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I.
The second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (hereafter,
Critique) contains several major and myriad minor emendations.
The revision of the mode of presentation is apparent in four
sections of the Critique: the Aesthetic; the Doctrine of the Concepts
of the Understanding; the Principles of Pure Understanding; and
the paralogisms advanced against rational psychology (Bxxxviii).
A new refutation of psychological idealism begins at B274. Perhaps
most importantly, a new Preface frames the Critique.
In this new Preface, Kant not only introduces his revolutionary
hypothesis, namely that what can be known a priori about objects
as appearances is only what can be put into them by the knower or
that objects as appearances conform to human cognition, but also
indicates that the first main part of the Critique contains not only
its apodictic proof, but also its validation.1 Though Kant is clear
about this point, he is less clear regarding how the first main part
of the Critique accomplishes both tasks. This raises two important
questions relating to Kants method therein that, to my knowledge,
have been largely neglected in the secondary literature: in what does
the apodictic proof that a judgement may serve as an hypothesis
consist?; and how is such validated? In this essay, I offer answers to
both of these questions based on an analysis of Kants lectures on
logic.
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II.2
In nearly all of his lectures on logic, Kant discusses the possibility
of providing apodictic proof that, on the one hand, a given
hypothesis, formulated as a judgement, is certain and, on the other
hand, a judgement may serve as an hypothesis. In these lectures,
an hypothesis is understood as an explanation of something in
general, which may arise from reason, or from experience, or from
appearance (24: 220). Since these discussions consider in some
detail the necessary requirements of each kind of apodictic proof, as
part and parcel of their possibility, they shed considerable light on
the apodictic proof that the judgement what can be known a priori
about objects as appearances is only what is put into them by the
knower or that objects as appearances conform to human cognition
may serve as an hypothesis in the first main part of the Critique. It
is, therefore, profitable to survey them, emphasizing the similarities
they have with each other, and with the Critique.
Necessary Requirements for the Apodictic Proof of an
Hypothesis
Among the earliest of Kants discussions of hypotheses are those
in the Blomberg Logic, a set of lecture notes from the early 1770s.
This set of notes focuses on the necessary requirements that a
given hypothesis, formulated as a judgement, is certain. If all of
the consequences that follow from an assumed hypothesis are true
and agree with what is given, then it is not an opinion anymore
but instead is a certain judgement; as certain as the judgement,
for example, that snow is white (24: 220). Nevertheless, it is
practically impossible to demonstrate every consequence for an
hypothesis. Hence, we must say that if all the consequences that
we have been able to draw from an hypothesis are true, then I
have great cause to conclude that the hypothesis itself is certain
and true as a judgement (24: 220). Kant continues to develop this
line of argument throughout his lectures on logic, namely that it is
impossible to prove apodictically that a given hypothesis, formulated
as a judgement, is certain. Nevertheless, he affirms at least by 1780
that it is possible to prove apodictically that a judgement may serve
as an hypothesis, and thereby serve at least to explain something in
general, even if the (empirical) truth of the hypothesis cannot be
established.3
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Accordingly:
1 According to Kant, an hypothesis must meet two conditions in
order to be worthy of being assumed.
2 The first is that an hypothesis must establish with certainty the
possibility of an object.
3 The second is that an hypothesis must account a priori for an
event.
4 Accounting for something a priori is to show that it is determinable
by the synthetic a priori principles of the understanding.
5 But this is just to establish with certainty that something is a
possible experience.
6 Hence, to establish with certainty the possibility of an object is
to account for it a priori.
7 Therefore, the two conditions that Kant lists are indistinguishable.
The nerve of this argument is the second premise, namely that an
adequate hypothesis establishes with certainty the possibility of an
object. On Buttss view, an adequate hypothesis explains a priori
what is given, the explanandum, which is an object of possible
experience, or what is the same, an event.
This is not Kants view. Kants view is rather that the object of
possible experience is the explanans of an event, which is, in turn,
the explanandum. An adequate hypothesis, then, explains an event
a priori in terms of an object of possible experience. For this, it
must be demonstrated that the connection between the object of
possible experience that is the ground of explanation and the given
consequences is certain. While Kant does not here indicate how
such a demonstration proceeds, perhaps it proceeds by linking the
explanans and explanandum through the dynamical principles of
the understanding, namely the synthetic a priori principles that are
used to regulate the interaction of objects of possible experience (cf.
A148/B187A162/B202; A176/B218A226/B274).
In addition, Kant claims that the apodictic proof that a judgement
may serve as an hypothesis must demonstrate that the ground of
explanation is an object of possible experience. As Kant succinctly
explains:
It is only possible for our reason to use the conditions of possible
experience as conditions of the possibility of things; but it is by no means
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Again, Kant does not here indicate in what this proof consists.
Perhaps it proceeds by showing that the ground of explanation is
determinable by the mathematical principles of the understanding,
namely the synthetic a priori principles of the understanding that
are used to constitute objects of possible experience (cf. esp. A162/
B202A176/B218).
In the final analysis, pace Butts, there are, in fact, two necessary
requirements for the apodictic proof that a judgement may serve as
an adequate explanation of nature. Furthermore, these necessary
requirements are the same as those enumerated in both the Vienna
Logic and the Jsche Logic. This link between the Critique and these
transcripts makes it possible to determine in what the apodictic
proof of Kants revolutionary hypothesis most likely consists.
The Apodictic Proof of Kants Revolutionary Hypothesis
The hypothesis that Kant proposes in his new Preface offers an
explanation of something in general, namely the possibility of
synthetic a priori cognition. Although he claims that the hypothesis
is apodictically proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic and the
Transcendental Analytic, Kant offers no comment regarding how
the constitution of our representations of space and time and the
elementary concepts of the understanding constitute such a proof
of the hypothesis that what can be known a priori about objects as
appearances is only what is put into them by the knower or that
objects as appearances conform to human cognition. Given the
framework provided by Kants lectures on logic, the Transcendental
Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic satisfy the necessary
requirements for the apodictic proof that a judgement may serve as
an hypothesis, thereby apodictically proving the hypothesis.
According to the first requirement, what is expressed in the
judgement must be possible. This requires, on the one hand, proof
of the possibility of objects as appearances. The apodictic proof of
the revolutionary hypothesis must demonstrate, then, the possibility
of objects as appearances. According to Kant, the Transcendental
Aesthetic as a whole proves that objects as appearances are possible:
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Notes
Cf. Bxvi and Bxviii. Following A73/B98, the hypothesis may be
formulated as follows: if objects as appearances conform to human
cognition or what is known about objects as appearances is only what
is put into them by the knower, then synthetic a priori cognition is
possible.
The first main part of the Critique, namely the Transcendental
Doctrine of Elements, contains two parts: the Transcendental Aesthetic
and the Transcendental Logic. The Transcendental Logic contains the
Transcendental Analytic and the Transcendental Dialectic. The second
main part of the Critique, namely the Transcendental Doctrine of
Elements, contains four chapters, each with its own subdivisions: The
Discipline of Pure Reason; The Canon of Pure Reason; The Architectonic
of Pure Reason; The History of Pure Reason. References to Kants works
other than the first Critique are given by volume and page number to the
Akademie edition (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1902 ).
2
I am especially grateful to Michael Davis, Christopher DiTeresi,
Warren Schmaus, John Snapper and the anonymous reviewer for
helpful comments on this section.
3
If this is the correct interpretation of Kants distinction, then it is possible
that an hypothesis, formulated as a judgement, is true, although such
can never be proved, let alone apodictically. It is also possible that the
same hypothesis may serve as an explanation of something in general.
As Kant insists, the latter may be proved apodictically.
Although he is not explicit on this point, Kant seems to allow that
a judgement may serve as an hypothesis in either natural science, as an
explanation of something given in nature or appearance, or metaphysics,
as an explanation of something given in reason. Moreover, it seems to
be Kants position that the use of an hypothesis in either metaphysics or
natural science is for the more general purpose of making progress. In this
he follows Christian Wolff s Commentary on the Institution of the Rules
for the Study of Mathematics cf. J.E. Hofmannus, ed., Gesammelte
Werke, vol. 33 (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1971),
165526. Kant would have been familiar with this work, as it is appended
to Wolff s Elements of Mechanics, the textbook used for at least one of
the two courses on mechanics that Kant taught. Cf. Erich Adickes, Kant
als Naturforscher, vol. 1 (Berlin: W. De Gruyter, 1942), p.11.
Wolff discusses hypotheses as an important means to progress in
science in 309, noting the contribution of Copernicus hypothesis in the
progress of science beyond Ptolemy and through Johannes Kepler, who
discovered the three fundamental laws of planetary motion that bear his
name, to Newton, who in 1687 described universal gravitation and the
three fundamental laws of motion that bear his name. Kants Preface to
the second edition of the Critique is similar, noting explicitly Copernicus
use of an hypothesis to make progress in the science of astronomy (cf.
Bxvi and Bxxii); it is therefore plausible that Kant had Wolff s discussion
in mind when he penned the new Preface in which he announces his
1
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4
5
7
8
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