Sub-Saharan Africa a rebellious

working class
, Andy Wynne and

Introduction
There used to be some debate over whether there was really a working
class in Africa, but since the millennium, across much of sub-Saharan
Africa, the working class has been involved in regular strikes and other
mass actions. Not only this, but those workers who have taken collective
strike action have often been winning their demands or, at least, achieving
higher pay increases and partly rolling back the Neoliberal attacks which
have been inflicted by the local ruling class with the support and
encouragement of the international financial institutions.
Lower productivity and higher reserve army of labour
However, the working class of sub-Saharan Africa still suffers significantly
worse conditions and lower salaries than their counterparts in the industrial
countries. The global working class is segmented by immigration controls,
travel costs and other issues. So the value of labour is not uniform across
the globe. Within many countries, there is internal migration towards the
better employment opportunities and salaries in the capital cities. This
process is replicated regionally and globally, so for example, Lagos and
Johannesburg act as region magnets across West and southern Africa
respectively. Similarly at the global level workers risk their lives to improve
their standards of living by attempting to enter the European Union or
North America. Although the claims of the theorists of unequal exchange
do not appear to be supported by the trends of recent decades. Over the
last forty years, there has been a levelling up in per capita wealth and
incomes between states, but a dramatic increase in income and wealth
inequality within almost every country in the world1.
The lower value of labour (indicated by poorer salaries) in sub-Saharan
Africa is due first to the lower productivity of labour in Africa (a smaller pie)
and secondly the higher level of unemployment and the reserve pool of
labour (tending to reduce the share of the pie taken by labour). It is
estimated that in 2009 the productivity of labour (GDP in 2005 PPP$ per
person employed) was 14 times as high in the advanced countries as in
sub-Saharan Africa 2. Unemployment is also generally higher across the
region, with, for example, official estimates of unemployment rates of
around 25 percent in South Africa and Nigeria 3.
In addition, urban
1
2

Harvey, David (2014) Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism, Profile Books, London, page 171

International Labour Organization (2010) Global Wage Report Africa Brief (2010/11), ILO : Geneva
African Development Bank (2013) African Economic Outlook 2013 pocket edition, AfDB
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/PDF/Pocket%20Edition%20AEO2013EN.web.pdf
3

unemployment is boosted by migration from rural areas.

Link between protest cycles and economic developments
Despite the diversity of national economic experiences, the economic
history of sub-Saharan Africa can be broadly divided into four sub-periods 4:
19601980, when the growth of many African economies equalled
that in many other areas of the world,
19802000, when economic growth collapsed as a result of the
external shocks of oil price increases, declining terms of trade and
increased real rates of interest, made worse by structural adjustment,
20002007, reasonable economic growth largely from the significant
increase in the prices received for primary products, and
2008 to present when economic uncertainty returned with some
decline in demand for raw materials with the slow down in the
European and American markets and reduced growth in the Chinese
economy.
Over the same period, there were three major cycles of protest, when social
movements played a vital role in challenging injustice and exploitation and
raised the possibility of radical social change. Broadly these were the:
1. struggles for political independence from the end of the second world war to around 1960;
2. protests against structural adjustment and the introduction of other elements of
neoliberalism from the late 1970s into the 1990s. The strong left currents in many
countries were severely weakened by a combination of the failure to provide an alternative
to the austerity and the significant falls in living standards and the ideological collapse that
was associated with the fall of the Berlin Wall, and
3. third wave of movements for democracy in the 1990s. This resulted in the introduction of
multiparty democracy but these are choiceless democracies5 where the only
option provided is Neoliberalism.
The long struggle to introduce Neoliberal reforms and so increase the rate
of exploitation of the working class continues across sub-Saharan Africa. As
in the industrial countries, this is a continual process. So, for example,
there is a continual battle between the governments and the trade unions
to reduce the level of fuel subsidies in Nigeria. There have been eight
general strikes since 1999 and yet fuel subsidies still remain significant.
Similarly there has been a struggle over the last couple of years, in
particular, to increase the tuition fees for universities, with the students of
4

UN Economic Commission for Africa (March 2011) Economic Report on Africa 2011 Governing development in Africa - the role of the state in economic transformation, Addis
Ababa: UNECA and African Union
5
Dwyer, Peter and Zeilig, Leo (2012) African Struggles Today, Chicago: Haymarket

Lagos State University winning a significant battle in their struggle against

fee increases in August 2014).
In other African countries, privatisation, out-sourcing and contract labour
are being introduced by national governments and indigenous companies
with the support and encouragement of the international financial
institutions (IMF and World Bank) and the examples provided by the
industrial counties. However, such Neoliberal reforms are clearly in the
interests of the local ruling classes who have seen their income and wealth
increase dramatically especially when the reforms were associated with
significant economic growth as in recent years.
However, this reform movement is being slowed down, undermined and in
some cases reversed by the combativityely of the working class- led social
movements. In recent years, there have been almost insurrectional general
strikes in, for example, Burkina Faso (2011) and Nigeria (2012) which have
benefited from significant support from the wider layers of informal workers
and urban and rural poor (see below). In many countries there have also
been long and bitter strikes by, for example, teachers whose effects have
been felt (and often supported) in every town and village.
Ideological weakness of the working class
Generally, there has also been a fairly high level of struggle and working
class strikes, at least since the beginning of the current millennium, but the
main problem is the weakness of the socialist left. Whilst the current
protests in many African countries are being spearheaded by the organised
working class, the trade unions have been weakened by the absence of a
significant radical or Marxist current. As a result, for example, the trade
union leaders have more significant power and have more freedom to be
able to sell out or contain strikes and other protests.
The absence of significant Marxist currents across sub-Saharan Africa
means that it is nationalist policies rather than working class consciousness
that have gained the ideological ascendancy. As a result, the idea of the
national interest and trade unions making compromises in the interests of
national development are dominant. This can significantly weaken trade
unions and lead to their leaders calling off significant disputes in the
national interest. Similarly, the hegemony of the ideas of the importance
of negotiation and collective bargaining can greatly strengthen the power
of the trade union leadership against the interests of a militant and classconscious rank and file trade union membership.
The end of communism or socialism in Russia, across East Europe and
induction of free market reforms in China weakened the left internationally.
As in the industrial countries, the communist and other socialist parties
across Africa either collapsed or were significantly weakened.
So called communist or socialist governments in Africa were either
otherover-thrown, as in the case of Ethiopia and Burkina Faso, or made

their peace with capitalism and supported the introduction of Neoliberalism

as with Tanzania or Angola. In other countries governments continued to
support the West and free-market capitalism as in Kenya and Nigeria. In all
cases, an alternative model of state- led development was undermined,
inequality has significantly increased and any serious attempt to reduce
poverty has been abandoned. As a result, there are no national left
reformist parties vying for power. Elections are between alternative
interest groups seeking to grab state power in order to loot the treasury
and pay off their clients.
All this has meant that the ideological space available for an authentic
socialist or Marxist voice is reduced. In most countries, existing communist
or socialist parties either collapsed or were very significantly weakened.
This tendency was increased with the financial gains that could be made
with reaching an accommodating accommodation, to a greater or lesser
extent, with capitalism and accepting the financial benefits available in
terms of support from the state or NGOs. This has meant that trade union
activism is increasingly seen as a career move with former national trade
union leaders taking power in Zambia and Benin State (Nigeria) or
becoming opposition leaders as in Zimbabwe. In addition, the left lost the
support of the so cold communist states in terms of scholarships and cheap
editions of Marxist classics whose sale locally could be a significant source
of financial support for socialist organisations.
As a result, in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the left has had to be
re-built from scratch, for example, with the International Socialist
Organisation in Zimbabwe, the Social Democratic Party in Kenya and the
Socialist Workers League in Nigeria. In some cases organisations with
hundreds if not thousands of members have been built with significant
support, at least in some universities and individual socialists have been
able to lead significant working class protests.
In the absence of an influential socialist alternative, especially when the
mass of people face great poverty, inequality and the absence of hope for
the future (the mass of Africans are economically no betterworse off than at
independence), then they turn to almost anything in their desperation
religion and ethnicity being the two obvious enclaves which are highly
promoted by the global and local elites. Across sub-Saharan Africa born
again churches are major businesses, Islamic fundamentalism has a
significant following and tribalism ethnicity has raised its ugly head in many
countries.
Case studies from Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Burkina Faso
This chapter provides four case studies on the strikes and other protests of
the organised working class in Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Burkina Faso.
They demonstrate a rising wave of trade union strikes and other collective
action over the last few years. We also explores the prospects for the
influence and the building of socialist alternatives in these countries. These

four countries are not exceptional, but have been chosen to be

representative of developments across the region.

Nigeria the giant continues to thunder

Introduction

The working class and the trade union movement played an active role in
the campaign against military governments and for the return of
democracy, eventually achieved in 1999. As a result, the Abacha military
government had, for example, banned the two oil unions and the university
staff union, put the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) under a sole
administrator in 1994 (General Babangida did the same in 1988, then
resigned five years later under the threat of a NLC- led general strike).
Despite the trade union role in the fight for democracy, recent governments
have not been sympathetic to the trade union movement. The Trade
Unions Act6, 2005 provides workers with the freedom to join (or not to join)
any trade union, but denies them the right to strike over socio-economic
and political policies. In contrast, trade unions have led an active struggle
against governments trying to end the oil fuel subsidy subsidies and for an
increase in the minimum wage. As a result there have been eight general
strikes, including the last and most dramatic one in January 2012, these
were:
2000, June against a proposed 50% increase in price of petrol.
2002, January - labour leaders end a two-day general strike after they
were arrested
2003, July - eight days, the longest general strike since 1964
2004, June - three-day general strike
2004, October - four day warning strike over fuel price increases
2007, June four-day strike wins most of its demands including stopping
15% fuel price increase, doubling the rate of VAT to 10% and privatising
two oil refineries and honouring a 15% pay increase for civil servants7
2010, November - one day strike to increase the minimum wage from
7,500 naira to the current 18,000 naira
2012, January nine day general strike over a threat to increase the fuel
price by nearly 120%.
The main issue of these general strikes was the repeated attempts by the
government to reduce or eliminate the price of fuel as indicated by the
following table:
6

Trade Unions Act, CAP T14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, LFN, 2010.

For more details, see: http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category/comment/42507

Year
1999
2000
2002
2003
2004
2012

Price
(naira)
20
22
26
34
65
97

Price increase
(%)
10
18
31
91
49

The oil fuel subsidy (oil fuel subsidy is this expression deliberate?) (which
some people now argue has ceased to exist) is one of the few benefits that
the common people gain from Nigerias oil reserves. Most people, at least
in the urban areas benefit from the reduced price of cooking and transport
costs.
It is estimated that around a tenth of the workforce are members of trade
unions. Affiliates of the Nigeria Labour Congress organise around 4.5million
workers and the Trade Union Congress (for more senior staff) has some two
million members8. However, estimates by the National Bureau of Statistics9
suggest that the number of people in formal employment may be as low as
4million. This indicates a very high level of unionisation and could be
explained by unions over reporting their membership. ILO estimates that
just over 20% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa are in waged or
salaried employment which would be 40 million Nigerians, suggesting that
over 15% are members of trade unions.
Aborisade10 best summarized the entire militant action when he stated:
For the period of the strike, everything came to a standstill in both
the public and private sectors of the economy, including the informal
sub-sector, schools, markets, offices, airports, seaports etc. all were
closed. Road transportation was completely paralysed. Streets were
deserted and towns/cities became ghost communities. Trade union
leaders, socialists, pro-democracy and human rights activist,
employed and unemployed youths, students in primary and tertiary
institutions poured into the streets in protest. Smoke of burnt tires,
which were used to barricade roads, (mixed freely with heavy teargas
shot by security agents). Against the provisions of the Nigerian
constitution even the armed forces, the Nigerian military troops, had
to be deployed against protesters that were only armed with leaves.
In addition to the general strikes, there have also been a range of other
strikes and disputes. There was a major national teachers strike in July
2008 that secured promises of a 30% pay increase for all teachers in public
schools. The implementation of this agreement, and the national minimum
wage of N18,000, has rumbled on across the different states since May
8

Baba Aye (2013) Which way for the Nigerian Working Class ? paper prepared for the National Union of
Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) International Colloquium, November, Johannesburg
9
National Bureau of Statistics (2014) 1st and 2nd Quarter 2014 Job Creation Survey Report, Abuja: NBS
10
Aborisade, Femi (2003) Post-military Dictatorship in Nigeria: Any Democratic Gains. Paper presented at a
seminar organised by the Elegant Social Club (ESC), Iseyin, Oyo State, 28 December

2010 and was part of the background to the five day general strike in
Benue State in August 2014.
During most of 2013 there were strikes in universities, polytechnics, and
colleges of education. In 2014 many universities attempted to significantly
increase their fees, but the students fought back, with a resounding victory
at Lagos State University where the State Government abandoned the
astronomical increase in school fees that had been imposed in the last
three or four years.its attempt to raise the student fees.
In recent years, there have also been several strikes in the health sector,
both locally and nationally, with a two- month strike by public sector
doctors in mid-2014. Unfortunately, disunity between the doctors and
other health workers means that these strikes were not successful and
public health funding remains abysmally low in Nigeria by international
standards.
This disunity is also a problem across many unions, at least in the public
sector where there are two unions, one for senior officials and another for
other workers. This is clearly reflected with the main two union centres, the
NLC and the TUC (for senior staff). In addition, with casualisation, the
creation of public agencies and youth employment schemes, many workers
are not allowed to join existing unions as these are restricted to official
permanent civil servants.
However, despite this, and the repeated sell-outs by the trade union
leadership, the trade union movement has not suffered any major defeats,
has maintained the fuel subsidy (although much reduced) and defeated a
general move to the principal principle of no-work, no-pay. As a result, in
most cases, Nigerian workers (like many workers across sub-Saharan Africa)
are still paid when they are on strike.

Interview with , on the protests in Benin City in January

201211
The January 2012 insurrection was the high point of recent working class
struggles. Over the course of nine days, the general strike developed into
the largest social movement in Nigerias history. Millions struck and mass
protests were held in every major urban centre, from Lagos in the south, to
Kano in the north. Banners reading Occupy Nigeria identified the struggle
as part of an international movement in opposition to economic deprivation
and social inequality. The following interview provides some background to
the protests in one of the six major industrial centres in Nigeria.
AW: Who were the people who actively supported the demonstrations?
SA: There were thousands of people every day. People who came out on
the protests were trade union members, youths, market women. There
11

Undertaken by Andy Wynne, 15th September 2014, Benin City

were also civil society actors and activists, members of the Traders
Association of New Benin and Okada, the motor bike taxi riders, who came
out in their hundreds.
AW: But most people stayed at home?
SA: Not really, there were times when some joined briefly. So, for instance
when we were marching along a particular road, people on that road would
tend to come out and join, then the numbers would be countless, covering
the whole road. But by the time we moved out of their neighbourhood,
they tended to go back. There were days when the crowd was indeed
massive. One day, the entire Ring Road was filled up, perhaps close to ten
thousand people. But that was just one of those very rare moments.
Dont forget that there is a very huge informal sector. There are people
who must try to sell something everyday in order to feed. So those people,
protest or no protest, if they do not find a way to sell something they will
almost starve to death. So these people always came out, either very early
in the morning or late in the evening after the protests to try to sell
something.
AW: What about the left? Were they able to intervene successfully?
SA: The left was part of the Coalition to Save Nigeria. Our work was to see
that things went peacefully. We were also to ensure that labour and the
NLC/TUC played its role as the vanguard of the movement. The lefts role
was to meet with and encourage labour to play its leadership role which it
did very well.
Left groups also tried to share leaflets here [in Benin City], but there was no
conscious or deliberate effort to use the opportunity to identify and raise
new cadres. That did not happen until towards the end of the protests
when we tried to make efforts to do that.
It was only when we were entering the second week, that we started
thinking of the need to have some permanent gains. For the left in Nigeria,
in Edo State, our primary focus was labour. So we tried to make
interactions with labour and to hold lectures. But for the first three or four
days, there were no such efforts to the best of my knowledge.
AW: So what happened, what went wrong with the protests?
SA: What happened that led to the end of the strike was that,
unfortunately, labour leaders, the NLC/TUC called off the strike abruptly,
without due recourse to the coalition and without seeking the views of the
other members of the coalition at the national level. They just called off
the strike.
AW: And that was accepted?

SA: When that announcement was made by the NLC, the majority of
Nigerians felt betrayed. There were a few over zealous young people who
wanted to continue the protests, but they could not, because that betrayal
simply took the steam out of the engine. People did not feel that they could
do any more.
AW: So what do you think are the lessons from these protests for the next
time that they are organised?
SA: A major outcome of the protests is that people have been much more
ready to protest. They now see that, some how, they can gain a measure
of success if they protest. This is because the protest showed the collective
power of the people.
Initially the President said he was not going to go back, it was final. He
threatened that nothing would make him reverse the price. Then
eventually he reversed it to 97 naira. If the protests had held on for
another day or two he would have reversed it much further. That is also
one of the major lessons learnt the people still have the power. It is just
that co-ordinating and organising them is not easy. That is why it is
important for there to be regular interactions between civil society and
labour.
Another lesson is that we should not allow the labour leadership to decide
again on behalf of the people involved in the protests. We have to find a
way to ensure that it is the true representatives of the protestors that
decide on their behalf. Without the support of the masses, the NLC and
TUC will not have the formidable resistance that makes government listen
to them.
So we hope that, in the future, that alternative structures and processes will
be there and will be credible and formidable enough to negotiate directly
on behalf of the people. Once that is created, greater victories will be won.
Conclusions
Despite these magnificent working class struggles, the left in Nigeria is
currently rather weak and for most people it effectively does not exist. This
is in sharp contrast to the position in 1987 when the Political Bureau set up
by the Babangida military regime reported that majority of Nigerians
declared a preference for socialism.
There are now three or four significant socialist groups with perhaps as
many as a few hundred members each, the Democratic Socialist Movement
(associated with the Socialist Party in Britain), the Socialist Workers League
(associated with the British SWP), Committee for Workers Alternative (CWA)
(associated with the late Ted Grants group in Britain) and the Socialist
Party of Nigeria (including such stalwarts of the Nigerian left as Eskor Toyo,
Eddie Madunagu and the late Festus Iyayi).

With a population of approaching 200 million, socialism does not appear as

a possible alternative for most of the people of Nigeria. As a result,
especially in the southern half of the country, churches, both traditional and
revivalist, have a huge following, providing hope for many in the next life, if
not for this.
Similarly, in the north, Islam remains very strong and provides the bedrock
for Boko Haram and its militant approach. In recent months, a new stage
appears to be developing in its rebellion. It is now being able to defeat the
national army and has controlled several medium sized towns for several
months. However, its sectarian attitude and widespread killings of both
Christians and Muslims mean that many who would support a radical
alternative to the corrupt regimes in Abuja are repelled.
Especially across the middle belt of Nigeria, the widespread poverty means
that significant numbers of people are turning to tribalism ethnicity and
other disputes. Christians may be pitted against Muslims; pastoralist
against cultivators; or so-called indigenes against new comers.
All this shows the alternative forms of the barbarism of capitalism, the fate
of the mass of miserably poor people when socialists are not able to
provide a credible alternative leadership. However, in the few cases where
socialists have been able to organise properly, with regular meetings and
the production of regular publications they have shown that it is possible to
attract a significant following. This can allow them to take leadership
positions in working class struggles and begin to build a real socialist
alternative.

The Zimbabwean crucible

Zimbabwe underwent a relatively late period of structural adjustment that savaged
public services and industry in a country that had been relatively diversified industrially
and more prosperous than many of its continental cousins. As a reaction to this
economic adjustment in the first fives years of the 1990s, there was growth in
opposition, which developed impressively in the second part of the decade into a
mass movement. This movement unified an array of forces, war veterans from the
struggle against the white minority, Smith regime in the 1960s and 1970s, students,
hawkers, market women, and wide layers of workers organised in the trade union
federation ZINASU.
One of the factors that interests us in Zimbabwe during these years, is the role of a
small, often not more than a hundred members, socialist organisation, the
International Socialist Organisation (ISO) of Zimbabwe, that played an important,
indeed entirely disproportionate role in the street battles, political education of cadre,
and formation of strike committees and even the MDC. For the authors of this chapter

a keen study of the Zimbabwes moment in the 1990s, and early 2000s, and it
subsequent defeat and unraveling, is essential for revolutionaries and activists across
the continent.
Zimbabwe then and now
Today Zimbabwe is still in the grip of a crippling economic crisis. GDP per capita is
estimated to be the same as it was in 1953. Before dollarisation in 2009 the country
had the highest inflation rate in the world, soaring to 165,000 percent in February
2008. At the beginning of 2014 an estimated 75 percent of the population lived below
the poverty line.
ZANU-PF victory in the 2008 elections, despite the violence and rigged poll,
significantly shaped the next six years. ZANU-PFs dictatorship launched protracted
inter-party negotiations that started soon after Mugabes presidential inauguration. 11
February 2009 saw the birth of an inclusive Government of National Unity (GNU), with
leading members of the MDC assuming significant positions in the new parliament.
Morgan Tsvangirai became Prime Minster. Tendia Beti, a long standing member of the
MDC (and before this a founder of the ISO), secured the important Finance portfolio.
But vital ministries and real power remained firmly in ZANU-PF hands.
ZANU-PFs fairly decisive victory in the 2013 elections marked the end of political
party collaboration. Mugabes relationship to his anti-imperialism, a promise to speak
to the poor and outcast, has always been highly opportunistic, swinging with wild
inconsistency between price-controls and liberalisation. One area that has became
contentious was the Indigenisation Act. Promoted by ZANU-PF as a black
empowerment initiative the Act insists on a 51 percent indigenous shareholding for
foreign companies operating in Zimbabwe. Such posturing by ZANU has created a
limited social base for itself within Zimbabwe, and an even larger continental, and
regional influence. The Economic Freedom Fighters in South Africa, for example, point
to Mugabes apparent radicalism as their model.
The MDC has long been characterised by confusing vacillations, calling mass action
then retreating from it, seeking to align itself with rightwing policies and accepting
shoddy compromises with the regime. Today thousands may still identify with the
radicalism and confidence of the working class from the late 1990s. Joseph
Tanyanyiwa, General Secretary of the National Union of the Clothing Industry, recalled
in 2011, The MDC was a rising giant. People are still missing those days. People are
always saying why cant we go back to those good old days where we would really
control by means of workers power. It is still a deep conviction that we can deliver
workers from the bondage of oppression.
The two red years
Zimbabwes biennio rosso of 1996-1998 saw the revolt of students and workers.
Strikes by nurses, teachers, civil servants and builders rippled across the country. In
January 1998 housewives orchestrated a bread riot that became an uprising of the
poor living in Harares township. The protests, strikes and campaigns were often
explicitly against the governments programme of structural adjustment. This had
resulted in closed factories, retrenched workers and slashing of state funding to the
national university and students. Inspired by the largely urban movement the rural
poor often poor ex-veterans of the war for independence, started to invade white
owned farms. Initially the regime evicted the squatters and arrested their leaders. In

June 1998 the University of Zimbabwe in Harare was closed for five months and
students started to demand that the opposition forces be organised in a national
political party a workers party.
These years of popular mobilisation and political debate were described by one
activist as a sort of revolution. Eventually the revolt gave way to the formation of the
Movement of the Democratic Change in September 1999, formed by the Zimbabwe
Congress of Trade Union. At this point the new party was resolutely pro-poor, formed
by the working class and for them. As Job Sikhala, a founding member of the MDC
and soon to be MP, explained, it was basically a party of the poor with a few middle
class.12
As the new party came into formation attempts were made to stifle the independent
voices within the movement. ISO that had built solidarity, organised labour forums, set
up tenants associations, and participated in strikes and demonstrations were
obstructed in their work. Despite this ISO won an important seat in a working class
area of Harare in the 2000 parliamentary elections as part of the MDC and, despite
continued opposition from the party leadership remained in the party until 2003.
It is hard to exaggerate the role of ISO, much underplayed by official academic
accounts of the struggles in the 1990s. Brighton Makunike, who was chair of the MDC
at the University of Zimbabwe in 2003, explained, What I like from ISO is their issue of
jambanja [resistance], they dont beat about the bush trying to come up with some
alternative, they always have the way forward at their disposal.
ISO in Zimbabwe emphasized self-activity and collective decision-making. This did not
turn the organisation into a talking shop of endless debates but, by their own
admission, decisions were reached through the democratic process of the majority
and then acted on. The partys stature rested not only on their pamphlets and debates,
but also on action, that included collecting for striking workers, organising
demonstrations etc.
Ultimately the ISO was unable to stop both the neo-liberal turn of the MDC because,
according to Gwisai, it lacked the necessary size and penetration to offer a
sufficient counter weight to the might of local and international neo-liberal forces. 13
Other political forces began to flock to the MDC. It was now seen by respectable
NGOs, some white farmers and the middle classes as a force that could appease
foreign interests and replace ZANU-PF with a government respectful of existing
property rights and business interests. So under the influence of these groups the
MDC did not attack the hypocrisy of the regime, but instead allied itself to those whose
farms had been seized and who saw a continuation of ESAP as the solution to
Zimbabwes woes.
As the MDC distanced itself from its radical base, ZANU-PF started to develop political
defences in rural areas. Both the war veterans and the youth militias were pillars of the
same policy: to create support bases across the country who could physically
undermine the opposition and shore up the ruling party. By 2003 the MDC seemed
demoralised and without a strategy to challenge the regime.
Zanu-PF strikes back
12

Interview (Harare), 31 July 2003.

M. Gwisai, Revolutionaries, Resistance and Crisis in Zimbabwe: Anti-Neo-liberal Struggles in
Periphery Capitalism Harare: I.S.O. Pamphlet, 2002
13

ZANU-PF increasingly sold itself internationally and at home as the true inheritors of
the liberation movement, set on a programme of pro-poor reforms occasionally using
Marxist language. The MDC by contrast seem cowed and unable to mount a serious
resistance, both on the streets and in policies. One decisive moment occurred in June
2003. The so-called final push on 2 June was launched by the MDC and meant to
turn the tables on the regime with a week-long stayaway and march on Mugabes
State House. No serious efforts were made to mobilise their forces, leaving only
students at the national university in Harare to organise a protests that was violently
crushed.
Zimbabwean activism began to suffer from the donor syndrome, as foreign funded
NGOs increasing filled the political vacuum that had been left by the opposition and
the collapse in the economy. Zimbabwean-based organisations saw the massive
inflow of funds. This has had the effect of distorting grass-roots activism, described as
the commodification of resistance as mobilisation become paid for from NGO
funds.14
Munyaradzi Gwisai a leading member of ISO, drew the attention to the mistakes being
made by the MDCs leadership, criticising the hijacking of the party by the
bourgeoisie, marginalisation of workers, adoption of neo-liberal positions and cowardly
failure to physically confront the Mugabe regime and bosses. It is imperative that
the party moves much more leftward ... in order to realign to its base.' 15
Although certain important efforts were made to mount opposition to the ruling party
after 2003, increasingly these did not come from the MDC. New organisations
attempted to fill the vacuum. Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) is an activist
organisation that led some of the most important protests in recent years, often on
issues of violence against women. The Zimbabwe Social Forum (ZSF), formed in
2002, became an alternative space for political discussion and a forum that attempted
to group together those who sought to resist the regime.
Conclusions
Zimbabwe is a harsh place today to be a revolutionary socialist. The working class, in
a diversified industrial sector in the 1990s, stands in ruins, though not totally
obliterated. Ten of thousands of workers in the printing, bottling, clothing and food
processing sector have been sacked. Approximately three million Zimbabweans have
been compelled to leave the country, many moving South. As one sober, unexcitable
Zimbabwean commentator has recently written, the reconfiguration of Zimbabwes
political economy in the 2000s has forced both the opposition MDCs and the civic
movement to rethink issues of social agency in Zimbabwes public sphere. 16
Revolutionaries must have the courage to accept these realities. What happens to
socialist organisation, the project of revolutionary socialist transformation, when its
agency is dislodged, almost extinguished by a brutal process of restructuring,
14

Interview (Bulawayo), 22 May 2003.

Cited in L, Zeilig, Revolt and Protest (I. B. Tauris, London: 2007), p.160.
16
B. Raftopoulos, Zimbabwean Politics in the Post-2013 Election Period in African Spectrum 2, 2014
p. 100
15

retraction and crisis? In the words of Brian Raftopoulos, the central force of the labour
movement has been largely lost to civic struggles. 17
For many years Zimbabwean socialists have spoken of the commodification of
resistance. Grassroots campaigners and activists, in the context of mass hunger and
unemployment, are diverted from involvement in their movements, to NGO funded
events, initiatives and projects. This is a process that has also affected socialists and
working class militants across sub-Saharan Africa.
Any analysis of the Zimbabwean crisis must contain a nuanced understanding of
events, the structural constraints on the formation of organisation and development of
socialist politics, as well as an appraisal of agency, organisation and protest. In the
late 1990s the MDC needed a larger, clearer, better organised, radical socialist voice.
There was a brief vacuum that could not be filled by a brilliant, though terribly small
organisation like ISO; instead the void was occupied by a class that included white
farmers, professionals and NGOs.
Revolutionary organisation can make a central contribution, cause events to be
shaped in a decisive way, but only if the forces, strength, politics, engagement and
size of the radical left are in place. In the absence of such organisation, the role is
invariably taken by bourgeois, or petty bourgeois parties and classes. The unraveling
of the crisis in Zimbabwe, an expression of the neo-liberal counter-revolution across
the continent, has led to the dislodging of the countrys working class. This will be
rebuilt and reconstituted with economic growth within the context of a working class
strike wave which is currently engulfing the continent. In the meantime the patient
work of remembering, studying and rebuilding a revolutionary current needs to take
place in Zimbabwe as elsewhere.

17

Raftopoulos, Zimbabwean Politics p. 100

Kenya learning from the teachers

Introduction
As in other African countries, the trade unions in Kenya may have been
weakened over the last two or three decades with the economic problems,
privatisation, out-sourcing and contract labour. However, in the last few
years there has been a rising level of strike action with many successes.
It is also easy to exaggerate how strong the trade unions were in the past,
for example, a recent thought piece said:
In the period leading up to Kenyan independence in 1963, unions provided
one of the most significant platforms for agitating for the rights of Kenyan
workers, and even contributed to the nationalist movement by providing a
forum for political debate.18

In reality, Jomo Kenyatta, the first president of Kenya, did all he could to
emasculate the trade union movement. He appointed the moderate trade
union leader, Tom Mboya, as Minister for Labour and between 1964-65,
legislation was passed in Parliament effectively making workers strikes
illegal and rendering trade unions ineffective.19 In 1965, the trade union
federation, the Central Organisation for Trade Unions (COTU) was formed
and the state, had a direct role in approving the leading officials20.
In the mid-1950s less than 5% of Kenyan workers were members of trade
unions, by 1963 this had increased to nearly 30%. With independence
workers were anxious to receive their fair share of the rewards of uhuru 21
(freedom) and so unions continued to grow and twenty years later it was
estimated that 36% of the workforce was unionised.
The unions were then weakened with state repression and tribalism that
culminated in violence after the December 2007 elections resulting in the
deaths of over a thousand people and up to half a million being displaced.22
There are also the divisions between the Muslim community, especially in
Mombasa and along the coast, and the predominantly Christian population.
This tension was made worse with the Kenyan army invading southern
Somalia in 2011 and the terrorist attack on the Westgate shopping mall in
September 2013.

Strike Wave
18

Boru, Abdullahi (2013) Striking Out: How Kenya's Unions Have Gone from Hero to Zero, 21 August 2013
http://thinkafricapress.com/kenya/end-teachers-strikes-showcases-weak-and-unpopular-nature-unions
19
Patel, Zarina (2006) Unquiet the life and times of Makhan Singh, Zand Graphics: Nairobi, page 344
20
Op cit
21
William Robert Ochieng', Robert M. Maxon (eds) (1992) An Economic History of Kenya, East African
Publishers, - Kenya page 358.
22
Mwandawiro Mghanga (2010) Land, elections, and conflicts in Kenyas Coast Province,
Heinrich Bll Stiftung: Kenya

There have been a dozen national teachers strikes in Kenya since

independence over fifty years ago23. Five of these strikes occurred over the
last five years and the last two were the most intense, lasting several
weeks each. There was yet another teachers strike brewing in September
2014. This suggests that these strikes are part of a rising wave of strikes
across sub-Saharan Africa. In Kenya there have also been a series of major
strikes in the public health and local government sectors, along with some
disputes in the private sector.
The last teachers strike started in June 2013 when the Kenya National
Union of Teachers (KNUT) called out their over 200,000 members. The
militancy and influence of this strike was demonstrated at the end June
when the dockworkers threatened to down tools in solidarity with the
teachers.
The teachers were demanding parity with civil service and implementation
of a 1997 agreement on higher allowances (an example of a recurrent
theme of the government not implementing agreements with trade unions).
KNUT called off the four-week strike after accepting a settlement giving
teachers a commuter allowance, a promise to hire 10,000 new teachers
and negotiation on other allowances.
However, the threat of further strike action continued. At the end of July
2013, the KNUT threatened to resume the strike if the government did not
pay teachers their July salaries.
But although nearly three quarters of teachers in Kenya are members of
KNUT, nearly two thirds of the non-members are in their twenties24. In
addition, the main teachers union faces competition from smaller unions.
Graduate teachers in Kenya earn an annual salary of not much more than
5,000 and teach classes with an average of 100 pupils each.
The militancy of the teachers is reflected in other parts of the public sector.
The nurses and other health workers, for example, held a strike that lasted
for more than two months and paralysed operations in public hospitals for
the first part of 2013. In retaliation, the government stopped their salaries.
Local health strikes then followed as the following interview indicates.

Interview on nurses victory at the Kenyatta National

Hospital
In June 2013, nearly 4,000 nurses at the Kenyatta National Hospital
(Nairobi) scored a major victory. This in turn it encouraged workers at the
Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital to win a 24 per cent pay rise in
September which was backdated for two years. Whilst workers at Pumwani
23

Kibiwott Koross (2012) History of teachers' strikes since independence, The Star, 3,
September, Nairobi
24
Anyango, Obange, Abeka, Ondiek, Odhiambo Odera and Ayugi (2013) Factors Affecting Performance of Trade
Unions in Kenya, American Journal of Business and Management, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2013, 181-185
http://wscholars.com/index.php/ajbm/article/viewFile/313/pdf

Maternity Hospital had to strike for a week in the same month to win an
agreement for 30-60 per cent pay increases.
Albert N. Obed, Secretary General of the Kenya Union of Domestic, Hotels,
Educational Institutions, Hospitals & Allied Workers (KUDHEIHA) provides
further details.25
I understand the nurses at the Kenyatta National Hospital have just won a
significant victory?
Yes, it was agreed that next month (July) the nurses will receive their 46%
pay increase (and a 23% increase in their housing allowance) which will be
back dated to July 2011. This will be a major victory and all nurses at the
Kenyatta National Hospital will receive a reasonable payment.
What is the background to the nurses strike?
The union, KUDHEIHA Workers, started negotiating a new Collective
Bargaining Agreement in 2009, but regrettably, we were offered nothing in
terms of salary increment. So in December 2010 the union demanded a
salary increase for two years. As the management refused to accept our
demand, we lodged a trade dispute with the Ministry of Labour, whereby a
conciliator was appointed to solve the matter. Our frantic efforts to resolve
the matter at the Ministry of Labour did not bear any fruit, hence we were
left with no other option but to refer the dispute to the Industrial Court for
arbitration and fair determination.
The following year, 2011 we had a strike at the Kenyatta National Hospital
demanding pay parity with civil servants. An agreement was reached to
increase the allowances, but the government refused to pay. So in
February 2013 we again went to court and won our case. Finally we had
another strike last week and the government has finally caved in and
agreed that the full implementation of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, allowances and back-pay will be paid out in July, 2013.
Will your victory will also assist the nurses at the Moi Referral & Teaching
Hospital?
Yes, there are two specialist or referral hospitals in Kenya, the Kenyatta
National Hospital in Nairobi and the Moi Referral Hospital in Eldoret in the
west of Kenya. The current Collective Bargaining Agreement for the
Referral Hospital ends at the end of this month. So based on our victory at
the Kenyatta National Hospital, the union will be negotiating for pay parity
[the nurses at the Referral Hospital issued a two week strike notice the next
day].
There are also a number of other strikes at the moment?
There are many strikes and other disputes, as most employers dont
embrace social dialogue. However, with the new government promising to
create jobs and claiming zero tolerance of corruption, the trade unions feel
they can get the best now. This is especially the case when the members
25

Interview with Andy Wynne, Nairobi, Kenya, 23 June 2013

of Parliament and Senators have been demanding more money for

themselves rather than being concerned about service delivery.
We believe that the economic problems should be addressed by the
government and the World Bank. But it is very unfortunate at their policies
of privatization have made things worse for workers. For example, Kenya
Bus services used to have a good network of buses, but since it was
privatized it does not operate so well and so workers suffer from longer and
more expensive journeys.
NGOs are also good at providing seminars, conferences and reports, but
they do not really help the workers or our members. So we have to depend
on ourselves and we hope that our victory at the Kenyatta National Hospital
will encourage other workers to take strike action. No matter whether the
government can afford it or not, now it is the time for as many workers as
possible to exercise their constitutional right to strike.

Recent Strikes
This strike wave has continued, for example, in March 2014 university
lecturers held a two week strike over none payment of monies owed an
agreement two years previously. One of the county governments, Elgeyo
Marakwet, agreed to hire contract nurses on permanent terms. Kenya
National Union of Nurses official Benson Biwott said: "We are happy with
that, although we want them to look into the terms and conditions of all
nurses." The union wants other counties to employ more than 2,000 nurses
who are still working on contractual terms.
In mid-August 2014, the Kenya National Union of Nurses released a list of
demands they want addressed before resuming work. Secretary general
Seth Panyako said failure by most counties to hire the nurses is one of the
reasons that led them to call for another national strike. "We don't want to
hear of nurses being hired on contract. It's inhuman and unacceptable
because the concerned workers are being frustrated and exploited by being
underpaid," he said.
Health workers at the Coast General Hospital embarked on a go-slow
grounding crucial services, especially at the hospital's emergency and
maternity wing. In early September, having been paid their June, July and
August salaries they agreed to go back to work. In addition, the head of
the hospital is to be allowed to return to his job. He was allegedly sent on
compulsory leave by the county government for effectively supporting the
strike.
There have also been several strikes by local government workers against
delays in receiving their pay. In July 2013 hundreds of workers for the
Mombasa County government were on strike demanding payment of
delayed salaries from the last two months. The branch secretary of the
Kenya County Workers Union Mombasa branch was subjected to humiliation

after hundreds of striking Mombasa county government workers heckled

him as he tried to persuade them to go back to work.
More than 11,000 Nairobi county government workers struck in September
2013 to compel the government to implement their agreement from the
previous year. The strike was banned by court action. But workers of the
Kenya County Government Workers Union took strike action and
demonstrated outside the City Council offices where they were attacked by
the police with tear gas after they dumped garbage to block the entrance.
Laikipia local government workers went on strike from 29 September 2014
to demand their salary arrears and more than 600 workers took to the
streets.
Although the mass of strikes have been in the public sector, there have also
been a number of strikes in the private and parastatal sectors. Dock
workers in Mombasa were one of the first groups to respond threatening
strike action against privatisation of parts of the Kenya Ports Authority. In
November 2012, a two-day strike by dock workers had gained permanent
jobs for many casual workers. Workers at the countrys giant sugar
producing factory based in Kakamega paralysed operations for a day in
mid-August 2013 when they downed tools over outsourcing of the
companys services. In September 2014, 11,000 Unilever tea workers
struck over the failure by the company to implement the agreement from
the previous year. Orange TELKOM Kenya employees threatened to gowent
on strike from October 8, 2014, if their performance bonuses are not
reviewed. In addition, KK Guards who provide security for the US and other
embassies went on strike in mid-June 2013 and even the police have been
given the go ahead to form a trade union.

Need for a clear socialist alternative

As in many other African countries, the organised working class has shown
its combatively, as indicated above, as it attempts to defend and improve
its pay and working conditions from a relatively poor base. However, with
the absence of a mass socialist alternative there is always the real risk of
the poor turning to religious, community and ethnic alternatives.
Kenya has one of the largest socialist organisations in sub-Saharan Africa
(outside South Africa). The Social Democratic Party26 has about 3,000
committed members (paying monthly subs) and one of its members was
elected as the Organising Secretary in the University of Nairobi student
elections in April 2013. However, this organisation has still failed to break
clearly from nationalist and electoral politics. So in re-action to the postelection violence in 2007, the SDP Chair said27:

26
27

www.sdpkenya.org

Mwandawiro Mghanga (2010) Land, elections, and conflicts in Kenyas Coast Province,
Heinrich Bll Stiftung: Kenya (Page 4)

Kenyans must take responsibility for their attitudes and actions and
participate in the search for short term and long term solutions to the
political and social crisis in the country.
Mwandawiro is a former Member of Parliament (2002 2007) and the Party
put a lot of effort in to the March 2013 elections, but their results were
disappointing and they failed to gain any significant victories.
More seriously, the SDP did not condemn the Kenyan armys invasion of
Somalia in 2011 and in their reaction to the attacks on Westgate shopping
mall of September 2013 called for strengthening of state security28. This
attitude makes it more difficult for the SDP to organise in solidarity with the
almost one million Somali refugees in Kenya and the significant Muslim
community, especially in the working class areas of Mombasa.
Similarly, although, the SDP does support working class collective action,
for example, expressing solidarity with the Health Workers strike in
December 2013, it does not have a clear vision of working class selfemancipation nor the need for rank and file workers to organise
independently of the trade union leadership.
The mass strike wave in Kenya could provide fertile ground for growth of
the SDP and it is hoped that its politics can be adapted to provide a clear
demonstration of socialism from below, socialism as the self-emancipation
of the working class and the need for a complete break from nationalist
politics.

BurkinaFasoEnoughisenough!
INTRODUCTION
In the early 1980s, President Sankara was a beacon of hope against the increased inequality and
insecuritystructuraladjustmentintroducedacrossAfrica. Inthefirsthalfof2011BurkinaFasowas
againinthenewsasstrikes(includingageneralstrikeon8 thApril),massactionandevenmutiniesby
the presidential guardcameclose to bringing the ArabSpringtosubSaharan Africa andtoppling
Sankarasmurdererwhohasbeenpresidentsince1987.
ThomasSankarasstrategywasdefinedinhisPoliticalOrientationSpeech29.Itwasadefiantalternative
to neoliberal development strategies aiming to eliminate corruption, promote reforestation, avert
famine,makeeducationandhealthrealpriorities(withanationwideliteracycampaignandvaccinating
2.5millionchildren). Itlaunchedthemostambitiousprogramforsocialandeconomicchangeever
attemptedinAfrica30.
28

http://sdpkenya.org/index.php/documents/121-sdp-condemns-the-dreadful-terror-attack-at-thewestgate-mall-expresses-its-condolences-to-those-killed-and-wishes-quick-recovery-to-all-injured
29
30

AnEnglishtranslationofthisspeechisavailablefrom:http://www.scribd.com/doc/96585260
ThomasSankara:TheUprightManbyCaliforniaNewsreel:http://newsreel.org/nav/title.asp?tc=CN0205

Theirstrongcommitmenttowomen'srightsledtotheoutlawingoffemalegenitalmutilation,forced
marriagesandpolygamy.Womenwereappointedtohighgovernmentpositionsandactivelyrecruited
tothemilitary31.Theywereencouragedtoworkoutsidethehomeandgirlswereencouragedtostayat
schoolevenifpregnant32. TheSankaragovernmentwasalsothefirstAfricangovernmenttopublicly
recognizethechallengeofHIV/AIDS33.
Sankaraandhisallieswerecommittedtoachievingtheiregalitarianideals,butthesewereimposed
ratherthanbeingwonthroughcollectiveactionoftheworkersandmassofthepoorpeople.Despiteits
manysignificantachievements,thiswassocialismfromabove,nottheselfemancipationofthe
workingclassandpopularmasses.Thisapproachwastoleadtotheregimecomingintoconflictwith
sectionsoftheworkingclassanditsorganisations.
Whentheschoolteacherswentonstrike,justoversixmonthsafterSankaracametopower,nearly
1,500weredismissedandtheywerenottoreturntotheirjobsuntilafterhisdeath 34.Aunionfrontwas
setupinJanuary1985againstthedeclineindemocraticandtradeunionfreedoms.Thiswastostay
activethroughouttherevolutionarySankara,periodeventhoughthetradeunionsandindependent
organisationswereconsiderablyweakenedasaresultofrepression(includingdismissalofcivil
servants,arrestsandtorture,etc).Theactionsoftheunionswereconsideredsubversiveandcouldbe
punishedwithmilitarysanctions35.
TheGovernmentbannedtradeunionsandafreepress 36astheywereseenascominginthewayoftheir
reforms. Corrupt officials, counterrevolutionaries and "lazy workers" were tried in peoples
revolutionary tribunals. The public trials of former senior government officials was a positive
development,butthesetrailswerealsobeusedagainstgenuinecriticsoftheregime.Sankaraalsoset
upCubanstyleCommitteesfortheDefenceoftheRevolution(CDRs).
Inthenameofwantingtomakearevolutionforthemassofthepoorpeople,Sankaradiditwithout
themorevenagainstthem.Sankararecognisedthisinhisselfcriticalspeechof2 ndofOctober1987.
Butheandhisalliesdidnothavetimetorestorethelinksbetweenthegovernmentandthemass
independentworkingclassorganisations.
Sankarawasassassinatedwithtwelveofhiscomradesinacoupd'tatledbyhisdeputy,Blaise
Compaor.Aweekbeforehisdeath,hedeclared:"Whilerevolutionariesasindividualscanbe
murdered,youcannotkillideas"37.OneofthemainoppositionpartiesinBurkinaFasoremainshis
SankaristPartyandSankaraiscommonlyreferredtoas"Africa'sCheGuevara" 38.Heremainsan
inspirationformanyyoungpeopleacrosstheregion39andproofthatanotherworldispossiblefor
Africa.
Inthebeginningofthe1990sinternationalgeopoliticspushedthecountrytostartthetransitionto
multipartydemocracyandafreemarketeconomy.BurkinaFasoisnowpresentedasoneoftheWorld
31

CaliforniaNewsreel
ThomasSankara,Wikipedia:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Sankara#cite_noteUprightDVD5
33
Theramaili'sBlog
34
CaliforniaNewsreel
35
DcretN85078,1er/2/1985
36
CaliforniaNewsreel
37
BurkinaFasoSalutes"Africa'sChe"ThomasSankarabyMathieuBonkoungou,Reuters,Oct172007
38
CaliforniaNewsreel
39
ThomasSankara,Wikipedia:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Sankara#cite_noteUprightDVD5
32

BankandIMFsbestpupils,butisstilloneofthepoorestcountriesintheworld (181th outof187

countriesinthe2013UNHumanDevelopmentIndex)with46%ofthepopulationstrugglingtoexist
beneaththepovertyline.
LikemanycountriesinsubSaharanAfrica,thissituationofneoliberalstructuraladjustmentledtogreat
inequality.OneintenBurkinabenowownhalfofthecountriesriches 40.Therehasalsobeenapillageof
national resources by the presidential clique (senior political officials and senior military figures).
Partlyasaresult,thereishighunemployment,especiallyforthetwothirdsofthepopulationthatis
under25yearsold
BlaiseCompaorwaslastreelectedinNovember2010byover80%ofthevoteafteraquartercentury
inpower(butonlyreceiving1.7millionvotesfromanelectorateofsevenmillion).Lessthanthree
monthslater,inthefirsthalfof2011,apowerfulpopularmovementeruptedwithdemonstrationsand
strikes(butalsomilitarymutinies).Strikestookplaceinmanyworkplaces,forexample,schools,atthe
ComoSugarCompanyandinthegoldmines,wherefantasticbraverywasdemonstratedagainstthe
policewhoweresupportingthemineowners.Thepeopleturnedtothepolicepresentsaying:
Thereisnoauthorityanymore,sowewillsolveourproblemswithviolence...Whatweask
youtodoistocallOuagadougou [thecapital] andtellthemtobringalltheriotpolice.
Becausewehaverealizedthatthepolicyoftheminingbossesistousetheriotpoliceto
suppressthelocalpeople.Whiletheministersinchargeoftheminesarehappytodinewith
theminingbosses,theyneverhaveasmuchas30minutestotalktothelocalpeople.Solet
theriotpolicecome.Someofuswillfall.Wewanttoseethepoliceshootatus.Butwealso
haveconfidenceinourselves.WearesurewewilleventuallyovercomeEssakanemine.
Suchstrikesalsodemonstratedsolidarityfrombeyondtheworkingclass.Duringastrikebyworkersat
theComoSugarCompany,thelargestprivateemployerinthecountry,women,children,young
people,otherprivatesectorworkersandpensionersdemonstratedtheirsolidarity.
TheauthorityofCompaorwasshakenashisauthorityrestedonthearmyandespeciallythe
presidentialguardwhichmutiniedon14April2011.Atthisstagethegovernmentgaveintomany
populardemands(forexample,theteachers),butonceorderwasrestoredtheregimereturnedto
repressionagainstthefirstgroupofworkerstostrikeworkersintheMinistryofFinance.
Since2008,goldhasreplacedcottonastheprimarysourceofwealth.By2012BurkinaFasowasthe
fourthlargestproducerofgoldintheworld.Thisisbasedonsevenmajorgoldmines,mostofwhich
areownedbyforeignmultinationals(Canadian,Russian,Britishetc)withthegovernmentowning
around10%ofsharesgivingitthefinancialincentivetointerveneonthesideoftheowners.The
challengestheworkersfaceincludecasualisationanddiscriminationinfavourofexpatriateworkers.
Themineshavealsohadadetrimentalimpactonlocalcommunitieswithexpropriationorlowlevelsof
compensationforpeasantland,increasingscarcityofwater,banningofinformalgoldmining,pollution
andthedisruptionoflocallife.
InAugust2012,anewconflictbrokeoutatTaparkomineswhere29workersweredismissedfor
incitingtheircolleaguestodisobedienceafterauniongeneralassemblyagreedtotakea30minute
breakduringtheir10hourshiftsasstipulatedintheircollectivebargainingagreement.Theworkers
wereforciblyexpelledwiththehelpoftheriotpoliceandtheirleadersdismisseddespitethelocal
labourboardrefusingtoacceptthedismissals.
AsinseveralotherAfricancountries(forexample,EgyptandSenegal)oneoftheaspectsofthe
protestsistheuncertaintyoverthefutureofthepresident.Constitutionallyhisterminofficeisdueto
endin2015.IfCompaordoesstanddowntherewillberivalryoverhissuccession,ifnotfurther
socialagitationislikely.However,hismostlikelyopponenthassaid,Iamnotafraidorashamedto
40

Etudenationaleprospective,Burkina2025,rapportgnral,2005.

saythatIamaneoliberaltoday,theworldbelongstousneoliberals.Soevenachangeofpresident
isnotlikelytoseeachangeofthestateseconomicpolicies.
TolSgnon,secretarygeneralofCGTBamajortradeunioncentreexplainedthisproblemsaying 41
WecanreplaceBlaiseCompaorwithsomeoneelsewhowillchoosethesameneoliberal
policies.Inthissense,weneedtodevelopcriticalthoughttowardsthevariouspoliticalforces
thatareattemptingtopresentthemselvesasalternativestothecurrentgovernmentbutwhich,
forthemostpart,sharethebasicfundamentalsoftheneoliberalpoliciesoftheexisting
government.
EveninBurkinaFaso,wherethemajorityofthepeoplestillliveinruralareas,theorganisedworking
classusuallyformthecoreofsocialprotests.Inthefirsthalfof2014,thisincluded:
significantlyincreasedallowancesforpublicsectorworkersfollowingapublicsectorand
teachersstrikeinearlyFebruary.
athreedaysitinattheOuagadougoumunicipalityheadquartersinearlyMay.
onedaystrikebypublicsectorjournalistsinradio,TVandprintinmidJulyoverpayand
againstgovernmentinterference.
Butthelackofanorganisedsocialistoppositionwithaclearviewoftheneedfortheselfemancipation
oftheworkingclass42meansthattheseprotestscanoftenbecontainedwithinthelimitsofcurrent
societyandsodonotresultissignificantimprovementsfortheworkingclassorotherpoorpeople.A
radicalbreakfromneoliberaleconomicpolicieswillonlytakeplaceoncethesugarworkers,gold
miners,teachersandothermembersofthecoreworkingclassareabletousethepowertheyhave
clearlyexercisedtoendtheirexploitationandalienation.Butitneedsthedevelopmentofaclear
socialistorganisationwithmasssupporttofusethepowerofthesmallorganisedworkingclassandthe
poormajorityofthepopulation.

41

LObservateur Paalga (2013) Meeting contre la vie chre : Rviser les salaires et non les articles , 22 July
There is hardly any country in French Africa with a significant Marxist group, however there is a socialist
bulletin produced for French speaking Africans - www.afriquesenlutte.org
42

Conclusions
The ILO estimates that there are around 100million wage earners in subSaharan Africa. Whilst clearly a minority of the population, it may be as
high as quarter of the adult population and so a serious force to be
reckoned with.
The working class in Africa is growing and is well organised but faces the
onslaught of a local ruling class suffering from low productivity, but
supported by the global push to Neoliberalism.
The most recent period since the late 20th Century has seen a return to
limited average per capita economic growth, but this wealth has largely
been grabbed by the economic elite. It will take more sustained struggle
by the growing working class to see a significant reduction in poverty over
the coming decades. The huge working class struggles in recent years
indicated in this chapter show that this is distinct possibility.
However, the subjective element is very weak, so almost universally
organisations of the radical/revolutionary left to the left of the traditional
Communist Parties are non-existant or too small to be effective. But clearly
the opportunity is there with, for example, Economic Freedom Fighters in
South Africa, SDP in Kenya and groups of the IST (Botswana, Ghana,
Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe) or similar (Mauritius, Namibia etc).
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 associated with collapse of so called
communist countries across Eastern Europe and in Russia. In China the
change was just as pronounced, but without a change of regime. These
changes have had a catastrophic effect on the socialist movement
internationally in a comparable way to which the Bolshevik revolution of
1917 had a positive impact:
[T]he aspirations of the masses in all countries and the possibilities
before them are no longer the same as before 1917: the conditions
of politics and economy have changed by the impact of the socialist
revolutions already taking place.43
In December 2008, recognised the objective problems we faced with the
following sober assessment44: Marxism of any kind has had the smallest influence it
has enjoyed since the revolutions of 1848...
This was made worse by significant working class defeats in Britain (the coal miners strike)
and the US (the strike by the air traffic controllers). In sub-Saharan Africa socialists were
more tide to Russia, but the working class, although suffering catastrophic economic collapse
did not suffer the same defeats as the trade unions in Britain and the US. This explains why
the level of strikes is higher now in sub-Saharan Africa than in these countries. So in 2011 I
43

Toyo, Eskor (1981) Primary Accumulation and Development Strategy in a Neo-colonial Economy a
critique of dependence theory and its implications (unpublished paper)
44

Callinicos, Alex (2008) Whats going on? A reply to John Rees, in Special pre-conference Bulletin, December,
SWP : London

have estimated that a South African trade unionist was a 100 times more likely to strike than
their sister or brother in Britain.
But the ideological defeat of the left in Africa has been greater.

Despite their current relative weakness, this level of collective working

class struggles could be fertile ground for the growth of a new radical and
Marxist left. In turn, the development of such a new left could further
strengthen the social movements and especially struggles by the organised
working class. This is the hope for sub-Saharan Africa.
The need to rebuild the orthodox Marxist tradition across sub-Saharan
Africa. This will be based on the power of the working class and provide an
alternative to at best various shades of African nationalism and at worst
various militant religious cults. But this will be built through the collective
action of the trade unions, the working class and other poor people as
demonstrated by the strikes, protests and revolts which have taken place in
Burkina Faso, as in many other places in sub-Saharan Africa over the last
five years or more.