Corinthian Gardens vs Spouses Tanjangco

Respondents-spouses Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco (the Tanjangcos) own Lots 68 and 69
located at Corinthian Gardens Subdivision, Quezon City, which is managed by petitioner
Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. (Corinthian). On the other hand, respondents-spouses
Frank and Teresita Cuaso (the Cuasos) own Lot 65 which is ` to the Tanjangcos lots.

Before the constructions of the house at lot 65, A relocation survey was conducted by
Democrito De Dios (Engr. De Dios), referred by the Corinthians to the Cuasos, operating under
the business name D.M. De Dios Realty and Surveying. Before, during and after the construction
of the said house, Corinthian conducted periodic ocular inspections in order to determine
compliance with the approved plans pursuant to the Manual of Rules and Regulations of
Corinthian.6 Unfortunately, after the Cuasos constructed their house, employing the services od
the builder, C.B. Paraz, their perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos Lot 69 by 87
square meters.
No amicable settlement was reached between the parties.
the Tanjangcos demanded that the Cuasos demolish the perimeter fence but the latter failed
and refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit against the Cuasos for
Recovery of Possession with Damages.
Eventually, the Cuasos filed a Third-Party Complaint8 against Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De
Dios. The Cuasos ascribed negligence to C.B. Paraz for its failure to ascertain the proper
specifications of their house, and to Engr. De Dios for his failure to undertake an accurate
relocation survey, thereby, exposing them to litigation. The Cuasos also faulted Corinthian for
approving their relocation survey and building plans without verifying their accuracy and in
making representations as to Engr. De Dios' integrity and competence.
the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the Tanjangcos. It, however, ruled that the Cuasos were
builders in good faith. The RTC likewise held that C.B. Paraz was grossly negligent in not taking
into account the correct boundaries of Cuasos lot when it constructed the house. The thirdparty complaint against Corinthian and Engr. De Dios, on the other hand, was dismissed for lack
of cause of action.
Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Tanjangcos, the Cuasos, and C.B. Paraz all appealed to the
CA. CA reversed the ruling, holding that the Cuasos are builders in bad faith.
1. the CA allowed the Tanjangcos to exercise the rights granted under Articles 449, 450, 451 and
549 of the New Civil Code, which include the right to demand the demolition of the offending
perimeter wall after reimbursing the Cuasos the necessary expenses for the preservation of the
encroached area.
2. The Cuasos were ordered to pay monthly rentals of P10,000.00 for the use, enjoyment and
occupancy of the lot from 1989 up to the time they vacate the property, with interest.

3. hey were, likewise, ordered to pay the Tanjangcos moral damages, exemplary damages,
and attorneys fees, with interest.
The Cuasos appeal against the Tanjangcos, on the other hand, was dismissed for lack of merit.
On the third-party complaints, Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios were all found negligent
in performing their respective duties and the court ordered them to contribute to the judgment
sum.
1. Corinthian filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Hence, Corinthian filed the
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA Decision and Resolution, and
impleading the Cuasos as one of the respondents being the third-party plaintiffs in the RTC.
The Court gave due course and The Cuasos filed their memorandum.

[2. In the meantime, the Tanjangcos moved for partial entry of judgment of the CA Decision
which was granted directing the issuance of an Entry of Judgment and a Certification that its
Decision has become final and executory with respect to the Cuasos, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De
Dios for their failure to file an appeal assailing the said Decision before this Court.
The Tanjangcos then moved for the execution of the judgment against the Cuasos, specifically
the demolition of the perimeter fence,20 which was also granted by the RTC in its Order. Because
of this, the Cuasos prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
preliminary injunction before this to enjoin the demolition of the perimeter fence.
3. the Cuasos prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary
injunction before this Court to enjoin the demolition of the perimeter fence.
They averred that the premature demolition of the alleged encroaching perimeter wall and
other improvements will cause grave and irreparable damage to them, because what is sought
to be demolished is part of their residence. To which Tanjangco opposed contending that they
cannot obtain affirmative relief from this Court by reason or on account of the appeal taken by
Corinthian. The appeal, they added, is personal to Corinthian and would not benefit the Cuasos
for they did not appeal the adverse decision against them. Finally, they argued that the Cuasos
are now estopped from questioning the enforcement of the CA Decision since they issued a
managers check to pay the money judgment.

Cuasos' application for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction for lack of merit. In the Cuasos
case, their right to injunctive relief had not been clearly and unmistakably demonstrated. They
failed to show proof that there is material and substantial invasion of their right to warrant the
issuance of an injunctive writ.
It bears stressing that the Cuasos failed to appeal the ruling of the CA. This failure to contest the
CA decision before this Court was fatal to their cause. It had the effect of an admission that they
indeed acted in bad faith, as they accepted the CA ruling. The decision of the CA, therefore,
became binding and final as to them.

While it is true that this Court noted the Memorandum and Supplemental Memorandum filed
by the Cuasos, such notation was made only insofar as Corinthian made them respondents in
this petition. This Court cannot grant to the Cuasos any affirmative relief as they did not file a
petition questioning the CA ruling. Consequently, the Decision of the CA holding that the Cuasos
acted in bad faith and that the perimeter fence may now be demolished cannot be put in issue
by the Cuasos. It is a fundamental principle that a party who does not appeal, or file a petition
for certiorari, is not entitled to any affirmative relief.]

Issue: Corinthian, the sole petitioner in this case, raises the issue whether or not the Court of
Appeals has legal basis to be liable for the judgment sum and increase unilaterally and without
proof the amount prayed for in the Complaint, i.e., P2,000.00, as reasonable compensation for
the use and enjoyment of the portion of the lot encroached upon, to P10,000.00.
Tanjangcos stand by the ruling of the CA and opine that Corinthian was negligent in approving
the building plan of the Cuasos.
1. They submit that Corinthian's claim that it merely conducts "table inspections" of
buildings further bolsters their argument that Corinthian was negligent in conveniently
and unilaterally restricting and limiting the coverage of its approval, contrary to its own
Manual of Rules and Regulations;
2. that the acceptance of a builder's bond does not automatically make Corinthian liable
but the same affirms the fact that a homeowner can hold it liable for the consequences
of the approval of a building plan;
3. and that Corinthian, by regularly demanding and accepting membership dues, must be
wary of its responsibility to protect the rights and interests of its members.
Held:
a. negligent?
[we find Corinthian negligent. Corinthian cannot and should not be allowed to justify or excuse
its negligence by claiming that its approval of the Cuasos building plans was only limited to a socalled "table inspection;" and not actual site measurement. To accept some such postulate is to
put a premium on negligence. its Manual of Rules and Regulations stipulates in Section 3 thereof
(under the heading Construction), thus:
No new construction can be started unless the building plans are approved by the
Association and the appropriate Builders cash bond and pre-construction fees are
paid.
It goes without saying that this Manual of Rules and Regulations applies to all - or it does not
apply at all. To borrow a popular expression, what is sauce for the gander is sauce for the goose
- or ought to be. To put it matter-of-factly and bluntly, thus, its so-called "table inspection"
approval of the Cuasos building plans is no less of an approval, as approvals come and go. And
since it is an approval tainted with negligence, the necessary and inevitable consequences which

law and justice attach to such negligence must, as a matter of law and justice, also necessarily
attach to Corinthian.]

b. judicial notice?

1. Courts may fix the reasonable amount of rent for the use and occupation of a disputed
property. However, petitioners herein erred in assuming that courts, in determining the amount
of rent, could simply rely on their own appreciation of land values without considering any
evidence. As we have said earlier, a court may fix the reasonable amount of rent, but it must still
base its action on the evidence adduced by the parties.
2. A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in controversy. The court may take
judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or which are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. Before taking
such judicial notice, the court must "allow the parties to be heard thereon." Hence, there can be
no judicial notice on the rental value of the premises in question without supporting evidence.
Truly, mere judicial notice is inadequate, because evidence is required for a court to determine
the proper rental value.

But contrary to Corinthian's arguments, both the RTC and the CA found that indeed rent was
due the Tanjangcos because they were deprived of possession and use of their property. This
uniform factual finding of the RTC and the CA was based on the evidence presented below.
Moreover, in Spouses Catungal v. Hao,43 we considered the increase in the award of rentals as
reasonable given the particular circumstances of each case. We noted therein that the
respondent denied the petitioners the benefits, including rightful possession, of their property
for almost a decade.
Similarly, in the instant case, the Tanjangcos were deprived of possession and use of their
property for more than two decades through no fault of their own. Thus, we find no cogent
reason to disturb the monthly rental fixed by the CA.
All told, the CA committed no reversible error.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S.

TUMBOKON,Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila,

Social Justice Society and other petitioners in an original petition for mandamus under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the
City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. This ordinance was enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila on November 20, 2001.
The ordinance provides that:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health,
public safety, and general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as
its adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in
the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the
southwest, and Estero de Pandacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area,
Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon
in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino
Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II
to Commercial I.
xxx

xxx

xxx

SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation

of which are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a
period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity of this Ordinance within
which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses which are hereby
in consequence, disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and
directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease
and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the
ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals
of the oil companies.
On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU)[8] with the oil companies. They agreed that the scaling
down of the Pandacan Terminals *was+ the most viable and practicable option. Which was
ratified by the Sanggunian Panglungsod.
In the March 2007 decision, We ruled that respondent had the ministerial duty under the Local
Government Code (LGC) to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the
city,[13] including Ordinance No. 8027. We also held that we need not resolve the issue of
whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent
resolutions passed by the Sanggunian could amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027 since the
resolutions which ratified the MOU and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it
full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. We concluded that there was nothing that legally
hindered respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.

After The Court promulgated its decision in this case on March 7, 2007, Chevron Philippines Inc.
(Chevron), Petron Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell)
(collectively, the oil companies) and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Department of Energy (DOE), filed their respective motions for leave to intervene and for
reconsideration of the decision.

Chevron[1] is engaged in the business of importing, distributing and marketing of

petroleum products in the Philippines while Shell and Petron are engaged in the business of
manufacturing, refining and likewise importing, distributing and marketing of petroleum
products in the Philippines.[2] The DOE is a governmental agency created under Republic Act
(RA) No. 7638[3] and tasked to prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise and control all plans,
programs, projects and activities of the government relative to energy exploration,
development, utilization, distribution and conservation.

On April 11, 2007, The conducted the oral arguments in Baguio City to hear petitioners
Prior to the motion made by the oil companies and Doe, Chevron, and Shell had filed a
complaint against respondent for the annulment of Ordinance No. 8027 with application for
writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction, which was
granted by the court.
Petron likewise filed its own petition in the RTC of Manila, Branch 42, also attacking the validity
of Ordinance No. 8027 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order (TRO). This was docketed as civil case no. 03-106379. In an order
dated August 4, 2004, the RTC enjoined the parties to maintain the status quo.

Thereafter, in 2006, the city council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8119, also known as the
Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006.[18] This was approved by
respondent on June 16, 2006.[19] Aggrieved anew, Chevron, Petron and Shell filed a complaint in
the RTC of Manila, Branch 20, asking for the nullification of Ordinance No. 8119. The court
issued a TRO in favor of Petron, enjoining the City of Manila and respondent from enforcing
Ordinance No. 8119.

Meanwhile, in civil case no. 03-106379, the parties filed a joint motion to withdraw complaint
and counterclaim on February 20, 2007.[24] In an order dated April 23, 2007, the joint motion
was granted and all the claims and counterclaims of the parties were withdrawn.

Issue: Notice on The Injunctive

writs
Held:
Contention of intervernors: Under Rule 65, Section 3[59] of the Rules of Court, a petition
for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station. According to the oil companies, respondent did not unlawfully fail or
neglect to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 because he was lawfully prevented from doing so by
virtue of the injunctive writs and status quo order issued by the RTC of Manila, Branches 39 and
42.
First, we note that while Chevron and Shell still have in their favor the writs of preliminary
injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction, the status quo order in favor of Petron is no
longer in effect since the court granted the joint motion of the parties to withdraw the
complaint and counterclaim.[60]
Second, the original parties failed to inform the Court about these injunctive writs. Respondent
(who was also impleaded as a party in the RTC cases) defends himself by saying that he
informed the court of the pendency of the civil cases and that a TRO was issued by the RTC in
the consolidated cases filed by Chevron and Shell (IN RTC). It is true that had the oil companies
only intervened much earlier, the Court would not have been left in the dark about these facts.
Nevertheless, respondent should have updated the Court, by way of manifestation, on such a
relevant matter.
In his memorandum, respondent mentioned the issuance of a TRO. Under Section 5 of Rule 58
of the Rules of Court, a TRO issued by the RTC is effective only for a period of 20 days. This is
why, in our March 7, 2007 decision, we presumed with certainty that this had already lapsed.[61]

Respondent also mentioned the grant of injunctive writs in his rejoinder which the Court,
however, expunged for being a prohibited pleading. The parties and their counsels were clearly
remiss in their duties to this Court.

In resolving controversies, courts can only consider facts and issues pleaded by the
parties.[62] Courts, as well as magistrates presiding over them are not omniscient. They can only
act on the facts and issues presented before them in appropriate pleadings. They may not even
substitute their own personal knowledge for evidence. Nor may they take notice of matters
except those expressly provided as subjects of mandatory judicial notice.
Issue 2: Notice on Ordinance 8119
The March 7, 2007 decision did not take into consideration the passage of Ordinance No. 8119
entitled An Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning
Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the Administration, Enforcement and Amendment
thereto which was approved by respondent on June 16, 2006. The simple reason was that the
Court was never informed about this ordinance.
1. While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by Congress, the rule
with respect to local ordinances is different. Ordinances are not included in the enumeration of
matters covered by mandatory judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.[73]

2. Although, Section 50 of RA 409[74] provides that:

SEC. 50 Judicial notice of ordinances. - All courts sitting in the city shall
take judicial notice of the ordinances passed by the [Sangguniang Panglungsod].

This cannot be taken to mean that this Court, since it has its seat in the City of Manila, should
have taken steps to procure a copy of the ordinance on its own, relieving the party of any duty
to inform the Court about it.
Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial notice of municipal
ordinances, a court is not required to take judicial notice of ordinances that are not before it

and to which it does not have access. The party asking the court to take judicial notice is
obligated to supply the court with the full text of the rules the party desires it to have notice
of.[75] Counsel should take the initiative in requesting that a trial court take judicial notice of
an ordinance even where a statute requires courts to take judicial notice of local ordinances.
The intent of a statute requiring a court to take judicial notice of a local ordinance is to remove
any discretion a court might have in determining whether or not to take notice of an
ordinance. Such a statute does not direct the court to act on its own in obtaining evidence for
the record and a party must make the ordinance available to the court for it to take notice.
Issue 3: Respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance No. 8027 was repealed by Ordinance No.
8119 in civil case no. 03-106379?
The oil companies assert that respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance No. 8027 was
repealed by Ordinance No. 8119 in civil case no. 03-106379 (where Petron assailed the
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027) when the parties in their joint motion to withdraw
complaint and counterclaim stated that the issue ...has been rendered moot and academic by
virtue of the passage of [Ordinance No. 8119].[79] They contend that such admission worked
as an estoppel against the respondent.
Respondent countered that this stipulation simply meant that Petron was recognizing the
validity and legality of Ordinance No. 8027 and that it had conceded the issue of said
ordinances constitutionality, opting instead to question the validity of Ordinance No. 8119.[80]

The oil companies deny this and further argue that respondent, in his answer in civil case no.
06-115334 (where Chevron and Shell are asking for the nullification of Ordinance No. 8119),
expressly stated that Ordinance No. 8119 replaced Ordinance No. 8027:[81]
... Under Ordinance No. 8027, businesses whose uses are not in accord with the
reclassification were given six months to cease [their] operation. Ordinance No.
8119, which in effect, replaced Ordinance [No.] 8027, merely took note of the
time frame provided for in Ordinance No. 8119.... Ordinance No. 8119 thus
provided for an even longer term, that is[,] seven years;

Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4.
Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a
party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof.
The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (Emphasis supplied)

While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently take a position
contrary to or inconsistent with what was pleaded,[83] the aforestated rule is not applicable here.
Respondent made the statements regarding the ordinances in civil case nos. 03-106379 and
06-115334 which are not the same as this case before us.[84] To constitute a judicial
admission, the admission must be made in the same case in which it is offered.
Hence, respondent is not estopped from claiming that Ordinance No. 8119 did not
supersede Ordinance No. 8027. On the contrary, it is the oil companies which should be
considered estopped. They rely on the argument that Ordinance No. 8119 superseded
Ordinance No. 8027 but, at the same time, also impugn its (8119s) validity. We frown on the
adoption of inconsistent positions and distrust any attempt at clever positioning under one or
the other on the basis of what appears advantageous at the moment. Parties cannot take
vacillating or contrary positions regarding the validity of a statute[85] or ordinance. Nonetheless,
we will look into the merits of the argument of implied repeal.

G HOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner, - versus - NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED

WORKERS UNION Local 103 (NAMAWU)

The petitioner, G Holdings, Inc. (GHI), is a domestic corporation primarily engaged in the
business of owning and holding shares of stock of different companies.[2] . Private respondent,
National Mines and Allied Workers Union Local 103 (NAMAWU), was the exclusive bargaining
agent of the rank and file employees of Maricalum Mining Corporation (MMC),[3]an entity
operating a copper mine and mill complex at Sipalay, Negros Occidental.[4]
MMC was incorporated by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) in 1984, on account of their foreclosure of Marinduque Mining
and Industrial Corporations assets. MMC started its commercial operations in August

1985. Later, DBP and PNB transferred it to the National Government for disposition or
privatization because it had become a non-performing asset.
Pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement[6] executed between GHI and Asset Privatization
Trust (APT), the former bought ninety percent (90%) of MMCs shares and financial
claims.[7] These financial claims were converted into three Promissory Notes[8] issued by MMC
in favor of GHI totaling P500M and secured by mortgages over MMCs properties. Upon the
signing of the Purchase and Sale Agreement and upon the full satisfaction of the stipulated
down payment, GHI immediately took physical possession of the mine site and its facilities, and
took full control of the management and operation of MMC
Almost four years thereafter, or on August 23, 1996, a labor dispute arose between
MMC and NAMAWU, with the latter eventually filing with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board of Bacolod City a notice of strike.[11] Then Labor Secretary, now Associate
Justice of this Court, Leonardo A. Quisumbing, later assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and
ruled in favor of NAMAWU. the lay-off (of workers) implemented was declared illegal and that
MMC committed unfair labor practice. He then ordered the reinstatement of the laid-off
workers, with payment of full backwages and benefits, and directed the execution of a new
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) incorporating the terms and conditions of the previous
CBA providing for an annual increase in the workers daily wage.[12] In two separate casest, we
sustained the validity of the Quisumbing Order, which became final and executory on January
26, 2000.[13]

partial writ of execution (Brion Writ) was thereafter issued which ordered the DOLE sheriffs to
proceed to the MMC premises for the execution of the same. Althoiugh MMCs resident
manager initially resisted its enforcement, the issuance of the July 18, 2002 Alias Writ of
Execution and Break-Open Order (Sto. Tomas Writ) made the enforecemant possible.
GHI filed with the Regional Trial Court Negros Occidental, Special Civil Action (SCA) No. 1127
for Contempt with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and to Nullify the Sheriffs Levy on Properties. GHI contended that the
levied properties were the subject of a Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage, executed by
MMC in favor of GHI to secure the aforesaid P550M promissory notes, and that the mortgaged
properties were already extrajudicially foreclosed in July 2001 and sold to GHI as the highest
bidder.
The trial court issued ex parte a TRO effective for 72 hours, and set the hearing on the
application for a writ of injunction.[23] The trial court ordered the issuance of a Writ of
Injunction (issued on October 18, 2002)[24] enjoining the DOLE sheriffs from further enforcing
the Sto. Tomas Writ and from conducting any public sale of the levied-on properties

NAMAWUs separate motions for the reconsideration of the injunction order and for the
dismissal of the case was thereafter denied.

Aggrieved, NAMAWU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, assailing the
October 17, 18 and December 4, 2002 orders of the RTC.
after due proceedings, on October 14, 2003, the appellate court rendered a Decision setting
aside the RTC issuances and directing the immediate execution of the Sto. Tomas Writ.
The CA ruled, among others, that the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
September 5, 1996 Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage yielded the conclusion that the
deed was sham, fictitious and fraudulent; (seci)
that it was executed two weeks after the labor dispute arose in 1996, but surprisingly, it was
registered only on February 24, 2000, immediately after the Court affirmed with finality the
Quisumbing Order.
The CA also found that the certificates of title to MMCs real properties did not contain any
annotation of a mortgage lien,
and, suspiciously, GHI did not intervene in the long drawn-out labor proceedings to protect its
right as a mortgagee of virtually all the properties of MMC.
GHI elevated the case to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari,
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PERTINENT DECISION OR ORDER IN THE
SAID LABOR DISPUTE BETWEEN MMC AND NAMAWU MAY BE ENFORCED AGAINST GHI, THERE
IS ALREADY A FINAL DEETERMINATION BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES
IN SAID LABOR DISPUTE
Held:
a. Judicial notice must be taken by this Court of its Decision in Maricalum Mining Corporation
v. Hon. Arturo D. Brion and NAMAWU,[34] in which we upheld the right of herein private
respondent, NAMAWU, to its labor claims.
Upon the same principle of judicial notice, we acknowledge our Decision in Republic of
the Philippines, through its trustee, the Asset Privatization Trust v. G Holdings, Inc., [35] in
which GHI was recognized as the rightful purchaser of the shares of stocks of MMC, and thus,
entitled to the delivery of the company notes accompanying the said purchase.
These company notes, consisting of three (3) Promissory Notes, were part of the documents
executed in 1992 in the privatization sale of MMC by the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to
GHI. Each of these notes uniformly contains stipulations establishing and constituting in favor
of GHI mortgages over MMCs real and personal properties.

We find both decisions critically relevant to the instant dispute. In fact, they should have
guided the courts below in the disposition of the controversy at their respective levels. To
repeat, these decisions respectively confirm the right of NAMAWU to its labor claims [37] and
affirm the right of GHI to its financial and mortgage claims over the real and personal
properties of MMC, as will be explained below. The assailed CA decision apparently failed to
consider the impact of these two decisions on the case at bar. Thus, we find it timely to
reiterate that: courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether
or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable to the
case under consideration.
2. However, the CA correctly assessed that the authority of the lower court to issue the
challenged writ of injunction depends on the validity of the third partys (GHIs) claim of
ownership over the property subject of the writ of execution issued by the labor
department. Accordingly, the main inquiry addressed by the CA decision was whether GHI could
be treated as a third party or a stranger to the labor dispute, whose properties were beyond the
reach of the Writ of Execution dated December 18, 2001.
In this light, all the more does it become imperative to take judicial notice of the two cases
aforesaid, as they provide the necessary perspective to determine whether GHI is such a party
with a valid ownership claim over the properties subject of the writ of execution. In Juaban v.
Espina,[40] we held that in some instances, courts have also taken judicial notice of proceedings
in other cases that are closely connected to the matter in controversy. These cases may be so
closely interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to invoke a rule of judicial notice. The two
cases that we have taken judicial notice of are of such character, and our review of the instant
case cannot stray from the findings and conclusions therein.

2,
Republic etc., v. G Holdings, Inc. acknowledged the existence of the Purchase and Sale
Agreement between the APT and the GHI, and recounts the facts attendant to that transaction,
as follows:
The series of negotiations between the petitioner Republic of
the Philippines, through the APT as its trustee, and G Holdings culminated in
the execution of a purchase and sale agreement on October 2, 1992. Under the
agreement, the Republic undertook to sell and deliver 90% of the entire issued
and outstanding shares of MMC, as well as its company notes, to G Holdings
in consideration of the purchase price of P673,161,280. It also provided for a
down payment of P98,704,000 with the balance divided into four tranches
payable in installment over a period of ten years.
It is difficult to conceive that these mortgages, already existing in 1992, almost four (4) years
before NAMAWU filed its notice of strike, were a fictitious arrangement intended to

defraud NAMAWU. After all, they were agreed upon long before the seeds of the labor
dispute germinated.
While it is true that the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage was executed only
on September 5, 1996, it is beyond cavil that this formal document of mortgage was merely a
derivative of the original mortgage stipulations contained in the Promissory Notes of October 2,
1992. The execution of this Deed in 1996 does not detract from, but instead reinforces, the
manifest intention of the parties to establish and constitute the mortgages on MMCs real and
personal properties.

The Court notes that the case filed with the lower court involves a principal action for injunction
to prohibit execution over properties belonging to a third party not impleaded in the legal
dispute between NAMAWU and MMC. We have observed, however, that the lower court and
the CA failed to take judicial notice of, or to consider, our Decisions in Republic, etc., v. G
Holdings, Inc., and Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Brion and NAMAWU, in which we
respectively recognized the entitlement of GHI to the shares and the company notes of MMC
(under the Purchase and Sale Agreement), and the rights of NAMAWU to its labor claims. At
this stage, therefore, neither the lower court nor the CA, nor even this Court, can depart from
our findings in those two cases because of the doctrine of stare decisis.
From our discussion above, we now rule that the trial court, in issuing the questioned
orders, did not commit grave abuse of discretion, because its issuance was amply supported by
factual and legal bases.

SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP, Petitioners,

vs.
ROSALIE PALAA CHUA, Respondent.

Respondent Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial

building, located at Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque City.
Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against petitioners,
Spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip (Spouses Latip). Rosalie attached to the complaint a

contract of lease over two cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as lessor, and
by Spouses Latip, as lessees thereof.
1a

Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale lease
rights over two (2) cubicles in Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale of goods during
the Christmas season, they readily accepted Rosalies offer to purchase lease rights in
Roferxane Bldg., which was still under construction at the time. Thereafter, in December
1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles were finished, Spouses Latip occupied them without
waiting for the completion of five (5) other stalls.
Spouses Latip averred that the contract of lease they signed had been novated by their
purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they were surprised to receive a
demand letter from Rosalies counsel and the subsequent filing of a complaint against them.
The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie, where the petitioners were ordered to vacate and pay
rental arrears. The RTC reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Latip
ordering the respondent to pay moral and exemplary damages to the spouses. The
RTC did not give credence to the contract of lease, ruling that it was not notarized and, in all
other substantial aspects, incomplete.
The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip that the contract of lease was modified and
supplemented; and the entire lease rentals for the two (2) cubicles for six (6) years had
already been paid by Spouses Latip in the amount of P2,570,000.00.
ss to Rosalies claim that her receipt of P2,570,000.00 was simply goodwill payment by
prospective lessees to their lessor, and not payment for the purchase of lease rights,
the RTC shot this down and pointed out that, apart from her bare allegations, Rosalie
did not adduce evidence to substantiate this claim
the CA, as previously mentioned, reversed the RTC and reinstated the decision of the
MeTC. The CA ruled that the contract of lease, albeit lacking the signature of Ferdinand and
not notarized, remained a complete and valid contract.
And that finally, On the issue of whether the amount of P2,570,000.00 merely
constituted payment of goodwill money, the CA took judicial notice of this common
practice in the area of Baclaran, especially around the Redemptorist Church.
According to the appellate court, this judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn
Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid goodwill
money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat.

Issue: Spouses Latip should be ejected from the leased cubicles, considering, as previously

adverted to, the CA, in ruling for Rosalie and upholding the ejectment of Spouses Latip, took
judicial notice of the alleged practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to
pay goodwill money to the lessor.
Held:

!. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial
notice is mandatory or discretionary on the courts, thus:

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and
maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of matters
which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to
be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
a. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power
to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the
requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly
resolved in the negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter
must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively
settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be
judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to
facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. (cww)

b. To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the

usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be
otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that
it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal
knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not
authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally
known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which
are "commonly" known.
3. Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters

coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life,
or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of
ready and unquestioned demonstration. (og (tru))
a. From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is apparent that the
matter which the appellate court took judicial notice of does not meet the requisite of
notoriety. To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice to
pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC,
with the former even ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was of "common
knowledge" or notoriously known.
b. Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to her petition for review before the CA,

containing a joint declaration under oath by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they
had paid goodwill money to Rosalie as their lessor. On this score, we emphasize that the
reason why our rules on evidence provide for matters that need not be proved under Rule
129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking of the usual form of
evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known, it will not be disputed by the parties.
However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching

documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalies appeal
before the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie.
On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the receipts amounting
to P2,570,000.00, we hold that the practice of payment of goodwill money in the Baclaran
area is an inadequate subject of judicial notice. Neither was Rosalie able to provide sufficient
evidence that, apart from the belatedly submitted Joint Affidavit of the stallholders of
Roferxane Bldg., the said amount was simply for the payment of goodwill money, and not
payment for advance rentals by Spouses Latip.

Ultimately, on the issue of whether Spouses Latip ought to be ejected from the leased
cubicles, what remains in evidence is the documentary evidence signed by both parties the
contract of lease and the receipts evidencing payment of P2,570,000.00.

The RTC was already on the right track when it declared that the receipts for P2,570,000.00
modified or supplemented the contract of lease. However, it made a quantum leap when it
ruled that the amount was payment for rentals of the two (2) cubicles for the entire six-year
period.
There is nothing on the receipts and on record that the payment and receipt
of P2,570,000.00 referred to full payment of rentals for the whole period of the lease. All
three receipts state Rosalies receipt of cash in varying amounts. The first receipt
for P2,000,000.00 did state payment for two (2) cubicles, but this cannot mean full payment
of rentals for the entire lease period when there are no words to that effect. Further, two
receipts were subsequently executed pointing to the obvious fact that the P2,000,000.00 is
not for full payment of rentals. Thus, since the contract of lease remained operative, we
find that Rosalies receipt of the monies should be considered as advanced rentals on
the leased cubicles
Finally, we note that the lease ended in 2005. Consequently, Spouses Latip can be ejected
from the leased premises. They are liable to Rosalie for unpaid rentals on the lease of
the two (2) cubicles in accordance with the stipulations on rentals in the Contract of
Lease. However, the amount of P2,570,000.00, covering advance rentals, must be
deducted from this liability of Spouses Latip to Rosalie.