Professional Documents
Culture Documents
February 2014
Rev. 1
CONTAINER
ONTAINER SECURING OPERATION
PERATION
HAZID R
REPORT
PROJECT TITLE
Development of CSAP (Cargo Safe Access Plan) for IMO CSS (Cargo
Stowage & Securing) Code Annex 14
PROJECT NO.
N.A.
TASK
DOCUMENT TITLE
HAZID Report
DOCUMENT NO.
N.A.
PAGES
54 (including cover)
Technical Division,
Korean Register of Shipping
RESPONSIBLE
PARTY
Rev.
Date
27 Jan. 2014
14 Feb. 2014
Prepared
Checked
Approved
C.H. Choung
J.G. Lim
K.H. Song
C.H. Choung
J.G. Lim
K.H. Song
February 2014
HAZID Report
Rev. 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
IMO CSS code Annex 14, which was newly included in 2010, requires a CSAP (Cargo safe
access plan) and risk assessments on container securing operation. In order to identify all
the possible hazards and then enhance the safety of container securing operation, a
HAZID study was conducted. As a result of the HAZID study, 5 hazards and related 39
hazardous events in total were identified and ranked in terms of risk index for the semiquantitative risk evaluation.
Among the hazards and hazardous events identified, 5 hazards and 24 events were
found to have unacceptable risk level, and 15 events to have acceptable but ALARP risk
level. Regarding the hazards and hazardous events with unacceptable risk or ALARP risk,
additional safety actions and recommendations for risk control were discussed and
proposed in SAFETY ACTION LOG, which would be considered and utilized by designers
or a supervisor when developing the CSAP and ship design in the future.
In conclusion, the overall safety level of the container securing operation is considered
unacceptable. It is found that all the 5 potential hazards could be critical threats to the
operators on board. Relevant safety actions against them, therefore, must be provided to
the operation process or ship design. Furthermore, it is also recommended that, for more
reliable and safe system development, some practical measures should be investigated
appropriately in order to control the hazards, in accordance with the ALARP principle.
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PARTICIPATING COMPANY
Korean Register of Shipping
KR
DISCLAIMER
Korean Register has made every reasonable effort to perform the work contained herein
in a manner consistent with high professional standards. This work is dependent on the
accuracy of information provided by the Client.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Introduction 1
2. Abbreviations and References 2
2.1 Abbreviations 2
2.2 Reference Documents 2
3. HAZID Methodology 3
4. Container Securing Operation 5
5. HAZID Study 7
5.1 Purpose 7
5.2 Scope of Work 7
5.3 HAZID Team 8
5.4 HAZID Workshop 8
5.5 Risk Evaluation Criteria 9
6. HAZID Results 13
6.1 Overview 13
6.2 Hazard Review 15
7. Conclusion 17
ANNEX I
ANNEX II
CVs of EXPERTS 22
ANNEX III
ANNEX IV
HAZID WORKSHEET 25
ANNEX V
HAZARD REGISTER 32
ANNEX VI
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1. Introduction
Container securing operation, such as lashing and unlashing, currently being carried out
in container ports is generally considered as highly dangerous, and a range of accidents
resulting in severe injuries and fatalities have occurred frequently. In order to control the
danger work appropriately, IMO regulation of CSS (Cargo stowage & securing) code was
established
tablished and gone into force in 1998. Since then, the code was amended several
times, and new Annex 14 (MSC.1/Circ.1352), which has the title of Guidan
Guidance on Providing
Safe Working Conditions for Securing of Containers on Deck
Deck,, was included in 2010.
CSS code Annex 14 requires preparing a CSAP (Cargo safe access plan) based on risk
assessment of container securing operation. Furthermore, it is required by the code that
initial design of container carrier should be performed based on the results of risk
assessments.
In order to increase the knowledge on the container securing
ecuring operation and to identify
the major issues or hazards that could have significant impact on the safety of the
operation,, a HAZID (Hazard identification)
dentification) study was carried out by a multi
multi-disciplinary
HAZID team, under the lead of KR. A HAZID workshop
p that is essential work of the study
was conducted on 21st October 2013, at KR head-office, Busan, Korea.
The purpose of this report is to outline the works and methodology of the HAZID study
conducted for the container securing operation
operation. And the resultss of the study including
findings, proposals and recommendations are also summarized in the report and should
be considered at the development of the CSAP and ship design.
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Description
As low as reasonably practicable
CEA
CSAP
CSS
FSA
FI
HAZID
IMO
Frequency index
Hazard identification
International maritime organization
RI
Risk index
SI
Severity index
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3. HAZID Methodology
The overall objective of HAZID study, which would
ould be generally implemented at design
concept development or initial design phase, is to understand various interactions
between the target system and its surroundings, and interference between main facilities,
so that engineers, who are related to the target system development, can identify
possible hazards associated with the target sy
system.
stem. Therefore, it is possible, in a more
reasonable and efficient way, to review the safety level of the target system and to
explore adequate safety actions preventing and/or mitigating the impact of identified
hazards on the human, environment and vess
vessel.
The
he general procedure of HAZID study is shown in Figure 3-1
1 below. The HAZID
preparation should be made, preferably no later than one week prior to the start of
HAZID workshop, by HAZID facilitator and informed to all the HAZID participants.
Figure 3-1
1 Overall Schematic Diagram of HAZID Study Procedure
HAZID study is carried out by a HAZID team, which is basically a multidisciplinary team
of personnel and consists of one facilitator as team leader and several qua
qualified experts
having various experience and knowledge on the target system. If necessary, a scribe
may participate in the team for documentation. However, a HAZID team should not have
too many people around the table at any time, in order to make the team easy to be
managed. A typicall HAZID team should include the following experts familiar with the
target system;
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A project representative
HAZID workshop is the main work of HAZID study. The workshop is normally conducted
for 1 to 5 days, depending on the size and complexity of the target system
systems contents.
HAZID workshop is basically team
team-based brainstorming, and often, in order to facilitat
facilitate
discussion during the workshop, specific technique may be used in addition. There are
some techniques available for HAZID workshop, such as HAZID Checklist, What
What-If, SWIFT,
FMECA, etc. Among them, facilitator should select the most appropriate one and
introduce
troduce it to HAZID team members at the beginning of the workshop for consideration.
Furthermore, for the sake of ranking or prioritizing risk associated with identified hazards,
adequate method and evaluation criteria, which are qualitative or semi
semi-quantitative in
most cases, should be prepared by facilitator before the workshop. Risk prioritization
could give designers/engineers the benefit of identifying which hazards or safety systems
should be noticed for more enhanced safety of the target system. In general,
eneral, the answers
to the following questions are discussed during the workshop and then recorded in the
HAZID worksheet:
l
Outcomes of HAZID study should be documented properly and finalized after review of
HAZID team members. HAZI
HAZID
D report to be prepared and issued by facilitator is a
representative result of HAZID study. The report should include summary of works done,
materials used, findings, proposed actions and recommendations. And also, SAFETY
ACTION LOG that contains the requ
required
ired course of actions or further recommendations
developed and agreed by HAZID team should be attached in the report.
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All the working process mentioned above are usually performed in the very narrow and
high position such as the space on lashing bridge. Lashing rod may be longer than 2
times of container box height. Therefore, lashing and unlashing operation itself is very
dangerous work which has many hazards such as fall, slip, trips and other
ther potential fatal
accidents.
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5. HAZID Study
5.1 Purpose
The purposes of this HAZID study are:
l
To identify the nature and scale of hazards that might present during the
container securing operation
operation,
Lashing
Unlashing
In this study, only the risk to human wass considered. Neither risk to environment nor risk
to asset was investigated, since all the experts participating in the study agreed that the
operation of container securing could hardly thr
threaten
eaten natural environment and asset.
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Hazards, causes and consequences that have the potential to affect personnel
were identified.
Risk indices for the hazards (or hazardous events) were decided.
Additional safety
ty actions and recommendations were examined.
All the findings and decisions from the workshop are the result of consensus of the team
members and based on the experience and expertise of the qualified experts.
5.5
.5 Risk Evaluation Criteria
For
or the evaluation and prioritization of the risk level associated with identified hazards,
specific semi-quantitative
quantitative risk evaluation criteria, such as risk matrix, was used. Risk
prioritization or ranking is a simplistic technique for an initial sorting o
of identified
hazards into categories according to their perceived level of seriousness in order to allow
them to receive the appropriate level of attention.
Container securing operation is a usual work being implemented
d on the existing
container carriers.. In this regard
regard,, it is considered reasonable that the risk evaluation
criteria established for the safety of conventional ships are applicable to th
the operation.
Various international activities for enhanc
enhancing ships safety have been carried out since the
late 1990s. One of the outcomes from IMO (International maritime
aritime organization) was
taken into consideration as the most appropriate one in this study. In more detail,
considering The Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment for use in the IMO rule
rule-making
process (MSC/Circ.1023-MEPC/Circ.392)
MEPC/Circ.392) proposed by IMO
IMO, risk
isk evaluation criteria for
discussion and decision of the HAZID team during the HAZID workshop were defined.
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Frequency
Frequent
Description
Category
Reasonably
Probable
Remote
Likely
ikely to occur once per 10,000 times operation
(i.e. for several container carriers, likely to occur once in their life time)
Extremely
Remote
Unlikely but possible to occur once or twice in the total life of all the
container carriers
So extremely remote that it should not be considered as possible to
occur
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Severity
Description
Category
(Effects on Human)
Minor
Significant
Severe
Catastrophic
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FI
Frequency
Minor
Significant
Severe
Catastrophic
Frequent
10
11
10
Reasonably Probable
Remote
Extremely Remote
The
he risk matrix is divided into three risk regions as defined below:
l
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6. HAZID Results
In this HAZID study, dozens of hazardous events related to the five (5) pre-defined
hazards were identified through the HAZID workshop. Hazardous event means a possible
scenario of accident associated with a specific hazard. A detailed causal relationship
between potential cause and consequence can be understood from a hazardous event.
During the HAZID workshop, various safeguards already provided in the container
securing
operation
were
discussed
discussed,
and
then
additional
safety
actions
or
6.1 Overview
From the HAZID workshop and post
post-HAZID
HAZID processing, totally 39 hazardous events for
the five (5) pre-defined
defined hazards were identified. The
he second and fifth hazards produced
the most hazardous events, such as 11, and the fourth hazard made the least events of 3.
Table 6-1 Number of Hazardous Events by Hazard
Pre-defined Hazards
1. Slips and
2. Falls from
3. Dropped
4. Working
5. Poor
Trips
Height
Object
Environment
Operation
11
11
Sum
Number of
Hazardous
39
Events
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ALARP Risk
Intolerable Risk
10
13
23
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Pre-defined
defined
Hazards
ALARP
Intolerable
Risk
Risk
Risk
Sum
11
Dropped Object
bject
Working Environment
nvironment
Poor Operation
peration
11
15
24
39
Sum
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It is found that, due to the pre-defined hazards, 24 hazardous events having the
intolerable risk level could occur. As for the safe operation of container securing,
reasonable safety actions for risk reduction shall be prepared on the basis of specific
causes and consequences of the events, and then implemented appropriately.
The major hazardous events ranked with high risk level are listed in HAZARD REGISTER
(see ANNEX V). And
nd the required safety actions, which shall be implemented by a safety
supervisor or ship designer in the future and then approved by a safety supervisor or the
HAZID facilitator, are listed in SAFETY ACTION LOG at the end of this HAZID report ((see
ANNEX VI).
6.2.2 Hazards with the ALARP Risk
As shown in Table 6-3
3 and Figure 6
6-3, hazardous events in the ALARP risk region are 15
in total, and they are associated with all the pre
pre-defined
defined hazards. ALARP risks are
acceptable level in principle from the viewpoint of the system safety. However, in order to
improve the current safety of tthe operation process,
ocess, practical and reasonable safety
actions may be adopted on the basis of the result of cost effectiveness analysis (CEA).
Regarding risk reduction of the hazards or hazardous events having the ALARP risk level,
the ALARP principle should be considered as an important standard of judgment.
According to the IMO FSA guidelines (Ref. 6), the ALARP risk should be reduced to meet
economic
conomic responsibility: Risk is to be reduced to a level as low as is reasonably
practicable. The
he term reasonable is interpreted to mean cost
cost-effectiveness
ness. Risk reduction
measures or recommended safety actions should be technically practicable and the
associated
ociated costs should not be disproportionate to the benefits gained.
The relevant hazardous events are listed in HAZARD REGISTER (see ANNEX V). And the
recommended safety actions, which should be considered by a safety supervisor or ship
designer in the future but do not need to be approved,
oved, are listed in SAFETY ACTION
LOG at the end of this HAZID report ((see ANNEX VI).
6.2.3 Hazards with the Negligible Risk
There is no hazard and hazardous event having the negligible rrisk level in this study.
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7. Conclusion
Container
ontainer securing operation, such as lashing and unlashing, is currently being carried
out in huge numbers of container ports all over the world
world. The
he securing operation is
generally recognized as much dangerous work, and a range of accidents resulting in
severe injuries and fatalities have occurred frequently. In this study, for the sake of
ensuring further enhanced safety of the securing operation, a HAZID study was
conducted by a HAZID team that consists of several experts having sufficient expertise in
container lashing and unlashing
unlashing. Detailed information on the experts of HAZID team is
included in ANNEX I and ANNEX II. From the HAZID study, risk levels
evels of the current
procedure and practice of container securing operation were evaluated, and then
reasonable and practicable measures for controlling the risks were deduced. The
worksheets, in which all the findings and decisions from this study were relevantly
recorded, are contained in HAZID WORKSHEET (see ANNEX IV).
During the HAZID workshop, many kinds of hazardous events and related causes and
consequences were identified, and their risk levels were determined based on the
agreement of HAZID team members. Consequently, 5 hazards and 39 hazardous events
were identified in total.. All the hazards and 24 hazardous events (about 62%) belonged
to the intolerable risk region, and the rest, such as 15 hazardous events (about 38%),
were located in the ALARP risk region. Investigating the risk index distribution, it is found
that
hat almost high risks depend on high frequencies, while consequence levels are
relatively low. HAZARD REGISTER (see ANNEX V) contains all the major hazards and
hazardous events identified.
Based on the result of evaluating the risk levels, it is concluded that the current risk level
of container securing operation is significantly high as much as unacceptable. In this
regard, additional risk reduction measures for decreasing the high risks to acceptable
level shall be applied to the container securing operation.. Dozens of risk reduction
measures, that is, safety actions were discussed and determined by the experts of HAZID
team. Considering the majority of high risks resulted from high frequencies, rather than
high consequences, the safety actions propo
proposed
sed by the HAZID study are mainly related
to accident prevention.
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As a result of analyzing the hazards and hazardous events identified, the following
perspectives on the safe operation of ccontainer
ontainer securing were deduced.
l
In general,
the majority of h
hazardous events identified involve the unacceptable risk level
as well,
additional safety actions for reducing the high risks of container securing
operation into the acceptable level shall be considered and implemented.
the most concerned accident having the unacceptable risk level is a slight
injury due to slipping up or falling over obstacles on the passage way,
a range of lashing gears (e.g., lashing rod, twist lock, lashing cone
cone, etc.) and
structural members (e.g., eye plate, stopper, coaming stay, stanchion bracket,
mooring fittings, etc.) could cause the accident,
in order to control the high risk accident, several mandatory safety actions
are proposed, such as wearing safety shoes,
hoes, painting and highlighting
dangerous area with a contrasting color, sufficient arrangement of storage
boxes for lashing gears and operating tools, non
non-slip
slip surfaces, and adequate
lights around the passage ways, and
furthermore, it is recommended to co
consider
nsider additional options, such as
frequent inspection of deck structure, and passage way breadth larger than
600mm.
the most
ost concerned accident having the unacceptable risk level is a serious
injury or fatality due to falling off high places (e.g., falling from the top of
coaming, hatch cover, stanchion, lashing bridge, cross deck, etc.),
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the most concerned accident having the unacceptable risk level is a serious
injury or fatality due to a falling object (e.g., container, lashing gear,
operating tool, etc.), and
in order to control the high risk accident, several mandatory safety actions
are proposed, such as wearing a safety helmet, double checking container
locking with the gantry crane, container weight equipment installation on the
gantry crane, sufficient arrangement of storage boxes for lashing gears and
operating
ating tools, and toe boards around the sides of elevated lashing bridges
and platforms.
the most concerned accident having the unacceptable risk level is a serious
injuryy or fatality due to an electric shock,
in order to control the high risk accident, several mandatory safety actions
are proposed, such as wearing insulated gloves and shoes, frequent checking
electric cables before working, and circuit
circuit-breaker
breaker installation, and
in order to control the high risk accident, several mandatory safety actions
are proposed, such as preparation of reasonable and practicable work
manual, observance of the manual, proper training of lashing operators,
working in pairs, sufficient time for lashing operation, clear distance of 70mm
between
tween parallel turnbuckles, careful operation of the special containers, and
minimized weight of lashing gears.
In order to cope with the identified hazards appropriately, specific safety actions and
recommendations, which are mandatory or optional, were determined and proposed.
SAFETY ACTION LOG is provided in the end of this HAZID report ((see ANNEX VI) so that
it could facilitate the recording of follow
follow-up
up actions associated with the safety actions
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HAZID Report
ANNEX I
No.
Rev. 1
Name
Company
Choi,
Korean
orean
Jong-il
Register
egister
Choung,
Korean
orean
Choung-ho
Register
egister
Im,
Korean
orean
Jin-sung
Register
egister
Lim,
Korean
orean
Sung-hwan
Register
egister
Na,
Korean
orean
Seong
Register
egister
Oh,
Korean
orean
Byung-yul
Register
egister
Seo,
Korean
orean
Ji-man
Register
egister
Role
Expert
member
Remark
Full-time
Facilitator
Full-time
Risk assessment
Survey team
Senior surveyor
Ship survey
New technology support team
Principal surveyor
Ship survey
Expert
member
Expert
member
Full-time
Full-time
Scribe
Full-time
Risk assessment
Convention & legislation service team
Principal surveyor
Ship survey
Convention & legislation service team
Deputy senior surveyor
Ship survey
Page 21
Expert
member
Expert
member
Full-time
Full-time
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ANNEX II
Rev. 1
CVs of EXPERTS
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Remarks
No.
Pre-Defined Hazard
Hazards
other objects
- Ergonomics
operation
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101
Possible Cause
Operation
Existing
Consequence
Mode
Safeguards
FI
SI
RI
1. Moving
Proposed Actions
Remarks
etc.)
sufficiently.
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
contrasting color.
6.3.5
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
be checked frequently.
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
shoes)
bridge)
102
Potential
6.2
* Slight injuries
1.0
7.2
1. Moving
5.2
1.3
6.5
6.1
1.2
7.3
bridge)
Slippery passage way due to oil
103
* Slight injuries
1. Moving
104
2. Non-slip surface
* Slight injuries
1. Moving
5.7
1.2
6.8
5.3
1.0
6.3
5.7
1.0
6.7
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
105
106
* Slight injuries
1. Moving
* Slight injuries
1. Moving
harsh weather
107
walking.
* Slight injuries
1. Moving
5.7
1.3
7.0
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
108
* Slight injuries
2. Lashing
5.2
3. Unlashing
2.0
7.2
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Possible Cause
Potential
Operation
Existing
Consequence
Mode
Safeguards
* Severe injuries
201
FI
SI
RI
1. Moving
4.5
2.7
7.2
* Single fatality
Proposed Actions
Remarks
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
6.2.1.3
202
203
* Severe injuries
1. Moving
4.5
* Single fatality
No hand rail around the sides of
* Severe injuries
* Single fatality
2.7
7.2
1. Moving
4.5
2.8
7.3
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
204
* Severe injuries
2. Lashing
* Single fatality
3. Unlashing
4.4
2.7
7.0
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
205
206
* Severe injuries
* Single fatality
* Slight injuries
1. Moving
3.7
2.3
6.0
4.2
2.0
6.2
2. Lashing
3. Unlashing
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
provided.
207
* Severe injuries
1. Moving
* Single fatality
2. Lashing
5.0
2.5
7.5
1. Operating or walking on
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
3. Unlashing
Irrecognition of opened access hole
* Slight injuries
1. Moving
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
208
4.6
2.7
7.3
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Possible Cause
Fixation trouble of an opened
Potential
Operation
Existing
Consequence
Mode
Safeguards
* Slight injuries
FI
SI
RI
1. Moving
209
4.2
1.7
5.8
Proposed Actions
Remarks
hoop.
moving
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
Annex 14/6.2.4.2 & 6.2.4.5 &
6.2.4.6
210
* Severe injuries
1. Moving
lashing points
* Single fatality
2. Lashing
4.3
2.0
6.3
4.1
2.0
6.1
FI
SI
RI
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
3. Unlashing
211
* Severe injuries
* Single fatality
1. Moving
301
Possible Cause
Potential
Operation
Existing
Consequence
Mode
Safeguards
* Single fatality
1. Moving
* Multiple fatalities
2. Lashing
Proposed Actions
Remarks
3.3
3. Unlashing
3.7
7.0
weight, etc.)
302
* Single fatality
1. Moving
* Multiple fatalities
2. Lashing
3.0
3.7
6.7
3. Unlashing
303
* Single fatality
1. Moving
* Multiple fatalities
2. Lashing
3. Unlashing
4.5
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2.5
7.0
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304
Possible Cause
Potential
Operation
Existing
Consequence
Mode
Safeguards
FI
SI
RI
Remarks
* Severe injuries
1. Moving
* Single fatality
2. Lashing
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
sufficiently.
3. Unlashing
5.2
1.7
6.8
or container top)
305
Proposed Actions
* Severe injuries
2. Lashing
* Single fatality
3. Unlashing
cone, etc.
platforms.
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
Annex 14/6.2.2.5
bridge, etc.)
5.3
2.7
7.9
main deck
Falling of operating bar/tools
* Severe injuries
2. Lashing
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
* Single fatality
3. Unlashing
306
5.3
2.5
7.8
Possible Cause
Potential
Operation
Existing
Consequence
Mode
Safeguards
FI
SI
RI
Proposed Actions
Remarks
* Severe injuries
1. Moving
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
* Single fatality
2. Lashing
Annex 14/ 8
refer container
* Multiple fatalities
3. Unlashing
401
4.5
2.7
7.2
work.
3. Circuit-breaker
breaker should be fitted
on the vessel.
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Possible Cause
Potential
Operation
Existing
Consequence
Mode
Safeguards
FI
SI
RI
Proposed Actions
Remarks
* Severe injuries
1. Moving
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
* Single fatality
2. Lashing
deck
* Multiple fatalities
3. Unlashing
on deck.
2. Operators should wear insulated
gloves and shoes.
402
4.0
2.5
6.5
Lightning
403
* Single fatality
1. Moving
* Lightning
* Multiple fatalities
2. Lashing
conductor on
3. Unlashing
the vessel
3.3
2.3
5.7
FI
SI
RI
5.7
1.3
7.1
502
Possible Cause
Potential
Operation
Existing
Consequence
Mode
Safeguards
* Slight injuries
2. Lashing
turnbuckles
* Severe injuries
3. Unlashing
* Slight injuries
2. Lashing
* Severe injuries
3. Unlashing
5.7
1.3
7.0
lashing)
Proposed Actions
Remarks
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
should be ensured.
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
should be ensured.
* Slight injuries
2. Lashing
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
* Severe injuries
3. Unlashing
503
5.3
Page 29
1.7
7.0
pairs.
February 2014
HAZID Report
Rev. 1
504
Possible Cause
Potential
Operation
Existing
Consequence
Mode
Safeguards
FI
SI
RI
Proposed Actions
Remarks
* Slight injuries
2. Lashing
* Severe injuries
3. Unlashing
* Slight injuries
2. Lashing
* Recommended minimum
manually handled
* Severe injuries
3. Unlashing
5.0
1.8
6.8
operation
hatch cover)
505
6.2
1.0
20 kg or so.
7.2
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
Annex 14/ 6.3.2.2 & 6.3.3.3 &
6.3.4.6 & 7.2.1.4
* No immediate accident is
2. Lashing
operators
estimated in harbor
3. Unlashing
506
6.0
1.3
7.3
* No immediate accident is
2. Lashing
estimated in harbor
3. Unlashing
necessary.
container, etc.)
507
5.8
1.3
7.1
508
* Slight injuries
2. Lashing
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
* Severe injuries
3. Unlashing
* Single fatality
6.0
2.0
8.0
Page 30
February 2014
HAZID Report
Rev. 1
509
Possible Cause
Potential
Operation
Existing
Consequence
Mode
Safeguards
* No immediate accident is
2. Lashing
of lashing/unlashing works
estimated in harbor
3. Unlashing
FI
SI
RI
5.5
1.7
7.2
Proposed Actions
Remarks
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
510
* Slight injuries
2. Lashing
drinking
* Severe injuries
3. Unlashing
5.0
2.3
7.3
5.3
1.3
6.6
* Refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352
* Single fatality
511
* No immediate accident is
2. Lashing
estimated in harbor
3. Unlashing
painting, etc.)
Page 31
February 2014
HAZID Report
ANNEX V
No.
Hazard
Poor
Rev. 1
HAZARD REGISTER
Event
Cause
ID
508
operation
Consequence
Operation
Mode
Incomplete communication
* Slight injuries
2. Lashing
* Severe injuries
3. Unlashing
RI
Risk Level
8.0
Intolerable
7.9
Intolerable
7.8
Intolerable
7.5
Intolerable
* Single fatality
Dropped
305
objects
3
Dropped
306
* Severe injuries
2. Lashing
hold
* Single fatality
3. Unlashing
* Severe injuries
2. Lashing
* Single fatality
3. Unlashing
* Severe injuries
1. Moving
* Single fatality
2. Lashing
objects
4
Falls from
207
height
3. Unlashing
Slips and
103
Falls from
203
height
Falls from
* Slight injuries
1. Moving
7.3
Intolerable
* Severe injuries
1. Moving
7.3
Intolerable
of coaming top
* Single fatality
* Slight injuries
1. Moving
7.3
Intolerable
* No immediate
2. Lashing
7.3
Intolerable
unskilled operators
accident in harbor
3. Unlashing
Lashing/unlashing
ashing/unlashing work right
* Slight injuries
2. Lashing
7.3
Intolerable
after drinking
* Severe injuries
3. Unlashing
spilled or dropped
trips
6
208
height
cross deck
Poor
506
operation
9
Poor
510
operation
* Single fatality
10
Slips and
101
* Slight injuries
1. Moving
7.2
Intolerable
* Slight injuries
2. Lashing
7.2
Intolerable
1. Moving
7.2
Intolerable
1. Moving
7.2
Intolerable
7.2
Intolerable
trips
way
11
Slips and
108
trips
3. Unlashing
12
Falls from
201
height
13
Falls from
202
height
14
Working
environment
401
* Severe injuries
area
* Single fatality
* Severe injuries
top
* Single fatality
* Severe injuries
1. Moving
* Single fatality
2. Lashing
of refer container
* Multiple fatalities
3. Unlashing
Page 32
February 2014
HAZID Report
No.
Hazard
15
Poor
Rev. 1
Event
ID
505
operation
16
Poor
Cause
509
operation
Consequence
Operation
Mode
RI
Risk Level
7.2
Intolerable
7.2
Intolerable
7.1
Intolerable
7.1
Intolerable
* Slight injuries
2. Lashing
* Severe injuries
3. Unlashing
Insufficient or improper
* No immediate
2. Lashing
instruction of lashing/unlashing
accident in harbor
3. Unlashing
Careless tightening or
* Slight injuries
2. Lashing
loosening turnbuckles
* Severe injuries
3. Unlashing
* No immediate
2. Lashing
sized container
accident in harbor
3. Unlashing
* Slight injuries
1. Moving
7.0
Intolerable
* Severe injuries
2. Lashing
7.0
Intolerable
* Single fatality
3. Unlashing
* Single fatality
1. Moving
7.0
Intolerable
gantry crane
* Multiple fatalities
2. Lashing
7.0
Intolerable
7.0
Intolerable
7.0
Intolerable
works
17
Poor
501
operation
18
Poor
507
operation
19
Slips and
107
trips
20
Falls from
204
height
21
Dropped
301
objects
3. Unlashing
22
Dropped
303
objects
* Single fatality
1. Moving
* Multiple fatalities
2. Lashing
operators
23
Poor
502
operation
24
Poor
503
operation
25
Slips and
104
Dropped
* Slight injuries
2. Lashing
turnbuckles
* Severe injuries
3. Unlashing
* Slight injuries
2. Lashing
* Severe injuries
3. Unlashing
* Slight injuries
1. Moving
6.8
ALARP
* Severe injuries
1. Moving
6.8
ALARP
* Single fatality
2. Lashing
6.8
ALARP
puddles of rain
trips
26
3. Unlashing
304
objects
3. Unlashing
27
Poor
504
operation
28
Slips and
106
Dropped
* Slight injuries
2. Lashing
operator's negligence
* Severe injuries
3. Unlashing
* Slight injuries
1. Moving
6.7
ALARP
* Single fatality
1. Moving
6.7
ALARP
* Multiple fatalities
2. Lashing
6.6
ALARP
way to walk
trips
29
302
objects
gantry crane
30
Poor
operation
511
Any
other
3. Unlashing
duties
lashing/unlashing
except
No
immediate
accident in harbor
Page 33
2. Lashing
3. Unlashing
February 2014
HAZID Report
No.
Hazard
31
Slips and
Rev. 1
Event
Cause
ID
102
Structural
failures,
Consequence
such
as
Operation
Mode
RI
Risk Level
* Slight injuries
1. Moving
6.5
ALARP
* Severe injuries
1. Moving
6.5
ALARP
* Single fatality
2. Lashing
on deck
* Multiple fatalities
3. Unlashing
* Slight injuries
1. Moving
6.3
ALARP
* Severe injuries
1. Moving
6.3
ALARP
lashing points
* Single fatality
2. Lashing
6.2
ALARP
1. Moving
6.1
ALARP
1. Moving
6.0
ALARP
trips
way
32
Working
402
environment
33
Slips and
105
to harsh weather
trips
34
Falls from
210
height
3. Unlashing
35
Falls from
206
Falls from
platform
fitted
between
* Slight injuries
height
36
No
211
height
Falling
from
ladder
while
accommodation
boarding
the
2. Lashing
3. Unlashing
* Severe injuries
* Single fatality
vessel
37
Falls from
205
height
38
Falls from
209
Working
environment
* Severe injuries
* Single fatality
* Slight injuries
1. Moving
5.8
ALARP
* Single fatality
1. Moving
5.7
ALARP
* Multiple fatalities
2. Lashing
height
39
403
Lightning
3. Unlashing
Page 34
February 2014
HAZID Report
Rev. 1
TASK
DOCUMENT
HAZID Report
TARGET
SYSTEM
(1) of (15)
Hazard ID
Hazards
Hazardous Event ID
Op. Mode
Risk Index
Risk Level
107
7
7.0
Intolerable
Working environment
402
1, 2, 3
6.5
ALARP
210
1, 2, 3
6.3
ALARP
Written by :
HAZID facilitator
Signed :
Date : 28/0
28/01/2014
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Response :
Written by :
Close out :
Written by :
Page 35
February 2014
HAZID Report
Rev. 1
Sheet No.
TASK
DOCUMENT
HAZID Report
TARGET
SYSTEM
(2) of (15)
Hazard ID
Hazards
Hazardous Event ID
Op. Mode
Risk Index
Risk Level
Dropped objects
301
1, 2, 3
7
7.0
Intolerable
Dropped objects
303
1, 2, 3
7
7.0
Intolerable
Dropped objects
302
1, 2, 3
6
6.7
ALARP
] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):
Written by :
HAZID facilitator
Signed :
Date : 28/0
28/01/2014
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Response :
Written by :
Close out :
Written by :
Page 36
February 2014
HAZID Report
Rev. 1
Sheet No.
TASK
DOCUMENT
HAZID Report
TARGET
SYSTEM
(3) of (15)
Hazard ID
Hazards
Hazardous Event ID
Op. Mode
Risk Index
Risk Level
203
7
7.3
Intolerable
204
2, 3
7
7.0
Intolerable
206
2, 3
6.
6.2
ALARP
205
6.
6.0
ALARP
Written by :
HAZID facilitator
Signed :
Date : 28/0
28/01/2014
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Response :
Written by :
Close out :
Written by :
Page 37
February 2014
HAZID Report
Rev. 1
Sheet No.
TASK
DOCUMENT
HAZID Report
TARGET
SYSTEM
(4) of (15)
Hazard ID
Hazards
Hazardous Event ID
Op. Mode
Risk Index
Risk Level
Dropped objects
305
2, 3
7.9
Intolerable
Poor operation
505
2, 3
7.2
Intolerable
Poor operation
502
2, 3
7.0
Intolerable
] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):
Written by :
HAZID facilitator
Signed :
Date : 28/0
28/01/2014
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Response :
Written by :
Close out :
Written by :
Page 38
February 2014
HAZID Report
Rev. 1
Sheet No.
TASK
DOCUMENT
HAZID Report
TARGET
SYSTEM
Hazard ID
(5) of (15)
Hazardous Event ID
Op. Mode
Risk Index
Risk Level
106
6.7
ALARP
209
5.8
ALARP
[ ] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):
1. Fixed and long vertical ladder should be provided with a guard hoop.
(refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352 Annex 14/ 6.2)
2. Provision of cell guides above main deck should be examined at ship design phase.
3. Minimum clear distance of 600 mm should be ensured for safe walking i.w.o. main deck, cross deck and
lashing bridge. (refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352 Annex 14/ 6.2)
Written by :
HAZID facilitator
Signed :
Date : 28/0
28/01/2014
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Response :
Written by :
Close out :
Written by :
Page 39
February 2014
HAZID Report
Rev. 1
Sheet No.
TASK
DOCUMENT
HAZID Report
TARGET
SYSTEM
(6) of (15)
Hazard ID
Hazards
Hazardous Event ID
Op. Mode
Risk Index
Risk Level
208
7.3
Intolerable
103
7.
7.3
Intolerable
101
7.2
Intolerable
201
7.2
Intolerable
] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):
Written by :
HAZID facilitator
Signed :
Date : 28/0
28/01/2014
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Response :
Written by :
Close out :
Written by :
Page 40
February 2014
HAZID Report
Rev. 1
Sheet No.
TASK
DOCUMENT
HAZID Report
TARGET
SYSTEM
(7) of (15)
Hazard ID
Hazards
Hazardous Event ID
Op. Mode
Risk Index
Risk Level
Dropped objects
306
2, 3
7.8
Intolerable
101
7.2
Intolerable
Dropped objects
304
1, 2, 3
6.8
ALARP
Signed :
Date : 28/0
28/01/2014
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):
Written by :
HAZID facilitator
Response :
Written by :
Close out :
Written by :
Page 41
February 2014
HAZID Report
Rev. 1
Sheet No.
TASK
DOCUMENT
HAZID Report
TARGET
SYSTEM
(8) of (15)
Hazard ID
Hazards
Hazardous Event ID
Op. Mode
Risk Index
Risk Level
Working environment
401
1, 2, 3
7.2
Intolerable
Working environment
402
1, 2, 3
6.5
ALARP
Signed :
Date : 28/0
28/01/2014
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):
Written by :
HAZID facilitator
Response :
Written by :
Close out :
Written by :
Page 42
February 2014
HAZID Report
Rev. 1
Sheet No.
TASK
DOCUMENT
HAZID Report
TARGET
SYSTEM
(9) of (15)
Hazard ID
Hazards
Hazardous Event ID
Op. Mode
Risk Index
Risk Level
Dropped objects
306
2, 3
7.8
Intolerable
103
7.3
Intolerable
104
6.8
ALARP
Dropped objects
304
1, 2, 3
6.8
ALARP
] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):
Written by :
HAZID facilitator
Signed :
Date : 28/0
28/01/2014
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Response :
Written by :
Close out :
Written by :
Page 43
February 2014
HAZID Report
Rev. 1
Sheet No.
TASK
DOCUMENT
HAZID Report
TARGET
SYSTEM
(10) of (15)
Hazard ID
Hazards
Hazardous Event ID
Op. Mode
Risk Index
Risk Level
102
6.5
ALARP
[ ] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):
1. Deck structural members and lashing gears on board should be surveyed by crew frequently.
(refer to MSC.1/Circ.1352 Annex 14/ 7.3)
Written by :
HAZID facilitator
Signed :
Date : 28/0
28/01/2014
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Response :
Written by :
Close out :
Written by :
Page 44
February 2014
HAZID Report
Rev. 1
Sheet No.
TASK
DOCUMENT
HAZID Report
TARGET
SYSTEM
(11) of (15)
Hazard ID
Hazards
Hazardous Event ID
Op. Mode
Risk Index
Risk Level
207
1, 2, 3
7.5
Intolerable
202
7.2
Intolerable
201
7.2
Intolerable
Signed :
Date : 28/0
28/01/2014
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):
Written by :
HAZID facilitator
Response :
Written by :
Close out :
Written by :
Page 45
February 2014
HAZID Report
Rev. 1
Sheet No.
TASK
DOCUMENT
HAZID Report
TARGET
SYSTEM
(12) of (15)
Hazard ID
Hazards
Hazardous Event ID
Op. Mode
Risk Index
Risk Level
Poor operation
508
2, 3
8.0
Intolerable
Poor operation
510
2, 3
7.3
Intolerable
Poor operation
509
2, 3
7.2
Intolerable
108
2, 3
7.2
Intolerable
Poor operation
503
2, 3
7.0
Intolerable
] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):
Written by :
HAZID facilitator
Signed :
Date : 28/0
28/01/2014
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Response :
Written by :
Close out :
Written by :
Page 46
February 2014
HAZID Report
Rev. 1
Sheet No.
TASK
DOCUMENT
HAZID Report
TARGET
SYSTEM
(13) of (15)
Hazard ID
Hazards
Hazardous Event ID
Op. Mode
Risk Index
Risk Level
Poor operation
506
2, 3
7.3
Intolerable
Poor operation
507
2, 3
7.1
Intolerable
] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):
Written by :
HAZID facilitator
Signed :
Date : 28/0
28/01/2014
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Response :
Written by :
Close out :
Written by :
Page 47
February 2014
HAZID Report
Rev. 1
Sheet No.
TASK
DOCUMENT
HAZID Report
TARGET
SYSTEM
(14) of (15)
Hazard ID
Hazards
Hazardous Event ID
Op. Mode
Risk Index
Risk Level
Poor operation
501
2, 3
7.1
Intolerable
] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):
Written by :
HAZID facilitator
Signed :
Date : 28/0
28/01/2014
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Response :
Written by :
Close out :
Written by :
Page 48
February 2014
HAZID Report
Rev. 1
Sheet No.
TASK
DOCUMENT
HAZID Report
TARGET
SYSTEM
(15) of (15)
Hazard ID
Hazards
Hazardous Event ID
Op. Mode
Risk Index
Risk Level
Poor operation
504
2, 3
6.8
ALARP
[ ] Recommendation (Advisory)
(Advisory):
1. While the gantry crane in port is operating, any lashing operator should be sufficiently away from the
moving container.
Written by :
HAZID facilitator
Signed :
Date : 28/0
28/01/2014
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Signed :
Date :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
Response :
Written by :
Close out :
Written by :
Page 49