TANADA VS.

TUVERA
Publication is indispensable for the validity of laws, even if it provides for its own effectivity date.
Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of penal regulations and make the said
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. All unpublished presidential issuances, which are
of general application, shall have no binding force and effect until published.
OPLE VS. TORRES
Definition of Administrative Orders:
Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental
operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative
orders.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in
the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the
sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
Ruling:
A.O. No. 308 is declared unconstitutional for being violative of the principle of separation of powers. It
erodes the plenary power of Congress to make laws. It establishes for the first time a National
Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of
various contending state policies the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest
against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen
cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without
the contemplated identification card.
BLAQUERA VS. ALCALA
The President issued subject Administrative Orders to regulate the grant of productivity incentive
benefits and to prevent discontentment, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government
personnel by committing limited resources of government for the equal payment of incentives and
awards. The President was only exercising his power of control by modifying the acts of the
respondents who granted incentive benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from
the Office of the President, thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources. In
the view of the President, respondents did a mistake which had to be corrected. In so acting, the
President exercised a constitutionally-protected prerogative
The Presidents duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all
executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the
power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls
and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action
taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule
on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary. (Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Pao,
21 SCRA 898)
Neither can it be said that the President encroached upon the authority of the Commission on Civil
Service to grant benefits to government personnel. AO 29 and AO 268 did not revoke the privilege
of employees to receive incentive benefits. The same merely regulated the grant and amount thereof.
Sound management and effective utilization of financial resources of government are basically

executive functions, not the Commissions. Implicit is this recognition in EO 292, which states:
Sec. 35. Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System. - There shall be established a
government-wide employee suggestions and incentive awards system which shall be administered
under such rules, regulations, and standards as maybe promulgated by the Commission. In
accordance with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the Commission, the President or
the head of each department or agency is authorized to incur whatever necessary expenses involved
in the honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the government who by their
suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishment, and other personal efforts contribute to the
efficiency, economy, or other improvement of government operations, or who perform such other
extraordinary acts or services in the public interest in connection with, or in relation to, their official
employment. (Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Book V)
Conformably, it is the President or the head of each department or agency who is authorized to incur
the necessary expenses involved in the honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees
of the government. It is not the duty of the Commission to fix the amount of the incentives. Such
function belongs to the President or his duly empowered alter ego.
CAMPOREDONDO VS. NLRC
The test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or private in nature is
simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under
the general corporation law? Those with special charters are government corporations subject to its
provisions, and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and are
compulsory members of the Government Service Insurance System. The PNRC was not "impliedly
converted to a private corporation" simply because its charter was amended. Therefore, the NLRC
had no jurisdiction of petitioner.
SHIPSIDE VS CA
The functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or
ministrant. While public benefit and public welfare, particularly, the promotion of the economic and
social development of Central Luzon, may be attributable to the operation of the BCDA, yet it is
certain that the functions performed by the BCDA are basically proprietary in nature. The promotion
of economic and social development of Central Luzon, in particular, and the countrys goal for
enhancement, in general, do not make the BCDA equivalent to the Government. Other corporations
have been created by government to act as its agents for the realization of its programs, the SSS,
GSIS, NAWASA and the NIA, to count a few, and yet, the Court has ruled that these entities,
although performing functions aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, are not
government-function corporations invested with governmental attributes. It may thus be said that the
BCDA is not a mere agency of the Government but a corporate body performing proprietary
functions.
REPUBLIC VS EXPRESS TELECOM
The rule is well-entrenched that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before resorting to
the courts. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one's cause of action.
This rule would not only give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter by itself
correctly, but would also prevent the unnecessary and premature resort to courts. In the case of
Lopez v. City of Manila, we held:
As a general rule, where the law provides for the remedies against the action of an administrative

board, body or officer, relief to courts can be sought only after exhausting all remedies provided. The
reason rests upon the presumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to correct its
mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and decide it properly. Therefore, where a
remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can
be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide the matter
by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts.
Clearly, Extelcom violated the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies when it went directly to
the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition from the Order of the NTC without first
filing a motion for reconsideration. It is well-settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a
prerequisite to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari.
The general rule is that, in order to give the lower court the opportunity to correct itself, a motion for
reconsideration is a prerequisite to certiorari. It is also basic that petitioner must exhaust all other
available remedies before resorting to certiorari. This rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions
such as any of the following: (1) the issues raised are purely legal in nature, (2) public interest is
involved, (3) extreme urgency is obvious or (4) special circumstances warrant immediate or more
direct action.
This case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to this rule. Although the Order of the
NTC granting provisional authority to Bayantel was immediately executory, it did not preclude the
filing of a motion for reconsideration. Under the NTC Rules, a party adversely affected by a decision,
order, ruling or resolution may within fifteen days file a motion for reconsideration. That the Order of
the NTC became immediately executory does not mean that the remedy of filing a motion for
reconsideration is foreclosed to the petitioner.
PHILSA VS SECRETARY
The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, namely private employment
agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling in Taada vs. Tuvera.
Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those
merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties. Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall under any of these
exceptions. Therefore, petitioner should be absolved from the three (3) counts of illegal exaction as
POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 could not be the basis of administrative sanctions
against petitioner for lack of publication.
COMELEC VS QUIJANO-PADILLA
The contract is void and unenforceable. Enshrined in the Constitution is the mandate that "no money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." Thus, in the
execution of government contracts, the precise import of this constitutional restriction is to require the
various agencies to limit their expenditures within the appropriations made by law for each fiscal year.
The VRIS Project was awarded to PHOTOKINA on account of its bid in the amount of P6.588 Billion
Pesos. However, under Republic Act No. 8760, the only fund appropriated for the project was P1
Billion Pesos and under the Certification of Available Funds only P1.2 Billion Pesos was
available. Clearly, the amount appropriated is insufficient to cover the cost of the entire VRIS
Project. There is no way that the COMELEC could enter into a contract with PHOTOKINA whose
accepted bid was way beyond the amount appropriated by law for the project. This being the case,

the BAC should have rejected the bid for being excessive or should have withdrawn the Notice of
Award on the ground that in the eyes of the law, the same is null and void.
SIMON VS CHR
CHR is not a quasi-judicial body. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as
regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasijudicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
CHR has only investigative powers.
SANDOVAL VS COMELEC
Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for annulment of petitioner's proclamation,
COMELEC was not merely performing an administrative function. The administrative powers of the
COMELEC include the power to determine the number and location of polling places, appoint election
officials and inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and
government instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, register
political parties, organizations or coalitions, accredit citizens' arms of the Commission, prosecute
election offenses, and recommend to the President the removal of or imposition of any other
disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has deputized for violation or disregard of its
directive, order or decision. In addition, the Commission also has direct control and supervision over
all personnel involved in the conduct of election. However, the resolution of the adverse claims of
private respondent and petitioner as regards the existence of a manifest error in the questioned
certificate of canvass requires the COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It behooves the Commission to
hear both parties to determine the veracity of their allegations and to decide whether the alleged error
is a manifest error. Hence, the resolution of this issue calls for the exercise by the COMELEC of its
quasi- judicial power. It has been said that where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is
of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is
conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. The COMELEC
therefore, acting as quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of procedural due process
in resolving the petitions filed by private respondent.
VILLAFLOR VS CA
Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; i.e.,
courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of
an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.[21]
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply this doctrine to cases involving matters
that demand the special competence of administrative agencies even if the question involved is also
judicial in character. It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into
play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case,

the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its
view.
In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto
itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. In Machete vs. Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the
primary jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB) in an agrarian
dispute over the payment of back rentals under a leasehold contract. In Concerned Officials of the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Vasquez, the Court recognized that the MWSS
was in the best position to evaluate and to decide which bid for a waterworks project was compatible
with its development plan.
The rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case, since the
questions on the identity of the land in dispute and the factual qualification of private respondent as
an awardee of a sales application require a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands as the
administrative agency with the expertise to determine such matters. Because these issues
preclude prior judicial determination, it behooves the courts to stand aside even when they
apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of the
administrative agency.
PAAT VS CA
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can
still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before courts
judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause
of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for
lack of cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its
practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses
and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of
justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency
concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are not
amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of
cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by
the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is
disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when
there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter
ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require
exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10)
when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
CARALE VS ABARINTOS
Observance of the mandate regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is a sound practice and
policy. It ensures an orderly procedure which favors a preliminary sifting process, particularly with
respect to matters peculiarly within the competence of the administrative agency, avoidance of
interference with functions of the administrative agency by withholding judicial action until the

administrative process had run its course, and prevention of attempts to swamp the courts by a resort
to them in the first instance. The underlying principle of the rule rests on the presumption that the
administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter, will decide the same
correctly. There are both legal and practical reasons for this principle. The administrative process is
intended to provide less expensive and more speedy solutions to disputes. Where the enabling
statute indicates a procedure for administrative review, and provides a system of administrative
appeal, or reconsideration, the courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, will not entertain a
case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate
authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the
administrative forum. Accordingly, the party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the
prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion
before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide
the matter by itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court. In the instant
case, Pontejos did not attempt to seek administrative relief, which was both available and sufficient.