Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Emerson Baez
FROM: Rabelais Medina
DATE: November 3, 14
RE: Limitation of the United State Presidents Foreign Relations Powers
FACTS
Presidents Power to Foreign Relations
1. Constitutional Grant
The Presidents constitutional grants with regard to foreign
affairs are stated in the following provision excerpts: a) ARTICLE
II. Section 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a President
of the United States, b) ARTICLE II. Section 2. The President
shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into
the actual Service of the United c) States xxx He shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors and other
public Ministers and Consuls and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for d) ARTICLE II. Section 3. he shall receive Ambassadors and
other public Ministers he shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the
United States.
2. Initiation (President v Congress)
The president or the Congress can initiate foreign relations.
Constitutionally, foreign policy powers are divided between
president and the Congress, but the Congress, and the country
as a whole, often defers to the presidents wishes because the
office has come to represent the country as a whole when
dealing with the rest of the world.1 The President or the executive
branch can make foreign policy through: 1) responses to foreign
events, 2) proposals for legislation, 3) negotiation of international
agreements, 4) policy statements and 5) policy implementation.2
The Congress can make foreign policy through: 1) resolutions
and policy statements, 2) legislative directives, 3) legislative
pressure, 4) legislative restrictions/funding denials, 5) informal
advice and 6) congressional oversight.3
1 Genovese, M. et al (2005). The Presidency and the Law. New York, N.Y. PALGRAVE
MACMILLAN. p163. Print.
2 Grimmett, R. (1991). Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress. CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE REPORTS (CRS) AND ISSUE BRIEFS
3 Ibid. 2.
assailed on the ground that it was not legislated by the Congress. [The
court upheld the validity on the grounds 1) that it was authorized by
past congressional enactments and 2) that the congress has implicitly
supported the action by the absence of any action]. 7 [B]ecause of the
changeable and explosive nature of contemporary international
relations, and the fact that the Executive is immediately privy to
information which cannot be swiftly presented to, evaluated by, and
acted upon by the legislature, Congressin giving the Executive
authority over matters of foreign affairsmust of necessity paint with
a brush broader than that it customarily wields in domestic areas. 8It
however said that [t]his does not mean that simply because a statute
deals with foreign relations, it can grant the Executive totally
unrestricted freedom of choice. However, the 1926 Act contains no
such grant. We have held, Kent v. Dulles, supra, and reaffirm today,
that the 1926 Act must take its content from history: it authorizes only
those passport refusals and restrictions which it could fairly be argued
were adopted by Congress in light of prior administrative practice.
Kent v. Dulles, supra, at 128. So limited, the Act does not constitute an
invalid delegation. . . .9
e. Goldwater v. Carter
The issue at bar in this case is whether or not the termination of a
treaty by the President requires the concurrence of the Senate. The
court was divided on the issue since the constitution is silent on the
matter. Their division however, in effect, technically validated President
Carters termination of the United States treaty with Taiwan. Justice
Powells contention on the matter states that [t]he Judicial Branch
should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between the
President and Congress until the political branches reach a
constitutional impasse. Otherwise, we would encourage small groups
or even individual Members of Congress to seek judicial resolution of
issues before the normal political process has the opportunity to
resolve the conflict.10 Justice Bernnan dissented, stating that the
issues is not political in nature and that the previous jurisprudence
states that the Constitution commits to the President alone the power
to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign regimes11.
f. Dames & Moore v. Regan
The Supreme Court held in this case that the Congress failure to act
tacitly on the matter authorized the executive agreements of the US
with Iran on the suspension of American financial claims against Iran. It
held, [t]o the contrary, we think both the legislative history and cases
7 Ibid. 1. p 172.
8 Ibid.
9 Zemel v Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965)
10 Goldwater v. Carter 444 U.S. 996 (1979)
11 Ibid.