Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970
AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Amelito R. Mutuc in his own behalf.
Romulo C. Felizmena for respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:
The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner Amelito Mutuc, then a candidate for delegate
to the Constitutional Convention, in this special civil action for prohibition to assail the validity of a
ruling of respondent Commission on Elections enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign
purposes, was not in vain. Nor could it be considering the conceded absence of any express power
granted to respondent by the Constitutional Convention Act to so require and the bar to any such
implication arising from any provision found therein, if deference be paid to the principle that a
statute is to be construed consistently with the fundamental law, which accords the utmost priority to
freedom of expression, much more so when utilized for electoral purposes. On November 3, 1970,
the very same day the case was orally argued, five days after its filing, with the election barely a
week away, we issued a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition prayed for. This opinion is
intended to explain more fully our decision.
In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29, 1970, petitioner, after setting forth his
being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and his candidacy for the position of delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, alleged that respondent Commission on Elections, by a telegram sent to
him five days previously, informed him that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but
prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud
speakers, an order which, according to him, is "violative of [his] constitutional right ... to freedom of
speech." 1 There being no plain, speedy and adequate remedy, according to petitioner, he would
seek a writ of prohibition, at the same time praying for a preliminary injunction. On the very next day,
this Court adopted a resolution requiring respondent Commission on Elections to file an answer not
later than November 2, 1970, at the same time setting the case for hearing for Tuesday November 3,
1970. No preliminary injunction was issued. There was no denial in the answer filed by respondent
on November 2, 1970, of the factual allegations set forth in the petition, but the justification for the
prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, 2which made it unlawful
for candidates "to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda
gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign
origin." 3It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped
voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the above statute subject to
confiscation. It prayed that the petition be denied for lack of merit. The case was argued, on

November 3, 1970, with petitioner appearing in his behalf and Attorney Romulo C. Felizmena
arguing in behalf of respondent.
This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for urgency, the election being barely
a week away, issued on the afternoon of the same day, a minute resolution granting the writ of
prohibition, setting forth the absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to impose such
a ban in the light of the doctrine ofejusdem generis as well as the principle that the construction
placed on the statute by respondent Commission on Elections would raise serious doubts about its
validity, considering the infringement of the right of free speech of petitioner. Its concluding portion
was worded thus: "Accordingly, as prayed for, respondent Commission on Elections is permanently
restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its
aforesaid order banning the use of political jingles by candidates. This resolution is immediately
executory." 4
1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the question before us was one of power.
Respondent Commission on Elections was called upon to justify such a prohibition imposed on
petitioner. To repeat, no such authority was granted by the Constitutional Convention Act. It did
contend, however, that one of its provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of
electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods
or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words
"and the like." 5 For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order.
We view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-known
principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to
things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. 6 It is quite apparent that what was
contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.
The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of respondent Commission was its failure to
manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its
being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or
prescription. 7 Thus, certain Administrative Code provisions were given a "construction which should
be more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law." 8 The desirability of removing in that
fashion the taint of constitutional infirmity from legislative enactments has always commended itself.
The judiciary may even strain the ordinary meaning of words to avert any collision between what a
statute provides and what the Constitution requires. The objective is to reach an interpretation
rendering it free from constitutional defects. To paraphrase Justice Cardozo, if at all possible, the
conclusion reached must avoid not only that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that
score. 9
2. Petitioner's submission of his side of the controversy, then, has in its favor obeisance to such a
cardinal precept. The view advanced by him that if the above provision of the Constitutional
Convention Act were to lend itself to the view that the use of the taped jingle could be prohibited,
then the challenge of unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet. For, in unequivocal language, the
Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has been our constant holding
that this preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is
the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. What
respondent Commission did, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which
this constitutional right is directed. Nor could respondent Commission justify its action by the
assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle, would be free, either by himself or
through others, to use his mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not to be
emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by him
through tape or other mechanical contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondent

Commission, then the effect would hardly be distinguishable from a previous restraint. That cannot
be validly done. It would negate indirectly what the Constitution in express terms assures. 10
3. Nor is this all. The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for
the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is
a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority
accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of
government in the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield
obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the
enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether
substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or
disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the
judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power
of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of
adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It
overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a
recognition of its being the supreme law.
To be more specific, the competence entrusted to respondent Commission was aptly summed up by
the present Chief Justice thus: "Lastly, as the branch of the executive department although
independent of the President to which the Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of the
'enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections,' the power of decision
of the Commission is limited to purely 'administrative questions.'"11 It has been the constant holding
of this Court, as it could not have been otherwise, that respondent Commission cannot exercise any
authority in conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the Constitution.12 Our
decisions which liberally construe its powers are precisely inspired by the thought that only thus may
its responsibility under the Constitution to insure free, orderly and honest elections be adequately
fulfilled. 13 There could be no justification then for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from
respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free
speech. Petitioner's case, as was obvious from the time of its filing, stood on solid footing.
WHEREFORE, as set forth in our resolution of November 3, 1970, respondent Commission is
permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance
with its aforesaid order banning the use of political taped jingles. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs. Ferrer 1 on the unconstitutionality of the challenged
provisions of the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, I concur with the views of Mr. Justice
Fernando in the main opinion that "there could be no justification .... for lending approval to any

ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a
constitutional right as free speech." I would only add the following observations:
This case once again calls for application of the constitutional test of reasonableness required by the
due process clause of our Constitution. Originally, respondent Commission in its guidelines
prescribed summarily that the use by a candidate of a "mobile unit roaming around and
announcing a meeting and the name of the candidate ... is prohibited. If it is used only for a certain
place for a meeting and he uses his sound system at the meeting itself, there is no violation." 2Acting
upon petitioner's application, however, respondent Commission ruled that "the use of a sound
system by anyone be he a candidate or not whether stationary or part of a mobile unit is not
prohibited by the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act" but imposed the condition "provided that
there are no jingles and no streamers or posters placed in carriers."
Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the use of a 'jingle,' a verbally recorded form of
election propaganda, is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster,' a printed form of election
propaganda, and both forms of election advertisement fall under the prohibition contained in sec. 12
of R.A. 6132," and "the record disc or tape where said 'jingle' has been recorded can be subject of
confiscation by the respondent Commission under par. (E) of sec. 12 of R.A. 6132." In this modern
day and age of the electronically recorded or taped voice which may be easily and inexpensively
disseminated through a mobile sound system throughout the candidate's district, respondent
Commission would outlaw "recorded or taped voices" and would exact of the candidate that he make
use of the mobile sound system only by personal transmission and repeatedly personally sing his
"jingle" or deliver his spoken message to the voters even if he loses his voice in the process or
employ another person to do so personally even if this should prove more expensive and less
effective than using a recorded or taped voice.
Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate, therefore, petitioner's basic freedom of speech
and expression. They cannot pass the constitutional test of reasonableness in that they go far
beyond a reasonable relation to the proper governmental object and are manifestly unreasonable,
oppressive and arbitrary.
Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers" or posters on the mobile unit or carrier is
concerned, respondent Commission's adverse ruling that the same falls within the prohibition of
section 12, paragraphs (C) and (E) has not been appealed by petitioner. I would note that
respondent Commission's premise that "the use of a 'jingle' ... is no different from the use of a
'streamer' or 'poster' "in that these both represent forms of election advertisements to make the
candidate and the fact of his candidacy known to the voters is correct, but its conclusion is not.
The campaign appeal of the "jingle" is through the voters' ears while that of the "streamers" is
through the voters' eyes. But if it be held that the Commission's ban on "jingles" abridges
unreasonably, oppressively and arbitrarily the candidate's right of free expression, even though such
"jingles" may occasionally offend some sensitive ears, the Commission's ban on "streamers" being
placed on the candidate's mobile unit or carrier, which "streamers" are less likely to offend the voters'
sense of sight should likewise be held to be an unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary curtailment of
the candidate's same constitutional right.
The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by respondent Commission, laudable
as it may be, should not be sought at the cost of the candidate's constitutional rights in the earnest
pursuit of his candidacy, but is to be fulfilled in the strict and effective implementation of the Act's
limitation in section 12(G) on the total expenditures that may be made by a candidate or by another
person with his knowledge and consent.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs. Ferrer 1 on the unconstitutionality of the challenged
provisions of the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, I concur with the views of Mr. Justice
Fernando in the main opinion that "there could be no justification .... for lending approval to any
ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a
constitutional right as free speech." I would only add the following observations:
This case once again calls for application of the constitutional test of reasonableness required by the
due process clause of our Constitution. Originally, respondent Commission in its guidelines
prescribed summarily that the use by a candidate of a "mobile unit roaming around and
announcing a meeting and the name of the candidate ... is prohibited. If it is used only for a certain
place for a meeting and he uses his sound system at the meeting itself, there is no violation." 2Acting
upon petitioner's application, however, respondent Commission ruled that "the use of a sound
system by anyone be he a candidate or not whether stationary or part of a mobile unit is not
prohibited by the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act" but imposed the condition "provided that
there are no jingles and no streamers or posters placed in carriers."
Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the use of a 'jingle,' a verbally recorded form of
election propaganda, is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster,' a printed form of election
propaganda, and both forms of election advertisement fall under the prohibition contained in sec. 12
of R.A. 6132," and "the record disc or tape where said 'jingle' has been recorded can be subject of
confiscation by the respondent Commission under par. (E) of sec. 12 of R.A. 6132." In this modern
day and age of the electronically recorded or taped voice which may be easily and inexpensively
disseminated through a mobile sound system throughout the candidate's district, respondent
Commission would outlaw "recorded or taped voices" and would exact of the candidate that he make
use of the mobile sound system only by personal transmission and repeatedly personally sing his
"jingle" or deliver his spoken message to the voters even if he loses his voice in the process or
employ another person to do so personally even if this should prove more expensive and less
effective than using a recorded or taped voice.
Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate, therefore, petitioner's basic freedom of speech
and expression. They cannot pass the constitutional test of reasonableness in that they go far
beyond a reasonable relation to the proper governmental object and are manifestly unreasonable,
oppressive and arbitrary.
Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers" or posters on the mobile unit or carrier is
concerned, respondent Commission's adverse ruling that the same falls within the prohibition of
section 12, paragraphs (C) and (E) has not been appealed by petitioner. I would note that
respondent Commission's premise that "the use of a 'jingle' ... is no different from the use of a
'streamer' or 'poster' "in that these both represent forms of election advertisements to make the
candidate and the fact of his candidacy known to the voters is correct, but its conclusion is not.
The campaign appeal of the "jingle" is through the voters' ears while that of the "streamers" is
through the voters' eyes. But if it be held that the Commission's ban on "jingles" abridges
unreasonably, oppressively and arbitrarily the candidate's right of free expression, even though such
"jingles" may occasionally offend some sensitive ears, the Commission's ban on "streamers" being
placed on the candidate's mobile unit or carrier, which "streamers" are less likely to offend the voters'
sense of sight should likewise be held to be an unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary curtailment of
the candidate's same constitutional right.

The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by respondent Commission, laudable
as it may be, should not be sought at the cost of the candidate's constitutional rights in the earnest
pursuit of his candidacy, but is to be fulfilled in the strict and effective implementation of the Act's
limitation in section 12(G) on the total expenditures that may be made by a candidate or by another
person with his knowledge and consent.
#

Footnotes
1 Petition, paragraphs 1 to 5.
2 Republic Act No. 6132 (1970).
3 Section 12 (E), Ibid.
4 Resolution of Nov. 3, 1970.
5 Section 12(E), Constitutional Convention Act.
6 Cf. United States v. Santo Nino, 13 Phil. 141 (1909); Go Tiaoco y Hermanos v.
Union Insurance Society of Canton, 40 Phil. 40 (1919); People vs. Kottinger 45 Phil.
352 (1923); Cornejo v. Naval, 54 Phil. 809 (1930); Ollada v. Court of Tax Appeals, 99
Phil. 605 (1956); Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Social Security
Commission, L-15045, Jan. 20, 1961, 1 SCRA 10.
7 Cf. Herras Teehankee v. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945); Manila Electric Co. v. Public
Utilities Employees Association, 79 Phil. 409 (1947); Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil.
368 (1949); Guido v. Rural Progress Administration, 84 Phil. 847 (1949); City of
Manila v. Arellano Law Colleges, 85 Phil. 663 (1950); Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 86 Phil.
50 (1950); Radiowealth v. Agregado, 86 Phil. 429 (1950); Sanchez v. Harry Lyons
Construction, Inc., 87 Phil. 532 (1950); American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101
Phil. 386 (1957); Gonzales v. Hechanova, L-21897, Oct. 22, 1963, 9 SCRA 230;
Automotive Parts and Equipment Co., Inc. v. Lingad, L-26406, Oct. 31, 1969, 30
SCRA 248; J. M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, L-21064, Feb.
18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413.
8 Radiowealth v. Agregado, 86 Phil. 429 (1950).
9 Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Ross, 289 US 373 (1933).
10 Cf. Saia v. People of the State of New York, 334 US 558 (1948).
11 Abcede v. Hon. Imperial, 103 Phil. 136 (1958). The portion of the opinion from
which the above excerpt is taken reads in full: 'Lastly, as the branch of the executive
department although independent of the President to which the Constitution
has given the 'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections,' the power of decision of the Commission is
limited to purely 'administrative questions.' (Article X, sec. 2, Constitution of the
Philippines) It has no authority to decide matters 'involving the right to vote.' It may
not even pass upon the legality of a given vote (Nacionalista Party v. Commission on
Elections, 47 Off. Gaz., [6], 2851). We do not see, therefore, how it could assert the
greater and more far-reaching authority to determine who among those

possessing the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, who have complied with
the procedural requirements, relative to the filing of certificate of candidacy should
be allowed to enjoy the full benefits intended by law therefore. The question whether
in order to enjoy those benefits a candidate must be capable of 'understanding the
full meaning of his acts and the true significance of election,' and must have over
a month prior to the elections (when the resolution complained of was issued) 'the
tiniest chance to obtain the favorable indorsement of a substantial portion of the
electorate, is a matter of policy, not of administration and enforcement of the law
which policy must be determined by Congress in the exercise of its legislative
functions. Apart from the absence of specific statutory grant of such general, broad
power as the Commission claims to have, it is dubious whether, if so granted in
the vague, abstract, indeterminate and undefined manner necessary in order that it
could pass upon the factors relied upon in said resolution (and such grant must not
be deemed made, in the absence of clear and positive provision to such effect, which
is absent in the case at bar) the legislative enactment would not amount to undue
delegation of legislative power. (Schechter vs. U.S., 295 US 495, 79 L. ed. 1570.)"
pp. 141-142.
12 Cf. Cortez v. Commission on Elections, 79 Phil. 352 (1947); Nacionalista Party v.
Commission on Elections, 85 Phil. 149 (1949); Guevara v. Commission on Elections,
104 Phil. 268 (1958); Masangcay v. Commission on Elections, L-13827, Sept. 28,
1962, 6 SCRA 27; Lawsin v. Escalona, L-22540, July 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 643;
Ututalum v. Commission on Elections,
L-25349, Dec. 3, 1965, 15 SCRA 465; Janairo v. Commission on Elections, L-28315,
Dec. 8, 1967, 21 SCRA 1173; Abes v. Commission on Elections, L-28348, Dec. 15,
1967, 21 SCRA 1252; Ibuna v. Commission on Elections,
L-28328, Dec. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 1457; Binging Ho v. Mun. Board of Canvassers,
L-29051, July 28, 1969, 28 SCRA 829.
13 Cf. Cauton v. Commission on Elections, L-25467, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 911.
The other cases are Espino v. Zaldivar, L-22325, Dec. 11, 1967, 21 SCRA 1204;
Ong v. Commission on Elections, L-28415, Jan. 29, 1968, 22 SCRA 241; Mutuc v.
Commission on Elections, L-28517, Feb. 21, 1968, 22 SCRA 662; Pedido v.
Commission on Elections, L-28539, March 30, 1968, 22 SCRA 1403; Aguam v.
Commission on Elections, L-28955, May 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 883; Pelayo, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, L-28869, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1374; Pacis v.
Commission on Elections, L-29026, Sept. 28, 1968, 25 SCRA 377; Ligot v.
Commission on Elections, L-31380, Jan. 21, 1970, 31 SCRA 45; Abrigo v.
Commission on Elections, L-31374, Jan. 21, 1970, 31 SCRA 27; Moore v.
Commission on Elections, L-31394, Jan. 23, 1970, 31 SCRA 60; Ilarde v.
Commission on Elections, L-31446, Jan. 23, 1970, 31 SCRA 72; Sinsuat v.
Pendatun,
L-31501, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 630.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
1 L-32546 & 32551, Oct. 17, 1970, re: sections 8(A) and 12(F) and other related
provisions.
2 Petition, page 9.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19650

September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL,respondent-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant.

Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex) conceived and laid the
groundwork for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. Denominated
Caltex Hooded Pump Contest, it calls for participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a
hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. Employees of the Caltex
(Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its advertising agency, and their immediate families excepted,
participation is to be open indiscriminately to all motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers. For the
privilege to participate, no fee or consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products
required to be made. Entry forms are to be made available upon request at each Caltex station where a
sealed can will be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.
A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the station level, called Dealer Contest, the
contestant whose estimate is closest to the actual number of liters dispensed by the hooded pump thereat
is to be awarded the first prize; the next closest, the second; and the next, the third. Prizes at this level
consist of a 3-burner kerosene stove for first; a thermos bottle and a Ray-O-Vac hunter lantern for
second; and an Everready Magnet-lite flashlight with batteries and a screwdriver set for third. The firstprize winner in each station will then be qualified to join in the Regional Contest in seven different
regions. The winning stubs of the qualified contestants in each region will be deposited in a sealed can
from which the first-prize, second-prize and third-prize winners of that region will be drawn. The
regional first-prize winners will be entitled to make a three-day all-expenses-paid round trip to Manila,
accompanied by their respective Caltex dealers, in order to take part in the National Contest. The
regional second-prize and third-prize winners will receive cash prizes of P500 and P300, respectively. At
the national level, the stubs of the seven regional first-prize winners will be placed inside a sealed can
from which the drawing for the final first-prize, second-prize and third-prize winners will be made. Cash
prizes in store for winners at this final stage are: P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second; Pl,500 for third; and
P650 as consolation prize for each of the remaining four participants.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but
also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with
the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view sections 1954(a),
1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, the pertinent provisions of which read as follows:

SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. No matter belonging to any of the following classes,
whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines through the mails, or to
be deposited in or carried by the mails of the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or
employee of the Bureau of Posts:
Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or conveying
or purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme
depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any
money or property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.
SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.Upon satisfactory evidence that any person or company is engaged in
conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal
property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme,
device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, the Director of Posts may instruct any postmaster or
other officer or employee of the Bureau to return to the person, depositing the same in the mails, with the
word fraudulent plainly written or stamped upon the outside cover thereof, any mail matter of whatever
class mailed by or addressed to such person or company or the representative or agent of such person or
company.
SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphic transfer service.The Director
of Posts may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person or company is engaged in conducting any
lottery, gift enterprise or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot,
chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or
enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promise, forbid the issue or payment by any postmaster of any postal
money order or telegraphic transfer to said person or company or to the agent of any such person or
company, whether such agent is acting as an individual or as a firm, bank, corporation, or association of
any kind, and may provide by regulation for the return to the remitters of the sums named in money
orders or telegraphic transfers drawn in favor of such person or company or its agent.
The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated October 31, 1960, in
which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position
that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the then
Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the provisions aforesaid and
declined to grant the requested clearance. In its counsels letter of December 7, 1960, Caltex sought a
reconsideration of the foregoing stand, stressing that there being involved no consideration in the part of
any contestant, the contest was not, under controlling authorities, condemnable as a lottery. Relying,
however, on an opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice on an unrelated case seven years before
(Opinion 217, Series of 1953), the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves
consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a gift enterprise which is equally banned by the
Postal Law, and in his letter of December 10, 1960 not only denied the use of the mails for purposes of
the proposed contest but as well threatened that if the contest was conducted, a fraud order will have to
be issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives.
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition for declaratory relief against
Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying that judgment be rendered declaring its Caltex Hooded

Pump Contest not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of
the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public. After issues were joined and upon the
respective memoranda of the parties, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the proposed Caltex Hooded Pump Contest
announced to be conducted by the petitioner under the rules marked as Annex B of the petitioner does
not violate the Postal Law and the respondent has no right to bar the public distribution of said rules by
the mails.
The respondent appealed.
The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon two basic issues: first, whether the
petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief; and second, whether the proposed Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest violates the Postal Law. We shall take these up in seriatim.
1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which was the applicable legal
basis for the remedy at the time it was invoked, declaratory relief is available to any person whose rights
are affected by a statute . . . to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the . . .
statute and for a declaration of his rights thereunder (now section 1, Rule 64, Revised Rules of Court). In
amplification, this Court, conformably to established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain
conditions sine qua non therefor, to wit: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy
must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a
legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination
(Tolentino vs. The Board of Accountancy, et al., G.R. No. L-3062, September 28, 1951; Delumen, et al. vs.
Republic of the Philippines, 50 O.G., No. 2, pp. 576, 578-579; Edades vs. Edades, et al., G.R. No. L-8964,
July 31, 1956). The gravamen of the appellants stand being that the petition herein states no sufficient
cause of action for declaratory relief, our duty is to assay the factual bases thereof upon the foregoing
crucible.
As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present controversy, a number of significant
points stand out in bold relief. The appellee (Caltex), as a business enterprise of some consequence,
concededly has the unquestioned right to exploit every legitimate means, and to avail of all appropriate
media to advertise and stimulate increased patronage for its products. In contrast, the appellant, as the
authority charged with the enforcement of the Postal Law, admittedly has the power and the duty to
suppress transgressions thereof particularly thru the issuance of fraud orders, under Sections 1982 and
1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, against legally non-mailable schemes. Obviously pursuing its
right aforesaid, the appellee laid out plans for the sales promotion scheme hereinbefore detailed. To
forestall possible difficulties in the dissemination of information thereon thru the mails, amongst other
media, it was found expedient to request the appellant for an advance clearance therefor. However,
likewise by virtue of his jurisdiction in the premises and construing the pertinent provisions of the Postal
Law, the appellant saw a violation thereof in the proposed scheme and accordingly declined the request. A
point of difference as to the correct construction to be given to the applicable statute was thus reached.
Communications in which the parties expounded on their respective theories were exchanged. The
confidence with which the appellee insisted upon its position was matched only by the obstinacy with
which the appellant stood his ground. And this impasse was climaxed by the appellants open warning to
the appellee that if the proposed contest was conducted, a fraud order will have to be issued against it
and all its representatives.

10

Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed for. The appellees insistent
assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest, and the challenge thereto and
consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live controversy.
The justiciability of the dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal
right on one side and a denial thereof on the other, concerning a real not a mere theoretical question
or issue. The contenders are as real as their interests are substantial. To the appellee, the uncertainty
occasioned by the divergence of views on the issue of construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to
enhance its business. To the appellant, the suppression of the appellees proposed contest believed to
transgress a law he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an unavoidable duty. With the appellees bent to
hold the contest and the appellants threat to issue a fraud order therefor if carried out, the contenders
are confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences
are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines,
G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955). And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past
when it can rightly be said that merely the appellees desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the
fears of others which admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has
ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of
right which is actually contested (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133,
citing: Woodward vs. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350).
We cannot hospitably entertain the appellants pretense that there is here no question of construction
because the said appellant simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a given set of facts as
embodied in the rules of the contest, hence, there is no room for declaratory relief. The infirmity of this
pose lies in the fact that it proceeds from the assumption that, if the circumstances here presented, the
construction of the legal provisions can be divorced from the matter of their application to the appellees
contest. This is not feasible. Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and expounding the
meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that
intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others,by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly

provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the case here. Whether or not
the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law
inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein. To our mind, this is
as much a question of construction or interpretation as any other.
Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a pronouncement on the matter at hand can
amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion the handing down of which is anathema to a declaratory
relief action. Of course, no breach of the Postal Law has as yet been committed. Yet, the disagreement
over the construction thereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has taken a fixed and final shape,
presenting clearly defined legal issues susceptible of immediate resolution. With the battle lines drawn, in
a manner of speaking, the propriety nay, the necessity of setting the dispute at rest before it
accumulates the asperity distemper, animosity, passion and violence of a full-blown battle which looms
ahead (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 132 and cases cited), cannot but be
conceded. Paraphrasing the language inZeitlin vs. Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d., 901, 31 Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P.
2d., 152, cited in 22 Am. Jur., 2d., p. 869, to deny declaratory relief to the appellee in the situation into
which it has been cast, would be to force it to choose between undesirable alternatives. If it cannot obtain
a final and definitive pronouncement as to whether the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law apply to
its proposed contest, it would be faced with these choices: If it launches the contest and uses the mails for
purposes thereof, it not only incurs the risk, but is also actually threatened with the certain imposition, of
a fraud order with its concomitant stigma which may attach even if the appellee will eventually be

11

vindicated; if it abandons the contest, it becomes a self-appointed censor, or permits the appellant to put
into effect a virtual fiat of previous censorship which is constitutionally unwarranted. As we weigh these
considerations in one equation and in the spirit of liberality with which the Rules of Court are to be
interpreted in order to promote their object (section 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court) which, in the
instant case, is to settle, and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to, rights and duties
under a law we can see in the present case any imposition upon our jurisdiction or any futility or
prematurity in our intervention.
The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding effect of the ruling we hand down in this
case if he believes that it will not have the final and pacifying function that a declaratory judgment is
calculated to subserve. At the very least, the appellant will be bound. But more than this, he obviously
overlooks that in this jurisdiction, Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form a part of
the legal system (Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). In effect, judicial decisions assume the same
authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that
they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide
thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto. Accordingly, we entertain no
misgivings that our resolution of this case will terminate the controversy at hand.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just reached is not without
precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged
in promotional advertising was advised by the county prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan
had the characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales promotion were conducted, the corporation
would be subject to criminal prosecution, it was held that the corporation was entitled to maintain a
declaratory relief action against the county prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales promotion
plan. In pari materia, see also: Bunis vs. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin vs.

Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc. vs. Scott, 15 N.J. Super. 124, 82 A. 2d., 903.
In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for declaratory relief.
2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using almost identical terminology in
sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely non-mailable, and empowers
the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders against, or otherwise deny the use of the facilities of the
postal service to, any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of
money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind. Upon these words
hinges the resolution of the second issue posed in this appeal.
Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As early as in 1922, in El Debate, Inc. vs.

Topacio, 44 Phil., 278, 283-284, which significantly dwelt on the power of the postal authorities under the
abovementioned provisions of the Postal Law, this Court declared that
While countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the authoritative one for this jurisdiction is
that of the United States Supreme Court, in analogous cases having to do with the power of the United
States Postmaster General, viz.: The term lottery extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by
chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of
gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third,
chance. (Horner vs. States [1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497;

12

U.S. vs. Filart and Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker [1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs.
Baguio [1919], 39 Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel Construction Company vs. Carmona, p. 233, ante.)
Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements of prize and chance are too obvious in
the disputed scheme to be the subject of contention. Consequently as the appellant himself concedes, the
field of inquiry is narrowed down to the existence of the element of consideration therein. Respecting this
matter, our task is considerably lightened inasmuch as in the same case just cited, this Court has laid
down a definitive yard-stick in the following terms
In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of
property by chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the
chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid
directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.
Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by the clarity of the language in which the
invitation to participate therein is couched. Thus
No puzzles, no rhymes? You dont need wrappers, labels or boxtops? You dont have to buy anything?
Simply estimate the actual number of liter the Caltex gas pump with the hood at your favorite Caltex
dealer will dispense from to , and win valuable prizes . . . . .
Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service
be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. A prospective contestant
has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the entry form which is available on demand, and accomplish
and submit the same for the drawing of the winner. Viewed from all angles or turned inside out, the
contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery. Indeed, even as we
head the stern injunction, look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real
element and pernicious tendencies which the law is seeking to prevent (El Debate, Inc. vs.
Topacio, supra, p. 291), we find none. In our appraisal, the scheme does not only appear to be, but
actually is, a gratuitous distribution of property by chance.
There is no point to the appellants insistence that non-Caltex customers who may buy Caltex products
simply to win a prize would actually be indirectly paying a consideration for the privilege to join the
contest. Perhaps this would be tenable if the purchase of any Caltex product or the use of any Caltex
service were a pre-requisite to participation. But it is not. A contestant, it hardly needs reiterating, does
not have to buy anything or to give anything of value.1awphl.nt
Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being admittedly for sales promotion, would naturally
benefit the sponsor in the way of increased patronage by those who will be encouraged to prefer Caltex
products if only to get the chance to draw a prize by securing entry blanks. The required element of
consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the proponent of the contest. The true test, as
laid down in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, is whether the participant pays a
valuable consideration for the chance, and not whether those conducting the enterprise receive something
of value in return for the distribution of the prize. Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of the
contestant is all that matters, not that of the sponsor. The following, culled from Corpus Juris Secundum,
should set the matter at rest:

13

The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby to receive, or in fact does receive, some benefit in
the way of patronage or otherwise, as a result of the drawing; does not supply the element of
consideration. Griffith Amusement Co. vs. Morgan, Tex. Civ. App., 98 S.W., 2d., 844 (54 C.J.S., p. 849).
Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest proposed by
the appellee is not a lottery that may be administratively and adversely dealt with under the Postal Law.
But it may be asked: Is it not at least a gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any
real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, which is equally prescribed? Incidentally,
while the appellants brief appears to have concentrated on the issue of consideration, this aspect of the
case cannot be avoided if the remedy here invoked is to achieve its tranquilizing effect as an instrument of
both curative and preventive justice. Recalling that the appellants action was predicated, amongst other
bases, upon Opinion 217, Series 1953, of the Secretary of Justice, which opined in effect that a scheme,
though not a lottery for want of consideration, may nevertheless be a gift enterprise in which that element
is not essential, the determination of whether or not the proposed contest wanting in consideration as
we have found it to be is a prohibited gift enterprise, cannot be passed over sub silencio.
While an all-embracing concept of the term gift enterprise is yet to be spelled out in explicit words, there
appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is commonly
applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods are sold for their market value but by way of
inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur., 654; Black, Law
Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 817; Ballantine, Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Retail Section of
Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth vs. Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker vs. State, 193 S.E.,
605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell vs. State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus conceived, the term
clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted, there is no sale of anything to which the
chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified
contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellees products.
Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellees contest can be encompassed within the
broadest sweep that the term gift enterprise is capable of being extended, we think that the appellants
pose will gain no added comfort. As stated in the opinion relied upon, rulings there are indeed holding
that a gift enterprise involving an award by chance, even in default of the element of consideration
necessary to constitute a lottery, is prohibited (E.g.: Crimes vs. States, 235 Ala 192, 178 So. 73; Russell vs.
Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 129 Ga. 154, 58 S.E., 88; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater
Corporation, 132 P. 2d., 689, 694, 698, 114 Mont. 52). But this is only one side of the coin. Equally
impressive authorities declare that, like a lottery, a gift enterprise comes within the prohibitive statutes
only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and consideration (E.g.: Bills vs. People, 157 P.
2d., 139, 142, 113 Colo., 326; DOrio vs. Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565, 151 Wash., 297; People vs. Psallis, 12
N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City and County of Denver vs. Frueauff, 88 P., 389, 394, 39 Colo., 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S.,
1131, 12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54 C.J.S., 851, citing: Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56 Ga. App., 705; 18
Words and Phrases, perm. ed., pp. 590-594). The apparent conflict of opinions is explained by the fact
that the specific statutory provisions relied upon are not identical. In some cases, as pointed out in 54
C.J.S., 851, the terms lottery and gift enterprise are used interchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); in
others, the necessity for the element of consideration or chance has been specifically eliminated by
statute. (54 C.J.S., 351-352, citing Barker vs. State,supra; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater
Corporation, supra). The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is, therefore,
that every case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision.

14

Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in association with the word
lottery. With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of legal
hermeneutics noscitur a sociis which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as
the element of chance is concerned it is only logical that the term under a construction should be
accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith.
Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term gift enterprise be
so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that
element of consideration from the gift enterprise therein included.
This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law, resort to the
determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud orders, it is
axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for disseminating printed matters
which on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and
similar schemes, justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress their tendency to inflame the
gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in
gambling it is inherent that something of value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it
follows ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the contestant to participate, the reason behind
the law can hardly be said to obtain. If, as it has been held
Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute lottery, if it is not resorted to as
a device to evade the law and no consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, from the party receiving
the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or stimulated thereby. City of Roswell vs. Jones, 67 P. 2d.,
286, 41 N.M., 258. (25 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., p. 695, emphasis supplied).
we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we are persuaded to hold
that, under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we have heretofore examined, gift
enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve
the element of consideration. Finding none in the contest here in question, we rule that the appellee may
not be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof.
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief,
and that the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest as described in the rules submitted by the appellee does not
transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ.,
concur.

15

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6355-56

August 31, 1953

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for appellant.
Manuel O. Chan for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring section 13 of
Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal
Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the income tax
collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo
the amount of P2,345.46, representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1,1950 to
October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to December
31,1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without special pronouncement as to costs.
Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as they do the same question of law, they were jointly
submitted for determination in the lower court. Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg presiding, in a rather
exhaustive and well considered decision found and held that under the doctrine laid down by this Court in
the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo
and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the
Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes.
We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and considering the proposition and the arguments pro
and cons involved in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, which are raised, brought up and presented
here. In that case, we have held despite the ruling enunciated by the United States Federal Supreme Court
in the case of O Malley vs. Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that taxing the salary of a judicial officer in the
Philippines is a diminution of such salary and so violates the Constitution. We shall now confine our-selves
to a discussion and determination of the remaining question of whether or not Republic Act No. 590,
particularly section 13, can justify and legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial
officers.
According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our
decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because
immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the
Solicitor General reproduced what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill
No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.
For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9, Article VIII of our Constitution:.

16

SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good
behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of
their office. They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished

during their continuance in office. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate
Justice, fifteen thousand pesos.
As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional provision, we held in the Perfecto case
that judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection
thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution of their salaries during their continuance in
office, a thing which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter, according to the Solicitor
General, because Congress did not favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto case, Congress
promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to counteract the ruling in that decision, at least now to
authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. We quote section 13
of Republic Act No. 590:
SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be
considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be dimunition of
his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
So we have this situation. The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the Constitution, particularly
section 9, Article VIII, has held that judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their
salaries, because the collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries, specifically prohibited by the
Constitution. Now comes the Legislature and in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, says that no salary
wherever received by any public officer of the Republic (naturally including a judicial officer) shall be
considered as exempt from the income tax, and proceeds to declare that payment of said income tax is
not a diminution of his compensation. Can the Legislature validly do this? May the Legislature lawfully
declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a
decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise? To determine this
question, we shall have to go back to the fundamental principles regarding separation of powers.
Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to make
and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution of carrying out of the provisions
of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial
department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the
courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the
meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide
whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has
to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit or restrict
the power granted to the courts by the Constitution. (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al., 44N. W., 2nd 341, 342.)
When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is
the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it without
violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law
of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute is in

17

violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution.
Any other course would lead to the destruction of the Constitution. Since the question as to the
constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction
upon the suggestion that action might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the
judicial tribunals. (11 Am. Jur., 714-715.)
Under the American system of constitutional government, among the most important functions in trusted
to the judiciary are the interpreting of Constitutions and, as a closely connected power, the determination
of whether laws and acts of the legislature are or are not contrary to the provisions of the Federal and
State Constitutions. (11 Am. Jur., 905.).
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act NO. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary
of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or
ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office, found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This
act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined
and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of
what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative
definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the
legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied)
The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision, validate it so as to
prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the

constitutional inhibition. (11 Am. Jur., 919, emphasis supplied)

We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the
power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the
interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative
department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution
means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it
in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions.
Under such a system, a final court determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law of
the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different interpretation of the
law or of the Constitution by the Legislative department. That would be neither wise nor desirable, besides
being clearly violative of the fundamental, principles of our constitutional system of government,
particularly those governing the separation of powers.
So much for the constitutional aspect of the case. Considering the practical side thereof, we believe that
the collection of income tax on a salary is an actual and evident diminution thereof. Under the old system
where the in-come tax was paid at the end of the year or sometime thereafter, the decrease may not be so
apparent and clear. All that the official who had previously received his full salary was called upon to do,
was to fulfill his obligation and to exercise his privilege of paying his income tax on his salary. His salary
fixed by law was received by him in the amount of said tax comes from his other sources of income, he
may not fully realize the fact that his salary had been decreased in the amount of said income tax. But
under the present system of withholding the income tax at the source, where the full amount of the

18

income tax corresponding to his salary is computed in advance and divided into equal portions
corresponding to the number of pay-days during the year and actually deducted from his salary
corresponding to each payday, said official actually does not receive his salary in full, because the income
tax is deducted therefrom every payday, that is to say, twice a month. Let us take the case of Justice
Endencia. As Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, his salary is fixed at p12,000 a year, that is to say,
he should receive P1,000 a month or P500 every payday, fifteenth and end of month. In the present
case, the amount collected by the Collector of Internal Revenue on said salary is P1,744.45 for one year.
Divided by twelve (months) we shall have P145.37 a month. And further dividing it by two paydays will
bring it down to P72.685, which is the income tax deducted form the collected on his salary each half
month. So, if Justice Endencias salary as a judicial officer were not exempt from payment of the income
tax, instead of receiving P500 every payday, he would be actually receiving P427.31 only, and instead of
receiving P12,000 a year, he would be receiving but P10,255.55. Is it not therefor clear that every payday,
his salary is actually decreased by P72.685 and every year is decreased by P1,744.45?
Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection with House Bill No. 1127, which became Republic
Act No. 590, it would seem that one of the main reasons behind the enactment of the law was the feeling
among certain legislators that members of the Supreme Court should not enjoy any exemption and that as
citizens, out of patriotism and love for their country, they should pay income tax on their salaries. It might
be stated in this connection that the exemption is not enjoyed by the members of the Supreme Court
alone but also by all judicial officers including Justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of inferior
courts. The exemption also extends to other constitutional officers, like the President of the Republic, the
Auditor General, the members of the Commission on Elections, and possibly members of the Board of Tax
Appeals, commissioners of the Public Service Commission, and judges of the Court of Industrial Relations.
Compares to the number of all these officials, that of the Supreme Court Justices is relatively insignificant.
There are more than 990 other judicial officers enjoying the exemption, including 15 Justices of the Court
of Appeals, about 107 Judges of First Instance, 38 Municipal Judges and about 830 Justices of the Peace.
The reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme
Court and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of
the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990 judicial officials.
The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers, but was grounded on public policy.
As said by Justice Van Devanter of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Evans vs. Gore (253 U.
S., 245):
The primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges, but, like the
clause in respect of tenure, to attract good and competent men to the bench and to promote that
independence of action and judgment which is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations
and pervading principles of the Constitution and to the administration of justice without respect to person
and with equal concern for the poor and the rich. Such being its purpose, it is to be construed, not as a
private grant, but as a limitation imposed in the public interest; in other words, not restrictively, but in
accord with its spirit and the principle on which it proceeds.
Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the Philippines enjoying this exemption,
especially when the great bulk thereof are justices of the peace, many of them receiving as low as P200 a
month, and considering further the other exemptions allowed by the income tax law, such as P3,000 for a
married person and P600 for each dependent, the amount of national revenue to be derived from income
tax on the salaries of judicial officers, were if not for the constitutional exemption, could not be large or

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substantial. But even if it were otherwise, it should not affect, much less outweigh the purpose and the
considerations that prompted the establishment of the constitutional exemption. In the same case
of Evans vs. Gore, supra, the Federal Supreme Court declared that they (fathers of the Constitution)
regarded the independence of the judges as far as greater importance than any revenue that could come
from taxing their salaries.
When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from payment of income tax
on his salary, as a privilege . It is already attached to his office, provided and secured by the fundamental
law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to secure and preserve his independence of
judicial thought and action. When we come to the members of the Supreme Court, this excemption to
them is relatively of short duration. Because of the limited membership in this High Tribunal, eleven, and
due to the high standards of experience, practice and training required, one generally enters its portals
and comes to join its membership quite late in life, on the aver-age, around his sixtieth year, and being
required to retire at seventy, assuming that he does not die or become incapacitated earlier, naturally he is
not in a position to receive the benefit of exemption for long. It is rather to the justices of the peace that
the exemption can give more benefit. They are relatively more numerous, and because of the meager
salary they receive, they can less afford to pay the income tax on it and its diminution by the amount of
the income tax if paid would be real, substantial and onerous.
Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing unusual or abhorrent in it, as long as it is based
on public policy or public interest. While all other citizens are subject to arrest when charged with the
commission of a crime, members of the Senate and House of Representatives except in cases of treason,
felony and breach of the peace are exempt from arrest, during their attendance in the session of the
Legislature; and while all other citizens are generally liable for any speech, remark or statement, oral or
written, tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to blacken
the memory of one who is dead, Senators and Congressmen in making such statements during their
sessions are extended immunity and exemption.
And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who enjoy this exemption. Persons, natural and
juridical, are exempt from taxes on their lands, buildings and improvements thereon when used
exclusively for educational purposes, even if they derive income therefrom. (Art. VI, Sec. 22 [3].) Holders of
government bonds are exempted from the payment of taxes on the income or interest they receive
therefrom (sec. 29 (b) [4], National Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic Act No. 566). Payments
or income received by any person residing in the Philippines under the laws of the United States
administered by the United States Veterans Administration are exempt from taxation. (Republic Act No.
360). Funds received by officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army who served in the Armed Forces
of the United States, allowances earned by virtue of such services corresponding to the taxable years 1942
to 1945, inclusive, are exempted from income tax. (Republic Act No. 210). The payment of wages and
allowances of officers and enlisted men of the Army Forces of the Philippines sent to Korea are also
exempted from taxation. (Republic Act No. 35). In other words, for reasons of public policy and public
interest, a citizen may justifiably by constitutional provision or statute be exempted from his ordinary
obligation of paying taxes on his income. Under the same public policy and perhaps for the same it not
higher considerations, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to exempt judicial
officers from paying taxes on their salaries so as not to decrease their compensation, thereby insuring the
independence of the Judiciary.

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In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that
the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the
Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is
within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the
Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a
Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said
statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous
interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.
In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with no
pronouncement as to costs.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, and Labrador, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring:
Without expressing any opinion on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, G.
R. No. L-2314, in view of the part I had in that case as former Solicitor General, I wish however to state
that I concur in the opinion of the majority to the effect that section 13, Republic Act No. 590, in so far as
it provides that taxing of the salary of a judicial officer shall be considered not to be a diminution of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law, constitutes an invasion of the province and jurisdiction
of the judiciary. In this sense, I am of the opinion that said section is null and void, it being a
transgression of the fundamental principle underlying the separation of powers.
PARAS, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
I dissent for the same reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Ozaeta in Perfecto vs. Meer,
85 Phil., 552, in which I concurred. But I disagree with the majority in ruling that no legislation may
provide that it be held valid although against a provision of the Constitution.

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Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. Palomar

Case No. 45
G.R. No. 19650 (September 29, 1966)
Chapter V, Page 137, Footnote No. 211
FACTS:
Petitioner conceived the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest where participants
have to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump can dispense
during a specific period of time. There was no fee or consideration required to be
paid, nor any purchase of any Caltex products to be made in order to join the
contest. Foreseeing the extensive use of mail for advertising and communications,
Caltex requested clearance for Respondent Postmaster General but was denied
citing said contest is a gift enterprise deemed as a non-mailable matter under the
anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Hence, Petitioner filed a petition for
declaratory relief.
ISSUE:
W/N the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest falls under the term gift enterprise
which is banned by the Postal Law.
HELD:
No, said contest is not a gift enterprise. The word lottery is defined as a
game of chance where the elements of which are (1) consideration, (2) chance,
and (3) prize. The term gift enterprise and scheme in the provision of the Postal
Law making unmailable any lottery, gift, enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of
money or any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind
means such enterprise as will require consideration as an element. The intent of the
prohibition is to suppress the tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt
public morals. There being no element of consideration in said contest, the spirit of
the law is preserved.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 28

Endencia and Jugo v. David

Case No. 98
G.R. No. L-6355-56 (August 31, 1953)
Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No.33
FACTS:
RA 590 declares that no salary received by a public officer shall be
considered exempt from income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be
a diminution of his compensation fixed by law. While Art. 8, Sec. 9 of the Constitution
states that judges shall receive compensation as fixed by law, which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office. Petitioners question the legality of RA
590.
ISSUE:
W/N RA 590 unconstitutional.
HELD:
No. Saying that the taxing of the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease in
compensation is a clear interpretation of Which shall not be diminished during their
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continuance in office, by the Legislature. Through the separation of powers, such a

task must be done by the Judiciary. Judicial officers are exempt from taxes on his
salary not for his own benefit but for the public, to secure and preserve his
independence of judicial thought and action.
LATIN MAXIM:
1, 6c, 7a, 24a
Mutuc vs. Comelec
Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention (1970). His candidacy was given
due course by the COMELEC but he was prohibited from playing his campaign jingle on his mobile units
because this is an apparent violation of COMELECs band to purchase, produce, request or distribute
sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature),
flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like,
whether of domestic or foreign origin. It was COMELECs contention that the jingle proposed to be
used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda
material (falling under and the likes category), under the above COMELEC statute subject to
confiscation.
HELD: 1. By virtue of Ejusdem Generis, general words following any enumeration must be of the same
class as those specifically referred to. It did contend, however, that one of its provisions referred to
above makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens,
lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and
cigarettes, and concluding with the words and the like. For respondent Commission, the last three
words sufficed to justify such an order. We view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our
approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any
enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. It
is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind
referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its
distribution.
2. This is a curtailment of Freedom of Expression. The Constitution prohibits the abridgment of the
freedom of speech.

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