You are on page 1of 54

HAZID REPORT

CONTAINER SECURING OPERATION

February 2014

Rev. 1

KOREAN REGISTER OF SHIPPING

CONTAINER
ONTAINER SECURING OPERATION
PERATION
HAZID R
REPORT

PROJECT TITLE

Development of CSAP (Cargo Safe Access Plan) for IMO CSS (Cargo
Stowage & Securing) Code Annex 14

PROJECT NO.

N.A.

TASK

HAZID Study on Container Securing Operation

DOCUMENT TITLE

HAZID Report

DOCUMENT NO.

N.A.

PAGES

54 (including cover)

New Technology Support Team & Hull Team I (Cargo Ship),


CLIENT

Technical Division,
Korean Register of Shipping

RESPONSIBLE
PARTY

Ship & Plant Research Team,


New Growth Research Division,
Korean Register of Shipping

Rev.

Date

27 Jan. 2014

14 Feb. 2014

Reason for Issue

Prepared

Checked

Approved

Draft issue for Team review

C.H. Choung

J.G. Lim

K.H. Song

Final report issue

C.H. Choung

J.G. Lim

K.H. Song

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
IMO CSS code Annex 14, which was newly included in 2010, requires a CSAP (Cargo safe
access plan) and risk assessments on container securing operation. In order to identify all
the possible hazards and then enhance the safety of container securing operation, a
HAZID study was conducted. As a result of the HAZID study, 5 hazards and related 39
hazardous events in total were identified and ranked in terms of risk index for the semiquantitative risk evaluation.
Among the hazards and hazardous events identified, 5 hazards and 24 events were
found to have unacceptable risk level, and 15 events to have acceptable but ALARP risk
level. Regarding the hazards and hazardous events with unacceptable risk or ALARP risk,
additional safety actions and recommendations for risk control were discussed and
proposed in SAFETY ACTION LOG, which would be considered and utilized by designers
or a supervisor when developing the CSAP and ship design in the future.
In conclusion, the overall safety level of the container securing operation is considered
unacceptable. It is found that all the 5 potential hazards could be critical threats to the
operators on board. Relevant safety actions against them, therefore, must be provided to
the operation process or ship design. Furthermore, it is also recommended that, for more
reliable and safe system development, some practical measures should be investigated
appropriately in order to control the hazards, in accordance with the ALARP principle.

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

PARTICIPATING COMPANY
Korean Register of Shipping

KR

DISCLAIMER
Korean Register has made every reasonable effort to perform the work contained herein
in a manner consistent with high professional standards. This work is dependent on the
accuracy of information provided by the Client.

ii

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction 1
2. Abbreviations and References 2
2.1 Abbreviations 2
2.2 Reference Documents 2
3. HAZID Methodology 3
4. Container Securing Operation 5
5. HAZID Study 7
5.1 Purpose 7
5.2 Scope of Work 7
5.3 HAZID Team 8
5.4 HAZID Workshop 8
5.5 Risk Evaluation Criteria 9
6. HAZID Results 13
6.1 Overview 13
6.2 Hazard Review 15
7. Conclusion 17

ANNEX I

HAZID TEAM LIST 21

ANNEX II

CVs of EXPERTS 22

ANNEX III

PRE-DEFINED HAZARD LIST 24

ANNEX IV

HAZID WORKSHEET 25

ANNEX V

HAZARD REGISTER 32

ANNEX VI

SAFETY ACTION LOG 35

iii

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

1. Introduction
Container securing operation, such as lashing and unlashing, currently being carried out
in container ports is generally considered as highly dangerous, and a range of accidents
resulting in severe injuries and fatalities have occurred frequently. In order to control the
danger work appropriately, IMO regulation of CSS (Cargo stowage & securing) code was
established
tablished and gone into force in 1998. Since then, the code was amended several
times, and new Annex 14 (MSC.1/Circ.1352), which has the title of Guidan
Guidance on Providing
Safe Working Conditions for Securing of Containers on Deck
Deck,, was included in 2010.
CSS code Annex 14 requires preparing a CSAP (Cargo safe access plan) based on risk
assessment of container securing operation. Furthermore, it is required by the code that
initial design of container carrier should be performed based on the results of risk
assessments.
In order to increase the knowledge on the container securing
ecuring operation and to identify
the major issues or hazards that could have significant impact on the safety of the
operation,, a HAZID (Hazard identification)
dentification) study was carried out by a multi
multi-disciplinary
HAZID team, under the lead of KR. A HAZID workshop
p that is essential work of the study
was conducted on 21st October 2013, at KR head-office, Busan, Korea.
The purpose of this report is to outline the works and methodology of the HAZID study
conducted for the container securing operation
operation. And the resultss of the study including
findings, proposals and recommendations are also summarized in the report and should
be considered at the development of the CSAP and ship design.

Page 1

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

2. Abbreviations and References


2.1 Abbreviations
Abbreviation
ALARP

Description
As low as reasonably practicable

CEA

Cost effectiveness analysis

CSAP

Cargo safe access plan

CSS

Cargo stowage and securing

FSA

Formal Safety Assessment

FI
HAZID
IMO

Frequency index
Hazard identification
International maritime organization

RI

Risk index

SI

Severity index

2.2 Reference Documents


Reference documents available for the HAZID study are like the followings;
[1] MSC.1/Circ.1352, Amendments to the code of safe practice for cargo stowage and
securing, Annex 14, June 2010
[2] Safety of container lashing operation
operation, KOSHA Technical Report, November 2011
[3] Guideline of safe loading and unloading operation for container carrier
carrier, KOSHA
Guide B-1-2011,
2011, December 2011
[4] Safety
afety measures for lasing operation
operation, KOSHA workshop material
[5] General arrangement of a typical large container carrier (9,000 TEU class
class)
[6] MSC 83/INF.2, The Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO
rule-making
making process (MSC/Circ.1023
(MSC/Circ.1023-MEPC/Circ.392), May 2007
At the beginning of the HAZID workshop, the documents above were briefly presented
to the members of HAZID team for consideration.

Page 2

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

3. HAZID Methodology
The overall objective of HAZID study, which would
ould be generally implemented at design
concept development or initial design phase, is to understand various interactions
between the target system and its surroundings, and interference between main facilities,
so that engineers, who are related to the target system development, can identify
possible hazards associated with the target sy
system.
stem. Therefore, it is possible, in a more
reasonable and efficient way, to review the safety level of the target system and to
explore adequate safety actions preventing and/or mitigating the impact of identified
hazards on the human, environment and vess
vessel.
The
he general procedure of HAZID study is shown in Figure 3-1
1 below. The HAZID
preparation should be made, preferably no later than one week prior to the start of
HAZID workshop, by HAZID facilitator and informed to all the HAZID participants.

Figure 3-1
1 Overall Schematic Diagram of HAZID Study Procedure
HAZID study is carried out by a HAZID team, which is basically a multidisciplinary team
of personnel and consists of one facilitator as team leader and several qua
qualified experts
having various experience and knowledge on the target system. If necessary, a scribe
may participate in the team for documentation. However, a HAZID team should not have
too many people around the table at any time, in order to make the team easy to be
managed. A typicall HAZID team should include the following experts familiar with the
target system;
Page 3

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

A project representative

A technical secretary of the project

Safety/process/facility designer(s) and/or engineer(s)

Construction/operation designer(s) and/or engineer(s)

HAZID workshop is the main work of HAZID study. The workshop is normally conducted
for 1 to 5 days, depending on the size and complexity of the target system
systems contents.
HAZID workshop is basically team
team-based brainstorming, and often, in order to facilitat
facilitate
discussion during the workshop, specific technique may be used in addition. There are
some techniques available for HAZID workshop, such as HAZID Checklist, What
What-If, SWIFT,
FMECA, etc. Among them, facilitator should select the most appropriate one and
introduce
troduce it to HAZID team members at the beginning of the workshop for consideration.
Furthermore, for the sake of ranking or prioritizing risk associated with identified hazards,
adequate method and evaluation criteria, which are qualitative or semi
semi-quantitative in
most cases, should be prepared by facilitator before the workshop. Risk prioritization
could give designers/engineers the benefit of identifying which hazards or safety systems
should be noticed for more enhanced safety of the target system. In general,
eneral, the answers
to the following questions are discussed during the workshop and then recorded in the
HAZID worksheet:
l

What systems are included in study area?

What kind of hazards may occur in the area?

What kind of causes may involve the hazards?

What are the potential consequences?

What are the effective risk-reducing measures?, and

Are there recommendations


ecommendations for further safety improvement?

Outcomes of HAZID study should be documented properly and finalized after review of
HAZID team members. HAZI
HAZID
D report to be prepared and issued by facilitator is a
representative result of HAZID study. The report should include summary of works done,
materials used, findings, proposed actions and recommendations. And also, SAFETY
ACTION LOG that contains the requ
required
ired course of actions or further recommendations
developed and agreed by HAZID team should be attached in the report.

Page 4

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

4. Container Securing Operation


In this section, typical works of container lashing/unlashing are described in brief.
Container lashing is to secure the container box to fixed container securing fittings on
the container ship using portable container securing fittings.
Raised container sockets are normally used as fixed container fittings. Twistlocks
Twistlocks, stacker
and lashing bars are normally used as portable container fittings. First step of container
securing is to install twistlocks or stackers beneath the bottom of container box at the
quay before loading the container box onboard the vessel. When the container box is
loaded onboard the vessel with the gantry crane, the twistlocks or stackers are inserted
into the raised container sockets. Stackers are usually used for container stowage in hold
while twistlocks are used for container stowage on deck. T
Twistlock
wistlock is generally semi
semiautomatic type. Hence,, when the twistlocks are inserted into the raised sockets, they are
closed automatically. In this way, o
other container boxes are loaded on top of container
boxes which are secured on deck. In case of 18
18,000 TEU container carriers, 1
10 tiers of
container box are stowed on deck and 11 tiers are stowed in hold.
The effectiveness
ectiveness of container lashing
lashing, performed as described above
above, is evaluated in
accordance with the respective rule of classification societies. Ra
Racking,
cking, compression,
lifting and shear forces induced on the container box due to the ship motions defined by
the six degrees of freedom are checked when evaluating the container lashing. Especially
in case that containers are stowed high on deck more than 3 tiers, racking, compression
and lifting can be problematic. In order to reduce these problematic loads, lashing rods
(or lashing bars) are additionally installed with various lashing patterns between container
box and container lashing eye fixed on the ccontainer
ontainer ships. Container boxes, stowed on
deck in the outmost row of the ships, are subject to the wind load. To resist this wind
load, additional lashing rods are generally installed for the container boxes in the
outmost row of the ship.
Container loading
ing and lashing works are carried out in the orders as mentioned above.
However, container unloading and unlashing works are performed in the opposite orders.
When unlashing the container box, lashing rods should be removed manually
manually, using
operating rod. And then, the
he semi
semi-automatic twistlocks in closed position should be
opened manually, using the operation rod. After all this work, container box can be
unloaded form the ship to the quay by the gantry crane.
Page 5

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

All the working process mentioned above are usually performed in the very narrow and
high position such as the space on lashing bridge. Lashing rod may be longer than 2
times of container box height. Therefore, lashing and unlashing operation itself is very
dangerous work which has many hazards such as fall, slip, trips and other
ther potential fatal
accidents.

Page 6

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

5. HAZID Study
5.1 Purpose
The purposes of this HAZID study are:
l

To identify the nature and scale of hazards that might present during the
container securing operation
operation,

To identify the possible causes associated with the identified hazards


hazards,

To identify the potential


tential impact of hazards on the people performing the
container securing operation on deck,

To review the adequacy of existing safeguards (hardware systems and/or


operational procedures)
ures) associated with the identified hazards,

To propose additional safety actions and recommendations for improving the


safety of the container securing operation, and

To understand overall safety level of the current process of container securing


operation.

5.2 Scope of Work


The
he work scope of this HAZID study includes
l

Container securing operation process on deck,, such as lashing and unlashing,


which is being carried out by several operators according to the current practice
practice.

Subject vessel is a range of large container carriers (Post-Panamax


Panamax class) currently existing,
and it is assumed that the vessels are being moored at berth in a container port for
loading and unloading. Any seagoing condition of the vessels is out of the scope of this
study. Furthermore, any operation of container securing in hold is not covered.
Operation modes considered are three types.
l

Lashing

Unlashing

Moving between lashing points

In this study, only the risk to human wass considered. Neither risk to environment nor risk
to asset was investigated, since all the experts participating in the study agreed that the
operation of container securing could hardly thr
threaten
eaten natural environment and asset.

Page 7

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

5.3 HAZID Team


A HAZID team was constructed with total 7 members for this study. A safety engineer
(facilitator) from KR facilitated the HAZID workshop and provided knowledge on the
HAZID methodology. All the iissues discussed and items determined during the workshop
were also recorded relevantly in the HAZID worksheet by a scribe from KR. Several
experts related to the container securing operation
operation, from KR,, joined the team and
attended the HAZID workshop. All of them are the qualified experts having considerable
experience and expertise on the operation and survey of container lashing/unlashing
lashing/unlashing.
Brief information on the HAZID team members is provided in ANNEX I and ANNEX II.

5.4 HAZID Workshop


HAZID workshop is the main activity of HAZID study. The followings are the detailed
description of the HAZID workshop conducted for this study.
5.4.1 Venue and Date
A HAZID workshop was held at the 5th meeting room (the 11th floor) of KR head
head-office in
Busan, Korea on 21st October 2013. The workshop started at 11:00 and ended at 18:00.
5.4.2
.4.2 Workshop Process
The HAZID workshop was conducted as a facilitated and team-based
based brainstorming
using several pre-defined hazards as prompts for identification. The pre
pre-defined hazards,
which were determined by facilitator before the workshop, such as ANNEX III, were
provided to the HAZID team members at the beginning of the workshop.
As for the container securing operation of conventional large container carrier
carriers (PostPanamax class),, all kinds of potential
potentials, such as causes and consequences
consequences, and risk indices
were explored by the HAZID team during the workshop. And then, various safeguards
(hardware systems and/or operational procedures), which were already existing or being
planned to be applied in the future, for reducing the risk associated with the specific
hazards (or hazardous
ous events
events) were reviewed. And
nd also, if necessary, further applicable
safety measures were examined. All the items mentioned in the workshop were relevantly
recorded in HAZID WORKSHEET ((see ANNEX IV). The
he HAZID workshop was carried out in
accordance with the following steps
steps;

Page 8

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

HAZID methodology and workshop schedule were introduced by tthe facilitator to


ensure that all the attendees are familiar with the workshop process and
schedule.

Scope of work, pre-defined


defined hazards, operation modes and risk matrix to be used
were explained by the
he facilitator
facilitator.

Basic information on the ccontainer securing operation was presented by a


an
expert from New Technology Support Team of KR.

Hazards, causes and consequences that have the potential to affect personnel
were identified.

Existing or planned safeguards were discussed.

Risk indices for the hazards (or hazardous events) were decided.

Additional safety
ty actions and recommendations were examined.

All the findings and decisions from the workshop are the result of consensus of the team
members and based on the experience and expertise of the qualified experts.

5.5
.5 Risk Evaluation Criteria
For
or the evaluation and prioritization of the risk level associated with identified hazards,
specific semi-quantitative
quantitative risk evaluation criteria, such as risk matrix, was used. Risk
prioritization or ranking is a simplistic technique for an initial sorting o
of identified
hazards into categories according to their perceived level of seriousness in order to allow
them to receive the appropriate level of attention.
Container securing operation is a usual work being implemented
d on the existing
container carriers.. In this regard
regard,, it is considered reasonable that the risk evaluation
criteria established for the safety of conventional ships are applicable to th
the operation.
Various international activities for enhanc
enhancing ships safety have been carried out since the
late 1990s. One of the outcomes from IMO (International maritime
aritime organization) was
taken into consideration as the most appropriate one in this study. In more detail,
considering The Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment for use in the IMO rule
rule-making
process (MSC/Circ.1023-MEPC/Circ.392)
MEPC/Circ.392) proposed by IMO
IMO, risk
isk evaluation criteria for
discussion and decision of the HAZID team during the HAZID workshop were defined.

Page 9

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

5.5.1 Frequency Index


In order to facilitate examination and decision on the likelihood (or probability) of
hazards (or hazardous events
events),, frequency categorization and related indices were defined
as shown in the frequency index table ((Table 5-1).. According to the recommendation in
the IMO guideline, the indices are in a logarithmi
logarithmic scale.
Regarding each hazard (or hazard
hazardous event),, the most appropriate frequency index was
discussed during the workshop and finally determined through full agreement among
the members of HAZID team.
Table 5
5-1 Definition of Frequency Index (FI)
FI

Frequency

Frequent

Description

Category

Reasonably
Probable

Likely to occur once per month on the operation


Likely to occur once per year on the operatio
operation, or
Likely
ikely to occur once per 10 times operation
Likely to occur once per 10 years on the operation, or
Likely
ikely to occur once per 100 times operation
Likely to occur once per 100 years on the operation, or

Likely to occur once per 1,000 times operation


(i.e. for a container carrier, likely to occur once in its life time)
Likely to occur once per 1,000 years on the operation, or

Remote

Likely
ikely to occur once per 10,000 times operation
(i.e. for several container carriers, likely to occur once in their life time)

Extremely
Remote

Unlikely but possible to occur once or twice in the total life of all the
container carriers
So extremely remote that it should not be considered as possible to
occur

5.5.2 Severity Index


In order to facilitate examination and decision on the seriousness
riousness of hazards (or
hazardous events), severity categorization and related indices were defined as shown in
the severity index table (Table
Table 5-2).. According to the recommendation in the IMO
guideline, the indices are in a logarithmic scale.

Page 10

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

Regarding each hazard (hazard


hazardous event), the most appropriate severity index was
discussed during the workshop and finally determined through full agreement among
the members of HAZID team.
Table 5-2 Definition of Severity Index (SI)
SI

Severity

Description

Category

(Effects on Human)

Minor

Significant

Severe

Catastrophic

Single minor injury


Single severe injury or multiple minor injuries
Single fatality or multiple severe injuries
Multiple fatalities

5.5.3 Risk Index


Risk is defined as the combination of the frequency of accidents occurrence and the
severity of its consequences. For the semi
semi-quantitative
quantitative risk evaluation criteria, a risk index
was determined as the sum of frequency index and severity index:
l

Risk Index = Frequency Index + Severity Index

To all the hazards (or hazardous event


events) identified, relevant risk indices
ces were given, and
then it was possible to prioritize risk levels of each hazards (or hazard
hazardous events). In
other words, comparing the risk index of each hazard (or hazardous
ous event
event), the HAZID
team members could understand which event and hazard had higher risk level and so
should be paid close attention to.
5.5.4
.5.4 Risk Matrix and Risk Region
Risk matrix is constructed using the combination of FI and SI. The
he risk matrix used for
this study is presented
esented in Table 5-3. In this study, ALARP (As low as reasonably
easonably practical)
principle, which is commonly accepted for maritime safety issues and recommend
recommended by
the IMO guideline, was considered for risk evaluation

Page 11

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

Table 5-3 Risk Matrix and Risk Region


Severity
1

FI

Frequency

Minor

Significant

Severe

Catastrophic

Frequent

10

11

10

Reasonably Probable

Remote

Extremely Remote

The
he risk matrix is divided into three risk regions as defined below:
l

Intolerable risk regio


egion: The red-colored area. It has the risk indices equal to or
larger than 7. This
his level of risk exposes the company to intolerable losses to
people. No hazard in this region is acceptable and thus the
he hazard located on
this region shall be eliminated or its risk shall be reduced immediately through
appropriate safety actions (e.g., design changes, safety systems, inspection
inspection, or
maintenance procedure etc.
etc.).

ALARP risk region: The


he yellow
yellow-colored area. It has the risk indices less than 7 and
greater than 4. Allll the hazards in this region have acceptable risk level in
principle, but this level of risk should be mitigated by all physical, procedural and
behavioral controls that can practicably be applied. When the level of risk cannot
be reduced further without additional expenditure, a responsible person of
project should make a decision on its implementation, based on ALARP principle.

Negligible risk region


region: The blue-colored area. It has the risk indices equal to or
less than 4. This level of risk is sufficiently small to be ignored. Any hazard in this
region is broadly acceptable, and further safety action for risk reduction is not
necessary.

Page 12

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

6. HAZID Results
In this HAZID study, dozens of hazardous events related to the five (5) pre-defined
hazards were identified through the HAZID workshop. Hazardous event means a possible
scenario of accident associated with a specific hazard. A detailed causal relationship
between potential cause and consequence can be understood from a hazardous event.
During the HAZID workshop, various safeguards already provided in the container
securing

operation

were

discussed
discussed,

and

then

additional

safety

actions

or

recommendations required for risk reduction were investigated as well.


All the items discussed and found during the HAZID workshop were recorded in HAZID
WORKSHEET, as shown in ANNEX IV.

6.1 Overview
From the HAZID workshop and post
post-HAZID
HAZID processing, totally 39 hazardous events for
the five (5) pre-defined
defined hazards were identified. The
he second and fifth hazards produced
the most hazardous events, such as 11, and the fourth hazard made the least events of 3.
Table 6-1 Number of Hazardous Events by Hazard
Pre-defined Hazards
1. Slips and

2. Falls from

3. Dropped

4. Working

5. Poor

Trips

Height

Object

Environment

Operation

11

11

Sum

Number of
Hazardous

39

Events

Figure 6-1 Distribution of Hazardous Events by Hazard

Page 13

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

For the sake of risk prioritization, all the hazard


hazardous events identified were ranked in
terms of risk index according to Section 5.5. The number of hazardou
ous events classified
by the risk index is shown in Table 6-2 and Figure 6-2.
Table 6-2 Number of Hazardous Events by Risk Index
Negligible Risk
Risk Index
Number of
Hazardous Events

ALARP Risk

Intolerable Risk

10

13

23

Figure 6-2 Distribution of Hazardous Events by Risk Index


The largest risk index is 8.0 and it was given to one hazardous event belonging to the
fifth hazard, such as poor operation
operation. Among the all hazardous events identified, 24
events are unacceptable, such as intolerable risk level, and the rest of the events (15
events) are acceptable, such as ALARP risk level. There was no event having sufficiently
low risk level to be neglected
neglected.
The number of hazardous events classified according to both the pre-defined
defined hazard and
the risk region is shown in Table 6-3 and Figure 6-3. The majority of the hazardous
events, almost 62%, are located in the intolerable risk region, and the others, about 38%,
are in the ALARP risk region
region. No events in the negligible risk region were identified. The
second and fifth hazards, such as Falls from height and Poor
Poor operation
operation, have produced
the most highly ranked hazardous events, and the fir
first and third hazards, such as Slips
and trips and Dropped
Dropped object
object,, are also associated with unacceptable risk. Relatively, the
fourth hazard, such as Working
Working environment
environment,, has made less hazardous events and
contributed to lower risk level. As a result, overall risk level of container securing
operation is considered as quite high and unacceptable.

Page 14

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

Table 6-3 Number of Hazardous Events by Hazard & Risk Level


No.

Pre-defined
defined
Hazards

Number of Hazardous Events


Negligible

ALARP

Intolerable

Risk

Risk

Risk

Sum

Slips and Trips


rips

Falls from Height


eight

11

Dropped Object
bject

Working Environment
nvironment

Poor Operation
peration

11

15

24

39

Sum

Figure 6-3 Distribution of Hazardous Events by Hazard & Risk Level

6.2 Hazard Review


Further detailed descriptions of the hazards and hazardous events identified from the
HAZID study are written as the follows.
6.2.1 Hazards with the Intolerable Risk
As shown in Table 6-3
3 and Figure 6
6-3, all the pre-defined hazards are associated with the
hazardous events belonging to the intolerable risk region. In other words, any hazard
among them could provoke highly dangerous accidents that have unaccept
acceptable risk level.
Accordingly, additional safety actions shall be inv
invented
ented and applied to the current
practice of container securing operation for ensuring the risks due to the hazards will be
reduced to an acceptable level, such as below the upper limit of the ALARP risk region,
regardless of the cost-effectiveness.
effectiveness.

Page 15

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

It is found that, due to the pre-defined hazards, 24 hazardous events having the
intolerable risk level could occur. As for the safe operation of container securing,
reasonable safety actions for risk reduction shall be prepared on the basis of specific
causes and consequences of the events, and then implemented appropriately.
The major hazardous events ranked with high risk level are listed in HAZARD REGISTER
(see ANNEX V). And
nd the required safety actions, which shall be implemented by a safety
supervisor or ship designer in the future and then approved by a safety supervisor or the
HAZID facilitator, are listed in SAFETY ACTION LOG at the end of this HAZID report ((see
ANNEX VI).
6.2.2 Hazards with the ALARP Risk
As shown in Table 6-3
3 and Figure 6
6-3, hazardous events in the ALARP risk region are 15
in total, and they are associated with all the pre
pre-defined
defined hazards. ALARP risks are
acceptable level in principle from the viewpoint of the system safety. However, in order to
improve the current safety of tthe operation process,
ocess, practical and reasonable safety
actions may be adopted on the basis of the result of cost effectiveness analysis (CEA).
Regarding risk reduction of the hazards or hazardous events having the ALARP risk level,
the ALARP principle should be considered as an important standard of judgment.
According to the IMO FSA guidelines (Ref. 6), the ALARP risk should be reduced to meet
economic
conomic responsibility: Risk is to be reduced to a level as low as is reasonably
practicable. The
he term reasonable is interpreted to mean cost
cost-effectiveness
ness. Risk reduction
measures or recommended safety actions should be technically practicable and the
associated
ociated costs should not be disproportionate to the benefits gained.
The relevant hazardous events are listed in HAZARD REGISTER (see ANNEX V). And the
recommended safety actions, which should be considered by a safety supervisor or ship
designer in the future but do not need to be approved,
oved, are listed in SAFETY ACTION
LOG at the end of this HAZID report ((see ANNEX VI).
6.2.3 Hazards with the Negligible Risk
There is no hazard and hazardous event having the negligible rrisk level in this study.

Page 16

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

7. Conclusion
Container
ontainer securing operation, such as lashing and unlashing, is currently being carried
out in huge numbers of container ports all over the world
world. The
he securing operation is
generally recognized as much dangerous work, and a range of accidents resulting in
severe injuries and fatalities have occurred frequently. In this study, for the sake of
ensuring further enhanced safety of the securing operation, a HAZID study was
conducted by a HAZID team that consists of several experts having sufficient expertise in
container lashing and unlashing
unlashing. Detailed information on the experts of HAZID team is
included in ANNEX I and ANNEX II. From the HAZID study, risk levels
evels of the current
procedure and practice of container securing operation were evaluated, and then
reasonable and practicable measures for controlling the risks were deduced. The
worksheets, in which all the findings and decisions from this study were relevantly
recorded, are contained in HAZID WORKSHEET (see ANNEX IV).
During the HAZID workshop, many kinds of hazardous events and related causes and
consequences were identified, and their risk levels were determined based on the
agreement of HAZID team members. Consequently, 5 hazards and 39 hazardous events
were identified in total.. All the hazards and 24 hazardous events (about 62%) belonged
to the intolerable risk region, and the rest, such as 15 hazardous events (about 38%),
were located in the ALARP risk region. Investigating the risk index distribution, it is found
that
hat almost high risks depend on high frequencies, while consequence levels are
relatively low. HAZARD REGISTER (see ANNEX V) contains all the major hazards and
hazardous events identified.
Based on the result of evaluating the risk levels, it is concluded that the current risk level
of container securing operation is significantly high as much as unacceptable. In this
regard, additional risk reduction measures for decreasing the high risks to acceptable
level shall be applied to the container securing operation.. Dozens of risk reduction
measures, that is, safety actions were discussed and determined by the experts of HAZID
team. Considering the majority of high risks resulted from high frequencies, rather than
high consequences, the safety actions propo
proposed
sed by the HAZID study are mainly related
to accident prevention.

Page 17

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

As a result of analyzing the hazards and hazardous events identified, the following
perspectives on the safe operation of ccontainer
ontainer securing were deduced.
l

In general,

all the pre-defined


defined hazards to the container securing operation are
associated with the unacceptable risk level,

the majority of h
hazardous events identified involve the unacceptable risk level
as well,

accordingly, the container securing operation is understo


understood
od as a significantly
dangerous work too harsh for the safety of operators, and

additional safety actions for reducing the high risks of container securing
operation into the acceptable level shall be considered and implemented.

Regarding the first hazard of Slips and trips ,

the most concerned accident having the unacceptable risk level is a slight
injury due to slipping up or falling over obstacles on the passage way,

a range of lashing gears (e.g., lashing rod, twist lock, lashing cone
cone, etc.) and
structural members (e.g., eye plate, stopper, coaming stay, stanchion bracket,
mooring fittings, etc.) could cause the accident,

in order to control the high risk accident, several mandatory safety actions
are proposed, such as wearing safety shoes,
hoes, painting and highlighting
dangerous area with a contrasting color, sufficient arrangement of storage
boxes for lashing gears and operating tools, non
non-slip
slip surfaces, and adequate
lights around the passage ways, and

furthermore, it is recommended to co
consider
nsider additional options, such as
frequent inspection of deck structure, and passage way breadth larger than
600mm.

Regarding the second hazard of Falls from height ,

the most
ost concerned accident having the unacceptable risk level is a serious
injury or fatality due to falling off high places (e.g., falling from the top of
coaming, hatch cover, stanchion, lashing bridge, cross deck, etc.),

in order to control the high risk ac


accident, several mandatory safety actions
are proposed, such as painting and highlighting dangerous area with a
contrasting color, installation of proper hand rails around the high places,
and putting a ban on walking or operating on the top of high places, and

furthermore, it is recommended to consider additional options, such as


platforms between hatch cover and stanchion top, guard hoops on vertical

Page 18

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

ladders, and adequate lights around all the lashing points.


l

Regarding the third hazard of Being struck by dropped objects ,

the most concerned accident having the unacceptable risk level is a serious
injury or fatality due to a falling object (e.g., container, lashing gear,
operating tool, etc.), and

in order to control the high risk accident, several mandatory safety actions
are proposed, such as wearing a safety helmet, double checking container
locking with the gantry crane, container weight equipment installation on the
gantry crane, sufficient arrangement of storage boxes for lashing gears and
operating
ating tools, and toe boards around the sides of elevated lashing bridges
and platforms.

Regarding the fourth hazard of Being


Being affected by working environment
environment ,

the most concerned accident having the unacceptable risk level is a serious
injuryy or fatality due to an electric shock,

in order to control the high risk accident, several mandatory safety actions
are proposed, such as wearing insulated gloves and shoes, frequent checking
electric cables before working, and circuit
circuit-breaker
breaker installation, and

furthermore, it is recommended to consider an additional option, such as


installing protection covers for the exposed lights on deck.

Regarding the fifth hazard of Improper


Improper or poor lashing operation
operation ,

the most concerned accident having the unacceptable rrisk


isk level is severe
injuries due to inadequate lashing/unlashing process,

unskilled operators, carelessness of operators, or excessive weight of lashing


gears could, in most cases, bring about the accident,

in order to control the high risk accident, several mandatory safety actions
are proposed, such as preparation of reasonable and practicable work
manual, observance of the manual, proper training of lashing operators,
working in pairs, sufficient time for lashing operation, clear distance of 70mm
between
tween parallel turnbuckles, careful operation of the special containers, and
minimized weight of lashing gears.

In order to cope with the identified hazards appropriately, specific safety actions and
recommendations, which are mandatory or optional, were determined and proposed.
SAFETY ACTION LOG is provided in the end of this HAZID report ((see ANNEX VI) so that
it could facilitate the recording of follow
follow-up
up actions associated with the safety actions

Page 19

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

and recommendations. A supervisor of the operation or ship designer is the responsible


person to consider the safety actions or recommendations, and to decide whether they
would be implemented or not.

Page 20

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

ANNEX I

No.

Rev. 1

HAZID TEAM LIST

Name

Company

Choi,

Korean
orean

Jong-il

Register
egister

Choung,

Korean
orean

Choung-ho

Register
egister

Im,

Korean
orean

Jin-sung

Register
egister

Lim,

Korean
orean

Sung-hwan

Register
egister

Na,

Korean
orean

Seong

Register
egister

Oh,

Korean
orean

Byung-yul

Register
egister

Seo,

Korean
orean

Ji-man

Register
egister

Team & Background


Hull team 1 (Cargo ship)
Senior surveyor
Plan approval of structural drawings

Role
Expert
member

Remark

Full-time

Ship & plant research team


Senior researcher

Facilitator

Full-time

Risk assessment
Survey team
Senior surveyor
Ship survey
New technology support team
Principal surveyor
Ship survey

Expert
member

Expert
member

Full-time

Full-time

Ship & plant research team


Senior researcher

Scribe

Full-time

Risk assessment
Convention & legislation service team
Principal surveyor
Ship survey
Convention & legislation service team
Deputy senior surveyor
Ship survey

Page 21

Expert
member

Expert
member

Full-time

Full-time

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

ANNEX II

Rev. 1

CVs of EXPERTS

Choi, Jong-il, Hull Surveyor,, BS


From 2007, when he joined KR, Mr. Choi has been worked as a staff for hull drawing
approval of Dry Cargo Ship. He got a BS degree in Naval Architecture and Ocean
Engineering at Inha University in Korea. He has reviewed hull structure and statutory
items of various ships such as Container ships, Ro
Ro-Ro
Ro Ships, Bulk Carriers, Passenger
ships, etc. Also, He is attending the meeting of IMO as a
an advisor of the delegate of the
Republic of Korea.
Choung, Choung-ho, Safety Engineer, MSE
From 2005, when he joined KR, Mr. Choung has been active in the area related to safety
engineering of ships and offshore systems. He got an MSc degree in Naval Architecture
and Ocean Engineering at Seoul National University in Korea. He has been widely
experienced
erienced in hull design, struc
structural
tural analysis by using FEM, HAZID, FSA and so forth. He
is recently interested in fire/explosion risk analysis and structural reliability analysis.
Im, Jin-sung, Hull Surveyor,, BS
Since he graduated from Korea Maritime University in 2002, he worked as a navigational
officer for 6 years with Hyundai Merchant Marine which is one of the biggest maritime
companies in Korea. His experience on a container ship is rich because he was onboard
only container ships during the period. Joining KR in 2009, he has worked as a surveyor
in the Headquarters to support its branches in Korea and overseas.
Lim, Sung-hwan, Hull Surveyor
Surveyor, BS
He is a naval architect. He worked as a hull outfitting design engineer before joining KR.
Since he joined KR in 2003, he has experienced a wide range of drawing approval
including structural and conventional drawings. He also worked in IACS & International
Affairs Center during IACS chairmanship of KR. He worked as a hull surveyor in Hyund
Hyundai
Heavy Industry, experiencing the wide range of the new building projects including
13,100 TEU container carriers. After various experience of classification business, he is
now actively working on new technical development in New Technology Team.

Page 22

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

Na, Seong, Safety Engineer, MSE


From 2010, when he joined KR, Mr. Na has been active in area related to maritime and
offshore safety engineering. He got a Master of Science degree in Maritime Operations
from Liverpool John Moores University in the U.K. with the dissertation on A trial
application of Formal Safety Assessment to ship collision. His previous experience
includes 3 years of working as a deck officer of merchant ships and several years of
working as a researcher at KO
KORDI
RDI and KR. He is recently interested in Marine and
Offshore Safety Assessment, Human Factors, Production Availability.
Oh, Byung-yul, Hull Surveyor
Surveyor, BS
Since 1988, when he joined KR, Mr. Oh has been active in the area related to IMO
convention and Statutory services. He got a license of 1st degree Marine Navigation
Officer and serviced many ships including container ship. He has been widely
experienced in ship and equipment inspection and attended many technical meetings of
IMO and ILO as a technicall advisor to Korean delegation
delegation.
Seo, Ji-man, Hull Surveyor, BS
He had been working as an officer of merchant ships since 2005 to 2011, especially as a
chief officer from 2009. From 2012, when he joined KR, Mr. Seo has been active in KR
IACS Statutory panell work related to all technical items which are addressed by
international instruments, e.g. IMO conventions. He participated in the IMO Sub
Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation in 2013 as an advisor of the delegate of the Republic
of Korea.

Page 23

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

ANNEX III PRE-DEFINED


DEFINED HAZARD LIST

Remarks
No.

Pre-Defined Hazard
Hazards

(Designated Hazards from


IMO CSS Code Annex 14
14)

Slips, trips, tumbles, falls

- Slips, trips, falls

Falls from height

- Falls from height

Being struck by dropped objects

- Being struck by falling lashing gear or

(e.g., container, lashing gear, etc.)

other objects

Being affected by working


environment
4

(e.g., electricity, lightning, hot


surface, high pressure, fire,
explosion, toxic gas, etc.)

- Adjacent electrical risks


- Potential damage due to container
operations
- The adequacy of the access to all areas
that is necessary to safely perform
container securing operations
- Injuries whilst manually handling lashing
gear

Improper or poor lashing

- Ergonomics

operation

- Implications of lashing 96 high, or


higher, containers and mixed stows of 40
40
and 45 containers

Page 24

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

ANNEX IV HAZID WORKSHEET


Pre-defined Hazard 1 Slips, Trips, Tumbles
umbles and Falls
No.

101

Possible Cause

Operation

Existing

Consequence

Mode

Safeguards

FI

SI

RI

1. Moving

Proposed Actions

Remarks

Obstacles, such as various lashing

* Slight injuries (bone

1. The passage way should be

* Possible obstacles: lashing

gears, on the passage way (i.w.o.

fracture, bruise, scratch,

cleared by operators all the time.

rod, twist lock, lashing cone,

main deck, cross deck and lashing

etc.)

2. Storage box for lashing gears and

eye plate, stopper, coaming

tools should be arranged

stay, stanchion bracket,

sufficiently.

mooring fittings, etc.

3. All fixed obstacles in the passage

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

way should be highlighted in a

Annex 14/ 6.2.1.4 & 6.2.2.7 &

contrasting color.

6.3.5

1. Deck structural members should

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

be checked frequently.

Annex 14/ 7.3

1. Safety equipment (e.g., safety

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

shoes)

Annex 14/ 6.2.1.2 & 7.2.1.6

bridge)

Structural failures, such as crack,

102

Potential

6.2

* Slight injuries

1.0

7.2

1. Moving

hole, etc., on the passage way (i.w.o.


main deck, cross deck and lashing

5.2

1.3

6.5

6.1

1.2

7.3

bridge)
Slippery passage way due to oil

103

* Slight injuries

1. Moving

spilled or dropped (i.w.o. main deck,


cross deck and lashing bridge)
Slippery passage way due to

104

2. Non-slip surface
* Slight injuries

1. Moving

puddles of rain (i.w.o. main deck,

5.7

1.2

6.8

5.3

1.0

6.3

5.7

1.0

6.7

1. Operators should wear safety

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

shoes while working.

Annex 14/ 7.2.1.6

1. At minimum, clear distance of

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

600 mm should be ensured for safe

Annex 14/ 6.2.1.1 & 6.2.2.3

cross deck and lashing bridge)

105

Excessive rolling of vessel due to

Too small breadth of passage way

106

* Slight injuries

1. Moving

* Slight injuries

1. Moving

harsh weather

to walk (i.w.o. main deck, cross deck


and lashing bridge)
Lack of lighting on the passage way

107

walking.
* Slight injuries

1. Moving

5.7

while working nights (i.w.o. main

1.3

7.0

1. All the lashing points should be

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

equipped with adequate lights.

Annex 14/ 6.1.3 & 6.4

1. A Work manual, which is

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

reasonable, practical and detailed,

Annex 14/ 4.4

deck, cross deck and lashing bridge)


Refer container temperature check

108

with an inadequate portable ladder

* Slight injuries

2. Lashing

5.2

3. Unlashing

or without a portable ladder

2.0

7.2

should be prepared by Ship owner.

Page 25

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

Pre-defined Hazard 2 Falls from Height


No.

Possible Cause

Potential

Operation

Existing

Consequence

Mode

Safeguards

Careless walking on dangerous area

* Severe injuries

(e.g., side coaming top, etc.)

(hospitalization for several

201

FI

SI

RI

1. Moving

4.5

days or more required)

2.7

7.2

* Single fatality

Proposed Actions

Remarks

1. Walking on the side coaming top

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

should be prohibited all the time.

Annex 14/ 4.4 & 6.2.3.3 &

2. Dangerous area should be

6.2.1.3

painted with a different color and


properly highlighted.

202

203

Careless walking on hatch cover top

* Severe injuries

1. Moving

4.5

* Single fatality
No hand rail around the sides of

* Severe injuries

coaming top (i.w.o. cross deck)

* Single fatality

2.7

7.2

1. Moving

4.5

2.8

7.3

1. Walking on the hatch cover top

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

should be prohibited all the time.

Annex 14/ 4.4

1. Collapsible or fixed hand rail

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

should be provided around the

Annex 14/ 6.2.3 & 7.2.3

sides of transverse coaming top.

204

No hand rail around the outboard

* Severe injuries

2. Lashing

side of stanchion top

* Single fatality

3. Unlashing

4.4

2.7

7.0

1. Collapsible or fixed hand rail

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

should be provided around the

Annex 14/ 6.2.3 & 7.2.3

outboard side of stanchion top.

205

206

Inadequate hand rail around the

* Severe injuries

sides of lashing bridge top

* Single fatality

No platform fitted between hatch

* Slight injuries

cover and stanchion top

1. Moving

3.7

2.3

6.0

4.2

2.0

6.2

2. Lashing
3. Unlashing

1. Hand rail complying with the

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

regulation should be provided.

Annex 14/ 6.2.3 & 7.2.3

1. Adequate platform should be

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

provided.

Annex 14/ 6.1.2 & 6.2.2.4 &


7.2.3

207

Operating on container top or

* Severe injuries

1. Moving

moving between container tops

* Single fatality

2. Lashing

5.0

2.5

7.5

1. Operating or walking on

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

container top should be prohibited.

Annex 14/ 4.4 & 6.3.2.3 &

3. Unlashing
Irrecognition of opened access hole

* Slight injuries

6.3.3.2 & 7.2.2.2 & 7.2.2.3

1. Moving

on lashing bridge top or cross deck

1. The vicinity of access hole should

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

be painted with a different color

Annex 14/ 6.2.2.6 & 6.2.4.2 &

and properly highlighted.

6.2.4.9 & 6.2.4.14 & 7.2.1.2

2. Access hole cover should be

208

4.6

2.7

7.3

painted with a different color and


properly highlighted.

Page 26

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

Pre-defined Hazard 2 Falls from Height


No.

Possible Cause
Fixation trouble of an opened

Potential

Operation

Existing

Consequence

Mode

Safeguards

* Slight injuries

FI

SI

RI

1. Moving

access hole cove

209

4.2

1.7

5.8

Proposed Actions

Remarks

1. Fixed and long vertical ladder

* Suddenly the cover could be

should be provided with a guard

closed while operator's

hoop.

moving
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
Annex 14/6.2.4.2 & 6.2.4.5 &
6.2.4.6

210

Lack of lighting on the elevated

* Severe injuries

1. Moving

lashing points

* Single fatality

2. Lashing

4.3

2.0

6.3

4.1

2.0

6.1

FI

SI

RI

1. All the lashing points should be

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

equipped with adequate lights.

Annex 14/ 6.1.3 & 6.4

3. Unlashing

211

Falling from accommodation ladder

* Severe injuries

while boarding the vessel

* Single fatality

1. Moving

Pre-defined Hazard 3 Being Struck by Dropped Objects


No.

301

Possible Cause

Potential

Operation

Existing

Consequence

Mode

Safeguards

Container falling from the gantry

* Single fatality

1. Moving

crane (due to locking failure, corner

* Multiple fatalities

2. Lashing

fitting erosion, excessive container

Proposed Actions

Remarks

1. Double checking container


locking with the crane

3.3

3. Unlashing

3.7

7.0

weight, etc.)

2. Container weighing equipment


should be installed in the gantry
crane.

302

Hatch cover falling while it is being

* Single fatality

1. Moving

lifted up/down by the gantry crane

* Multiple fatalities

2. Lashing

1. Double checking hatch cover

3.0

3.7

6.7

locking with the crane

3. Unlashing

303

Falling of a safety cage, which is

* Single fatality

1. Moving

1. Double checking hatch cover

used to transfer lashing operators

* Multiple fatalities

2. Lashing

locking with the crane

3. Unlashing

4.5

Page 27

2.5

7.0

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

Pre-defined Hazard 3 Being Struck by Dropped Objects


No.

304

Possible Cause

Potential

Operation

Existing

Consequence

Mode

Safeguards

FI

SI

RI

Remarks

Lashing gear falling onto the

* Severe injuries

1. Moving

1. Operators should wear a safety

* Possible lashing gears:

passage way or lashing points (from

* Single fatality

2. Lashing

helmet while working.

lashing rod, twist lock, lashing

2. Storage box for lashing gears and

cone, operating tools, etc.

tools should be arranged

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

sufficiently.

Annex 14/ 6.3.5

a elevated platform, lashing bridge

3. Unlashing

5.2

1.7

6.8

or container top)

305

Proposed Actions

Lashing gear falling into the hold

* Severe injuries

2. Lashing

1. Toe boards (or kick plates) should

* Possible lashing gears:

(from main deck, cross deck, lashing

* Single fatality

3. Unlashing

be provided around the sides of

lashing rod, twist lock, lashing

elevated lashing bridges and

cone, etc.

platforms.

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

2. Provision of cell guides above

Annex 14/6.2.2.5

bridge, etc.)

5.3

2.7

7.9

main deck
Falling of operating bar/tools

* Severe injuries

2. Lashing

1. Operators should wear a safety

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

* Single fatality

3. Unlashing

helmet while working.

Annex 14/ 6.3.5

306

5.3

2.5

7.8

2. Storage box for lashing gears and


tools should be arranged
sufficiently.

Pre-defined Hazard 4 Being Affected by Working Environment


No.

Possible Cause

Potential

Operation

Existing

Consequence

Mode

Safeguards

FI

SI

RI

Proposed Actions

Remarks

Electric shock due to a leak of

* Severe injuries

1. Moving

1. Operators should wear insulated

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

electricity from the equipments of

* Single fatality

2. Lashing

gloves and shoes.

Annex 14/ 8

refer container

* Multiple fatalities

3. Unlashing

2. Cable should be checked before

401

4.5

2.7

7.2

work.
3. Circuit-breaker
breaker should be fitted
on the vessel.

Page 28

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

Pre-defined Hazard 4 Being Affected by Working Environment


No.

Possible Cause

Potential

Operation

Existing

Consequence

Mode

Safeguards

FI

SI

RI

Proposed Actions

Remarks

Electric shock due to a leak of

* Severe injuries

1. Moving

1. Protection cover should be

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

electricity from damaged lights on

* Single fatality

2. Lashing

provided to all the exposed lights

Annex 14/ 6.4

deck

* Multiple fatalities

3. Unlashing

on deck.
2. Operators should wear insulated
gloves and shoes.

402

4.0

2.5

6.5

3. Operators should be careful not


to contact or smash lights on deck
while working.
4. Circuit-breaker
breaker should be fitted
on the vessel
sel for any refer
container.

Lightning

403

* Single fatality

1. Moving

* Lightning

* Multiple fatalities

2. Lashing

conductor on

3. Unlashing

the vessel

3.3

2.3

5.7

FI

SI

RI

5.7

1.3

7.1

Pre-defined Hazard 5 Improper or Poor Lashing Operation


No.
501

502

Possible Cause

Potential

Operation

Existing

Consequence

Mode

Safeguards

Careless tightening or loosening

* Slight injuries

2. Lashing

turnbuckles

* Severe injuries

3. Unlashing

Very small distance between

* Slight injuries

2. Lashing

turnbuckles (in case of parallel

* Severe injuries

3. Unlashing

5.7

1.3

7.0

lashing)

Proposed Actions

Remarks

1. Sufficient lashing operation time

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

should be ensured.

Annex 14/ 4.4

2. At minimum, clear distance of

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

70mm between parallel turnbuckles

Annex 14/ 6.3.4.4

should be ensured.

Improperly putting down

* Slight injuries

2. Lashing

1. Work manual should be obeyed.

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

disconnected lashing rods

* Severe injuries

3. Unlashing

2. All the works should be done in

Annex 14/ 4.4

503

5.3

Page 29

1.7

7.0

pairs.

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

Pre-defined Hazard 5 Improper or Poor Lashing Operation


No.

504

Possible Cause

Potential

Operation

Existing

Consequence

Mode

Safeguards

FI

SI

RI

Proposed Actions

Remarks

Small accidents due to operator's

* Slight injuries

2. Lashing

negligence (e.g., operator's hand or

* Severe injuries

3. Unlashing

1. No access during the crane

Excessive weight of lashing gears

* Slight injuries

2. Lashing

1. Weight of lashing gears should

* Recommended minimum

manually handled

* Severe injuries

3. Unlashing

be minimized as low as possible.

weight for manual handling is

5.0

foot is caught under container or

1.8

6.8

operation

hatch cover)

505

6.2

1.0

20 kg or so.

7.2

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
Annex 14/ 6.3.2.2 & 6.3.3.3 &
6.3.4.6 & 7.2.1.4

Poor workmanship due to unskilled

* No immediate accident is

2. Lashing

1. Lashing operators should be

* When ocean going,

operators

estimated in harbor

3. Unlashing

trained as necessary to carry out

container stacks on deck may

their duties in a safe manner.

collapse and then catastrophic

506

6.0

1.3

7.3

situation may occur.


* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
Annex 14/ 4.4

Improper lashing due to special

* No immediate accident is

2. Lashing

1. For the special containers,

* When ocean going,

sized container (e.g., high cubic

estimated in harbor

3. Unlashing

additional training of operators is

container stacks on deck may

necessary.

collapse and then catastrophic

2. High cubic containers should be

situation may occur.

loaded on the highest position.

* Special lashing gear, tools or

container, etc.)

507

5.8

1.3

7.1

methods are required by the


regulation (e.g., extension
lashing rods, loading on the
highest position, etc.).

508

Incomplete communication between

* Slight injuries

2. Lashing

* A Work manual, which is

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

lashing operators (especially when

* Severe injuries

3. Unlashing

reasonable, practical and detailed,

Annex 14/ 4.4

moving heavy object, such as

* Single fatality

6.0

2.0

8.0

should be prepared by Ship owner.

container, hatch cover, etc.)

Page 30

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

Pre-defined Hazard 5 Improper or Poor Lashing Operation


No.

509

Possible Cause

Potential

Operation

Existing

Consequence

Mode

Safeguards

Insufficient or improper instruction

* No immediate accident is

2. Lashing

of lashing/unlashing works

estimated in harbor

3. Unlashing

FI

SI

RI

5.5

1.7

7.2

Proposed Actions

Remarks

1. A Work manual, which is

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

reasonable, practical and detailed,

Annex 14/ 4.4

should be prepared by Ship owner.

510

Lashing/unlashing work right after

* Slight injuries

2. Lashing

drinking

* Severe injuries

3. Unlashing

5.0

2.3

7.3

5.3

1.3

6.6

1. Before starting the work, sobriety

* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352

test should be carried out.

Annex 14/ 4.4

* Single fatality

511

Any other duties except

* No immediate accident is

2. Lashing

lashing/unlashing (e.g., welding,

estimated in harbor

3. Unlashing

painting, etc.)

Page 31

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

ANNEX V
No.

Hazard

Poor

Rev. 1

HAZARD REGISTER
Event

Cause

ID
508

operation

Consequence

Operation
Mode

Incomplete communication

* Slight injuries

2. Lashing

between lashing operators

* Severe injuries

3. Unlashing

RI

Risk Level

8.0

Intolerable

7.9

Intolerable

7.8

Intolerable

7.5

Intolerable

* Single fatality

Dropped

305

objects
3

Dropped

306

Lashing gear falling into the

* Severe injuries

2. Lashing

hold

* Single fatality

3. Unlashing

Falling of operating bar/tools

* Severe injuries

2. Lashing

* Single fatality

3. Unlashing

Operating on container top or

* Severe injuries

1. Moving

moving between container tops

* Single fatality

2. Lashing

objects
4

Falls from

207

height

3. Unlashing

Slips and

103

Falls from

203

height

Falls from

* Slight injuries

1. Moving

7.3

Intolerable

No hand rail around the sides

* Severe injuries

1. Moving

7.3

Intolerable

of coaming top

* Single fatality

Irrecognition of opened access

* Slight injuries

1. Moving

7.3

Intolerable

Poor workmanship due to

* No immediate

2. Lashing

7.3

Intolerable

unskilled operators

accident in harbor

3. Unlashing

Lashing/unlashing
ashing/unlashing work right

* Slight injuries

2. Lashing

7.3

Intolerable

after drinking

* Severe injuries

3. Unlashing

spilled or dropped

trips
6

Slippery passage way due to oil

208

hole on lashing bridge top or

height

cross deck

Poor

506

operation
9

Poor

510

operation

* Single fatality

10

Slips and

101

Obstacles, such as various

* Slight injuries

1. Moving

7.2

Intolerable

* Slight injuries

2. Lashing

7.2

Intolerable

1. Moving

7.2

Intolerable

1. Moving

7.2

Intolerable

7.2

Intolerable

lashing gears, on the passage

trips

way

11

Slips and

108

Refer container temperature


check with an inadequate

trips

3. Unlashing

portable ladder or without a


portable ladder

12

Falls from

201

height
13

Falls from

202

height

14

Working
environment

401

Careless walking on dangerous

* Severe injuries

area

* Single fatality

Careless walking on hatch cover

* Severe injuries

top

* Single fatality

Electric shock due to a leak of

* Severe injuries

1. Moving

electricity from the equipments

* Single fatality

2. Lashing

of refer container

* Multiple fatalities

3. Unlashing

Page 32

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

No.

Hazard

15

Poor

Rev. 1

Event
ID
505

operation
16

Poor

Cause

509

operation

Consequence

Operation
Mode

RI

Risk Level

7.2

Intolerable

7.2

Intolerable

7.1

Intolerable

7.1

Intolerable

Excessive weight of lashing

* Slight injuries

2. Lashing

gears manually handled

* Severe injuries

3. Unlashing

Insufficient or improper

* No immediate

2. Lashing

instruction of lashing/unlashing

accident in harbor

3. Unlashing

Careless tightening or

* Slight injuries

2. Lashing

loosening turnbuckles

* Severe injuries

3. Unlashing

Improper lashing due to special

* No immediate

2. Lashing

sized container

accident in harbor

3. Unlashing

Lack of lighting on the passage

* Slight injuries

1. Moving

7.0

Intolerable

No hand rail around the

* Severe injuries

2. Lashing

7.0

Intolerable

outboard side of stanchion top

* Single fatality

3. Unlashing

Container falling from the

* Single fatality

1. Moving

7.0

Intolerable

gantry crane

* Multiple fatalities

2. Lashing

7.0

Intolerable

7.0

Intolerable

7.0

Intolerable

works

17

Poor

501

operation
18

Poor

507

operation
19

Slips and

107

way while working nights

trips
20

Falls from

204

height
21

Dropped

301

objects

3. Unlashing

22

Dropped

303

objects

Falling of a safety cage, which

* Single fatality

1. Moving

is used to transfer lashing

* Multiple fatalities

2. Lashing

operators

23

Poor

502

operation
24

Poor

503

operation
25

Slips and

104

Dropped

Very small distance between

* Slight injuries

2. Lashing

turnbuckles

* Severe injuries

3. Unlashing

Improperly putting down

* Slight injuries

2. Lashing

disconnected lashing rods

* Severe injuries

3. Unlashing

Slippery passage way due to

* Slight injuries

1. Moving

6.8

ALARP

Lashing gear falling onto the

* Severe injuries

1. Moving

6.8

ALARP

passage way or lashing points

* Single fatality

2. Lashing

6.8

ALARP

puddles of rain

trips
26

3. Unlashing

304

objects

3. Unlashing

27

Poor

504

operation
28

Slips and

106

Dropped

* Slight injuries

2. Lashing

operator's negligence

* Severe injuries

3. Unlashing

Too small breadth of passage

* Slight injuries

1. Moving

6.7

ALARP

Hatch cover falling while it is

* Single fatality

1. Moving

6.7

ALARP

being lifted up/down by the

* Multiple fatalities

2. Lashing

6.6

ALARP

way to walk

trips
29

Small accidents due to

302

objects

gantry crane

30

Poor
operation

511

Any

other

3. Unlashing
duties

lashing/unlashing

except

No

immediate

accident in harbor

Page 33

2. Lashing
3. Unlashing

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

No.

Hazard

31

Slips and

Rev. 1

Event

Cause

ID
102

Structural

failures,

Consequence
such

as

Operation
Mode

RI

Risk Level

* Slight injuries

1. Moving

6.5

ALARP

Electric shock due to a leak of

* Severe injuries

1. Moving

6.5

ALARP

electricity from damaged lights

* Single fatality

2. Lashing

on deck

* Multiple fatalities

3. Unlashing

Excessive rolling of vessel due

* Slight injuries

1. Moving

6.3

ALARP

Lack of lighting on the elevated

* Severe injuries

1. Moving

6.3

ALARP

lashing points

* Single fatality

2. Lashing

6.2

ALARP

1. Moving

6.1

ALARP

1. Moving

6.0

ALARP

crack, hole, etc., on the passage

trips

way

32

Working

402

environment

33

Slips and

105

to harsh weather

trips
34

Falls from

210

height

3. Unlashing

35

Falls from

206

Falls from

platform

fitted

between

* Slight injuries

hatch cover and stanchion top

height
36

No

211

height

Falling

from

ladder

while

accommodation
boarding

the

2. Lashing
3. Unlashing

* Severe injuries
* Single fatality

vessel

37

Falls from

205

height
38

Falls from

209

Working
environment

* Severe injuries

the sides of lashing bridge top

* Single fatality

Fixation trouble of an opened

* Slight injuries

1. Moving

5.8

ALARP

* Single fatality

1. Moving

5.7

ALARP

* Multiple fatalities

2. Lashing

access hole cover

height
39

Inadequate hand rail around

403

Lightning

3. Unlashing

Page 34

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

ANNEX VI SAFETY ACTION LOG


Sheet No.

SAFETY ACTION LOG


PROJECT

Development of CSAP for IMO CSS Code Annex 14

TASK

HAZID Study on Container Securing Operation

DOCUMENT

HAZID Report

TARGET

Current Practice of Container Securing Operation on Deck

SYSTEM

(1) of (15)

- for Conventional Large Sized Container Carriers (Post


(Post-Panamax
Panamax Class)

Hazard ID

Hazards

Hazardous Event ID

Op. Mode

Risk Index

Risk Level

Slips and trips

107

7
7.0

Intolerable

Working environment

402

1, 2, 3

6.5

ALARP

Falls from height

210

1, 2, 3

6.3

ALARP

[ ] Course of Action (Compulsory)


(Compulsory):
1. All the lashing points on deck sh
shall be equipped with adequate illumination.
(refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352 Annex 14/ 6.4)
[ ] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):
2. Protection cover should be provided to all the exposed lights on deck.
3. Operators should be careful not to contact or smash the lights on deck while working.

Written by :

HAZID facilitator

Signed :

Date : 28/0
28/01/2014

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Response :

Written by :
Close out :

Written by :

Page 35

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

Sheet No.

SAFETY ACTION LOG


PROJECT

Development of CSAP for IMO CSS Code Annex 14

TASK

HAZID Study on Container Securing Operation

DOCUMENT

HAZID Report

TARGET

Current Practice of Container Securing Operation on Deck

SYSTEM

(2) of (15)

- for Conventional Large Sized Container Carriers (Post


(Post-Panamax
Panamax Class)

Hazard ID

Hazards

Hazardous Event ID

Op. Mode

Risk Index

Risk Level

Dropped objects

301

1, 2, 3

7
7.0

Intolerable

Dropped objects

303

1, 2, 3

7
7.0

Intolerable

Dropped objects

302

1, 2, 3

6
6.7

ALARP

[ ] Course of Action (Compulsory):


1. Container locking with the gantry crane in port sh
shall be double-checked
checked all the time.
2. Hatch cover locking with the gantry crane in port sh
shall be double-checked
checked all the time.
3. Container weighing equipment sh
shall be installed on the gantry crane in port.
[

] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):

Written by :

HAZID facilitator

Signed :

Date : 28/0
28/01/2014

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Response :

Written by :
Close out :

Written by :

Page 36

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

Sheet No.

SAFETY ACTION LOG


PROJECT

Development of CSAP for IMO CSS Code Annex 14

TASK

HAZID Study on Container Securing Operation

DOCUMENT

HAZID Report

TARGET

Current Practice of Container Securing Operation on Deck

SYSTEM

(3) of (15)

- for Conventional Large Sized Container Carriers (Post


(Post-Panamax
Panamax Class)

Hazard ID

Hazards

Hazardous Event ID

Op. Mode

Risk Index

Risk Level

Falls from height

Falls from height

203

7
7.3

Intolerable

204

2, 3

7
7.0

Intolerable

Falls from height

206

2, 3

6.
6.2

ALARP

Falls from height

205

6.
6.0

ALARP

[ ] Course of Action (Compulsory)


(Compulsory):
1. Adequate hand rail, which is collapsible or fixed, sh
shall be provided around;
- the sides of transverse coaming top
top, and
- the outboard sides of stanchion top.
[ ] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):
2. Hand rail design should comply with the relevant regulation.
(refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352 Annex 14/ 6.2 & 7.2)
3.. Adequate platform should be provided, especially between hatch cover and stanchion top.
(refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352 Annex 14/ 6.1 & 6.2 & 7.2)

Written by :

HAZID facilitator

Signed :

Date : 28/0
28/01/2014

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Response :

Written by :
Close out :

Written by :

Page 37

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

Sheet No.

SAFETY ACTION LOG


PROJECT

Development of CSAP for IMO CSS Code Annex 14

TASK

HAZID Study on Container Securing Operation

DOCUMENT

HAZID Report

TARGET

Current Practice of Container Securing Operation on Deck

SYSTEM

(4) of (15)

- for Conventional Large Sized Container Carriers (Post


(Post-Panamax
Panamax Class)

Hazard ID

Hazards

Hazardous Event ID

Op. Mode

Risk Index

Risk Level

Dropped objects

305

2, 3

7.9

Intolerable

Poor operation

505

2, 3

7.2

Intolerable

Poor operation

502

2, 3

7.0

Intolerable

[ ] Course of Action (Compulsory)


(Compulsory):
1. Toe boards (or kick plates) shall
all be provided around the sides of elevated lashing bridges and platforms.
(refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352 Annex 14/ 6.2)
2. Weight of any lashing gear shall be minimized, preferably less than 20 kg.
(refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352 Annex 14/ 6.3 & 7.2)
3. Minimum clear distance of 70 mm between parallel turnbuckles shall be ensured.
(refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352 Annex 14/ 6.3)
[

] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):

Written by :

HAZID facilitator

Signed :

Date : 28/0
28/01/2014

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Response :

Written by :
Close out :

Written by :

Page 38

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

Sheet No.

SAFETY ACTION LOG


PROJECT

Development of CSAP for IMO CSS Code Annex 14

TASK

HAZID Study on Container Securing Operation

DOCUMENT

HAZID Report

TARGET

Current Practice of Container Securing Operation on Deck

SYSTEM
Hazard ID

(5) of (15)

- for Conventional Large Sized Container Carriers (Post


(Post-Panamax
Panamax Class)
Hazards

Hazardous Event ID

Op. Mode

Risk Index

Risk Level

Slips and trips

106

6.7

ALARP

Falls from height

209

5.8

ALARP

] Course of Action (Compulsory)


(Compulsory):

[ ] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):
1. Fixed and long vertical ladder should be provided with a guard hoop.
(refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352 Annex 14/ 6.2)
2. Provision of cell guides above main deck should be examined at ship design phase.
3. Minimum clear distance of 600 mm should be ensured for safe walking i.w.o. main deck, cross deck and
lashing bridge. (refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352 Annex 14/ 6.2)

Written by :

HAZID facilitator

Signed :

Date : 28/0
28/01/2014

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Response :

Written by :
Close out :

Written by :

Page 39

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

Sheet No.

SAFETY ACTION LOG


PROJECT

Development of CSAP for IMO CSS Code Annex 14

TASK

HAZID Study on Container Securing Operation

DOCUMENT

HAZID Report

TARGET

Current Practice of Container Securing Operation on Deck

SYSTEM

(6) of (15)

- for Conventional Large Sized Container Carriers (Post


(Post-Panamax
Panamax Class)

Hazard ID

Hazards

Hazardous Event ID

Op. Mode

Risk Index

Risk Level

Falls from height

208

7.3

Intolerable

Slips and trips

103

7.
7.3

Intolerable

Slips and trips

101

7.2

Intolerable

Falls from height

201

7.2

Intolerable

[ ] Course of Action (Compulsory)


(Compulsory):
1. Dangerous area shall be painted with a contrasting color and properly highlighted;
- all the intrusions and fixed obstacles i.w.o. any passage way,
- the vicinity of access hole, and its cover.
(refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352 Annex 14/ 6.2 & 7.2)
2. The passage way, i.w.o. deck and lashing bridge, shall be kept clear by operators all the time.
(refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352 Annex 14/ 6.2)
3. All passage ways and stairs shall have non
non-slip surfaces.
(refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352 Annex 14/ 6.2)
[

] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):

Written by :

HAZID facilitator

Signed :

Date : 28/0
28/01/2014

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Response :

Written by :
Close out :

Written by :

Page 40

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

Sheet No.

SAFETY ACTION LOG


PROJECT

Development of CSAP for IMO CSS Code Annex 14

TASK

HAZID Study on Container Securing Operation

DOCUMENT

HAZID Report

TARGET

Current Practice of Container Securing Operation on Deck

SYSTEM

(7) of (15)

- for Conventional Large Sized Container Carriers (Post


(Post-Panamax
Panamax Class)

Hazard ID

Hazards

Hazardous Event ID

Op. Mode

Risk Index

Risk Level

Dropped objects

306

2, 3

7.8

Intolerable

Slips and trips

101

7.2

Intolerable

Dropped objects

304

1, 2, 3

6.8

ALARP

Signed :

Date : 28/0
28/01/2014

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

[ ] Course of Action (Compulsory)


(Compulsory):
1. Storage box for lashing gears and tools shall be provided sufficiently.
(refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352 Annex 14/ 6.3)
[

] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):

Written by :

HAZID facilitator

Response :

Written by :
Close out :

Written by :

Page 41

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

Sheet No.

SAFETY ACTION LOG


PROJECT

Development of CSAP for IMO CSS Code Annex 14

TASK

HAZID Study on Container Securing Operation

DOCUMENT

HAZID Report

TARGET

Current Practice of Container Securing Operation on Deck

SYSTEM

(8) of (15)

- for Conventional Large Sized Container Carriers (Post


(Post-Panamax
Panamax Class)

Hazard ID

Hazards

Hazardous Event ID

Op. Mode

Risk Index

Risk Level

Working environment

401

1, 2, 3

7.2

Intolerable

Working environment

402

1, 2, 3

6.5

ALARP

Signed :

Date : 28/0
28/01/2014

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

[ ] Course of Action (Compulsory)


(Compulsory):
1. Electric cables shall be checked before starting to work, all the time.
2. Circuit-breaker
breaker shall be fitted on the vessel.
3. All the operators shall wear properly insulated gloves and shoes.
[

] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):

Written by :

HAZID facilitator

Response :

Written by :
Close out :

Written by :

Page 42

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

Sheet No.

SAFETY ACTION LOG


PROJECT

Development of CSAP for IMO CSS Code Annex 14

TASK

HAZID Study on Container Securing Operation

DOCUMENT

HAZID Report

TARGET

Current Practice of Container Securing Operation on Deck

SYSTEM

(9) of (15)

- for Conventional Large Sized Container Carriers (Post


(Post-Panamax
Panamax Class)

Hazard ID

Hazards

Hazardous Event ID

Op. Mode

Risk Index

Risk Level

Dropped objects

306

2, 3

7.8

Intolerable

Slips and trips

103

7.3

Intolerable

Slips and trips

104

6.8

ALARP

Dropped objects

304

1, 2, 3

6.8

ALARP

[ ] Course of Action (Compulsory)


(Compulsory):
1. All the operators shall wear safety equipment, such as safety shoes, helmet, gloves, safety belt, etc.
(refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352 Annex 14/ 7.2)
[

] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):

Written by :

HAZID facilitator

Signed :

Date : 28/0
28/01/2014

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Response :

Written by :
Close out :

Written by :

Page 43

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

Sheet No.

SAFETY ACTION LOG


PROJECT

Development of CSAP for IMO CSS Code Annex 14

TASK

HAZID Study on Container Securing Operation

DOCUMENT

HAZID Report

TARGET

Current Practice of Container Securing Operation on Deck

SYSTEM

(10) of (15)

- for Conventional Large Sized Container Carriers (Post


(Post-Panamax
Panamax Class)

Hazard ID

Hazards

Hazardous Event ID

Op. Mode

Risk Index

Risk Level

Slips and trips

102

6.5

ALARP

] Course of Action (Compulsory)


(Compulsory):

[ ] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):
1. Deck structural members and lashing gears on board should be surveyed by crew frequently.
(refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352 Annex 14/ 7.3)

Written by :

HAZID facilitator

Signed :

Date : 28/0
28/01/2014

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Response :

Written by :
Close out :

Written by :

Page 44

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

Sheet No.

SAFETY ACTION LOG


PROJECT

Development of CSAP for IMO CSS Code Annex 14

TASK

HAZID Study on Container Securing Operation

DOCUMENT

HAZID Report

TARGET

Current Practice of Container Securing Operation on Deck

SYSTEM

(11) of (15)

- for Conventional Large Sized Container Carriers (Post


(Post-Panamax
Panamax Class)

Hazard ID

Hazards

Hazardous Event ID

Op. Mode

Risk Index

Risk Level

Falls from height

207

1, 2, 3

7.5

Intolerable

Falls from height

202

7.2

Intolerable

Falls from height

201

7.2

Intolerable

Signed :

Date : 28/0
28/01/2014

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

[ ] Course of Action (Compulsory)


(Compulsory):
1. Walking on the top of hatch cover shall be prohibited all the time.
2. Walking on the top of side coaming shall be prohibited all the time
3. Walking or operating on the top of container shall be prohibited all the time.
(refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352 Annex 14/ 4.4 & 7.2)
[

] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):

Written by :

HAZID facilitator

Response :

Written by :
Close out :

Written by :

Page 45

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

Sheet No.

SAFETY ACTION LOG


PROJECT

Development of CSAP for IMO CSS Code Annex 14

TASK

HAZID Study on Container Securing Operation

DOCUMENT

HAZID Report

TARGET

Current Practice of Container Securing Operation on Deck

SYSTEM

(12) of (15)

- for Conventional Large Sized Container Carriers (Post


(Post-Panamax
Panamax Class)

Hazard ID

Hazards

Hazardous Event ID

Op. Mode

Risk Index

Risk Level

Poor operation

508

2, 3

8.0

Intolerable

Poor operation

510

2, 3

7.3

Intolerable

Poor operation

509

2, 3

7.2

Intolerable

Slips and trips

108

2, 3

7.2

Intolerable

Poor operation

503

2, 3

7.0

Intolerable

[ ] Course of Action (Compulsory)


(Compulsory):
1. A work manual for container securing, which is reasonable, practical and detailed, shall be prepared.
2. The work manual shall cover not only conventional containers but also special containers (e.g., refer
containers, high cubic containers, irregular sized containers, etc.)
3. The work manual shall be complied with all the time.
4. Before starting the work, a sobriety test shall be carried out.
5. All the securing work shall be performed in pairs.
[

] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):

Written by :

HAZID facilitator

Signed :

Date : 28/0
28/01/2014

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Response :

Written by :
Close out :

Written by :

Page 46

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

Sheet No.

SAFETY ACTION LOG


PROJECT

Development of CSAP for IMO CSS Code Annex 14

TASK

HAZID Study on Container Securing Operation

DOCUMENT

HAZID Report

TARGET

Current Practice of Container Securing Operation on Deck

SYSTEM

(13) of (15)

- for Conventional Large Sized Container Carriers (Post


(Post-Panamax
Panamax Class)

Hazard ID

Hazards

Hazardous Event ID

Op. Mode

Risk Index

Risk Level

Poor operation

506

2, 3

7.3

Intolerable

Poor operation

507

2, 3

7.1

Intolerable

[ ] Course of Action (Compulsory)


(Compulsory):
1. Lashing operators shall be trained as necessary to carry out their duties in a safe manner.
(refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352 Annex 14/ 4.4)
2. In case of special containers (e.g. high cubic containers, refer containers, etc.), additional training of
lashing and unlashing works shall be provided to the operators.
3. High cubic containers shall be loa
loaded on the highest position all the time.
[

] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):

Written by :

HAZID facilitator

Signed :

Date : 28/0
28/01/2014

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Response :

Written by :
Close out :

Written by :

Page 47

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

Sheet No.

SAFETY ACTION LOG


PROJECT

Development of CSAP for IMO CSS Code Annex 14

TASK

HAZID Study on Container Securing Operation

DOCUMENT

HAZID Report

TARGET

Current Practice of Container Securing Operation on Deck

SYSTEM

(14) of (15)

- for Conventional Large Sized Container Carriers (Post


(Post-Panamax
Panamax Class)

Hazard ID

Hazards

Hazardous Event ID

Op. Mode

Risk Index

Risk Level

Poor operation

501

2, 3

7.1

Intolerable

[ ] Course of Action (Compulsory)


(Compulsory):
1. Sufficient operation time for container securing
securing,, which is reasonable and practicable, shall be ensured.
[

] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):

Written by :

HAZID facilitator

Signed :

Date : 28/0
28/01/2014

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Response :

Written by :
Close out :

Written by :

Page 48

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division

Container Securing Operation

February 2014

HAZID Report

Rev. 1

Sheet No.

SAFETY ACTION LOG


PROJECT

Development of CSAP for IMO CSS Code Annex 14

TASK

HAZID Study on Container Securing Operation

DOCUMENT

HAZID Report

TARGET

Current Practice of Container Securing Operation on Deck

SYSTEM

(15) of (15)

- for Conventional Large Sized Container Carriers (Post


(Post-Panamax
Panamax Class)

Hazard ID

Hazards

Hazardous Event ID

Op. Mode

Risk Index

Risk Level

Poor operation

504

2, 3

6.8

ALARP

] Course of Action (Compulsory)


(Compulsory):

[ ] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):
1. While the gantry crane in port is operating, any lashing operator should be sufficiently away from the
moving container.

Written by :

HAZID facilitator

Signed :

Date : 28/0
28/01/2014

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Signed :

Date :

(dd/mm/yyyy)

Response :

Written by :
Close out :

Written by :

Page 49

Ship & Plant Research Team


New Growth R
Research Division