A Self-Reliant Defense

Posture (SRDP) roadmap

and a DARPA-equivalent
Tweet

2
This page has been shared 2 times. View these Tweets.

Like

210 people like this.

In 2013, the Self-Reliant Defense Posture (SRDP) program an ongoing

albeit lackadaisical effort to create an indigenous defense industry saw
the most tangible display of high-level support in recent decades, when
the Department of National Defense committed significant resources to the
modernization of the Government Arsenal (GA), and facilitated the
organization of the Defense Industries Association of the Philippines
(DIAP). Both actions came on the heels of the successful entry into
Philippine Navy service of a series of indigenously constructed marine
vessels: The BRP Tagbanua (AT-296), the largest locally manufactured
warship in history, and three Multi-Purpose Assault Craft (MPAC) Mk.II,
arguably the fastest ships in the fleet. Both joined the fleet a year earlier.

The year also saw the operational use C-130 #3633, the first Philippine Air
Force Hercules transport aircraft to undergo Programmed Depot
Management careof the 410th Maintenance Wing. It was an achievement
many hoped would herald a new era in improved Hercules availability all
by Filipino hands.

Prospects for SRDP looked more promising in 2013 than it had ever been
in recent years. But would it really last?
SRDP history shows that the Philippines neither lacks the imagination nor
the talent to initiate domestic weapons production. However that same
account also shows a long track record of failure to sustain such efforts.
While the aforementioned recent SRDP developments showed a promising
change in institutional outlook towards self-sufficiency, a change in the
status quo will require more than a mere high-level peek into the current
state of local-manufacture. This bump in interest must be institutionalized
if it is ever to achieve any lasting effects.
Towards this end, the Philippines needs to establish an SRDP roadmap
that clearly defines the following:
The key defense articles that the Philippines needs to produce on it own
to achieve its security goals
Among the above-mentioned articles, which does the government intend
to produce by itself and which ones will it farm out to Philippine
industry
Before local industry commits the capital and resources necessary to
research, develop, and eventually manufacture goods for the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), it needs to understand the nature of the
demand. Without this, the pool of willing entrepreneurs will be slim at best
. . . if not non-existent.
What we need to produce ourselves
SRDP sought to protect the country from geopolitically motivated
disruptions in the supply of defense material, as well as to allow local
industry and labor to benefit from defense expenditure. The AFP spends
billions of pesos to both acquire new equipment and maintain existing
ones. Unless local industry learns to satisfy these needs itself, all these
funds would be destined for foreign vendors. SRDP was supposed to
control this foreign-currency hemorrhage and help keep funds in-country.
The ability to pursue this program has been hampered by a multitude of
factors: funding, lack of an industrial base, etc.. However, even if these
prevailing limitations were addressed, the programs objective shouldnt be
to completely eliminate importation of all defense equipment from foreign
sources.

Very few countries actually design and/or manufacture every single

defense article entirely on their own. Even the United States, for all its
wealth and manufacturing capacity, still has its soldiers uniforms
manufactured in eastern Europe and Asia. The official sidearm of the US
Army is Italian: the M9 Barreta. Its standard Squad Automatic Weapon
(SAW) and Medium Machine Gun (GPMG) are Belgian in origin: the
M249 and M240 respectively, both built by Fabrique Nationale
Manufacturing, Inc. (The latter replaced the iconic M60 machine gun) The
UH-72 Lakota Light Utility Helicopter that recently entered service with the
Army as a replacement for the UH-1 Huey and the OH-58 Kiowa is
manufactured by Eurocopter. The most powerful military force in the
world accepts the practicality and cost effectiveness of foreign solutions for
their troops. A defense-spending fact that shouldnt be lost upon SRDP
advocates.
There are two main reasons for continuing to import items, both of which
allow the AFP to acquire equipment in the most efficient and cost-effective
manner:
Time to deploy
Economies of scale
Time-to-deploy
Decades of under-investment in national defense means that the AFP is in
such a dire state that many of the items on the AFP modernization list are
critical pieces of equipment that cannot be delayed by protracted
development times. The militarys principal concerns are time-do-deploy
and reliability. Acquiring off-the-shelf and proven equipment means that
they can field weapon systems to the troops in the shortest possible time
and with the confidence that the systems will work as advertised and as
proven by other users around the world.
Off-the-shelf products can be deployed significantly faster than something
that still needs to make the transition from the drawing board to the field.
Take for example the largest military vessel produced by local industry for
the Philippine Navy to date: the 51-meter BRP Tagbanua Landing Craft
Utility (LCU). From bid initiation, to design definition, to actual delivery,
this project took six years to complete. In contrast, Daewoo shipyard can
complete an entire 122 meter Makassar class LPD in only four months
using pre-existing designs.
Time-to-deploy considerations arent unique to the Philippines. Even the

Peoples Republic of China isnt immune to such concerns, which is why

they are still buying Russian engines for their vaunted new-generation
aircraft instead of waiting for their design bureaus to perfect their designs.
How can time-to-deploy considerations be balanced with inevitable delays
caused by development? Read on.
Economies of scale
Contrary to a sentiment popular amongst defense-commentators, incountry production will not automatically translate to lower cost of
equipment. Setting up of industries is neither cheap nor easy. Acquisition
of capital equipment and plant facilities where none existed before is a
very financially intensive affair. All of those costs will have to be passed on
to the buyer and unless the equipment is purchased in quantity, whatever
is produced domestically could become the most expensive items of its
kind in the world. (See older article about supply-and-demand). When
buying equipment from foreign sources that are already ongoing concerns,
one not only benefits from pre-existing infrastructure and experience, but
also an existing global customer base that allows the vendor to spread out
the cost of production resulting in lower per-unit costs.
Ultimately, SRDP program managers must be selective about what is
produced locally. A balance between self-reliance and fiscal responsibility
must be struck all without compromising the AFPs modernization
efforts. A proposal for how to do this will be discussed later in this article.
Government-Private sector synergy: Who produces what?
Central to the DNDs ongoing efforts to reviving SRDP is the modernization
of the Government Arsenal. The primacy of the Arsenal as an SRDP engine
is affirmed in issuances such as Executive Order 303, Series of 2004
which states:
SECTION 1. Sourcing the Government Munitions Requirements. The AFP,
PNP, and other government agencies are hereby directed to source their
small arms ammunition and such other munitions requirements as may be
available from the Government Arsenal;
To this end, the arsenal has increased production to levels that have now
surpassed its previous output record of 20 million rounds set in 1978.
Production for 2013 exceeded 23 million rounds. It is worth noting that the

arsenal achieved this volume with its existing aging equipment. Much of
the arsenals ongoing modernization efforts revolve around replacement or
supplementation of existing equipment with state-of-the-art equivalents.
Such as the new production line from Waterbury Farrel which will be
dedicated to the production of M193/M855 5.56mm rounds. This and other
new machines promise even more strides in production capacity thus
allowing the GA to satisfy the routine ammunition needs of both the AFP
and Philippine National Police (PNP).

The GAs activities, however, do not end with ammunition production. With
the creation of the Small Arms Repair and Upgrade Division (SARUD), the
Arsenal has begun providing the AFP with small arms refurbishment
services bringing unserviceable rifles back to operational status. The
SARUD is a key step towards the re-establishment of a small arms
manufacturing capability back to the arsenal complex. A function that was
lost when the martial-law era Elisco Tool stopped production of Philippinemade M-16s.
The growth in the arsenals capabilities, however, presents potential
private sector SRDP players with an interesting quandry: Will the business
I setup eventually run into conflict with the GAs offerings? Solution: An
SRDP roadmap.
A roadmap for SRDP
An SRDP roadmap would show where government agencies like the
Government Arsenal growth are headed, thus allowing defense
entrepreneurs to plan their investments accordingly and manage
expectations. For example, a for-profit entity that produces ammunition
would then understand that its role in SRDP would either be to simply
provide surge capacity for national emergencies that call for more output

than what the GA can accommodate otherwise it would need to enter into
a Joint Venture (JV) with the DND provided, of course, that the
company is already a mature industry fixture. Areas of concern that are
not on the plate of any government agency (e.g., GA, Philippine Aerospace
Development Corp, Department of Science and Technology, etc.) would
then be fair game and would merit more capital.
A side-benefit of maintaining a roadmap would be the definition of
development horizons. It would give a timeline for when a particular piece
of equipment is required, and therefore layout the AFPs decision criteria
for whether or not to wait for local prototypes to mature or to procure offthe-shelf. This avoids the time-to-deploy conflict between SRDP and the
AFP modernization program that is mentioned above and would give
private industry time to acquire the expertise and technology required to
respond to a future government request for products. It also protects
potential SRDP entrepreneurs from a state of limbo where their wares
never leave the prototype stage. A situation that currently affects the
Project Trident Strike Remote Control Weapon System (RCWS)
developed by the Naval Sea Systems Command (NSSC) and the Mapua
Institute of Technology. This RCWS has reportedly gone through several
versions and modifications . . . and is no where near being deployed for
operational testing.

This roadmap would need to encompass the SRDP development activities

of all AFP services and government agencies (e.g., GA, PADC, etc.). It
would avoid duplication of effort among these organizations, in the same
manner that the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA) rationalized the aerospace and rocketry programs of various

entities within the US government, whose fractured efforts reportedly gave
the Soviet Union the opportunity to take the opening lead in the space
race.
Drafting and implementing a policy instrument of this breadth requires an
entity with the expertise to grasp the technological hurdles that must be
overcome, the militarys doctrinal considerations that must be satisfied,
and possess the required business acumen to see the venture through. It
must also have the means to either absorb technology transfers itself, or is
able to farm this out qualified private sector entities.
To this end . . . the Philippines needs its equivalent to the American
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
A Philippine DARPA
Before crafting a Philippine DARPA, it would be best to understand what
the original DARPA is and map it to the Philippine setting. Like NASA,
DARPA was organized in response to the technological challenge that the
Soviet Union presented during the space race and continues to play a key
role in maintaining American leadership in military technology today. It
was established in 1958 to oversee strategic application of United States
research and development capacity to benefit of national defense and has
since given rise to now-ubiquitous technologies such as the following:
ARPANET this effort to link computers into a national network
became the basis for the modern Internet
GPS early DARPA work on a positioning system called TRANSIT laid
the groundwork for what eventually became the current Global
Positioning System
M-16 assault rifle DARPA initiated the Project Agile study that
eventually created the rifle that has been the official US military
assault rifle for the past 50 years
In recent years, it has organized technology competitions like the DARPA
Robotics Challenge whose participants are currently tasked to develop
robots that are capable of assisting humans in responding to natural and
man-made disasters.
DARPA leverages both government and private sector research
organizations for its projects. The agencys 50th anniversary publication
summarizes how it manages its projects as follows:

The DARPA program manager will seek out and fund researchers within
U.S. defense contractors, private companies, and universities to bring the
incipient concept into fruition. Thus, the research is outcome-driven to
achieve results toward identified goals, not to pursue science per se. The
goals may vary from demonstrating that an idea is technically feasible to
providing proof-of-concept for an operational capability.
By design, DARPA leverages the industrial capacity and existing research
infrastructure of the United States to achieve its goals. As a consequence
surprisingly, as related by the document linked above DARPA doesnt
have its own organic research facilities and is entirely dependent on the
capabilities of its research partners. DARPA projects are also focused on
developing cutting-edge technologies, leaving comparatively less risky
development projects to other procurement organizations within the
Department of Defense. For this reason, a pure US-DARPA model is at best
a source of inspiration for what can be done, but cannot be completely
replicated in a country with limited manufacturing capacity like the
Philippines.
Other nations whove adopted national policies that apply technological
solutions to defense, and developed indigenous military industrial
complexes have come up with their own variations of the DARPA concept.
Consider the following countries: South Korea, India, Pakistan, and
Singapore. These countries have very robust domestic defense materiel
production capabilities and are even able to export their products, or take
part in co-production ventures.
Lessons from South Korea
Thanks to the selection of the Korean Aerospace Industry FA-50 Golden
Eagle for the Philippine Air Forces Lead-In Fighter Trainer / Surface Attack
Aircraft requirement, the Defense Acquisition Program
Administration (DAPA) has gained prominence in the Philippine defense
social media circles for its involvement in negotiations for the purchase of
the aircraft. DAPA defense materiel acquired from South Korea and is
tasked with the harnessing of manufacturing capacity of South Korean
industry in that countrys defense.

Its Website describes its function as follows. The DAPA is tasked

implementation of the following national policies:
Reinforcement of R&D in national defense
Reinforcement of global competitiveness of the acquisition program
Expansion of export support for the defense industry
Prioritization of domestic R&D
Strengthening cooperation of nation-wide science and technology
Like the US DARPA, this entity leverages already existing capabilities, but
adds a marketing function to the equation because of its involvement in
the export of South Korean defense technology.
Lessons from India
The Indian Department of Defense Production (DDP) takes a direct
hand in the production of military equipment for the Indian military, from
the HAL Tejas Light Combat Aircraft to the Arjun Main Battle Tank. The
following organizations fall under this departments control:

Ordnance Factory Board (OFB)

Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL)
Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL)
Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers Limited (GRSE)
Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL)
Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL)
Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL)
BEML Limited (BEML)
Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL)
Mishra Dhatu Nigam Limited (MIDHANI)
Directorate General of Quality Assurance (DGQA)
Directorate General of Aeronautical Quality Assurance (DGAQA)
Directorate of Standardisation (DOS)
Directorate of Planning & Coordination (Dte. of P&C)

 Defence Exhibition Organisation (DEO)

National Institute for Research & Development in Defence Shipbuilding
(NIRDESH)
DDP efforts put India in a position to absorb foreign technologies as part
of co-production ventures. Hindustan Aircraft Limited, for example, is now
gearing up for local production of Frances most advanced combat aircraft
to-date: Rafale Multi-Role Fighters. It is worth noting that the DDP
was created at a time when the defense industry was the reserved for the
public sector. In 2001, India opened the industry up to private sector
involvement with up to 100% domestic participation and a maximum of
26% foreign direct investment.
Lessons from Pakistan
Like its similarly-named Indian counterpart, the Pakistani Ministry of
Defense Production (MODP) participates in the manufacture of defense
materiel for its armed forces. Among other achievements, it is the driving
force behind local production of the Chinese JF-17 Light Combat Aircraft.
Its Website describes its role as follows:
Laying down policies or guidelines on all matters relating to defence
production
Procurement of firearms, weapons, ammunition, equipment, stores and
explosives for the defence forces
Declaration of industries necessary for the purpose of defence or for the
prosecution of war
Research and development of defence equipment and stores
Co-ordination of defence science research with civil scientific research
organizations
Indigenous production and manufacture of defence equipment and
stores
Negotiations of agreements or MOUs for foreign assistance or
collaboration and loans for purchase of military stores and technical
know-how or transfer of technology
Export of defence products
Marketing and promotion of activities relating to export of defence
products
Coordinate production activities of all defence production organizations
or establishments
Like the Indian model, the Pakistani government is deeply involved in the
manufacture of its own defense articles. Like the South Korean DAPA, the

MODP also takes steps to promote the export of Pakistani technology.

Lessons from Singapore
The Defense Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) is the latest
Singaporean Ministry of Defense (MINDEF) organization dealing with
defense-related R&D and procurement. Its official Website describes its
role as follows:
Acquiring platform and weapon systems for the SAF
Advising MINDEF on all defence science and technology matters
Designing, developing and maintaining defence systems and
infrastructure
Providing engineering and related services in defence areas
Promoting and facilitating the development of defence science and
technology in Singapore
It was established in 2000 and absorbed the functions of the what was
then known as the Defense Technology Group (DTG). Tim Huxley, in his
book Defending the Lion City, credited DTG with facilitating the creation of
the Singaporean defense industry by acting as intermediaries between
foreign defense companies who were willing to enter into Industrial
Cooperation Programs (ICP) with Singapore and state-owned corporations
to include the following:
Chartered Industries of Singapore (CIS) initially established in
1967 to produce small arms ammunition, it eventually branched out
into license production of M-16 rifles. By the 70s this company was
manufacturing larger weapons like machine guns, mortars, and
grenade launchers
Singapore Shipbuilding and Engineering established in 1968 to
maintaining and building naval vessels, entered into a technology
transfer arrangement with the German firm Lurssen which
eventually resulted in the construction of motor gun boats for the
Royal Singaporean Navy
Singapore Electronic and Engineering Ltd established in 1969 to
provide electronic engineering services for the Royal Singaporean Air
Force
These and other companies were brought under a holding company owned
by the Singaporean Ministry of Finance but directed by MINDEF. By 1989
this holding company was restructured to accommodate diversification of
its activities beyond purely military ventures such as electronics and
engineering and renamed Singapore Technologies (ST) Holdings.

The ICP arrangements brokered by DTG, now DSTA, initially allowed

Singaporean companies to accomplish self-reliance activities such as incountry manufacturing components for the Royal Singaporean Air Forces
CH-47 Chinook helicopters and F-16 fighters. In 1999 it allowed Singapore
to become a major participant in the US-UK Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
program.
Implications for Philippine SRDP
Close scrutiny of the histories of the five self-reliance samples presented
above offer a number of take-aways:
Stable self-reliance policies. The political decision to establish and
maintain a domestic defense industry must be measured in decades, not
mere years, to give these policies a chance to yield results. The Indian
Tejas LCA program, for example, started in 1983 but even as late as 27
years later (as per Air Forces Monthly, May 2010) HAL was only producing
its third Limited Series Production aircraft. Although the Tejas program is
sometimes touted as an example of why domestic production is more a
political decision than a practical one, it remains an example of the length
of the gestation period for such endeavors which go beyond time-ingrade timetables of individual officers, even beyond normal Presidential
terms.
In the Philippines, a fair number of SRDP-related endeavors are conducted
by service-level research organizations, often resulting from serendipitous
pairings of SRDP-minded officers with industrialists and/or inventors willing
to take a chance at dealing with the Philippine government. While efforts
these do have their place in the grand scheme of things, the more
complicated projects that take this route that have historically churned out
one-off products. Often times, when time-in-grade issues force AFP
personnel handling projects to leave their positions, development stops.
Even when a project reaches completion, the departure of its original
proponents often cause a change in the institutional stance towards the
endeavor, resulting in either outright cancellation of the project or worse:
indefinite postponement.
An SRDP-czar-like body such as Philippine DARPA, that is independent of
the various services but is supported by the Department of National
Defense, could presumably provide some stability to the these sorts of
efforts.

Each to his own competence. The military shouldnt run these

programs alone. Other sectors of the government have a role to play and
their respective skill-sets must be brought to bear (e.g., Finance, Trade &
Industry, etc.). Singapore, for example, drew about the expertise of the
Ministry of Finance to setup financial a holding entity to manage and
finance the various self-reliance companies and architect their expansion
into alternative profit centers. Ministry of Defense involvement was
primarily at the technical and requirements definition level.
Interfacing with private sector entities such as the aforementioned
Defense Industry Association, or similar organizations, could draw in
additional talent that would otherwise not be available in government
service.
Profit. Export of whatever defense articles are produced is a key goal.
This not only extends the longevity of the production line, it also facilitates
achievement of economies of scale. As mentioned earlier, the South
Korean DAPA served as the primary point of contact for the South Korean
defense industry.
Mature procurement system. For the non-American samples, their selfreliance programs are closely tied to their procurement procedures.
Implementation of an SRDP roadmap cannot outstrip the efficiency of the
DND-AFPs overall acquisition system. Therefore advancement of the
DNDs procurement service is essential to progress in SRDP.
In the Singaporean system, both foreign and domestic defense companies
take part in open bidding for MinDef contracts. However procurement rules
grant participants in Industrial Cooperation Programs with Singaporean
companies additional weight in the final selection. There are no such
protections in the Philippine setting, where the original SRDP Presidential
Decree was actually amended in December 2003 through GPPB Resolution
06-2003 which deprived the government of the option to pursue SRDP
acquisitions without subjecting potential participants to public bidding. This
reflects an institutional attitude towards defense that generally hostile to
SRDP.
Arguably, DARPA, DAPA, and DSTA represent the ideal free-market
oriented relationship between the defense department and private
industry. With indigenous defense-oriented companies actively taking part
in developing tailor-made weapon systems in response to government
requests and receiving production contracts in open competition with both

domestic and foreign companies. At this point in history, the Philippines is

nowhere near having this state of affairs. Despite SRDP being a 14-yearold program, the Philippines remains closer to the starting points for DDP,
MODP, and DSTA than the present-day state of either DAPA or DARPA.
In crafting its equivalent to DARPA / DAPA / DDP / MODP / DSTA, the
Philippines with two choices:
1. Select an existing government entity and expand its role
2. Create a completely new entity with resources drawn from existing
entities
The United States faced a similar question when it evaluated its efforts to
put a man on the Moon by the 70s. One of the candidates foundations for
the expanded effort was the National Advisory Committee for Astronautics
(NACA) which had been organized in 1915 and had been guiding
American aerospace development since then. However, on the strength of
the General Accounting Office which had judged NACA as having become
too lethargic to keep pace with technological developments at the time,
the US Congress enacted legislation that created an entirely and NASA was
born. What route the Philippines ultimately takes will depend on similar
evaluations of existing Philippines departments and/or government owned
and controlled corporations.
The following organizations, theoretically at least, possess the key
elements necessary for the creation of a Philippine DARPA:
Government Arsenal as already mentioned earlier, this institution has
been chosen as the lynchpin for renewed SRDP efforts. Its plant site in
Limay, Bataan has been designated as a Defense Industrial Estate and the
GA recently issued a bid invitation for consultancy services for the creation
of a Master Development Plan for its continued development. For this
reason, this is the logical base upon which a Philippine DARPA and SRDProadmap-custodian can be based. However, to approach the capabilities of
the above-mentioned self-reliance organizations it will require significant
expansion beyond its current areas of expertise which are primarily in
manufacturing and research & development and currently focused
ordnance and small arms technology.
Defense Industry Association this is an group of Philippine
companies that are have chosen to involve themselves in the domestic

security market place. Its members include companies that were part of
the original SRDP effort in the 70s and have varying levels of expertise in
their respective fields. Arguably DIA members would be involved primarily
in production and certain aspects of R&D, leaving responsibility for SRDP
policy direction to the DND itself. How this relatively new entity develops
remains to be seen
Philippine Aerospace Development Corp this aerospace SRDP
pioneer has assembled a total of 67 Britten Normal Islands and 44 BO105 helicopters for the Philippine market and has established overhaul and
maintenance facilities for various relatively low-technology aircraft and
engine components. The company is currently in such a dismal state that
the Commission on Audit recommended considering closure of the
company in 2012. Despite being certified for BN Islander overhaul, that
still didnt make it the preferred vendor for the Philippine Navys Britten
Normal Islander refurbishment programs which when to Hawker Pacific
Ltd instead.

Philippine Investment & Trading Corporation the PITC brings the

necessary expertise to sell Philippine products to the world and would be a
key player in the export of whatever defense articles the Philippine
defense industry produces. This organization brings complex financial
transaction experience to the table and was the AFPs agent for past
counter-trade deals that eventually acquired the SIAI-Marchetti S211
aircraft, and various communications equipment. What the organization
lacks however, as reported for the Commission on Audit, is the
technical expertise to adequately comprehend military requirements.

While the Government Arsenals central role in SRDP, at least in the near
term to mid-term, is both logical and inevitable, where SRDP goes in the
long term will depend on a NACA-NASA-like evaluation of the GAs
performance, as well as those of the other entities listed above. Only time
will tell if the SRDP roadmap and responsibility for a Philippine DARPA will
go to an existing SRDP actors or an entirely new entity. All that is certain is
that if the goals of SRDP are ever to be achieved the status quo cannot
continue.
This article is also available on the Timawa.net forum at the following
location: http://www.timawa.net/forum/index.php?topic=36697.0