Against The Current The Survival of Authoritarianism in Burma

Against the Current: The Survival of Authoritarianism in Burma
Author(s): Jalal Alamgir

Source: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 3 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 333-350
Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia
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Against the Current:

The Survivalof Authoritarianism
in Burna*
JalalAlamgir
I. INTRODUCTION
THE
LAST TWO DECADES have witnessed an unprecedented growthof

democracy around the world. Freedom House estimates that the
numberof "free"countries,thatis, democracieswithoutseriousviolations
of human rights,has gone up fromthirty
to seventy-six
between 1973 and
the beginning of 1996.1
Burma, however,has gone against the current.In the Pacific Rim,

South Korea and Taiwanhave recentlydemocratized,and so have Burma's
neighbors,Bangladeshand Thailand. India is a democracy,and theworld's
largestone forthatmatter.Burma seems the odd countryout in Southern
Asia. It has been under continuous authoritarianrule since 1962. The
regimehas been isolatedfrommostoftheworld,partlybychoice and partly
by the unwillingnessof manycountries to support the repressivejunta.
Burmese authoritarianismdoes not even have the high economic performance thathas somewhat"legitimized"a fewothernon-democracies,such
as the big power adjacent to it - China. How, then,has authoritarianism
in Burma been able to surviveforso long? This is the question the paper
at hand seeks to answer.
The global wave of democratizationhas inspireda spate of studiesin
the social sciences. Most,however,while underscoringmovementtoward
democracy,usually omit from their inquiry the survivalof monolithic
repressive regimes.2 A more complete understanding of recent
* For their helpful comments on previous drafts,I thank Vikram Chand, Clark Neher, Ansil
Ramsay,Nagesh Rao, Rachel Boynton,and two anonymous reviewersforPacificAffairs.
1 Freedomin theWorld:The Annual SurveyofPoliticalRightsand Civil Liberties1995-96 (New York:
Freedom House, 1996), p. 4.
2 The literature is vast and expanding. Examples are Guillermo O'Donnell
and Philippe C.
Schmitter, TransitionsfromAuthorztarianRule: TentativeConclusions about UncertainDemocracies
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Alfred Stepan, RethinkingMilitaryPolitics
(Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1988); Timothy Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern (New York:
Random House, 1990); Samuel P. Huntington, The ThirdWave:Democratization
in theLate Twentieth
Century(Norman: Universityof Oklahoma Press, 1991); Adam Przeworski,Democracyand theMarket
(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1991); Merle Goldman, SowingtheSeeds ofDemocracyin
China (Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, 1994); Stephan Haggard and Stephen B. Webb, eds.,
Votingfor Reform:Democracy,Political Liberalization, and EconomicAdjustment(New York: Oxford
UniversityPress, 1994); and Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economyof
DemocraticTransitions(Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1995).
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democratization must incorporate findings from countries that have not

democratized. Cuba, North Korea, Libya, Vietnam or Burma can provide
more variabilityfor studies that use democratization as the dependent variable. Other analyses that treat democratization as an independent variable
can use these countries as control cases. This paper aims to contribute to
the overall literature on democratization by exploring the Burma story.
I intend to do that in two stages. The firststage, elaborated in section
II of the paper, is theoretical. By looking at germane theories I identifythe
structural bases that support authoritarianism. I also make an inventoryof
strategies an authoritarian regime can adopt to maintain itself. My definition of authoritarianism is simple: It is a systemthat does not allow regular,
institutionalized changes in government through free elections.
The second stage, contained in section IV, is an examination of Burma
as a case study. Here, based on the theoretical "inventory," I review the
actual survivalstrategiespursued by the Burmese state. The overall method,
thus, is to firstexamine what differenttheories propose as to how an authoritarian regime survives, and then to compare the Burmese experience
against theoretical expectations or hypotheses. The concluding section of
the essay summarizes the findings and offerssome theoretically informed
speculations on the future of Burmese politics.
II. FRAMEWORKOF ANALYSIS:
THESES ABOUT MAINTENANCEOF AUTHORITARIANISM
The central theoretical argument of this essay is that authoritarianism

has both structuraland strategicsources. The long-term basis of the survival
of authoritarianism may be found in structural characteristics, such as tradition and social order, classes, ethnic and religious divisions, ideology
(nationalism, socialism/communism), economic institutions and conditions, and long-term economic performance. These are "structural"
because theyrepresent not human actors per se, but the social, cultural, or
economic arrangement, ordering, or situation in which actors find themselves. I emphasize here social, cultural, and economic, but not political
structure, because I treat the political structure - authoritarianism - as
given. I will argue that the structural base of support for authoritarianism
was put in place in Burma between 1962 and 1988, during Ne Win's rule.
The structuralbase gradually eroded or changed and became more difficult to hold on to by the late eighties. Domestic and international
pro-democracy forces posed strategic
challenges to the regime. These forces,
which represent actors withinthestructure,
include students and the intelligentsia, the clergy,foreign powers, and the media. Our objective will be to
examine how the State Law and Order Restoration - SLORC - regime
responded strategicallyto these forces in the post-1988 period.
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Burma - Against theCurrent
StructuralSourcesofAuthoritarianism
Modernization theorists, starting with Emile Durkheim, Max Weber,
and Talcott Parsons, posit that authoritarianism generally exists in societies that have pre-modern structures,and that it is eventually replaced with
democracy, which is automatic ifthe societal variables, such as value-system,
mode of production, and above all, rationality,have sufficientlyprogressed.
This implies the following theses on the survival of authoritarianism:
Thesis 1: Authoritarianism arises in a pre-modern setting. It will maintain itselfby thwartingmodernization, and by appealing to traditional
values, culture, and religion.
Modernization theory, however, can lead to opposing theses. Neil
Smelser argued that social disturbances accompany modernization, especially in countries that undergo rapid industrialization. In such instances,
there is a functional necessity for a "strong, centralized government."3
Accordingly,
Thesis 2: The structural source of authoritarianism is instability and
dislocation in the context of modernization. An authoritarian regime
claims to maintain order.
Within the Marxist literature, there are two general perspectives on
authoritarianism.First,there is bourgeois authoritarianism,encapsulated as
follows:
Thesis3: An authoritarian regime under capitalism arises to serve the
interestsof capital and to confront organized labor.
The other way authoritarianism can arise is through a socialist revolution, during which, as Marx put it, "the state can be nothing but the
"4
revolutionary
dictatorship
oftheproletariat.
Thesis 4: Authoritarianism arises from/during a revolution in order to
successfullycomplete the transition to a postrevolutionary era.
Neo-Marxist analysis of underdevelopment, especially dependency
theory,proposed the following general hypothesis:5
'Neil Smelser, "Mechanisms of and Adjustments to Change," in T. Burns, ed., IndustrialMan

(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969).
4 Karl Marx, CritiqueoftheGothaProgram,
reprinted in Robert C. Tucker, The Marx-EngelsReader,
2d ed. (New York:W. W. Norton, 1978), p. 630, original italics.And as Engels put it, though a bit sarcastically,"A revolution is certainlythe most authoritarian thing there is," in Friedrich Engels, On
Authority,
reprinted in Tucker, TheMarx-EngelsReader,p. 733.
5A recent application of such a thesis is Dietrich Rueschemeyer, E. H. Stephens, and John D.
Stephens, CapitalistDevelopment& Democracy(Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1992), which
finds the working class as "the most consistent pro-democratic force," and that theirweakness perpetuated authoritarian coalitions between the middle class and the landed aristocracy.Barrington
Moore also highlightsthe antidemocratic nature of the landed gentry.BarringtonMoore,Jr., Social
OriginsofDictatorship
and Democracy(Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). See, in addition, Hamza Alavi, 'The
State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh," NewLeftReview,no. 74 (1972), pp. 59-81;
and Alavi, "India and the Colonial Mode of Production," TheSocialistRegister1975 (London: Merlin,
1975).
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Thesis5: The main structuralroot of authoritarianismin developing
class-basedalliance againsttheworkingclass.
countriesis a transnational
Accordingto Clive Thomas, thereare additional rootsof authoritarianismin developingcountries:"thehighlyfragmented..
.social formations
[of peripheralcountries],combined withtheirmultiracialor multiethnic
populations,encouragethevigorouspromotionofthestateas theprincipal
forceand unifying
unifying
symbolof the society."6
Thesis6: A heterogeneous and underdeveloped settingencourages
authoritarianism.
Repressionis utilizedto promoteand coerce national
unification.
Specialistsstudyingthe "developmentalstate"or "bureaucraticauthoritarianism"point out that when the state embarks on a rapid (usually
export-led)growthroute,a strongauthoritarianregimedominatedbytechnocrats and the militaryis likely to arise, so it can direct capital into
profitablesectors,represswages,and providestability.7
Thesis7: Authoritarianism(bureaucratic-military)
is required forfast
(export-led)growth.The continuityof such regimesrestsupon high
economic performance.
Some of the hypothesissuggestedabove are mutuallyconflictive
and some akin.To minimizeredundancy,theycan be consolidatedinto
fourmain strandsof arguments,as presentedbelow:
TheStructural
BasesofAuthoritarianism:
Modernization
Thesis:Authoritarianism
arises in a pre-modernsetting,
continues throughthe instabilityof industrialization,and appeals to
tradition,culture,and religion.
is based on a transnationalcapitalCapitalismThesis:Authoritarianism
ist alliance, and is necessary to repress labor and promote fast
export-ledgrowth.
SocialismThesis:Authoritarianism
is necessaryto maintainrevolutionary
ideologyand to completesocialisttransformation.
NationalismThesis:Authoritarianismarises in a heterogenous society
and seeks to promote national unityand the strictmaintenance of
order.
6 CliveY. Thomas, TheRiseoftheAuthoritarian

Statein Peripheral
Societies(NewYork: MonthlyReview
Press, 1984), p. 119; also Basil Davidson, TheBlackMan's Burden(NewYork: Times Books, 1992).
7 Guillermo O'Donnell,
Modernizationand BureaucraticAuthoritarianism
(Berkeley: Institute of
InternationalStudies, 1973); Peter Evans, DependentDevelopment:
TheAllianceofMultinational,
Stateand
Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1979); Stephan Haggard, Pathways
fromthePeriphery:The PoliticsofGrowthin NewlyIndustrializingCountries(Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1990).
336

StrategiesofAuthoritarianismagainst Pro-Democracy
Challenges.According
to Samuel Huntington, there were five general threats to authoritarianism
in the seventies and the eighties.8 First dictatorships, mostlyautarkic ones,
faced an economic performance challenge, marked by economic decline
brought on by oil shocks, a decrease in primary commodity prices and the
debt crisis. An authoritarian government might confront these crises in
the following way:
The Economic ReformStrategy:Introduce market-oriented changes in
economic policy, pursue multilateral aid, and promote economic
pluralism.
Second, the postwar economic growth had increased literacy, social
development, and overall income, leading to an empowerment of actors
especially middle-class actors - within the civil society who started to
demand a more open political system.Hence,
ThePoliticalReformStrategy:
Liberalize the polity,that is, open up limited
space for people to vent their grievances.
Huntington also notes "changes in the doctrine and activities of the
Catholic Church," in response to which the state usually undertook
repression of the clergy and the dissemination their ideas.
The Secularism Strategy:Increase repression and emphasize secular
values. (The reverse of this may also be true: Authoritarian regimes confront challenges from pro-secular institutions by emphasizing
religious-fundamentalistvalues.)
In face of the promotion of democracy by external actors, such as the
United States, the USSR, the Vatican, NGOs or multilateral agencies, a
regime may adopt
The International Alliance Strategy:Align with other authoritarian
countries, and emphasize nationalism.
Finally, to counter snowballing, or demonstration effects from one
democratizing country to another, authoritarian regimes tend to restrict
independent communication.
The CensorshipStrategy:Censor media, and suppress communication
with the outside world.
Scope and LimitationsoftheStudy.As intimated, I plan to look at Burma
by breaking its political history into the 1962-88 and 1988-93 periods,
corresponding respectivelyto Ne Win's and SLORC's rule, and to the structural and strategic sources. I evaluate the theses above by firsteliminating
those which clearly do not apply to Burma, and then assessing the extent
to which the others "fit"the Burmese case.
8 Huntington, The ThirdWave.
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The reader may suspect that I have overlooked two quite obvious theses. First,authoritarian regimes surviveby using sheer brute force against all
opposition. This argument, while factual, is tautological, for authoritarian
regimes by definition have to rely on repression. Force by itself does not
explain much; rather,it is used as an essential part of all the survival strategies listed above. No doubt the Burmese regime has been severely
repressive, and the purpose of this essay is to go beyond examining just
repression.
The second obvious thesis is that authoritarian regimes cope with opposition by democratizing. Democratization is one step further than
liberalization; it involves conducting free elections and transferringpower.
But the undertaking of democratization implies the end of authoritarian
rule. Analytically,as such, it is not a survivalstrategy;it is surrender,which is
what we hope to see in Burma some day soon.
III. A BRIEFCHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Burma emerged as a sovereign nation-state in 1948, and until 1958 it
was a parliamentary democracy, crafted along the Indian model of federalism. In 1958, at the request of Prime Minister U Nu, the military chief
General Ne Win temporarily took over power to suppress minorityinsurgency and restore order so that national elections could be held in 1960.
In 1962, U Nu resigned as prime minister because of divisions within his
party,AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League). In the leadership
vacuum Ne Win seized power and established a "Revolutionary Council"
to govern the state under the military,known in Burma as the tatmadaw.
He subsequently banned all political parties and dissent, and organized
Burma as a one-partystate under the BSPP, the Burma Socialist Programme
party.To this end, a new constitution was passed in 1974.
Ne Win ruled until 1988. In April Aung San Suu Kyi, the expatriate
daughter of Aung San, came back to Burma amid growing student demands
for democratization. As a token of liberalization Ne Win resigned in July,
as thousands of students were killed in militaryfiringson demonstrations
between March and September. General Saw Maung took over as the new
ruler of Burma. One-party authoritarianism under the 1974 constitution
was abrogated, and military authoritarianism was established under the
SLORC junta. The next year, Suu Kyi, who became embroiled in the
struggle for democracy, was put under house arrest. SLORC organized
national elections in 1990, in which Suu Kyi's coalition, the National League
for Democracy (NLD) secured overwhelming victory.SLORC, however,has
refused to transferpower, and is stillruling Burma (they changed the country's name from Burma to Myanmar). Only very recently, in July, 1994,
have they released Suu Kyi (now a Nobel laureate) from house arrest, but
they continue to limit her actions.
338

IV. THE SURVIVALOF BURMESE AUTHORITARIANISM
Structural
Sources.Ne Winjustifiedhis ascension to power bystressing
threeexigencies.First,a militarytakeover,he argued,was the onlywayto
National unitywas posed as the forepreventBurma fromdisintegrating.
mostproblemfacingmultiethnicBurma.And itwas notjust sheerrhetoric
- it did have a plausible ringof truthto it.9The dominantethnic group
in Burma is the Burmans,concentratedin the centralvalleyof the river
Irrawaddy.Karens,Shans, Mons, Chins,Arakanese,and numerous other
ethnicminoritiesare scatteredaround the peripheralregion.Considering
thismulticulturalsetting,the originalconstitutionwas based on federalism;it even allowed the opportunityforKarens and Shans to secede from
the union afterten years. Burmese authoritarianismrose amid various
small-scaleethnicinsurgencies,
whichtheregimeup to thepresenttimehas
been tryingto crush.The brutalwaragainstethnicitieshas helped Burmese
regimesto divertattentionawayfromtheireconomic failures.A new constitutionpassed byNe Win in 1974 rejected federalismand emphasized
nationalidentityoverethnicity.
Nationalism was emphasized not only to suppress minoritiesbut to
breed xenophobia as well. Priorto the militarytakeover,the nascentcapitalist class in Burma was composed mostly of Chinese and Indian
merchants,centeredaround Rangoon and otherports.The authoritarian
nationalistrhetoric
ideologywithfiercely
governmentcoupled anticapitalist
in order to wipe out thisexpatriatemerchantclass. Anti-Chineseriotsin
1967 were tacitly(sometimesexplicitly)encouraged,followingfood shortages. As it destroyed entrepreneurship in society, it also reduced
the potentialforeconomic challenges againstauthoritariansignificantly
ism.Up to 300,000settledIndiansand Pakistaniswereestimatedto have left
the countryby 1965. In addition, the regime passed "citizenshiplaws,"
variousprivileges(such as medical school admission)forcitizens
restricting
who cannot prove their Burmese ancestryback to 1823.10English was
banned as a medium of instruction.Continuingin the same vein,SLORC
has repeatedlyportrayedAung San Suu Kyias "soiledblood," because she is
marriedto a Britishcitizen.The Burma case seems to confirmthe thesis
thatvigorouspromotionof nationalismhas been a major ideological base
forauthoritarianregimesin peripheralsocieties.
The desireto establish"socialism"is the second excusewhichtherulers
At takeover,
in Burmahave used in theirestablishmentofauthoritarianism.
9 SeeJosef Silverstein,Burma: MilitaryRule and thePoliticsofStagnation(Ithaca: Cornell University

Press, 1977); and David I. Steinberg, Burma's Road TowardDevelopment:Growthand Ideologyunder
MilitaryRule (Boulder: WestviewPress, 1981), chapters 1 and 2.
10 Mya Maung, Totalitarianismin Burma: Prospects
forEconomicDevelopment(New York: Paragon
Press, 1992), p. 19.
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Ne Win argued that the Revolutionary Council intended to return to
socialism, which he claimed was the original dream of AFPFL (Anti-Fascist
Peoples Freedom League) and Aung San. Until 1988, Burmese authoritarianism directed itselfby an ideology called the "Burmese Way to Socialism."
What made this socialism the BurmeseWay was its compatibilitywithwhat the
regime identified as "traditional values." Its pronouncements were "sufficiently vague.. .but sufficientlyemotive to appeal to public sentiment.""
The Revolutionary Council also published an ideological proclamation entifled TheSystemofCorrelationofMan and His Environment,
which tried to blend
the Marxist notion of dialectics with Buddhist theological concepts about
change.12 In spite of such appeals, the regime, to date, has frequentlyfound
itselfchallenged by the organized Buddhist clergy,the sangha, which I will
examine later. Suffice to say now that the ideological grounding for authoritarian regimes in Burma was found in a blend of the modernization thesis
(appeals to tradition), the socialism thesis, and the nationalism thesis. The
capitalism thesis, however, does not hold in Burma, in stark contrast to its
neighbors of Southeast Asia, such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore.
The regime's socialist and nationalist ideology justified an antimarket
economic structure based on total state command and control. All sectors
of the economy, except agriculture, were nationalized. Industrial
production was vested upon twelve corporations headed by military
appointees. Price, production, and distribution were largely decided centrally. Only in very recent years has the Burmese junta allowed private
investment.In 1988, there were in the entire country only four private firms
with more than 100 employees, compared to 426 state-owned enterprises
of the same size. There were 150 state-owned firms that employed 51-100
workers, compared to just nine private firms.13 The economy is still highly
regulated.
Historically, only one foreign firmwas allowed to operate in Burma; it
was a German company, a purveyor of arms and ammunition. All others
were nationalized between 1962 and 1965. In the late seventies, some foreign investmentwas allowed in the natural resources sector,but only as joint
ventures with the state. Some of the regulations have been withdrawn
recently (I will look at this later), but as a structural factor, multinational
capital has not been present in Burma between 1962 and 1988, so as to
become a long-term support base for authoritarianism. A useful contrast
can be drawn with the "Banana Republics" of Central America.
11Robert Taylor, The Statein Burma (Honolulu: Universityof Hawaii Press, 1987), p. 296.
Silverstein,Burma: MilitaryRule,pp. 80-87.

Wilfried Lfitkenhorst,"Industrial Development and Industrial Policy in Myanmar: Turning
Challenges into Changes," in Mya Than andJoseph L. H. Tan, eds., MyanmarDilemmasand Options
(Singapore: Instituteof Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), p. 175; data fromtable 6.
12
340

Furthermore, Burma has not had a high-trade,high-performance economy. By adopting autarkic "socialism," Ne Win's regime stifled foreign
trade. In the fifties,trade (especially the rice trade) accounted for close to
40 percent of GDP. Between 1970-77, it had come down to 13 percent.14
Burma was one of the world's leading rice exporters in the early twentieth
century, but it is now dependent on food aid. In 1941, Burma's annual
exports of rice amounted to more than 3 million tons; the figure for 199394 was 263,000 tons, a considerable increase from a trough in 1989 at
merely 49,000 tons.15
The Burmese command economy has not experienced sustained high
growth; quite the contrary,it has stagnated substantially.At independence
Burmese leaders boasted about it being one of the richest countries in
Southeast Asia. While its neighbors grew and socially developed rapidly,
data indicate that the Burmese standard of living declined. In 1961, the
average urban Burmese spent 48 percent of his/her income on food; in
1976, theyhad to spend 79 percent, indicative of a large decrease in living
standards.16 In 1993 dollars, Burmese per capita GDP was $1060 in 1980 at
the officialrate of exchange (which translatesinto a meager $43 at the black
market rate - the real value lies somewhere in between); it declined to
$906 by 1993, and is projected to be $833 by the year 2000, if the current
economic and demographic trends continue. Between 1980-93, the average annual real growth rate of GDP/capita has been -1.2 percent, and the
annual growth rate of total real GDP has been 0.9 percent.17 In view of the
the consistent decline, the United Nations in 1987 declared Burma one of
the least developed countries in the world.
The appeal to socialism, the bedrock of Ne Win's economic planning,
was accompanied by the setting up of councils for workers and peasants in
order to lend formal credence to the notion that the state is acting for their
benefit. Ne Win's government established a nationwide Workers' council,
though the council does not have much decision-making power. Ne Win
himself attended council meetings to impress upon urban workers that he
represented their cause. Stagnation and scarcity,however, led to growing
labor unrest, strikes,and demonstrations, which were put down brutally.
A critical,and prudent (from the viewpoint of the regime) decision was
to not nationalize agriculture. Some token land reformswere undertaken to
rid the agrarian structure of some large landlords. By and far,though, the
regime kept the peasantry relatively free from collectivization. Whereas
the state effectivelycontrolled all industrial production, 94 percent of
agricultural production was still in private hands in 1985.18 This was critiTaylor,The State in Burma, p. 344.
Far East and Australasia 1996 (London: Europa Publications, 1996), p. 644.
16
These statisticsare fromSteinberg,Burma's Road, p. 78 and table 5.1.
17UNCTAD, Least Developed Countries 1995 Report (NewYork: United Nations, 1995), p. A-3.
14
15
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agricultural production was stillin private hands in 1985.18 This was critical
because it did not alienate the peasantry in an economic settingwhere the
majority of the population was employed in agriculture. Even in 1990-92,
about 70 percent of the labor force was agrarian.'9 Ne Win's regime, in addition, formed a Peasants' Council, based on which the state could claim
that the peasantry, representing most of the population, played a greater,
and direct, role in the polity. However, the government was the only legal
buyer in the agricultural market,and it siphoned enormous amounts of surplus value off the peasantry by setting prices that did not reflect demand
conditions, seasonal characteristics,and the cost-structureof production.20
By involving both workers and farmers into formal state organizations,
the regime's corporatist strategywas successful in securing crucial allies
against the better-educated urban-based opposition. Further, in the early
years the Revolutionary Council did not face much opposition from either
domestic groups or foreign observers, as people had generally positive
memories of the two years of Ne Win's (authoritarian) rule (1958-60)
within a constitutional government.21 The militaryinitially registered the
support of the Burmese urban workers by creating animosity toward the
Chinese and Indian merchant class. Its Workers' Council and Peasants'
Council proved helpful in forging links with the majority of the population until the seventies. In 1972, Ne Win and other top brass resigned from
the military,so that theybegan to appear as civilians, heading a trulysocialist program under a comprehensive workers-peasants party.The party had
affiliate organizations for the youth, so as to contain - ultimately a futile
effort- ominous political inclinations of students. These organizations
were not successful in the urban areas. The BSPP, (Burma Socialist
Programme Party) as in many East European one-party states, was not a
channel through which opposition could voice serious grievances, though
it was effective for a while in keeping parts of the rural populace busy in
various organizational activities.
The constitution passed in 1974, which formally gave power to a
"People's Assembly" with Ne Win as the president, was a good exercise in
public relations for the regime. For three years during its drafting,fifteen
committees toured the countryside to garner people's opinion on it, and
about 17,000 local "task groups" were formed to discuss it and suggest
modifications. Ne Win argued that this was the only way to drafta constitution, and that the earlier one was made by "lawyersand politicians" removed
from the "people."22 Thus, in addition to organizing workers' and peasants'
groups, Ne Win's populist stance sought a direct alliance with "the people."
8 Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 351.
9 UNDP, Human Development Report 1994 (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1994), p. 163.
20 See Mya Maung, The Burma Road to Poverty(New York: Praeger, 1991), chapters 6-7.
21 Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 291.
22
Ibid., p. 307-10.
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Burma- AgainsttheCurrent
As economic stagnation became deep rooted in the seventies,the
regimebegan to solicitnew allies. The governmentoverlooked the black
market,which allowed a good number of people to trade and to earn a
livelihood outside of regulated auspices.23When student-and clergy-led
oppositionmountedin the eighties,the regimesoughtthe supportofvarious ethnicgroupswithwhomtheyhad finallymanaged to come to ceasefire
agreements.It is importantto note thatthe regime's supportbase in the
civilsocietyhas not been constant,partlybecause it could not perform
economically,and hence could not create a group of economic beneficiaries independent of the military.Both Ne Win and SLORC have relied
as itsmain base ofsupport.Theyhave procuredhardmostlyon themilitary
ware for the soldiers and pursued ethnic wars to keep them busy,while
installing military commanders to oversee almost every significant
economic and politicalorganization.
Sources.
The Burmesejunta has been brutalin dealingwithproStrategic
democracy demonstrations.Immediately after the takeover,the army
occupied Rangoon University,
killed hundreds,and blew up the Students
Union Building,whichwas a historicsymbolof resistance.Again,in 1974,
thearmymassacreduniversity
students,and in 1988 theykilledabout three
thousand,accordingto an estimatebyFreedomHouse.24Collegeswereshut
downforthreeyearsafterwards.
Facing severerepression,at leastten thousand studentsfled the cities to the Thai border. Rangoon Universityand
affiliated
technicaland medicalschoolsremainclosed. Almosteverydaythe
police, on a varietyof pretexts,round up and detain politicallyactive
students.
The power of both studentsand the sangha(the Buddhistclergy)was
augmentedafterSuu Kyibegan to use the regime'sownweapon againstit.
She argued thatdemocracy,checks and balances, and human rightsare
compatiblewithBuddhismas wellas withBurmesetraditions;in herwords,
"itis a puzzlementto theBurmesehow conceptswhichrecognizetheinherent dignityand the equal and inalienable rightsof human beings...canbe
inimical to indigenous values."25
The sangha (i.e., the Buddhist clergy), has played a central role in
organizingoppositionto theregime,since all politicalpartieswerebanned
in 1964.The strategy
ofbothNe Win and SLORC has been to simplyrepress
23
Steinberg,Burma'sRoad, p. 169.
24Freedom
in theWorld,1993-1994, pp. 174-76; see also Amnesty
InternationalReport1989 (London:
AmnestyInternational Publications, 1989), pp. 165-68. Amnestyestimates that over one thousand
were killed between March and September of 1988. Bertil Lintner, Outrage: Burma's Strugglefor
Democracy
(London and Bangkok: White Lotus, 1990), and Maung, Totalitarianism,
chapter 2, discuss
in detail the student revoltsof 1988.
25 Aung San Suu Kyi, "In Quest of Democracy," in Freedom
fromFear and OtherWritings(London:
Viking, 1991), p. 175. See alsoJosef Silverstein, "The Idea of Freedom in Burma and the Political
Thought of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,"PacificAffairs,
vol. 69, no. 2 (1996), pp. 211-28.
343

PacificAffairs
such organization. Immediately after seizing power, the Revolutionary
Council asked all monks to register with the government, which they
refused to do.26 The Buddha Sasana Council, a large religious organization,
was dissolved in 1962. On numerous occasions soldiers have fired upon
demonstrations by monks. They have invaded monasteries and pagodas to
cleanse the clergy of "political" elements. In October 1990, for instance,
over three hundred monks were arrested during a violent crackdown on the
clergy; most are still in detention.27 After coming to power, SLORC dissolved all organizations of the sangha, except nine that it considers apolitical
"legal sects."28The role of the Buddhist clergy is parallel to the role played
recently by the Catholic Church, and the response of the regime has also
been parallel.
The statedjustification withwhich the regime has cracked down on students and the sangha is simple and obvious: the need to preserve law and
order. In order to do that, the Revolutionary Council abrogated the constitution, as has been customary for most coups d'etat. Meetings of more than
five people were banned and SLORC derived its acronym from a claimed
responsibility to restore law and order. It is this rationale that also fed its
counterinsurgency wars against various ethnic groups, and against students
and intellectuals. The army is the mainstay of SLORC's strategic survival;
therefore,massive resources are channeled into the defense sector. The militarybudget has increased dramatically since SLORC's takeover,risingfrom
less than $100 million in 1988 to close to $1 billion in 1994. The figure
puts the country, which ranks (1994-95) one hundred and thirtieth in
human development, at the thirty-seventhplace in the world in defense
expenditure. Among the forty-sevenLeast Developed Countries (LDC's as
categorized by the United Nations), Burma has the largest military,the
highest militaryspending, and is the second-largest importer of arms (after
Yemen). Its militaryexpenditure is more than twice its combined spending
on education and health, the worst record in Asia.29 It is patently obvious
that the primacy of the militaryat the expense of social development translates into severe repression.
To complete the strictpreservation of law and order and to infuse the
societywith its ideologies, the state suppressed all media. Communication is
further inhibited because of the country's fragile infrastructure and
26
27
165.
Silverstein,Burma: MilitaryRule,pp. 97-100.

For a description see Lintner, Outrage.The statisticsare fromFreedomin theWorld1995-96, p.
Maung, Totalitarianism,
p. 185.
The statisticsare from UNDP, Human DevelopmentReport1994, p. 34; US Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, WorldMilitaryExpendituresand ArmsTransfers1995 (Washington, DC: US
Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 42-43; and Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI) webpage at the following URL: http://www.sipri.se/projects/Milex/expenditure/Myanmar.html,October 7, 1996.
28
29
344

facilities.Burma had in 1990 only 0.2 TV sets on average for every 100 people. Compare that to its neighbors India (3.2) or Thailand (11.4). TV and
radio broadcast, needless to say, are under state control. International
phone charges are prohibitive at $5 a minute and higher. SLORC has
banned unauthorized possession of a computer with internet facilities. In
June 1996,James Nichols, honorary consul for Norway and diplomatic representative for Denmark, Finland, and Switzerland, died in prison, serving
a three-year sentence for the "unauthorized use of a fax machine."30 The
junta created a massive propaganda ring under the Ministryof Information.
There have been only two newspapers, one in Burmese and one in English,
both published by the state. Foreign reporters are routinely prohibited
from the country. Combined with these constrictive policies, the regime's
autarkic stance and superpower-neutralityhave helped keep many of its misdeeds in relative darkness. The overall situation validates my thesis that the
authoritarian response to pro-democracy influence from abroad is to curb
independent communication. Despite these efforts,however, Burmese prodemocracy activists were encouraged by the events in the Philippines,
China, Thailand, and elsewhere, as well as the international attention following Suu Kyi's winning the Nobel Prize in 1991. Amnesty International
launched a global campaign for democracy in Burma in 1991, and the U.N.
Human Rights Commission also started monitoring human rightsviolations
of the SLORC regime.
Faced with sustained economic stagnation and serious political challenges, SLORC had to undertake some political liberalization measures as a
strategic response, especially after its 1988 massacres. National elections
were held in 1990, yet politicians were not allowed to speak or rally against
SLORC (Order 3/89). In spite of SLORC's efforts,the National League
for Democracy (NLD), led by Suu Kyi, won a landslide victory,capturing
87.7 percent of the 485 seats. SLORC, however, refused to transferpower;
instead, they reverted to terrorizingthe political opposition.
SLORC has pursued a dual strategy: (1) to delay as far as possible the
transferof power, and (2) to crush opposition political leaders to the extent
that they either give up or are subdued. The regime has been fairly
successful on the firstcount. Its pretext has been to argue that power can be
transferredonly aftera "perfectconstitution" is drafted. To this end, in 1993
SLORC selected 699 people to form a national convention to draft a
constitution. Out of the delegates, only 90 were from the NLD. These members were "handpicked," so that theywere mostly sympathetic to SLORC's
needs; a lot of them from ethnic groups that have recently signed ceasefire agreements with SLORC. Although opposition MPs were a minorityin
30 TV statisticsare fromUNDP, Human Development

Report1994, p. 161. The Nichols storyis covered in Financial Times,October 5, 1996, p. 1.
345

PacificAffairs
this body, they managed to garner support in the convention so as to delay
the passing of the constitution. The constitution,which is now in the fourth
year of drafting,is basically another means of legitimizing authoritarianism.
It reserves a quarter of the seats in the parliament for members of the
armed forces. It stipulates that the president of the country must have had
military experience, must not be married to a foreigner, and must have
lived in Burma for twentyyears - all this obviously directed against Suu Kyi.
However, Suu Kyi's NLD withdrewfrom the convention in November 1995,
faced with these unacceptable, and indeed petty,stipulations. SLORC took
advantage of this withdrawal by indicating next April that it considered the
1990 legislature no longer valid because voter preferences and composition
of the electorate had changed in the six years since election. The final move
came in June, 1996, when the junta passed a law prohibiting disruptions in
draftingthe constitution.
The second strategyhas not worked as well. Suu Kyi was under house
arrest from 1989 to July 1995, but this has only increased her popularity.
Other opposition MPs have been terrorized since the elections. In May of
NLD members were imprisoned on "treason" charges, and
1991, forty-eight
the militaryhas recentlyindicated that Suu Kyi is also verging on "treason."
In May 1996, about 260 NLD demonstrators were persecuted and arrested,
and in September, the junta cracked down on a pro-democracy rally and
arrested 583 people. Apart from breaking up demonstrations, almost every
day SLORC picks random pretexts to detain and incarcerate opposition
members with charges such as "holding foreign currency,""making videos,"
or "driving dangerously." Most often the penalty exceeds a year in prison.
Overall, however, the opposition, including many "handpicked" members
of the convention, has remained firm against SLORC, though divided
within itself.
Economic policy changes came in the seventies in the wake of prolonged stagnation. The junta, in response, opened up trade, and, in dire
need of funds, agreed in 1976 to the establishment of the Burma Aid
Group, mobilized by the World Bank to provide multilateral economic assistance. In 1977, the regime passed the "Right to Private Enterprise Law,"
which allowed small-scale private economic activity. The government
announced that between 1988 andJuly 1994, about 3,815 private limited
companies, 311 foreign companies, and 974 partnerships were registered.31
The regime sought foreign investment,particularlyin exploiting minerals,
oil, and gas - natural resources that the state can claim and control easily.
The policy has strengthened since SLORC came to power. According to
government statistics (which are always suspect), foreign companies have
31
Asia 1995 Yearbook(Hong Kong: Review Publishing Company, 1995), p. 97.
346

invested$5.35 billion since SLORC's takeoverthroughthe end of 1996.32

The largestrecent investmentis by Unocal and Total, twooil companies
that plan to build a pipeline from an offshoresite through Burma to
Thailand. If liberalizationfostersprivatecompetitionand createsa robust
group of entrepreneurs,it mayultimatelyhelp undermine the economic
base of SLORC. However,the processof negotiationsseem to indicatethat
liberalization has resulted in cartels and monopolies that would only
strengthenstate power. Many of the larger investmentsare made in
collaborationwithcompanies thatare eitherrun or owned bythe military
top brass. It is for thisreason thatSuu Kyihas repeatedlyasked foreign
companiesnot to invest.
Some countries of the West have responded. The EC has an arms
embargo on Burma, and partial U.S. trade sanctionshave been in place
since 1988. The White House is also contemplatingbanning new investment in Burma. Some investors,including Macy's, Eddie Bauer, Liz
Claiborne, Levi Strauss,Disney,Heineken, Carlsberg,and, most comprehensively,Pepsico, have withdrawnfromthe country.U.S. cities such as
San Francisco,Oakland, Berkeley,Ann Arbor,and Madison, as well as the
State of Massachusettsbar contractingcompanies to have business ties to
Burma. Most donors, including the World Bank and Asian Development
Bank,have suspended aid.
The regime'srelationswithitsneighbors,however,have been a source
of constantsupport,especiallysince itsforeignpolicyrejectedboth dominant powersof the cold war.Burmese leaders have consistently
stirredup
ofboththeWesternand theSovietvarieties.Until
ideas againstimperialism,
the seventies,Burma maintained a foreignpolicy equidistantfromboth
poles. Burmese rulerseven withdrewthe countryfromthe Non-Aligned
Movementin 1979, arguingthatthe associationhad lost itsoriginalgoals.
Economicallyand socially,Burmabecame insulatedfromtheoutsideworld.
The U.N. operation in Burma has been quite small, compared to other
NGOs have been allowed
developingnations,and since 1962,no significant
to operate there.33
The relativeabsence of European powersin Burma,however,was compensated forby its large neighbor,China, and the space leftbyWestern
investorsis taken up by those fromthe newlyindustrializingcountriesof
Asia. China and Burma became closer in the eighties,when both began to
be condemned in theWestfortheirhuman rightstransgressions,
especially
in the wake of the studentmassacresin Rangoon (1988) and Tiananmen
Square (1989). FurthertieswithChina developed because it was a cheap
AP Wire Service, "Burma Groups Call forTalks,"January16, 1997, 2:02 PM EST.
See Chi-shad Liang, Burma's ForeignRelations: Neutralismin Theoryand Practice (New York:
Praeger, 1990); Clark D. Neher, SoutheastAsia in theNew InternationalEra (Boulder, CO.: Westview
Press, 1991), chapter 9.
32
33
347

PacificAffairs
and fairlydependable source of armsneeded forthe Burmesemilitary:in
1993 the twocountriesconcluded a U.S.$1.2 billion arms deal to be carriedout forthecomingfewyears.34
China suppliedarmsworth$300 million
out of the total $370 million thatBurma spent on arms importsduring
1992-94.35Additionally,the border provinces of China could utilize the
Burmeseblackmarketto sell theircommodities.36
withtheofficial
Recently,
opening of border trade, China has become one of the largest trading
partnersof Burma. The followingtable listsBurma's threelargesttrading
partners.
TABLE 1.
LARGESTTRADINGPARTNERSOF BURMA,1992 DATA
Importsfrom(US$ millions)
1. Singapore
2. China
3. Japan
325.4
284.3
106.1
Exportsto (US$ millions)

1. China
2. Singapore
3. India
119.1
89.1
51.2
Source: Far East &Australasia 1996 (London: Europa Publications,1996),

p. 649.
Burma has maintained cordial relations with other authoritarian
regimesof SoutheastAsia. Thailand (even ifit'sa democracynow) has been
a largeand long-timeinvestorin Burma,extractingteak,minerals,and fisheries on concessional termswiththe Burmese militaryelite. Gun-runners
based in Singapore have been centralin supplyingarms to the tatmadaw.
Asian multinationalssuch as Nissan,Daewoo, and Mitsuihave recentlyset
up large investments.Most of all, ASEAN (Associationof SoutheastAsian
Nations) has provided ideological support to Burmese authoritarianism,
in contrastto the European Community'srole in encouragingdemocratization in Europe. ASEAN has rejected American and European calls to
impose sanctionson Burma,and has assured the regimethatitwould not
meddle in whatit considersthe "internalaffairsof Myanmar,"and would
instead"constructively
engage" thejunta in dealingwithdomesticpolitics.37
In 1995, Burmajoined ASEAN's TreatyofAmityand Cooperation,seen as
the firststep towardeventualfullmembership.The organizationrecently
indicated that Burma would soon be admitted, along with Laos and
Cambodia.
3'John Badgley, "Myanmar in 1993: A Watershed Year," Asian Survey,vol. 34, no. 2 (1994), pp.
153-59.
35 WorldMilitaryExpenditures
and ArmsTransfers
1995, p. 155.
36 Chi-shad Liang, Burma'sForeign
Relations,chapter 5.
37JosefSilverstein,"Burma in an International Perspective,"Asian Survey,
vol. 32, no. 10 (1992),
pp. 951-63.
348

Japanand Australia,the twocountriesin theregionclosestto European

and NorthAmericandemocraticideals, have disappointedpro-democracy
in theirpolicytowardBurma.Japanhas been supportingSLORC. It
activists
was the firstcountryto recognizeSLORC in 1989, and it has also resumed
its aid program, saying that aid would benefit the average Burmese.
Australia's policy is to "neither discourage nor encourage" trade with
Burma.It has ruled out imposingeconomic sanctionsagainstthe regime.
V. CONCLUSIONS: THE FUTURE OF BURMESE AUTHORITARIANISM
basisforauthoritarianism
in Burmawas put in
The long-term
structural
place duringNe Win'srule,roughlybetween1962 and 1988. Itwasbased on
severerepressionjustifiedin termsofnationalism,socialism,and appeals to
bythestate
cultureand tradition.The economywas controlledsubstantially
and itsmilitaryofficers.The agrarianstructurewas kept unchanged so as
to not alienatethepeasantry,
whichcomprisesthemajorityofthepopulace.
In response to pro-democracychallenges since 1988, SLORC has acted
brutallyagainstthe studentsand the clergywheneverpossible,and at other
timeshas teased witheconomic and politicalliberalization,whichusually
have been modestin scope. It continuesto suppressmedia and findsinternationalsupportin otherauthoritarianpowers,especiallyin the region.
Based on the theoriesand findings,what can thisessaysay about the
in Burma? Given the nationwideopposition,it
futureof authoritarianism
does notseem reasonableto expectthatauthoritarianism
in Burmawillsurviveindefinitely
into thefuture.There are twopossibilities.The firstoption
is a totalwithdrawalof the army,and the establishmentof a Western-style
liberal democracy.The chances forthisseem remote,however,given the
military'sclout and the gargantuanproportionof resources thatit commands.The second possibility
is inferior,
yetlooks more likely.Burma may
move towardwhatClark Neher has dubbed an Asian-style
democracy,evidentin theASEAN nations.38This means thattherewould be a strongstate
and strongmilitarypresence,alongside a relatively
weak legislaturepopularly and fairlyelected. There is ample regional support for such an
outcome. In 1993, delegates from forty-nineAsian countries met in
Bangkok and reviewedthe UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights.They
reached thefollowingconclusion,proclaimedas the BangkokDeclaration:
" [F] undamentalfreedomssuch as speech, press,and the rightto democraticallychange one's governmentare not inalienable, but mustinstead be
considered in the context of...national and regional particularitiesand
varioushierarchical,religiousand culturalbackgrounds."39
vol. 34, no. 11 (1994), pp. 949-61.
Clark Neher, "Asian StyleDemocracy," Asian Survey,
Quoted in Charles Grawbow, "Asia: The Authoritarian Challenge," in Freedomin theWorld
1993-94, pp. 41-49.
38
39
349

PacificAffairs
In eithercase, thecrafting
ofdemocracyin Burmawillbe influencedby
Suu Kyi'sstrategicstance.Her optionshave been constrainedbythe Peace
Prize, and thejunta realizes,presumablywithrelief,thatshe willrestrain
her supportersand hot-bloodedstudentsfromconfronting
the regimeviolently.This stanceof NLD has been beneficialto SLORC's survival,at least
to the extent that Suu Kyi's politics are predictable to the junta.
Democratizationin Eastern Europe, or in South Asian countriessuch as
Bangladesh and Pakistan,bycontrast,was accomplishedduringperiods of
considerable uncertainty.In their last days, the Ershad regime in
Bangladesh,the Marcos governmentin the Philippinesand the Ceausescu
dictatorshipin Romania hardlyknewwhatto expect,werenot preparedto
act coherently,and could not musterenough forcesto counter the prodemocracyturmoil.The politicsof NLD, on the other hand, suggestthat
the change towarddemocracyin Burma would probablybe long drawn
out and is likelyto be accomplished through negotiations rather than
througha directoverthrowby mass mobilization.And veryimportantly,
the demise of Burmese authoritarianism
is predicatedon at least the neuifnot the support,of regional actorstowardthe movementagainst
trality,
SLORC. Probablysensingthis,SLORC announced in Declaration1/90 that
itslegitimacydid not come fromthe people but from"thefactthatitwas
accepted as the governmentof Burma bythe UN" and theworldat large.40
SLORC's internationaleconomic positionwillnot be affectedmore unless
ASEAN imposes an embargo, which is unlikely.Democratizationwill be
achievedpeacefullyifChina holds back itsmilitary
supportto thejunta,just
in faceofdemocraticmobilizationin
as theSovietUnion exercisedrestraint
Eastern Europe. That maynot be forthcomingtillChina itselfliberalizes
itspolity.
BrownUniversity,
Providence,
RI, U.S.A.February,
1997
40 Silverstein, "Burma in an International Perspective," p. 952. Suu Kyi has recently asked the
United Nations to vacate the Burmese seat in the organization, so that SLORC cannot claim international acceptance of its role.
350


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