Testate

Estate of Adriana Maloto v. CA, G.R. No. 76464, February

29,1988

FACTS:
Adriana Maloto died on October 1963 in Iloilo City, her place of residence. On
November 1963, Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and
Felino Maloto, niece and nephews respectively, of Adriana Maloto commenced an
intestate proceeding in the CFI of Iloilo that was docketed as Spec. Pro. No. 1736.
They executed an intestate proceeding and divided the estate in the proportion of
one-fourth (1/4) share for each. The CFI judge approved the partition.

Subsequently, on April 1, 1967, a document purporting to be the last will and
testament of Adriana Maloto was delivered to the CFI of Iloilo. Aldina et al. were all
named as heirs but Aldina and Constancio appeared to have bigger shares in the will
than what they received in the extrajudicial partition. There were also dispositions
in favor of Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion
Miraflor.

Aldino and Constancio, along with the other devisees and legatees, filed a motion in
S.P. No. 1736 for, among others, the allowance of the will of Adriana Maloto. The CFI
judge denied the motion on the ground that the said motion had been filed out of
time. The petitioners (Aldino et al.) filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
with the SC but it was denied on the ground of improper remedy.

The petitioners then commenced S.P. No. 2176 in the CFI of Iloilo for the probate of
the alleged last will and testament. The probate court dismissed the petition on the
basis of the finding of said court in S.P. No. 1736 that the alleged will sought to be
probated had been destroyed and revoked by the testatrix


ISSUE: WON the will was revoked by Adriana


HELD:
REVOCATION THEREOF; PHYSICAL ACT OF DESTRUCTION; ANIMUS
REVOCANDI, A NECESSARY ELEMENT. The physical act of destruction of a will,
like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless
the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not
imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be
performed by another person but under the express direction and in the presence of
the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be
the will itself.

In this case, while animus revocandi, or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for
that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus

revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last
will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt
physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the
testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction

[There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these

requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by Adriana's

maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all,
much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not
proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And
then, the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe
and Eladio, were one in stating that they were the only ones present at the
place where the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was located in which
the papers proffered as a will were burned It is an important matter of
public interest that a purported will is not denied legalization on dubious
grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be
shaken to its very foundations.]
As to Res Judicata:
The doctrine of res adjudicata finds no application in the present controversy. For a judgment to be a
bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: (1) the presence of a final former
judgment; (2) the former judgment was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is,
between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action

No final judgment rendered insofar as the probate of Adriana Maloto's will is concerned.

The decision of the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 1736, although final, involved only the
intestate settlement of the estate of Adriana. As such, that judgment could not in any manner be
construed to be final with respect to the probate of the subsequently discovered will of the decedent.
Neither is it a judgment on the merits of the action for probate. This is understandably so because the
trial court, in the intestate proceeding, was without jurisdiction to rule on the probate of the
contested will.

The probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the probate of the alleged will of
Adriana Maloto in S.P. No. 1736. Indeed, the motion to reopen the proceedings was filed out of time.
Moreover, it is not proper to make a finding in an intestate proceeding that the discovered will has
been revoked. In fact, the probate court in S.P. No. 1736 stated in its order that Movants should have
filed a separate actionfor the probate of the will. Even this Court, in dismissing the petition for
certiorari, said that the more appropriate remedy is a separate proceeding for the probate of the
alleged will.

Thus, the order of the probate court in S.P. No. 1736 is not a bar to the present petition for the
probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto

As to {in}DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION:

The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose validity the revocation depends, is
equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive conditions, and hence prevents the revocation of the

original will. But a mere intent to make at some time a will in the place of that destroyed will not
render the destruction conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid
execution of a new wil