Chapter 8

Theories of Deterrence, Arms Control and Strategic Stability.

Deterrence evolved historically in tandem with events of the cold war. (Discuss).
Nuclear deterrence was at the heart of international strategic theory during Cold War.
Since then attention has focused upon conventional deterrence. This new focus includes
weapons of mass destruction.
The use of the term deterrence arose in the Cold War. Prior to this Benthams utilitarian
notion of deterring actors via punishment for misdeeds was the closest historical
equivalent to the concept. Deterrence theory accords well with realism. Consists of both
carrots as well as sticks. (Discuss.) Nuclear weapons led to need to prevent (deter)
wars as opposed to winning them. Deterrence evolved in stages (waves per jervis).
1945-49 containment was US policy. In 1949 the USSR exploded an atomic bomb. In
1950 Korean War broke out. Non-nuclear, limited war strategy was emphasized.
Doctrine of nuclear sufficiency evolved under Eisenhower (1953-1961). Credibility of
threat/counterthreat was crucial. Several axioms emerged:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

Nuclear weapons exist to prevent nuclear and major conventional war.

They cant prevent civil wars, guerrilla insurgencies and etc.
They require constant, costly, technological innovation (discus).
Deterrence is as much a psychological as it is a military concept.
To be effective deterrent capability cant be kept secret.
Deterrence and defense are distinct but closely related concepts (discuss).

Ultimate result was strategy of mutual assured destruction. Deterrence theory assumes
that the parties to a conflict are fundamentally rational. A paradox arises because actually
carrying out a strategy of mutual assured destruction (MAD) seems fundamentally
irrational. Also: as military technology became more complex the uncertainties
surrounding its usage rose rapidly. This had the effect of making rational calculation ever
harder. Some analysts such as Jervis questions deterrences central premise by asserting
that decision-makers were not necessarily rational. Also questioned was the assumption
that both sides saw the game exactly the same way.
Procedural rationality (normal rationality) versus instrumental rationality (abnormal
but internally self-consistent rationality (Hitler, Bin-Laden) compared and contrasted.
(Discuss.)
Deterrence versus compellance (define).
Controllability of nuclear (e.g. prospects for a limited nuclear war not spinning out of
control). (Discuss.)
Nuclear deterrence did not eliminate the need for a conventional defense as well.
General deterrence versus imminent deterrence (Morgan). (Discuss & define). Huth &
Russet used Morgans definition of imminent deterrence (one side is at least

seriously considering an attack, while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order
to prevent it.) They identified 54 such cases occurring between 1900 and 1980. In 31
(57%) of the cases, deterrence was found to have succeeded. Other researchers cast
doubts on these findings however.
Disarmament , arms control, and deterrence (Discuss.)
Post-Cold War deterrence (Discus.)
Terrorism (Discuss at length.) Per Betts now less danger of complete annihilation but
more danger of mass destruction. Threats arise from:
1) Non-state affiliated (independent) groups
2) Rouge state sponsored groups.
Nuclear weapons are seen as being likely to form central core of deterrence well into the
21st century. Effects of new technologies? (Discuss.)