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II.-CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE OF NATURE (I.).'
BY M. B. FOSTER.
I.
Paganismand Rationalismin GreekPhilosophy.
Every science of nature must depend upon presuppositions
about nature which cannot be establishedby the methodsof
the scienceitself. Thus it is the methodQfthe inductivenatural
sciences,describedby Mill, to proceed fromexperienceof particular natural phenomena to a conclusion about all natural
phenomenaof the same kind. The proceduredependsupon the
presuppositionthat natureis " uniform" in Mill's sense of the
ofnatureisincapableofbeingestablished
word; buttheuniformity
by the methodsof inductivescience. It was the method,again,
of physics,on Descartes' conceptionof it, to proceedby demonstration, like the mathematician,from self-evidentpremises.
But the possibilityof thus extendingthe methodof mathematics
to the science of nature depends upon a presuppositionabout
naturewhichcannotitselfbe demonstrated,
namelythat nature
is a homogeneousmaterial substance, determinedthroughout
by subjectionto universaland necessarylaws.
To assertthe truthof what naturalsciencepresupposesis not
scienceofnaturebut philosophyofnature. I use thistermsolely
forthe sake of brevityin terminology,
and withoutany implication of the possibilityof developinga systematicmetaphysics
of nature. It may be, forall I wishto assume to the contrary,
that the philosophyof natureis exhaustedin the two assertions
thatnatureis subjectto universallaws and thatit is uniform
in the
sense requiredby inductivenaturalscience. It will be sufficient
for my purpose if it is grantedthat these two assertionsare
not establishedby the processes'of natural science, but that
the procedureof natural science is dependentupon them.
11 ventureto presupposein the readeracquaintancewith a previous
articleentitled" The ChristiandoctrineofCreationand theRise ofModern
NaturalScience", publishedin MIND, October,1934.
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M. B. FOSTER:
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M. B. FOSTER:
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M. B. FOSTER:
is of a naturewhollydifferent
fromthat of the object whichhe
produces,and hence the assertionthat God stands to naturein
to artefactimpliesthat the beingof God
the relationof artificer
is not akin to that of any naturalobject. Christiantheologians
indeed were not slow to recognisethe affinitiesbetween this
Platonic theoryand the doctrineof God revealed in the Old
Testament, and they accordinglyappropriatedmuch of the
teachingof the Timaeus into the theologyof the Creation.
But in Plato himselfthe doctrineof the Demiurgeis inextricably confusedwith another doctrineaccordingto which God
is conceivedto be relatedto the worldnot as artificer
to artefact,
but as fatherto son.' This doctrineis incompatiblealike with
the doctrineof the Demiurge with which Plato identifiedit,
and withthe teachingof the Christianrevelation. A fatheris
necessarilyof the same natureas his son,and hence thisdoctrine
preciselyreversesthe implicationsof the former. It implies
that the beingof God is akin to that of the naturalworldwhich
he has produced,2and is thus essentiallypagan in the sense in
whichI have definedtheterm. The residualelementofpaganism
in Plato's philosophyis exhibitedpreciselyin his failureto dis1 he followingreferences
to the Timaeus8may sufficeto prove this.
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1 and of paternity.
tinguishthe two relationsof manufacture
If he had understoodwhat was implied in the attributionof
the formerto God he would have realised that it excluded the
latter.
Plato's cosmology,
WhentheChristiantheologiansincorporated
they expurgatedthis residue of paganism. They did indeed
continueto attributeto God, as Plato had done,thetwo activities
of technicalproductionand ofgeneration,but theydistinguished,
as Plato could not, a separate relationforthe exerciseof each.
In the doctrineof the TrinityGod was conceived as Father
and not as Maker,in the doctrineof Creationas Maker and not
as Father. The two operations which Plato had conceived
uponthesameobjectare nowconceived
as terminating
confusedly
distinctlyto terminateeach upon its proper object.2 God as
Father generatesthe divine Son, God as Maker produces the
naturalworld,God sharesthesamenaturewithwhathe generates,
but not the same naturewithwhathe makes; ,henceit was not
not until
until afterthese two doctrineshad been distinguished,
the explicit contrastof God's relation to the world with this
relationto the Son had evacuatedeverynotionof paternityfrom
the conceptionof the former,that it was,possible to conceive
fromthat of the worldwhichhe
God's natureas whollydifferent
produced,and thus to eliminatethe last relic of paganismfrom
the conceptionof the Deity.3
When once the distinctionhad been made betweenthe two
conceptionsof divine workmanshipand divine generation,it
1 I shallusethisterm
theGreekVEXv,
forwantof a betterto translate
its acquiredassociation
with
witha requestthatthereaderwilldiscount
theterm'artifice',
havepreferred
I should
industry.
themethods
ofmodern
and 'artificial',
connection
with'artificer'
forthesakeofitsetymological
stillmoreirrelevant.'Art'
by associations
if it werenot disqualified
in modern
usageto the
becauseit has beenconfined
also is unsuitable
inimportant
from
respects
art,whichdiffers
of ' fine' orcreative
practice
the operationdenotedby
EXv1q.
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M. B. FOSTER:
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M. B. FOSTER:
ofmovementwhichis communicated
to it byimpactfromwithout.
Nor does its own form,or specificessence(that whichconstitutes
it the kind of artefactit is, rake, fork or shovel) contribute
anythingto the determination
even of the directionof its movement. This is determinedby the nature and directionof the
impact on the one hand, on the other by the mass, size and
spatial configuration,
or particularshape, of the object.
It may be worth while to dwell longer on the distinction
impliedin thislast assertion,that its shape is, but its formis not,
a cause determining
the movementof an artefact. Form in an
artefactis whatthe craftsmanadds to his materialsin the process
of making. It is presentin the finishedpot, differentiating
it by
its presencefromthe lumpof clay withwhichthe potterstarted,
and constituting
it by its presencesomethingmorethan a lump
of clay, namelya pot. It is true that the potterin the process
of formationhas also to alter the shapepof the lump, but the
alterationof the shape is not the same as the addition of the
form. The formeris the resultofmanipulation,but the latterof
intelligence. A man lackingin intelligence,
an idiot,can manipulate a lumpof clay intovariousshapes; whathe cannotdo is to
add to it theformwhichwill make it morethana lump of clay.
But this form,whichconstitutesthe essenceof the potter'sproduct, and differentiates
it fromthe productof the idiot's fingers,
is entirelyirrelevantif we wishto predictthe directionin which
the artefactwill be moved by a given impact. That is determined,not by that in the pot which distinguishesit fromthe
idiot's product,but by that whichit has in commonwith the
idiot'sproduct,namely'byits natureas a lumpof clay. Whereas
if we could suppose the potterto have transmittedto the clay
a share of the lifeupon whichhis own activitydepends,so that
the pot became not an artefactbut an animal, the formwhich
it so acquired would be a real cause determining
its movement.
The reactionof an animal to a given impact dependsupon the
specificnaturewhichmakes it the kind of animal it is, and not
upon the spatial configuration
ofits body,consideredas a portion
of matter. Or,to put the same obvioustruthin different
words,
a givenimpactwillnot have the same effectupon a livinganimal
and upon the dead body of the same animal,althoughits shape
is not alteredby death.
There is one morepoint to be noted beforewe finishwiththis
distinction. Form in the artefactis the source of no conatus
of self-preservation.An artificialobject may, no doubt, like
any other material object whatever,offerresistanceto disintegration;it requiresthe expenditureof someforce,and there-
449
30
450
M. B. FOSTER:
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M. B. FOSTER:
avycvos
avr'exeaOa&).
forceto frustrate
it, and this is the reasonwhyforceis needed to lifta
-weighty
body.
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M. B. FOSTER.
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M. B. FOSTER:
It may,no dQubt,be objectedthat thesetwo theoriesof philosophic knowledgeare not confusedby Plato,"but considered
sucessivelyas alternatives,of which the earlier,that of the
Symposium,was simply rejected in favour of the later. If
this objectionis raised,I have not sufficient
masteryof Platonic
scholarshipto refuteit; and ifthe objectoris preparedto uphold
it with all its implications,if he is preparedto maintainthat
Plato thoughtwhen he wrotethe Symposium,that the supreme
act ofthephilosophiclifewas devoidofany elementofintellection,
and whenhe wrotethe Republicthatit was devoidofany element
of love,-I shall confessthat so far as he is concernedthis illustrationwill have failed of the object forwhichit was inserted.
I am not of course denyingthat Plato's thoughtmoved in the
intervalbetweenthe Symposiumand the Republic
away fromthe
eroticand towardsthe rationalistconceptionof the philosophic
act. I should maintainratherthat it is thisveryadvance which
to be adopted,as theSymposiumneverwas,
qualifiedtheRepublic
intothe greattraditionof Christianthought. But I do not think
that Plato distinguishedthe two conceptionsas mutuallyexclusive alternatives.2
LFor the presencein Plato of the erotic conceptionof philosophic
activity,cf. Temple," Plato's Visionof the Ideas ", in MIND, 1908; and
Stenzel,op. cit.
This conceptionmustnot,however,be stressedto the exclusionof the
other. To supposethat Plato conceivedthe 'supremephilosophicexperienceas eroticandnotintellectual
wouldbe a worseerrorthantheconverse,
and morecustomary,
one ofignoringtheeroticelemententirely.
2 1 may perhapsavail myselfof the licenceof a footnoteto carrythis
a littlefurther
digression
thanitsimmediaterelevanceto themainargument
of the text would warrant. The productiveactivitywhichsupervenes
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M. B. FOSTER:
The Aristoteliandefinition
of the naturalby contrastwiththe
artificialimpliesthat formis presentas 'soul' in naturalobjects.
These are not merelyinformedbut animatedby the indwelling
that the formof the
' eidos '. It is in virtueof this difference
naturalobject possessesthe power,whichthe formofthe artefact
lacks,ofsubduingmatterto its ownnature; a powerwhichis exercised,forexample,in everyassimilationoffoodby an organism.
A formendowedwiththis poweris morethan merelya formin
thesensein whichwe shouldmostnaturallyunderstandtheword;
it is a cause, originativeof activityand productiveof effects.
It is onlybecause it is endowedwiththis originativeand productive powerthat Aristotlecan hold that knowledgeof the formal
of the operations
cause is the principalkey to the understanding
of nature. Thus,ifthe readerwill tolerateone moreillustration,
livingcreaturesexposed to a gale of wind do not remainmerely
passive to its force. On the contrary,each reacts against it
accordingto its kind,and the natureof each is exhibitedin the
active endeavourto subdue the elementto the end of its own
betterpreservation,whetherby flight,or by such a disposition
of the body as will minimisethe surfaceexposed,or by turning
to account the forceof the wind itself,as soaringbirds do to
is successenablethemto ascend. Preciselyin so faras thiseffort
ful, a knowledgeof the nature of each will enable the observer
bothto understandand to predictits behaviour. Thereis always
to sucha cataclysmic
the possibilitythatthe gale may strengthen
violence that these effortsare quite vain, and the animals are
sweptbeforeit likedead bodies. If and whenthisshouldhappen,
natureitselfwould have been subdued to blind necessity; and
wouldcease at thepointat which
the possibilityofunderstanding
the powerof naturefailed.
This power of dominating environmentis characteristic,
accordingto Aristotle,of the naturalas such, and is therefore
shared with living organisms,though in a less degree,by inanimatenaturalobjects. Earthand firehave each itsownnature,
whichexhibitsitselfin thetendencyto movein a certaindirection,
downwardsin the case of the former,upwardsin that of the
latter. This naturewillassertitself,like that oflivingcreatures,
against contraryinfluences; a slightwind will not drive flame
downwardsnor earth upwards; only with these the point is
reached sooner at which nature succumbsto necessity,and at
whichthereforea knowledgeof the natureceases to enable the
observerto predictthe event.
But artefactspossess no 'natures 1 in this sense of the word
1v I
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M. B. FOSTER:
awaken at all. Nor is the object of it, like Locke's ' abstract
generalideas', a. compoundof sensiblequalities commonto all
the objectsof a seriesofparticularexperiences. On thecontrary,
its object is devoid of sensiblequalities; it is so farfromhaving
beentheobjectofall theexperienceswhichprecededitsdiscovery,
thatit is incapableofhavingbeen the object ofany one of them.
A trianglecan be the object of experienceonlyin so far as it is
visible or tangible; but-the trianglewhich the geometrician
cannotpossiblybe
knowswhenhe has understoodits definition,
either. A triangleis a figureenclosed by three straightlines,
and a line has lengthbut no breadth. How can that whichhas
no breadthbe eitherseen or touched?
This is not to say, of course,that the intelligibleessence is
notpresentin thesensibleexamples. That they,witha greateror
less degreeof perfection,embodyit, is indeed what constitutes
theirnature,its presencein them is what determinesthem to
possess the sensiblequalities whichthey do possess, and alone
makes possiblethat recognitionthat these particularsare of the
same kind, whichmust precede the attemptto understandthe
essence. It has, finally,no actual existenceapart fromsensible
embodiment; but it is intelligibleapart fromany sensibleembodiment,is indeed intelligibleonly when it is conceived in
completedistinctionfromit, and the act in whichit is known
as thus distinct,although it presupposesprevious experience,
containsitselfno elementof sense. I ask the readerto bear in
mind that in the paragraphswhichfollowI shall use the term
" intelligible" strictlyin this sense. That is intelligiblewhich
is capable of being so distinguishedfromthe sensible that it
can become an object of knowledgeby itself. A criterionof
of an object in this sense is its capacity of
the intelligibility
being defined.'
The essencesof artificialobjects are intelligiblein this sense.
An untutoredsavage turnedloose amonga collectionofartefacts,
warehouse,will be in the same condition
let us say in a furniture
with respectto the objects which he sees and touches as the
novice who is faced with a varietyof drawingsof geometrical
figuresof which he does not understandthe definition. No
empirical classificationof the articles according to senwible
resembla'nces,nor tabulation of sensible qualities common to
all membersofsuch a class,willsufficehim forthe attainmentof
an understandingof what each article is. This understanding
1 I am of courseusing the term" definition
" also in its strictsense}
The enumerationof the sensible qualities which togetherconstitutea
" nominalessence", is not definition.
461
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M. B. FOSTER:
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466
FOSTER:
(To be concluded.)