The Study of Using ASEAN Conflict Settlement Mechanisms in Solving The South China Sea Dispute

1st National and International Conference on Humanities and Social Sciences
October 31, 2014, KU Home, Bangkok, THAILAND
The Study of Using ASEAN Conflict Settlement Mechanisms

in Solving the South China Sea Dispute
Vanly Seng
Abstract
Numerous reports on the South China Sea dispute are constantly dominated by confrontations
occurring in the disputed territories. There has been a tendency to focus more on the role of regional
organizations in dispute settlement whilst less attention is given to the role of the regional regimes, in this
case the ASEAN Political Security Community. In light of this observation, this paper was intended to
critically analyze the ASEAN dispute settlement mechanisms in managing the SCS conflict in pursuit of
regional peace and security. The maritime dispute over potentially resourceful territories and waters that
also cover strategic sea lanes of trade involves China, Taiwan and four ASEAN member states i.e. the
Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei Darussalam.
In this study a qualitative research method was employed as the researcher intended to critically
analyze how the ASEAN Political Security Community has facilitated and encouraged trends, transactions,
and trust by establishing norms of behavior, monitoring mechanisms, and sanctions to enforce those
norms in its attempts to resolve the South China Sea dispute. An explanatory qualitative method was
used in studying this phenomenon. The qualitative approach was implemented as it was capable of
illustrating the specific patterns of the relations and causal explanations in the interaction amongst the
claimant states. The researcher had on the one hand used traditional sources such as books and articles
in well reputable journals, but also moved beyond this and used pieces from magazines, news, reports,
the internet and official statements from the actors involved.
The research findings show that ASEAN member states have implemented various programs
through Track I diplomacy, Track II diplomacy, Confidence Building Mechanisms (CBMs) and Preventive
Diplomacy to contain the dispute from escalating into outright conflict. The findings also clarify that as a
regional regime the ASEAN Political Security Community does not possess authority to dictate over its
member states. However, it is addressing challenges amongst its members and improving its dispute
settlement mechanisms. As such, ASEAN member states continue to optimistically look forward to a
Graduate School of Peace Studies and Diplomacy, Siam University; Email: sengvannly84@gmail.com

future with an ASEAN Political Security Community whose developed mechanisms will minimize conflicts
amongst its members and the region at large.
Key Word: South China Sea, ASEAN Political Security Community, Track I Diplomacy, Confident Building
Mechanism, Preventive Diplomacy
Introduction
Territorial disputes have been witnessed across the world throughout history. The Asian region is
noted to have the highest number of territorial disputes in the period after 1945. Today the Southeast
Asian region characterized by controversy over the ownership of several atolls, coral reefs, islands and
adjacent waters in the South China Sea (SCS) proves that the region is indeed no alien to territorial
disputes. The SCS stretches from Singapore to the strait of Taiwan and is said to have around two
hundred islands and reefs, including the Spratly and Paracel islands, Scarborough Shoal, the Pratas islands
and the Macclesfield Bank which are believed to hold rich fishing grounds and to have large oil and
natural gas reserves. The ownership of most of these islands and that of the adjacent waters is disputed
by six claimant states, namely China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. Of these
claimant states four are ASEAN member-states i.e. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.
The scenario in the SCS is laden with security implications whose consequences could be far
reaching because China, the regions biggest power claims sovereignty over all the disputed islands.
Moreover, Chinas energy lifelines as well as those of Japan, South Korea and India and a large part of
their trade pass through the disputed SCS. Table below illustrates the claimant states involved in the SCS
dispute and their respective claims. Although, Indonesia is not included in this study as a major claimant
state in the SCS dispute its involvement is acknowledge, firstly because Chinas historical claims of the
SCS waters overlap with Natuna gas reserves of Indonesia, secondly, Indonesias involvement is also
noted through its role as the former ASEAN Chairman of 2011.
Table 1: The South China Sea Claimant States and their claims
Claimant State
Basis of Claim
The Claim
China
Historical foundations
Claims the entire SCS; Claims sovereignty over
all the disputed islands
Taiwan
Historical foundations
Claims the whole of the SCS; Controls the Pratas
Islands in the Spratlys is said to have even built
an airstrip and has since settled-in its military
Vietnam
Colonial Principles of the
Claims the Spratlys and Paracel Islands; installed
continental shelf
patrols around the disputed Islands
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Table 1: (Con.)
Claimant State
Basis of Claim
The Claim
Philippines
Principles of the continental shelf Main claim is on the Macclesfield Bank which it
currently controls a huge underwater group of
reefs and shoals; in 1950 it claimed six other
Islands which form some of the largest Islands
in the disputed waters; in 1971 made a formal
claim of eight islands known as the Kalayaan
Malaysia
Principles of the continental shelf 1979 claimed eleven cluster coral Islands in the
and Mapping that it conducted, southeastern Spratly Islands; Controls three
following particular geographical Islands.
coordinates
Brunei
Principles of the continental shelf Has the same claims as Malaysia
Source: Buntaro (2011)
When Beijing declared that the South China Sea now constituted as Chinas core interest on
par with Taiwan, Tibet or Xinjiang (Sukma, 2010) , the news was not well received by ASEAN countries. As
a result, tense maritime stand-offs between China and some of its neighbors have persisted in the
disputed SCS, where key shipping lanes carry some US$5 trillion a year in world trade (Martina, 2011).
Although, China has sought to pursue bilateral means of resolving the dispute in the SCS, ASEAN has
taken it upon itself to bring the issue to the regional body and address it multilaterally as a topical
agenda in the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meetings and other such forums in which there is a desire to see
the South China Sea as a peaceful and stable region (Martina, 2011).
Founded in 1967, ASEAN primarily focused on resolving political-territorial disputes amongst the
countries Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. According to Rana (2002) today
these bilateral disputes are history, resolved through mutual accommodation, and more important, the
creation of deep-rooted mutual confidence. Rana (2002) goes on to say ASEAN and China have also
managed to evolve a method of putting into cold storage the complex sea boundary issue in the SCS
that involves several countries of the region. However, contemporary developments prove otherwise
and East Asian nations have to face thorny issue i.e. the SCS dispute. Buntoro (2011) adds that the
dilemma encountered by ASEAN is that of having to maintain harmonious relations amongst its member
states, whilst on the other hand it should minimize the potential of conflict in the field that can threaten
its regional security.
Using the ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC) Blueprint as a guideline, another useful
tool that is being used in order to try and attain a win-win situation toward resolving the dispute is the
Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties to the South China Sea conflict signed between ASEAN
countries and China in 2002. With ASEAN working toward upgrading the Declaration of the code of
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conduct in the SCS and how to implement it, there are prospects that the APSC may fulfill a fairly
successful diplomatic role as it attempts to diffuse the tensions of the conflicting claimants in the SCS
territorial dispute. It would appear that the multilateral approach should be acceptable to all the
claimant states in view of the fact that they all recognize the 2002 Declaration of Conduct (DOC). The
DOC can be used as a basis for further collective regional negotiations to come up with a workable
solution. In light of this observation, this study differs from the previous researches because firstly it
focuses on the ASEAN Political Security Community as a regional regime, which differs from other studies
which usually give primary attention to the bigger regional organizations. Such contrasting attitudes raises
questions on how the researcher intends to analyze the case study and here among other points the
researcher intends to make use of two of Archers (2001) conclusions in regards to security communities
in which he says, by monitoring states agreements, international organizations give them the confidence
to cooperate in the absence of trust.and.international organizations can help shape state practices by
setting down norms that define what is acceptable.
Numerous reports on the SCS are constantly dominated by news of the conflicts and
confrontations occurring in the territory in question, and tend to focus on the bigger regional organizations
whilst less attention is given to the role of regional regimes in this case the APSC. In light of this
background and observation, the following research question is established.
How has the ASEAN Political Security Community so far managed the South China Sea dispute
in ASEANs efforts to settle the dispute in its pursuit of regional security?
Objective and Scope

Objective
The main objectives of this study are as follows:
1. To explain the efforts of the ASEAN Political Security Community in managing the South China
Sea dispute.
2. To critically examine the effectiveness of the dispute settlement mechanisms applied by
ASEAN Political Security Community in dealing with the South China Sea dispute.
3. To offer recommendations on multilateral measures and arrangements for ASEAN to pursue on
in order to handle the future rounds of dispute settlement more effectively.
Scope
The principles of International Law have been thought to play a key role in resolving the dispute;
however, they may not necessarily provide a set of answers to absolutely every issue. Thus, this study
looked beyond the sovereignty issue such as defining the maritime areas that each claimant state is
entitled to according to international law, or intending to draw maritime boundaries in the SCS. The
intention is to identify the role played by APSC in solving the dispute and determine what significance
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those resolutions really made in the dispute; and the impact of ASEAN Political Security Community
(APSC) with a view to recommending the possibility of the conflict solutions, therefore, the approaches of
conflict management such as CBMs, preventive Diplomacy, mediation, Code of Conduct and others joint
cooperation dialogue among the parties will be analyzed.
Conceptual Framework
The concepts discussed in this study are both the guidelines and the solution mechanism as the
researcher attempts to appreciate the role of the APSC in the SCS dispute and in the end also give
recommendations. There most likely will still remain numerous questions in regards to this research
thereby opening avenues for further studies to be carried out. Not one concept has power over another,
but rather a comprehensive amalgamation of the wide ranging approaches are used to explain the
behavior of states towards maritime territorial disputes as well as attempt to pave a way for resolving the
disputes. The use of various conceptual frameworks in this study indicates that each of these concepts
has something to offer in the understanding and analysis of different dispute settlement mechanism. The
diagram below illustrates the so-called dispute settlement mechanisms employed by ASEAN Political
Security Community. In this regard, the ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC) is the independent
variable which is again separated into four categories, that is to say, Track I Diplomacy, Track II Diplomacy,
Preventive Diplomacy and Confidence Building Mechanisms; while, the South China Sea Dispute is the
dependent ones.
The Diagram of the Conceptual Framework
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Research Methodology
In this research, a qualitative data collection method was employed as the researcher intended
to analyze how the ASEAN Political Security Community facilitated and encouraged trends, transactions,
and trust by establishing norms of behavior, monitoring mechanisms, and sanctions to enforce those
norms in its attempts to resolve the SCS dispute. An explanatory qualitative method was used in studying
this phenomenon. The researcher had on the one hand used traditional sources such as books and
articles in well reputable journals, but also moved beyond this and used pieces from magazines, news,
reports, the internet and official statements from the actors involved. Therefore, the study was based on
library and documentary research.
Research Results
The APSC fulfills its key role in managing the SCS dispute through mechanisms such as Track I
diplomacy, Track II diplomacy together with the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and Preventive
Diplomacy. These mechanisms are credited for avoiding the escalation of the SCS dispute into a more
volatile conflict. They have been and continue to be important in the governance of the Southeast Asian
region. However, there are a number of factors that have evidently hampered its progress towards
resolving the SCS dispute over the past years:
Firstly, from the signing of the DOC between ASEAN states and China 2002, only until recently has
there been a sense of urgency to implement a working plan toward settling the SCS dispute. Notable
efforts to spearhead the SCS dispute settlement have been during Indonesias chairmanship of ASEAN
particularly during its 2011 term. Indonesia played a pivotal role by asking China, for example, for the
meaning of the nine bars encompassing the entire South China Sea.insisting on the conformity of
maritime claims with UNCLOS provisions (Severino, 2012). These nine bars, commonly referred to as
the nine dotted line have not only been of importance to Indonesia, but also to Vietnam, an ASEAN
member state which is also a claimant in the SCS.
The nine dash line is not recognized internationally or legally but it falls within the 12 nautical
miles of Vietnams EEZ. China claims this nine dotted and Vietnam regards this as severe threat to its
sovereignty. Vietnam is strongly bemused by Chinas claims. It feels as though China is making previously
undisputed waters to now become disputed such that the SCS dispute is developing into an issue
concerning that security of Vietnam.
Secondly, the APSC mechanisms have not been strong enough to sway the claimant states to
reach an agreement to collectively resolve the SCS dispute. There has been some weak solidarity
amongst ASEAN member states. This flaw in ASEAN was particularly evident when the ten member bloc
failed to produce a joint statement for the first time in its history at the end of the July 2012 ASEAN
Foreign Ministers Meeting in Phnom Penh. The issue stemmed from the fact that some countries still
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kept insisting on putting in (as part of the joint communiqu) the Scarborough Shoal issue, which is a
bilateral dispute between the Philippines and China. And some still insisted on putting the dispute
between Vietnam and China on an exclusive economic zone and a sea dispute (Voice of America Khmer,
2012).
Not being able to even agree to disagree to include the developments of the SCS dispute in the
joint communiqu was definitely embarrassing for ASEAN. The failure to have a regional position to reach
a consensus was a blow and probably a wake-up call for ASEAN. With a general culture of indirectness
that has penetrated even in the political systems, this development has forced the ASEAN into action.
Again here the Indonesian leadership continues to play a pivotal role through the notable six principles
that it is currently championing to gain consensus for ASEAN solidarity to establish a working COC on the
SCS. These are efforts aimed at reducing tensions in the SCS, and hopefully in the future the dispute can
be settled.
Thirdly, the U.S-China involvement in the SCS dispute has had an impact on the developments
within ASEAN as well as in the disputed territories. The U.S and China both deny any suggestions that the
SCS dispute is primarily about a U.S-Sino competition. The U.S justifies its concerns in the SCS as
legitimate because of the strategic sea lanes covered in the disputed areas which are of crucial
importance to its trade. It maintains its main interest on the freedom of flow of commerce and freedom
of navigation in the SCS. China on the contrary disagrees with the U.S argument and does not
acknowledge the UNCLOS stipulations in regards to the SCS. Nonetheless, their relations with different
ASEAN states have resulted in divisions within ASEAN. On one hand, there are notable partnership
between the U.S and the Philippines; the U.S and Malaysia and the U.S and Vietnam. On the other hand,
China and Cambodia have maintained strong ties.
This research focuses on the six SCS claimant states and the APSC, but there has been a need to
briefly discuss the U.S involvement as a superpower. As reiterated by Buzan and Waever (2003), by nature
superpowers have wide ranging interests which transcend the logic of geography. An issue that raises
eyebrows in particular is the fact that the U.S is committing so many resources to safeguard the Southeast
Asian region yet it has a huge budget deficit. This may be an indication that the U.S may actually have
something to gain from the region that may help it to recover from its financial and economic crisis. As
mentioned in the previous section, in international politics states prioritize their own survival. Like any
other state America needs to survive in this competitive global economic and political arena and will do
what it can to maintain its position as superpower. The same goes for China, a growing power which
needs to maintain an increase on its estimated annual average 10% economic growth rate. The U.S and
China have stronger political muscle over the ASEAN states. In as much as they have partnered with
different members of the ten member bloc, the U.S and China could still used their power to override
the claims by the other smaller states. Of course this will not be done violently, and not even by means
of active combat between the U.S and China in the least.
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Although the U.S and China may not agree on certain issues, they are great powers who need
each other particularly in regards to their economic interdependence. Southeast Asian states are not only
ones who do not want a war outbreak, even these two powers are aware of the devastating
consequences of a war between them, more so when they are still recovering from the global economic
crisis of the past decade. An ideal solution to economic growth for the two would be to manipulate their
persuasive diplomatic means and their leverage as great powers over the smaller ASEAN claimant states
and Taiwan. In such a scenario Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei and Taiwan emerge as
convenient actors in the SCS dispute as the U.S and China divide the territories between themselves.
As the more capacitated state, in long run the U.S could exploit resources on behalf of its Southeast
Asian partners whilst China on the other end exploits within some of its already claimed territories.
Lastly, the issue of confidence within ASEAN itself is still to be improved to create a better
platform to collectively resolve disputes. ASEAN member states seem not to have much confidence with
each other, there is still a sense of skepticism prevailing within the ten member bloc. However, having
conducted this research there is no doubt that ASEAN member states still have some hope. They
continue to optimistically look forward to a future with an APSC whose developed mechanisms will be
able to minimize conflicts amongst its members. Experience has demonstrated that regional security
mechanisms normally play a pacifying role as they are often crafted between and among regional leaders
who know or are familiar with each other. In the case of the Asia-Pacific region, it is hoped that, ASEAN,
through the APSC, will fulfill as successful role in its overall pursuit for regional security. The APSC is more
about internal consolidation i.e. within its region. By being able to firstly resolve its internal issues, then
ASEAN itself will be in a better position to attempt addressing issues that affect its members and its
neighbors as in the case with the SCS dispute which also involves China and Taiwan.
This research also sought to briefly assess the prospects of the establishment of an ASEAN
Community in 2015 in the background of the SCS dispute. The establishment of the ASEAN Community
by 2015 is good and noble objective by ASEAN, but its establishment will definitely be affected by the
developments in the SCS dispute. However the SCS dispute does not stop the ASEAN Community from
being established. For a successful ASEAN Community 2015 there is need for concrete dispute settlement
mechanisms. What ASEAN member state needs to do is to strengthen the APSC mechanisms. This will be
in efforts to create a credible security environment for the region. When this is achieved it may be easier
for the ASEAN member states convene and collectively address the SCS dispute. Political observers argue
that the APSC may be adopted in 2015 in the ASEAN Community but that the actual implementation will
be delayed because of the intra and regional disputes. With such a pessimistic forecast, then it is most
likely that at its establishment, ASEAN Community 2015 will be a weak Community, just like ASEAN itself
was a weak organization at its formation in 1967. Only with time and experience will there be hope for a
stronger ASEAN Community.
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Recommendations
This research may not have developed a new concept to address the management of disputes,
but based on the data analysis of the research, the researcher makes the following recommendations:
1. There is need to develop the ASEAN Political Security Community at a fast and committed
level in such a manner that results in strengthening the APSCs mechanisms and efforts towards dispute
settlement between its member states and other states from outside its region;
2. APSC is affected by weak intra-ASEAN solidarity. In the world of politics all states have interests
of some which differ, but again in an interdependent world, for their own good - states sometimes have
to agree to disagree and work for a common good. ASEAN member states have to uphold regional
solidarity for the sake of regional interests;
3. ASEAN member states will have to minimize the influence of external powers in their affairs
because this has adverse impacts on intra-ASEAN relations. ASEAN member states need to make bold
moves against great power involvement or manipulation so as to establish and work with their own
mechanisms i.e. make the APSC effective, and not always have to rely on international institutions e.g. the
ICJ;
4. The urgent efforts by ASEAN to establish a concrete working COC are greatly commended.
Nevertheless ASEAN also needs a COC that has principles directly addressing the settlement of the
disputed territories, as well as one to which China can also sign. That way ASEAN has better chances to
effectively implement its multilateral mechanisms in covering the initial stages of the SCS dispute
settlement;
5. On the practical side, the APSC regime should greatly consider influencing its member states to
develop a united regional defense mechanism; and
6. ASEAN states have to build a common regional position on every other issue to establish
balanced Pillars for an effective ASEAN Community 2015.
Conclusion
By use of the APSC Blueprint and the ASEAN Charter, the APSC member states have
implemented varying programs in Track I diplomacy, Track II diplomacy together with the Confidence
Building Measures (CBMs) and Preventive Diplomacy as dispute settlement mechanisms in efforts to
manage the SCS dispute. Whilst APSC is characterized by these commendable documents and
mechanisms, the procedures toward resolving disputes are more complex than just following a set norms,
principles or customs. As a result, so far the APSC has not been able to guarantee its region sustainable
regional peace and security. Unfortunately the APSC is not an institution therefore it does not have the
authority to dictate over its member states. The APSC is a regional regime, as such, its key role only goes
as far as influencing its member states to act in ways that favor and maintain regional peace and security.
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References
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Buntoro, K. 2011. Indonesia, ASEAN dan Laut Cina Selatan: Implikasi dan Permasalahannya. Jarkata:
Bakorkamila.
Buzan, B. & Waever, O. 2003. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Martina, M. China announces naval drills in Western Pacific. Jakarta Post, 24 November 2011.
Rana, K. 2002. Bilateral Diplomacy. New Delhi: Manas Publications.
Severino, C. 2012. A paper on Indonesia in ASEANs Chair. Retrieved July 16, 2012 from www.iseas.
edu.sg/aseanstudiescentre/asco57-10.pdf.
Sukma, R. 2010. The South China Sea is a test for ASEAN-China relations. The Jakarta Post, 24 August
2010.
Voice of America Khmer. 2012. Breakdowns Overshadow Accomplishments as ASEAN Meeting Ends.
Retrieved July 16, 2012 from www.voacambodia.com/content/breakdowns-overshadowaccom
plishments-as-asean-meating-ends-162372446/1405452.html.
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1st National and International Conference on Humanities and Social Sciences

October 31, 2014, KU Home, Bangkok, THAILAND