Faustino Gojo vs Segundo Goyala

1970 || Barredo, J
Facts
In 1951, Segundo Goyala with his wife Antonina Almoguera (now deceased) sold to Faustino Gojo by a
Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale an agricultural land for P750. The repurchase was to be made within 1 year. Gojo paid
another P100 thereafter.
In 1961 or 10 years later, Gojo filed in the CFI of Sorsogon a petition for consolidation of ownership of
the land against Goyala and his wife. He alleged that the date of repurchase had passed and the vendors werent able
to repurchase the land. Thus, ownership had consolidated in him. He prayed for a judicial order to that effect.
Goyala filed an answer alleging that his wife had died in 1959 and denied the pacto de retro sale. Instead, it
was a cash loan of P750 payable 1 year without interest, that his daughter obtained additional amounts to make the
total loan P810. To guarantee payment, he executed a mortgage over the coconut land. He tried to pay the P810
back but Gojo refused to receive it and refused to cancel the document of mortgage. In his counterclaim, he prayed
that the Court:

dismiss the petition

order Gojo to receive the P810 tendered

declaring the document to be mortgage and not a pacto de retro sale plus to cancel it

order Gojo to pay P1,800 per year beginning 1951 as reasonable monetary value of the products of the
property

if the court finds the document to be a pacto de retro sale, then to order Gojo to execute a deed of resale
Goyala filed a manifestation informing the court that his wife was dead and that her surviving nearest kin
were her children. The Court ordered Gojos counsel to submit an amended complaint substituting Almoguera with
her successors-in-interest as party defendants w/in the reglementary period. Goyala filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the lapse of 43 days after Gojos receipt of a copy of the order, he failed to submit the
amended complaint Trial court dismissed the complaint.
Goyala filed a motion to declare Gojo in default in respect of Goyalas counterclaim. Trial court granted
the motion. During trial, court ruled in Goyalas favor.

Believed Goyalas version (read above). The document was made a pacto de retro sale on suggestion of
Gojo to exempt himself from liabilities under the Usury Law. Gojo refused the P810 payment of debt because
it was night time and advised Goyala to return the next day. Goyala tried to redeem the property the next day
but Gojo said the period of redemption had expired. Goyala tried to redeem it another 3 times but Gojo
refused the money.

Held that the Pacto de Retro sale was an equitable mortgage and that Goyala is allowed to redeem the land
Gojo appealed to CA, which held that the appeal involves purely questions of law so it certified the appeal to
the SC. He argues that there was o occasion for the trial court to declare him in default in respect of appellee's
counterclaim in this case, for the reasons that:
(a) the counterclaim "falls within the category of compulsory counterclaim" which does not call for an
independent answer as the complaint already denies its material allegations;
(b) the dismissal of the complaint in this case without prejudice carried with it the dismissal of the said
counterclaim.
Issue: WoN it was a compulsory counterclaim YES
Ratio:

A plaintiff who fails or chooses not to answer a compulsory counterclaim may not be declared in default,
principally because the issues raised in the counterclaim are deemed automatically joined by the allegations of
the complaint.
Goyalas counterclaim was a compulsory one since it arises out of or is necessarily connected with transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the complaint.
o Gojos complaint alleged that the right of Goyala to repurchase the property had already expired and
asked for an order of consolidation;
o Goyalas counterclaim was for reformation of the deed claiming that it was only a mortgage.
o The counterclaim was clearly inconsistent with and directly controverted; the whole theory and basic
allegations of the complaint. In consequence, Gojos complaint stood as the answer to Goyalas
counterclaim.
Trial court should not have ordered for the dismissal of the complaint due to Gojos failure to follow a court order
(to submit an amended complaint). That order is void because in Casenas vs Resales, the Court held that when
a party to a case dies and due notice was given, the court should order the appearance of the legal
representatives of the deceased. There should be no obligation for Gojo to amend his complaint.
It is not proper to dismiss a complaint when a compulsory counterclaim has been pleaded by defendant.
o Under Rule 17 Sec 2, the right of the plaintiff to move for the dismissal of an action after the defendant
has filed his answer is qualified by the clause providing that: "If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a
defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not be
dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court."
o With this limitation, the power of the court to dismiss the complaint upon motion of plaintiff, which is
usually without prejudice, is not purely discretionary.
o Purpose: avoid multiplicity of suits expense, inconsistency of 2 decisions
o The best interests of justice require that conflicting claims regarding the same matter should be decided
in one single proceeding.

REMANDED CASE.

CHAVEZ V SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 91391
GUTIERREZ, JR; January 24, 1991

FACTS
- July 31, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) with the
assistance of Solicitor General Francisco Chavez filed with the respondent Sandiganbayan a complaint docketed as Civil Case No.
0033 against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Juan Ponce Enrile, among others, for reconveyance, reversion and accounting, restitution
and damages.
-After the denial of his motion to dismiss, respondent Enrile filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim with
damages.
On January 30, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution which deferred The resolution of the Motion to Dismiss the
Counterclaim against the Plaintiff government until after trialRespondent Enrile then requested leave from the Sandiganbayan to
implead the petitioner and the PCGG officials as party defendants for lodging this alleged "harassment suit" against him.
The motion praying for leave to implead additional parties(Chavez et al) to his counterclaim was granted in a resolution dated June
8, 1989, without prejudice to the defenses which said defendants may put forth individually or in common, in their personal
capacities or otherwise.
In a later resolution dated November 2, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan denied a motion to reconsider the June 8, 1989
resolution.

Thereafter, all the PCGG officials filed their answer to the counterclaims invoking their immunity from suits as provided in Section 4
of Executive Order No. 1.
Instead of filing an answer, the petitioner comes to this Court assailing the resolutions as rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners claim
-no counter-claim can be filed against him in his capacity as Solicitor General since he is only acting as counsel for the Republic. He
cites the case of Borja v. Borja,1
- since he is simply the lawyer in the case, exercising his duty under the law to assist the Government in the filing and prosecution of
all cases pursuant to Section 1, Executive Order No. 14, he cannot be sued in a counterclaim in the same case.

ISSUES
1.WON Chavez (SolGEn)is immune from suit
2.WON it is proper to implead Chavez (as SolGen) petitioner as additional party defendant in the counterclaim filed by respondent
Enrile

HELD
1.No.
The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection
with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad faith.
Moreover, the petitioner's argument that the immunity proviso under Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 also extends to him is not
well-taken. A mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the charges being automatically dropped.
Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any
other official of the Republic. (id., at page 586)
Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General acts in bad faith, or, as contended by the private respondent,
"maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG commissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against him an evidently baseless
suit in derogation of the latter's constitutional rights and liberties" (Rollo, p. 417), there can be no question that a complaint for
damages may be filed against him. High position in government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another.
The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on Human Relations may be taken against public officers or
private citizens alike.
2. No. Senator Enrile has to file a separate and distinct civil action for damages against the Solicitor General.
-The charges pressed by respondent Enrile for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code arising from the filing of an alleged
harassment suit with malice and evident bad faith do not constitute a compulsory counterclaim.
In the case of Tiu Po v. Bautista, (103 SCRA 388 [1981]), we ruled that damages claimed to have been suffered as a consequence
of an action filed against the petitioner must be pleaded in the same action as a compulsory counterclaim. We were referring,
however, to a case filed by the private respondent against the petitioners or parties in the litigation. In the present case, the
counterclaim was filed against the lawyer, not against the party plaintiff itself.
-To allow a counterclaim against a lawyer who files a complaint for his clients, who is merely their representative in court and not a
plaintiff or complainant in the case would lead to mischievous consequences.
-The problem is particularly perplexing for the Solicitor General. As counsel of the Republic, the Solicitor General has to appear in
1

The appearance of a lawyer as counsel for a party and his participation in a case as such counsel does not make him a party to the action. The fact
that he represents the interests of his client or that he acts in their behalf will not hold him liable for or make him entitled to any award that the Court
may adjudicate to the parties, other than his professional fees. The principle that a counterclaim cannot be filed against persons who are acting in
representation of another ? such as trustees ? in their individual capacities (Chambers v. Cameron, 2 Fed. Rules Service, p. 155; 29 F. Supp. 742)
could be applied with more force and effect in the case of a counsel whose participation in the action is merely confined to the preparation of the
defense of his client. Appellant, however, asserted that he filed the counterclaim against said lawyer not in his individual capacity but as counsel for the
heirs of Quintin de Borja. But as we have already stated that the existence of a lawyer-client relationship does not make the former a party to the
action, even this allegation of appellant will not alter the result We have arrived at (at pp. 924-925)

controversial and politically charged cases. It is not unusual for high officials of the Government to unwittingly use shortcuts in the
zealous desire to expedite executive programs or reforms. The Solicitor General cannot look at these cases with indifferent
neutrality. His perception of national interest and obedience to instructions from above may compel him to take a stance which to a
respondent may appear too personal and biased. It is likewise unreasonable to require Government Prosecutors to defend
themselves against counterclaims in the very same cases they are prosecuting.
VALIENTES V. RAMAS, MINOR (2010)
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Petition for CERTIORARI assailing the decision of CA
[Brief facts:]
Petitioners are heirs of Domingo Valientes who was owner of land in Zamboanga Del Sur. Domingo mortgaged the
land as security for loan with spouses Belen. Spouses Belen eventually sold the land to Minor when Domingo heirs
was not able to retrieve back the land.
1979 RTC granted Minors prayer to have the title of the land transferred to her name.
1998 Heirs of Valiente filed a complaint for cancellation of the TCT, reconveyance, and receivership
2000 Minor filed motion to dismiss on the grounds forum shopping and litis pendentia
o
Original decision of RTC was that forum shopping does not apply; Motion for Recon was granted
dismissing on the ground of forum shopping
CA decided that while there was no forum shopping or litis pendentia, that the case can no longer prosper
for action has prescribed.
RELEVANT DOCTRINE:
On Authority of the Court of Appeals to Dismiss the Complaint on the Grounds of Prescription
and Laches Despite Respondents Failure to Appeal the Dismissal Order:
o
CLAIM OF HEIRS OF VALIENTES: Petitioners now claim before us that private respondent Minors
failure to appeal the RTCs dismissal of the complaint on the sole ground of forum shopping
constituted a waiver of the defense of prescription. Petitioners further argue that the
consideration by the Court of Appeals of grounds not assigned as errors in the Appellees Brief
runs contrary to the precepts of fair play, good taste and estoppel
COURT SAYS ON THIS:
o
Based on Rule 9.12, The second sentence of this provision does not only supply exceptions to
the rule that defenses not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived,

it also allows courts to dismiss cases motu proprio on any of the enumerated grounds
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and
(4) prescription provided that the ground for dismissal is apparent from the pleadings
or the evidence on record.
We therefore rule that private respondent Minor cannot be deemed to have waived the defense of
prescription, and that the Court of Appeals may consider the same motu proprio. Furthermore, as regards
the pronouncement by the Court of Appeals that Civil Case No. 98-021 is likewise heavily infirmed with
laches, we rule that the Court of Appeals is not in error when it considered the same motu proprio. While
not included in the above enumeration under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, we have ruled in
previous cases that laches need not be specifically pleaded and may be considered by the court
on its own initiative in determining the rights of the parties

Alicer v. Compas
Rule 9, Sec. 1; Defense/Objection Waived
Carpio
May 30, 2011
Short Version:
This stems from a case for Reconveyance of Title with Damages.
Compas filed this complaint against
1. The Spouses Pineda
2. Trinidad Alicer (whom I assumed to be the mom of the heirs of Alicer)
3. The Heirs of Arturo Alicer
2

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the
action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim

4. Edgar Selda
5. The Rural Bank of Carigara
After all the preliminary matters have been done, the case was supposed to go to pre-trial,
set for Feb. 20, 2003. It was rescheduled to Mar. 13-14, on motion of Rural Bank. Before the
said date, Compas moved to reschedule it to Mar. 20-21. Then, Trinidad and the Estate of
Alicer moved to reschedule it to May 8, 2003.
The Court did not receive the motions for postponement by Compas and the Alicers, and
thus held the pre-trial on Mar. 13-14 still. However, on that day, only a few of the counsels
parties were in attendace. As such, it was finally rescheduled to July 25, 2003.
On July 25, 2003; all parties were present except for Trinidad Alicer and the Heirs of Arturo
Alicer. Upon motion by Compas, the absentees were declared in default.
The Alicers moved to lift the default order, alleging that they did not receive a notice of the
pre-trial that was supposed to held on July 25, 2003. This was denied by the RTC. The Alicers
then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, questioning the RTC.
CA; petition dismissed
1. A motion for postponement is never presumed, and the counsel shouldve been on guard when it
hadnt heard from the Court in a long time.
2. CA found that the Alicers were represented by Attys. Lagunzan, Emata and Von Kaiser Soro.
a. Rule 13, Sec. 2; if a party is represented by several counsels, service xxx may be made
on any of them and that notice to one xxx is equivalent to notice to all.
b. A copy was actually sent to Atty. Lagunzad (who represented Trinidad)
c. A copy was actually also sent to Atty. Emata (who represented the Heirs)
3. Re. Atty. Emata; the confusion was due to Ematas use of 4 office addresses which generated
bewilderment as to (Ematas) exact and official address. Just in case Maam asks;
a. Ground Floor, Door B, Lagasca Apartments, 8259 Constancia Street, Makati City.
b. Rm. 416 Margarita Bldg., J. Rizal Ave., Cor. Cardona, Makati City.
c. Constancia Street, Makati City.
d. FH Center, LDS Chapel Compound, Dela Costa cor. Solaiman Streets, Salcedo Village,
Makati
The Court says it is the duty of the counsel to inform the Court of any change in
address and make a record of it. Emata failed to do this, in violation Rule 7, Sec. 3.
Emata claims that he failed to notify the Court because he was dealing with medical
problems, having had elevated blood pressure and cerebral blood clots.
The Court brushes this aside for lack of credibility, as Emata was able to file a
number of pleadings and motions for the petitioners using his new address (the one
in Salcedo Village)
Issue and Dispositive:
W/n the CA erred in dismissing the same? No.
Ratio:
SC;
The RTC declared (the Alicers) in default for failing to attend the pre-trial conference. Under
Rule 18, Sec. 5 of the Rules, non-appearance of the defendant at the pre-trial conference
allows the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte, thus:

SEC. 5. Effect of failure to appear. The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the
next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice,
unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to
allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof .
The SC notes that the CA found that the RTC furnished both Atty. Lagunzad and Atty. Emata
with the order xxx scheduling the pre-trial on June 5, 2003, xxx (and) the order resetting the
pre-trial to July 25, 2003, and the pre-trial order (itself) dated July 25, 2003.
If indeed Atty. Emata failed to receive any of these orders, xxx such failure could only be
attributed to the negligence of Atty. Emata xxx The CA found that Atty. Emata failed to
inform the trial court of his change of address, which itself he did not refute.
The SC agrees with the CA in sustaining the default order of the trial court. There was no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in declaring petitioners in default
because they failed to appear during the pre-trial conference. The findings of fact of (the
CA), xxx is conclusive upon this Court which is limited to reviewing errors of law xxx
The SC notes however that; (the Alicers) cannot claim that they were denied substantial
justice considering that they can still appeal the judgment of the trial court on the main
case, which they did.
As held in Banco de Oro-EPCI, Inc. v. Tansipek:
It is important to note that a party declared in default respondent Tansipek in this case is
not barred from appealing from the judgment on the main case, whether or not he had
previously filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default, and regardless of the result of the
latter and the appeals therefrom. However, the appeal should be based on the Decisions
being contrary to law or the evidence already presented, and not on the alleged invalidity of
the default order.