
promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and
therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of
five (5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for
the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary
expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of
fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or
reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of
Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been only
one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the
unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 1969,
is based on the ground that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with
law, evidence and facts adduced during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension
of ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the
Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the
arguments were actually filed by the herein petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I",
pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day period required for the filing of such supporting
arguments counted from the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Herein petitioners
received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the
motion for reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed beyond the
reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of
time, or where the arguments in suppf such motion are filed beyond the 10 day
reglementary period provided for by the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order or
decision subject of 29-a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. But in all these
cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly and petition were not
involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available
must be specifically raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or
defense not raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue
can be raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it appears that the
determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the
very lis mota of the case without the resolution of which no final and complete
determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It is thus seen that a procedural rule of
Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant case,
the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must
likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 80

institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and in their defense to the
said charge.

as it subverts the human rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the
peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the record.

In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the
organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial
Relations rule which impinges on such human rights. 30-a

The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules
with reference to the case at is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No.
103, the C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act according
to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or
legal forms ..."

It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its
own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of
justice require." 30-b Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto.
Domingo. 30-c reiterated this principle and added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all situations without concerning
itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any
case, without further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in
court is not substantially impaired. Thus, this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari
and vice-versa. In other words, when all the material facts are spread in the records
before Us, and all the parties have been duly heard, it matters little that the error of the
court a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction. We can then and there render the
appropriate judgment. Is within the contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly
legal and within the power of this Court to strike down in an appeal acts without or in
excess of jurisdiction or committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond
the admit of its authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceed in any
error of judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of
jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not the
errors this Court has found in the decision of the Court of Appeals are short of being
jurisdiction nullities or excesses, this Court would still be on firm legal grounds should it
choose to reverse said decision here and now even if such errors can be considered as
mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid
the unnecessary return of this case to the lower court for the sole purpose of pursuing the
ordinary course of an appeal. (Emphasis supplied). 30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial Relations rule in this
particular case at bar would an unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties" which
denies justice to the herein laborers, whose basic human freedoms, including the right to
survive, must be according supremacy over the property rights of their employer firm
which has been given a full hearing on this case, especially when, as in the case at bar,
no actual material damage has be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property
rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution
renders more imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash
with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with resolution concern by the specific
guarantees outlined in the organic law. It should be stressed that the application in the
instant case Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein
respondent firm is unreasonable and therefore such application becomes unconstitutional

On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice
Barredo, speaking for the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc.,
et. al., 30-e thus:
As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for new
trial is not "newly discovered," as such term is understood in the rules of procedure for
the ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion is not binding upon the Court of
Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of
Industrial Relations shall adopt its, rules or procedure and shall have such other powers
as generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided, however, That in the hearing,
investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any
duties and power under this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not
be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such
manner as it may deem just and equitable.' By this provision the industrial court is
disengaged from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said
court is not even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue
such orders as may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future disputes. (Ang Tibay v.
C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71
Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We believe that this provision is ample enough to have
enabled the respondent court to consider whether or not its previous ruling that
petitioners constitute a minority was founded on fact, without regard to the technical
meaning of newly discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua
Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578). (emphasis supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the
instant case is to rule in effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert
competent lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary of human freedoms secured to them
by the fundamental law, simply because their counsel erroneously believing that he
received a copy of the decision on September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969 filed his motion for reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is only one
day late considering that September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they ceased to be
instruments of justice, for the attainment of which such rules have been devised.
Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a
unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 81

As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315
[1910]. The Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat.
Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy
v. Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as far back as 1910, "technicality.
when it deserts its proper-office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and
chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this
Court has remained committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil.
124 [1936]) was of a similar mind. For him the interpretation of procedural rule should
never "sacrifice the ends justice." While "procedural laws are no other than
technicalities" view them in their entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends themselves for
the compliance with which courts have organized and function, but as means conducive
to the realization the administration of the law and of justice (Ibid., p.,128). We have
remained steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a
sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in altar of sophisticated technicalities with
impairment of the sacred principles of justice." (Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104
Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly put by Justice Makalintal, they "should give way to
the realities of the situation." (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA
1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point promulgated in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968,
23 SCRA citing McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice
Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation of Justice Labrador that rules of procedure
"are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense"; but are intended "to help secure
substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g

Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:

Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given
effect, the dismissal or termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders
of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence from work. The respondent Court itself
recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not include the dismissal of the
other 393 employees who are members of the same Union and who participated in the
demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the
Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not officers, were not dismissed and
only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named as respondents
in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's
Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm
insinuates that not all the 400 or so employee participated in the demonstration, for
which reason only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in the
unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not
all, of the morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a
consequence, the firm continued in operation that day and did not sustain any damage.

Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete
lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are
being subjected to indignities by the local police, It was more expedient for the firm to
conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms
and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer
opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent company
assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure and implement
selfishness, if not greed.

The appropriate penalty if it deserves any penalty at all should have been simply to
charge said one-day absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight
(8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union
leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as well as that of their respective
families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time
strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.

The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously seek to
destroy our system of Government, but from men of goodwill good men who allow
their proper concerns to blind them to the fact that what they propose to accomplish
involves an impairment of liberty.
... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember,
however, is thatpreservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A suppression of
liberty has the same effect whether the suppress or be a reformer or an outlaw. The only
protection against misguided zeal is a constant alertness of the infractions of the
guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the
demands of the moment makes easier another, larger surrender. The battle over the Bill
of Rights is a never ending one.
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel secure
because we belong to a group that is important and respected, we must recognize that
our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that we in all honor and
good conscience must be observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.

Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the
petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8) employees for having written and published "a
patently libelous letter ... to the Bank president demanding his resignation on the grounds
of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in
the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming
that the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they
were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of
their right of self organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and
protection, (Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act ...) This is the view of some members
of this Court. For, as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a
small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted
activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 82

involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416

[1949]).
xxx xxx xxx
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their
grievances.
xxx xxx xxx
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the
respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of
self-organization of employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB 324
U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge for cause (Philippine
Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied.
The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the right of the employer
to select his employees or to discharge them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that
right by interfering with the countervailing right of self organization (Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S. 177 [1941])...
xxx xxx xxx
In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct,
identified as an interference with the employees' right of self-organization or as a
retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor
practice within the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act.
(Emphasis supplied.) 33
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in
the Republic Savings case, supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity
of the bank president no less, such recognition and protection for free speech, free
assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more imperative
in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against the company nor any of
its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from
the date of their separation from the service until re instated, minus one day's pay and
whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during their separation
from the service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.
_____________________________________
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
[MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President,
HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director,
Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as
Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette
or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette
of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234,
265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415,
427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644,
658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 10601061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808,
1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153,
155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291,
293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370,
382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561,
576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726,
837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529,
1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 16061609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 17371742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 18021804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 18391840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889,
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 83

1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 20302044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507,
509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568,
570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92,
94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright
on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant
petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal
personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties"
within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect
the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason
of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a
public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not
show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs.
Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of
mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has
some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the
public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved
[Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of
public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public
duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose
instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested
in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual,
as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General
to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay,
Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that
the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought
to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not
be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a
general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because,
if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself
is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel
for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those
in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings
no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the
Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be
enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding,
it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same,
considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to
represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question
contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official
Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on
Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said
article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official
Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law
itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the
effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes
applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does
not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 84

provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638
provides as follows:

executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. 6

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative
acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all
executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published;
[4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by
law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines
shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which
he may authorize so to be published. ...

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or
"of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate
notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication
of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon
the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are
kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan
Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative recordsno such
publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without
publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have
actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the
specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo
la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales
decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las
mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be
published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon
respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional
right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance
and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official
Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as
to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of
the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the
Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts
of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain
their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which
have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court,
quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts
done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only
during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's
declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to
their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this
Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage
District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been
found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights
and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton
v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559,
566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official.
Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations
deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the
nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the
right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor
before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their
publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 85

which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the
presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive,
have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can
be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter
may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented
or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice
Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents
of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected
thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials
considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of
policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have
been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some
criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written
opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would
unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for
unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would
arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any
legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such

publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic
standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be
admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under
all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the
same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me,
raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the
interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of
effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the
Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now
applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my
mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute
or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana.
Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this
case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said
though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before
they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the
Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement
with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it
requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law
without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds
that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the
government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would
indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if
it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not
prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure
once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of
its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect
of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could
be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance
with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in
the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on
such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could
still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our
decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal
prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases
though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still
be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or
executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of
balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 86

traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.

That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm
that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general
application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the
Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule
as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided."
Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It
does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later
legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a
different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin
that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official
Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too
far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself
therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.

Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different
effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has
been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise
that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain
respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity
and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their
effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and
essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient
of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period
generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of
effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that
proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree
becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it
will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity
mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will
run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of
Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published
and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject
to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently
stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable
opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey
before they can be punished for its violation, 1 citing the settled principle based on due
process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and
the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for
their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the
guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be
bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette.
The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in
the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said
laws already provide for their effectivity date.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay
concur in this separate opinion.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil
Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for
the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the
provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they
are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only
laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official
Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does
not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it
clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its
effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall
be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for
their effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply
"An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette."
Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines
its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 87

Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the
Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public
nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders
and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that
not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only
"important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that
publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it
should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an
earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or
restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when
and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that
role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws
become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is
elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall
be by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of
such publication being in the Official Gazette.

This defendant is charged of the crime of Violation of Municipal Ordinance in an

information filed by the provincial Fiscal, dated October 9, 1968, as follows:
That in the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in the Municipality of Pagbilao, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being then the owner and operator of a fishpond situated in the barrio of
Pinagbayanan, of said municipality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously refuse and fail to pay the municipal taxes in the total amount of THREE
HUNDRED SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTY TWO CENTAVOS (P362.62), required
of him as fishpond operator as provided for under Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as
amended, inspite of repeated demands made upon him by the Municipal Treasurer of
Pagbilao, Quezon, to pay the same.
Contrary to law.
For the prosecution the following witnesses testified in substance as follows;
MIGUEL FRANCIA, 39 years of age, married, farmer and resident of Lopez, Quezon
In 1962 to 1967, I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. I know the accused as I
worked in his fishpond in 1962 to 1964. The fishpond of Nazario is at Pinagbayanan,
Pagbilao, Quezon. I worked in the clearing of the fishpond, the construction of the dikes
and the catching of fish.
On cross-examination, this witness declared:

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I worked with the accused up to March 1964.

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a
public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

NICOLAS MACAROLAY, 65 years of age, married, copra maker and resident of

Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon

________________________

I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon since 1959 up to the present. I know the
accused since 1959 when he opened a fishpond at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. He
still operates the fishpond up to the present and I know this fact as I am the barrio captain
of Pinagbayanan.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44143 August 31, 1988
THE
PEOPLE
OF
vs.
EUSEBIO NAZARIO, accused-appellant.

THE

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,

SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner was charged with violation of certain municipal ordinances of the
municipal council of Pagbilao, in Quezon province. By way of confession and
avoidance, the petitioner would admit having committed the acts charged but would
claim that the ordinances are unconstitutional, or, assuming their constitutionality, that
they do not apply to him in any event.
The facts are not disputed:

On cross-examination, this witness declared:

I came to know the accused when he first operated his fishpond since 1959.
On re-direct examination, this witness declared:
I was present during the catching of fish in 1967 and the accused was there.
On re-cross examination, this witness declared:
I do not remember the month in 1962 when the accused caught fish.
RODOLFO R. ALVAREZ, 45 years old, municipal treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon,
married

CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 88

As Municipal Treasurer I am in charge of tax collection. I know the accused even before
I was Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao. I have written the accused a letter asking him to
pay his taxes (Exhibit B). Said letter was received by the accused as per registry return
receipt, Exhibit B-1. The letter demanded for payment of P362.00, more or less, by way
of taxes which he did not pay up to the present. The former Treasurer, Ceferino
Caparros, also wrote a letter of demand to the accused (Exhibit C). On June 28, 1967, I
sent a letter to the Fishery Commission (Exhibit D), requesting information if accused
paid taxes with that office. The Commission sent me a certificate (Exhibits D-1, D-2 &
D-3). The accused had a fishpond lease agreement. The taxes unpaid were for the years
1964, 1965 and 1966.
On cross-examination, this witness declared:
I have demanded the taxes for 38.10 hectares.
On question of the court, this witness declared:
What I was collecting from the accused is the fee on fishpond operation, not rental.
The prosecution presented as part of their evidence Exhibits A, A-1, A-2, B, B-2, C, D,
D-1, D-2, D-3, E, F, F-1 and the same were admitted by the court, except Exhibits D, D1, D-2 and D-3 which were not admitted for being immaterial.
For the defense the accused EUSEBIO NAZARIO, 48 years of age, married, owner and
general manager of the ZIP Manufacturing Enterprises and resident of 4801 Old Sta.
Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, declared in substance as follows:
I have lived in Sta. Mesa, Manila, since 1949. I buy my Residence Certificates at Manila
or at San Juan. In 1964, 1965 and 1966, I was living in Manila and my business is in
Manila and my family lives at Manila. I never resided at Pagbilao, Quezon. I do not own
a house at Pagbilao. I am a lessee of a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon, and I have a
lease agreement to that effect with the Philippine Fisheries Commission marked as
Exhibit 1. In 1964, 1965 and 1966, the contract of lease, Exhibit 1, was still existing and
enforceable. The Ordinances Nos. 4, 15 and 12, series of 1955, 1965 and 1966, were
translated into English by the Institute of National Language to better understand the
ordinances. There were exchange of letters between me and the Municipal Treasurer of
Pagbilao regarding the payment of the taxes on my leased fishpond situated at Pagbilao.
There was a letter of demand for the payment of the taxes by the treasurer (Exhibit 3)
which I received by mail at my residence at Manila. I answered the letter of demand,
Exhibit 3, with Exhibit 3-A. I requested an inspection of my fishpond to determine its
condition as it was not then in operation. The Municipal Treasurer Alvarez went there
once in 1967 and he found that it was destroyed by the typhoon and there were pictures
taken marked as Exhibits 4, 4-A, 4-B and 4C. I received another letter of demand,
Exhibit 5, and I answered the same (Exhibit 5-A). I copied my reference quoted in
Exhibit 5-A from Administrative Order No. 6, Exhibit 6. I received another letter of
demand from Tomas Ornedo, Acting Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao, dated February
16, 1966, Exhibit 7, and I answered the same with the letter marked as Exhibit 7-A,
dated February 26, 1966. I received another letter of demand from Treasurer Alvarez of

Pagbilao, Exhibit 8, and I answered the same (Exhibit 8-A). In 1964, I went to Treasurer
Caparros to ask for an application for license tax and he said none and he told me just to
pay my taxes. I did not pay because up to now I do not know whether I am covered by
the Ordinance or not. The letters of demand asked me to pay different amounts for taxes
for the fishpond. Because under Sec. 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code,
municipal taxes lapse if not paid and they are collecting on a lapsed ordinance. Because
under the Tax Code, fishermen are exempted from percentage tax and privilege tax.
There is no law empowering the municipality to pass ordinance taxing fishpond
operators.
The defense presented as part of their evidence Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 3-A, 4, 4-B, 4-B, 4-C, 5,
5-A, 6, 6-A, 6-B, 6-C, 7, 7-A, 8 and 8-A and the same were admitted by the court.
From their evidence the prosecution would want to show to the court that the accused, as
lessee or operator of a fishpond in the municipality of Pagbilao, refused, and still refuses,
to pay the municipal taxes for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in violation of Municipal
Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 15, series of
1965, and finally amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966.
On the other hand, the accused, by his evidence, tends to show to the court that the taxes
sought to be collected have already lapsed and that there is no law empowering
municipalities to pass ordinances taxing fishpond operators. The defense, by their
evidence, tried to show further that, as lessee of a forest land to be converted into a
fishpond, he is not covered by said municipal ordinances; and finally that the accused
should not be taxed as fishpond operator because there is no fishpond yet being operated
by him, considering that the supposed fishpond was under construction during the period
covered by the taxes sought to be collected.
Finally, the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ultra vires as it is outside
of the power of the municipal council of Pagbilao, Quezon, to enact; and that the
defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ambiguous and uncertain.
There is no question from the evidences presented that the accused is a lessee of a parcel
of forest land, with an area of 27.1998 hectares, for fishpond purposes, under Fishpond
Lease Agreement No. 1066, entered into by the accused and the government, through the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on August 21, 1959.
There is no question from the evidences presented that the 27.1998 hectares of land
leased by the defendant from the government for fishpond purposes was actually
converted into fishpond and used as such, and therefore defendant is an operator of a
fishpond within the purview of the ordinance in question. 1
The trial Court 2 returned a verdict of guilty and disposed as follows:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4,
series of 1955, as amended by Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965 and further amended by
Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao, Quezon; and
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 89

hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P50.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency at the rate of P8.00 a day, and to pay the costs of this proceeding.
SO ORDERED. 3
In this appeal, certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner alleges that:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 4,
SERIES OF 1955, AS AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 15, SERIES OF 1965, AND
AS FURTHER AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 12, SERIES OF 1966, OF THE
MUNICIPALITY OF PAGBILAO, QUEZON, IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING
AMBIGUOUS AND UNCERTAIN.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDINANCE IN
QUESTION, AS AMENDED, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING EX POST
FACTO.
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDINANCE IN
QUESTION COVERS ONLY OWNERS OR OVERSEER OF FISHPONDS OF
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND NOT TO LESSEES OF PUBLIC LANDS.
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE QUESTIONED
ORDINANCE, EVEN IF VALID, CANNOT BE ENFORCED BEYOND THE
TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF PAGBILAO AND DOES NOT COVER NONRESIDENTS. 4
The ordinances in question are Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, Ordinance No. 15, series
of 1965, and Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao.
Insofar as pertinent to this appeal, the salient portions thereof are hereinbelow quoted:
Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of
Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare of
fishpond on part thereof per annum. 5
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. l (a). For the convenience of those who have or owners or managers of fishponds
within the territorial limits of this municipality, the date of payment of municipal tax
relative thereto, shall begin after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said
fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries. 6
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of
Pagbilao shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare or any fraction
thereof per annum beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started
operating before the year 1964. 7
The first objection refers to the ordinances being allegedly "ambiguous and
uncertain." 8 The petitioner contends that being a mere lessee of the fishpond, he is not

covered since the said ordinances speak of "owner or manager." He likewise maintains
that they are vague insofar as they reckon the date of payment: Whereas Ordinance No. 4
provides that parties shall commence payment "after the lapse of three (3) years starting
from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries." 9 Ordinance No. 12
states that liability for the tax accrues "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if
the fishpond started operating before the year 1964." 10
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application." 11 It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either
a saving clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 12 the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more
persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying
to persons passing by." 13 Clearly, the ordinance imposed no standard at all "because one
may never know in advance what 'annoys some people but does not annoy others.' " 14
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a "perfectly vague" 15 act whose obscurity
is evident on its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from legislation couched in
imprecise language but which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively
phrased in which case, it may be "saved" by proper construction.
It must further be distinguished from statutes that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly
applicable to certain types of activities. In that event, such statutes may not be challenged
whenever directed against such activities. In Parker v. Levy, 16 a prosecution originally
under the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice (prohibiting, specifically, "conduct
unbecoming an officer and gentleman"), the defendant, an army officer who had urged
his men not to go to Vietnam and called the Special Forces trained to fight there thieves
and murderers, was not allowed to invoke the void for vagueness doctrine on the premise
that accepted military interpretation and practice had provided enough standards, and
consequently, a fair notice that his conduct was impermissible.
It is interesting that in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 17 a divided Court sustained
an act of Congress (Republic Act No. 4880 penalizing "the too early nomination of
candidates" 18 limiting the election campaign period, and prohibiting "partisan political
activities"), amid challenges of vagueness and overbreadth on the ground that the law
had included an "enumeration of the acts deemed included in the terms 'election
campaign' or 'partisan political activity" 19 that would supply the standards. "As thus
limited, the objection that may be raised as to vagueness has been minimized, if not
totally set at rest." 20 In his opinion, however, Justice Sanchez would stress that the
conduct sought to be prohibited "is not clearly defined at all." 21 "As worded in R.A
4880, prohibited discussion could cover the entire spectrum of expression relating to
candidates and political parties." 22 He was unimpressed with the "restrictions"
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 90

Fernando's opinion had relied on: " 'Simple expressions of opinions and thoughts
concerning the election' and expression of 'views on current political problems or issues'
leave the reader conjecture, to guesswork, upon the extent of protection offered, be it as
to the nature of the utterance ('simple expressions of opinion and thoughts') or the subject
of the utterance ('current political problems or issues')." 23
The Court likewise had occasion to apply the "balancing-of-interests" test, 24 insofar as
the statute's ban on early nomination of candidates was concerned: "The rational
connection between the prohibition of Section 50-A and its object, the indirect and
modest scope of its restriction on the rights of speech and assembly, and the embracing
public interest which Congress has found in the moderation of partisan political activity,
lead us to the conclusion that the statute may stand consistently with and does not offend
the Constitution." 25 In that case, Castro would have the balance achieved in favor of
State authority at the "expense" of individual liberties.
In the United States, which had ample impact on Castro's separate opinion, the balancing
test finds a close kin, referred to as the "less restrictive alternative " 26 doctrine, under
which the court searches for alternatives available to the Government outside of statutory
limits, or for "less drastic means" 27 open to the State, that would render the statute
unnecessary. In United States v. Robel, 28 legislation was assailed, banning members of
the (American) Communist Party from working in any defense facility. The U.S.
Supreme Court, in nullifying the statute, held that it impaired the right of association,
and that in any case, a screening process was available to the State that would have
enabled it to Identify dangerous elements holding defense positions. 29 In that event, the
balance would have been struck in favor of individual liberties.
It should be noted that it is in free expression cases that the result is usually close. It is
said, however, that the choice of the courts is usually narrowed where the controversy
involves say, economic rights, 30 or as in the Levycase, military affairs, in which less
precision in analysis is required and in which the competence of the legislature is
presumed.
In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. It is
unmistakable from their very provisions that the appellant falls within its coverage. As
the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term " manager." He does not
deny the fact that he financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish fries into
the fishponds, and had employed laborers to maintain them. 31 While it appears that it is
the National Government which owns them, 32 the Government never shared in the
profits they had generated. It is therefore only logical that he shoulders the burden of tax
under the said ordinances.
We agree with the trial court that the ordinances are in the character of revenue
measures 33 designed to assist the coffers of the municipality of Pagbilao. And obviously,
it cannot be the owner, the Government, on whom liability should attach, for one thing,
upon the ancient principle that the Government is immune from taxes and for another,
since it is not the Government that had been making money from the venture.

Suffice it to say that as the actual operator of the fishponds in question, and as the
recipient of profits brought about by the business, the appellant is clearly liable for the
municipal taxes in question. He cannot say that he did not have a fair notice of such a
liability to make such ordinances vague.
Neither are the said ordinances vague as to dates of payment. There is no merit to the
claim that "the imposition of tax has to depend upon an uncertain date yet to be
determined (three years after the 'approval of the fishpond' by the Bureau of Fisheries,
and upon an uncertain event (if the fishpond started operating before 1964), also to be
determined by an uncertain individual or individuals." 34 Ordinance No. 15, in making
the tax payable "after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is
approved by the Bureau of Fisheries," 35 is unequivocal about the date of payment, and
its amendment by Ordinance No. 12, reckoning liability thereunder "beginning and
taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964
," 36 does not give rise to any ambiguity. In either case, the dates of payment have been
definitely established. The fact that the appellant has been allegedly uncertain about the
reckoning dates as far as his liability for the years 1964, 1965, and 1966 is concerned
presents a mere problem in computation, but it does not make the ordinances vague.
In addition, the same would have been at most a difficult piece of legislation, which is
not unfamiliar in this jurisdiction, but hardly a vague law.
As it stands, then, liability for the tax accrues on January 1, 1964 for fishponds in
operation prior thereto (Ordinance No. 12), and for new fishponds, three years after their
approval by the Bureau of Fisheries (Ordinance No. 15). This is so since the amendatory
act (Ordinance No. 12) merely granted amnesty unto old, delinquent fishpond operators.
It did not repeal its mother ordinances (Nos. 4 and 15). With respect to new operators,
Ordinance No. 15 should still prevail.
To the Court, the ordinances in question set forth enough standards that clarify imagined
ambiguities. While such standards are not apparent from the face thereof, they are visible
from the intent of the said ordinances.
The next inquiry is whether or not they can be said to be ex post facto measures. The
appellant argues that they are: "Amendment No. 12 passed on September 19, 1966,
clearly provides that the payment of the imposed tax shall "beginning and taking effect
from the year 1964, if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964.' In other
words, it penalizes acts or events occurring before its passage, that is to say, 1964 and
even prior thereto."37
The Court finds no merit in this contention. As the Solicitor General notes, "Municipal
Ordinance No. 4 was passed on May 14, 1955. 38 Hence, it cannot be said that the
amendment (under Ordinance No. 12) is being made to apply retroactively (to 1964)
since the reckoning period is 1955 (date of enactment). Essentially, Ordinances Nos. 12
and 15 are in the nature of curative measures intended to facilitate and enhance the
collection of revenues the originally act, Ordinance No. 4, had prescribed. 39 Moreover,
the act (of non-payment of the tax), had been, since 1955, made punishable, and it cannot
be said that Ordinance No. 12 imposes a retroactive penalty. As we have noted, it
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 91

operates to grant amnesty to operators who had been delinquent between 1955 and 1964.
It does not mete out a penalty, much less, a retrospective one.

Manila, Philippines, September 17, 1968.

The appellant assails, finally, the power of the municipal council of Pagbilao to tax
"public forest land." 40 In Golden Ribbon Lumber Co., Inc. v. City of Butuan 41 we held
that local governments' taxing power does not extend to forest products or concessions
under Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Act then in force. (Republic Act No.
2264 likewise prohibited municipalities from imposing percentage taxes on sales.)

Judge 1

First of all, the tax in question is not a tax on property, although the rate thereof is based
on the area of fishponds ("P3.00 per hectare" 42). Secondly, fishponds are not forest
lands, although we have held them to the agricultural lands. 43By definition, "forest" is "a
large tract of land covered with a natural growth of trees and underbush; a large
wood." 44(Accordingly, even if the challenged taxes were directed on the fishponds, they
would not have been taxes on forest products.)

City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:

They are, more accurately, privilege taxes on the business of fishpond maintenance.
They are not charged against sales, which would have offended the doctrine enshrined
by Golden Ribbon Lumber, 45 but rather on occupation, which is allowed under Republic
Act No. 2264. 46 They are what have been classified as fixed annual taxes and this is
obvious from the ordinances themselves.
There is, then, no merit in the last objection.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. Costs against the appellant.

(SGD.) FRANCISCO ARCA

The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on
February 22, 1968 and signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas of
Manila on March 27, 1968. 2

AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN

OF THE PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT
OR TO BE ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST SECURING AN
EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES. 3
Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 4 prohibits aliens from being employed or to
engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein,
whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit
from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons employed
in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance
programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those
working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or
congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.
Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three (3)
months to six (6) months or fine of not less than P100.00 but not more than P200.00 or
both such fine and imprisonment, upon conviction. 5

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978
MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner,
vs.
HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents.

On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in
Manila, filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, denominated
as Civil Case No. 72797, praying for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a
judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and void. 6

FERNANDEZ, J.:

In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the following as his grounds for
wanting the ordinance declared null and void:

This is a petition for certiorari to review tile decision dated September 17, 1968 of
respondent Judge Francisco Arca of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, in
Civil Case No. 72797, the dispositive portion of winch reads.

1) As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City of Manila, Ordinance

No. 6537 is discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation;

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the
respondents, declaring Ordinance No. 6 37 of the City of Manila null and void. The
preliminary injunction is made permanent. No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.

2) As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful

occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to
the cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the
action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of
legislative powers:
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 92

3) It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus,
deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. 7
On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on
September 17, 1968 rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and
making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction. 8
Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent Judge, then Mayor Antonio J. Villegas
filed the present petition on March 27, 1969. Petitioner assigned the following as errors
allegedly committed by respondent Judge in the latter's decision of September 17,1968: 9
I. THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR
OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE CARDINAL
RULE OF UNIFORMITY OF TAXATION.
II. RESPONDENT JUDGE LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE AND PATENT
ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE
PRINCIPLE AGAINST UNDUE DESIGNATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
III. RESPONDENT JUDGE FURTHER COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT
ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE DUE
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION.
Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null and
void on the ground that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because the rule on
uniformity of taxation applies only to purely tax or revenue measures and that Ordinance
No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure but is an exercise of the police power of the
state, it being principally a regulatory measure in nature.
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because
its principal purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the first part
which requires that the alien shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves
the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of
applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second
part which requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a
revenue measure. There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who
have been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to
raise money under the guise of regulation.
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to
consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are
required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not
forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and
substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular
legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien
whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly
employee or a highly paid executive

Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in
the exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality
fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action,
expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for
its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary
and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance
is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an
activity per se lawful. 10
In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization Board, 11 where a law
granted a government agency power to determine the allocation of wheat flour among
importers, the Supreme Court ruled against the interpretation of uncontrolled power as it
vested in the administrative officer an arbitrary discretion to be exercised without a
policy, rule, or standard from which it can be measured or controlled.
It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso 12 that the authority and discretion to grant and
refuse permits of all classes conferred upon the Mayor of Manila by the Revised Charter
of Manila is not uncontrolled discretion but legal discretion to be exercised within the
limits of the law.
Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or
criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted to him
by the ordinance.
The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the
Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of
Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic
right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true
that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an
alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This
guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due
process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. 13
The trial court did not commit the errors assigned.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 93

two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the
discretion of the court.
The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:
(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45987

May 5, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CAYAT, defendant-appellant.
MORAN, J.:
Prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), the accused, Cayat, a native of
Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, was sentenced by the justice of the peace court of
Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos (P5) or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. On appeal of the Court of First Instance, the following information was filed
against him:
That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of
the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused,
Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and illegally receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under his
control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the socalled native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed
themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.
Accused interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, he admitted all the
facts alleged in the information, but pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons
adduced in his demurrer and submitted the case on the pleadings. The trial court found
him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pesos (P50) or
supper subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The case is now before this court
on appeal. Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 read:
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a
non-Christian tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and
ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale,
beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and
liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make
prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be
the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any
provincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such
liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe.
SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act
shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding

(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and.
(3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state.
Counsel for the appellant holds out his brief as the "brief for the non-Christian tribes." It
is said that as these less civilized elements of the Filipino population are "jealous of their
rights in a democracy," any attempt to treat them with discrimination or "mark them as
inferior or less capable rate or less entitled" will meet with their instant challenge. As the
constitutionality of the Act here involved is questioned for purposes thus mentioned, it
becomes imperative to examine and resolve the issues raised in the light of the policy of
the government towards the non-Christian tribes adopted and consistently followed from
the Spanish times to the present, more often with sacrifice and tribulation but always
with conscience and humanity.
As early as 1551, the Spanish Government had assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude
toward these inhabitants, and in the different laws of the Indies, their concentration in socalled "reducciones" (communities) have been persistently attempted with the end in
view of according them the "spiritual and temporal benefits" of civilized life. Throughout
the Spanish regime, it had been regarded by the Spanish Government as a sacred "duty to
conscience and humanity" to civilize these less fortunate people living "in the obscurity
of ignorance" and to accord them the "the moral and material advantages" of community
life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws." (Decree of the
Governor-General of the Philippines, Jan. 14, 1887.) This policy had not been deflected
from during the American period. President McKinley in his instructions to the
Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, said:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the
same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American
Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government, and under which many of
those tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which
they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal government should, however, be
subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant
and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce
civilized customs.
Since then and up to the present, the government has been constantly vexed with the
problem of determining "those practicable means of bringing about their advancement in
civilization and material prosperity." (See, Act No. 253.) "Placed in an alternative of
either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization," the present
government "has chosen to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with humanity
and with the national conscience." (Memorandum of Secretary of the Interior, quoted in
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 94

Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660, 714.) To this end, their homes and
firesides have been brought in contact with civilized communities through a network of
highways and communications; the benefits of public education have to them been
extended; and more lately, even the right of suffrage. And to complement this policy of
attraction and assimilation, the Legislature has passed Act No. 1639 undoubtedly to
secure for them the blessings of peace and harmony; to facilitate, and not to mar, their
rapid and steady march to civilization and culture. It is, therefore, in this light that the
Act must be understood and applied.
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation
based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not
be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the
same class. (Borgnis vs.Falk Co., 133 N.W., 209; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61; 55 Law. ed., Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660; People
and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. Vera and Cu Unjieng, 37 Off. Gaz .,
187.)
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and
substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon
"accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the degree
of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief,
but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine
Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from
settled communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) This distinction is
unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions
existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof
who at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers,
cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.
That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy,
receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating
liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members
of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this
Act.," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the nonChristian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the
lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian
tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the
government to raise their standard of life and civilization.
The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its
enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act
was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the assumption that the nonChristians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the Legislature

understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with
it must go measures of protection and security.
Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal
thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by
reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its
application.
Appellants contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or
other duly authorized agent of the government to seize and forthwith destroy any
prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of the nonChristian tribes is violative of the due process of law provided in the Constitution. But
this provision is not involved in the case at bar. Besides, to constitute due process of law,
notice and hearing are not always necessary. This rule is especially true where much
must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to particular
cases. (McGehee, Due Process of Law p. 371, cited with approval in Rubivs. Provincial
Board of Mindoro, supra.) Due process of law means simply: (1) that there shall be a law
prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the
government; (2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation; (3) that it shall be enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and (4) that it shall be
applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of the class. (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan, 10
Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal by the United States Supreme Court, 218 U.S., 302: 54
Law. ed., 1049.) Thus, a person's property may be seized by the government in payment
of taxes without judicial hearing; or property used in violation of law may be confiscated
(U.S. vs. Surla, 20 Phil., 163, 167), or when the property constitutes corpus delicti, as in
the instant case (Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil., 439, 442).
Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said
that the police power is the most insistent and least limitable of all powers of the
government. It has been aptly described as a power co-extensive with self-protection and
constitutes the law of overruling necessity. Any measure intended to promote the health,
peace, morals, education and good order of the people or to increase the industries of the
state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity (Barbier vs. Connolly,
113 U.S., 27), is a legitimate exercise of the police power, unless shown to be whimsical
or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual, the same must be
upheld.
Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the nonChristian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and,
eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian
brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a
view to a greater Philippines.
The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less
capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the
public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in
tht enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 95

can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the
government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and
civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in
view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. It is
indeed gratifying that the non-Christian tribes "far from retrograding, are definitely
asserting themselves in a competitive world," as appellant's attorney impressively avers,
and that they are "a virile, up-and -coming people eager to take their place in the world's
social scheme." As a matter of fact, there are now lawyers, doctors and other
professionals educated in the best institutions here and in America. Their active
participation in the multifarious welfare activities of community life or in the delicate
duties of government is certainly a source of pride and gratification to people of the
Philippines. But whether conditions have so changed as to warrant a partial or complete
abrogation of the law, is a matter which rests exclusively within the prerogative of the
National Assembly to determine. In the constitutional scheme of our government, this
court can go no farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had the power to enact the
law. If the power exists, and we hold it does exist, the wisdom of the policy adopted, and
the adequacy under existing conditions of the measures enacted to forward it, are matters
which this court has no authority to pass upon. And, if in the application of the law, the
educated non-Christians shall incidentally suffer, the justification still exists in the allcomprehending principle of salus populi suprema est lex. When the public safety or the
public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of persons,
the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any
incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private
interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation (Cf. Boston
Beer Co. vs. Mass., 97 U.S., 25; 24 law. ed., 989).
Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
________________________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23794

February 17, 1968

ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC
CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC
CITY, defendants-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed 1 Ordinance No.
4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per
centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign
countries." 2

Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
on March 20, 1964 for P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total of
P12,087.50.
On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, with service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a
complaint 3 against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and
Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of
the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of
taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution), aside from being an export tax forbidden
under Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code. It further alleged that the tax is
neither a production nor a license tax which Ormoc City under Section 15-kk of its
charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, otherwise known as the Local
Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; and that the tax amounts to a customs duty, fee
or charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 because the tax
is on both the sale and export of sugar.
Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant
city's power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the
afore-cited constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and submission of the case on
memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that
upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant
chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes,
licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.
Appeal therefrom was directly taken to Us by plaintiff Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc. Appellant alleges the same statutory and constitutional violations in the aforesaid
taxing ordinance mentioned earlier.
Section 1 of the ordinance states: "There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any
and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company,
Incorporated, in Ormoc City, a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per
export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." Though referred
to as a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the
sugar produced is exported.
Appellant questions the authority of the defendant Municipal Board to levy such
an export tax, in view of Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which denies
from municipal councils the power to impose an export tax. Section 2287 in part states:
"It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form
whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same,
and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an
unreasonable charge for wharfage use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void."
Subsequently, however, Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 effective June 19, 1959,
gave chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts authority to levy for public
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 96

purposes just and uniform taxes, licenses or fees. Anent the inconsistency between
Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act 2264,
this Court, in Nin Bay Mining Co. v. Municipality of Roxas 4 held the former to have been
repealed by the latter. And expressing Our awareness of the transcendental effects that
municipal export or import taxes or licenses will have on the national economy, due to
Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, We stated that there was no other alternative until
Congress acts to provide remedial measures to forestall any unfavorable results.
The point remains to be determined, however, whether constitutional limits on the
power of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of
taxation, were infringed.
The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, 5 We ruled that
the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does
not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is
reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
(2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to
present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those
of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not
meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the
classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as
well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of
the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the
tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as
the entity to be levied upon.
Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were
not arbitrarily collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). 6 At the time of
collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same
being then presumed constitutional until declared otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged
ordinance is declared unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to
refund the P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid under protest. No costs. So ordered.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President,
BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, Vice-President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M.
UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila, ALFREDO C.
FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA,
Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and
Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL
CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION
rep. by its President. REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT
COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES
rep. by its President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf of all
the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and
Municipal
Courts
throughout
the
Country, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as
Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted
by the petitioners that this hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and
circular they are here challenging. The Supreme Court is itself affected by these
measures and is thus an interested party that should ordinarily not also be a judge at the
same time. Under our system of government, however, it cannot inhibit itself and must
rule upon the challenge, because no other office has the authority to do so. We shall
therefore act upon this matter not with officiousness but in the discharge of an
unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness.
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the
Philippine
Postal
Corporation
through
its
Circular
No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 97

Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of
Deeds, along with certain other government offices.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as
judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The National Land Registration
Authority has taken common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as
sending of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its
motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title
embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the
required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final
form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is
discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption
of the constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature
and the Executive, every statute is supposed to have first been carefully studied and
determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly
shown that it is constitutionally flawed, the attack against its validity must be rejected
and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
I. We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution
providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof."
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2)
to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which
the title gives no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and
unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of
legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being
considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition
or otherwise, if they shall so desire. 1
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew
the franking privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does
it reflect its purposes.
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining
its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and
for Other Purposes Connected Therewith."
The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:
The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal system:
a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters, from
sender to addressee, with full recognition of their privacy or confidentiality;

b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and understanding through the

unhampered flow or exchange of postal matters between nations;
c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different users and
changing needs, including but not limited to, philately, transfer of monies and valuables,
and the like;
d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the industry to finance
the overall cost of providing the varied range of postal delivery and messengerial
services as well as the expansion and continuous upgrading of service standards by the
same.
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:
Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions,
rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
repealed or modified accordingly.
All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for
under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and
5059. The Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated
October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and conditions
as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.
The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged
act violates the Constitution.
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the
title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the
act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement. 2
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general
objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but
would actually render legislation impossible. 3 As has been correctly explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter
germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of
the object in view, may properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the
same act the machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for
its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters are
properly connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they
should also have special mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed.
725).
This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a
statute on a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute
on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid,
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 98

notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a
matter more germane to an act and to the object to be accomplished thereby than the
repeal of previous legislations connected therewith." 4

conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of

conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed.,
p.81).

The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not
the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to
be briefly expressed in its title. 5 As observed in one case, 6 if the title of an act embraces
only one subject, we apprehend it was never claimed that every other act which repeals it
or alters by implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule
would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.

It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was
returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A.
Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been
duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by
President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.

We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is
germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the
creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by
virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included
in the title of the said law.

Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the
certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco
Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez 7 laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is
conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals
like
the yeas and nayson
the
final
reading
of
the
bill). 8 The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the
old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, 9 where we explained the reason thus:

II. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of
the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and
PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No.
4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition,
violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as follows:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings
on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the
last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall
be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeasand nays entered in the Journal.
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives,
requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have
differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers. They
stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between both Houses and so
the second paragraph could not have been validly added as an amendment.
These argument are unacceptable.
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising
differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this
question. Its broader function is described thus:
A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited
to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference
committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the
freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But
occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its
mandate, These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on

To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as
we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade
a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions, of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an
amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No.
7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of
each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure
was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We
are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government,
to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
III. The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal
protection clause.
It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the
franking privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the
Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the
National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints
against public offices and officers. 10
The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a
valid classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking
privilege has been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult
Education, the Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications Office; the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National Historical Commission; the
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 99

Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering
Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special
Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the
Provincial and City Assessors; and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled
Persons. 11
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every
unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless
been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide
for a more, specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process
clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all
persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal
protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons,
regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults.
What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each
other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars. 13
What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the
franking privilege extended to the President of the Philippines or the Commission on
Elections or to former Presidents of the Philippines purely as acourtesy from the
lawmaking body? Is it offered because of the importance or status of the grantee or
because of its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees been chosen pell-mell, as it
were, without any basis at all for the selection?
We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was
carefully deliberated upon, by the political departments before it was finally enacted.
There is reason to suspect, however, that not enough care or attention was given to its
repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting withdrawal of the franking privilege from the
Judiciary.
We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is
unimaginable that the political departments would have intended this serious slight to the
Judiciary as the third of the major and equal departments the government. The same
observations are made if the importance or status of the grantee was the criterion used for
the extension of the franking privilege, which is enjoyed by the National Census and
Statistics Office and even some private individuals but not the courts of justice.

In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the
perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of
substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of
communication between the government and the people.
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the
government, it is the Judiciary, that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no
question that if there is any major branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is
the Judicial Department, as the respondents themselves point out. Curiously, the
respondents would justify the distinction on the basis precisely of this need and, on this
basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while extending it to others less
deserving.
In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service
Office show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails
amounted to P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other
agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the
intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to
P86,481,759. Frank mails coming fromthe Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and
those coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The
respondents' conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the
Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it.
The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking
privilege should be extended only to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like
the widows of former Presidents) but not to those who need it badly (especially the
courts of justice). It is like saying that a person may be allowed cosmetic surgery
although it is not really necessary but not an operation that can save his life.
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the
remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government,
including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some
and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction
between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which
definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has
been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does
not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members
of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a
similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we
may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court
should be similarly treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the need of
the National Census and Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that
a similar if not greater need is not recognized in the courts of justice.
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 100

(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the
privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which,
like former Presidents of the Philippines or their widows, does not send as much frank
mail as the Judiciary.)
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled
corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the
public service. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot
excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange
for the franchise extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys
under its charter.14 Among the services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of
mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the
discharge of their own public functions.
We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion
pesos, 55% of which is supplied by the Government, and that it derives substantial
revenues from the sources enumerated in Section 10, on top of the exemptions it enjoys.
It is not likely that the retention of the franking privilege of the Judiciary will cripple the
Corporation.

We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to

provoke. While ruling against the discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be
accused of similar discrimination through the exercise of our ultimate power in our own
favor. This is inevitable. Criticism of judicial conduct, however undeserved, is a fact of
life in the political system that we are prepared to accept.. As judges, we cannot debate
with our detractors. We can only decide the cases before us as law imposes on us the
duty to be fair and our own conscience gives us the light to be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354
is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it
withdraws the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the
Regional trail Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, and the National Land Registration
Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of which offices the said privilege shall be
RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
_____________________________
EN BANC

At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of
justice, the withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen this
serious problem. The volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents
themselves, should stress the dependence of the courts of justice on the postal service for
communicating with lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial process. The Judiciary
has the lowest appropriation in the national budget compared to the Legislative and
Executive Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than
1%, is alloted for the judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the increased difficulties
of our courts if they have to affix a purchased stamp to every process they send in the
discharge of their judicial functions.

G.R. No. L-59234 September 30, 1982

We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents
a valid exercise of discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary,
we find its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The
distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that
make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.

This Petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order" filed by the Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc.,
Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation, seeks to declare the nullity of Memorandum
Circular No. 77-42, dated October 10, 1977, of the Board of Transportation, and
Memorandum Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, of the Bureau of Land
Transportation.

This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is
a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.

Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation

composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience
to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible
to vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao
are two of the members of TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such
certificate of public convenience.

IV
In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its
title and that it was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However,
we annul Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution
providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO

and
ACE
TRANSPORTATION
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU
OF LAND TRANSPORTATION,respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum

Circular No. 77-42 which reads:
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 101

SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of

Old and Dilapidated Taxis
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to insure that only safe and comfortable
units are used as public conveyances;

instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all
within the National Capitol Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a
schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public
conveyances. To quote said Circular:

WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in Metro-Manila, has, time and again,
complained against, and condemned, the continued operation of old and dilapidated
taxis;

Pursuant to BOT Memo-Circular No. 77-42, taxi units with year models over six (6)
years old are now banned from operating as public utilities in Metro Manila. As such the
units involved should be considered as automatically dropped as public utilities and,
therefore, do not require any further dropping order from the BOT.

WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort,

convenience, and safety, a program of phasing out of old and dilapidated taxis should be
adopted;

Henceforth, taxi units within the National Capitol Region having year models over 6
years old shall be refused registration. The following schedule of phase-out is herewith
prescribed for the guidance of all concerned:

WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board of Transportation, the latter
believes that in six years of operation, a taxi operator has not only covered the cost of his
taxis, but has made reasonable profit for his investments;

Year Model

NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this policy, the Board hereby declares that no car
beyond six years shall be operated as taxi, and in implementation of the same hereby
promulgates the following rules and regulations:
1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are ordered withdrawn
from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In
the registration of cards for 1978, only taxis of Model 1972 and later shall be accepted
for registration and allowed for operation;
2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 are ordered withdrawn from public
service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In the
registration of cars for 1979, only taxis of Model 1973 and later shall be accepted for
registration and allowed for operation; and every year thereafter, there shall be a six-year
lifetime of taxi, to wit:

Automatic Phase-Out Year

1980

1974

1981

1975

1982

1976

1983

1977
etc.

etc.

1980 Model 1974

Strict compliance here is desired. 2

1981 Model 1975, etc.

In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978;
those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in
1981.

All taxis of earlier models than those provided above are hereby ordered withdrawn from
public service as of the last day of registration of each particular year and their respective
plates shall be surrendered directly to the Board of Transportation for subsequent
turnover to the Land Transportation Commission.
For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein shall
immediately be effective in Metro-Manila. Its implementation outside Metro- Manila
shall be carried out only after the project has been implemented in Metro-Manila and
only after the date has been determined by the Board. 1
Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land
Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980,

On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 807553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the
registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as
well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of
registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
On February 16, 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a "Manifestation and Urgent
Motion", praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case was heard on February
20, 1981. Petitioners presented testimonial and documentary evidence, offered the same,
and manifested that they would submit additional documentary proofs. Said proofs were
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 102

submitted on March 27, 1981 attached to petitioners' pleading entitled, "Manifestation,

Presentation of Additional Evidence and Submission of the Case for Resolution." 3
On November 28, 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a "Manifestation and
Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition" praying that the case be resolved or
decided not later than December 10, 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of
whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of their interests before
their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on January 1, 1982.
Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but
was later informed that the records of the case could not be located.
On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was instituted wherein the following queries
were posed for consideration by this Court:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with
the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the
petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due process?
B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements
imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of
the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?
On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:
Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power
4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices,
measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators
of public utility motor vehicles.
Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the
exercise of its powers:
Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. In the exercise of the powers granted in the preceding
section, the Board shag proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry.
Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion, may require the
cooperation and assistance of the Bureau of Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary,
particularly the Highway Patrol Group, the support agencies within the Department of
Public Works, Transportation and Communications, or any other government office or
agency that may be able to furnish useful information or data in the formulation of the
Board of any policy, plan or program in the implementation of this Decree.

The Board may also can conferences, require the submission of position papers or other
documents, information, or data by operators or other persons that may be affected by
the implementation of this Decree, or employ any other suitable means of inquiry.
In support of their submission that they were denied procedural due process, petitioners
contend that they were not caged upon to submit their position papers, nor were they
ever summoned to attend any conference prior to the issuance of the questioned BOT
Circular.
It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway accorded the Board
gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the
formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a
conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from
operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the
Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim,
therefore, that they were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with
certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to
issuing the challenged Circulars. operators of public conveyances are not the only
primary sources of the data and information that may be desired by the BOT.
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is neither violative
of procedural due process. As held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and Banco Filipino,
44 SCRA 307 (1972):
Pevious notice and hearing as elements of due process, are constitutionally required for
the protection of life or vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or
loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, generally
dependent upon a past act or event which has to be established or ascertained. It is not
essential to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future
conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise.
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners further take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and
oppressive because the roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of
maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and, therefore, their actual physical
condition should be taken into consideration at the time of registration. As public
contend, however, it is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring
evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple
standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must
be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six
years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that
time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment
obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable
service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation
practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard
of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been
met.
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 103

On Equal Protection of the Law:

Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to equal protection of
the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely
towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be pointed out that implementation
outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. To repeat
the pertinent portion:

WHEREFORE, the Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition is hereby dismissed. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein shall
immediately be effective in Metro Manila. Its implementation outside Metro Manila
shall be carried out only after the project has been implemented in Metro Manila and
only after the date has been determined by the Board. 4
In fact, it is the understanding of the Court that implementation of the Circulars in Cebu
City is already being effected, with the BOT in the process of conducting studies
regarding the operation of taxicabs in other cities.
The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in
this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and
more constant use. This is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are
not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the
equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed.
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding
consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by
old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare
of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of
society. 5 It may also regulate property rights. 6 In the language of Chief Justice Enrique
M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of
governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert
that their interests are disregarded". 7
In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services
is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that
the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons Identically
or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law
provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for
real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. 8 What is
required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so
that all persons under Identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same
treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. 9 The challenged
Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria.
Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any
constitutional infirmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of
constitutional right must be clear, categorical and undeniable.10

EN BANC
G.R. No. 78164

July 31, 1987

TERESITA TABLARIN, MA, LUZ CIRIACO, MA NIMFA B. ROVIRA,

EVANGELINA S. LABAO, in their behalf and in behalf of applicants for
admission into the Medical Colleges during the school year 1987-88 and future
years who have not taken or successfully hurdled tile National Medical Admission
Test
(NMAT).petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge of
Branch XXXVII of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region with seat at Manila, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY LOURDES
QUISUMBING, in her capacity as Chairman of the BOARD OF MEDICAL
EDUCATION, and THE CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT
(CEM), respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year
1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 104

National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education,
one of the public respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the Center for
Educational Measurement (CEM).
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to
enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education
and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23
August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for
securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting
applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on
26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary
injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was
conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for certiorari with this Court to set
aside the Order of the respondent judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the
"Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:
Section 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization
and regulation of medical education (b) the examination for registration of physicians;
and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the
Philippines. (Underscoring supplied)
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education which is
composed of (a) the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports or his duly authorized
representative, as Chairman; (b) the Secretary of Health or his duly authorized
representative; (c) the Director of Higher Education or his duly authorized
representative; (d) the Chairman of the Medical Board or his duly authorized
representative; (e) a representative of the Philippine Medical Association; (f) the Dean of
the College of Medicine, University of the Philippines; (g) a representative of the
Council of Deans of Philippine Medical Schools; and (h) a representative of the
Association of Philippine Medical Colleges, as members. The functions of the Board of
Medical Education specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:
(a) To determine and prescribe equirements for admission into a recognized college of
medicine;
(b) To determine and prescribe requirements for minimum physical facilities of colleges
of medicine, to wit: buildings, including hospitals, equipment and supplies, apparatus,
instruments, appliances, laboratories, bed capacity for instruction purposes, operating
and delivery rooms, facilities for outpatient services, and others, used for didactic and
practical instruction in accordance with modern trends;

(c) To determine and prescribe the minimum number and minimum qualifications of
teaching personnel, including student-teachers ratio;
(d) To determine and prescribe the minimum required curriculum leading to the degree
of Doctor of Medicine;
(e) To authorize the implementation of experimental medical curriculum in a medical
school that has exceptional faculty and instrumental facilities. Such an experimental
curriculum may prescribe admission and graduation requirements other than those
prescribed in this Act; Provided, That only exceptional students shall be enrolled in the
experimental curriculum;
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a
register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of
twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical
Education;
(g) To select, determine and approve hospitals or some departments of the hospitals for
training which comply with the minimum specific physical facilities as provided in
subparagraph (b) hereof; and
(h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and regulations for the
proper implementation of the foregoing functions. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:
Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any student who has not
been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral
turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or
arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of
Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former
professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall
be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the
preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.
xxx

xxx

x x x (Emphasis supplied)

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of
a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines,
beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that:
2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the
selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to
improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the
successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year
by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine
Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 105

requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the
issuance of the prescribed certificate of elegibility for admission into the medical
colleges.

(d) Article XIV, Section l: "The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to
quality education at all levels and take appropriate steps to make such education
accessible to all. "

3. Subject to the prior approval of the Board of Medical Education, each medical college
may give other tests for applicants who have been issued a corresponding certificate of
eligibility for admission that will yield information on other aspects of the applicant's
personality to complement the information derived from the NMAT.

(e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course
of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."

xxx

xxx

xxx

8. No applicant shall be issued the requisite Certificate of Eligibility for Admission

(CEA), or admitted for enrollment as first year student in any medical college, beginning
the school year, 1986-87, without the required NMAT qualification as called for under
this Order. (Underscoring supplied)
Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent Center conducted
NMATs for entrance to medical colleges during the school year 1986-1987. In December
1986 and in April 1987, respondent Center conducted the NMATs for admission to
medical colleges during the school year 1987.1988.1avvphi1
Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction may be
issued to enjoin the enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, pending resolution of the issue of
constitutionality of the assailed statute and administrative order. We regard this issue as
entirely peripheral in nature. It scarcely needs documentation that a court would issue a
writ of preliminary injunction only when the petitioner assailing a statute or
administrative order has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong enough to
overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside from
showing a clear legal right to the remedy sought. The fundamental issue is of course the
constitutionality of the statute or order assailed.
1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in
their assertion, violated by the continued implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act 2381, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985. The provisions
invoked read as follows:
(a) Article 11, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect of human rights. "
(b) ArticleII, Section l3: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation
building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and
social well being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs."
(c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to education, science and
technology, arts, culture and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social
progress and to promote total human liberation and development. "

Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain "State policies"
which the government is enjoined to pursue and promote. The petitioners here have not
seriously undertaken to demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the statute and the
administrative order they assail collide with the State policies embodied in Sections 11,
13 and 17. They have not, in other words, discharged the burden of proof which lies
upon them. This burden is heavy enough where the constitutional provision invoked is
relatively specific, rather than abstract, in character and cast in behavioral or operational
terms. That burden of proof becomes of necessity heavier where the constitutional
provision invoked is cast, as the second portion of Article II is cast, in language
descriptive of basic policies, or more precisely, of basic objectives of State policy and
therefore highly generalized in tenor. The petitioners have not made their case, even
a prima facie case, and we are not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the
legislation and regulation impugned as unconstitutional could possibly offend the
constitutional provisions pointed to by the petitioners.
Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once more
petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact
clash with that provision. On the contrary we may note-in anticipation of discussion infra
that the statute and the regulation which petitioners attack are in fact designed to
promote "quality education" at the level of professional schools. When one reads Section
1 in relation to Section 5 (3) of Article XIV as one must one cannot but note that the
latter phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with absolute literalness. The State is not
really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education " accessible
to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but
rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. "
2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against the constitutional principle which
forbids the undue delegation of legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary
standard to be followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical Education. The general
principle of non-delegation of legislative power, which both flows from the reinforces
the more fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of powers among the three
great departments of government,1 must be applied with circumspection in respect of
statutes which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as obviously complex
and technical as medical education and the practice of medicine in our present day world.
Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point 47 years ago in Pangasinan Transportation Co.,
Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission:2
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 106

One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of

powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare or delegate potestas
non potest delegare, adopted this practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by
G.E. Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also
recognized in principle in the Roman Law (d. 17.18.3) has been made to adapt itself to
the complexities of modern government, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits
of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and England
but in practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil.
318, 1939]. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication
of the subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering
the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power
by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts." 3
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by
an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and
highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta4
The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation
objection is easily met.The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically.
It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the
Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be
attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads. 5
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959
Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5
(a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered
together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle.
3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985,
is an "unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement," which results in a denial of due
process. Again, petitioners have failed to specify just what factors or features of the
NMAT render it "unfair" and "unreasonable" or "inequitable." They appear to suggest
that passing the NMAT is an unnecessary requirement when added on top of the
admission requirements set out in Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other
admission requirements established by internal regulations of the various medical
schools, public or private. Petitioners arguments thus appear to relate to utility and
wisdom or desirability of the NMAT requirement. But constitutionality is essentially a
question of power or authority: this Court has neither commission or competence to pass
upon questions of the desirability or wisdom or utility of legislation or administrative
regulation. Those questions must be address to the political departments of the
government not to the courts.
There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail: the legislative and
administrative provisions impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid
exercise of the police power of the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning,
is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and
promote an the important interests and needs in a word, the public order of the

general community.6 An important component of that public order is the health and
physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny
is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. 7
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable
relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to
medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general
community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by
recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been
recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. 8 That
the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate
admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized.
thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice
medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been
recognized as valid exercises of governmental power.9 Similarly, the establishment of
minimum medical educational requirements i.e., the completion of prescribed courses
in a recognized medical school for admission to the medical profession, has also been
sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. 10 What we have
before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical
schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of
regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the
graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student
body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of
admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who
exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical
practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our
professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of
our social and economic development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT
as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants
into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the
country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance,
medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test
[MCAT]11 and quite probably in other countries with far more developed educational
resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners
to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably
related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That
end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly
effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies
and minds for disease or trauma.
4. Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict
with the equal protection clause of the Constitution. More specifically, petitioners assert
that that portion of the MECS Order which provides that
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 107

the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be
determined every-year by the Board of Medical 11 Education after consultation with the
Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. (Emphasis supplied)

suspending petitioner until the termination of the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A.
6975, otherwise known as Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990,
which provides:

infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other words, that students
seeking admission during a given school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a
different cutoff score than that established for an, e.g., earlier school year, are
discriminated against and that this renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious."
The force of this argument is more apparent than real. Different cutoff scores for
different school years may be dictated by differing conditions obtaining during those
years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a function of such
factors as the number of students who have reached the cutoff score established the
preceding year; the number of places available in medical schools during the current
year; the average score attained during the current year; the level of difficulty of the test
given during the current year, and so forth. To establish a permanent and immutable
cutoff score regardless of changes in circumstances from year to year, may wen result in
an unreasonable rigidity. The above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from being
arbitrary or capricious, leaves the Board of Medical Education with the measure of
flexibility needed to meet circumstances as they change.

Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a
complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP
for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or
more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is
terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within
ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused (Emphasis ours).

We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein
as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an
unconstitutional imposition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the
respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994
ISHMAEL
HIMAGAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. JUDGE HILARIO MAPAYO, RTC,
Br. 11, Davao City, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioner, a policeman assigned with the medical company of the Philippine National
Police Regional Headquarters at Camp Catitigan, Davao City, was implicated in the
killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After
the informations for murder 1 and attempted murder 2 were filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 11, Davao City, on September 16, 1992, the trial court issued an Order

On October 11, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his
suspension, 3 relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his
suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days and, also, on our ruling in Deloso v.
Sandiganbayan, 4 and Layno v. Sandiganbayan. 5 In his order dated December 14,
1993 6 respondent judge denied the motion pointing out that under Section 47 of R.A.
6975, the accused shall be suspended from office until his case is terminated. The motion
for reconsideration of the order of denial was, likewise, denied. 7 Hence, the petition
for certiorari andmandamus to set aside the orders of respondent Judge and to command
him to lift petitioner's preventive suspension.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no question that the case of petitioner who is charged with murder and
attempted murder under the Revised Penal Code falls squarely under Sec. 47 of RA 6975
which specifically applies to members of the PNP. In dispute however, is whether the
provision limits the period of suspension to 90 days, considering that while the first
sentence of Sec. 47 provides that the accused who is charged with grave felonies where
the penalty imposed is six (6) years and one (1) day shall be suspended from office "until
the case is terminated", the second sentence of the same section mandates that the case,
which shall be subject to continuous trial, shall be terminated within 90 days from the
arraignment of the accused.
Petitioner posits that as a member of the Philippine National Police, under Sec. 91 of RA
6975 which reads:
Sec. 91. The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to
all personnel of the Department.
he is covered by the Civil Service Law, particularly Sec. 42 of PD 807 of the Civil
Service Decree, which limits the maximum period of suspension to ninety (90) days,
thus:
Sec. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. When
the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is
not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days
after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the
respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service; Provided, That when the
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 108

delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.
He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the
Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection
of
laws.
He
further
asserts
that
the
requirements
in
Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 that "the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office
until the case is terminated" and the succeeding sentence, "Such case shall be subject to
continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the
accused" are both substantive and should be taken together to mean that if the case is not
terminated within 90 days, the period of preventive suspension must be lifted because of
the command that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment.
We disagree.
First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the
member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one
day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted
before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing
that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not
qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The
first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time frame within
which the trial should be finished.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the
suspension of accused be lifted? The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the
mandatory word "shall" before the phrase "be terminated within ninety (90) days", there
is nothing in R.A. 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will
be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails
to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to
administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to
criminal 8 or civil liability. 9 If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the
accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy.
He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the
accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his
liberty by habeas corpus. 10
Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section
clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of preventive suspension in pending
administrative investigation, not in criminal cases, as here. What is more, Section 42
expressly limits the period of preventive suspension to ninety (90) days. Sec. 91 of R.A.
6975 which states that "The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules shall apply to
all personnel of the Department" simply means that the provisions of the Civil Service
Law and its implementing rules and regulations are applicable to members of the
Philippine National Police insofar as the provisions, rules and regulations are not

inconsistent
with
R.A. 6975. Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which limits the preventive
suspension to ninety (90) days cannot apply to members of the PNP because Sec. 47 of
R.A. 6995 provides differently, that is, the suspension where the penalty imposed by law
exceeds six (6) years shall continue until the case is terminated.
Third. Petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso is misplaced. These cases all stemmed
from charges in violation of R.A. 3019 (1060), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt
Practices
Act
which,
unlike
R.A. 6975, is silent on the duration of the preventive suspension. Sec. 13 of R.A. 3019
reads as follows:
Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In the case of Layno, the duly elected mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, was
preventively suspended after an information was filed against him for offenses under
R.A. 3019 (1060), the Anti-Graft Corrupt Practices Act. He had been suspended for four
(4) months at the time he filed a motion to lift his preventive suspension. We held that
his indefinite preventive suspension violated the "equal protection clause" and shortened
his term of office. Thus:
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of
office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension
decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he
would have been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal
mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to.
It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the
people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or
malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as
in this instance, criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established. Moreover,
if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence.
A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable
length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in
the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such
a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted
likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the man they had
elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted
continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted
in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an
unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted.
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 109

3. Nor is it solely the denial of procedural due process that is apparent. There is likewise
an equal protection question. If the case against petitioner Layno were administrative in
character the Local Government Code would be applicable. It is therein clearly provided
that while preventive suspension is allowable for the causes therein enumerated, there is
this emphatic limitation on the duration thereof: "In all cases, preventive suspension shall
not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension." It may be recalled that
the principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to national government
officials. So it was held in the leading case of Garcia v. Hon. Executive Secretary.
According to the opinion of Justice Barrera: "To adopt the theory of respondents that an
officer appointed by the President, facing administrative charges, can be preventively
suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where the preventive
suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing,
contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service law." Further:
"In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he
could in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly established after due
hearing, in violation of the Constitution. Clearly then, the policy of the law mandated by
the Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite duration. In this particular case, the
mere fact that petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act does not justify a different rule of law. To do so would be to negate the safeguard of
the equal protection guarantee. 11

So other than that in that particular section, ano ba itong "Jurisdiction in Criminal
Cases?" What is this all about?

The case of Deloso, likewise, involved another elective official who

was preventively suspended as provincial governor, also under RA 3019 the Anti-Graft
Law. This Court, faced with similar factual circumstances as in Layno, applied the ruling
in the latter case "in relation to the principles of due process and equal protection."

SEN. SAGUISAG. Kung five years and litigation ng Supreme Court, ganoon ba and . . .?

It is readily apparent that Section 13 of R.A. 3019 upon which the preventive suspension
of the accused in Laynoand Deloso was based is silent with respect to the duration of the
preventive suspension, such that the suspension of the accused therein for a prolonged
and unreasonable length of time raised a due process question. Not so in the instant case.
Petitioner is charged with murder under the Revised Penal Code and it is undisputed that
he falls squarely under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 which categorically states that
his suspension shall last until the case is terminated. The succeeding sentence of the
same section requires the case to be subjected to continuous trial which shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. As previously
emphasized, nowhere in the law does it say that after the lapse of the 90-day period for
trial, the preventive suspension should be lifted. The law is clear, the ninety (90) days
duration applies to the trial of the case not to the suspension. Nothing else should be read
into the law. When the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their
meaning determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean
exactly what it says. 12

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Page 29 Preventive Suspension.

Fourth. From the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on National

Defense relative to the bill that became R.A. 6975, the meaning of Section 47 of R.A.
6975 insofar as the period of suspension is concerned becomes all the more clear. We
quote:

SEN. PIMENTEL. Hindi, and ibig kong sabihin, let us just assume that a case can be, as
Rene
pointed
out,
can
run
to
six
years
bago
ma-terminate, sometimes ten years pa nga e. Okay, but maybe we should mandate. . .

REP. ZAMORA. In case they are charged with crimes.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Ah, the previous one is administrative, no. Now,
if it is charged with a crime, regular courts.
SEN. GONZALES. Ano, the courts mismo ang magsasabing . . .
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, the jurisdiction.
REP. ZAMORA. The jurisdiction if there is robbery.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay. "Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal
Case. Upon the filing of a complaint or informations sufficient in form and substance
against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six
years and one day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from the
office until the case is terminated."
REP. ALBANO. Where are we now Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Grave felonies ito e. Six years and one day or
more.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Hindi, dahil iyong iba panay disciplinary iyon e.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Anong page iyan, Rene?

REP. GUTANG. Ang complaint kasi ng mga tao, pagka may pulis na may criminal case
at may baril pa rin at nag-uuniforme, hindi magandang tingnan e. So parang natatakot
iyong mga witnesses.
SEN. GONZALES. Anyway, kung ma-exempt na rito naman siya e.
REP. GUTANG. Mayroong entitlement to reinstatement and pay. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
SEN. PIMENTEL. Dito sa "Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case." Okay ito
but I think we should also mandate the early termination of the case. Ibig sabihin, okay,
hindi ba "the suspension of the accused from office until the case is terminated?" Alam
naman natin ang takbo ng mga kaso rito sa ating bansa e.
REP. ZAMORA. Twenty days, okay na.

CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 110

REP. ZAMORA. Continuous hearing.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Not only that, but the case must be terminated within a period.
REP. ALBANO. Ninety days na ho sa Supreme Court the trial.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Ha?
REP. ALBANO. The trial must be done within ninety days,
SEN. PIMENTEL. Ang ibig kong sabihin kung maari sanang ilagay rito that the case
shall also be terminated in one year from the time . . . aywan ko kung kaya nating gawin
iyon.
REP. ALBANO. One solution, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Criminal case? Hindi ba that has all been held as
directory even if you put it in the law?
SEN. PIMENTEL. I know, but, iyon na nga, we are looking at some solution to a
particular situation.
SEN. ANGARA. Let's have continuous hearing and be terminated not later than ninety
days.
REP. ZAMORA. Ang point ni Ernie, that's really only the directory. All of these, well,
looks exactly the same thing.
SEN. ANGARA. No, but at least, we will shorten it up in a case like this. We are really
keen on having it quick, swift.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Swift justice.
REP. ALBANO. Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Yes.
REP. ALBANO. Following the Veloso case in Anti-graft cases before the
Sandiganbayan, the preventive suspension is only ninety days. In no case shall it go
beyond ninety days which can also be applicable here because this is a preventive
suspension.
SEN. PIMENTEL. No, because you can legislate at least.
SEN. SAGUISAG. But then the case may be anti-graft ha. The case filed against a
policeman may be anti-graft in nature. . .
SEN. PIMENTEL. Correct, correct, but is that a constitutional provision? Is it?
REP. ALBANO. No, but as a standard procedure.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Then you can legislate.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, because this particular provision is for
criminal cases. I know anti-graft is a criminal case but here we are talking, let's say, of
murder, rape, treason, robbery. That's why it is in that context that there is a difference
between a purely anti-graft case and a criminal case which could be a serious case since
it is six years and one day or more, so it must be already a grave felony.
xxx xxx xxx
REP. ALBANO. . . .
What I mean
Veloso case.

to

say

is,

preventive

suspension,

we

can

use

the

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, that's too short, that's what I am saying. The
feeling here is, for policeman, we have to be stricter especially if it is a criminal case.
What Rene is just trying to say is, he is agreeable that the suspension is until the case is
terminated, but he just wants some administrative balancing to expedite it. So let us
study what kind of language could be done along that line. So just on the National Police
Commission . . .
SEN. ANGARA. Can I suggest a language that may reflect. . .
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, please.
SEN. ANGARA. "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and be terminated not
later than . . ." whatever we agree.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, so let's study that.
So if there are any further amendments to Chapter 2 on the National Police Commission.
. . . . . 13
The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension
a member of the PNP charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law
exceeds six years of imprisonment and which suspension continues until the case against
him is terminated.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of
persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on
preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the
law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly
brought out in the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his
post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously
exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the
accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90
days
under
Section
47
of

CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 111

R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws.
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to
eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence
of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute
equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. 14 Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications,
such as the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and
substantial differences; 15 is germane to the purpose of the law; 16 applies to all members
of
the
same
class; 17 and applies to current as well as future conditions, 18 the classification may not
be impugned as violating the Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A distinction
based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such
as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
______________________________________

Can a provision of law, initially valid, become subsequently unconstitutional, on the

ground that its continuedoperation would violate the equal protection of the law? We
hold that with the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other
governmental financial institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of
Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes invidious
discrimination on the2,994 rank-and-file employees of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP).
I. The Case
First the facts.
On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the
old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP.
On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner
Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition
against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain
respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of
R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board
shall:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection,
hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall
aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in
accordance with sound principles of management.

BANC
G.R. No. 148208

December 15, 2004

CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:

A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject
to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko
Sentral's human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board
shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided
for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act].Provided, however, That
compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary
grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic
Act No. 6758. [emphasis supplied]
The thrust
of
petitioner's
challenge is
that
the
above proviso makes
an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the
BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law
(SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or
those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended
that this classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 112

personnel's position. Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of
Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP.1 Petitioner offers the following
sub-set of arguments:
a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the questioned proviso does not
appear in the original and amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the original
version of Senate Bill No. 1235; 2
b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the rate prescribed
by the SSL actually defeats the purpose of the law3 of establishing professionalism and
excellence at all levels in the BSP; 4 (emphasis supplied)
c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendments introduced during the deliberation
of Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its relevance to the objectives of the law, and
even admitted by one senator as discriminatory against low-salaried employees of the
BSP;5
d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL;
thus within the class of rank-and-file personnel of government financial institutions
(GFIs), the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon;6 and
e. the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file and
resulted in the gross disparity between their compensation and that of the BSP officers'. 7
In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and
capricious, and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. 8 Petitioner also
stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the
declaration of the unconstitutionality of the proviso in question without affecting the
other provisions; and (b) the urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP
rank-and-file employeeshave been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was
implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the inequitable proviso has no force
and effect of law, respondents' implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction;
and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course except through this petition for prohibition, which this Court should take
cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue involved. 9
Respondent BSP, in its comment,10 contends that the provision does not violate the equal
protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in
harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as "fiscal and administrative
autonomy of BSP," and the mandate of the Monetary Board to "establish professionalism
and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management."
The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends the
validity of the provision. Quite simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on
actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of R.A. No.
7653 to establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing
laws and policies of the national government.11

II. Issue
Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in this case is whether the last
paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional
mandate that "No person shall be. . . denied the equal protection of the laws." 12
III. Ruling
A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION,
SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the
classification created by the questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no
constitutional infirmities.
It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the
Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules
shall operate - so long as the classification is not unreasonable. As held in Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union,13 and reiterated in a long line of cases:14
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in
order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman
and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not
mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to
the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as
to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in
certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of
a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should
be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over
matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of
discretion. It is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked
differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 113

made with mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in many cases
properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude
the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to
evils as they may appear. (citations omitted)
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification.15 The equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class.16 If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently
from another.17 The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and
must apply to all those belonging to the same class.18
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers
(SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP's lack of
competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not
intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a
disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and
benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely,
and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. 19
That the provision was a product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of
the Senate Bill does not detract from its validity. As early as 1947 and reiterated in
subsequent cases,20 this Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to
refuse invalidating a provision of law, on the ground that the bill from which it
originated contained no such provision and was merely inserted by the bicameral
conference committee of both Houses.
Moreover, it is a fundamental and familiar teaching that all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. 21 An act of the legislature, approved
by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. 22 To justify the
nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
not a doubtful and equivocal breach.23
B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT
LAWS EXEMPTING
ALL
OTHER
RANK-AND-FILE
EMPLOYEES
OF
GFIs
FROM
THE
SSL
RENDERS
THE
CONTINUED
APPLICATION
OF
THE
CHALLENGED
PROVISION
A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature's power, we
hold that the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of
other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso.
1. The concept of relative constitutionality.
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere
comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the

statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its
application to another.24
A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered
circumstances.25 Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or
confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to
inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions.26
Demonstrative of this doctrine is Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount
Vernon,27 where the Court of Appeals of New York declared as unreasonable and
arbitrary a zoning ordinance which placed the plaintiff's property in a residential district,
although it was located in the center of a business area. Later amendments to the
ordinance then prohibited the use of the property except for parking and storage of
automobiles, and service station within a parking area. The Court found the ordinance to
constitute an invasion of property rights which was contrary to constitutional due
process. It ruled:
While the common council has the unquestioned right to enact zoning laws respecting
the use of property in accordance with a well-considered and comprehensive plan
designed to promote public health, safety and general welfare, such power is subject to
the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably and
this is so whenever the zoning ordinance precludes the use of the property for any
purpose for which it is reasonably adapted. By the same token, an ordinance valid
when adopted will nevertheless be stricken down as invalid when, at a later time, its
operation under changed conditions proves confiscatory such, for instance, as when
the greater part of its value is destroyed, for which the courts will afford relief in an
appropriate case.28 (citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued enforcement of a valid law
as unconstitutional as a consequence of significant changes in circumstances. Rutter v.
Esteban29 upheld the constitutionality of the moratorium law - its enactment and
operation being a valid exercise by the State of its police power 30 - but also ruled that
the continued enforcement of the otherwise valid law would be unreasonable and
oppressive. It noted the subsequent changes in the country's business, industry and
agriculture. Thus, the law was set aside because its continued operation would be grossly
discriminatory and lead to the oppression of the creditors. The landmark ruling states:31
The question now to be determined is, is the period of eight (8) years which Republic
Act No. 342 grants to debtors of a monetary obligation contracted before the last global
war and who is a war sufferer with a claim duly approved by the Philippine War Damage
Commission reasonable under the present circumstances?
It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only extends relief to debtors of prewar
obligations who suffered from the ravages of the last war and who filed a claim for their
losses with the Philippine War Damage Commission. It is therein provided that said
obligation shall not be due and demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after
settlement of the claim filed by the debtor with said Commission. The purpose of the law
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 114

is to afford to prewar debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving them a

reasonable time within which to pay their prewar debts so as to prevent them from being
victimized by their creditors. While it is admitted in said law that since liberation
conditions have gradually returned to normal, this is not so with regard to those who
have suffered the ravages of war and so it was therein declared as a policy that as to them
the debt moratorium should be continued in force (Section 1).
But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending since
1945 as a result of the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their
enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and
would continue to be unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to prewar
debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language
means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12) years before
they could effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. his period
seems to us unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible,
and should be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are
practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes
extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And the injustice is more patent
when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation
of the relief, unlike similar statutes in the United States.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what we believe to be as
the only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, we feel that the only way
open to us under the present circumstances is to declare that the continued operation
and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is unreasonable and
oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same
should be declared null and void and without effect. (emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
2. Applicability of the equal protection clause.
In the realm of equal protection, the U.S. case of Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v.
Ivey32 is illuminating. The Supreme Court of Florida ruled against the continued
application of statutes authorizing the recovery of double damages plus attorney's fees
against railroad companies, for animals killed on unfenced railroad right of way without
proof of negligence. Competitive motor carriers, though creating greater hazards, were
not subjected to similar liability because they were not yet in existence when the statutes
were enacted. The Court ruled that the statutes became invalid as denying "equal
protection of the law," in view of changed conditions since their enactment.
In another U.S. case, Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Faulkner,33 the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky declared unconstitutional a provision of a statute which imposed a duty upon a
railroad company of proving that it was free from negligence in the killing or injury of
cattle by its engine or cars. This, notwithstanding that the constitutionality of the
statute, enacted in 1893, had been previously sustained. Ruled the Court:

The constitutionality of such legislation was sustained because it applied to all similar
corporations and had for its object the safety of persons on a train and the protection of
property. Of course, there were no automobiles in those days.
The subsequent inauguration and development of transportation by motor vehicles on
the public highways by common carriers of freight and passengers created even greater
risks to the safety of occupants of the vehicles and of danger of injury and death of
domestic animals. Yet, under the law the operators of that mode of competitive
transportation are not subject to the same extraordinary legal responsibility for killing
such animals on the public roads as are railroad companies for killing them on their
private rights of way.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co.
v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct. 486, 488, 79 L.Ed. 949, stated, "A statute valid when
enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions to which it is applied. The
police power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted
arbitrarily or unreasonably." A number of prior opinions of that court are cited in support
of the statement. The State of Florida for many years had a statute, F.S.A. 356.01 et
seq. imposing extraordinary and special duties upon railroad companies, among which
was that a railroad company was liable for double damages and an attorney's fee for
killing livestock by a train without the owner having to prove any act of negligence on
the part of the carrier in the operation of its train. In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v.
Ivey, it was held that the changed conditions brought about by motor vehicle
transportation rendered the statute unconstitutional since if a common carrier by motor
vehicle had killed the same animal, the owner would have been required to prove
negligence in the operation of its equipment. Said the court, "This certainly is not equal
protection of the law."34 (emphasis supplied)
Echoes of these rulings resonate in our case law, viz:
[C]ourts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in determining
whether that statute has any discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its
face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation. Though the law itself be fair on
its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the
denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.35 (emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
[W]e see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which
permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the
constitutional prohibition.. In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional
because of their effect in operation. If a law has the effect of denying the equal
protection of the law it is unconstitutional. .36 (emphasis supplied, citations omitted
3. Enactment of R.A. Nos. 7907 + 8282 + 8289 + 8291 + 8523 + 8763
+ 9302 = consequential unconstitutionality of challenged proviso.
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 115

According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653 is
also violative of the equal protection clause because after it was enacted, the charters of
the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended, but the personnel of the latter GFIs
were all exempted from the coverage of the SSL. 37 Thus, within the class of rank-andfile personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon.
Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993,
Congress also undertook the amendment of the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and
SSS, and three other GFIs, from 1995 to 2004, viz:
1. R.A. No. 7907 (1995) for Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP);
2. R.A. No. 8282 (1997) for Social Security System (SSS);
3. R.A. No. 8289 (1997) for Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation,
(SBGFC);
4. R.A. No. 8291 (1997) for Government Service Insurance System (GSIS);
5. R.A. No. 8523 (1998) for Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP);
6. R.A. No. 8763 (2000) for Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC);38 and
7. R.A. No. 9302 (2004) for Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC).
It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven
other GFIs share this common proviso: a blanket exemption of all their
employees from the coverage of the SSL, expressly or impliedly, as illustrated below:
1. LBP (R.A. No. 7907)
Section 10. Section 90 of [R.A. No. 3844] is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 90. Personnel. xxx

xxx

xxx

All positions in the Bank shall be governed by a compensation, position classification

system and qualification standards approved by the Bank's Board of Directors based on a
comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The
compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the
private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board no more than once
every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on
productivity and profitability. The Bank shall therefore be exempt from existing laws,
rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification
standards. It shall however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible
with the principles under Republic Act No. 6758. (emphasis supplied)
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. SSS (R.A. No. 8282)

Section 1. [Amending R.A. No. 1161, Section 3(c)]:

xxx

xxx

xxx

(c)The Commission, upon the recommendation of the SSS President, shall appoint an
actuary and such other personnel as may [be] deemed necessary; fix their reasonable
compensation, allowances and other benefits; prescribe their duties and establish such
methods and procedures as may be necessary to insure the efficient, honest and
economical administration of the provisions and purposes of this Act: Provided,
however, That the personnel of the SSS below the rank of Vice President shall be
appointed by the SSS President: Provided, further, That the personnel appointed by the
SSS President, except those below the rank of assistant manager, shall be subject to the
confirmation by the Commission; Provided further, That the personnel of the SSS shall
be selected only from civil service eligibles and be subject to civil service rules and
regulations: Provided, finally, That the SSS shall be exempt from the provisions of
Republic Act No. 6758 and Republic Act No. 7430. (emphasis supplied)
3. SBGFC (R.A. No. 8289)
Section 8. [Amending R.A. No. 6977, Section 11]:
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation shall:

xxx

xxx

xxx

(e) notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758, and Compensation
Circular No. 10, series of 1989 issued by the Department of Budget and
Management, the Board of Directors of SBGFC shall have the authority to extend to
the employees and personnel thereof the allowance and fringe benefits similar to
those extended to and currently enjoyed by the employees and personnel of other
government financial institutions. (emphases supplied)
4. GSIS (R.A. No. 8291)
Section 1. [Amending Section 43(d)].
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 43. Powers and Functions of the Board of Trustees. - The Board of Trustees shall
have the following powers and functions:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(d) upon the recommendation of the President and General Manager, to approve the
GSIS' organizational and administrative structures and staffing pattern, and to establish,
fix, review, revise and adjust the appropriate compensation package for the officers and
employees of the GSIS with reasonable allowances, incentives, bonuses, privileges and
other benefits as may be necessary or proper for the effective management, operation and
administration of the GSIS, which shall be exempt from Republic Act No. 6758,
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 116

otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law and Republic Act No. 7430,
otherwise known as the Attrition Law. (emphasis supplied)
xxx

xxx

xxx

5. DBP (R.A. No. 8523)

Section 6. [Amending E.O. No. 81, Section 13]:
Section 13. Other Officers and Employees. - The Board of Directors shall provide for an
organization and staff of officers and employees of the Bank and upon recommendation
of the President of the Bank, fix their remunerations and other emoluments. All positions
in the Bank shall be governed by the compensation, position classification system and
qualification standards approved by the Board of Directors based on a comprehensive
job analysis of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be
comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be
subject to periodic review by the Board of Directors once every two (2) years, without
prejudice to yearly merit or increases based on the Bank's productivity and
profitability. The Bank shall, therefore, be exempt from existing laws, rules, and
regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards.
The Bank shall however, endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible
with the principles under Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758, as amended). (emphasis supplied)
6. HGC (R.A. No. 8763)
Section 9. Powers, Functions and Duties of the Board of Directors. - The Board shall
have the following powers, functions and duties:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(e) To create offices or positions necessary for the efficient management, operation and
administration of the Corporation: Provided, That all positions in the Home Guaranty
Corporation (HGC) shall be governed by a compensation and position classification
system and qualifications standards approved by the Corporation's Board of Directors
based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and
responsibilities: Provided, further, That the compensation plan shall be comparable
with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and which shall be
exempt from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary
Standardization Law, and from other laws, rules and regulations on salaries and
compensations; and to establish a Provident Fund and determine the Corporation's and
the employee's contributions to the Fund; (emphasis supplied)
xxx

xxx

xxx

7. PDIC (R.A. No. 9302)

Section 2. Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 3591, as amended] is hereby further amended
to read:

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

3.
xxx

A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject
to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Corporation's
human resource development program: Provided, That all positions in the Corporation
shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system and qualification
standards approved by the Board based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of
actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with
the prevailing compensation plans of other government financial institutions and
shall be subject to review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years without
prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and
profitability. The Corporation shall therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules
and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification
standards. It shall however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible
with the principles under Republic Act No. 6758, as amended. (emphases supplied)
Thus, eleven years after the amendment of the BSP charter, the rank-and-file of
seven other GFIs were granted the exemption that was specifically denied to the
rank-and-file of the BSP. And as if to add insult to petitioner's injury, even the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was granted the same blanket exemption
from the SSL in 2000!39
The prior view on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653 was confined to an evaluation
of its classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found
reasonable because there were substantial distinctions that made real differences between
the two classes.
The above-mentioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant
changes in circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued
operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653,
thereby exposing the proviso to more serious scrutiny.This time, the scrutiny relates to
the constitutionality of the classification - albeit made indirectly as a consequence of the
passage of eight other laws - between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven
other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply
equally to all members of the class. Theproviso may be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically
to make unjust distinctions between persons who are without differences. 40
Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions: Given
that Congress chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage of the SSL,
can the exclusion of the rank-and-file employees of the BSP stand constitutional scrutiny
in the light of the fact that Congress did not exclude the rank-and-file employees of the
other GFIs? Is Congress' power to classify so unbridled as to sanction unequal and
discriminatory treatment, simply because the inequity manifested itself, not instantly
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 117

through a single overt act, but gradually and progressively, through seven separate acts
of Congress? Is the right to equal protection of the law bounded in time and space that:
(a) the right can only be invoked against a classification made directly and deliberately,
as opposed to a discrimination that arises indirectly, or as a consequence of several other
acts; and (b) is the legal analysis confined to determining the validity within the
parameters of the statute or ordinance (where the inclusion or exclusion is articulated),
thereby proscribing any evaluation vis--vis the grouping, or the lack thereof, among
several similar enactments made over a period of time?
In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the
mere assertion that each exemption (granted to the seven other GFIs) rests "on a policy
determination by the legislature." All legislative enactments necessarily rest on a
policy determination - even those that have been declared to contravene the
Constitution. Verily, if this could serve as a magic wand to sustain the validity of a
statute, then no due process and equal protection challenges would ever prosper. There is
nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination made by Congress or by the
Executive; it cannot run riot and overrun the ramparts of protection of the Constitution.
In fine, the "policy determination" argument may support the inequality of treatment
between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality
of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and other GFIs' who are similarly situated. It
fails to appreciate that what is at issue in the second level of scrutiny is not
thedeclared policy of each law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress'
inconsistent and unequal policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven
other GFIs. At bottom, the second challenge to the constitutionality of Section 15(c),
Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is premised precisely on the irrational
discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment of persons similarly
situated. In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that "no person shall be denied
the equal protection of the laws" includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow
invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect of denying the
equal protection of the law, or permits such denial, it is unconstitutional. 41
It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the BSP rank-and-file from the
other GFIs cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For as regards the exemption from the
coverage of the SSL, there exist no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP
rank-and-file from the other rank-and-file of the seven GFIs. On the contrary, our legal
history shows that GFIs have long been recognized as comprising one distinct class,
separate from other governmental entities.
Before the SSL, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 985 (1976) declared it as a State policy
(1) to provide equal pay for substantially equal work, and (2) to base differences in pay
upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification
requirements of the positions. P.D. No. 985 was passed to address disparities in pay
among similar or comparable positions which had given rise to dissension among
government employees. But even then, GFIs and government-owned and/or
controlled corporations (GOCCs) were already identified as a distinct class among

government employees. Thus, Section 2 also provided, "[t]hat notwithstanding a

standardized salary system established for all employees, additional financial incentives
may be established by government corporation and financial institutions for their
employees to be supported fully from their corporate funds and for such technical
positions as may be approved by the President in critical government agencies."42
The same favored treatment is made for the GFIs and the GOCCs under the SSL. Section
3(b) provides that one of the principles governing the Compensation and Position
Classification System of the Government is that: "[b]asic compensation for all personnel
in the government and government-owned or controlled corporations and financial
institutions shall generally be comparable with those in the private sector doing
comparable work, and must be in accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages."
Thus, the BSP and all other GFIs and GOCCs were under the unified Compensation and
Position Classification System of the SSL,43 but rates of pay under the SSL were
determined on the basis of, among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for
comparable work. Notably, the Compensation and Position Classification System was to
be governed by the following principles: (a) just and equitable wages, with the ratio of
compensation between pay distinctions maintained at equitable levels;44 and (b) basic
compensation generally comparable with the private sector, in accordance with
prevailing laws on minimum wages.45 Also, the Department of Budget and Management
was directed to use, as guide for preparing the Index of Occupational Services, the
Benchmark Position Schedule, and the following factors:46
(1) the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the
positions;
(2) the nature and complexity of the work to be performed;
(3) the kind of supervision received;
(4) mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work;
(5) nature and extent of internal and external relationships;
(6) kind of supervision exercised;
(7) decision-making responsibility;
(8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports;
(9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and
(10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job.
The Benchmark Position Schedule enumerates the position titles that fall within Salary
Grades 1 to 20.
Clearly, under R.A. No. 6758, the rank-and-file of all GFIs were similarly situated in all
aspects pertaining to compensation and position classification, in consonance with
Section 5, Article IX-B of the 1997 Constitution.47
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 118

Then came the enactment of the amended charter of the BSP, implicitly exempting
the Monetary Board from the SSL by giving it express authority to determine and
institute its own compensation and wage structure. However, employees whose positions
fall under SG 19 and below were specifically limited to the rates prescribed under the
SSL.
Subsequent amendments to the charters of other GFIs followed. Significantly, each
government financial institution (GFI) was not only expressly authorized to determine
and institute its own compensation and wage structure, but also explicitly exempted without distinction as to salary grade or position - all employees of the GFI from
the SSL.
It has been proffered that legislative deliberations justify the grant or withdrawal of
exemption from the SSL, based on the perceived need "to fulfill the mandate of the
institution concerned considering, among others, that: (1) the GOCC or GFI is
essentially proprietary in character; (2) the GOCC or GFI is in direct competition with
their [sic]counterparts in the private sector, not only in terms of the provisions of goods
or services, but also in terms of hiring and retaining competent personnel; and (3) the
GOCC or GFI are or were [sic] experiencing difficulties filling up plantilla positions
with competent personnel and/or retaining these personnel. The need for the scope of
exemption necessarily varies with the particular circumstances of each institution, and
the corresponding variance in the benefits received by the employees is merely
incidental."
The fragility of this argument is manifest. First, the BSP is the central monetary
authority,48 and the banker of the government and all its political subdivisions. 49 It
has the sole power and authority to issue currency;50provide policy directions in the areas
of money, banking, and credit; and supervise banks and regulate finance companies and
non-bank financial institutions performing quasi-banking functions, including
the exempted GFIs.51 Hence, the argument that the rank-and-file employees of the
seven GFIs were exempted because of the importance of their institution's mandate
cannot stand any more than an empty sack can stand.
Second, it is certainly misleading to say that "the need for the scope of exemption
necessarily varies with the particular circumstances of each institution." Nowhere in the
deliberations is there a cogent basis for the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file from the
exemption which was granted to the rank-and-file of the other GFIs and the SEC. As
point in fact, the BSP and the seven GFIs are similarly situated in so far as Congress
deemed it necessary for these institutions to be exempted from the SSL. True, the SSLexemption of the BSP and the seven GFIs was granted in the amended charters of each
GFI, enacted separately and over a period of time. But it bears emphasis that, while each
GFI has a mandate different and distinct from that of another, the deliberations show that
theraison d'tre of the SSL-exemption was inextricably linked to and for the most part
based on factors common to the eight GFIs, i.e., (1) the pivotal role they play in the
economy; (2) the necessity of hiring and retaining qualified and effective personnel to
carry out the GFI's mandate; and (3) the recognition that the compensation package of

these GFIs is not competitive, and fall substantially below industry standards.
Considering further that (a) the BSP was the first GFI granted SSL exemption; and (b)
the subsequent exemptions of other GFIs did not distinguish between the officers and the
rank-and-file; it is patent that the classification made between the BSP rank-and-file
and those of the other seven GFIs was inadvertent, and NOT intended, i.e., it was not
based on any substantial distinction vis--vis the particular circumstances of each GFI.
Moreover, the exemption granted to two GFIs makes express reference to allowance and
fringe benefits similar to those extended to and currently enjoyed by the employees and
personnel of other GFIs,52 underscoring that GFIs are a particular class within the realm
of government entities.
It is precisely this unpremeditated discrepancy in treatment of the rank-and-file of the
BSP - made manifest and glaring with each and every consequential grant of blanket
exemption from the SSL to the other GFIs - that cannot be rationalized or justified. Even
more so, when the SEC - which is not a GFI - was given leave to have a compensation
plan that "shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plan in the [BSP] and
other [GFIs],"53 then granted a blanket exemption from the SSL, and its rank-and-file
endowed a more preferred treatment than the rank-and-file of the BSP.
The violation to the equal protection clause becomes even more pronounced when we are
faced with this undeniable truth: that if Congress had enacted a law for the sole purpose
of exempting the eight GFIs from the coverage of the SSL, the exclusion of the BSP
rank-and-file employees would have been devoid of any substantial or material basis. It
bears no moment, therefore, that the unlawful discrimination was not a direct result
arising from one law. "Nemo potest facere per alium quod non potest facere per
directum." No one is allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly.
It has also been proffered that "similarities alone are not sufficient to support the
conclusion that rank-and-file employees of the BSP may be lumped together with similar
employees of the other GOCCs for purposes of compensation, position classification and
qualification standards. The fact that certain persons have some attributes in common
does not automatically make them members of the same class with respect to a
legislative classification." Cited is the ruling in Johnson v. Robinson:54 "this finding of
similarity ignores that a common characteristic shared by beneficiaries and
nonbeneficiaries alike, is not sufficient to invalidate a statute when other characteristics
peculiar to only one group rationally explain the statute's different treatment of the two
groups."
The reference to Johnson is inapropos. In Johnson, the US Court sustained the validity of
the classification as there were quantitative and qualitative distinctions, expressly
recognized by Congress, which formed a rational basis for the classification limiting
educational benefits to military service veterans as a means of helping them readjust to
civilian life. The Court listed the peculiar characteristics as follows:
First, the disruption caused by military service is quantitatively greater than that caused
by alternative civilian service. A conscientious objector performing alternative service is
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 119

obligated to work for two years. Service in the Armed Forces, on the other hand,
involves a six-year commitment
xxx

xxx

xxx

Second, the disruptions suffered by military veterans and alternative service performers
are qualitatively different. Military veterans suffer a far greater loss of personal freedom
during their service careers. Uprooted from civilian life, the military veteran becomes
part of the military establishment, subject to its discipline and potentially hazardous duty.
Congress was acutely aware of the peculiar disabilities caused by military service, in
consequence of which military servicemen have a special need for readjustment
benefits55 (citations omitted)
In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL,
there are no characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so
as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to
mention the anomaly of the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the law is not
only superficial,56 but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make
real differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.
Moreover, the issue in this case is not - as the dissenting opinion of Mme. Justice CarpioMorales would put it - whether "being an employee of a GOCC or GFI is reasonable and
sufficient basis for exemption" from R.A. No. 6758. It is Congress itself that
distinguished the GFIs from other government agencies, not once but eight times,
through the enactment of R.A. Nos. 7653, 7907, 8282, 8289, 8291, 8523, 8763, and
9302. These laws may have created a "preferred sub-class within government
employees," but the present challenge is not directed at the wisdom of these laws.
Rather, it is a legal conundrum involving the exercise of legislative power, the validity of
which must be measured not only by looking at the specific exercise in and by
itself (R.A. No. 7653), but also as to the legal effects brought about by seven separate
exercises - albeit indirectly and without intent.
Thus, even if petitioner had not alleged "a comparable change in the factual milieu as
regards the compensation, position classification and qualification standards of the
employees of the BSP (whether of the executive level or of the rank-and-file) since the
enactment of the new Central Bank Act" is of no moment. In GSIS v. Montesclaros,57this
Court resolved the issue of constitutionality notwithstanding that claimant had
manifested that she was no longer interested in pursuing the case, and even when the
constitutionality of the said provision was not squarely raised as an issue, because the
issue involved not only the claimant but also others similarly situated and whose claims
GSIS would also deny based on the challenged proviso. The Court held that social
justice and public interest demanded the resolution of the constitutionality of the proviso.
And so it is with the challenged proviso in the case at bar.
It bears stressing that the exemption from the SSL is a "privilege" fully within the
legislative prerogative to give or deny. However, its subsequent grant to the rank-and-file
of the seven other GFIs and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees

breached the latter's right to equal protection. In other words, while the granting of a
privilege per se is a matter of policy exclusively within the domain and prerogative of
Congress, the validity or legality of the exercise of this prerogative is subject to judicial
review.58 So when the distinction made is superficial, and not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between those included and excluded, it becomes
a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and the power to correct.59 As held
in the United Kingdom case of Hooper v. Secretary of State for Work and
Pensions,60 once the State has chosen to confer benefits, "discrimination" contrary to law
may occur where favorable treatment already afforded to one group is refused to another,
even though the State is under no obligation to provide that favorable treatment. 61
The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other
seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination - no one
can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent
blanket and total exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was
withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes without any rational
basis.
Again, it must be emphasized that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute
equality but it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that
equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which,
if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those
that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion; whatever restrictions cast on
some in the group is equally binding on the rest.62
In light of the lack of real and substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal
treatment between the rank-and-file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the
enactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of the
challenged proviso anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same should be
declared as an outlaw.
IV.
Equal Protection Under International Lens
In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the main
have followed the"rational basis" test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative
classifications63 and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. 64
A. Equal Protection in the United States
In contrast, jurisprudence in the U.S. has gone beyond the static "rational basis"
test. Professor Gunther highlights the development in equal protection jurisprudential
analysis, to wit: 65
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 120

Traditionally, equal protection supported only minimal judicial intervention in most

contexts. Ordinarily, the command of equal protection was only that government must
not impose differences in treatment "except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly
related to the object of regulation." The old variety of equal protection scrutiny focused
solely on the means used by the legislature: it insisted merely that the classification in
the statute reasonably relates to the legislative purpose. Unlike substantive due
process, equal protection scrutiny was not typically concerned with identifying
"fundamental values" and restraining legislative ends. And usually the rational
classification requirement was readily satisfied: the courts did not demand a tight fit
between classification and purpose; perfect congruence between means and ends was not
required.
xxx

xxx

xxx

[From marginal intervention to major cutting edge: The Warren Court's "new equal
protection" and the two-tier approach.]
From its traditional modest role, equal protection burgeoned into a major
intervention tool during the Warren era, especially in the 1960s. The Warren Court
did not abandon the deferential ingredients of the old equal protection: in most areas of
economic and social legislation, the demands imposed by equal protection remained as
minimal as everBut the Court launched an equal protection revolution by finding large
new areas for strict rather than deferential scrutiny. A sharply differentiated two-tier
approachevolved by the late 1960s: in addition to the deferential "old" equal protection,
a "new" equal protection, connoting strict scrutiny, arose. The intensive review
associated with the new equal protection imposed two demands - a demand not only as
to means but also one as to ends. Legislation qualifying for strict scrutiny required a far
closer fit between classification and statutory purpose than the rough and ready
flexibility traditionally tolerated by the old equal protection: means had to be shown
"necessary" to achieve statutory ends, not merely "reasonably related"
ones. Moreover, equal protection became a source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in
the areas of the new equal protection had to be justified by "compelling" state interests,
not merely the wide spectrum of "legitimate" state ends.
The Warren Court identified the areas appropriate for strict scrutiny by searching
for two characteristics: the presence of a "suspect" classification; or an impact on
"fundamental" rights or interests. In the category of "suspect classifications," the Warren
Court's major contribution was to intensify the strict scrutiny in the traditionally
interventionist area of racial classifications. But other cases also suggested that there
might be more other suspect categories as well: illegitimacy and wealth for example. But
it was the 'fundamental interests" ingredient of the new equal protection that proved
particularly dynamic, open-ended, and amorphous.. [Other fundamental interests
included voting, criminal appeals, and the right of interstate travel .]
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Burger Court was reluctant to expand the scope of the new equal protection,
although its best established ingredient retains vitality. There was also mounting
discontent with the rigid two-tier formulations of the Warren Court's equal protection
doctrine. It was prepared to use the clause as an interventionist tool without resorting to
the strict language of the new equal protection. [Among the fundamental interests
identified during this time were voting and access to the ballot, while "suspect"
classifications included sex, alienage and illegitimacy.]
xxx

xxx

xxx

Even while the two-tier scheme has often been adhered to in form, there has also been an
increasingly noticeable resistance to the sharp difference between deferential "old" and
interventionist "new" equal protection. A number of justices sought formulations that
would blur the sharp distinctions of the two-tiered approach or that would narrow the gap
between strict scrutiny and deferential review. The most elaborate attack came from
Justice Marshall, whose frequently stated position was developed most elaborately in his
dissent in the Rodriguez case: 66
The Court apparently seeks to establish [that] equal protection cases fall into one of two
neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review - strict scrutiny or
mere rationality. But this (sic) Court's [decisions] defy such easy categorization. A
principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of
standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the equal protection clause.
This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which Court
will scrutinize particular classification, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and
societal importance of the interests adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness
of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.
Justice Marshall's "sliding scale" approach describes many of the modern decisions,
although it is a formulation that the majority refused to embrace. But the Burger
Court's results indicate at least two significant changes in equal protection
law: First, invocation of the "old" equal protection formula no longer signals, as it did
with the Warren Court, an extreme deference to legislative classifications and a virtually
automatic validation of challenged statutes. Instead, several cases, even while voicing the
minimal "rationality" "hands-off" standards of the old equal protection, proceed to find
the statute unconstitutional.Second, in some areas the modern Court has put forth
standards for equal protection review that, while clearly more intensive than the
deference of the "old" equal protection, are less demanding than the strictness of the
"new" equal protection. Sex discrimination is the best established example of
an"intermediate" level of review. Thus, in one case, the Court said that "classifications
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives." That standard is "intermediate" with respect
to both ends and means: where ends must be "compelling" to survive strict scrutiny and
merely "legitimate" under the "old" mode, "important" objectives are required here; and
where means must be "necessary" under the "new" equal protection, and merely

The Burger Court and Equal Protection.

CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 121

"rationally related" under the "old" equal protection, they must be "substantially related"
to survive the "intermediate" level of review. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

before the law and equal protection of the law without any discrimination, constitutes
basic principles in the protection of human rights. 74

B. Equal Protection in Europe

Most, if not all, international human rights instruments include some prohibition on
discrimination and/or provisions about equality.75 The general international provisions
pertinent to discrimination and/or equality are the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR);76 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR); the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD);77 the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC).

The United Kingdom and other members of the European Community have also
gone forward in discriminatory legislation and jurisprudence. Within the United
Kingdom domestic law, the most extensive list of protected grounds can be found
in Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It prohibits
discrimination on grounds such as "sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status." This list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Discrimination on the basis of
race, sex and religion is regarded as grounds that require strict scrutiny. A further
indication that certain forms of discrimination are regarded as particularly
suspect under the Covenant can be gleaned from Article 4, which, while allowing states
to derogate from certain Covenant articles in times of national emergency, prohibits
derogation by measures that discriminate solely on the grounds of "race, colour,
language, religion or social origin." 67
Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has developed a test of justification
which varies with the ground of discrimination. In the Belgian Linguistics case68 the
European Court set the standard of justification at a low level: discrimination would
contravene the Convention only if it had no legitimate aim, or there was no reasonable
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be
realised.69 But over the years, the European Court has developed a hierarchy of
grounds covered by Article 14 of the ECHR, a much higher level of justification
being required in respect of those regarded as "suspect" (sex, race, nationality,
illegitimacy, or sexual orientation) than of others. Thus, in Abdulaziz, 70 the European
Court declared that:
. . . [t]he advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member
States of the Council of Europe. This means that very weighty reasons would have to be
advanced before a difference of treatment on the ground of sex could be regarded as
compatible with the Convention.
And in Gaygusuz v. Austria,71 the European Court held that "very weighty
reasons would have to be put forward before the Court could regard a difference of
treatment based exclusively on the ground of nationality as compatible with the
Convention."72 The European Court will then permit States a very much narrower
margin of appreciation in relation to discrimination on grounds of sex, race, etc., in the
application of the Convention rights than it will in relation to distinctions drawn by states
between, for example, large and small land-owners. 73
C. Equality under International Law
The principle of equality has long been recognized under international law. Article 1 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that all human beings are
born free and equal in dignity and rights. Non-discrimination, together with equality

In the broader international context, equality is also enshrined in regional

instruments such as the American Convention on Human Rights;78 the African Charter
on Human and People's Rights;79 the European Convention on Human Rights;80 the
European Social Charter of 1961 and revised Social Charter of 1996; and the European
Union Charter of Rights (of particular importance to European states). Even the Council
of the League of Arab States has adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights in 1994,
although it has yet to be ratified by the Member States of the League. 81
The equality provisions in these instruments do not merely function as traditional
"first generation" rights, commonly viewed as concerned only with constraining
rather than requiring State action. Article 26 of the ICCPR requires "guarantee[s]" of
"equal and effective protection against discrimination" while Articles 1 and 14 of the
American and European Conventions oblige States Parties "to ensure ... the full and free
exercise of [the rights guaranteed] ... without any discrimination" and to "secure without
discrimination" the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed.82 These provisions impose a
measure of positive obligation on States Parties to take steps to eradicate discrimination.
In the employment field, basic detailed minimum standards ensuring equality and
prevention of discrimination, are laid down in the ICESCR83 and in a very large number
of Conventions administered by the International Labour Organisation, a United Nations
body. 84 Additionally, many of the other international and regional human rights
instruments have specific provisions relating to employment. 85
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also gone beyond the earlier
tendency to view the prohibition against discrimination (Article 26) as confined to the
ICCPR rights.86 In Broeks87 and Zwaan-de Vries,88 the issue before the Committee was
whether discriminatory provisions in the Dutch Unemployment Benefits Act (WWV) fell
within the scope of Article 26. The Dutch government submitted that discrimination in
social security benefit provision was not within the scope of Article 26, as the right was
contained in the ICESCR and not the ICCPR. They accepted that Article 26 could go
beyond the rights contained in the Covenant to other civil and political rights, such as
discrimination in the field of taxation, but contended that Article 26 did not extend to the
social, economic, and cultural rights contained in ICESCR. The Committee rejected this
argument. In its view, Article 26 applied to rights beyond the Covenant including the
rights in other international treaties such as the right to social security found in ICESCR:
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 122

Although Article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit discrimination, it does not
of itself contain any obligation with respect to the matters that may be provided for by
legislation. Thus it does not, for example, require any state to enact legislation to provide
for social security. However, when such legislation is adopted in the exercise of a State's
sovereign power, then such legislation must comply with Article 26 of the Covenant.89
Breaches of the right to equal protection occur directly or indirectly. A classification may
be struck down if it has the purpose or effect of violating the right to equal protection.
International law recognizes that discrimination may occur indirectly, as the Human
Rights Committee90 took into account the definitions of discrimination adopted by
CERD and CEDAW in declaring that:
. . . "discrimination" as used in the [ICCPR] should be understood to imply any
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status, and which has thepurpose or effect of nullifying
or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal
footing, of all rights and freedoms. 91 (emphasis supplied)
Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and
its conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in cadence and in
consonance with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in international
law. There should be no hesitation in using the equal protection clause as a major cutting
edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational discrimination in our society. Indeed, the
social justice imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the special status and
protection afforded to labor, compel this approach. 92
Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and international
law, we held in International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing: 93
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our
Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the
Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to
the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of
the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith."
International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes
discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., the general
principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the Convention
(No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation - all
embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and

justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part
of its national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor
of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of
work." These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace - the factory, the
office or the field - but include as well the manner by which employers treat their
employees.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities
for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit
and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote
and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and
discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in Article
7 thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of just and [favorable] conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
i. Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any
kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those
enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;
xxx

xxx

xxx

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long

honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially
equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be
paid similar salaries. (citations omitted)
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies
should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when they run
afoul of the Constitution.94 The deference stops where the classification violates a
fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the
Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as
the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting
adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.
Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the
Constitution requires a stricter judicial scrutiny finds no support in American or English
jurisprudence. Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are not per
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 123

se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive and have been used to
support many of our decisions.95 We should not place undue and fawning reliance upon
them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come
to our own decisions through the employment of our own endowments. We live in a
different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests
and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our
own concept of law and justice.96 Our laws must be construed in accordance with the
intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of
each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto. More importantly, they
must be construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-all and the end-all of
all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and different
from others.97
In the 2003 case of Francisco v. House of Representatives, this Court has stated that:
"[A]merican jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of
dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have
only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned....[I]n
resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign
jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by
different constitutional settings and needs." 98 Indeed, although the Philippine
Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development
have long since diverged. 99
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of equal
protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution.
The Preamble proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing
inequities in Philippine society. The command to promote social justice in Article II,
Section 10, in "all phases of national development," further explicitated in Article XIII,
are clear commands to the State to take affirmative action in the direction of greater
equality. [T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for
a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality. 100
Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic
rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor. 101 Under the policy of social
justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class
on the humane justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in
law.102 And the obligation to afford protection to labor is incumbent not only on the
legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a
living reality.103 Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the equalization of
social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated.104
V.
A Final Word

Finally, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged
provision. It has been proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court, but
with Congress, which alone has the power to erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No.
7653. Indeed, a bill proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the SSL has
supposedly been filed.
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions
of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its
legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the
legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment. 105
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right,
or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with
special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered
down view would call for the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike down any
law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the
actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or
one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the
character or nature of the actor. 106
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations,
the issue on whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or
the limitations respected, is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being
one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said
qualifications, conditions or limitations - particularly those prescribed or imposed by the
Constitution - would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue
and the settlement thereof are the main functions of courts of justice under the
Presidential form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of
checks and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a consequence,We have neither the
authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under the
ineluctable obligation - made particularly more exacting and peremptory by our
oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the
Constitution - to settle it.This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson, it was held that courts
have a "duty, rather than a power", to determine whether another branch of the
government has "kept within constitutional limits." Not satisfied with this postulate, the
court went farther and stressed that, if the Constitution provides how it may be amended
- as it is in our 1935 Constitution - "then, unless the manner is followed, the judiciary as
the interpreter of that constitution, will declare the amendment invalid." In fact, this very
Court - speaking through Justice Laurel, an outstanding authority on Philippine
Constitutional Law, as well as one of the highly respected and foremost leaders of the
Convention that drafted the 1935 Constitution - declared, as early as July 15, 1936, that
"(i)n times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of
conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments" of
the government.107 (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 124

In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or
officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and
status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the
lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are
competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to
the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file
employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in
rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement are given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that
majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and
rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is they and not the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the
adjustment This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from
poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and
improve the quality of life for all." 108 Any act of Congress that runs counter to this
constitutionaldesideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass
muster.
To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this
Court. They represent the more impotent rank-and-file government employees who,
unlike employees in the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective
bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment, nor the
power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices. Not only are they impotent as a
labor unit, but their efficacy to lobby in Congress is almost nil as R.A. No. 7653
effectively isolated them from the other GFI rank-and-file in compensation. These BSP
rank-and-file employees represent the politically powerless and they should not be
compelled to seek a political solution to their unequal and iniquitous
treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature to act. They
cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting time.
Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court's
duty to save them from reasonless discrimination.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the
last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.
___________________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 147387

December 10, 2003

RODOLFO C. FARIAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO,

and AGAPITO A. AQUINO, AS MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS TAXPAYERS, IN THEIR OWN BEHALF
AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY IN THE
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES,petitioners,
vs.

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON.

FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, AND SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 152161
CONG.
GERRY
A.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

SALAPUDDIN, petitioner,

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair
Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
(The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or
local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition in G.R. No. 147387 was filed by Rodolfo C.
Farias, Manuel M. Garcia, Francis G. Escudero and Agapito A. Aquino. At the time of
filing of the petition, the petitioners were members of the minority bloc in the House of
Representatives. Impleaded as respondents are: the Executive Secretary, then Speaker of
the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., the Commission on Elections,
the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), the
Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General of the House of Representatives.
The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 152161 was filed by Gerry A. Salapuddin, then
also a member of the House of Representatives. Impleaded as respondent is the
COMELEC.
Legislative History of Republic Act No. 9006
Rep. Act No. 9006, entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices," is a consolidation of
the following bills originating from the House of Representatives and the Senate,
respectively:
House Bill (HB) No. 9000 entitled "AN ACT ALLOWING THE USE OF MASS
MEDIA FOR ELECTION PROPAGANDA, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 881, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE OMNIBUS
ELECTION CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES;" 1
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 125


Senate Bill (SB) No. 1742 entitled "AN ACT TO ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF
FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL, AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS
THROUGH FAIR ELECTION PRACTICES." 2
A Bicameral Conference Committee, composed of eight members of the Senate3 and
sixteen (16) members of the House of Representatives,4 was formed to reconcile the
conflicting provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
On November 29, 2000, the Bicameral Conference Committee submitted its
Report,5 signed by its members, recommending the approval of the bill as reconciled and
approved by the conferees.
During the plenary session of the House of Representatives on February 5, 2001, Rep.
Jacinto V. Paras proposed an amendment to the Bicameral Conference Committee
Report. Rep. Didagen P. Dilangalen raised a point of order commenting that the House
could no longer submit an amendment thereto. Rep. Sergio A.F. Apostol thereupon
moved that the House return the report to the Bicameral Conference Committee in view
of the proposed amendment thereto. Rep. Dilangalen expressed his objection to the
proposal. However, upon viva voce voting, the majority of the House approved the
return of the report to the Bicameral Conference Committee for proper action.6
In view of the proposed amendment, the House of Representatives elected anew its
conferees7 to the Bicameral Conference Committee.8 Then again, for unclear reasons,
upon the motion of Rep. Ignacio R. Bunye, the House elected another set of conferees 9 to
the Bicameral Conference Committee.10
On February 7, 2001, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, Rep.
Bunye moved that the House consider the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on
the contrasting provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. Rep. Dilangalen observed
that the report had been recommitted to the Bicameral Conference Committee. The Chair
responded that the Bicameral Conference Report was a new one, and was a result of the
reconvening of a new Bicameral Conference Committee. Rep. Dilangalen then asked that
he be given time to examine the new report. Upon motion of Rep. Apostol, the House
deferred the approval of the report until the other members were given a copy thereof. 11
After taking up other pending matters, the House proceeded to vote on the Bicameral
Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB
No. 1742. The House approved the report with 125 affirmative votes, 3 negative votes
and no abstention. In explaining their negative votes, Reps. Farias and Garcia expressed
their belief that Section 14 thereof was a rider. Even Rep. Escudero, who voted in the
affirmative, expressed his doubts on the constitutionality of Section 14. Prior to casting
his vote, Rep. Dilangalen observed that no senator signed the Bicameral Conference
Committee Report and asked if this procedure was regular. 12
On the same day, the Senate likewise approved the Bicameral Conference Committee
Report on the contrasting provisions of SB No. 1742 and HB No. 9000.

Thereafter, Rep. Act No. 9006 was duly signed by then Senate President Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr. and then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte,
Jr. and was duly certified by the Secretary of the Senate Lutgardo B. Barbo and the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives Robert P. Nazareno as "the
consolidation of House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1742," and "finally passed by
both Houses on February 7, 2001."
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed Rep. Act No. 9006 into law on February 12,
2001.
The Petitioners Case
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act
No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is
unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution,
requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point
out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily
deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the
elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they
are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom
upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep.
Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus
Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to
appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive
officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than
the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon
filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they
campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand,
Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - they
are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy.
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 126

The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as
irregularities attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof,
should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that "[t]his
Act shall take effect upon its approval" is a violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it
becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good
law; hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court
in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,13 that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the
constitutional mandate on the "Accountability of Public Officers:" 14
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of
Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in the
Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the
filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.
The Respondents Arguments
For their part, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge this
Court to dismiss the petitions contending, preliminarily, that the petitioners have no legal
standing to institute the present suit. Except for the fact that their negative votes were
overruled by the majority of the members of the House of Representatives, the
petitioners have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of the passage of Rep.
Act No. 9006. Neither do petitioners have any interest as taxpayers since the assailed
statute does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.
Invoking the "enrolled bill" doctrine, the respondents refute the petitioners allegations
that "irregularities" attended the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9006. The signatures of the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House, appearing on the bill and the certification
signed by the respective Secretaries of both houses of Congress, constitute proof beyond
cavil that the bill was duly enacted into law.
The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, as it repeals Section 67
of the Omnibus Election Code, is not a proscribed rider nor does it violate Section 26(1)
of Article VI of the Constitution. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006, "An Act to Enhance the
Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election
Practices," is so broad that it encompasses all the processes involved in an election
exercise, including the filing of certificates of candidacy by elective officials.
They argue that the repeal of Section 67 is germane to the general subject of Rep. Act
No. 9006 as expressed in its title as it eliminates the effect of prematurely terminating the
term of an elective official by his filing of a certificate of candidacy for an office other

than the one which he is permanently holding, such that he is no longer considered ipso
facto resigned therefrom. The legislature, by including the repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006, has deemed it fit to remove the
"unfairness" of considering an elective official ipso facto resigned from his office upon
the filing of his certificate of candidacy for another elective office. With the repeal of
Section 67, all elective officials are now placed on equal footing as they are allowed to
finish their respective terms even if they run for any office, whether the presidency, vicepresidency or other elective positions, other than the one they are holding in a permanent
capacity.
The respondents assert that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code need
not be expressly stated in the title of Rep. Act No. 9006 as the legislature is not required
to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents. It must be deemed sufficient
that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general subject which
the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every means necessary for its
accomplishment. Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution merely calls for all the
parts of an act relating to its subject to find expression in its title. Mere details need not
be set forth.
According to the respondents, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals
Section 67, leaving Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code intact and effective, does
not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Section 67 pertains to elective
officials while Section 66 pertains to appointive officials. A substantial distinction exists
between these two sets of officials; elective officials occupy their office by virtue of their
mandate based upon the popular will, while the appointive officials are not elected by
popular will. The latter cannot, therefore, be similarly treated as the former. Equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated are treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
Further, Section 16, or the "Effectivity" clause, of Rep. Act No. 9006 does not run afoul
of the due process clause of the Constitution as it does not entail any arbitrary
deprivation of life, liberty and property. Specifically, the section providing for penalties
in cases of violations thereof presume that the formalities of the law would be observed,
i.e., charges would first be filed, and the accused would be entitled to a hearing before
judgment is rendered by a court having jurisdiction. In any case, the issue about lack of
due process is premature as no one has, as yet, been charged with violation of Rep. Act
No. 9006.
Finally, the respondents submit that the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of
the House of Representatives did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not excluding
from the Rolls those members thereof who ran for the Senate during the May 14, 2001
elections. These respondents merely complied with Rep. Act No. 9006, which enjoys the
presumption of validity until declared otherwise by the Court.
The Courts Ruling

CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 127

Before resolving the petitions on their merits, the Court shall first rule on the procedural
issue raised by the respondents, i.e., whether the petitioners have the legal standing or
locus standi to file the petitions at bar.

resolved. It may likewise be added that the exceptional character of the situation that
confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity for a ruling, the
national elections beings barely six months away, reinforce our stand. 27

The petitions were filed by the petitioners in their capacities as members of the House of
Representatives, and as taxpayers and registered voters.

Every statute is presumed valid.28 The presumption is that the legislature intended to
enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be
necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.29

Generally, a party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as
a result of its enforcement.15 The rationale for requiring a party who challenges the
constitutionality of a statute to allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy is "to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."16
However, being merely a matter of procedure, this Court, in several cases involving
issues of "overarching significance to our society," 17 had adopted a liberal stance on
standing. Thus, in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 18 this Court brushed
aside the procedural requirement of standing, took cognizance of, and subsequently
granted, the petitions separately filed by then Senator Francisco Tatad and several
members of the House of Representatives assailing the constitutionality of Rep. Act No.
8180 (An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes).
The Court likewise took cognizance of the petition filed by then members of the House
of Representatives which impugned as unconstitutional the validity of a provision of
Rep. Act No. 6734 (Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) in
Chiongbian v. Orbos.19 Similarly, the Court took cognizance of the petition filed by then
members of the Senate, joined by other petitioners, which challenged the validity of Rep.
Act No. 7716 (Expanded Value Added Tax Law) in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance. 20
Members of Congress, such as the petitioners, were likewise allowed by this Court to
challenge the validity of acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government
agencies or instrumentalities in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation,21 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.,22 Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez,23 Albano v. Reyes,24 and Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization.25

It is equally well-established, however, that the courts, as guardians of the Constitution,

have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature
transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law.30 And where the acts of the other
branches of government run afoul of the Constitution, it is the judiciarys solemn and
sacred duty to nullify the same.31
Proceeding from these guideposts, the Court shall now resolve the substantial issues
raised by the petitions.
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider 32
At the core of the controversy is Section 14, the repealing clause of Rep. Act No. 9006,
which provides:
Sec. 14. Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881)
and Sections 10 and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a
consequence, the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No.
8436 is rendered ineffective. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and
regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or modified or amended accordingly.
The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted earlier, reads:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or
local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Certainly, the principal issue posed by the petitions, i.e., whether Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which this Court had declared in Dimaporo26 as deriving its
existence from the constitutional provision on accountability of public officers, has been
validly repealed by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, is one of "overarching
significance" that justifies this Courts adoption of a liberal stance vis--vis the
procedural matter on standing. Moreover, with the national elections barely seven
months away, it behooves the Court to confront the issue now and resolve the same
forthrightly. The following pronouncement of the Court is quite apropos:

SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof.

... All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional question. Considering,
therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity
of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that [its] constitutionality . . . be now

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be
so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement

The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling
legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely
calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title. 33
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that
the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that

CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 128

that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not
a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably
to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and
every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere
details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act. 34
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly,
Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices." Section 2 of
the law provides not only the declaration of principles but also the objectives thereof:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. The State shall, during the election period, supervise
or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of
media of communication or information to guarantee or ensure equal opportunity for
public service, including access to media time and space, and the equitable right to reply,
for public information campaigns and fora among candidates and assure free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections.
The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from
any form of harassment and discrimination.35
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be
expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content. 36
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes
a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are
holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the
ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the "one subject-one
title" rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the
title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long
as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered
in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the
general subject.37
The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the particular matter are
particularly instructive:

SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
Because I really do not believe that it is out of place. I think that even with the term "fair
election practice," it really covers it, because as expressed by Senator Roco, those
conditions inserted earlier seemed unfair and it is an election practice and, therefore, I
think, Im very comfortable with the title "Fair Election Practice" so that we can get over
with these things so that we dont come back again until we find the title. I mean, its one
provision which I think is fair for everybody. It may seem like a limitation but this
limitation actually provides for fairness in election practices as the title implies.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
Yes.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
So I would want to beg the House contingent, lets get it over with. To me, ha, its not a
very touchy issue. For me, its even a very correct provision. I feel very comfortable with
it and it was voted in the Senate, at least, so I would like to appeal to the ... para matapos
na, then we come back as a Bicam just for the title Is that what youre ...?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
Its not the title per se, its the coverage. So if you will just kindly bear with us. Im
happy that there is already one comfortable senator there among ... several of us were
also comfortable with it. But it would be well that when we rise from this Bicam that
were all comfortable with it.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Yes. Anyway, lets listen to Congressman Marcos.
REP. MARCOS:
Mr. Chairman, may I just make the observation that although it is true that the bulk of
provisions deals with the area of propaganda and political advertising, the complete title
is actually one that indulge full coverage. It says "An Act to enhance the holding of free,
orderly, honest ... elections through fair election practices." But as you said, we will put
that aside to discuss later one.

Yes, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to clarify.

Secondly, I think the Declaration of Principles contained in Section 2, paragraph 2 is

perfectly adequate in that it says that it shall ensure candidates for public office that may
be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.

So all were looking for now is an appropriate title to make it broader so that it would
cover this provision [referring to the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code], is that correct? Thats all. Because I believe ...

Surely this provision in Section 67 of the old Election Code of the existing Omnibus
Election Code is a form of harassment or discrimination. And so I think that in the effort
at leveling the playing field, we can cover this and it should not be considered a rider.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):

SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:

SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:

We are looking for an appropriate coverage which will result in the nomenclature or title.
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 129

I agree, Mr. Chairman. I think the Congresswoman from Ilocos had very clearly put it,
that it is covered in the Declaration of Principles and in the objective of this bill. And
therefore, I hope that the House contingent would agree to this so that we can finish it
now. And it expressly provides for fair election practices because ...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Yeah, I think what is on the table is that we are not disputing this, but we are looking for
a title that is more generic so that then we have less of an objection on constitutionality. I
think thats the theory. So, there is acceptance of this.
Maybe we should not call it na limitation on elected officials. Maybe we should say the
special provision on elected officials. So how is that? Alam mo ito ...
REP. MARCOS:
I think we just change the Section 1, the short title.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Also, Then we say - - on the short title of the Act, we say ...
REP. MARCOS:
What if we say fair election practices? Maybe that should be changed...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
O, sige, fine, fine. Lets a brainstorm. Equal...
REP. PADILLA:
Mr. Chairman, why dont we use "An Act rationalizing the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections, amending for the purpose Batasang Pambansa
known as the Omnibus Election Code?"
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Why dont we remove "fair" and then this shall be cited as Election Practices Act?"
REP. PICHAY:
Thats not an election practice. Thats a limitation.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Ah - - - ayaw mo iyong practice. O, give me another noun.
REP. MARCOS:
The Fair Election.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
O, Fair Election Act.
REP. MACARAMBON:
Nagbi-brainstorm tayo dito, eh. How about if we change the title to enhance the holding
of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and ensure equal opportunity for public service through
fair election practices?
REP. PICHAY:
Fair election practices?
REP. MACARAMBON:
Yeah. To ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair ...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Wala nang practices nga.
REP. PICHAY:

Wala nang practices.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
It shall be cited as Fair Election Act.
(Informal discussions)
REP. PICHAY:
Approve na iyan.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Done. So, okay na iyon. The title will be "Fair Election Act."
The rest wala nang problema ano?
VOICES:
Wala na.
REP. MACARAMBON:
Wala na iyong practices?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Wala na, wala na. Mahina tayo sa practice, eh.
O, wala na? We will clean up.
REP. MARCOS:
Title?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
The short title, "This Act ..."
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
Youre back to your No. 21 already.
REP. MARCOS:
The full title, the same?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Iyon na nga. The full title is "An Act to enhance the holding ..." Thats the House
version, eh, dahil pareho, hindi ba? Then the short title "This Act shall be known as the
Fair Election Act."38
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of
harassment or discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive
department found cause with Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the
measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may believe that
the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But
policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the
exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. 39 It is not for this Court
to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an
enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is
the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion
within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the
judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring
them within the range of judicial cognizance.40 Congress is not precluded from repealing
Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra 41 upholding the validity of the
provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 130

purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that
the election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws
the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress is
achieved.
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill
should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and
scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not
received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. 42 In this case, it
cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon
by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as members of the House of
Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their
votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision
repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution43
The petitioners contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the
appointive ones and violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject
to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions
that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the
other.44 The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this
manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed
or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.45
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials.
The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are
elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon
stringent conditions.46 On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue
of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold
their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure 47 while others
serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.48

Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55,
Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers
and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan
political activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision,
elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously
expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.49
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect
to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for
any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the
Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials
vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and
all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal
protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
The Enrolled Bill Doctrine Is Applicable In this Case
Not content with their plea for the nullification of Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, the
petitioners insist that the entire law should be nullified. They contend that irregularities
attended the passage of the said law particularly in the House of Representatives
catalogued thus:
a. Creation of two (2) sets of BCC (Bicameral Conference Committee) members by the
House during its session on February 5, 2001;
b. No communication from the Senate for a conference on the compromise bill submitted
by the BCC on November 29, 2000;
c. The new Report submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC was presented for approval on the
floor without copies thereof being furnished the members;
d. The 2nd/3rd BCC has no record of its proceedings, and the Report submitted by it was
not signed by the Chairman (Sen. Roco) thereof as well as its senator-members at the
time it was presented to and rammed for approval by the House;
e. There was no meeting actually conducted by the 2nd/3rd BCC and that its alleged
Report was instantly made and passed around for the signature of the BCC members;
f. The Senate has no record of the creation of a 2nd BCC but only of the first one that
convened on November 23, 2000;
g. The "Effectivity" clauses of SB No. 1741 and HB No. 9000, as well as that of the
compromise bill submitted by the BCC that convened on November 20, 2000, were
couched in terms that comply with the publication required by the Civil Code and
jurisprudence, to wit:
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 131

...

The Effectivity Clause Is Defective

However, it was surreptitiously replaced in its final form as it appears in 16, R.A. No.
9006, with the provision that "This Act shall take effect immediately upon its approval;"

Finally, the "Effectivity" clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it
"shall take effect immediately upon its approval," is defective. However, the same does
not render the entire law invalid. In Taada v. Tuvera, 54 this Court laid down the rule:

h. The copy of the compromise bill submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC that was furnished the
members during its consideration on February 7, 2001, did not have the same 16 as it
now appears in RA No. 9006, but 16 of the compromise bill, HB 9000 and SB 1742,
reasons for which no objection thereto was made;
i. The alleged BCC Report presented to the House on February 7, 2001, did not "contain
a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject
measure;" and
j. The disappearance of the "Cayetano amendment," which is Section 12 of the
compromise bill submitted by the BCC. In fact, this was the subject of the purported
proposed amendment to the compromise bill of Member Paras as stated in paragraph 7
hereof. The said provision states, thusly:
Sec. 12. Limitation on Elected Officials. Any elected official who runs for president
and vice-president shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of the certificate of candidacy.50
The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court
is not persuaded. Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker
of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. A review of
cases51 reveals the Courts consistent adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to
deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the
petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd
Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This Court is not the proper forum for
the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate.
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no
concern.52 Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006
must be resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo v. De
Venecia,53 viz.:

... the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause
does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval,
or on any other date without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended.55
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code56 and the doctrine enunciated in Taada, Rep. Act
No. 9006, notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its
publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in
constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the
policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of
the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds,
the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional
limitations or the limits of legislative power. 57 No such transgression has been shown in
this case.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the
courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress
failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation
of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun,
it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that the rules adopted by deliberative
bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and
with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded
by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage
will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of
members have agreed to a particular measure."
CONSTILAW 2-SEC. I | 132