Article 22

Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete

Facts:
Respondent Tan alleged that she "is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, who was a partner in the commercial partnership,
Glory Commercial Company ... with Antonio Lim Tanhu and Alfonso Ng Sua that "defendant Antonio Lim Tanhu, Alfonso
Leonardo Ng Sua, Lim Teck Chuan, and Eng Chong Leonardo, through fraud and machination, took actual and active
management of the partnership and although Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan was the manager of Glory Commercial Company,
defendants managed to use the funds of the partnership to purchase lands and buildings and that she is entitled to share not only
in the profits of the partnership but also in other assets, both real and personal, acquired by the partnership with the funds of the
latter during its lifetime.
Defendants denied specifically that respondent Tan is the widow of Tee Hoon because, according to them, his legitimate wife
was Ang Siok Tin still living and with whom he had four (4) legitimate children presently residing in Hongkong, but also all the
allegations of fraud and conversion quoted above, the truth being, according to them, that proper liquidation had been regularly
made of the business of the partnership and Tee Hoon used to receive his just share until his death, as a result of which the
partnership was dissolved and what corresponded to him were all given to his wife and children.
It was alleged that plaintiff Tan Put and her late husband Po Chuan married at the Philippine Independent Church of Cebu City
on December, 20, 1949; that Po Chuan died on March 11, 1966; that the plaintiff and the late Po Chuan were childless but the
former has a foster son Antonio Nuez whom she has reared since his birth with whom she lives up to the present; that prior to
the marriage of the plaintiff to Po Chuan the latter was already managing the partnership Glory Commercial Co. then engaged in
a little business in hardware at Manalili St., Cebu City; that prior to and just after the marriage of the plaintiff to Po Chuan she
was engaged in the drugstore business; that not long after her marriage, upon the suggestion of Po Chuan the plaintiff sold her
drugstore for P125,000.00 which amount she gave to her husband in the presence of defendant Lim Tanhu and was invested in
the partnership Glory Commercial Co. sometime in 1950; that after the investment of the above-stated amount in the partnership
its business flourished and it embarked in the import business and also engaged in the wholesale and retail trade of cement and
GI sheets and under huge profits;
Issue: Whether there was a marriage between Tan Put and the late Po Chuan. Whether she can claim from the company of the
latters share.
Held:
Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other as husband and wife "shall
be set forth in an instrument" signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage.
Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract. While a marriage may also
be proved by other competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be satisfactorily explained. Surely, the certification
of the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of the
contract or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented to the court. In the case at bar, the purported
certification issued by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore, competent
evidence, there being absolutely no showing as to unavailability of the marriage contract and, indeed, as to the authenticity of the
signature of said certifier, the jurat allegedly signed by a second assistant provincial fiscal not being authorized by law, since it is
not part of the functions of his office. Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did not testify, the same is hearsay
As regards the testimony of plaintiff herself on the same point and that of her witness Antonio Nuez, there can be no question
that they are both self-serving and of very little evidentiary value, it having been disclosed at the trial that plaintiff has already
assigned all her rights in this case to said Nuez, thereby making him the real party in interest here and, therefore, naturally as
biased as herself. Besides, in the portion of the testimony of Nuez copied in Annex C of petitioner's memorandum, it appears
admitted that he was born only on March 25, 1942, which means that he was less than eight years old at the supposed time of the
alleged marriage. If for this reason alone, it is extremely doubtful if he could have been sufficiently aware of such event as to be
competent to testify about it.
An agreement with Tee Hoon was shown and signed by Tan Put that she received P40,000 for her subsistence when they
terminated their relationship of common-law marriage and promised not to interfere with each others affairs since they are
incompatible and not in the position to keep living together permanently. Hence, this document not only proves that her relation
was that of a common-law wife but had also settled property interests in the payment of P40,000.

Vda Chua vs. CA

Facts:
During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A. Vallejo from 1970 up to 1981.
Out of this union, the couple begot two illegitimate children.
Private Respondent Florita Vallejo filed a petition for declaration of heirship and guardianship of the two children and properties
worth 5 million pesos.
Petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to be the surviving spouse of Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss.
Respondent Vallejo filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Antonietta Chua is not the surviving spouse of the late Roberto
L. Chua but a pretender to the estate of the latter since the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman until he died.
The trial court issued an Order 7 denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. The court ruled that Antonietta Garcia had no
personality to file the motion to dismiss not having proven her status as wife of the decedent.
Petitioner presented a photocopy of the Marriage Certificate, Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua
married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; Residence Certificates indicating that he was married and was born
in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as
married; passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City.
Issue: Whether petitioner is indeed the surviving spouse of the deceased.
Held:
Petitioner has no legal standing to file the motion to dismiss as she is not related to the deceased, nor does she have any interest
in his estate as creditor or otherwise.
Only an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of administration. An interested person is one who
would be benefited by the estate such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; his interest is
material and direct, and not one that is only indirect or contingent.
Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving wife of the decedent. The best proof of marriage between man and
wife is a marriage contract which Antonietta Chua failed to produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the photostat copy of
the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces
of evidence. The trial court correctly ruled in its 21 August 1992 Order that:
. . . Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage
especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged
marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not
solemnized said alleged marriage

Article 25
Republic vs. CA and Castro
Facts:
Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court
Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally
attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the
marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the
contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it
was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their
cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The
baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital status before
leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her marriage.
Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of
their marriage. As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a
marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to
locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued."
Issue: Whether the documentary and testimonial evidences presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no
marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin
F. Cardenas.
Held:
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code.
The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being
one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. 5

Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:

Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an official
record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the
records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records
of his office contain no such record or entry.
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any
circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to
find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her
petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the
case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject
marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a
civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The
records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former.
Husband Edwin Cardenas was properly declared in default for ignoring the duly served notice of the proceedings and a copy of
the petition.

Article 26
Garcia vs. Recio
Facts:
Respondent Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on
March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce was issued by an
Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen. Petitioner, a Filipina, and respondent were married on
January 12, 1994. In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino.
Starting October 1995, the two lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were
still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy respondent allegedly had
a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondents first
marriage only in November 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its
subsequent dissolution. He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce
decree obtained in Australia in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
Issue: Whether the divorce obtained by Recio in Australia capacitated him to remarry
Held:
SC remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence. They cannot conclude that respondent,
who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner. The court a quo erred in finding that
the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the
second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all,
it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce
decree. Hence, the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show
petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage
on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the
Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

Pilapil vs. Somera

Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, got married in Germany.
They lived together for some time in Malate, Manila with their daughter.
After three years, respondent initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. He claimed that there was
failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC of
Manila.
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of
failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law
said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was
legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.
After five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City
Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as
1982 and with another man named Jesus Chua in 1983.
Issue: (1) Whether or not the divorce decree is valid in the Philippines and (2) if the private respondent can file a complaint of
adultery against the petitioner.
Held:
(1) Yes. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
(2) No. Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo

Facts:
Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in
Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born
on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that
petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Private respondent filed suit against petitioner stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is
conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private
respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to
Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree
has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation
he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop
was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the
Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is
contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.
Held:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in
the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent
and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.

Republic vs. Orbencido

Facts:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines. Their marriage was
blessed with a son and a daughter.
Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife
had been naturalized as an American citizen. Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE 4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies
to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to
the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife
obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution.
Held:
The twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the
time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this
case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
Respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the
divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence
sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by
E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence
submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as
an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to
remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

Marriages Exempt from License Requirement

Nial vs. Bayadog
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11,
1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption
that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Issue: Whether the marriage between Pepito and Norma was valid?
Held: NO
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and
wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in
fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact
remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a
perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other,
Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual
severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as
being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be questioned even after the death
of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.

Manzano vs. Sanchez

Facts:
Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano. Her husband contracted another
marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When Judge solemnized the marriage, he ought to know that the
same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both parties were separated.
Respondent Judge claims in his comment that he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the
two had been living together as H & W for 7 years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.
Had he known that Manzano was married, he would advise the latter not to marry again.
Issue: Whether the marriage was valid // Whether David and Luzviminda was exempted from marriage license under art 34
Held:
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22
March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of
their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated."
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial.
Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each
other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie,
much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at
bar.
Respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

Cosca vs. Palaypayon

With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but
he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a marriage license was not required. The contracting parties here
executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh.
AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only
eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old. If he and Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for
almost six (6) years already before they got married as they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve) been less than
thirteen (13) years old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve)
been aware of this when he solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties
who might ha(ve) executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license
requirement.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin for the second time with a marriage license
already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear that it was
solemnized under exceptional character as there was not marriage license and Judge Palaypayon had already signed the marriage
certificate. If it was true that he solemnized the first marriage under exceptional character where a marriage license was not
required, why did he already require the parties to have a marriage license when he solemnized their marriage for the second
time?

Mariategui vs. CA
Facts:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 8). During his lifetime, Lupo
Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot
four (4) children, namely: Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died and was survived by her children
named Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo also died and left a son
named Ruperto. With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter named Cresenciana who was born on May 8,
1910
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930. They had three children, namely: Jacinto,
born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on February 16, 1931 and Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco Mariategui died in
1941.
At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when he was still unmarried.
Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto
themselves Lot No. 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary registration
proceedings filed by the adjudicatees under Act No. 496, and the land registration court issued a decree ordering the registration
of the lot.
Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian and Paulina) filed with the lower court an amended
complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned by their common father, Lupo
Mariategui, and that, with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they (children of the third marriage) were deprived of
their respective shares in the lots.
Issue: Whether 3rd marriage is valid in the absence of a marriage license.
Held:
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the
declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was able to
mention to (him) that he and (his) mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses
deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was
introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the
marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present (People vs. Borromeo, 133
SCRA 106 [1984]).
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a
man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born
in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according
to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

Void and Voidable Marriages

Article 35
Domingo vs. CA
Facts:
Soledad Domingo, married Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation
of Property. She did not that he had a previous existing marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz; she came to know of the prior
marriage only when Emerlina sued them for bigamy. She has been working in Saudi Arabia and went back home when she
availed the one-month annual vacation leave. While on her vacation leave, she discovered that Roberto was cohabiting with
another woman and that he had been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent.
Roberto filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its
nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary.
Issue: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same
should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Held:
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. 14Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void.
The requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his
or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
It is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts.
Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might
well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody
and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must
be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity.

Nial vs. Bayadog

Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11,
1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption
that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Issue: Whether the marriage between Pepito and Norma was valid?
Held:
Void lack of marriage license. Not exempted

Article 36
Republic vs. Ca and Molina
Facts:
Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after
a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to
spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances.
Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable
of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought
of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in
order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
Issue: Whether the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity
Held:
No
There is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
"irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had
been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:

burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff

root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined

such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage

such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital obligations
of marriage

such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code

decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected

court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.

Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA

Facts:
Private respondent Gina Loi and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were married at the Manila Cathedral on May 22, 1988. Contrary to
Ginas expectations that the newlyweds were to enjoy making love or having sexual intercourse with each other, the defendant
just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. No sexual intercourse occurred during their
first night, second, third and fourth night.
From May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, they slept together in the same room and on the same bed but during this period, there
was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. A case was then filed to declare the annulment of the marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity. Gina alleged that Chi Ming was impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show him his penis
(clinically found to be only 3 inches and 1 cm. when erect). Defendant admitted that no sexual contact was ever made and
according to him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he
caressed her private parts she always removed his hands.
Issue: Whether the marriage is void under Art. 36
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.

Leouel Santos vs. CA

Facts:
Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two
exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church
wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened
Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent
interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a
number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia
would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after
her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return
home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where
he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990,
he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to come home, Leouel filed a complaint for voiding of marriage under art. 36 of the fc.
Issue: Whether the marriage is void under art. 36
Held: NO
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity
must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must
be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano

Facts:
Respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano,
a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the
Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she
gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, they got married. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to
Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two
months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991,
respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina8 and Santos
vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being
a Japanese national.
Issue: Whether marriage is void under art. 36
Held: No
Mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute psychological
incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable
expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance with
the guidelines set in Molina.
Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing
that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.
As ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.17 There was no
proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 18
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present case involves a
"mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no
distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the
spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine
psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for
determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

Choa vs. Choa

CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; NOT ESTABLISHED IN CASE
AT BAR. The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any way show the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
her marital obligations, simply because she filed cases against him. The evidence presented, even if taken as true, merely
establishes the prosecution of the cases against him. To rule that the filings are sufficient to establish her psychological
incapacity is not only totally erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity. Neither is the
testimony of respondent, taken by itself or in conjunction with his documentary offerings, sufficient to prove petitioner's
alleged psychological incapacity. Even if taken as true, the testimony of respondent basically complains about three
aspects of petitioner's personality; namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack
of an "intention of procreative sexuality." None of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes "psychological
incapacity."
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two children were born. Respondent filed a
complaint for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. He then amended his complaint for the declaration of nullity of
marriage based on petitioners alleged PI.
Respondent claimed that petitioner filed a complaint against him, charging him with perjury, false testimony, concubinage, and
deportation. According to him, the filing and the prosecution of these cases clearly showed that his wife (herein petitioner)
wanted not only to put him behind bars, but also to banish him from the country. He contends that this "is very abnormal for a
wife who, instead of protecting the name and integrity of her husband as the father of her children, had acted to the contrary.
Issue: Marriage void under art 36
Held: no
In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each
other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their
marital union.
In Republic v. Molina,[40] we ruled that the psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a
neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. We stressed that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
Respondents pious peroration that petitioner lacked the intention of procreative sexuality is easily belied by the fact that two
children were born during their union. Moreover, there is absolutely no showing that the alleged defect was already existing at
the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Dedel vs. CA
Facts:
Dedel and Sharon got married. Their union produced 4 children. Petitioner avers that during marriage, Sharon turned out to be an
irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men.
Sharon was once confined in the Manila Medical City for treatment by a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the
treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and
with whom she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along
her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his own.
Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then,
Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions.
Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of
infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of
Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of
infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage is void
Held:
In denying the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that private respondent's sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally
or psychologically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that private respondent's promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the
inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records was a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed
in church rites, and which produced four children. According to the Court, private respondent's sexual infidelity or perversion
and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither
could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts
are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. At best, the circumstances relied
upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, not for declaring a marriage void.
Furthermore, the trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and private respondent. The authority
to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church.

Article 40
Abunado vs. People
Facys:
Salvador married Narcisa Arceo. Narcisa left for Japan to work but returned to the PH, when she learned that her husband was
having an affair and has left their conjugal home.
Narcisa found Salvador cohabiting with Fe Plato. She also discovered that he contracted a second marriage with Zenaida
Bias before a judge in Rizal.
On January 19, 1995, Salvador filed an annulment case against Narcisa. On May 18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed
by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida.
Issue: Whether the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial to the case
Held:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity,
the crime had already been consummated.
Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is,
both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled

Morigo vs. People

Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work
and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He
subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo
was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial
question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner
contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in
order to be free from the bigamy case.
Held:
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.[25] In the latter case, the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held
therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who
enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even
if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as void. [26]
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a
judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at
least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing
officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage
contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more,
cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first
secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

Weigei vs. Sempio-Dy

In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,[15] the Court stressed the need for such declaration. In that case, Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an action for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground that the latter had a prior existing marriage. After
pretrial, Lilia asked that she be allowed to present evidence to prove, among others, that her first husband had previously been
married to another woman. In holding that there was no need for such evidence, the Court ruled: x x x There is likewise no
need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then
such a marriage though void still needs, according to this Court, a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel; x x x.
Facts:
Respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the
ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting
marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly
forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first
marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable?
Issue: whether the marriage is void
Held: Yes
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because
assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled.
Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first
husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID

Valdez vs. RTC

Facts:
Antonio Valdes (petitioner) and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five
children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code. Petition for nullity was granted. Three older children shall choose which parent they would want to stay with. Two
younger children shall be placed in the custody of their mother.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the
Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common
property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit
expressing their desire to remain with their father.
Petitioner argues that art. 147 does not apply to cases where the parties are psychologically incapacitated
Issue: Whether Art. 147 applies to void marriages.
Held:
In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the
rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through
their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household."
Art. 50 applies to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under articl 40 and 45.

People vs. Aragon

MARRIAGE LAW NULL AND VOID MARRIAGES; JUDICIAL DECREE TO ESTABLISH INVALIDITY, NOT
NECESSARY. A subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse is illegal and void from
its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity as distinguished from mere annuable marriage.
Facts:
First Marriage: Proceso Rosima and Gorrea, Cebu
Second: Rosima and Maria Faicol
Third Marriage: Rosima and Jesusa Magsalang
While valid and subsisting, Rosima contracted marriage with Tomera in Iloilo.
After Gorreas death (first wife) and seeing that the coast was clear in Cebu, accused brought Faicol to Cebu
Maria Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment in the hands of the accused. The accused sent Maria
Faicol to Ilioilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her eyesight. During her absence, the accused contracted a
third marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Magsalang.
CFI-Cebu found Rosima guilty of Bigamy.
The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in Act No. 3613 authorizing the filing
of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio, defendant could not legally contract marriage with
Jesusa C. Magsalang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial
declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the instance of the latter.
Issue: Whether defendant can legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Magsalang without the dissolution of his marriage to
Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage
Held:
It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the appellant was not
renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one
and appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage cannot prosper.

Mercado vs. Tan

Facts:
First marriage: Vincent Mercado and Thelma Oliva
Second marriage: Counselo Tan
Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991. Tan claimed that she had no knowledge of
Mercados marriage with Oliva. Tan filed a bigamy case against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva. 1993 decision declared 1st marriage null and void.
Issue: Whether Mercado is guilty of bigamy despite filing the declaration of nullity of the former marriage
Held:
It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a
voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the
second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The Code Commission believes that the parties to a marriage
should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure a judicial declaration of
nullity of their marriage before they should be allowed to marry again. x x x.
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his
first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a lettercomplaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime
had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an
accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial
question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
Vitug dissenting opinion
No such judicial declaration of nullity, in my view, should still be deemed essential when the marriage, for instance, is between
persons of the same sex or when either or both parties had not at all given consent to the marriage. Indeed, it is likely that
Article 40 of the Family Code has been meant and intended to refer only to marriages declared void under the provisions of
Articles 35, 36, 37, 38 and 53 thereof.
Art. 349. Bigamy.---The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
Surely, the foregoing provision contemplated an existing, not void, prior marriage. Covered by article 349 would thus be, for
instance, a voidable marriage, it obviously being valid and subsisting until set aside by a competent court. As early as People vs.
Aragon,1 this Court has underscored:
xxx Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial
declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been within the contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to
that effect would or should have been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict
interpretation.
Unlike a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and therefore not a defense in bigamy if the
second marriage were contracted prior to the decree of annulment), the complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted
marriage, being a total nullity and inexistent, should be capable of being independently raised by way of a defense in a criminal
case for bigamy. I see no incongruence between this rule in criminal law and that of the Family Code, and each may be applied
within the respective spheres of governance.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.

Article 41
Republic vs. Nolasco
Facts:
Respondent Nolasco was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during
one of his ship's port calls. Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned
to respondent's hometown after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker.
Respondent Nolasco testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left
his wife with his parents in San Jose. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his
mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left
Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in
November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also
stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all
returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.
Respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking
Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative,
that the marriage be declared null and void.
Trial court granted petition.
Republic appealed contending that Nolasco failed to show that there existed a well founded belief for such declaration.
Issue: Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead."
Held: no
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet
Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead.
When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities
or of the British Embassy, 14 he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of
inhabitants, to look for her there.

Lukban vs. Republic

Facts:
Lourdes G. Lukban, petitioner herein, contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian. On December 27, of the same year,
Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel and since then he has not been heard from despite diligent search made by her. She
also inquired about him from his parents and friends but no one was able to indicate his whereabouts. She has no knowledge if he
is still alive, his last known address being Calle Merced, Paco, Manila. She believes that he is already dead because he had been
absent for more than twenty years, and because she intends to marry again, she desires that her civil status be defined in order
that she may be relieved of any liability under the law.
Issue: Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of presumptive death before she can remarry
Held: no
Civil Code prevails during their marriage in 1933.
"For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The
declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of
the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the
law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the
spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and
the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage

Armas vs. Calisterio

Facts:
Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was
survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta Calisterio.
Petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon
City, Branch 104, a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia
Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and
respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to
the latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with
Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the estate of the
decedent.
Issue: Whether or not a judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is needed before contracting a second marriage?
Held:
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that
time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code [5] itself
limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met..
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James William Bounds, had been absent or had
disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico
Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid
notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.

Article 45-46
Anaya vs. Palaroan
Facts:
Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on 4 December 1953; that defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the
marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation.
Aurora's counterclaim; Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had pre-marital
relationship with a close relative of his; and that "the non-divulgement to her constituted fraud in obtaining her consent.
Issue: whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground
for annulment of marriage.
Held:
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that
would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to . . . chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage.

Buccat vs. Buccat

In the case of Buccat vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19) cited in the decision sought to be reviewed, which was also an action for the
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud, plaintiff's claim that he did not even suspect the pregnancy of the defendant was
held to be unbelievable, it having been proven that the latter was already in an advanced stage of pregnancy (7th month) at the
time of their marriage.
Facts:
Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccatmet in March 1938, became engaged in September, and got
married in Nov 26.
On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida , who was 9 months pregnant, gave birth to a son. Godofredo left
Luida and on March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to
married Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin. The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.
I s s u e : Whether Luidas concealment of her pregnancy constituted a ground for the annulment of marriage (fraud)
Held:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in which the State is
interested.
In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting a ground for
annulment; it was unlikely that Godofredo, a first- year law student, did not suspect anything about Luidas condition
considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy when they got married.

Aquino vs. Delizo

Facts:
Petitioner Fernando Aquino filed a complaint against respondent Conchita Deblizo for annulment of his marriage on the ground
that respondent concealed the fact that she was pregnant by another man; about four months after the marriage, she gave birth to
a child.
At the trial, the attorney's for both parties appeared and the court a quo ordered Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco to represent
the State in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only the plaintiff however, testified and the only documentary evidence
presented was the marriage contract between the parties. Defendant neither appeared nor presented any evidence despite the
reservation made by her counsel that he would present evidence on a later date.
CFI and CA dismissed the complaint
Issue: Whether concealment of pregnancy by another man constitutes fraud
Held: Yes
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other
than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage.
The defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage,
we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged
by plaintiff.
He could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their marriage more so
because she must have attempted to conceal the true state of affairs.

Menciano vs. San Jose

Facts:
Matilde Menciano, in her and her childrens behalf, filed a motion for declaration of heirs, alleging that she is the widow of the
deceased Faustino Neri San Jose, to whom she was married on September 28, 1944; that they lived together before the said
marriage, hence, Carlo Magno Neri was born on March 9, 1940, the child having enjoyed the status of a recognized natural child;
that their second child Faustino Neri, Jr., was born on April 25, 1945 and was legitimized by the subsequent matrimony of his
parents, thus he is a legitimate child in lawful wedlock.
On the other hand, on an amended answer, Paz Neri San Jose (the executrix of the deceased) and Rodolfo Pelaez (designated
universal heir in the will of the deceased dated December 19, 1940), denied the substantial allegations of Mencianos motion for
declaration of heirs and further alleged that the deceased was suffering from senile dementia from 1943 which became worse a
year later; that the marriage between Menciano and the deceased was in violation of the legal provisions and requisites for the
deceased was deprived of his free will due to his age, sickness, and bombardment; that Menciano took advantage of the
deceased s condition, forced the latter to marry her by means of deceit and threat; and that the deceased was congenitally sterile
and impotent. Moreover, the defendants also filed a counterclaim for the sum of P286,000 in cash, for jewels and certain
properties which, as presumed, were retained and illegally disposed of by Matilde Menciano.
Issue: Whether the marriage was valid
Held:
The marriage between the deceased and Matilde Menciano is evidenced by Exhibit I-C, which is an application for a marriage
license, dated September 28, 1944, signed by Faustino Neri San Jose, to marry Matilde Menciano; Exhibit 1-B, also an
application for a marriage license dated September 28, 1944, signed by Matilde Menciano, to marry Faustino Neri San Jose;
Exhibit 1-D, certificate for immediate issuance of the marriage license applied for, signed by the Acting Local Civil Registrar
and Faustino Neri San Jose and Matilde Menciano; and Exhibit 1-A, the marriage contract signed by Faustino Neri San Jose and
Matilde Menciano as contracting parties, Rev. Isaias Edralin, as solemnizing officer, and the witnesses L. B. Castaos and
Samson Pagan.
As all the above four exhibits are official and public documents, their validity can be successfully assailed only by strong, clear,
and convincing oral testimony.
In this case, the oral evidence presented by the defendants is not convincing so as to declare the said marriage invalid. A mere
glance at the signatures of the deceased in the aforesaid documents will convince anyone that they could not have been written by
a man who is almost unconscious and physically and intellectually incapacitated, as the defendants witnesses represent him to
have been.
ID.; ID TESTS OF CAPACITY. Neither old age, physical infirmities, feebleness of mind, weakness of the memory, the
appointment of a guardian, nor eccentricities are sufficient singly or jointly to show testamentary incapacity. The nature and
rationally of the will is of some practical utility in determining capacity. Each case rests on its own facts and must be decided by
its own facts. (Syllabus, p. 773.)
WILLS; PROBATE; CAPACITY TO MAKE A WILL. Neither senile debility, nor deafness, nor blindness, nor poor
memory, is by itself sufficient to establish the presumption that the person suffering therefrom is not in the full enjoyment of his
mental faculties, when there is sufficient evidence of his mental sanity at the time of the execution of the will.
Although the above doctrine relates to testamentary capacity, there is no reason why it should not be applied to the capacity to
contract marriage, which requires the same mental condition. Consequently, the court below did not err in declaring valid the
marriage of Faustino Neri San Jose and Matilde Menciano.

Jimenez vs. Canizares

Facts:
Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios Caizares upon the ground that the office of
her genitals or vagina was to small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition of her
genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist; and that for that reason he left the conjugal
home two nights and one day after they had been married. The wife was summoned and served a copy of the complaint. She did
not file an answer.
The Court ordered the wife to submit herself to a physical examination to determine her physical capability for copulation and to
file a medical certificate within 10 days.
Issue: whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed
and testified that his wife was and is impotent.
Held: No
Her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption
arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful
and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. This the Court may do
without doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not
being compelled to be a witness against herself.1 "Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The
presumption is in favor of potency." 2 The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual
intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.

Article 48-49
Sin vs. Sin
Facts:
After a two-year courtship and engagement, Florence and respondent Philipp T. Sin a Portugese citizen got married. Florence
filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Trial court and CA dismissed decision.
Issue: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the participation of the State in the
proceedings.
Held:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed (underscoring ours).
Throughout the trial in the lower court, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jose Danilo C.
Jabson[15] filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 16, 1994, stating that he found no collusion between the
parties,[16] he did not actively participate therein. Other than entering his appearance at certain hearings of the case, nothing more
was heard from him. Neither did the presiding Judge take any step to encourage the fiscal to contribute to the proceedings.
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition.

Ocampo vs. Florenciano

Facts:
Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several children who are not living with
plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit
relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed
for one year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other man other than Arcalas. In 1952, when
the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife
in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation to
which defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo
filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.
Issue: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed by the Family Code.
Held:
As we understand the article, it does not exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession made by the defendant outside of the
court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession of judgment. Confession of judgment usually happens when
the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the
plaintiff's demand.
Yet, even supposing that the above statement of defendant constituted practically a confession of judgment, inasmuch as there is
evidence of the adultery independently of such statement, the decree may and should be granted, since it would not be based on
her confession, but upon evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or mainly on
defendant's confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso facto, any defendant who opposes the separation will immediately
confess judgment, purposely to prevent it.