G.R. Nos.

175279-80

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

of the Philippines. The monthly support of P250,000.00 is without prejudice to any increase or decrease
thereof that this Court may grant plaintiff as the circumstances may warrant i.e. depending on the proof
submitted by the parties during the proceedings for the main action for support.6

FIRST DIVISION

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,7 asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal
support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children and
respondent has continued to support the family for their sustenance and well-being in accordance with
familys social and financial standing. As to the P250,000.00 granted by the trial court as monthly support
pendente lite, as well as theP1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent found it unconscionable and
beyond the intendment of the law for not having considered the needs of the respondent.

June 5, 2013

SUSAN LIM-LUA, Petitioner,

vs.
DANILO Y. LUA, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

In its May 13, 2004 Order, the trial court stated that the March 31, 2004 Order had become final and
executory since respondents motion for reconsideration is treated as a mere scrap of paper for violation
of the threeday notice period under Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
and therefore did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal. Respondent was given ten (10) days
to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of the court for disregarding the March 31, 2004
order granting support pendente lite.8

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner seeks to set aside the Decision1 dated
April 20, 2006 and Resolution2 dated October 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing her
petition for contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 01154) and granting respondent's petition for certiorari (CA-G.R.
SP No. 01315).

His second motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed a petition for certiorari in
the CA.

The factual background is as follows:

On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision,9 finding merit in respondents contention that the trial
court gravely abused its discretion in granting P250,000.00 monthly support to petitioner without
evidence to prove his actual income. The said court thus decreed:

On September 3, 2003,3 petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-29346 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 14.
In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought the amount
of P500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondents huge earnings from salaries and dividends in
several companies and businesses here and abroad.4
After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order5 dated March 31, 2004 granting
support pendente lite, as follows:
From the evidence already adduced by the parties, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (P250,000.00)
Thousand Pesos would be sufficient to take care of the needs of the plaintiff. This amount excludes the
One hundred thirty-five (P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical attendance expenses needed by
plaintiff for the operation of both her eyes which is demandable upon the conduct of such operation.
The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of defendant, should
be continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.
According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is demandable from the time plaintiff needed the said
support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand. Since the instant complaint was filed on 03
September 2003, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (P250,000.00) Thousand should be paid by
defendant to plaintiff retroactively to such date until the hearing of the support pendente
lite. P250,000.00 x 7 corresponding to the seven (7) months that lapsed from September, 2003 to March
2004 would tantamount to a total of One Million Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750,000.00) Thousand Pesos.
Thereafter, starting the month of April 2004, until otherwise ordered by this Court, defendant is ordered
to pay a monthly support of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand (P250,000.00) Pesos payable within the first
five (5) days of each corresponding month pursuant to the third paragraph of Art. 203 of the Family Code

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this petition is given due course. The assailed Orders dated
March 31, 2004, May 13, 2004, June 4, 2004 and June 18, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14,
Cebu City issued in Civil Case No. CEB No. 29346 entitled "Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua" are hereby
nullified and set aside and instead a new one is entered ordering herein petitioner:
a) to pay private respondent a monthly support pendente lite of P115,000.00 beginning the
month of April 2005 and every month thereafter within the first five (5) days thereof;
b) to pay the private respondent the amount of P115,000.00 a month multiplied by the
number of months starting from September 2003 until March 2005 less than the amount
supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent as her and their two (2) children
monthly support; and
c) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.10
Neither of the parties appealed this decision of the CA. In a Compliance11 dated June 28, 2005,
respondent attached a copy of a check he issued in the amount of P162,651.90 payable to petitioner.
Respondent explained that, as decreed in the CA decision, he deducted from the amount of support in
arrears (September 3, 2003 to March 2005) ordered by the CA -- P2,185,000.00 -- plus P460,000.00
(April, May, June and July 2005), totalingP2,645,000.00, the advances given by him to his children and
petitioner in the sum of P2,482,348.16 (with attached photocopies of receipts/billings).

In her Comment to Compliance with Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution,12 petitioner asserted
that none of the expenses deducted by respondent may be chargeable as part of the monthly support
contemplated by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.
On September 27, 2005, the trial court issued an Order13 granting petitioners motion for issuance of a
writ of execution as it rejected respondents interpretation of the CA decision. Respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration and subsequently also filed a motion for inhibition of Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr.
On November 25, 2005, Judge Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order14 denying both motions.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, both motions are DENIED. Since a second motion for
reconsideration is prohibited under the Rules, this denial has attained finality; let, therefore, a writ of
execution be issued in favor of plaintiff as against defendant for the accumulated support in arrears
pendente lite.
Notify both parties of this Order.
SO ORDERED.15

The appellate court said that the trial court should not have completely disregarded the expenses
incurred by respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two cars, payment of tuition
fees, travel expenses, and the credit card purchases involving groceries, dry goods and books, which
certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two children, but their mother (petitioner) as well. It held
that respondents act of deferring the monthly support adjudged in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 was not
contumacious as it was anchored on valid and justifiable reasons. Respondent said he just wanted the
issue of whether to deduct his advances be settled first in view of the different interpretation by the trial
court of the appellate courts decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. It also noted the lack of contribution
from the petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses to support their children.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition raising the following errors allegedly committed by the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING RESPONDENT GUILTY OF INDIRECT
CONTEMPT.

Since respondent still failed and refused to pay the support in arrears pendente lite, petitioner filed in
the CA a Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 01154 ("Susan Lim
Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua"). Respondent, on the other hand, filed CA-G.R. SP No. 01315, a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court ("Danilo Y. Lua versus Hon. Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr., in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 14, and Susan Lim Lua"). The two
cases were consolidated.

II.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE DEDUCTION OF THE AMOUNT OF
PHP2,482,348.16 PLUS 946,465.64, OR A TOTAL OF PHP3,428,813.80 FROM THE CURRENT
TOTAL SUPPORT IN ARREARS OF THE RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER AND THEIR
CHILDREN.17

By Decision dated April 20, 2006, the CA set aside the assailed orders of the trial court, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages
filed by Susan Lim Lua against Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP. CA-GR No. 01154;
b) GRANTING Danilo Y. Luas Petition for Certiorari docketed as SP. CA-GR No. 01315.
Consequently, the assailed Orders dated 27 September 2005 and 25 November 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil Case No. CEB-29346 entitled "Susan
Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and instead a new one is
entered:
i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of PhP2,482,348.16 plus 946,465.64, or
a total of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of Danilo Y.
Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two (2) children;
ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his monthly support of
PhP115,000.00 pesos starting from the time payment of this amount was deferred
by him subject to the deductions aforementioned.
iii. DIRECTING the issuance of a permanent writ of preliminary injunction.
SO ORDERED.16

The main issue is whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted from
the total support in arrears owing to petitioner and her children pursuant to the Decision dated April 12,
2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.
The pertinent provision of the Family Code of the Philippines provides:
Article 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall
include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner argues that it was patently erroneous for the CA to have allowed the deduction of the value of
the two cars and their maintenance costs from the support in arrears, as these items are not
indispensable to the sustenance of the family or in keeping them alive. She points out that in the
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740, the CA already considered the said items which it deemed chargeable
to respondent, while the monthly support pendente lite (P115,000.00) was fixed on the basis of the
documentary evidence of respondents alleged income from various businesses and petitioners
testimony that she needed P113,000.00 for the maintenance of the household and other miscellaneous
expenses excluding the P135,000.00 medical attendance expenses of petitioner.

Respondent, on the other hand, contends that disallowing the subject deductions would result in unjust
enrichment, thus making him pay for the same obligation twice. Since petitioner and the children resided
in one residence, the groceries and dry goods purchased by the children using respondents credit card,
totalling P594,151.58 for the period September 2003 to June 2005 were not consumed by the children
alone but shared with their mother. As to the Volkswagen Beetle and BMW 316i respondent bought for
his daughter Angelli Suzanne Lua and Daniel Ryan Lua, respectively, these, too, are to be considered
advances for support, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Respondent stressed that
being children of parents belonging to the upper-class society, Angelli and Daniel Ryan had never in their
entire life commuted from one place to another, nor do they eat their meals at "carinderias". Hence, the
cars and their maintenance are indispensable to the childrens day-to-day living, the value of which were
properly deducted from the arrearages in support pendente lite ordered by the trial and appellate
courts.

xxxx
ATTY. ZOSA:
Q What other expenses do you incur in living in that place?
A The normal household and the normal expenses for a family to have a decent living, Sir.
Q How much other expenses do you incur?
WITNESS:

As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is
generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to
the needs of the recipient.18 Such support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family.
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for annulment of
voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time during the proceeding, the court, motu
proprio or upon verified application of any of the parties, guardian or designated custodian, may
temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final order.19 Because of its
provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can settle an
application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of evidence
which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be established
by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record.20

A For other expenses, is around over a P100,000.00, Sir.

Q Why do you incur that much amount?
A For the clothing for the three (3) of us, for the vitamins and medicines. And also I am having a special
therapy to straighten my back because I am scoliotic. I am advised by the Doctor to hire a driver, but I
cannot still afford it now. Because my eyesight is not reliable for driving. And I still need another
househelp to accompany me whenever I go marketing because for my age, I cannot carry anymore heavy
loads.
xxxx
ATTY. FLORES:

In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for petitioner and her two children was
determined after due hearing and submission of documentary evidence by the parties. Although the
amount fixed by the trial court was reduced on appeal, it is clear that the monthly support pendente lite
of P115,000.00 ordered by the CA was intended primarily for the sustenance of petitioner and her
children, e.g., food, clothing, salaries of drivers and house helpers, and other household expenses.
Petitioners testimony also mentioned the cost of regular therapy for her scoliosis and
vitamins/medicines.
ATTY. ZOSA:

xxxx
Q On the issue of the food for you and the two (2) children, you mentioned P40,000.00 to P50,000.00?
A Yes, for the food alone.
Q Okay, what other possible expenses that you would like to include in those two (2) items? You
mentioned of a driver, am I correct?

xxxx
A Yes, I might need two (2) drivers, Sir for me and my children.
Q How much do you spend for your food and your two (2) children every month?
Q Okay. How much would you like possibly to pay for those two (2) drivers?
A Presently, Sir?
A I think P10,000.00 a month for one (1) driver. So I need two (2) drivers. And I need another househelp.
ATTY. ZOSA:
Yes.
A For the food alone, I spend not over P40,000.00 to P50,000.00 a month for the food alone.

Q You need another househelp. The househelp nowadays would charge you something
between P3,000.00 toP4,000.00. Thats quite
A Right now, my househelp is receiving P8,000.00. I need another which I will give a compensation
of P5,000.00.

Q Other than that, do you still have other expenses?

Q You talk of therapy?

A My clothing.

A Yes.

COURT:

Q So how much is that?

How about the schooling for your children?

A Around P5,000.00 a week.21

WITNESS:

As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond doubt that he can solely provide for the
subsistence, education, transportation, health/medical needs and recreational activities of his children,
as well as those of petitioner who was then unemployed and a full-time housewife. Despite this,
respondents counsel manifested during the same hearing that respondent was willing to grant the
amount of only P75,000.00 as monthly support pendente lite both for the children and petitioner as
spousal support. Though the receipts of expenses submitted in court unmistakably show how much
respondent lavished on his children, it appears that the matter of spousal support was a different matter
altogether. Rejecting petitioners prayer for P500,000.00 monthly support and finding the P75,000.00
monthly support offered by respondent as insufficient, the trial court fixed the monthly support
pendente lite at P250,000.00. However, since the supposed income in millions of respondent was based
merely on the allegations of petitioner in her complaint and registration documents of various
corporations which respondent insisted are owned not by him but his parents and siblings, the CA
reduced the amount of support pendente lite toP115,000.00, which ruling was no longer questioned by
both parties.

A The schooling is shouldered by my husband, Your Honor.

COURT:
Everything?
A Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
ATTY. FLORES:

WITNESS:

Controversy between the parties resurfaced when respondents compliance with the final CA decision
indicated that he deducted from the total amount in arrears (P2,645,000.00) the sum of P2,482,348.16,
representing the value of the two cars for the children, their cost of maintenance and advances given to
petitioner and his children. Respondent explained that the deductions were made consistent with the
fallo of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordering him to pay support pendente lite in arrears less
the amount supposedly given by him to petitioner as her and their two childrens monthly support.

A I need to have an operation both of my eyes. I also need a special therapy for my back because I am
scoliotic, three (3) times a week.

The following is a summary of the subject deductions under Compliance dated June 28, 2005, duly
supported by receipts22:

Q Madam witness, let us talk of the present needs. x x x. What else, what specific need that you would
like to add so I can tell my client, the defendant.

Q That is very reasonable. [W]ould you care to please repeat that?

A Therapy for my scoliotic back and then also for the operation both of my eyes. And I am also taking
some vitamins from excel that will cost P20,000.00 a month.
Q Okay. Lets have piece by piece. Have you asked the Doctor how much would it cost you for the
operation of that scoliotic?
A Yes before because I was already due last year. Before, this eye will cost P60,000.00 and the other
eyesP75,000.00.
Q So for both eyes, you are talking of P60,000.00 plus P75,000.00 is P135,000.00?
A Yes.
xxxx

Car purchases for Angelli Suzanne and Daniel Ryan Car Maintenance fees of Angelli Suzanne

Php1,350,000.00
613,472.86
51,232.50

Credit card statements of Daniel Ryan -

348,682.28

Car Maintenance fees of Daniel Ryan -

118,960.52

Php2,482,348.16

After the trial court disallowed the foregoing deductions, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
further asserting that the following amounts, likewise with supporting receipts, be considered as
additional advances given to petitioner and the children23:

Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua

Php 42,450.71

Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan

11,500.00

Travel expenses of Susan Lim-Lua

14,611.15

Credit card purchases of Angelli

Suzanne

408,891.08

Salon and travel expenses of Angelli

Suzanne

87,112.70

School expenses of Daniel Ryan Lua

260,900.00

Cash given to Daniel and Angelli

121,000.00

TOTAL -

GRAND TOTAL -

Php 946,465.64

Php 3,428,813.80

The CA, in ruling for the respondent said that all the foregoing expenses already incurred by the
respondent should, in equity, be considered advances which may be properly deducted from the support
in arrears due to the petitioner and the two children. Said court also noted the absence of petitioners
contribution to the joint obligation of support for their children.
We reverse in part the decision of the CA.
Judicial determination of support pendente lite in cases of legal separation and petitions for declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage are guided by the following provisions of the Rule on Provisional
Orders24
Sec. 2. Spousal Support.In determining support for the spouses, the court may be guided by the
following rules:
(a) In the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the
spouses may be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership.
(b) The court may award support to either spouse in such amount and for such period of time
as the court may deem just and reasonable based on their standard of living during the
marriage.
(c) The court may likewise consider the following factors: (1) whether the spouse seeking
support is the custodian of a child whose circumstances make it appropriate for that spouse
not to seek outside employment; (2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education and
training to enable the spouse seeking support to find appropriate employment, and that
spouses future earning capacity; (3) the duration of the marriage; (4) the comparative
financial resources of the spouses, including their comparative earning abilities in the labor
market; (5) the needs and obligations of each spouse; (6) the contribution of each spouse to

the marriage, including services rendered in home-making, child care, education, and career
building of the other spouse; (7) the age and health of the spouses; (8) the physical and
emotional conditions of the spouses; (9) the ability of the supporting spouse to give support,
taking into account that spouses earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and
standard of living; and (10) any other factor the court may deem just and equitable.
(d) The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of
the spouse.
Sec. 3. Child Support.The common children of the spouses shall be supported from the properties of the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership.
Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent or both may be ordered to give an amount
necessary for the support, maintenance, and education of the child. It shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.
In determining the amount of provisional support, the court may likewise consider the following factors:
(1) the financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent and those of the child; (2) the
physical and emotional health of the child and his or her special needs and aptitudes; (3) the standard of
living the child has been accustomed to; (4) the non-monetary contributions that the parents will make
toward the care and well-being of the child.
The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of the parent.
Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the CA was not appealed by either party,
there is no controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness. The dispute concerns the deductions
made by respondent in settling the support in arrears.
On the issue of crediting of money payments or expenses against accrued support, we find as relevant
the following rulings by US courts.
In Bradford v. Futrell,25 appellant sought review of the decision of the Circuit Court which found him in
arrears with his child support payments and entered a decree in favor of appellee wife. He complained
that in determining the arrearage figure, he should have been allowed full credit for all money and items
of personal property given by him to the children themselves, even though he referred to them as gifts.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled that in the suit to determine amount of arrears due the divorced
wife under decree for support of minor children, the husband (appellant) was not entitled to credit for
checks which he had clearly designated as gifts, nor was he entitled to credit for an automobile given to
the oldest son or a television set given to the children. Thus, if the children remain in the custody of the
mother, the father is not entitled to credit for money paid directly to the children if such was paid
without any relation to the decree.
In the absence of some finding of consent by the mother, most courts refuse to allow a husband to
dictate how he will meet the requirements for support payments when the mode of payment is fixed by
a decree of court. Thus he will not be credited for payments made when he unnecessarily interposed
himself as a volunteer and made payments direct to the children of his own accord. Wills v. Baker, 214 S.
W. 2d 748 (Mo. 1948); Openshaw v. Openshaw, 42 P. 2d 191 (Utah 1935). In the latter case the court
said in part: "The payments to the children themselves do not appear to have been made as payments
upon alimony, but were rather the result of his fatherly interest in the welfare of those children. We do
not believe he should be permitted to charge them to plaintiff. By so doing he would be determining for
Mrs. Openshaw the manner in which she should expend her allowances. It is a very easy thing for

children to say their mother will not give them money, especially as they may realize that such a plea is
effective in attaining their ends. If she is not treating them right the courts are open to the father for
redress."26
In Martin, Jr. v. Martin,27 the Supreme Court of Washington held that a father, who is required by a
divorce decree to make child support payments directly to the mother, cannot claim credit for payments
voluntarily made directly to the children. However, special considerations of an equitable nature may
justify a court in crediting such payments on his indebtedness to the mother, when such can be done
without injustice to her.
The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a divorce decree to pay to the mother
money for the support of their dependent children and the unpaid and accrued installments become
judgments in her favor, he cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on account of payments voluntarily
made directly to the children. Koon v. Koon, supra; Briggs v. Briggs, supra. However, special
considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in crediting such payments on his indebtedness
to the mother, when that can be done without injustice to her. Briggs v. Briggs, supra. The courts are
justifiably reluctant to lay down any general rules as to when such credits may be allowed.28 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited against the
accrued support pendente lite. As earlier mentioned, the monthly support pendente lite granted by the
trial court was intended primarily for food, household expenses such as salaries of drivers and house
helpers, and also petitioners scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought
by respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of petitioner and Angelli,
purchases through credit card of items other than groceries and dry goods (clothing) should have been
disallowed, as these bear no relation to the judgment awarding support pendente lite. While it is true
that the dispositive portion of the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordered herein respondent
to pay the support in arrears "less than the amount supposedly given by petitioner to the private
respondent as her and their two (2) children monthly support," the deductions should be limited to
those basic needs and expenses considered by the trial and appellate courts. The assailed ruling of the
CA allowing huge deductions from the accrued monthly support of petitioner and her children, while
correct insofar as it commends the generosity of the respondent to his children, is clearly inconsistent
with the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. More important, it completely ignores the unfair
consequences to petitioner whose sustenance and well-being, was given due regard by the trial and
appellate courts. This is evident from the March 31, 2004 Order granting support pendente lite to
petitioner and her children, when the trial court observed:
While there is evidence to the effect that defendant is giving some forms of financial assistance to his
two (2) children via their credit cards and paying for their school expenses, the same is, however, devoid
of any form of spousal support to the plaintiff, for, at this point in time, while the action for nullity of
marriage is still to be heard, it is incumbent upon the defendant, considering the physical and financial
condition of the plaintiff and the overwhelming capacity of defendant, to extend support unto the latter.
x x x29
On appeal, while the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 reduced the amount of monthly support fixed by
the trial court, it nevertheless held that considering respondents financial resources, it is but fair and
just that he give a monthly support for the sustenance and basic necessities of petitioner and his
children. This would imply that any amount respondent seeks to be credited as monthly support should
only cover those incurred for sustenance and household expenses.1avvphi1
In the case at bar, records clearly show and in fact has been admitted by petitioner that aside from
paying the expenses of their two (2) childrens schooling, he gave his two (2) children two (2) cars and

credit cards of which the expenses for various items namely: clothes, grocery items and repairs of their
cars were chargeable to him which totaled an amount of more than One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) for each of them and considering that as testified by the private respondent that she
needs the total amount of P113,000.00 for the maintenance of the household and other miscellaneous
expenses and considering further that petitioner can afford to buy cars for his two (2) children, and to
pay the expenses incurred by them which are chargeable to him through the credit cards he provided
them in the amount of P100,000.00 each, it is but fair and just that the monthly support pendente lite
for his wife, herein private respondent, be fixed as of the present in the amount of P115,000.00 which
would be sufficient enough to take care of the household and other needs. This monthly support
pendente lite to private respondent in the amount of P115,000.00 excludes the amount of One Hundred
ThirtyFive (P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical attendance expenses needed by private
respondent for the operation of both her eyes which is demandable upon the conduct of such operation.
Likewise, this monthly support of P115,000.00 is without prejudice to any increase or decrease thereof
that the trial court may grant private respondent as the circumstances may warrant i.e. depending on
the proof submitted by the parties during the proceedings for the main action for support.
The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of petitioner, should be
continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.30 (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, only the following expenses of respondent may be allowed as deductions from the accrued
support pendente lite for petitioner and her children:
1wphi1
Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua

Php 42,450.71

Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan

11,500.00

Credit card purchases of Angelli

365,282.20

(Groceries and Dry Goods)

Credit Card purchases of Daniel Ryan

228,869.38

TOTAL

Php 648,102.29

As to the contempt charge, we sustain the CA in holding that respondent is not guilty of indirect
contempt.
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority,
justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts order, but such
conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or,
in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice.31 To constitute contempt, the act must be
done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.32 The good faith, or lack of it, of the alleged
contemnor should be considered.33
Respondent admittedly ceased or suspended the giving of monthly support pendente lite granted by the
trial court, which is immediately executory. However, we agree with the CA that respondents act was
not contumacious considering that he had not been remiss in actually providing for the needs of his
children. It is a matter of record that respondent continued shouldering the full cost of their education
and even beyond their basic necessities in keeping with the familys social status. Moreover, respondent
believed in good faith that the trial and appellate courts, upon equitable grounds, would allow him to
offset the substantial amounts he had spent or paid directly to his children.

Respondent complains that petitioner is very much capacitated to generate income on her own because
she presently maintains a boutique at the Ayala Center Mall in Cebu City and at the same time engages
in the business of lending money. He also claims that the two children have finished their education and
are now employed in the family business earning their own salaries.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

Suffice it to state that the matter of increase or reduction of support should be submitted to the trial
court in which the action for declaration for nullity of marriage was filed, as this Court is not a trier of
facts. The amount of support may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or
increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to
support.34 As we held in Advincula v. Advincula35
Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is
essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her
alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the
means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.36

G.R. No. 183896

January 30, 2013

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated April 20, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 01154 and 01315 is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages
filed by Susan Lim Lua against Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP. CA-G.R. No. 01154;
b) GRANTING IN PART Danilo Y. Lua's Petition for Certiorari docketed as SP. CA-G.R. No.
01315. Consequently, the assailed Orders dated 27 September 2005 and 25 November 2005
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil Case No. CEB-29346 entitled
"Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and instead a new
one is entered:
i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of Php 648,102.29 from the support
pendente lite in arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two (2)
children;
ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his monthly support of
PhP115,000.00 pesos starting from the time payment of this amount was deferred
by him subject to the deduction aforementioned.
iii. DIRECTING the immediate execution of this judgment.
SO ORDERED."
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which
reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No.
03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided
for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the
Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at
Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that
is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in
1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the
Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at his
mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived
with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the
requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the
ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a
marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply
for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a
copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found.5 The Municipal
Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the
marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No.
9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:
11 July 2003

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No.
9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19,
1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F.
GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may
serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002,
and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether
or not there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel.8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued
to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are
issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by
Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License
No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their
office had not issued any other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other
person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain,
and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized
the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.13 He
stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He
testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with the
requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the day
before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his secretary.16 After the
solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz
submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo
by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the
marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on
January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did not know where the marriage license was
obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as
sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer and
the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21

Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that
she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She testified that she
sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week
before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house with the application for
marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house, showed her the marriage
license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She
further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she was told
that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been
filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy
dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the
sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the
wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony
corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract bearing
their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage
license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he
will get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an application for marriage
license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they
gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that
she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon
Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did
not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated
their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese.31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967
had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took
into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.33 As the marriage was not
one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an
absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent
declaring as follows:

1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent
Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:

2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the
respondent even if no property was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the
nullity of the marriage of the parties.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and
Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 030382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is
DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09
January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.

3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office,
are hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by
petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.

SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the same was denied by the CA in
a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41

SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same,
prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.

Hence, this petition.

Grounds in Support of Petition

The Ruling of the CA

I
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:
I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING

REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND
CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE
EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE,
THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH
THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND
THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN
THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE
PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of
Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative
value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and
Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also
considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only
instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy.38

II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE,
WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the
Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this
particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was
allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was
issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado
and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which
was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the
document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not comply
with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx

The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification, and
since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent
search had been conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative value.

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal
requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is
the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I
of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license
had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held
that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the
marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To
prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested certification that
no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was allowed,
as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an
official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found
to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as
evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the nonissuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to
be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with
the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for
marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and
such other relevant data.44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as
his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in
that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was
lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the
alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in
the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a
categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has
been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar
was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand.
In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was
indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to
those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent
search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to
explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither
party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the
validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the
existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her
mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to not
reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached
for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task of
applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license
was secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the
testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the
marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage
license could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria
inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued
for her and Syed.
In the case of Cario v. Cario,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of the
Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-

issuance of said license. The case of Cario further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the
parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to
prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured.49 Gloria has
failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage
license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that
would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No
marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Glorias failure to produce a copy of the alleged
marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were
validly married. To quote the CA:

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated
October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on
January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and
appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.
Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the
Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted
that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were presented
showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members of
appellants family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was
held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the
Marriage Contract.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 195670

December 3, 2012

xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima
Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on
01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We
take serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only after an Information for
Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for contracting a second or subsequent
marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward (appellee) by
declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from
his own deceit and perfidy.50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage
contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the
Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also
provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt
from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51 Again, this
marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without
a marriage license, is void ab initio.1wphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are
less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for
the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of
evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it
was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a
formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are

WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner,

vs.
AVELINA AMORES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of CoLlli assailing the
October 8, 2009 Decision2 and January 24, 2011 Resolution3 of the court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 01940, which affirmed the February 28, 2007 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros
Oriental, Branch 34 in Civil Case No. I 2884. The foregoing rulings dissolved the conjugal partnership of
gains of Willem Beumer (petitioner) and Avelina Amores (respondent) and distributed the properties
forming part of the said property regime.
The Factual Antecedents
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29, 1980. After several years,
the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 32, declared the nullity of their marriage in the Decision5 dated
November 10, 2000 on the basis of the formers psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership6 dated December 14,
2000 praying for the distribution of the following described properties claimed to have been acquired
during the subsistence of their marriage, to wit:

By Purchase:
a. Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 22846, containing an area of 252 square
meters (sq.m.), including a residential house constructed thereon.
b. Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21974, containing an area of 806
sq.m., including a residential house constructed thereon.
c. Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21306, containing an area of 756
sq.m.
d. Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre,
covered by TCT No. 21307, containing an area of 45 sq.m.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
between petitioner Willem Beumer and respondent Avelina Amores considering the fact that their
marriage was previously annulled by Branch 32 of this Court. The parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Titles Nos. 22846, 21974, 21306, 21307, 23567 and 23575 are hereby declared paraphernal
properties of respondent Avelina Amores due to the fact that while these real properties were acquired
by onerous title during their marital union, Willem Beumer, being a foreigner, is not allowed by law to
acquire any private land in the Philippines, except through inheritance.
The personal properties, i.e., tools and equipment mentioned in the complaint which were brought out
by Willem from the conjugal dwelling are hereby declared to be exclusively owned by the petitioner.
The two houses standing on the lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 21974 and 22846 are
hereby declared to be co-owned by the petitioner and the respondent since these were acquired during
their marital union and since there is no prohibition on foreigners from owning buildings and residential
units. Petitioner and respondent are, thereby, directed to subject this court for approval their project of
partition on the two houses aforementioned.

By way of inheritance:
e. 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 23567, containing an
area of 2,635 sq.m. (the area that appertains to the conjugal partnership is 376.45 sq.m.).
f. 1/15 of Lot 2055-I of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 23575, containing an
area of 360 sq.m. (the area that appertains to the conjugal partnership is 24 sq.m.).7

The Court finds no sufficient justification to award the counterclaim of respondent for attorneys fees
considering the well settled doctrine that there should be no premium on the right to litigate. The prayer
for moral damages are likewise denied for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.16

In defense, respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1 and
2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth being
that she used her own personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds
and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way of inheritance.9 She submitted a joint affidavit executed by her and
petitioner attesting to the fact that she purchased Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon using her
own money.10 Accordingly, respondent sought the dismissal of the petition for dissolution as well as
payment for attorneys fees and litigation expenses.11
During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of
respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as
his disability benefit12 since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. He
also claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was
contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid.13
For her part, respondent maintained that the money used for the purchase of the lots came exclusively
from her personal funds, in particular, her earnings from selling jewelry as well as products from Avon,
Triumph and Tupperware.14 She further asserted that after she filed for annulment of their marriage in
1996, petitioner transferred to their second house and brought along with him certain personal
properties, consisting of drills, a welding machine, grinders, clamps, etc. She alleged that these tools and
equipment have a total cost of P500,000.00.15
The RTC Ruling
On February 28, 2007, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 34 rendered its Decision, dissolving the
parties conjugal partnership, awarding all the parcels of land to respondent as her paraphernal
properties; the tools and equipment in favor of petitioner as his exclusive properties; the two (2) houses
standing on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties, the dispositive of which reads:

It ruled that, regardless of the source of funds for the acquisition of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4, petitioner
could not have acquired any right whatsoever over these properties as petitioner still attempted to
acquire them notwithstanding his knowledge of the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership
of private lands.17 This was made evident by the sworn statements petitioner executed purporting to
show that the subject parcels of land were purchased from the exclusive funds of his wife, the herein
respondent.18 Petitioners plea for reimbursement for the amount he had paid to purchase the foregoing
properties on the basis of equity was likewise denied for not having come to court with clean hands.
The CA Ruling
Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA, contesting only the RTCs award of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 in
favor of respondent. He insisted that the money used to purchase the foregoing properties came from
his own capital funds and that they were registered in the name of his former wife only because of the
constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership. Thus, he prayed for reimbursement of one-half
(1/2) of the value of what he had paid in the purchase of the said properties, waiving the other half in
favor of his estranged ex-wife.19
On October 8, 2009, the CA promulgated a Decision20 affirming in toto the judgment rendered by the
RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 34. The CA stressed the fact that petitioner was "well-aware of the
constitutional prohibition for aliens to acquire lands in the Philippines."21 Hence, he cannot invoke equity
to support his claim for reimbursement.
Consequently, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA Decision due
to the following error:

UNDER THE FACTS ESTABLISHED, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE PETITIONERS ATTEMPT AT
SUBSEQUENTLY ASSERTING OR CLAIMING A RIGHT OF HALF OR WHOLE OF THE PURCHASE PRICE USED
IN THE PURCHASE OF THE REAL PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.22 (Emphasis supplied)

spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is
proscribed by the Constitution, to wit:
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads:

The Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.
The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena
Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller23 the Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the
value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former
Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on
the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the
prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land24enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the
1987 Philippine Constitution which reads:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited constitutional
prohibition"25 and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the
subject properties in the latters name.26 Clearly, petitioners actuations showed his palpable intent to
skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no reason why it
should not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioners claim for reimbursement.
As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and
he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity
shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that
his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.27
In this case, petitioners statements regarding the real source of the funds used to purchase the subject
parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting to have previously executed a joint
affidavit that respondents personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1,28 he likewise claimed that his
personal disability funds were used to acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies show his
untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with unclean hands, he is now precluded
from seeking any equitable refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given
that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional
purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be
done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.29 Surely, a contract that violates
the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no
legal effect at all.30 Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code,31 petitioner cannot have the
subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase
thereof. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where
it finds them.32 Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly
entered into.
Neither can the Court grant petitioners claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment.33 As
held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return
the same to him.1wphi1
The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No
person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has
been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not
apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari
delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over
the subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord
Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson: "The objection that a contract is immoral or
illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the
defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general
principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between
him and the plaintiff."34(Citations omitted)
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship.35 Precisely, it is
the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land.
To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not
to the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were
properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless to state, the purpose of
the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony36 and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound
to protect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed October 8, 2009 Decision and January 24,
2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01940 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her
marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid
marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed that since the second marriage was held in 1983, the
crime of bigamy had already prescribed. The prosecution filed its Comment13 arguing that the crime of
bigamy had already been consummated when respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity;
that the law punishes the act of contracting a second marriage which appears to be valid, while the first
marriage is still subsisting and has not yet been annulled or declared void by the court.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 181089

October 22, 2012

MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAES, Complainant,

vs.
LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the Order1 dated September
24, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No.
4990-SPL which dismissed the lnformation for Bigamy filed against respondent Lourdes Tajolosa
Cipriano. Also assailed is the RTC Resolution2 dated January 2, 2008 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan.3 On January 24, 1983,
during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San
Pedro, Laguna.4 In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch
256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latters
psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family Code, which was docketed as Civil Case
No. 01-204. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an Amended
Decision5 declaring the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became final
and executory on October 13, 2003.6
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montaez, Silverios daughter from the first marriage,
filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint7 for Bigamy against respondent,
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 41972. Attached to the complaint was an Affidavit8 (Malayang
Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated August 23, 2004, thumb-marked and signed by Silverio,9 which alleged,
among others, that respondent failed to reveal to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates. On
November 17, 2004, an Information10 for Bigamy was filed against respondent with the RTC of San
Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL. The Information reads:
That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with one SILVERIO CIPRIANO VINALON while
her first marriage with SOCRATES FLORES has not been judicially dissolved by proper judicial
authorities.11
On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to Quash
Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint)12 alleging that her marriage with Socrates had

In its Order14 dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It found respondent's argument that
with the declaration of nullity of her first marriage, there was no more first marriage to speak of and
thus the element of two valid marriages in bigamy was absent, to have been laid to rest by our ruling in
Mercado v. Tan15 where we held:
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage
declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. For
contracting a second marriage while the first is still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial.
To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. x x x16
As to respondent's claim that the action had already prescribed, the RTC found that while the second
marriage indeed took place in 1983, or more than the 15-year prescriptive period for the crime of
bigamy, the commission of the crime was only discovered on November 17, 2004, which should be the
reckoning period, hence, prescription has not yet set in.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 claiming that the Mercado ruling was not applicable,
since respondent contracted her first marriage in 1976, i.e., before the Family Code; that the petition for
annulment was granted and became final before the criminal complaint for bigamy was filed; and, that
Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given any retroactive effect because this will impair her right to
remarry without need of securing a declaration of nullity of a completely void prior marriage.
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order,18 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set aside. Let a new one be entered
quashing the information. Accordingly, let the instant case be DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted a second marriage on January 24,
1983, i.e., before the effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did not require a judicial declaration
of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage; that jurisprudence
before the Family Code was ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of the first marriage. The RTC found that both marriages of respondent took place before the
effectivity of the Family Code, thus, considering the unsettled state of jurisprudence on the need for a
prior declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before commencing a second marriage and the principle
that laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the accused, it declared that the absence of a judicial
declaration of nullity should not prejudice the accused whose second marriage was declared once and
for all valid with the annulment of her first marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City in 2003.

Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but opposed by respondent. In a
Resolution dated January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among others, that the judicial
declaration of nullity of respondent's marriage is tantamount to a mere declaration or confirmation that
said marriage never existed at all, and for this reason, her act in contracting a second marriage cannot be
considered criminal.
Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us raising the following issues:
I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the
pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy on the ground of psychological incapacity is a valid defense for
a charge of bigamy for entering into a second marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code and
the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy?
II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to the enactment of the Family
Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy regarding the necessity of securing a declaration
of nullity of the first marriage before entering a second marriage ambivalent, such that a person was
allowed to enter a subsequent marriage without the annulment of the first without incurring criminal
liability.19

Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has
not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.23 It is essential in the
prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would
be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.24
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio in 1983, her
first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet been annulled
or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy were alleged in the
Information. In her Motion to Quash the Information, she alleged, among others, that:
xxxx

Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy
was filed by private complainant and not by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which should
represent the government in all judicial proceedings filed before us.20
Notwithstanding, we will give due course to this petition as we had done in the past. In Antone v.
Beronilla,21 the offended party (private complainant) questioned before the Court of Appeals (CA) the
RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her husband, and the CA dismissed the
petition on the ground, among others, that the petition should have been filed in behalf of the People of
the Philippines by the OSG, being its statutory counsel in all appealed criminal cases. In a petition filed
with us, we said that we had given due course to a number of actions even when the respective interests
of the government were not properly represented by the OSG and said:
In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order ruling of the trial
judge in a criminal case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to question the order or
ruling before us. x x x
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the plaintiff People of the
Philippines, we opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we required the OSG
to comment on the petition, as we had done before in some cases. In light of its Comment, we rule that
the OSG has ratified and adopted as its own the instant petition for the People of the Philippines.
(Emphasis supplied)22
Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the petition, which it did, praying that
the petition be granted in effect, such Comment had ratified the petition filed with us.
As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the
Information for bigamy filed against respondent.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy as follow:

2. The records of this case would bear out that accused's marriage with said Socrates Flores
was declared void ab initio on 14 April 2003 by Branch 256 of the Regional Trial Court of
Muntinlupa City. The said decision was never appealed, and became final and executory
shortly thereafter.
3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this case, her marriage with Mr.
Flores had already been declared void from the beginning.
4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983 to speak of. In other words,
there was only one marriage.
5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid marriages, is therefore
wanting.25
Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity was
declared only in 2003. The question now is whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first
marriage justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her.
We rule in the negative.
In Mercado v. Tan,26 we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage
was immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated. And by contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, the accused
committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
In Abunado v. People,27 we held that what is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.28 Even if the accused eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the
second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.29

In Tenebro v. CA,30 we declared that although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without
legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute
nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is, therefore, a recognition written into the
law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among
these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the
States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each
marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting
multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and
commitment.31

provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights." The Court went on to explain, thus:

And in Jarillo v. People,32 applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we affirmed the accused's conviction for
bigamy, ruling that the moment the accused contracted a second marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at
the time of the celebration of the second marriage, the accuseds first marriage which had not yet been
declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting.

In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration nullity of his first marriage
and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have
his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of
the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that
the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage license and thereafter contract
a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the
first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provision on bigamy.38

Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it
had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the subsequent
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that she contracted the
second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of
the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA33 is not applicable, since the declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage came after the filing of the Information, unlike in this case where the declaration was rendered
before the information was filed. We do not agree. What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is
when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage
exists.34 Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.35
Anent respondent's contention in her Comment that since her two marriages were contracted prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect
because this will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of a
completely void marriage.
We are not persuaded.
In Jarillo v. People,36 where the accused, in her motion for reconsideration, argued that since her
marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is Section
29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613),37 instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent marriage. We
did not find the argument meritorious and said:
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration that Article 40,
which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative
of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule,
no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.1wphi1
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the provisions of Article 40
of the Family Code, to wit:

WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated September 24, 2007
and the Resolution dated January 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31,
issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL, are hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL is ordered
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

for a marriage license.14 The petitioner even inquired about the costs of a wedding reception and the
bridal gown.15 Subsequently, however, the petitioner backed out of the wedding plans.16
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 165166

August 15, 2012

CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner,

vs.
DIVINA BULING, Respondent.

The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte
for damages against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry.17 Later, however, the petitioner and
the respondent amicably settled the case.18
The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995.19 When the petitioner did not show up
and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on July 24, 1995 demanding
recognition of and support for their child.20 When the petitioner did not answer the demand, the
respondent filed her complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite.21
The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the imputed
paternity,22 claiming that he first had sexual contact with the respondent in the first week of August 1994
and she could not have been pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he was
informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994.23

VILLARAMA, JR.,*
DECISION

During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondents motion,24 granted a P2,000.00 monthly
child support, retroactive from March 1995.25

BRION, J.:
THE RTC RULING
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari, 1 filed by petitioner Charles Gotardo, to challenge the
March 5, 2004 decision2 and the July 27, 2004 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA GR CV No.
76326. The CA decision ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son,
Gliffze 0. Buling. The CA resolution denied the petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that
the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze.4

In its June 25, 2002 decision, the RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving
Gliffzes filiation. It found the respondents testimony inconsistent on the question of when she had her
first sexual contact with the petitioner, i.e., "September 1993" in her direct testimony while "last week of
January 1993" during her cross-testimony, and her reason for engaging in sexual contact even after she
had refused the petitioners initial marriage proposal. It ordered the respondent to return the amount of
support pendente lite erroneously awarded, and to pay P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.26
The respondent appealed the RTC ruling to the CA.27
THE CA RULING

In his answer, the petitioner denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze.5 For the parties failure to amicably
settle the dispute, the RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings.6 Trial on the merits ensued.
The respondent testified for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez as witness. Evidence for the
respondent showed that she met the petitioner on December 1, 1992 at the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte branch where she had been hired as a casual employee, while
the petitioner worked as accounting supervisor.7 The petitioner started courting the respondent in the
third week of December 1992 and they became sweethearts in the last week of January 1993.8 The
petitioner gave the respondent greeting cards on special occasions, such as on Valentines Day and her
birthday; she reciprocated his love and took care of him when he was ill.9
Sometime in September 1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the respondent in the
formers rented room in the boarding house managed by Rodulfo, the respondents uncle, on Tomas
Oppus St., Agbao, Maasin, Southern Leyte.10 The petitioner rented the room from March 1, 1993 to
August 30, 1994.11 The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and became more frequent in June
1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994, the respondent found out that she was pregnant.12 When told of
the pregnancy, the petitioner was happy and made plans to marry the respondent.13 They in fact applied

In its March 5, 2004 decision, the CA departed from the RTC's appreciation of the respondents
testimony, concluding that the latter merely made an honest mistake in her understanding of the
questions of the petitioners counsel. It noted that the petitioner and the respondent had sexual
relationship even before August 1994; that the respondent had only one boyfriend, the petitioner, from
January 1993 to August 1994; and that the petitioners allegation that the respondent had previous
relationships with other men remained unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set aside the RTC decision
and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order granting
a P 2,000.00 monthly child support.28
When the CA denied29 the petitioners motion for reconsideration,30 the petitioner filed the present
petition for review on certiorari.
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTCs appreciation of the
respondents testimony, and that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove paternity.

THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT

The respondent submits that the CA correctly explained that the inconsistency in the respondents
testimony was due to an incorrect appreciation of the questions asked, and that the record is replete
with evidence proving that the petitioner was her lover and that they had several intimate sexual
encounters during their relationship, resulting in her pregnancy and Gliffzes birth on March 9, 1995.
THE ISSUE
The sole issue before us is whether the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside the RTCs
findings and ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son Gliffze.

evidentiary support. The petitioners denial cannot overcome the respondents clear and categorical
assertions.
The petitioner, as the RTC did, made much of the variance between the respondents direct testimony
regarding their first sexual contact as "sometime in September 1993" and her cross-testimony when she
stated that their first sexual contact was "last week of January 1993," as follows:
ATTY. GO CINCO:
When did the defendant, according to you, start courting you?
A Third week of December 1992.

OUR RULING
Q And you accepted him?
We do not find any reversible error in the CAs ruling.
A Last week of January 1993.
We have recognized that "[f]iliation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also
to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in this case) or
inheritance. [In paternity cases, the burden of proof] is on the person who alleges that the putative
father is the biological father of the child."31

Q And by October you already had your sexual intercourse?

A Last week of January 1993.

One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.32 We
have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting [his] pedigree,
admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130
of the Rules of Court."33
In Herrera v. Alba,34 we stressed that there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action that parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.35 We explained that
a prima facie case exists if a woman declares supported by corroborative proof that she had sexual
relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative father.36 We
explained further that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative father are: (1) incapability
of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that the mother
had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.37
In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father of
Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the
time of her conception.38Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had
intimate relationship.39
On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters with the respondent, only
that it occurred on a much later date than the respondent asserted, such that it was physically
impossible for the respondent to have been three (3) months pregnant already in September 1994 when
he was informed of the pregnancy.40 However, the petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of
infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of

COURT: What do you mean by accepting?

A I accepted his offer of love.41
We find that the contradictions are for the most part more apparent than real, having resulted from the
failure of the respondent to comprehend the question posed, but this misunderstanding was later
corrected and satisfactorily explained. Indeed, when confronted for her contradictory statements, the
respondent explained that that portion of the transcript of stenographic notes was incorrect and she had
brought it to the attention of Atty. Josefino Go Cinco (her former counsel) but the latter took no action
on the matter.42
Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony must be considered in
its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only
its isolated parts and to anchor a conclusion based on these parts. "In ascertaining the facts established
by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and
considered."43 Evidently, the totality of the respondent's testimony positively and convincingly shows
that no real inconsistency exists. The respondent has consistently asserted that she started intimate
sexual relations with the petitioner sometime in September 1993.44
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to
support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.45 Support consists of everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family.46 Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final
judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or
means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient.47 It may be reduced or increased proportionately
according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of
the person obliged to support.48

In this case, we sustain the award of P 2,000.00 monthly child support, without prejudice to the filing of
the proper motion in the RTC for the determination of any support in arrears, considering the needs of
the child, Gliffze, during the pendency of this case.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. The March 5, 2004 decision and the July 27,
2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 76326 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.

Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of their
cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin, married
to Sally;

SO ORDERED.
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in
the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 201061

July 3, 2013

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,

vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March 2012
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts

(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a single
individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and
Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against
Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for
declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on
the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid
marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in
accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties
during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children.
A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from
the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied.
Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
injunction which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to present any evidence before
the trial court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court gave Sally
several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11
September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings
from the trial court, Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial court to consider the
case submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court

On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent
marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43
(trial court). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September
1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn,
Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.

In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave weight
to the certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during
trial, that only Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February
1982 and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial
court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamins subsisting marriage with Azucena.

In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer
in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamins family. In December 1981, Azucena left for
the United States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife.
Sallys father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally
brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract.
Sally, knowing Benjamins marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be
registered.

The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court
ruled that the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but because
of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this
case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because
they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sallys claim for spousal support because she

was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice and Bentley who were
both of legal age and did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named in
her answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not
legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by
Benjamins parents who gave the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advance
inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married to
Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamins civil status in the title. As regards the two lots under TCT
Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by Benjamin using his own money
and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry in their purchase.
The trial court found that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N193656, and 253681 as well as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the
trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units were purchased from
the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720,
and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and
Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamins right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate
proceeding.

Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.
Respondents claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Further, no declaration of the status of the parties children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and
the Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order
dated 27 August 2009,7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial courts decision before
the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals

The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was married to
Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sallys share in the properties
covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamins share
reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at
Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared
NONEXISTENT.
Respondents claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos.
17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950,
188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629,
194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637, 194638, 194639, 198651, 206209,
206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The registered owners, namely:
Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the
owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila
are directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven (37) titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties acquired
from petitioners money without contribution from respondent, hence, these are properties of the
petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is appointed the administrator of these five (5)
properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of her collections of income from these five
(5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent
is further directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn over and surrender control and
possession of these properties including the documents of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-ownership of
the parties shared by them equally. However, the share of respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of
Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal
ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and distribution of these two (2) properties
shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.

In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the trial court did not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted that
there were six resettings of the case, all made at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception of
evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her evidence on the next hearing or the case would be
deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to present her evidence.
She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not subpoenaed despite the presence
of her other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sallys allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamins action was based on his prior marriage to
Azucena and there was no evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin
contracted the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court committed no
error in declaring Benjamins marriage to Sally null and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148
of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37 properties being
claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the
properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him
exclusively because he was able to establish that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and
8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamins actual contribution in their
purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be shared equally. However, the share of
Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his existing marriage with Azucena while Sallys
share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof of bad faith.

Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that would
show bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720
and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee while the properties under TCT Nos. N193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by the respondentappellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and common and to be shared
equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his first
marriage while the share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.8
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution,
the Court of Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.

11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all made at Sallys
instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally that in case
she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the date of the
scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting
Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sallys counsel insisted that the trial court could
not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial courts prior warning due
to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not complain that she had been deprived of her right
to present her evidence because all the postponements were at her instance and she was warned by the
trial court that it would submit the case for decision should she still fail to present her evidence on 28
November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed to
have waived her right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sallys continued failure
to present her evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of interest to
proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case because she was waiting for
the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the trial courts denial of her demurrer
to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any temporary restraining order as
Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable
institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate
delay and refusal to proceed by one of the parties.10
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally

The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial courts
ruling that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial courts
decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and nonexistent; and
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with modification
the trial courts decision regarding the property relations of Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court

Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin
because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally further
alleges that if she were allowed to present her evidence, she would have proven her marriage to
Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in acquiring real
properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to" her; that Benjamin was the
informant in their childrens birth certificates where he stated that he was their father; and that
Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no
real property registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was
not the informant in the birth certificates of his children with Azucena.
First, Benjamins marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial court,
evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered
into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and
subsisting.

Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts ruling that she waived her right
to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she and Benjamin
were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable institution.

On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of
the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to
Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued
for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series issued for the
month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage License
No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove
the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys
probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage
contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license.12

It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is
addressed to the discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, Sallys presentation of evidence was
scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and

It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally
was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of record was
certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the

The petition has no merit.

Waiver of Right to Present Evidence

Municipality of Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the Records Management
and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III,
Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics Office.15 The documentary and testimonial
evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial
court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at
the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives,
friends and the society especially from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a
fictitious marriage.

marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.

The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof
of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the informant in
Bernices birth certificate which stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 198218 while
Sally was the informant in Bentleys birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin and Sally were
married on 8 March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which did not
match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and,
at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a
license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the
beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It
was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568
did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month
of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 3520 which made their marriage void ab
initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on
void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely
simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not
err in sustaining the trial courts ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void
ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects
the trial courts decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court of Appeals did
notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring
that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial courts discussion that
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous.1wphi1 The trial court stated:
On whether or not the parties marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null
and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being
no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage
contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but
for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara
[CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was contracting marriage against the
provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the
marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no marriage license. The daring and
repeated stand of respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be
sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be
bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner
and Azucena.23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity
except for the existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage.
Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed
marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the

Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by
Article 148 of the Family Code which states:

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad
faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the
last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by
them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamins
father to his children as advance inheritance. Sallys Answer to the petition before the trial court even
admitted that "Benjamins late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his children and their
respective spouses which included Sally x x x."25
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in
accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the
names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the
name of Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782
and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally28 with the descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while
the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a single
individual. We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.29 Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without
proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148
of the Family Code.30
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the
case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She
further alleged that Judge Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his
partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound
discretion on the part of the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence to
establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred

from the decision or order itself.32 In this case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella did
not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sallys continued refusal to present her evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used uncomplimentary
words in writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against Sally or show that he
acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR: