WLC vs City of Manila

Police Power Not Validly Exercised Infringement of

Private Rights
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774
entitled An Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in
hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar
establishments in the City of Manila.White Light Corp is an
operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the
Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the
private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of
WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty
of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City
maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of
police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to
regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of
cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments,
including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor
of the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void
as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates
the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said
ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes
into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for
obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or
to wash up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to
be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected
only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that
individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent
that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of
public interest or public welfare.

JMM Promotions vs CA
Police Power
Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned
the deployment of performing artists to Japan and
other destinations. This was relaxed however with the
introduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council
which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and train
performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the
proposal POEA and the secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step
plan to realize the plan which included an Artists Record
Book which a performing artist must acquire prior to being
deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers of the
Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it
violated the right to travel, abridge existing contracts and
rights and deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM
intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court
ruled in favor of EIAC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The
regulation is a valid exercise of police power. Police power
concerns government enactments which precisely interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare or the common good. As the assailed
Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that
the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said
order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the
public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.
The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the
women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order

No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment

of performing artists to high risk destinations, a measure
which would only drive recruitment further underground, the
new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of
screening performing artists by requiring reasonable
educational and artistic skills from them and limits
deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for
the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It
cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room
for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
Ichong vs Hernandez
Constitutional Law Treaties May Be Superseded by
Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country
to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound
(then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he
and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in
the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress
passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act
the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to
engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the
nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened
several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him,
violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He
said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business
here in the country who helps in the income generation of the
country he should be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede
treaties or generally accepted principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally
accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all
between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA
1180. The equal protection of the law clause does not
demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause
is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class
and those who do not.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a
treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must
be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police
power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or
surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence,
Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market
stalls in the Pasay city market.
Espina vs Zamora
Retail Trade Liberalization Act (R.A. 8762); Police Power;
The control and regulation of trade in the interest of the public
welfare is of course an exercise of the police power of the
State; To the extent that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8762, the
Retail Trade Liberalization Act, lessens the restraint on the
foreigners right to property or to engage in an ordinarily
lawful business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to a
denial of the Filipinos right to property and to due process of
law.The control and regulation of trade in the interest of the
public welfare is of course an exercise of the police power of
the State. A persons right to property, whether he is a Filipino
citizen or foreign national, cannot be taken from him without

due process of law. In 1954, Congress enacted the Retail

Trade Nationalization Act or R.A. 1180 that restricts the retail
business to Filipino citizens. In denying the petition assailing
the validity of such Act for violation of the foreigners right to
substantive due process of law, the Supreme Court held that
the law constituted a valid exercise of police power. The State
had an interest in preventing alien control of the retail trade
and R.A. 1180 was reasonably related to that purpose. That
law is not arbitrary. Here, to the extent that R.A. 8762, the
Retail Trade Liberalization Act, lessens the restraint on the
foreigners right to property or to engage in an ordinarily
lawful business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to a
denial of the Filipinos right to property and to due process of
law. Filipinos continue to have the right to engage in the kinds
of retail business to which the law in question has permitted
the entry of foreign investors.
Police Power; It is not within the province of the Court to
inquire into the wisdom of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8762 save
when it blatantly violates the Constitution.It is not within
the province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of R.A.
8762 save when it blatantly violates the Constitution. But as
the Court has said, there is no showing that the law has
contravened any constitutional mandate. The Court is not
convinced that the implementation of R.A. 8762 would
eventually lead to alien control of the retail trade business.
Petitioners have not mustered any concrete and strong
argument to support its thesis. The law itself has provided
strict safeguards on foreign participation in that business.

Agustin vs Edu
Generally Accepted Principles of International Law Police
Power
Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is
assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 which
requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices
particularly to equip them with a pair of reflectorized
triangular early warning devices. Agustin is arguing that this
order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to
the motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking
lights which is already enough to provide warning to other
motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a
set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and
would only make manufacturers and dealers instant
millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an
expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose
cars are already equipped with 1) blinking-lights in the fore
and aft of said motor vehicles, 2) battery-powered blinking
lights inside motor vehicles, 3) built-in reflectorized tapes on
front and rear bumpers ofmotor vehicles, or 4) well-lighted
two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being
universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968
Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse
conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist
from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a
reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the
roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without
thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that
road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which
is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers
passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of
the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the

petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance

warning because he will still think what that blinking light is
all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement
car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the
mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease,
the danger of collision.
On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise
of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the
main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the
former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it
has offended against the due process and equal protection
safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was
mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of
the police power which was originally identified by Chief
Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847
decision, as nothing more or less than the powers of
government inherent in every sovereignty was stressed in
the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: Justice Laurel,
in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into
force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.
Persons and property could thus be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence
in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a
competence being referred to as the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The
concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in
a pre-Commonwealth decision as that inherent and plenary
power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that
sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court
in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is
in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of
government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, the most
essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers, extending
as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out to all the great public
needs. Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the
times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: Needs that were
narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the
present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or
urgent changes with the time. The police power is thus a
dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely
defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the
state and imposing upon its government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable
an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures
calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and
welfare.
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin,
compounded by the fact that the particular police power
measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public
safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to
invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None
has been called to our attention, an indication of its being nonexistent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained
the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived

with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found

nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was:
To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads
and streets designated as national roads . . . As a matter of
fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of
the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with
petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the
imperative demands of public safety.
Taxicab Operators vs BOT
Police Power
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI)
is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who
are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate
taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in
Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation
(BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads:
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and
Dilapidated Taxis
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT,
docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 7742 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and
operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model
1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phasedout, provided that, at the time of registration, they are
roadworthy and fit for operation.
ISSUES:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned
memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required by
Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the
petitioners constitutional right to procedural due process?
B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the
procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No.
101, would the implementation and enforcement of the
assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners
constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3)
Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable
classification and standard?
HELD
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged
BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and
comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and
dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power,
can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can
prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of
society. It may also regulate property rights. In the language
of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando the necessities imposed
by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
Bautista vs Juinio
Equal Protection Distinction Between Heavy and Extra
Heavy Cars and Others
Bautista is assailing the constitutionality of LOI 869 issued in
1979 which classified vehicles into Heavy and Extra Heavy.
The LOI further banned these vehicles during weekends and
holidays that is from 5am Saturday until 5am Monday.
Purpose of this law is to curb down petroleum consumption as
bigger cars consume more oil. Bautista claimed the LOI to be

discriminatory as it made an assumption that H and EH cars

are heavy on petroleum consumption when in fact there are
smaller cars which are also big on oil consumption. Further,
the law restricts their freedom to enjoy their car while others
who have smaller cars may enjoy theirs. Bautista avers that
there is no rational justification for the ban being imposed on
vehicles classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH), for
precisely those owned by them fall within such category.
ISSUE: Whether or not the LOI violates equal protection.
HELD: The SC held that Bautista was not able to
make merit out of her contention. The classification on
cars on its face cannot be characterized as an affront to
reason. The ideal situation is for the laws benefits to be
available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its
coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and
the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial
uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law.
The actual, given things as they are and likely to continue to
be, cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to
the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of
the situation. . . . To assure that the general welfare be
promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may
cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely
affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal
protection clause only if they can show that the governmental
act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the
common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the
very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It
suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on
all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons
must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being
different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities
imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed.
For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be
given to every person under circumstances, which if not
identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of
burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be
treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some
in the group equally binding on the rest.
association of small landowners vs secretary of agrarian
reform 175 scra 343
Equal Protection
These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the
constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform Act. Article XIII on
SocialJustice and Human Rights includes a call for the
adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State
shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded
on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are
landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or,
in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the
fruits thereof. RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code, had
already been enacted by Congress on August 8, 1963. This
was substantially superseded almost a decade later by PD 27,
which was promulgated on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial
law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands
for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify
maximum retention limits for landowners. On July 17, 1987,
Cory issued EO 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of
the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of
still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the
manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987
by PP 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform
program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the mechanics for its

implementation. Afterwhich is the enactment of RA 6657,

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which Cory
signed on June 10. This law, while considerably changing the
earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them
suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its
provisions.
In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the
executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property
rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause
is also violated because the order places the burden of solving
the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands.
No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other
properties.
The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries
under PD 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them,
EO 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due
process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian
problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their
lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation
of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to
show that they belong to a different class and should be
differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility
of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands
and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands
later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would
be premature.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal
protection clause.
HELD: The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of
the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection
because of the absence of retention limits has also become
academic under Sec 6 of RA 6657. Significantly, they too
have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the
complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of
agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters
on the ground that they belong to a particular class with
particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has
been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid
classification have been violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or
things similar to each other in certain particulars and different
from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must
conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the
measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things
similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights
conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not
shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a
different treatment. The argument that not only landowners
but also owners of other properties must be made to share the
burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is
a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners
that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is
no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress
is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect
by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is
abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.

DECS vs San Diego

Facts: The respondent failed to pass the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) 3 times and he was denied
admission to take the test for another time by the petitioner
under its rule that a student is allowed only to take the NMAT
3 times and after 3 consecutive failures a student shall not be
allowed to take NMAT the 4th time. Respondent invoke his
constitutional rights on academic freedom and quality
education in his petition for mandamus before the court.
Respondent judge rendered decision citing the admission rule
of the petitioner as an arbitrary exercise of police power,
depriving respondent of his right to pursue medical education
thus this petition for review before the higher court.
Issue: Whether or not the admission rule implemented by
petitioner an arbitrary exercise of police power.
Held: The court held that police power is validly exercised if
(a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the interference of the State,
and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. The proper exercise of the
police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and
a lawful method. The subject of the challenged regulation is
certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right
and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the
medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom
patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The
method employed by the challenged regulation is not
irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or
oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the
medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from
the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. The State
needs to implement decisive steps to regulate system of
education by directing students to the course where he is best
suited through initial tests and evaluation. The decision of the
respondent judge was reversed.
Villanueva vs Castaneda
There is in the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando,
Pampanga, along Mercado Street, a strip of land measuring 12
by 77 meters on which stands a conglomeration of vendors
stalls together forming what is commonly known as a talipapa.
This is the subject of the herein petition. The petitioners claim
they have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area
by virtue of a previous authorization granted to them by the
municipal government. The respondents deny this and justify
the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public
property. At the petitioners behest, we have issued a
temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo between
the parties pending our decision.
This dispute goes back to November 7, 1961, when the
municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No.
218 authorizing some 24 members of the Fernandino
United Merchants and
Traders Association to
construct
permanent stalls and sell in the above-mentioned place. The
action was protested on November 10, 1961, in Civil Case No.
2040, where the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch
2, issued a writ of preliminary injunction that prevented the
defendants from constructing the said stalls until final
resolution of the controversy. On January 18, 1964, while this
case was pending, the municipal council of San Fernando
adopted Resolution No. 29, which declared the subject area as
the parking place and as the public plaza of the
municipality, thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No.
218, series of 1961. Four years later, on November 2, 1968,
Judge Andres C. Aguilar decided the aforesaid case and held
that the land occupied by the petitioners, being public in
nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could

not be the subject of private occupancy. The writ of

preliminary injunction was made permanent.
HELD
Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the
resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement for
it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or
bargained away through the medium of a contract. In fact,
every contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital
infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the police
power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power
can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the
contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or
protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate
against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited
by the paramount police power.
We hold that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in denying the petition for prohibition. On the
contrary, he acted correctly in sustaining the right and
responsibility of the mayor to evict the petitioners from the
disputed area and clear it of all the structures illegally
constructed therein.

entered into on October 14, 2003 and November 10, 2003,

respectively. Pursuant to these agreements, three billboards
were set up along the Balintawak Interchange of the North
Expressway. One billboard showed petitioner promoting the
plastic products of Konka International Plastics Manufacturing
Corporation, and the other two showed petitioner endorsing
the clothes of 96 North. One more billboard was set up along
Roxas Boulevard showing petitioner promoting the game and
amusement parlors of G-Box.
Issue: Is Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 an
invalid exercise of police power?
Ruling: No, Police power, as an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order, or safety, and
the general welfare of the people. To determine the validity of
a police measure, two questions must be asked: (1) Does the
interest of the public in general, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, require the exercise of police power? and (2)
Are the means employed reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals?

PRC vs De Guzman

Didipio vs Gozun
Police Power Eminent Domain
In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to
stipulate with foreign companies when it comes to either
technical or financial large scale exploration or mining. In
1995, Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed an FTAA with
Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company. The FTAA
authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000 ha of land in
Quirino and N. Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio. After the
passage of the law, DENR rolled out its implementing RRs.
Didipio petitioned to have the law and the RR to be annulled
as it is unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of
property. In seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and its
implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional,
petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942
and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 which they claim allow the
unlawful and unjust taking of private property for private
purpose in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987
Constitution mandating that private property shall not be taken
except for public use and the corresponding payment of just
compensation. They assert that public respondent DENR,
through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private
property and allow taking of land without payment of just
compensation.
Traversing petitioners assertion, public respondents argue that
Section 76 is not a taking provision but a valid exercise of the
police power and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. This
government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for
the public good and that this adjustment curtails some
potential for the use or economic exploitation of private
property. Public respondents concluded that to require
compensation in all such circumstances would compel the
government to regulate by purchase.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are
valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Didipio. The SC noted the
requisites of eminent domain. They are;
(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;

Facts: The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College

of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the
Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993
by the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as
successful examinees in the medical licensure examination.
Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the
seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the
two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam,
Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology
(OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven
Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got
100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and
twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne.
For its part, the NBI found that the questionable passing rate
of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination
leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early
access to the test questions.
Issue: Was the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 a valid exercise of
police power
Ruling: Yes, it is true that this Court has upheld the
constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or
course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable
admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so
regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to
safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and
general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to
engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or
technical knowledge may be required to take an examination
as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers
Chavez vs. COMELEC
Fact: Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal
agreements with certain establishments to endorse their
products. On August 18, 2003, he authorized a certain Andrew
So to use his name and image for 96 North, a clothing
company. Petitioner also signed Endorsement Agreements
with Konka International Plastics Manufacturing Corporation
and another corporation involved in the amusement and video
games business, G-Box. These last two agreements were

(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.

(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in
such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial
enjoyment of the property.
In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is
invalid. Indeed there is taking involved but it is not w/o just
compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides for just
compensation as well as section 107 of the DENR RR. To wit,
Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of
the surface owner, occupant, or concessionaire as a
consequence of such operations shall be properly compensated
as may be provided for in the implementing rules and
regulations.
Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and
Occupant- Any damage done to the property of the surface
owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a consequence
of the mining operations or as a result of the construction
or installation of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above
shall be properly and justly compensated.
Further, mining is a public policy and the government can
invoke eminent domain to exercise entry, acquisition and use
of private lands.
City Govt of QC vs Ericta
Police Power Not Validly Exercised
Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE
REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE
AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE
CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF. The law
basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area
of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity
burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been
residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their
death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QC
justified the law by invoking police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.
HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police
power. There is no reasonable relation between the setting
aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and
the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the
general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a
taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private
cemeteries.
Dela Cruz vs Paras
Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title Police Power Not
Validly Exercise
Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They
assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the
Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la
Cruz averred that the said Ordinanceviolates their right to
engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close
out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are
healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge
Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84

after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it

is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING
MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE
POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN
PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the
prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote
general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they
were deprived of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue,
Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the
operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful
occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord
84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were
merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the
assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had
stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers
and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency
with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such
a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could
qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering
public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a
measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly
the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The
purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by
reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can
only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.