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De La Salle University

University Student Government


Judiciary Branch
MIKEE KARINA DE VEGA and
JASON DON DIZON,
Petitioners
- Versus CARLO IIGO V. INOCENCIO and
PATRICK ANTHONY R. KAHN,
Respondents
X--------------------------------------------------X
COMMENT/OPPOSITION
(RE: RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND DISMISSAL
DATED 7 NOVEMBER 2014)
I.
Introduction
We approach this honorable court on a matter of transcendental importance. At trial is not
simply two concerned citizens and the University Student Governments top officials, but the
entire democratic process protected by the USG Constitution. We approach this honorable court
carrying the cause of defending democratic process as it ought to be both by the spirit of our
Constitution and by the spirit of Faith, Service and Communion. We feel as petitioners, that the
filed motion for reconsideration, its allegations and misguided judicial references lead the
discussion away from the issue of constitutionality to the legal standing of the petitioners, whose
concern they considered legitimate enough to be noticed and considered by the USG, as stated in
the last paragraph in the second part of their Motion for Reconsideration. Given the serious
allegations and misguided arguments contained in the Motion for Reconsideration that also prays
for the dismissal of our petition, we feel that as petitioners, we are entitled by due process to file
a comment in response. Hence, this comment/opposition.

II.
Grounds Relied Upon For The Comment/Opposition
Respondents raised the following arguments and counter-arguments in response to both the
complaint petitioners filed through their Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Urgent
Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ for
Preliminary Injunction filed and received by this Honorable Court last November 4, 2014,
hereafter referred to as "Petition for Certiorari" and the resolution of this Honorable Court
honoring the request for the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) released to both parties on the

same day, hereafter referred to as "Resolution":


THAT THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS AND RIGHT OF
RESPONSE ON THE PART OF BOTH THE PETITIONERS AND THIS
HONORABLE COURT
THAT PETITIONERS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO FILE THEIR
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DUE TO A LACK OF LOCUS STANDI
ON THE MATTER
THAT THERE IS NO ACTUAL CONTROVERSY DUE TO LACK OF
ACTUAL DAMAGES
THAT THE LEGAL QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY IS NOT
THE MAIN ISSUE OF THE CASE BECAUSE THE ISSUE IS BASED ON
FACTUALITY
THAT THE COURT TRIED TO USURP LEGISLATIVE POWER IN
AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION
THAT THE PETITION WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY WHICH CONSTITUTES BAD FAITH AND
CIRCUMVENTION OF THE PROPER METHOD OF DEMOCRACY
AND REPRESENTATION
THAT THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES MUST BE UPHELD IN THIS CASE
THAT THAT THE DOCTRINE OF REGULARITY AND OPERATIVE
FACT MUST BE UPHELD IN THIS CASE
HENCE, this comment which aims to enlighten the court on some misconceptions that the
respondents may have due to their attachment to the plebiscite.
The filing of this comment is in exercise of a right guaranteed by section 6, Rule 58 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which states, to wit:
Section 6. Grounds for objection to, or for motion of dissolution of, injunction or
restraining order. The application for injunction or restraining order may be denied, upon a
showing of its insufficiency. The injunction or restraining order may also be denied, or, if
granted, may be dissolved, on other grounds upon affidavits of the party or person enjoined,
which may be opposed by the applicant also by affidavits. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

III.
Discussion
Petitioners would like to oppose the following arguments and counter-arguments opposing parties
have presented in their Motion for Reconsideration:
THAT THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS AND RIGHT OF RESPONSE
ON THE PART OF BOTH THE PETITIONERS AND THIS HONORABLE COURT
Respondents assert that they have not been notified nor given copies of the formal pleading filed
by the petitioners and were only made aware by hearsay. It is under this premise that they claim
that their right to response and due process have been violated.
While petitioners concede that the due process clause of the Constitution as an important aspect
of the law, it must first be understood that due process does not mean that there must be specific
methods of notification. Respondents have been furnished a copy of the complaint on November
4, 2014 by this Honorable Court via electronic mail through their respective e-mail accounts. We
do not see why such a method of notification is invalid specially when respondents themselves
have relied on this Honorable Court as an intermediary to facilitate the transfer and notification of
legal documents regarding the issue. We say that these methods of notification are adequate.
Moreover, petitioners question the threshold of the respondents in their definition of what
constitutes due process. In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, the Court established the doctrine of
due process:
"Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in
all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is
satisfied when a person is notified of the charges against him and
given an opportunity to explain or defend himself."
Hence, in defense of this Honorable Court, respondents claim that their right to due process has
been violated due to a lack of hearing cannot hold water in this discussion. They have been
notified as explained in the foregoing but, moreover, their opportunity to explain and defend
themselves are enshrined in the very document this Comment/Opposition is created for.
Otherwise stated, the mere fact that the respondents have been able to file a Motion for
Reconsideration is a testament to how this Honorable Court has been able to preserve their right
to due process.
It is also important to examine the nature of the decision that the Honorable Court has
preemptively created. Petitioners once again concede that the standard for when the lack of notice
for the preliminary injunction is acceptable is the great or irreparable injury test. According to the
Philippine Supreme Court's decision in Social Security Commission vs. Bayona, "an irreparable
injury [...] will enjoin includes that degree of wrong of a repeated and continuing kind which
produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated only by conjecture, and not
by any accurate standard of measurement" (emphasis and underscoring provided).

In this particular circumstance, respondents clearly skirted the issue because the injury that we
have cited in our Petition for Certiorari was clearly not "[a] speculation or presumption of a low
voters' turnout for the plebiscite." Our Petition for Certiorari does not even include any of the
aforementioned terminologies. The injury pointed out was the fact that the rights of students to
fully be represented and empowered in the process of constitutional amendment has been
transgressed. Petitioners have proven this through the discussion on the exclusion of the
freshmen electorate in the creation of the proposed amendments, the poor information
dissemination, the lack of consultation of student sectors and the mishandling of voting
procedures in Plebiscite 2014. This injury, not only to petitioners but to the entire student
population, is irreparable as to continue the Plebiscite 2014 despite its unconstitutionality renders
the entire process as null and void, or, worse, future generations of Lasallians would have to live
under an unconstitutionally-amended constitution. Such an irony must not exist in order for us to
protect the sanctity and integrity of the fundamental law of our University Student Government
and petitioners believe that, as the vanguard of judicial interpretation and as an equal branch of
government, the Judiciary ought to protect this right.
The provision of law allowing for the civil action for the Urgent Application for a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO), hereafter referred to as "Application for TRO," was created to prevent
an irreparable injury, which petitioners have reiterated in the aforementioned. Respondents'
challenge to petitioners to provide an actual and tangibly-measured damage is an unreasonable
burden given that the only proof necessary was a conjecture, which by definition means "an
opinion or idea formed without proof or sufficient evidence." (Merriam-Webster Dictionary) The
possibility of the unconstitutionality, which the Judiciary has acknowledged in its decision
to grant the Application for TRO, is a sufficient cause to continue said TRO. The same
principle of prevention has been exercised by the Philippine Supreme Court which issued a TRO
on the priority development assistance fund (PDAF) and the disbursement acceleration fund
(DAP) once issues of its constitutionality have been raised by individual concerned citizens.
Assuming only for the sake of argument, that the court has failed in notifying the respondents of
charges brought upon them by the petition, we contend that this court has still acted within the
reasonable bounds of their power as granted them by the 1997 Rules for Civil Procedure, where
section 5 states, to wit:
Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. No
preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person
sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified
application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can
be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made,
may issue a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days
from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the
said twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified
time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period
whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the
corresponding order. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Knowing very well the efficiency of COMELEC in canvassing votes and proclaiming results,
canvassing and promulgation of the plebiscites results may have been over before this court

establishes beyond all reasonable doubt that the plebiscite was indeed unconstitutional, which
would have mooted the petition way before it prospers.
The Court, in acting by enjoining all parties to temporarily cease activities regarding the
plebiscite only acted in protection of the petitioners right to be free from great or irreparable
injury, which the motion for reconsideration failed to refute.
Petitioners respectfully conclude that this Honorable Court did not violate the rights of the
respondents to a due process despite the grant of the Application for TRO.

THAT PETITIONERS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO FILE THEIR PETITION FOR


CERTIORARI DUE TO A LACK OF LOCUS STANDI ON THE MATTER
Respondents claim that petitioners have no locus standi because the latter was "not actually
damaged as constituents of the USG" and, thus, have no legal personality in order to file the
Petition for Certiorari.
Petitioners would first like to point out a contradiction in the statements of the respondents. They
cannot claim the absence of proof of damage as constituents because, first, they have conceded
that both are qualified as stakeholders. A stakeholder, as defined, is "one who is involved in or
affected by a course of action." (Merriam-Webster Dictionary) To agree that petitioners are
stakeholders is a concession that there is a possibility of effects due to the Plebiscite 2014.
Second, the claim that there is no damage to petitioners is blatantly contradictory to the statement
of the respondents that "[petitioners'] direct injury is merely a far off and remote damage." This
concedes that there is, in fact, a direct injury to be sustained by petitioners.
To begin with, however, respondents simply were unresponsive to the damages pointed out by
the petitioners namely - (a) "both petitioners will be direct recipients of the possible results of
the plebiscite should its invalidity continue to be unquestioned" and (b) "the continuation of a
constitutionally invalid plebiscite is contrary to the rights of both petitioners, as guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights of Students, as enumerated in Article IV of the USG Constitution."
Petitioners cannot fathom why respondents, who are both University Student Government
officials, do not consider the possible transgression of rights of their constituents an actual
damage. While we will agree that the implications of the passage or rejection of Plebiscite 2014
produce long-term damage, the continuation of an unconstitutional plebiscite is harmful in and of
itself, which renders it deserving of a certiorari. In fact, according to Imbong v. Ochoa, "one can
challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights." This is
something petitioners were certainly able to do.
Respondents also seem to misdirect the Petition for Certiorari in their interpretation of the
following discussion:
"Lastly, given that the matter at hand is a question of
constitutionality, the matter is considered to be of transcendental
importance. Assuming but not conceding the inexistence of direct

personal interest, petitioners may serve as representations of the


public and the raising of this matter of transcendental importance is
a matter that must be resolved not only for the current generation of
Lasallians but also for the coming generations who will be affected
by the constitutional amendments" (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
We would like to clarify that the words underscored was not a concession that petitioners were
unable to cite actual damages. Rather, these statements refer to dynamism - as petitioners were
dynamic and responsive enough to assume that, even in the absence of an actual damage, there is
still cause for petitioners to file said Petition for Certiorari due to the doctrine of transcendental
importance.
Respondents, however, "cautioned" this Honorable Court that "[the doctrine of] Transcendental
Importance is a doctrine used to discuss moot and academic cases and serve as an exception to it
and not something that can be used as basis for petitioners to properly invoke Judicial Review."
We disagree.
The doctrine of transcendental importance is NOT used to discuss moot and academic cases as,
to begin with, there is no actual controversy in such. It is absurd for respondents to even assert
that the Philippine Supreme Court would create a doctrine for discussions, over which they do not
have any jurisdiction. What is certain, however, is that this doctrine may be invoked when the
matter is of "overreaching significance to society or of paramount public interest" - that is,
questions of constitutionality, which the Petition for Certiorari brings up to this Honorable Court.
We caution this Honorable Court to refer to Banat v. COMELEC and discover, upon perusal, that
the aforementioned case is not jurisprudence which clarifies the doctrine of transcendental
importance but rather it decides upon the required percentage of voters in order for a party-list to
win a seat in Congress.
Respondents claim that petitioners assume that, as ordinary undergraduate students, they serve as
a representation of an entire majority who agrees with the stipulations of the Petition on
Certiorari. Petitioners never made such claims. Moreover, such an allegation of the respondents is
moot and irrelevant to this case. In Imbong v. Ochoa and Jaworski v. PAGCOR, the Philippine
Supreme Court decreed that "rule on standing is merely a matter of procedure, hence, can be
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the
public interest so requires, such that when the matter is of constitutionality or transcendental
importance." Under this doctrine, it is not necessary for petitioners to obtain the signatures of a
substantial number of students to sue in public interest; a written or online petition has never been
required by any Philippine Court in order to sue for public interest. For instance, in Imbong v.
Ochoa wherein concerned citizens filed a Petition for Certiorari on the Reproductive Health Law
(which was granted due to its violation of the constitutional right to religion), the petitioners were
named "JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of
their minor children," which proves that individuals are allowed by Courts to sue in public
interest.

Petitioners lastly question the allegations of respondents that the former does not have a "citizen
standing" and is not a "tax payer." For at least a year now, both petitioners have been bona fide
undergraduate students of the University and according to Article II of the USG Constitution,
"The members of the USG shall be all undergraduate students of the University." Moreover, they
are considered taxpayers because the main funding of the University Student Government comes
from the tuition fee of the students, as well. This proves that both petitioners qualify as part of the
non-traditional plaintiffs - in this case, ordinary citizens and taxpayers.
Petitioners do not understand the reasoning of the respondent when they claim that petitioners
"cannot qualify as tax payers because they were not able to prove any appropriation made by the
USG that would endanger and be tantamount to misused public student funds." The argument on
taxpayers was made by petitioners as one of the proofs of their legal standing - their identity as
taxpayers is what empowers them to question the constitutionality of the decisions of the
institution to which they give sovereignty through, not only their votes, but also their taxes. This
argument proves that the respondents, as University Student Government officials, are
accountable to both petitioners. The logical underpinnings of respondents' argument simply does
not work. The standing of petitioners as taxpayers is not contingent on the misappropriation of
public student funds; in fact, corruption is immaterial to the standing of citizens as taxpayers.
Hence, given the aforementioned, both petitioners do have a legal standing in this issue.
THAT THERE IS NO ACTUAL CONTROVERSY DUE TO A LACK OF A WRITTEN
OR ONLINE PETITION
Petitioners would first like to clarify what it really means to have an actual controversy. In
Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on
Ancestral Domain, the Philippine Supreme Court determined that the only standard of actual
controversy is that the case must not be moot, academic or based on extra-legal and other similar
considerations.
The mere question of constitutionality is a legal issue and a controversy that is relevant at this
point in time. Mootness comes from the fact that the issues have already been resolved. In this
case, the Petition for Certiorari's claims that the Plebiscite 2014 is unconstitutional given its
non-compliance to certain provisions of the USG Constitution. We find that this Honorable Court
has seen an actual controversy as they have granted the Application for TRO under the grounds
that there might be a possiblity of unconstitutionality and have called for pre-hearing and hearing
sessions. All these acts concede that there is a legal issue that must be settled.
Respondents assert that the only way for there to be an actual controversy on this matter is for
there to be a written or online petition from the petitioners as exemplified by the cases Santiago v.
COMELEC and Lambino v. COMELEC. These assertions are irrelevant. Written and online
petitions are necessary should a concerned citizen desire to create amendments for the
constitution; however, the purpose of the Petition for Certiorari is not to create a new
constitutional amendment but rather to question the constitutionality of the process the University
Student Government underwent to impose Plebiscite 2014. We agree the cases show what proper
student or citizen initiative (the more politically-correct jargon is People's Initiative) but this

Petition for Certiorari is not of the same character. This assertion neither disproves the existence
of an actual controversy nor does it prove anything in this legal issue.
THAT THE LEGAL QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY IS NOT THE MAIN
ISSUE OF THE CASE BECAUSE THE ISSUE IS BASED ON FACTUALITY
Respondents claim that constitutionality because majority of the argumentation from both the
petitioners and the Court are of factual issues. This claim is without merit. This argumentation
relies on the logical underpinning that there is a wide distinction between questions of fact and
questions of law such that it is not possible to have a mixture of the two.
Petitioners will agree that some of the argumentation in the Petition for Certiorari have yet to be
verified factually (although petitioners have evidence ready to support their claims); however, the
factual issues are part of the resolution of the legal issue of constitutionality. Respondents do not
seem to understand the concept of lis mota - all that this requisite necessitates is that the main
issue be about the constitutionality of an executive or legislative act but it does not invalidate a
petition by virtue of the existence of factual issues. Lis mota dictates that other legislations must
be utilized in order to resolve a dispute prior to questioning the constitutionality. In this case,
there is no other way to resolve the dispute other than to answer the question of constitutionality.
Moreover, the factual issues are merely subsumed in the main legal issue of constitutionality which, in legal parlance, is referred to as "mixed questions law and fact." In Latorre v. Latorre,
the Philippine Supreme Court decreed:
"This Court [must] decide the case on the merits. To do so,
however, would require the examination by this Court of the
probative value of the evidence presented."
This decision to refer back to evidences and factual issues is borne out of the fact that the
Philippine Supreme Court acknowledges that factual issues are necessary to resolve legal issues.
Hence, in this case, the factual issues regarding the performance of the Legislative Assembly is
merely subsidiary to main legal issue of constitutionality which proves that constitutionality
remains to be the lis mota.
THAT THE COURT TRIED TO USURP LEGISLATIVE POWER IN AMENDING THE
CONSTITUTION
Respondents asserted that this Honorable Court went beyond its jurisdiction and rashly and
conspiratorially suggested that this is a move to usurp legislative power to amend the
Constitution. In defense of this Honorable Court, we say that respondents have no basis for such
claim except for the statement that the constitution does not prohibit the creation of amendments
prior to freshmen elections. To rule in favor of petitioners, according to respondents, would be
the creation of judicial legislations.
Such reasoning has no merit.

Petitioners based their claims of exclusion of the freshmen population on Article XXVI, Section
1:
"Any amendment or revision of this Constitution may be proposed
by the students through an initiative upon a vote of at least
two-thirds of the members of the LA." (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Under this section, it is clear that two-thirds of the members of the Legislative Assembly must be
present; however, no distinction has been made as to whether or not this Assembly should not
include the freshmen Legislative Assembly Representatives. It is true that there is no prohibition
on the creation of amendments without the completion of the Legislative Assembly but neither is
there a statement from the constitution that allows upperclassmen from excluding freshmen
Legislative Assembly Representatives in the creation of amendement. We think this is a matter of
constitutional interpretation of the term "LA" - an act that only the Judiciary is empowered to do,
not the Legislative and not the Executive.
Petitioners, however, would like to comment that the fairest way to interpret the use of the term
"LA" is to include the freshmen Legislative Assembly Representatives. In Civil Liberties Union
v. Executive Secretary, the Supreme Court affirmed that:
"It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no
one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing
upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another,
if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand
together." (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The problem with the notion that constitutional amendments can be made prior to the election of
freshmen Legislative Assembly Representatives is that it is contradictory with the other
provisions of the 2009 University Student Government Constitution, particularly the following:
Article III. Section 1 The USG shall have the power of which
emanates from the student body. It shall be the sole, unified,
autonomous and democratic representative body of the students.
Article IV. Section 9 Every student has the right to proper
representation and participation in all policy-making bodies inside the
University.
.
Both these sections refer to the right of students to be represented by the University Student

Government. Freshmen students are represented by their Legislative Assembly Representatives. Their
opinion and input on the matter is equally important as that of upperclassmen; otherwise, the
freshmen students should not be part of the plebiscite. But, the fact that they part of the plebiscite
shows that they are equally protected by the Constitution insofar as their rights to participate in
democracy is concerned. Petitioners do not see a reason by the same right should not be upheld in the
preparatory process - that is, the creation of the proposed amendments. This is also in compliance
with the equal protection clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Philippine Constitution which provides
"Nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws." Upperclassmen are represented in the
process of proposing amendments and ratifying said amendments; however, freshmen students are
only able to access their rights in the process of ratifying. Such a distinction has no basis and should
therefore not be upheld by this Honorable Court in the interest of fairness and equitability.

The Judiciary is the branch vested with the power to interpret the Constitution by the Constitution
itself. To echo the Philippine Supreme Court in Imbong v. Ochoa, "when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a
right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute." This is not a usurpation of power but
rather the exercise of the responsibility to balance the powers of other branches.
THAT THE PETITION WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY
WHICH CONSTITUTES BAD FAITH AND CIRCUMVENTION OF THE PROPER
METHOD OF DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION
Respondents claim that the Petition for Certiorari was not raised at the earliest opportunity.
However, they seem to have a misconception regarding the clause Issues of Constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity.
There are many remarkable mistakes with this claim. The very first being, that it unjustly
transfers the burden of proving good faith on the petitioners, rather than the usual burden of
proving bad faith on the part of the respondents. Equally remarkable, is the respondents
misunderstanding of the concept of earliest opportunity. The only discussion provided by the
Memorandum of Agreement in terms of violating the earliest opportunity rule is that
The petitioners however thought of it being convenient to file this case of
stopping the plebiscite only when the USG already started its voting process, only after
the COMELEC has spent on making ballots and preparing in numerous polling station.
The honorable court would note that nowhere in this line of thinking would prove, that even
assuming the earliest opportunity clause meant what they thought it to be, there was a violation.
In any case, this is not the true meaning of the earliest opportunity rule. The earliest opportunity
rule does not point to a specific timeframe wherein a case may be filed, but it refers to a period in
the proceedings. It states that for a petition to be valid for review in a hearing, it must be raised in
the pleadings part of the proceeding. Earliest Opportunity refers not to a point in the
measurement of the continuous revolution of this earth, but the earliest time upon the initiation of
the act. This specific view is taken by the court in Matibag vs. Benipayo 429 Phil. 554, when
they held that if a matter was not raised in the pleadings of a trial, it cannot be considered in the
trial, and if it is not considered in the trial, it may not be considered on appeal. Given that the

question on constitutionality is the very purpose of the petition, insofar as the petition and the
rule is concerned, it is well within the earliest opportunity.
THAT THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES MUST
BE UPHELD IN THIS CASE
Petitioners outright deny the allegation that we have not exhausted administrative remedies.
Petitioner DE VEGA was in attendance in the COLE meeting which, only at the time of this
petition, found out to be about the constitutional amendments. It was in this meeting that she felt
the immediate effect of being excluded from consultation for reasons earlier cited in this reply
and in the original petition. Moreover, whatever openness the USG may claim to have in
consultations regarding the amendments is not an adequate remedy for the relief sought by this
petition, which is the nullification of an unconstitutional act by the USG. We do not understand
how questions and answers may be an adequate remedy which qualifies non-exhaustion if the
amendments were only made public at the time of finalization and a plebiscite is in place, and
that the USG would have no incentive to respond to the relief being sought by this petition.
However, even assuming for the sake of argument that it was a valid administrative relief and that
we have violated procedural law by non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, we contend that
the nature of the petition falls under the special exceptions granted by the Philippine Supreme
Court in Philippines vs. Lacap, which states, to wit:
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical
considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where
there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged
administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d)
where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts
of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo
warranto proceedings. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

We contend, by the standard of when strong public interest is involved alone, we already
qualify for an exception the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies and therefore cannot
be dismissed on such basis.
Moreover, a schedule released by the Office of the Dean of Student Affairs shows that the USG
made intentions of releasing information about the Plebiscite only on the 12th of October 2014, 18
days before the start of the actual plebiscite. These 18 days were spent plotting and researching
the methods by which the USG came up with the amendments and the process of holding the
referendum. The insistence of the USG on the Plebiscites validity and their final decision to hold
it offers the petitioners no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to prevent the danger
provided by the remedy and thus falls under another exception provided by People vs. Lacup.

Hence, respondents cannot claim that we the petitioners be in failure to comply with exhaustion
of administrative remedies, but even in their ability to do so, we qualify for an exception based on
jurisprudence laid down by the Supreme Court.
THAT THAT THE DOCTRINE OF REGULARITY AND OPERATIVE FACT MUST BE
UPHELD IN THIS CASE
Respondents claim the following in their discussion of Part II in their Motion for
Reconsideration.
We would also like to remind the court of both the doctrine of REGULARITY and
OPERATIVE FACT which should apply in this situation, wherein in order to fully comprehend
this the court could read the following cases:
CSC v. Joson, 429 SCRA 773
Tuandavs Sandiganbayan, 249 SCRA 342
Lino Luna vs Rodriguez, 37 Phil 136
US v. Abalos, 1 Phil. 73
Garchitorena v. Crescini, 37 Phil. 675
Dimaandalvs Commission on Audit, 291 SCRA, 322 and the recent case of Belgica vs.
Ochoa, G.R. No. 208493 (2013) regarding the PDAF Scandal
Also as held by the Philippine Supreme Court in Francisco vs House of Representative the court
should always favor constitutionality with regards to acts of the government in order to ensure
harmonious operation of governmental function, unless of course there be clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary that Petitioners clearly lack in this case.
As a matter of response, we agree to the existence of the Doctrine of Operative Fact and Presumption of
Constitutionality. We agree that these are privileges enjoyed by legislation. This whole discussion does
not merit anything towards the dismissal of the petition since the dismissal cannot be issued on the basis
of a presumption of constitutionality. The petition itself aims to discuss the constitutionality of the
plebiscite and the TRO is issued towards protecting the integrity of that discussion, hence the lack of
permanence. The very fact that we are fulfilling our burden in discussing the reasons why it should be
unconstitutional means that we are acting with respect to the presumption of constitutionality, and the
absence of a definitive ruling of the Court on its constitutionality leaves the presumption untouched.
Whether or not the evidence to the contrary as indicated in the last line is sufficient is a matter that can
be concluded by the court upon a perusal of presented evidence and a full hearing, not one that can be
concluded by a respondent in an unsubstantiated sentence.

IV.
Conclusion
It may therefore be concluded, that the arguments presented for the purpose of dismissing our

petition and removing the TRO, failed to convince. The attacks on our non-compliance to
procedural laws were blind not only to actual understanding of the procedures they aim to protect
(in reference to the misunderstanding of Earliest opportunity) but also to the exceptions
provided by law in which we qualify.
Moreover, the only possible grounds for the dismissal of the petition found in the Motion for
Reconsideration and Dismissal filed by the respondents, is the insufficiency of proving the
damage done and the unconstitutionality. This last attempt at dismissing the petition is no longer
within the jurisdiction of procedural law since it necessitates a judgment on merit, not
compliance, which may only be present at the conclusion of a hearing.
The only remaining justiciable issue, insofar as our original Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition is concerned, is the substance and the merit of our arguments on the Plebiscites
constitutionality. It is therefore fitting that the Honorable Court should clear us of any procedural
violations insofar as filing and hearing the petition is concerned.

V.
Prayer
WHEREFORE, petitioners implore and pray to this honorable judiciary that:
1. That the Motion for Reconsideration and Dismissal be junked and set aside
2. That the Hearing for the petition may be initiated at the soonest possible time, as the
only remaining justiciable issue is the substance and the merit of the claims on
unconstitutionality
Signed on this day, 8th of November 2014

MIKEE KARINA DE VEGA


Petitioner

JASON DON DIZON


Petitioner

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