A Cognitive Approach To Metaphorical Expressions

9 789731 970387
Cognitive approach - korr1
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Imre AttIlA
A Cognitive ApproACh
to MetAphoriCAl
expressions
03/22/2010
SAPIeNtIA BOOKS
FUNDAIA
SAPIeNtIA
universitatea
sapientia
UNIverSItAteA
CretIN
PArtIUm
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Imre AttIlA
A Cognitive ApproACh to
MetAphoriCAl expressions
Scientia
Publishing House
Cluj-Napoca2009
03/22/2010
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SaPIeNtIa BOOKS 64.

tiinele naturii
the book was published with the support of the sapientia Foundation
Published by:
Sapientia Foundation Institute of research Programs
400112 Cluj-Napoca, matei Corvin 4.
tel./fax: +40-264-593694, e-mail: kpi@kpi.sapientia.ro
Website: www.scientiakiado.ro
Publisher in chief:
Zoltn Ksa
Szakvlemnyezte:
Dr. tefan Oltean egyetemi tanr
Dr. Hortensia Prlog egyetemi tanr
Dr. Szilgyi N. Sndor egyetemi tanr
Dr. Andrei Avram egyetemi tanr
anyanyelvi lektor: Richard Proctor
First english edition: 2009
Scientia, 2009
All rights reserved, including the rights for photocopying, public lecturing, radio
and television broadcast and translation of the whole work and of chapters as well.
Descrierea CIP a Bibliotecii Naionale a Romniei
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CONteNtS
Foreword
I. tHeORetICaL BaCKGROUND
1. Introduction
2. Our Conceptual System
3. Constituents of Cognitive Grammar
3.1. mental abilities
3.2. Perception
3.3. relationship, participants, perspective
3.4. Image schema
3.5. motion
3.6. Categorisation
3.7. Concept
3.8. Network
3.9. relative meaning
4. An Historical Overview of metaphor
5. metaphors in Cognitive linguistics
6. Prepositions, postpositions, adverbs,adverbial phrases
II. SeMaNtICS OF MetaPHORICaL eXPReSSIONS
7. metaphorical expressions
8. metaphorical Over-situations
8.1. Over (english)
9. metaphorical ABOve-situations
9.1. ABOve (english)
9.2. metaphorical ABOve
10. metaphorical ACrOSS-situations
10.1. Across (english)
10.2. metaphorical ACrOSS
11. metaphorical tHrOUGH-situations
11.1. through (english)
11.2. metaphorical tHrOUGH
12. metaphorical PrIN-situations
12.1. Prin (romanian)
12.2. PrIN1 through obstacle
12.3. PrIN2 through aperture
12.4. PrIN3 create aperture
12.5. PrIN4 inside
12.6. PrIN5 through inside
12.7. PrIN6 instrumental
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12.8. PrIN7 proximity
12.9. PrIN8 time
13. metaphorical PeSte-situations
13.1. Peste (romanian)
13.2. PeSte1 over-above
13.3. PeSte2 excess
13.4. PeSte3 (partial) cover
13.5. PeSte4 time
14. metaphorical t-situations
14.1. t (Hungarian)
14.2. t1 through (virtual) boundary/obstacle
14.3. t2 through aperture
14.4. t3 over (above/across)
14.5. t4 CHANGe
14.6. t5 from-to
14.7. t6 cover
15. metaphorical KereSZtl-situations
15.1. KereSZtl (Hungarian)
15.2. KereSZtl1 through
15.3. KereSZtl2 through aperture
15.4. KereSZtl3 over-above
15.5. KereSZtl4 through-across H
15.6. KereSZtl5 again
15.7. KereSZtl6 block
15.8. KereSZtl7 time
15.9. KereSZtl8 instrumental
16. metaphorical Fltt / Felett-situations
16.1. Fltt / felett (Hungarian)
16.2. Felett1 above a certain level or amount
16.3. Felett2 tIme
16.4. Felett3 cover
17. metaphorical Fell-situations
17.1. Fell (Hungarian)
17.2. Fell1 as an adverb
17.3. Fell2 as a postposition
17.4. Fell3 as a preverb
18. Conclusions
References
appendix 1. List of Figures
appendix 2. List of tables
abstract
about the author
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taRtaLOMjeGyzK
elsz
I. eLMLetI aLaPOzS
1. Bevezets
2. Fogalmi rendszernk
3. A kognitv nyelvszet sszetevi
3.1. mentlis kpessgek
3.2. A percepci
3.3. viszonyrendszer, rsztvevk, perspektva
3.4. Kpi smk
3.5. A mozgs
3.6. Kategorizls
3.7. Fogalmak
3.8. Hlzat
3.9. relatv jelents
4. A metafora trtneti ttekintse
5. metafork a kognitv nyelvszetben
6. Prepozcik, hatrozszk s szerkezetek
II. MetaFORIKUS SzeRKezeteK SzeMaNtIKja
7. metaforikus kifejezsek
8. metaforikus Over-esetek
8.1. Over (angol)
9. metaforikus ABOve-esetek
9.1. ABOve (angol)
9.2. metaforikus ABOve
10. metaforikus ACrOSS-esetek
10.1. ACrOSS (angol)
10.2. metaforikus ACrOSS
11. metaforikus tHrOUGH-esetek
11.1. tHrOUGH (angol)
11.2. metaforikus tHrOUGH
12. metaforikus PrIN-esetek
12.1. PrIN (romn)
12.2. PrIN1 akadlyon
12.3. PrIN2 nylson
12.4. PrIN3 nyls ltrehozsa
12.5. PrIN4 benne
12.6. PrIN5 benne keresztl
12.7. PrIN6 instrumentlis
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12.8. PrIN7 kzelsg
12.9. PrIN8 id
13. metaforikus PeSte-esetek
13.1. PeSte (romn)
13.2. PeSte1 t-felett
13.3. PeSte2 mrtken fell
13.4. PeSte3 (rszleges) feds
13.5. PeSte4 id
14. metaforikus t-esetek
14.1. t (magyar)
14.2. t1 (virtulis) akadlyon
14.3. t2 nylson
14.4. t3 felett
14.5. t4 vltozs
14.6. t5 forrs-cl
14.7. t6 feds
15. metaforikus KereSZtl-esetek
15.1. KereSZtl (magyar)
15.2. KereSZtl1 t
15.3. KereSZtl2 nylson
15.4. KereSZtl3 felett
15.5. KereSZtl4 horizontlis akadlyon
15.6. KereSZtl5 ismt
15.7. KereSZtl6 gt
15.8. KereSZtl7 id
15.9. KereSZtl8 instrumentlis
16. metaforikus Fltt / Felett-esetek
16.1. Fltt / felett (magyar)
16.2. Felett1 szint felett
16.3. Felett2 id
16.4. Felett3 feds
17. metaforikus Fell-esetek
17.1. Fell (magyar)
17.2. Fell1 hatrozsz
17.3. Fell2 nvut
17.4. Fell3 igekt
18. Kvetkeztetsek
Szakirodalom
Fggelk 1. brk jegyzke
Fggelk 2. tblzatok jegyzke
Kivonat
a szerzrl
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CUPRINS
Cuvnt nainte
I. aSPeCte teORetICe
1. Introducere
2. Sistemul conceptual
3. Constituenii gramaticii cognitive
3.1. Abilititi mintale
3.2. Percepia
3.3. relaii, participani, perspective
3.4. Scheme imaginare
3.5. micarea
3.6. Categorizarea
3.7. Concepia
3.8. reea de sensuri
3.9. Sens relativ
4. O scurt istorie a metaforei
5. metafore n lingvistica cognitiv
6. Prepoziii, postpoziii, adverbe, locuiuni adverbiale
II. SeMaNtICa eXPReSIILOR MetaFORICe
7. expresii metaforice
8. Cazuri metaforice cu Over
8.1. Over (limba englez)
9. Cazuri metaforice cu ABOve
9.1. ABOve (limba englez)
9.2. Sensul metaforic ABOve
10. Cazuri metaforice cu ACrOSS
10.1. ACrOSS (limba englez)
10.2. Sensul metaforic ACrOSS
11. Cazuri metaforice cu tHrOUGH
11.1. tHrOUGH (limba englez)
11.2. Sensul metaforic tHrOUGH
12. Cazuri metaforice cu PrIN
12.1. PrIN (limba romn)
12.2. PrIN1 obstacol
12.3. PrIN2 orificiu
12.4. PrIN3 creare orificiu
12.5. PrIN4 interior
12.6. PrIN5 prin interior
12.7. PrIN6 instrumental
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12.8. PrIN7 proximitate
12.9. PrIN8 temporal
13. Cazuri metaforice cu PeSte
13.1. PeSte (limba romn)
13.2. PeSte1 deasupra
13.3. PeSte2 exces
13.4. PeSte3 acoperire (parial)
13.5. PeSte4 temporal
14. Cazuri metaforice cu t
14.1. t (limba maghiar)
14.2. t1 obstacol (virtual)
14.3. t2 orificiu
14.4. t3 peste
14.5. t4 schimbare
14.6. t5 de la pn la
14.7. t6 acoperire
15. Cazuri metaforice cu KereSZtl
15.1. KereSZtl (limab maghiar)
15.2. KereSZtl1 prin
15.3. KereSZtl2 prin orificiu
15.4. KereSZtl3 peste
15.5. KereSZtl4 peste obstacol orizontal
15.6. KereSZtl5 repetitiv
15.7. KereSZtl6 blocaj
15.8. KereSZtl7 temporal
15.9. KereSZtl8 instrumental
16. Cazuri metaforice cu Fltt / Felett
16.1. Fltt / felett (limba maghiar)
16.2. Felett1 peste limit / msur
16.3. Felett2 temporal
16.4. Felett3 acoperire
17. Cazuri metaforice cu Fell
17.1. Fell (limba maghiar)
17.2. Fell1 sens adverbial
17.3. Fell2 sens postpoziinal
17.4. Fell3 sens de prefix adverbial
18. Concluzii
Bibliografie
anexa 1. Lista ilustraiilor
anexa 2. Lista tabelelor
Rezumat
Despre autor
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FORewORD
the present book tries to offer an insight regarding metaphorical

expressions containing the following prepositions or verbal prefixes:
over, through, above, across in english, prin, peste in romanian and t,
keresztl, felett, fell in Hungarian. the study constitutes the Ph.D.
dissertation of the author, and the corpus is based on recent and
representative dictionaries of the three languages involved: the shorter
oxford english Dictionary, Dicionarul explicativ al limbii romne (the
romanian explanatory Dictionary) and A magyar nyelv rtelmez
sztra (the Hungarian explanatory Dictionary).
the work is the result of a research extending over more than two
years, and the manuscript was finalized in November 2008. Consequently,
the bibliography contains titles of works related to this field of research
that were published before the summer of 2008. the study of the english
prepositions mentioned above triggered off a new field of linguistics,
namely cognitive linguistics. Our approach includes both a theoretical
approach to the subject, presenting an historical background to the topic,
as well as a presentation of dozens of cases in the three languages, starting
from central senses and their metaphorical extensions. the contrastive
study of the basically same situation in the three languages adds to the
novelty of this research, as the majority of works so far have been focusing
only on similarities. While the part describing the english preposition
follows the path of the traditional description developed by Brugman,
lakoff and others, an original approach may be observed when the
romanian and Hungarian prepositions and verbal prefixes are described.
One may also discover that romanian linguists in the 1970s already
described some aspects of prin, peste in terms of cognitive linguistics.
the supporting illustrations referring to the english prepositions are
basically taken from the cited authors, the illustrations referring to the
romanian and Hungarian cases are original, unless otherwise stated.
Although the present work only describes those metaphorical cases
which are to be found in the aforementioned dictionaries, we tend to
believe that they are the most representative metaphorical cases with the
highest occurrence. However, a future research will include cases relying
on samples from everyday communication and the media as well.
30.11.2009
Attila Imre
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I. tHeORetICaL BaCKGROUND
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CHAPter 1.
INtRODUCtION
What one finds in language depends in large measure on what one

expects to find. the statement belongs to langacker (1987:11) and
gives a glimpse of the way we try to approach certain metaphorical
expressions (extensions) in english. Gonzalez-marquez et al.
emphasises that cognitive linguistics is based on the idea that
language is an extension of our environments. If our environments
differ, then likely so will our languages. to better understand how this
process works, it is necessary to study and compare many languages in
conjunction with the cognitive systems that are part of. (2007:78).
Understanding metaphorical expressions leads us to understanding
sentences, and an interesting side-track may be how philosophers
approach metaphors and semantics. Wiggins (1997:3) states that Frege
was the first who made explicit the idea that to understand a sentence
is to have grasped its truth-condition, and for Frege (1879) this was not
an emphasised consequence of his general approach to questions of
meaning. thus we have to deal with a truth aspect of sentences as well,
and in this respect we can remember the early Wittgensteins truth
conditional thesis (1922):
4.022 A sentence in use (satz) shows how things stand if it is true.
And it says that they do so stand.
4.024 to understand a sentence in use means to know what is the
case if it is true.
4. 061 A sentence in use is true if we use it to say that things stand
in a certain way, and they do.
Wittgensteins sentence in use reminds us the context in which
these sentences appear, and the importance of context is further
explained by Frege (1884, cited by Wiggins 1997:13): only in the context
of a sentence does a word mean or stand for anything. this is connected
to Wittgensteins later remark stating that language is created while it is
being used, according to which every word has a meaning which is
correlated with the word (1958, philosophical investigations). the so-
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1. INtrODUCtION
called early Wittgenstein expressed his view on language in his 1922

work, tractatus logico-philosophicus, where language is something
innate, we are born with it. According to the late Wittgenstein, meaning
is in fact nothing else than use. this use may be interpreted as grasping
a concept, which in fact understanding a sentence in a language (Wiggins
1997). lewis (1972) states that A theory of meaning for a language
should be able to tell us the meanings of the words and sentences which
comprise that language. So one of our conclusions deriving from this
philosophical approach to language is that concept, truth, meaning, use,
understanding may become relevant in interpreting utterances, and now
we present the linguistic approach to language.
langacker mentions that our destiny in life is to deal with entities
that are neither rigorously defined nor ever fully understood (1987. 23),
so interpretation is given a central role. this idea is repeated in the
second part of his book (langacker 1991. 507), adding that among the
factors that shape these expectations are metaphors, whose
pervasiveness and formative influence in our mental life have been
emphasised in many studies (lakoff and Johnson 1980, lakoff 1987).
We think that one of the reasons for these studies was Chomsky. more
than three decades ago Chomsky presented a very pessimistic situation
concerning our knowledge of language (acquisition)1, stating that the
underlying mechanisms should be studied much more carefully (deep
structures) trying to find so-called universal governing rules (1972. 26).
He goes on, dealing with the form and meaning in natural languages:
Having mastered a language, one is able to understand an
indefinite number of expressions that are new to ones experience, that
bear no simple physical resemblance and are in no simple way
analogous to the expressions that constitute ones linguistic experience;
and one is able, with greater or less facility, to produce such
expressions on an appropriate occasion, despite their novelty and
independently of detectable stimulus configurations, and to be
understood by others who share this still mysterious ability. the
normal use of language is, in this sense, a creative activity. (1972. 100)
the next three decades saw the rising of cognitive linguistics,
which came as a reaction to Chomskys statement, arguing that novel
1. Purves (2004) states that Chomsky was not really interested in brain structure, but
he concluded that the complexity of language is such that it cannot simply be
learned, and that language must be predicated on a universal grammar, a term
coined by Chomsky (1975, 1981).
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expressions are not necessarily independent of detectable stimulus

configurations (new, metaphorical expressions are often based on our
bodily experience), and this ability is less mysterious, as we are
endowed for instance with abstraction and generalization.
According to cognitive linguists, SPACe and tIme can be regarded as
the two most fundamental domains of human experience; in this
respect see, for instance, evans and Green (2006. 68).
Although mac Cormac (1985) presumes the existence of deep
structures of the human mind as a language-generating device (with
analogy and disanalogy between the attributes), which comes close to
generative grammar, he presents a cognitive theory of metaphor; a
cognitive theory that, taken generally, says that lexicon, morphology,
and syntax form a continuum of symbolic units serving to structure
conceptual content for expressive purposes (langacker 1987. 35). thus
we cannot speak of grammar in isolation from meaning, the argument
continues, and this is further supported: cognitive grammar has
claimed for many years that grammar and meaning are indissociable
(langacker 1999. 1), and language necessarily comprises semantic
structures, phonological structures, and symbolic links between the
two. the central claim of cognitive grammar is that nothing else is
needed. language can be successfully analysed if it is viewed as part of
cognition and it is basically symbolic as expressions or linguistic forms
symbolize concepts. even words classified in traditional grammars as
grammatical terms (e.g. prepositions) are taken in cognitive grammar as
symbolic units which associate a phonological form with a concept.2
lakoff supports the idea (1987. 463), stating that we must find a
theory of grammar in which the syntax is not independent of
semantics, and mac Cormac is on the same wavelength: separation of
semantics and syntax is not possible (based on the discovery that a
change in syntax affects semantic interpretation); these two aspects of
grammar are intimately intertwined (1985. 116), the real blending
being represented by lakoff: I view cognitive grammar as an updated
version of generative semantics. (1987. 582).
Aitchison (2008. 5) states that syntax and semantics together form
the essence of any language. Still, Haugelands opinion (1981. 23)
slightly differs:
If you take care of the syntax, the semantics will take care of
itself.
2. A remark I am grateful to one of my critics (H.P.).
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lewis warns us that semantics has a very important role, as

semantics with no treatment of truth conditions is not semantics,
which reminds us Wittgenstein (lewis 1972, cited by travis 1997. 87).
Cognitive grammar also assumes that there is no clear distinction
between literal and figurative language (langacker 1987. 38), so we can
conclude that there are degrees of extension from concrete to abstract;
although this comes against marconis findings (1997), who is
concerned with truth and objectivity, which serves as a basis for
deviance, the appropriate answer is given by our conceptual system.
Although Chomsky approached language from a different perspective,
his remark fits into cognitive semantics as well:
We lose sight of the need for explanation when phenomena are too
familiar and obvious. We tend too easily to assume that explanations
must be transparent and close to the surface As native speakers, we
have a vast amount of data available to us. For just this reason it is easy
to fall into the trap of believing that there is nothing to be explained.
Nothing could be further from the truth. (Chomsky 1972. 256, cited
by Aitchison 2008. 7)
the problem is not solved if we separate semantics from syntax, as
in their recent book, evans and Green present another aspect. they
argue that we have dealt so far with cognitive semantics and cognitive
approaches to grammar, but they are only two sides of the same coin,
and their explanation goes: cognitive semanticists rely on language to
help them understand how the conceptual system works, while
cognitive grammarians rely on what is known about the conceptual
system to help them understand how language works (2006:170).
And we cannot finish the introduction without the hope that this
work will enforce the relationship between language and cognition, as
stated in the introduction to Gonzalez-marquez et al.
Work in cognitive metaphor, cognitive grammar, psycholinguistics,
discourse management, conceptual integration, and spatial cognition
has produced tantalizing proposals about the conceptual underpinnings
of human languages. A major movement in cognitive linguistics has thus
developed around the commitment to pursue empirical studies that
might help substantiate its claims, and to develop a coherent account of
the connection between language and cognition. (2007. XXII)
In the following we will try to present those aspects of cognitive
linguistics that seem important for our research, starting with the
human conceptual system.
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CHAPter 2.
OUR CONCePtUaL SySteM
lakoff and Johnson try to explain our conceptual system from the
experimentalist approach: the kind of conceptual system we have is
a product of the kind of beings we are and the way we interact with our
physical and cultural environments, the standard view seeks to be
objective (cf. dictionaries), but our comprehension is metaphorical
(1980. 119). However, one of the problems is that Chomsky correctly
observes that even the notion of body should be revised:
Without pursuing subsequent developments further, the general
conclusion is that the Cartesian concept of body was found to be
untenable. What is the concept of body that finally emerged? the answer
is that there is no clear and definite concept of body. If the best theory of
the material world that we can construct includes a variety of forces,
particles that have no mass, and other entities that would have been
offensive to the scientific common sense of the Cartesians, then so be
it: We conclude that these are properties of the physical world, the world
of body there is no longer any definite conception of body. (1988)
Chomskys argument is that the concept of body used by Descartes
was replaced by the Newtonian notion of body, which was altered due
to the research in particle physics. thus our present-day notion of body
is ill defined because we have no clear conception of what the body
is...and our understanding of the physical body will have to change to
accommodate the mental. (Beakley and ludlow 1992. 4)
A possible reply to Chomsky may be found in evans and Green
(2006. 232-3), when they describe the lexical concept BODY. they say
that this is understood more generally in terms of (three-dimensional)
SPACe, as SPACe is a domain that derives directly from our sensory
experience of the world. langacker states that basic domains derive
from directly embodied experiences that are pre-conceptual in nature,
and subjective experiences and sensory-perceptual experiences are
both directly embodied in pre-conceptual experiences. thus the notion
of body is connected to physical experience which leads to preconcepts and ultimately to concepts.
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2. OUr CONCePtUAl SYStem
langacker highlights another aspect of conception, saying that

people are more concerned with what they are conceiving than in the
particular way they are doing that (1999. 46). the conclusion is that the
identification of meaning with mental experience does not provide us
with direct access to the factors that shape it. regier briefly mentions
that the human conception of space appears to structure other parts of
the conceptual system through spatial metaphors, as the human
experience of space is constrained by the nature of the human
perceptual system (1996. 4). lakoff and Johnson, similarly: the
structure of our spatial concepts emerges from our constant spatial
experience, that is, our interaction with the physical environment,
although mac Cormac states that even the experiences of spatial
orientation involve cultural presuppositions, which means that one
cannot have a purely physical as opposed to cultural experience (1985.
66). However, edelman (cf. Gonzalez-marquez et al. 2007. 429)
supports the idea that space should serve as a natural scaffolding for
supporting structured representations, whose roots go back to the
ancient mnemonic method of loci described by Neisser (1976. 137),
and later in Wittgensteins tractatus (1922, proposition 3.1431: the
essential nature of the propositional sign becomes very clean when we
imagine it made up of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, books)
instead of written signs. the mutual spatial position of these things
then expresses the sense of the proposition).
In our introduction we mentioned Chomskys point of view
regarding creativity; if we accept the idea that metaphors are natural
manifestations of our language, in which creativity is involved (cf.
lakoff and Johnson 1980), then we tend to say that neither Chomsky and
Sampson (1980) is right and the solution is in between their theories;
while Chomsky supports the idea that children know in advance what
languages are like, Sampson states that no special knowledge is needed
as children take language as a puzzle which is to be solved.
Aitchison correctly observes that although children acquire the
complete grammar, no linguist has ever written a perfect grammar of any
language (2008. 99); this is obvious, if we accept the idea that grammar
is in the mind of the speakers. Consequently our effort to follow the
lakoffian findings in describing a part of language in terms of spatial
concepts is merely one of the possibilities to have a view upon language.
A spatial account of abstract conceptual categories helps us in
understanding, and the combination of objective space and human
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(subjective mind) in fact (re)creates the world. But in this case, we have
to take into account SPACe, which (more or less similarly to number and
time) is first perceived before it is conceptualized (we operate with terms
like long, short, high, low, deep, close, distant, left, and right). relatively,
it was not long ago (the foundation of geometry) that this rather long and
fuzzy set of characteristics were simplified and rationalized by terms like
height, width, profundity, distance and position (cf. ribot 2002. 145).
Newtonian classical mechanics was itself the innovative challenger
to a more primitive theory of motion derived form Aristotle, who said
that an object will continue its motion if and only if a force is
continuously applied to keep that object in motion. But there was no
difference between rectilinear and curvilinear motion, and this was
completed by Newton. However, Newtons theory still misses the
impetus theory, as Churchland correctly observes (1986. 289-290).
langacker states explicitly that we cannot be neutral, disembodied,
omniscient or uninvolved (1999. 203). Our experience is enabled,
shaped and nevertheless constrained by its biological endowment and
developmental history. At any given moment, we find ourselves in a
global spatial setting, within which we occupy a particular location.
Whenever we open our eyes, a broad expanse fills our visual field, but
we normally focus our attention on the occupants of a limited area
within it (1999. 67).
the very fact of observation already establishes a link, and certain
aspects of conceptualization are understood metaphorically in terms of
visual perception (Sweetser 1990). According to ribot (2002. 17),
perception is par excellence the capacity of knowing the concrete,
which is based on objectiveness. However, there is an inside enemy, the
human spirits natural tendency to simplify and eliminate. this is in
concordance with rosch (1977), where one can find the same idea:
specific qualities are emphasised, whereas others are overshadowed.
Directing and focusing our attention, the imposition of figure/ground
organization, the capacity for mental scanning, and the creation of
abstract things by conceptual reification are basic abilities, which are
presumably innate (cf. langacker 1999. 171).
Both psychology and cognitive linguistics agree that our
predominant sense is seeing. ribot says that man is first and foremost
visual (2002. 72), and in langackers view we are first and foremost
spatial and visual creatures (1999. 203). the best summary of this part
is although simplistic , as follows:
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In this world, it seems, there are people, animals and plants; the
people live in houses, they have bodies, they eat, they get sick and they
get better; they move around and travel; they live in a physical
environment with all kinds of objects and substances in it; the objects
and substances have all kinds of properties; the physical environment
affects the people; and the people make tools, work, and engage in
various other transactions with other people. this is an extremely
simplified world, but it is exactly the simplified nature of this world
that enables us to make use of parts of it in creating more abstract ones.
(Kvecses 2002. 20)
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CHAPter 3.
CONStItUeNtS OF COGNItIve GRaMMaR
3.1. Mental abilities

It is commonly accepted today that we have the inborn capacity for
certain basic kinds of experience: we can experience a certain range of
colours, pitches, tastes, smells, and tactile sensations; we have a notion
of spatial extensionality in which spatial configurations can be
manifested; we sense the passage of time, and these are called basic
domains. Aitchison (2008. 261-2) presents Gentners paper, which
attempts to list the cognitive skills we possess, and the list is
impressive, among which we can find, for instance, an ability to reason
analogically (Gentner et al. 2001), to think abstractly, to compare
representations, to reason about different possible worlds. the
importance of language which comes to complete our abilities is
highlighted below:
language can act as a lens through which we see the world; it can
provide us with tools through which we enlarge our capabilities; it can
help us appreciate groupings in the world that we might not have
otherwise grasped. (Gentner and Goldin-meadow 2003. 12, cited by
Aitchison 2008).
We also have various cognitive abilities, so we can compare (and
thus detect not only similarities, but also discrepancies, see langacker
1999. 2-3, 94), categorise (which is most straightforward when there is
no discrepancy, i.e. when the standard can be recognized in the target
because the latter fully satisfies its specifications), abstract (schematize)
and focus our attention and establish relationships. We are also capable
of grouping a set of entities on the basis of similarity, proximity, or
some other relationship, and we have the possibility of mental
scanning, in which we trace a path through a complex structure.
Generally speaking, cognition includes various phenomena, such as
attention, figure/ground organisation, prototypes (cognitive reference
points), comparison (point of reference with a target), metaphor, and
most broadly, the interpretation of novel experience with reference to
previous experience. these introductory words constitute one of the
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3. CONStItUeNtS OF COGNItIve GrAmmAr
conclusions of langackers study on reference point constructions

(1999. 202), which successfully defines our mental abilities.
Attention is connected to intellectual activity basically comprising
two types: association and dissociation (ribot 2002. 15). Abstraction is
connected to dissociation, which depends on attention, and in fact it is
the forming of new representations. the role of abstraction is
simplification, but attention precedes and prepares it (ribot 2002. 206207). these representations highlight some facets of concrete
representations but weaken other elements (cf. Schmidkunz 1889, cited
by ribot 2002. 16). Premeditated abstraction presupposes a choice, by
which redundant elements are omitted and there is difficulty in clearly
preserving the abstract element in mind. the importance of abstraction
is supported by the fact that there is no perfect similarity (cf. ribot
2002. 19), as the more we know two separate entities, the more their
similarity disappears. Kvecses (2002) accepts that similarity is
important, but he says that it is not always good because there are not
always pre-existing similarities; instead, we have correlations in
experience (PUrPOSeS Are DeStINAtIONS), perceived structural
similarity (lIFe IS A GAmBlING GAme), and conceptual metaphors
may serve as submappings (IDeAS Are FOOD).3
Creating or comprehending a metaphor depends on recognizing the
similarities among semantic features, if we accept mac Cormacs theory
(1985. 144), whereas landau and Jackendoff (1993. 71) say that shape is
the most important criterion of categorising. extension is based on
structural similarity perceived by the speakers, thus the internal category
structure is modified into central parts (with all basic constituents) and
periphery (with only few characteristics). Basic meaning is central,
whereas metaphorical is peripheral (cf. Szilgyi 1996. 46).
Another important remark has to be made between abstraction and
generalisation, as the first one has subjective reasons (attention),
whereas the latter is based on the association through similarity (ribot
2002. 21). Furthermore, the comparison of two events need not involve
them as unanalysed wholes; it may instead pertain only to certain
facets of them or their manifestation in particular domains, so capacity
for selection and abstraction is also important (langacker 1987. 104106). We have a proclivity to interpret new experience by means of
previous experience.
3. Capital letters refer to metaphorical concepts, and not expressions.
3.2. PerCePtION
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One consequence is that less canonical shapes are seen as more

canonical ones, for instance we can see dent on a surface. this way
perception depends on previous experience (as well as on
expectations), reaching the conclusion that structure is imposed.
mcClelland et al. (1986) state that perception is naturally influenced by
familiarity, this is the reason why we often misperceive unfamiliar
objects as more familiar ones and that we can get by with less time or
with lower-quality information in perceiving familiar items than we
need for perceiving unfamiliar items.
In short, we can say that cognition is strongly connected to
attention, which brings into picture comparison and similarity
mentioned when mental abilities were discussed; these two trigger off
selection and abstraction finally reaching generalization. Image schema
is connected to abstraction, but there is a lot more in it. All these mental
abilities lead to the perception of a relationship, which encapsulates
participants, perspective and motion.
3.2. Perception
In the previous part the importance of perception led us to enlarge
the topic by presenting it in a more detailed manner. First we would
like to offer a certain biological background, and then the cognitive
frame into which we think it fits perfectly.
According to Purves (2004. 257), the signal sent to the visual
centres in the brain is already highly processed when it leaves the
retina, emphasizing those aspects of the visual scene that convey the
most information, and Alfred Yarbus demonstrated that eye movements
reveal a good deal about the strategies used to inspect a scene (Purves
2004. 453). A much more detailed description can be found below:
[I]t can be argued that the most frequent behaviour of human beings
is movement of the eyes (Bridgeman 1992). this ceaseless twitching, as
one early researcher described it (Stratton 1906), is the visual systems
solution to the huge amount of available visual information and limited
processing resources. the human eye covers a visual field of about 200
but receives detailed information from only 2 (levi et al. 1985)... Of
most interest to the cognitive psychologist and arguably most common
are saccades, the rapid, ballistic movements that move the eye around
the visual field roughly 34 times a second. Other classes of eye
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movements, such as smooth pursuit, vergence, optokinetic nystagmus,

torsion, and micro-saccades, serve to maintain fixation despite head,
body or object motion, changes in depth, and to correct formuscle drift
and inaccuracy. (richardson 2007. 323)
richardsons conclusion is that eye movements are uniquely poised
between perception and cognition, and in this way they are central to the
function of the visual system. the real usefulness of eye movements relies
in both bottom-up perceptual properties of the world and top-down
cognitive processes. eye movements are extremely fast, quickly corrected,
and metabolically cheap, compared to other motor movements, they have
a much lower threshold for being triggered (2007:324). this presentation
leads us to attention again, and evans and Green (2006. 41, 198) approach
it from the linguists point of view: language provides ways of directing
attention to certain aspects of the scene being linguistically encoded. this
general ability, manifest in language, is called profiling (cf. langacker
1987) or windowing (cf. talmy 2000).
this attentional system specifies how the speaker intends the
hearer to direct his or her attention towards the entities that participate
in a particular scene. Another system, the perspectival one,
establishes a viewpoint from which participants and scenes are viewed.
According to evans and Green, this perspectival system is connected
to the conceptual perspective point from which we view an entity or
a scene and involves the four schematic categories: location, distance,
mode and direction (2006. 528).
3.3. Relationship, participants, perspective

According to langacker, a relationship generally has one or more
focal elements, (participants), which are salient within a particular
relational profile. the most salient element (trajector, tr) is thus
characterized as the primary figure within the relationship. If a
relationship encompasses a second focal element, it is called a
landmark (lm) and characterized as a secondary figure (1999. 8, 50,
209). these participants are conceptually autonomous, which means
that it is possible to conceive of them independently of any event
conception.
On the other hand, an event is conceptually dependent in that one
cannot conceptualize the event without in some way invoking the
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3.3. relAtIONSHIP, PArtICIPANtS, PerSPeCtIve
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conception of its participants (1999. 83). trajector is associated with

motion (at least it suggests it), describing physical activity, and
landmark offers a kind of reference point for locating the tr (cf.
langacker). this obviously leads us to the recognition of the
importance of relationship between tr and lm, namely distance and
closure (cf. Brugman). For instance, if tr touches lm, we can say that
there is an on relationship between the two, but if there is some space
between the two, the relationship changes into over/above. the latter
can be further differentiated: if distance is viewed relatively small, than
we likely choose above, but if it is huge, over is highly preferred in a
canonical view (to give an example, we can mention Israel
Kamakawiooles famous song entitled somewhere over the rainbow).
Brugman also observes that the individual entities in a collection
(e.g. bees, trees) are more or less contiguous but nonetheless they are
separated by appreciable gaps. Closure is responsible both for the
association of peripheral members to form a largely virtual boundary
delimiting the populated region from its surroundings, and also for the
connection of internal members to provide a conception of continuity
(even homogeneity) within the bounded area (cf. langacker 1987.196).
the importance of perspective (canonical view) has already been
hinted at, so its constituents are worth mentioning, which is presented
concisely by langacker: figure/ground alignment (tr/lm), viewpoint,
deixis, subjectivity/objectivity. Figure stands out of the ground, figure
is pivotal entity from the remainder (ground). Figure/ground alignment
constitutes the major point of difference between the sentences the cat
is under the blanket and the blanket is over the cat, as langacker
correctly observes (1987. 141).
A language provides alternate expressions (over, through, across)
suitable for coding conceived situations at varying levels of specificity;
this enables the speaker to abstract away from details considered
irrelevant on a particular occasion; viewpoint subsumes vantage point
and orientation. vantage point is the position from which a scene is
viewed. We are accustomed to seeing most of the objects in our
experience from a canonical viewpoint and in a canonical alignment
with respect to their surroundings. Specifications of vantage point and
orientation are central to the meaning of many relational expressions
(langacker 1987. 120-123). reference point is basically the same;
reference is an aspect often neglected, (being often hidden or implicit).
the canonical perception is side-viewed, distant enough in order to
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comprise the whole schema of over, in few cases being top-viewed.

langacker (1999. 173) points out that our reference point ability
remains below the threshold of explicit attention: we simply use it
without realizing that we are doing anything of the kind. the
importance of reference point is easy to observe in many cases, as the
expected shape and image schema may be the precondition for the
conception of over (cf. langacker 1999. 173), which is a side-viewed
above combined with across (cf. Brugman 1981).
Our main claim is that the metaphorical expressions containing
over are realized similarly, based on similar but metaphorical or
metonymical components and mental paths instead of real ones (cf.
langackers remark that metonymy is prevalent as our reference point
ability is fundamental and ubiquitous as it is a useful cognitive and
communicative function 1999. 199). this practically means that the
various meanings logically derive from a proto-scene, an idea which is
fully supported by tyler and evans (2004).
In many cases the subject serves as a locative reference point,
which already defines a spatial region (e.g. we know the approximate
whereabouts of a crocodile), and this gives us a clue about the target (cf.
langacker 1999. 185). He adds that individuals may also serve as
conceptual reference points with respect to which processes can be
situated. moreover, the reference point comes to be combined with
further (somewhat implicit elements, such as bigger mass is more
important than smaller mass); in our case, if the lamp is over the table,
then we could also say that the table is below the lamp, but the
reference point (speaker involved in a side-view situation) is combined
with canonical perception (lower objects more basic, that is more likely
to serve as source domains than higher ones).
the last important remark here belongs to Szilgyi (1996. 59), who
observes that the reference point is not necessarily a free one, as we
tend to learn from others the way we see the world so that our
perception of the world would be compatible with others view (e.g. a
rule: the less stable is related to the more stable).
3.4. Image schema

Another important factor to be presented is lakoffs imageschemata, which are abstractions of constantly recurring packages of
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3.4. ImAGe SCHemA
elements (gestalts) by contrast with features, which appeal neither to

recurring events nor explicitly to perceptual experience of those events
(cf. Brugman 1981. 58). lakoff states that they are fundamental to
cognition and linguistic semantics. mandler also attributes a major role
to image schemas:
[O]ne of the foundations of the conceptualizing capacity is the
image schema, in which spatial structure is mapped into conceptual
structure. (mandler 1992. 591, cited by evans and Green 2006. 46).
evans and Green see the importance of image-schema in the fact
that it constitutes one of the ways in which bodily experience gives rise
to meaningful concepts (2006. 158). Image schemas include such
notions as source-path-goal, container-content, centre-periphery,
linkage, force, and balance. they are highly abstract conceptions,
primarily configurational, which are grounded in everyday bodily
experience and play an essential role in structuring our mental world.
the table below analyses the difference between basic domains and
image schemas, taken from evans and Green (2006. 235):
table 1. Distinctions between basic domains and image schemas
table 7.6 Distinctions between basic domains and image schemas
Basic domain
Image schema
Occupies lower position in the

hierarchy of complexity, e.g.
SPACe, tIme,
temPerAtUre, PItCH
Need not occur in a wide range
of domain matrices, e.g.
temPerAtUre, ODOUr
Need not occupy lowest position

in the hierarchy of complexity,
e.g. UP-DOWN, FrONt-BACK,
CONtAINmeNt, PAtH
Occurs in the widest range of
domain matrices, e.g. SCAle,
PrOCeSS, OBJeCt,
CONtAINmeNt
Derived from sensory-perceptual
experience only, e.g. UPDOWN, FrONt-BACK,
CONtAINmeNt, SUrFACe
Derived from subjektive

experience, e.g. tIme,
emOtION, or sensoryperceptual experience, e.g.
SPACe, temPerAtUre
Bergen (2007. 288) mentions that many discussions took place on

how abstract concepts can be grounded in embodied systems, and the
interesting question is whether abstract events contain a spatial
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component. On the other hand, the psychological point of view

expressed by ribot is that abstract words almost always recall an image,
usually a visual one (cf. ribot 2002. 116).
these semantic conceptions emerge in physical experience
(experience with objects moving from source to goal along spatial paths
with actual containers and what they hold, etc.) and provide the basis for
projecting it metaphorically to other conceptual realms. Whereas
langacker considers these image schemas as innate, lakoff and Johnson
(1987) treats them as abstracted from everyday bodily experience.
3.5. Motion
We explore physical objects by contact with them; we experience
ourselves and other objects as containers with other objects in them or
outside of them; we move around the world; we experience physical
forces affecting us; and we also try to resist these forces, such as when
we walk against the wind. these kinds of basic physical experiences
give rise to image-schemas mentioned before, and the image schemas
structure many of our abstract concepts metaphorically: in-out, frontback, up-down, contact, motion, and force (Kvecses 2002. 37).
the motion schema includes initial (starting) point, movement
(along a path), and an endpoint, to which correspond in journeys the
point of departure, the travel, and the destination. A static image
schema then lacks all these, and relationship is the only thing that
matters. miller and Johnson-laird, Jackendoff, lakoff also treat motion
as source, path and destination, although movement can involve a
change of location or it can be stationary (e.g. shaking). When it
involves a change of location, it is associated with direction; further
sources include various basic entities, such as containers, substances,
physical objects and others (Kvecses 2002. 20). the relationship
between particular abilities and particular conceptual archetypes is of
special interest: in our case, the concept of an object moving through
space necessarily involves mental scanning through the spatial domain
(langacker 1999. 172). ribot emphasises the importance of movement,
stating that the psychological notion met with the majority of
relationships is that of movement. He goes on and comes to the
conclusion that all relationships expressed by prepositions can be
reduced to stability and movement in space and time (2002. 85).
3.5. mOtION
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Human beings are also included within this system, as, we are all
containers, and we experience everything else as outside us, giving rise
to the notion of boundaries. Boundaries are established easily, and
crossed easily in many cases as well.
One obvious reason is that boundaries of the semantic categories of
words are not rigid but fuzzy, and an increase in category size decreases
rather than increases the reaction time necessary for recall, contrary to
the findings of supporters of the network theory (mac Cormac 1985.
132). mac Cormacs fuzzy sets are nodes in the hierarchical network (a
network which has been the subject of ardent interpretations since
roschs prototype theory).
We even have virtual boundaries: bump and dent are abstract
domains, involving the conception of a three-dimensional object at least
one surface of which has a canonical shape. A bump or dent resides in
the departure of the actual shape of the object from its expected shape.
this virtual boundary is far more prevalent than it might be anticipated:
terms connected to it are bulge, ridge, protrusion, hole, depression,
cavity, cave, and the names of open containers are jar, pot, tub, vat, etc.
(langacker 1987. 195). When containers and boundaries are activated,
we have in fact movement (crossing the boundaries of a container), and
canonically (cf. reference point) moving objects generally receive a frontback orientation so that the front is in the direction of motion. (lakoff and
Johnson 1980. 42).
Spatial motion is change through conceived time in the location of
some entity, states langacker (1987. 167), whereas abstract motion
(terms for motion and other spatial relationships) are commonly
extended to non-spatial domains (1987. 168):
A train went through the tunnel.
it takes only five seconds to go through the alphabet.
i went through the book in just three hours.
he can go quickly from one mood to another.
this milk is about to go sour.
marconi adds that verbs are highly important in this respect:
many verbs of motion have a strongly referential component:
competence with them requires that one be able to visually identify
situations and activities that, in turn, have a typical appearance, a
physiognomy. In some cases (such as those of knock or kick) the
stereotypical scene may be unique, in others (such as those of jump,
swim or run) there may be a limited variety of visual stereotypes. even
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in the simplest cases, however, the ability to apply such words requires
the ability to identify complex patterns of motion in complex
situations. (1997. 159)
marconis remark is highly important for our research, coinciding
with talmys (2000) observations, according to which Spanish (similarly
to romanian, as both are latin languages) encodes the form of
movement into the verb. Consequently we can already predict that the
cases involving the romanian prin or peste will be much less in number
than the cases including the english over, across, through, above and the
Hungarian t, keresztl, fltt, as the english and Hungarian use more
satellites (talmy) around the verb, including preverbs.
3.6. Categorisation
According to evans and Green (2006. 168), categorisation
represents our ability to identify entities as members of groups (by
perceiving similarities and differences); the ability to categorise is
central to human cognition, sounds the final verdict. Philosophers have
been challenged by the question whether word meaning can be defined,
and this leads us to roschs research. rosch and her colleagues found
that category membership is not an all-or-nothing affair (cf. the
Aristotelian idea), and the set of necessary and sufficient conditions
does not work.
Clark treats the class membership question (2001. 47), based on
Fodor (1987) and Churchland (1989). In his view there are two broad
types of answers to this matter: membership is either fixed by facts about
inner cognitive organization (relations between inner facts and worldly
states), or it depends only on behaviour patterns. However, this is not as
simple, and we will offer further presentation of the problem below.
Our prerequisite here is that cognitive grammar is a usage-based
theory, and this explains the basic difference between two concepts:
Chomsky was interested in innate endowment, that human semantic
potential that can adapt itself to the syntactic structure of whichever
human language it encounters in the world, and Kay and mcDaniel
represent an impressive first step toward a perceptually based
explanation for semantic universals (regier 1996. 187). langacker
reinforces this idea, as in his view the prototype model offers a more
realistic account in many instances, but adopting it implies that class
3.6. CAteGOrISAtION
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membership is not predictable in absolute terms; it is a matter of degree,

decreasing as an entity deviates from the prototype with no specific cutoff point (1987. 46). this observation directs us back to rosch:
Cognitive representations of categories clearly contained more of
the information needed to respond to category members which had
been rated good examples of the category than to respond to category
members which had been rated bad examples. In other words, cognitive
representations of categories appeared to be more similar to the good
examples than to the poor examples. (1975. 225)
marconi comments upon roschs findings, observing that she was
clearly influenced by Wittgenstein: Wittgensteins idea that (at least
some) category words are used not on the basis of a set of necessary and
jointly sufficient conditions for their application but on the basis of
family resemblances among the items to which they are applied
(Wittgenstein 1958, 66-69) was clearly on roschs mind when she
thought out prototype theory (1997. 23). lakoff emphasised prototypes
(now based on rosch), and these were identified with feature bundles in
the mind and with image like exemplars of the category (lakoff 1987).
marconi quotes Johnson-laird on prototype, which is a system that
specifies all the default values. more recently langacker deals with
prototypes:
membership is a matter of degree: prototypical instances are full,
central members of the category, whereas other members form a
gradation from central to peripheral there is no specific degree of
departure from the prototype beyond. Substantial dissimilarity to the
prototype greatly diminishes the probability that a person will make
that categorisation. It is doubtful that any class, even personal pronoun,
is ever definitely closed. (1987. 17)
Before rosch, instead of family resemblances, attributes were
considered important, and her major contribution to the development
of cognitive linguistics is that she tested that membership in a category
is determined by the perceived distance of resemblance of the entity to
the prototype (cf. langacker 1987. 95). marconi sees prototypes as
being mentally real entities so they are not linguistic; they are mental,
and therefore connected to perception (which means they are
inherently grounded). lakoff comes to the conclusion that the minskyPutnam proposals (stereotypes and frames) are similar to his idealized
cognitive models (ICms) (marconi 1997. 166, Note 50; lakoff 1987.
116). meaningful constituents of ICms include basic level categories
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and image-schemata (container, path, up-down, centre, periphery).

they are directly meaningful by being directly understood in terms of
preconceptual structures in experience (lakoff 1987. 291), ICms are
embodied. marconis conclusion is that ICms are not prototypes, but
something similar. let us see langackers more recent approach:
A particular class represents a complex category that takes the form
of a network centred on prototype basic and universal linguistic
notions noun and verb being prime examples have this privileged
status precisely because they combine a cognitively salient prototype
with a highly abstract schema reflecting a basic cognitive ability. though
itself schematic, the prototype is grounded in experience. It embodies a
recurrent commonality so frequent in our everyday experience that it
can reasonably be called a conceptual archetype. (1999. 9)
mac Cormac gives a critical view to a certain extent; if we accept
that all language is metaphorical, than even within the same language
we may have a linguistic relativity among speakers, which lakoff and
Johnson also realized. In fact, the evidence against SapirWhorf
hypothesis was uncovered by Berlin and Kay: the colour vocabularies
of various languages form a fixed pattern. the so-called strong version
of the hypothesis states that people understand the world differently as
the grammar of their language is different. the weak version holds that
language only influences and not determines the performance of
certain cognitive processes (evans and Green 2006. 95-6). However,
Pinker rejects even the weak version:
most of the experiments have tested banal weak versions of the
Whorfian hypothesis, namely that words can have some effect on
memory or categorisation... Knowing a language, then, is knowing how
to translatementalese into strings of words, and vice versa. (Pinker
1994. 5782, cited by evans and Green 2006. 96)
Still, the cognitive linguistic approach to language, thought and
experience comes close to the weaker form, which is coined as neoWhorfian. In defence of the weak version evans and Green mention
Guugu Yimithirr: Guugu Yimithirr exclusively employs a field-based
frame of reference for locating entities in space. An important
consequence of this is that speakers of Guugu Yimithirr must be able to
dead-reckon their location with respect to the cardinal points of their
system, wherever they are in space. (2006. 100)
Finally, Boroditsky states that it appears that habits in language
encourage habits in thought. (2001. 12, cited by evans and Green
3.6. CAteGOrISAtION
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2006. 101). If we return back to rosch, we still have to mention that she
extended the notion of prototypicality to other categories, arguing that
humans categorise according to natural prototypes. When mac Cormac
says literal, he means the use of ordinary language to express concrete
objects and events, but we think that the term ordinary language is
problematic, as it was proved that people use ordinary language full
of metaphors, not even thinking about it, and cognitive linguistics does
not operate on the verge of literal versus figurative, but there are
degrees. After all, mac Cormac admits that literal statements are not
always free of ambiguity (1985. 74). In his view fuzzy sets are
compatible with prototype theory, as the common element is the degree
of the members. His conclusion is that we have to accept these
prototypical natural categories, as they offer a cognitive bridge to the
physical world. Folk theory operates with these categories, although
they are both limited and occasionally erroneous. evans and Green
(2006. 253) warns us that in roschs categorisation not scientific
categories are involved, but the everyday process of categorisation,
which for instance , basically differs from a biologists point of view.
the human categorisation system is finally constructed by two
principles (cf. rosch 1977. 429), namely cognitive economy4 and
perceived world structure.5
Prototypes have another aspect as well: culture, which often
reshapes membership and degree, including extended usage: lakoff
remarked (1987. 446) that being a member of a culture requires
individuals to have a large stock of conventional rich images (e.g.
english tea, Japanese kimono, African deserts). People often have images
of prototypical members of categories. And they tend to use such images
in making goodness-of-example judgements, these images are not
context-bound, and seem to be unconscious (cf. rosch). Categorising
operates then with family resemblance, more precisely with important
4. evans and Green: this principle states that an organism, like a human being,
attempts to gain as much information as possible about its environment while
minimising cognitive effort and resources. this cost-benefit balance drives
category formation. In other words, rather than storing separate information about
every individual stimulus experienced, humans can group similar stimuli into
categories, which maintains economy in cognitive representation. (2006)
5. evans and Green: the world around us has correlational structure. For instance,
it is a fact about the world that wings most frequently co-occur with feathers and
the ability to fly (as in birds), rather than with fur or the ability to breathe
underwater. this principle states that humans rely upon correlational structure of
this kind in order to form and organise categories. (2006)
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aspects of experience, which makes understanding and remembrance

easy (cf. lakoff & Johnson). they say that for human beings,
categorisation is primarily a means of comprehending the world, and as
such it must serve that purpose in a sufficiently flexible way. An object
is categorised in terms of a set of inherent properties (objectivist view),
but some of the properties that characterize our concept are
interactional. there need be no fixed core of properties of prototypical
items in all cases, but there is context, meaning, purpose, as in may cases
a single sentence will mean different things to different people (culture,
personal experience). this idea is reiterated by evans and Green:
...categorisation is not criterial. this means that it is not an all-ornothing affair. Instead, human categories often appear to be fuzzy in
nature, with some members of a category appearing to be more central
and others more peripheral. moreover, degree of centrality is often a
function of the way we interact with a particular category at any given
time not only is categorisation fuzzy (for example, when does a cup
become a bowl?), but also our interaction with a particular entity can
influence how we categorise it. (2006. 28-9)
In conclusion, we can say that from the cognitive point of view,
categories are open-ended, relative, and an instance of a category
depends on the purpose in using the category, as supported by many
examples (cf. lakoff and Johnson 1980. 12, 122-123, 164).
3.7. Concept
One of lakoffs major weaknesses is that he (taken as a whole) starts
from linguistics, and still deals with concepts; the result is that
meaning and concept is not clearly separated. So when metaphors are
described, he reaches the conclusion that there is always more in the
defining concept than is carried over to the defined concept, the less
clearly delineated (and usually less concrete) concepts are partially
understood in terms of the more clearly delineated (and usually more
concrete) concepts (lakoff & Johnson 1980. 109). Anyway, we can only
agree with the authors, when they say that so many of the concepts that
are important to us are either abstract or not clearly delineated in our
experience (e.g. emotions, ideas, time). It goes without saying that we
then need to grasp them by means of other concepts that we understand
in clearer terms (e.g. spatial orientations and objects, 1980. 115). In fact
3.8. NetWOrK
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this is what builds up our conceptual system; yet, when one would
believe that physical experience is the most basic type of experience,
lakoff & Johnson summarise:
We are not claiming that physical experience is in any way more
basic than other kinds of experience, whether emotional, mental,
cultural, or whatever. All of these experiences may be just as basic as
physical experiences. rather, what we are claiming about grounding is
that we typically conceptualize the non-physical in terms of the
physical. (1980.59)
they even introduce the notion of experiential gestalt (obviously,
taken from gestalt psychology), which is defined as a cluster of
components, a whole that human beings find more basic than the parts.
to a certain extent, this might have been served as the basis for further
development, for instance the theory of blended space (see Afterword
2003 to lakoff & Johnson 1980, and especially Fauconnier and turner
2002). this whole is different from all its parts put together and has
qualities that are not present in any of its part (cf. rosch 1977, stating
that people categorise objects not in set-theoretical terms, but in terms
of prototypes and family resemblances); the idea is completed later:
such a gestalt is often representable by an ICm, in such cases the entire
ICm is understood as being psychologically simpler than its parts.
Good gestalts are cognitively simple, easy to learn, easy to remember,
and easy to use (lakoff 1987. 489, 538). According to Szilgyi (1996.
37), the structure of the world of language is so specific to linguistics
that we cannot find one-to-one correspondences to the world perceived
by our sense. this would explain the need for ICms and gestalts.
roschs prototype theory is designed for concepts, and it is used to
operate with meanings, which may cause shift of ideas.
to sum up, we offer li and Gleitmans remark: Humans invent
words that label their concepts. (2002. 266, cited by evans and Green
2006. 62).
3.8. Network
One of roschs applications is the network theory. According to
marconi, to be able to use a word is, on the one hand, to have access to
a network of connections between that word and other words and
linguistic expressions. On the other hand, to be able to use a word is to
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know to map lexical items onto the real world, that is, to be capable of
both meaning and application (1997. 2).
Sandra & rice concludes that both Brugman (1981) and lindner
(1981) finalize their research as lexical networks (1995. 89). A network
is also easily interpreted as a structure with a centre and a periphery
(that is prototype and less prototypical member), which is congruent
with the cognitive linguistic assumption that categories are organised
with respect to a prototype. However, they criticize the theory, because
there is a lack of explicitness and a lot of vagueness regarding the
nature of the represented reality, at both the linguistic and cognitive
levels. their conclusion is that the prepositional network approach has
a bearing on properties of the human conceptual system.
Brugman later proposes a multidimensional network, which she
defines as a structured cluster of lexical entries which have the same
lexemic head and which are understood as together constituting a
category of related senses. (1988. 94). most networks are intended to
be of this sort and are posited to have the following properties: related
senses radiate from a core or prototypic meaning; the nodes in such a
network represent different senses which vary according to the
particular syntax or semantics of the lexeme in a given application; the
nodes are interrelated and the strength of the relation between different
senses is understood in terms of the distance between nodes and the
directionality and density of the links.
Sandra & rice propose another network type, which is basically the
combination of their forerunners (dictionaries, Brugman, lakoff,
langacker), and extended with more schemas, more prototypes, with
various full extensions, partial extensions and novel usages (1995. 96-97).
this brings into focus the question of polysemy, so in their opinion
instead of asking whether prepositions are polysemous it might be
better to ask to what degree they are polysemous:
Does polysemy refer to clearly related minor variations on a single
sense or to major variations which may only show some hint of
relatedness (like the relations between spatial, temporal, and abstract
usages)? ... the theoretical vocabulary used in the prepositional network
approach (e.g. image schemas, image schematic transformations,
figure/ground organization, categorisation by prototype, schema,
superschema) begs the question of the networks cognitive status. ... the
right way of looking at prepositional network models would be to
consider them as a-temporal and a-personal structures. (1995. 99-104)
3.9. relAtIve meANING
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the most important result in their research is that language users

make rather fine-grained distinctions, much in the way that
prepositional network modellers do (1995. 124), so the theory of
prepositional network is a viable solution to bridge the language user
and the linguists. to an extent this can be viewed as a proof that
cognitive grammar is usage (and user) based. langacker starts from
individual lexical items, and reaches to a similar conclusion: a typical
lexical item represents a complex category: it does not have just one
meaning, but a variety of related senses with varying degrees of
entrenchment.
these senses comprise a network, being linked by categorising
relationships. thus we reach another building block of cognitive
grammar, namely that lexical meanings cannot be sharply
distinguished from general knowledge of the entities referred to. this
item is not a fixed and limited semantic representation, but rather as
something that provides access to indefinitely many conceptions and
conceptual systems (langacker 1999. 4). the theory of prepositional
network and the theory of concepts inevitably direct us to meaning,
which is detailed below.
3.9. Relative meaning

langacker comes very close to deep structures when interpreting
meaning, stating that this is largely a matter of construal, which is
largely invisible. In this case, grammatical structure provides the best
clues, as through its grammar, a language is trying to tell us something
about how meaning is structured (langacker 1999. 71). Wierzbicka
completes the picture: If our descriptions of meaning are not anchored
in something which per se comprehensible they will be always
futile. Our remark is that her statement reflects the dilemma of
dictionary writers or readers, starting from the number of entries a
dictionary may contain, only to mention the cases of polysemy and
homonymy).
the dictionary view assumes that words, although related to other
words by lexical relations like synonymy and so on, can nevertheless
be defined in a context-independent way. In contrast, a number of
scholars, such as Fillmore (1975, 1977 and 1982) and langacker (1987)
have presented persuasive arguments for the view that words in human
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language are never represented independently of context. Instead, these

linguists argue that words are always understood with respect to frames
or domains of experience.
mac Cormacs interpretation contains that an adequate theory of
meaning includes semantic aspects, emotive aspects, speech act aspects,
contextual aspects, and even cultural aspects (1985. 183), warning us that
we have to give a special attention to cultural meaning, which leads us to
the meaning of a metaphor. From the logical point of view, we can include
again Wittgensteins tractatus (cited by marconi 1997. 95, 109): the
meanings of words are acquired by each speaker through their
participation in training activities, directly or indirectly involving
several people. there is even a synchronic and diachronic aspect of
meaning, as: the meanings of words both remain the same and change.
On the one hand, if the meanings of words and sentences were not stable,
communication would be impossible On the other hand, if the
meanings of words could not change, the formulation of new hypothetical
meanings through metaphors would also be impossible at any one time
the possible meanings of words remains fixed (synchrony), whereas over
the time the meanings of words change (diachrony) especially through the
use of metaphors. Yet in a metaphor we must be able to understand at the
same time both the ordinary stable meanings of the literal sense of the
referents and the new possibilities of meanings proposed by the
hypothetical aspects of the metaphor (marconi 1997. 181).
langacker completes the idea, as he observes that sentence meaning
is not a logical representation, but an integrated conceptualization some
facets of which are rendered more salient than others, and such
discrepancies are unproblematic in cognitive grammar (langackers
example: im in the phone book, 1999. 64). If we want to be more specific,
we can even differentiate meaning from meaning focus, connected to
prototypes: when we use buildings as metaphorical extensions within a
speech community, in fact we focus on particular aspects, such as
grounding, foundation, structure, framework, but not really chimney (cf.
Kvecses 2002). meaning is definitely joined to understanding (including
metaphors), and even contains communication-based elements: the
meaning of a metaphor will be partly culturally determined and partly
tied to peoples past experiences, where understanding is possible
through the negotiation of meaning (lakoff & Johnson 1980:142, 231).
Once understanding mentioned, the next logical step leads us back
to categorisation, as understanding our experiences in terms of objects
3.9. relAtIve meANING
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and substances allows us to pick out parts of our experience and treat
them as discrete entities or substances of a uniform kind. these entities
or substances must have at least one boundary, and lacking this
boundary forces us to categorise them as such (in the water refers to the
water within its banks, for example). It is common knowledge that the
understanding of meaning brings into the limelight another key
element, namely truth. We do not wish to offers details about a
philosophical approach to truth here (Frege and Wittgenstein),
although the result would be very close to a linguistic approach,
connected to relativism. In linguistics truth is relative to understanding
(of a context), lakoff & Johnson state that the truth of a sentence is
relative to the normal way we understand the world by projecting
orientation and entity structure onto it:
the fog is over the bay. (lakoff and Johnson 1980. 162)
this sentence is true based on certain tacit knowledge (the me-first
orientation, cf. Cooper and ross 1975, cited by lakoff & Johnson 1980.
132). Gibbs also accepts that contemporary speakers appear to have
tacit intuitions about their metaphorical understanding of certain
abstract concepts that lead them to talk about these concepts in
particular metaphoric ways (2007. 13). Canonically the speaker is I,
who is up, in front, active, good, here and now. thus truth is in fact the
understanding of a situation (cf. Wittgenstein 1922), although there is a
vicious circle: if understanding is seeing as, then truth may be relative.
thus we cannot but agree that meaning is always meaning to someone
(cf. Grice 1957), which has little to do with objective reality (cf. lakoff
& Johnson 1980. 184).
language cannot reflect reality objectively, as reality is not
objectively given. Instead, we can talk about a projected reality
(Jackendoff 1983), and lakoff and Johnson refers to it as experiential
realism (cf. evans and Green 2006. 48). this theory also correlates with
turbayne, cited by mac Cormac (1985. 55): We cannot say what reality
is, only what it seems like to us, imprisoned in Platos cave we are
victims of adding some interpretation. Avramides (1997. 60) says that
reference to speakers and their intentions is of fundamental importance
in the understanding of language, and Grices famous paper in fact
offers an analysis of meaning based on the speakers intention (1957).
Here Grice differentiates linguistic meaning which is timeless, whereas
the speakers meaning is connected to a particular occasion of
utterance. We would like to offer linguistic meaning when describing
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the metaphorical expressions, but we think that this is not going to be

possible without the speakers subjective meaning.
Now we can say that we presented briefly all the necessary
conditions, which contribute to our main interest, namely metaphors.
the next part will cover two main areas of metaphors, that is a
historical overview and metaphors in cognitive linguistics.
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CHAPter 4.
aN HIStORICaL OveRvIew OF MetaPHOR
As metaphor was the subject of various inquiries throughout the

centuries, we start by presenting the major thoughts connected to
metaphors. the nature of metaphor has been an ardent subject of
debate back to Aristotle, who discussed it on the level of noun (name),
stating that metaphor typically happens to the noun, and it is presented
as movement: the application of a strange (alien, allotrios) term
either transferred (displaced, epiphora) from the genus and applied to
the species or from the species and applied to the genus, or from one
species to another, or else by analogy. (1982. 1447b)
So the name of one domain is transferred to another, thus we apply
a name to an alien thing, which may express much clearly something,
which is difficult to grasp otherwise. Aristotles four possibilities of
creating a metaphor are: genus to species, species to genus, species to
species, and the fourth type is by analogy or proportion, and
resemblance is explicitly mentioned. However, in what was probably
his later work one can find that the major goal of rhetorical speech is
persuasion, which is of less importance from our point of view.
Nevertheless, the virtues of metaphor include clarity, warmth, facility,
appropriateness and elegance, and finally metaphor sets the scene
before our eyes (Aristotle 1954. 1410b).
later authors argued that even the definition of metaphor is itself
metaphorical, so the explanation for metaphor is thus circular. For
instance, Derrida (1982) realized that any explanation relies heavily on
physical and in this way on metaphorical , as our thinking is
basically metaphorical; this led to the conclusion that metaphors could
be only explained based on other metaphors. researchers might have
slowed down with their interest in metaphors then, leaving them to
thrive only in stylistics, as a basic figure of speech, a trope, trimming
ordinary language, taking away monotonousness by picturesque
replacements. Aristotles rhetoric encouraged this approach, and
things stayed more or less undisturbed until the 20th century, when
Chomsky directed back the attention of many to linguistics. Although
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4. AN HIStOrICAl OvervIeW OF metAPHOr
his greatest contribution is connected with generative grammar, his

language and Mind accepts the importance of cognitive linguistics
connected to psychology:
I think there is more of a healthy ferment in cognitive psychology
and in the particular branch of cognitive psychology known as
linguistics than there has been for many years if we are ever to
understand how language is used or acquired, then we must abstract for
separate and independent study a cognitive system, a system of
knowledge and belief, that develops in early childhood and that interacts
with many other factors to determine the kinds of behaviour that we
observe; to introduce a technical term, we must isolate and study the
system of linguistic competence that underlies behaviour but that is not
realized in any direct or simple way in behaviour. (1972. 1-4)
Chomsky refers back to Aristotle as well, and states that leibnitz and
many others wrongly attributed to him the famous sentence: there is
nothing in the mind that is not simply transmitted to it by the senses.
As we are mainly concerned here with metaphors from a cognitive point
of view, we can easily translate the sentence: the senses gather
information from the physical environment which is transmitted to the
mind to process it, thus the result of it may be expressed via (metaphoric)
thoughts to be found in (metaphoric) expressions, sentences (Chomsky
probably does not want to correct leibnitz here, and the origin of the
statement is beyond our quest). Chomsky admits that we are as far from
understanding language as was Descartes centuries ago (owing the failure
to the Saussurean linguistics of segmentation and classification).
Cognitive linguistics was able to complete (and not compete)
generative grammar, bringing the innovative idea (which is, by the way
was hinted at in Aristotles poetics), that our physical environment
offering the concrete may underlie abstract expressions. Cognitive
linguistics focuses on meaning and the uncovering of a network
system with interconnected elements may offer explanation about the
nature of metaphor. It is the merit of cognitive linguistics that it has
been able to make it widely accept the idea of including metaphor
within natural language, thus pioneering a way of understanding
metaphors by tracing its roots back to ordinary, concrete words,
reinterpreting resemblance, and explaining the need for metaphors
which were constituents only in stylistics.
the Saussurean classification must have had its merit as well,
whatever nature the classification was, as the idea of it re-emerged
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towards the end of the century. Brugman highlights the importance of

categories (another type of classification), based on rosch (1977) and
Kay and mcDaniel (1978), reaching the verdict: sensory elements in
categorising human experience represent a possibility to describe
language, although a single word is but a narrow investigation, not
revealing great truths about the language itself (Brugman 1981. 1). Still,
by analysing metaphors, it became obvious that they are grounded in
our everyday physical experience and they are not as close to similes
as it was rooted in the western tradition (Metaphor is an abbreviated
simile.). Instead, cultural stereotypes should be accounted for when
metaphors are investigated as, for instance, metaphors with snow in
eskimo trigger different associations than in any African language (cf.
SapirWhorf hypothesis and more recently, the neo-Whorfian
hypothesis). On the other hand, diachronically viewed, metaphors
dating decades or centuries ago might have changed as well, and
similarities that were important or easily observed may belong to
oblivion. the seeing as becomes problematic within cognitive
linguistics, as metaphors usually try to shake category boundaries, and
this friction fades with continuous usage. max Black (1962) took into
parts the constituents of metaphors, stating that only the common
elements will select each other and reconcile. this comes close to
roschs prototype theory of semantic features, where instead of tension
we have marginal members or we can also mention mac Cormacs fuzzy
set theory (1985).
Whereas concrete categories are much better defined and relatively
well-separated from others (although boundaries are flexible and they
often depend on the point of view, as members have various
characteristics), the abstract entities are often made more explicit via
metaphors, which make use of the concrete categories (cf. Aristotle).
Consequently metaphors do not describe reality, but they create one
where strange elements intermingle with more familiar ones, thus
revealing a part of how we see our surrounding world and ourselves.
langacker (1999. 208) states that we are able to conceive of one
situation against the background afforded of another. regarding new
information, previous discourse functions as background to the current
expression, and when speaking of metaphors, the source domain serves
as a background for structuring and understanding the target domain.
more recently, there are studies in which the theories of metaphor
are undermined by theories of metonymy. According to Barcelona
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(2003) and taylor (2003), metonymy is an operation that may be more

fundamental to the human conceptual system than metaphor. Barcelona
(2003. 31) even suggests that every metaphorical mapping presupposes
a prior metonymic mapping. the so-called primary metaphors are
argued to be motivated by experiential correlation (evans and Green
2006. 320), but correlation is basically metonymic (taylor 2003).
We could see that a historical account of metaphors already
encapsulates a cognitive interpretation as well, as the past three
decades contributed significantly to present-day approach to
metaphors. Now let us see recent interpretations.
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CHAPter 5.
MetaPHORS IN COGNItIve LINGUIStICS
lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) can be considered as the first ardent
supporters of metaphors, as in their view metaphors are conceptual, as
many of the ways in which we think and act are basically metaphorical
(cf. evans and Green 2006. 44). this means that Descartes rationalist
approach is overshadowed by the philosophical and psychological
approach, thus human experience deriving from the human body is more
important than the formal and computational system.
According to moran (1997), issues regarding metaphor in poetics,
rhetoric, aesthetics, philosophy of mind, epistemology and cognitive
studies cannot be wholly isolated form each other. So far we have tried
to present metaphors back to its beginnings, and we have to accept that
the sparkle to recent studies on metaphor belongs to Brugman, who
based her work on roschs findings. ever since cognitive linguists have
been arguing that metaphor is central to human language (cf. evans and
Green 2006). the basic idea is that metaphors (metaphorical expressions)
are based on our physical experience, and offers a background to the
analysis of metaphors in a synchronic frame. the comprehension of
figurative language is dependent on the literal understanding of the
words used, unlike in the case of idiomatic expressions:
literal language is precise and lucid, figurative language is
imprecise, and is largely the domain of poets and novelists. While
literal language is the conventional ordinary or everyday way we
have of talking abou things, figurative language is exotic or literary
and only need concern creative writers. (moran 1997. 249)
According to this view, most ordinary language is literal. However,
on closer inspection, much of our ordinary everyday language turns out
to be figurative in nature (evans and Green 2006. 287). Anyway, Gibbs
contradicts this ancient distinction (1994. 75). He differentiates
conventional literality, non-metaphorical literality, truth condition
literality and context-free literality. He also adds that certain concepts
are impossible to describe non-metaphorically, for instance tIme
without recourse to SPACe and mOtION is hard to describe.
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5. metAPHOrS IN COGNItIve lINGUIStICS
We will not enter another debate regarding the differences between

metaphors and iconicity, but it may be interesting to mention Gentner
and Bowdles experiment (2001) presented by Hasson and Giora (2007.
312). they studied the differences between metaphors and similes (cf.
Johnson 1996 research: comprehension times for metaphors and
similes), and concluded that when the sources are novel, similes can be
faster understood than metaphors, but when we face conventionalized
sources, the understanding of metaphors is faster. these findings are
completed by Kvecsess preface (2002) where the author contradicts
five traditional concepts regarding metaphor, e.g. one must have a
special talent to be able to use metaphors; in fact, it is used effortlessly
in everyday life by ordinary people, as it is an inevitable process of
human thought and reasoning. more recently, Gibbs discusses
metaphoric understanding based on a research conducted in 2006 by
Wilson and Gibbs, and his conclusion is that people were faster in
responding to the metaphor phrases having performed a relevant body
moment than when they did not move at all (Gibbs 2007. 16).
Another finding was that real movement is not required to
facilitate metaphor comprehension, only that people mentally simulate
such action. most generally, people do not understand the non-literal
meanings of the figurative phrases as a matter of convention.
Kvecsess forerunners, lakoff & Johnson also mention persistent
fallacies (1980. 244-245), stating that metaphor is a matter of words not
concepts; but the locus of metaphor is in concepts not words. moran
states (1997. 251) that in metaphor we interpret an utterance as
meaning something different from what the words would mean, if we
take them literally. this means, that the same words or utterances
change their meaning when taken metaphorically (moran 1997. 251).
metaphors transport the images, feelings, values, thought patterns,
etc. entrenched in our cultures, says mittelberg (2007. 34), based on
Dirven, Wolf, Poltzenhagen and Kvecses (2005). Furthermore,
metaphor is based on similarity; but it is based on cross-domain
correlations in our experience, which give rise to the perceived
similarities between the two domains within the metaphor. these two
domains lead to many interpretations to be mentioned below; we
would only like to mention here ricoeurs theory of metaphor, which is
based on icons (which stand for something) concerning cognitive
notions, and he adopts Wittgensteins 1958 proposal, namely seeing
as (mentioned by mac Cormac).
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lakoff & Johnson also say that all concepts are literal and none can
be metaphorical; but even our deepest concepts (time) are understood
and reasoned about via multiple metaphors, so they conclude that, in
short, metaphor is a natural phenomenon (1980. 247). According to
Coulson (2007), many empirical studies have compared reading times
for literal and non-literal utterances and found that when the
metaphorical meaning was contextually supported, reading times were
roughly similar. Gibbs (1994) notes, parity in reading times need not
entail parity in the underlying comprehension processes, and he also
mentions that literal and metaphorical meaning might take the same
amount of time to comprehend, but that the latter required more effort
or processing resources.
On the other hand, classical accounts of metaphor comprehension
(for instance Grice 1975 and Searle 1979) describe a two-stage model in
which literal processing is followed by metaphorical processing. the
real support in favour of lakoff and Johnson regarding their theory about
the central importance of metaphors comes from Pynte and colleagues,
who could not find qualitative difference in brain activity associated
with the comprehension of literal and metaphoric language (Coulson
2007. 414), which is consistent with Gibbs (1994) or Glucksberg (1998).
the pervasiveness of metaphors in human understanding can be
best characterized by the phenomenon whereby a target domain is
structured and understood with reference to another (more basic)
source domain (cf. lakoff and Johnson: physical experience shapes
our understanding). Here we seem to reiterate the idea that physical
experience is central, though we cannot say that it is more basic than
other (cf. emotions or time), although at a given point langacker (1999)
considers time more important than space, as the former is needed to
perceive changes in the latter (motion).
Anyway, a reasonable conclusion would be that the source domain
serves as the background for structuring and understanding the target
domain (langacker 1999. 208). At this point we can mention W. Bedell
Stanfords summary on metaphors: the essence of metaphor is that a
word undergoes a change or extension of meaning. In simile nothing of
this kind occurs; every word has its normal meaning and no semantic
transference is incurred (cited by mac Cormac 1985. 37).
to lakoff and Johnson, the essence of metaphor is understanding
and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another, and we act
according to the way we conceive of things (1980. 5). the problem is
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that one can easily remember those school days when the difference
between metaphors and similes were explained with a set of examples:
her cheeks are like red roses. (simile)
her rosy cheeks (metaphor)
the explanation was that metaphor is a shortened/compressed
simile, without the like element; we now know, that this is not as
simple as it may seem, as the only similarities relevant to metaphor are
similarities as experienced by people, which differs based on culture
and personal previous experience (lakoff and Johnson 1980. 154), and
metaphors force us to wonder, compare, note similarities and
dissimilarities, and then seek confirmation or lack of confirmation
regarding the suggestions posed by metaphors (marconi 1997. 76).
mac Cormac completes the picture about metaphors by stating that
resemblance and difference are also constituents when metaphor is at
stake, together with similarity, as they are all involved in the knowledge
process. One of the consequences is that the separation of metaphors
from everyday language becomes impossible, and it is worth mentioning
that mac Cormac places the so-called dead metaphors within ordinary
language. We would only say that dead metaphors (which are
nevertheless alive by constant usage, cf. Metaphors We live By) create a
fuzzy category in-between figurative and literal language, of course, if
we accept this rather controversial dichotomy.
Another problematic aspect (under controversion theory) is that
metaphors are meaningful, but false. this falsity comes from semantic
contradiction and not from empirical test (folk theory gladly passes
them), and interestingly enough , mac Cormac offers an approach of
degrees. He discusses the relativism of metaphors, and observes that
they could be false when taken literally and true when taken
figuratively. Hence the truth or falsity of the metaphor is relative to its
context of interpretation, as there is a degree to which their referents
have similar properties and false to the degree that their referents have
dissimilar properties. His fuzzy-set theory is consistent with it, so we
have F (false), D (diaphor), e (epiphor), t (truth) (1985. 216, 220). In his
view, we have epiphors (metaphors that express more than suggest) and
diaphors (metaphors that suggest more than they express). Diaphors
can become epiphors as their hypothetical suggestions find
confirmation in experience/experiment, so they turn commonplace.
Although this seems plausible, we cannot really accept his
argument, as the case of dead metaphors remains unsolved. remember
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that on the one hand we have metaphors we live by (lakoff), on the other
hand we have dead metaphors. Stylistically mac Cormac is right, but
cognitive grammar deals with understanding, motivation, nature and
origin; the way lakoff presents them offers an explanation to these.
Dictionaries contain dead metaphors (mac Cormac), but when
reading a dictionary, one can often find explanatory remarks, such as
(fig.), standing for figurative, which mac Cormac omits to mention. So
it seems plausible to us when mac Cormac criticizes lakoff & Johnson
(1985. 58-60), saying that they are adamant when it comes to the status
of metaphors: even when figurative metaphors become conventional or
literal metaphors, they retain their metaphorical status (otherwise
dictionaries could not have identified them as metaphors!). By
considering hundreds of dead metaphors, lakoff and Johnson
succeeded in showing that natural language presumes and expresses
many hidden conceptual meanings that arise from the use of these
metaphors. But they transformed these dead metaphors into live ones
by redefining the notion of dead metaphors. For them, metaphors are
alive because they are used in ordinary language as parts of the
systematic metaphoric expression. So they have no method left for
distinguishing between metaphoric and non-metaphoric utterances,
they have literal metaphors and figurative metaphors.
moran correctly observes that the meaning of the metaphor in
general will be confined to the intentions of the speaker if the meaning
of a metaphorical utterance is the speakers meaning, and the latter is a
function of the intentions of the speaker in making the utterance. thus
the interpretation of the metaphor will be a matter of the recovery of the
intentions of the speaker (1997. 264). If moran is right, the so-called
live metaphors can be difficult to interpret, as the interpreter is
dependent on assumptions about the beliefs and intentions of the
speaker (Cooper 1986. 73, cited by morgan 1997).
We can only say, that once categorising is accepted, there is a
degree of membership, including views upon language itself. So lakoff
and Johnson can only embed non-metaphorical concepts in direct
experience, which emerges through interaction of the agent with
his/her environment. Kvecses indirectly answers the question of
dead metaphors later (2002, preface):
dictionary entries are full of that, but there is an important
point: they are deeply entrenched, hardly noticed and thus effortlessly
used, they are most active in our thought. So they are alive. According
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to the cognitive approach, both metaphorical language and thought rise

from the basic bodily (sensori-motor) experience of human beings, and
it is a key instrument in organizing human thought.
metaphors bring about changes in the ways in which we perceive
the world, and these conceptual changes often bring about changes in
the ways in which we act in the world, accepts mac Cormac (1985.
149), as they appear so usually and so regularly a part of ordinary
language that instead of contending that metaphor deviates from a
normative grammar, one might better consider that any grammar which
cannot account for metaphor is too limited in comprehension to be
useful (1985. 32). moran analyses the relationship between metaphor
and communication, and concludes that:
...metaphorical speech counts as genuinely communicative (of a
content beyond the literal) because, among other things, the figurative
interpretation of the utterance is guided by assumptions about the
beliefs and intentions of the speaker, intentions which, among other
things satisfy the Gricean6 formula. (1997. 261)
the success of metaphor in communication may also be explained
by the fact that according to lakoff and Johnson, metaphor is beyond
language, as it is to be found primarily in thought and action (e.g. killing
wax dolls, cf. lakoff & Johnson 1980. 153). the danger of pervasiveness
of metaphor lies in the fact that there are many ways of creating it:
extending, elaboration, questioning, combining and personification
(Kvecses 2002. 47-50). metaphors produce new insights and new
hypotheses internally, whereas externally they act as mediators between
the human mind and culture, states mac Cormac (1985. 2). this
correlates with morans statement (1997. 252), according to which the
words employed in a metaphor undergo a meaning-shift, but when an
expression is interpreted metaphorically, the literal one is not cancelled
or removed form consideration. the constraint that limits the excessive
production of metaphors is that there must be a similarity between the
two entities compared: In metaphor...if we are to speak of a new
meaning, this meaning will be something reachable only through
comprehension of the previously established, literal meanings of the
particular words that make it up. (moran 1997. 253)
Davidson, on the other hand, denies the non-literal meaning
regarding metaphors. Although his approach belongs to the truth
6. Grice, H.P. (1975)
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conditional thesis, which differs from cognitive linguistics in its

approach to semantics and metaphors, his famous statement attracted
serious criticism: metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal
interpretation, mean, and nothing more (1979. 246, cited by moran
1997). Cognitive linguistics breaks away from the notion of predictability
of generative grammar, and replaces this notion with motivation. Our
remark is that when we have a metaphorical view, we employ only a part
of a source domain, not the whole (when needed), in other cases other
parts. the mappings that deviate from the widely accepted ones are
either considered as bad ones, or literal ones! this partial mapping (only
a part of a concept is mapped, and only a part of target is involved) peaks
in metaphorical highlighting (Kvecses 2002. 67, 75, 79), and the
unconventional use is called unutilized parts of the source (e.g. the
chimney of a building).
moreover, many metaphors do map additional knowledge from the
source onto the target, and one can pick out distinct pieces of knowledge
associated with the source domain of a metaphor, which is already
connected to the scope of a metaphor. this means that abstract concepts
are characterized by a large number of distinct source domains, and a
single concept can characterize many distinct target domains. thus war
may stand for both argument and love (Kvecses 2002. 94, 107). the
previously mentioned motivation comes into picture again, as truth
value is connected to motivation (purpose in mind when dealing with
categories, fuzzy sets), which ultimately helps in successful
communication to be realized by well-established meaning foci of words
(cf. Kvecses 2002).
the conclusion is that Platos and Aristotles objectivism and
subjectivism are only myths (cf. cave and the greatest thing by far is to be
a master of the metaphor, poetics 1459a). lakoff and Johnson conclude
that metaphor unites reason and imagination, creating an imaginative
reality (although virtual reality is contradictory in terms, nobody seems
to care too much about it, and we all seem to perfectly understand and use
the expression).
All in all, we can say that metaphors indeed give an insight into
everyday experience; the way we have been brought up to perceive our
world is not the only way and it is impossible to see beyond the
truths of ones particular culture (lakoff and Johnson 1980. 239).
these metaphors, after all, contribute to the differences between
humans and animals by the systematicity of analogies and disanalogies.
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Of the many theories of metaphors presented so far we feel ourselves

closest to Kvecsess approach, according to which we need no special
talent for metaphors; we agree that their understanding and use is
effortless in our life both for scholars and ordinary people, as it is an
inevitable process of human thought and reasoning. thus our
description of metaphorical expressions will include cases in which
metaphor is understood in its broadest possible sense, which are live
in the sense lakoff and Johnson resuscitated them.
even the unknown is felt closer this way, and major advances in
metaphor theory preserve these findings (cf. Joseph Gradys complex
metaphors, Srinivas Narayanans metaphors as neural phenomenon.
And the subject is not closed, as mac Cormacs statement leaves the
question open: not all language is metaphorical, only the theories
about metaphors are metaphorical (1985. 56).
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CHAPter 6.
PRePOSItIONS, POStPOSItIONS, aDveRBS,

aDveRBIaL PHRaSeS
the definition of prepositions or postpositions is usually connected

to their position within a phrase; they are typically satellites to nouns,
and their name differs according to their location: if they are before a
noun, they are prepositions (or verbal prefixes, preverbs), if they follow
a noun or verb they are referred to as postpositions. Adposition covers
both types. Adverbs, adverbial phrases can be considered as satellites
to verbs.
One of the common aspects is that when we want to express an
over relationship, there are several variants, depending on the
circumstances. By circumstances we refer to those elements which
belong to the domain of meaning and within the domain of surface
expression mentioned by talmy (2000b. 21): motion, path, figure,
ground, manner and cause belonging to meaning, and verb, adposition,
subordinate clause being described as satellites. Satellites bring into
picture another common aspect of the three languages, as the
prepositions discussed can function as satellites of particular verbs,
although they should not be mistaken for prepositions:
[Satellite] is the grammatical category of any constituent other
than a noun phrase or prepositional-phrase complement that is in a
sister relation to the verb root. It relates to the verb root as a dependent
to a head. the satellite, which can be either a bound affix or a free
word, is thus intended to encompass all of the following grammatical
forms, which traditionally have been largely treated independently of
each other: english verb particles ... latin verb prefixes. A set of forms
that can function as satellites in a language often overlaps partially, but
not wholly, with a set of forms in another grammatical category in that
language, generally the category of prepositions, verbs, or nouns. thus,
english satellites largely overlap with prepositions... One justification
for recognizing the satellite as a grammatical category is that it captures
an observable commonality, both syntactic and semantic, across all
these forms - for example, its common function across one typological
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6. PrePOSItIONS, POStPOSItIONS, ADverBS,ADverBIAl PHrASeS
category of languages as the characteristic site in construction with the

verb for the expression of Path or, more generally, of the core schema.
(talmy 2000b. 101)
Among others, vasiliu (1961. 11-14) highlighted the first emerging
problem connected to prepositions and postpositions, namely that their
treatment is difficult in traditional grammar, as lexically they are not
treated individually. She cites Gougenheim (1959), Benveniste (1949)
and Pottier (1957), and reaches the conclusion that they were
neglected; they were in light of the meanings of the words they were
usually attached to (e.g. nouns), but prepositions and postpositions do
have their own meaning and basic functions which can serve as a
starting point for all the meanings and secondary functions. What
makes our job difficult is the fact that prepositions or postpositions
never occur on their own, as vasiliu correctly observes (1961. 13), but
in a set of at least three items, for instance verb-preposition-noun. this
means that the intrinsic value of the prepositions/postpositions cannot
be separated from the phrase in which they appear, as the contents of
the verb and noun may determine the different meanings of the
preposition. And this is probably true for adverbial phrases as well in
our case (think something over).
From the cognitive point of view, we can say that it is exactly the
neighbourhood of the prepositions, postpositions, adverbs and
adverbial particles that can also help us make the difference between
literal and figurative meanings. Cognitive semantics will take into
consideration cases where they are inserted in phrases, starting from
prototypical, central, obvious meanings, to special cases, where the
roots are less obvious. It is the role of semantics to provide us with
acceptable explanations regarding the extended usage of particular
prepositions and particles. evans and Green (2007. 36) remind us that
polysemy is not restricted to word meaning but is a fundamental
feature of human language.
Another important remark was that prepositions/postpositions
appearing in verb-noun contexts are much more important than other
contexts (noun-adverb, verb-adverb), especially when verbs refer to
states or movement in space, and nouns denote entities situated space.
these cases are more relevant for the local meanings of the
prepositions/postpositions, as the ones involved in our study are
compound prepositions in romanian (prin < pe + n, printre < pe +
ntre, peste < pe + spre, cf. vasiliu, 1973. 358); the nature of english
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prepositions/postpositions supports this principle, as in the majority of

cases we have verb-preposition-noun (meet over dinner), or verb-nounadverbial particle (think the problem over), whereas in Hungarian t
and keresztl (among other functions) are verb-prepositioned particles
(prefixes, adverbials), sometimes called preverbs, followed by entities
denoting spatial or temporal relationships.
these prepositions can be very complex both semantically and
syntactically, and one of the most important problems was how to treat
various cases of prepositions, which can be also adverbs, or can be
prefixes of verbs, adjectives, and even nouns (overhear, overnight) as
well as (adverbial) particles in phrasal verbs (think over). Cognitive
grammarians seem to offer a possible solution within a cognitive
framework, for instance lakoff (1987), who describes over in terms of
landmark (lm) and trajector (tr). to our great relief, within this
system we can concentrate on the occurrence of words irrespective of
their syntactic background.
moreover, Kovcs (2005. 4) deals with the same problem, offering a
comforting explanation: although the various senses of over (for
instance) may seem totally unrelated, and its combination with verbs
and nouns seems to be arbitrary, cognitive grammarians were able to
analyse them to some degree. the relationship within the structure is
much more important in the case of prepositions, even if they are
sometimes adverbs, so whenever a dictionary entry contained the
prepositions above mentioned, we included them in our database.
In english this meant that our word could appear under various
headings (nouns, verbs, adjectives, alphabetical order, or in the case of
over hundreds of prefixed/prepositioned words in alphabetical order),
in Hungarian it was relatively easy as we had the alphabetical order of
the particles involved (t, keresztl, fell), and in romanian we
searched for any nouns and verbs that might contain our words and the
specific entries of the prepositions involved. A cognitive analysis of the
prepositions necessarily deals with spatial relations, as it is a wellknown fact that metaphors have at their root a concrete, literal
meaning, often described in terms of space and time.
What we found interesting that articles written in romanian more
than three decades ago can be considered as the forerunners of a
cognitive grammar in romania, as Dominte (1970), and vasiliu (1973)
describe prepositions in terms of cognitive approach, although roschs
prototype theory(see lakoffs 1980 presentation of the prototype
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theory) became widespread after that. Dominte (1970) mentions main

and secondary prepositions in space and time, stating that in space we
have position (state) and movement, whereas in time we have moment
and period (length), adding that constructions with time follow the
model of spatial ones, never vice versa.7 Nowadays it goes without
saying that the study of metaphors from a cognitive point of view
confirmed and explained why this phenomenon can happen, and a
whole system includes the exact description of space and its
components: lM, tr, source, path, goal (cf. lakoff 1980, radden 1994,
and many others. vasiliu (1973. 379-385) deals with prepositions from
the point of view of semantic markers, differentiating two basic types
of markers: inner (intrinsic) and transfer markers. Consequently, our
prepositions are presented in terms of localization, contact, extension
(both horizontal and vertical), overlapping/covering, spatial superiority
or spatial posteriority, limit, interiority and (dis)continuous space on
the one hand, and (non)oriented movement/lack of movement, initial
or final limit and lack of limit on the other hand, all included in a table
of prepositions. these tables also suggest that the starting point in
analysing prepositions is their literal, central meaning. Consequently in
the next part we try to present our prepositions based on the above
constituents.
7. Construciile temporale... iau ca model pe cele spaiale, niciodat invers., where

he quotes B. Pottier: sistmatique des elements de relation, Paris, 1962, in which
Pottier mentions that time can be described in terms of space, that is the
spatialization of time. (Dominte 1970. 233)
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II. SeMaNtICS OF MetaPHORICaL

eXPReSSIONS
Page 59
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CHAPter 7.
MetaPHORICaL eXPReSSIONS
talmys words offer the motivation for our research regarding the
prepositions, verbal prefixes (preverbs) and postpositions presented in
the previous section: Apparently, our cognition is organised in a way
that allows particular senses of a word to come into consciousness in the
relevant contexts, but not as a full connected set under introspection
though introspection does yield a few. the full set can again typically be
achieved only with the aid of analytic procedures, like those giving rise
to dictionaries through a kind of corpus research. (2007. XIv)
the importance of dictionaries is also revealed by Gibbs 2007
article, and further supported by Sandra (1998) and Sandra and rice
(1995), according to which there is a certain scepticism about trusting
cognitive linguists arguments and conclusions as they are often based
on individual introspections. Out of four central principles of cognitive
semantics described by evans and Green (2006. 160), we can mention
here the third one, namely that semantic structure is encyclopaedic in
nature. thus the dictionary view only offers a starting point for inquiry
regarding a particular concept or conceptual domain. So the
conventional meaning will usually be referred to as the central or
basic one, but encyclopaedic meaning arises in the context of use. the
table below (evans and Green 2006) shows four types of knowledge,
which all have an active role when meaning is defined:
table 2. Four types of knowledge
(table 7.2. Four kinds of knowledge that relate to the centrality of
encyclopaedic knowledge of word meaning
Conventional knowledge
Knowledge that is widely known
Generic knowledge
Knowledge that is general rather than
specific in nature
Intrinsic knowledge
Knowledge deriving from the form of the
entity or relation in question
Characteristik knowledge
Knowledge that is (relatively) unique to
the entity or relation in question
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7. metAPHOrICAl eXPreSSIONS
Our aim is to present a part of the system of prepositions which take

part in construing a network, including metaphorical extensions
containing over, above, across and through in english, prin and peste in
romanian and t, keresztl, fltt, fell in Hungarian. the starting point
is lakoff & Johnsons remark: Since metaphorical expressions in our
language are tied to metaphorical concepts in a systematic way, we can
use metaphorical linguistic expressions to study the nature of
metaphorical concepts and to gain an understanding of the metaphorical
nature of our activities (1980. 7). evans and Green (2006. 21) complete
the remark above by adding that concepts derive from percepts and the
range of perceptual information deriving from the world is integrated into
a mental image. It is not our aim to build up a comprehensive system of
types of metaphors (e.g. ontological, conceptual, etc.), and highlight the
relationship between, as this would go far beyond our reach. Instead, we
will try to briefly pinpoint the natural basis of the english metaphors built
on a corpus of 883 cards (card refers to either one entry, or in many cases
more than one, sometimes up to even ten entries) with over, 34 with
above, 20 with across, and 138 with through, all taken from the Shorter
Oxford english Dictionary, completed with examples taken from the cited
authors, marked separately. Our research will discuss these prepositions,
particles, prefixes and adverbs not necessarily separately, as they are
often intertwined. this can happen because of at least two factors. On the
one hand we have universal grammatical categories, on the other hand
there is the typical context based on personal and cultural experience.
the universal grammatical categories of noun and verb reflect a
structuring of the world into two kinds of basic conceptual entities: things
and relations. According to cognitive grammarians, things are conceptual
entities that have stability in space and over time, and relations are
conceptual links between two or more entities. relations are coded as
verbs, adjectives, prepositions and conjunctions (Kvecses 2002. 123).
langacker (1991. 283) contributes significantly to the topic tracing back
the roots to the ancient Greeks:
the universality of nouns and verbs and their centrality to
grammatical structure stem directly from the archetypal status of the
billiard-ball model. the elements of this model are: SPACe, tIme,
mAterIAl / SUBStANCe and eNerGY. there is a connection with
the four elements pointed by Greek philosophers, where earth is
material substance, air is space, fire is energy, and water is time (see
passage of time understood metaphorically in terms of flowing water).
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these elements are conceived of as constituting a world in which

discrete objects move around in space, make contact with one another,
and participate in energetic interactions ... Physical object and
energetic interactions provide the respective prototypes for the noun
and verb categories, which likewise represent a polar opposition among
the basic grammatical classes.
He completes the system with remarks concerning prepositions;
these are designated to atemporal relations with a thing as landmark
(1999. 21), they have two focal participants (1999. 10), and there is no
difference between lexicon and grammar, as we are also faced with a
matter of degree, as grammatical elements, including prepositions and
modal verbs are meaningful in many of their uses (1999. 18). the other
factor is experience. We can say that semantic structure is not universal
(langacker 1987. 2), and being language specific means that we have to
study individual languages in this respect.
All over lakoff & Johnsons book it was emphasised that different
cultures have different conceptual systems. the conceptual systems of
various cultures partly depend on the physical environments they have
developed in, and the social reality defined by a culture affects its
conception of physical reality. Since much of our social reality is
understood in metaphorical terms, and since our conception of the
physical world is partly metaphorical, metaphor plays a very
significant role in determining what is real for us (1980. 146). All
orientations are relative in canonical languages, but regier
demonstrated that there are non-canonical languages in this respect:
Australian Guugu Yimithirr language is absolute, always using absolute
reference points, namely north, east, south and west, so experience
constrains language (1996. 21). He goes on saying that whatever the
range of cross-linguistic variation in spatial semantic structure, that
variation does not in any way correspond to a conceptual difference
across languages. there is a universally shared human conception of
space derived from pre-linguistic experience, and although different
languages may pick up on different aspects of that shared conception,
no language can ever encode something that is conceptually alien to
speakers of other languages. Gopnik, cited by regier adds that there
cannot be semantic universals because childrens concepts change
profoundly, in radical ways, and simple spatial terms actually mean
something quite different to children than to adults. Now we return to
lakoff & Johnson:
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We are not claiming that physical experience is in any way more

basic than other kinds of experience, whether emotional, mental,
cultural or whatever. All of these experiences may be just as basic as
physical experiences. rather, what we are claiming about grounding is
that we typically conceptualize the non-physical in terms of the
physical that is, we conceptualize the less clearly delineated in terms
of more clearly delineated.
But mac Cormac asks: if some spatial concepts vary from culture to
culture, then how can we have any certainty that spatial concepts
emerge directly? metaphoric expressions depend on the context of the
hearer for their interpretation, and the context can vary from culture to
culture, says mac Cormac (1985. 70). We can only say that lakoff later
proved that variations from culture to culture are less important than
similarities. We should complete our introduction with the concept of
world-view: the language of an individual partially determines the
world-view and the conceptual system of an individual, so individuals
who speak different languages view the world differently with different
conceptual systems. Complete translation form one language to the
other remains impossible; to understand another language entails
complete immersion in that other language with the concomitant
change in thinking (cf. SapirWhorf hypothesis). We can agree that
every experience takes place within a vast background of cultural
presuppositions, but there are more physical and more cultural
experiences (lakoff & Johnson 1980. 57).
the possible metaphorical extensions follow a rule: when
developing a new expression for a grammatical concept, language users
have to conceptualize abstract domains of cognition in terms of
concrete domains (Heine et al. 1991. 31, cited by evans and Green
2006). this is the process which involves metaphorical extension
emerging from the mapping of image schematic concepts from source
to target domain (Heine et al. 1991. 46). their approach involves the
reconstruction of dead or frozen metaphors, as evans and Green
correctly observe (2006. 714-5). Heine et al. follow an experientialist
line, and they propose a metaphorical source domain hierarchy:
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Figure 1. source domain hierarchy

the evolution of linguistic studies brought about changes never
imagined before. Chomskys universal grammar with its ever changing
and improving facets laid the basis of a very serious syntactic analysis,
presenting many valuable explanations for the entire structure of all
languages. However, nowadays the cognitive approach seems to
complete the Chomskian concept, especially in an area hardly touched
upon by generative grammar. this area may be labelled as semantics,
more precisely cognitive semantics, which includes the study of
metaphors. Needless to say that countless books have been written on
metaphors since the emergence of the cognitive approach, but they all
agree upon at least one fact: figurative words and expressions stem
from concrete ones, and cognitive scientists were able to define some
basic categories which seem to constitute our physical world,
irrespective of the particular language. the basic categories include
prototypical items denoting spatial orientation, such as up-down, closedistant, in-out and so on. According to the cognitive linguists,
metaphorical language can be described and explained in terms of
concrete ones, which is more or less similar in different languages.
the prerequisite for our research is that a cognitive approach can
describe metaphorical expressions adequately enough to find common
aspects in the above-mentioned three languages, yet to define some
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language-specific expressions not present in the other two. We are also

aware of the fact that finding common basic categories with the help of
cognitive grammar resembles the very limited set of concepts described
in generative grammar, the so-called innate ones. Still, the study of
prepositions, and other marginal grammatical categories becomes more
possible within the cognitive framework which may offer a global
explanation for the nature of metaphors as well as a separate one for
each language.
there may be another thing to explain, that is the choice of three
languages, instead of one or two. Although we do not believe in
grammatical accidents, sometimes it might happen that there are
similar things in two languages, whereas the same thing in the third
one may lead to generalization. Culture-specific expressions may
appear in two geographically close languages, or belonging to the same
group of languages. However, the fashion of globalization will not mean
that we are going to describe metaphorical expressions in dozens of
languages, in this respect we are closer to vasilius belief, according to
which the results in the study of one particular language may lead to a
general theoretical treatment.8
vasiliu also states9 that in order to reach satisfactory results, we are
supposed to take an inventory of an as vast a database as possible.
However, the inventory of all existing situations is impossible, thus we
have tried to include in our database the corpus to be found first of all
in the representative dictionaries of the three languages. Consequently
we did research on the words in question in the shorter oxford english
Dictionary (SOeD, 2002) with more than half a million definitions,
Dicionarul explicativ al limbii romne (DeX, 1998) with more than
80,000 entries, and A magyar nyelv rtelmez sztra (rtSz., 1992)
with more than 60,000 entries. the result was a few thousand entries
containing one of the above-mentioned prepositions. the entries were
8. In original: rezultatele la care se poate ajunge prin studierea unei limbi concrete
oarecare pot servi ca punct de plecare n discuia teoretic general. (1961. 11)
9. In original: Pentru a realiza o clasificare ct mai cuprinztoare a prepoziiilor, este
necesar utilizarea unui material ct mai vast. Dat fiind ns c, n cazul unei limbi
vii, este imposibil inventarierea tuturor situaiilor existente, este necesar ca
materialul folosit s fie riguros delimitat, astfel nct omiterea, inevitabil, a
anumitor fapte s nu fie ntmpltoare, ci justificat de limitele, dinainte stabilite,
ale materialului. (1961. 14)
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listed on separate cards, but when we come to analyse and categorise

them, they will be split in at least three times as many cards as initially
due to the multiple meanings of the entries.
We also have to describe the background of these prepositions,
and the findings in this respect are interesting as well: the case of over,
through, t, keresztl seems relatively easy in comparison with the
romanian prin and peste. the meaning of the english and Hungarian
prepositions or preverbs is more or less obvious, whereas the romanian
prepositions are in fact combinations of more prepositions (vasiliu
1961, vasiliu 1973, Dominte 1970 and Cuni 1999).
Consequently, our next task is to define the prepositions involved,
presenting all the possible central (concrete, literal) meanings of them,
and trying to pinpoint the possible metaphorical extensions based on
the literal ones.
In our presentation of the english, romanian and Hungarian
prepositions we apply a system of abbreviations which differs from
langackers terms. We observed that in our cases there are usually two
basic types of objects: moving one(s) and static one(s). the moving object
is marked with S (we call it subject as it captures our attention by
moving, and it constitutes the basic frame of the schema). this is what
langacker coined as trajectory (tr). If we have S, it means that the
original S is somewhat altered. Sometimes we need S1 and S2 to indicate
that the original moving object (due to its movement in time or contact
with the static object) has radically or completely changed, and if S, S,
S1 and S2 are not superscript, they are more or less concrete objects.
Conversely, SM, SM, S1M and S2M are to be taken metaphorically.
Similarly, we have C referring to the static and concrete object
(container, in the lakoffian terms, which langacker describes as
landmark, lm), but of course, we do not always have a container-like
object. C1 and C2 usually refer to the movement of S from one place to
another, and is used when the surface of the static object is relevant in
the schema; CM indicates that the object is metaphoric. the arrow or
arrows indicate the direction of the movement; if the line of the arrow is
continuous, we can perceive a concrete action (i.e., the meaning of the
verb is literal), and the dashed/dotted arrow indicates a metaphorical
perception:
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table 3. Abbreviations
S is a concrete object
S is an altered concrete object
S1 refers to the source
S2 refers to the target
C is a concrete object
C1 refers to the source
C2 refers to the target
object whose surface is
important
SM metaphoric object
SM altered metaphoric object
S1M metaphoric source
S2M metaphoric target
CM metaphoric object
C1M metaphoric source
C2M metaphoric target
M metaphoric surface is
important
concrete movement
metaphoric movement
In support of this type of presentation we can mention evans and

Green (2006. 179), who state that the image schema CONtAINer
results from our recurrent and ubiquitous experiences with containers
as revealed by the extract below from Johnson (1987), which describes
the start of an ordinary day: You wake out of a deep sleep and peer out
from beneath the covers into your room. You gradually emerge out of
your stupor, pull yourself out from under the covers, climb into your
robe, stretch out your limbs, and walk in a daze out of the bedroom and
into the bathroom. You look in the mirror and see your face staring out
at you. You reach into the medicine cabinet, take out the toothpaste,
squeeze out some toothpaste, put the toothbrush into your mouth,
brush your teeth in a hurry, and rinse out your mouth. (Johnson 1987.
331, cited by evans and Green 2006)
Consequently, a large number of everyday objects and experiences
are categorised as specific instances of the schematic concept
CONtAINer: not only obvious containers like bathroom cabinets and
toothpaste tubes or less obvious containers like bed-covers, clothing
and rooms, but also states like sleep, stupor and daze (evans and
Green 2006), and the CONtAINer schema consists of the structural
elements interior, boundary and exterior, which are the minimum
requirements for a CONtAINer, according to lakoff (1987).
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CHAPter 8.
MetaPHORICaL OveR-SItUatIONS
Now we would like to present our adpositions and adverbial

phrases, first in their central, basic, most (proto)typical sense, which,
we believe, represent the starting point for a cognitive approach, then
in their extended, metaphorical occurrences. the basic meanings are
the ones we think of on hearing the words separately, and they are
essential in the constitution of the so-called extended (metaphorical)
meanings.
8.1. Over (english)

Probably the most famous case study of these prepositions belongs
to over. the literature in this respect is vast, starting with Brugmans
m.A. thesis (1981). the enormous complexity of over was studied later
by representative authors in the field, for instance lakoff (1987, Book
2, the Case study of over, 416-461), which gave the idea for us to
develop it into an analysis covering more interrelated prepositions in
more than one language. Kovcs (2005) mentions, that the most
important studies on the semantics of over are those of Brugman (1981),
taylor (1989), Dewell (1994) and tyler & evans (2003). their findings
revealed that the various prototypical, literal meanings serve as the
basis for metaphorical extensions, and the spatial relations are defined
as landmark (lm), denoting the entity as the reference point, trajectory
(tr), denoting a moving entity. their relationship is set in a framework
of container/source, along a path towards the goal. Obstacles may occur
on the way, but they can be surpassed via many ways: upward,
downward, with or without contact. Kovcs (2005. 13) briefly
summarises the most prototypical cases of over, concluding that these
are the central senses:
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8. metAPHOrICAl Over-SItUAtIONS
above and across sense, which means moving overhead, vertical

or not, with or without contact, with or without focus on the end point
(to jump over)
above sense, which lacks movement, so the verbs involved are
static ones, without contact and without across sense (to be over)
Covering sense, which means that the tr is about the size, or
even more extended than the lm. the action is practically over when
the tr gets from one end of the lm to the other, either above or across
(to spread over)
Reflexive sense, which includes cases when the initial upright
position can be distinguished from a final, non-upright position, usually
a horizontal one. Practically S (tr) is the C (lm) itself (C=S), hence the
term, which was denoted by lindner in her 1981 work (to fall over)
excess sense, where we perceive things in a container, usually
fluid types, which vertically follow a path of overflowing (to boil over)
From one side to the other sense, where the combination of over
with action verbs indicate a departure from one entity towards another
(to give something over)
However, evans and Green (2006. 36) include transfer and control,
without mentioning the reflexive sense (cf. tyler and evans 2004), and
the above and across sense is not listed either. this is probably due to
tyler and evans (2001, 2003, 2004), who question even the aboveacross sense described by lakoff.
Our contribution to this part is that as far as we know , cases
when C is a type of hole (tube, strainer, hole in the ground, key-hole,
etc.) have not been discussed yet. For instance, the lack of obstacle
might bother the cognitive (ICm) model we have in our mind, and we
complete pictures, frames involuntarily, which are perceived as lacking
something from the comforting whole, such as (long) discontinuous
line, instead of many short lines. Furthermore, another case (from one
side to the other) can be combined with the reflexive sense, thus
obtaining a 180 turn (to turn the key over). If we accept that our whole
physical being is in fact based on our bodily experience, our entire
system of concepts is arbitrary, thus we do not see why 90 is more
central than 180 or 360. tyler and evans (2003) illustrated four
possible trajectories of one single sentence, thus offering a glimpse
upon the intricacy of this preposition:
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8.1. Over (eNGlISH)
71
Figure 2. possible trajectories for the cat jumped over the wall
evans and Green (2006. 336) conclude that there are at least six
distinct and closely related variants, and they criticise lakoffs full
specification approach:
lakoffs approach entails that over has, at the very least, several
dozen distinct senses. A proliferation of senses is not problematic per se
because cognitive linguists are not concerned with the issue of economy
ofrepresentation. However, the absence of clear methodological
principles for establishing the distinct senses is problematic... the first
problem concerns a failure to distinguish between polysemy and
vagueness. 10 A linguistic expression is vague rather than polysemous if
context rather than information stored in semantic memory provides the
meaningful detail about the entity in question. (2006. 339-40)
tyler and evans (2003) argue that the interpretation of over with
respect to contact or lack of contact derives from the integration of over
with the other elements in the sentence. they conclude that the
linguistic context together with encyclopaedic knowledge provides the
details relating to the presence or absence of contact. they also rely on
Sandra and rice (1995) and Sandra (1998). According to tyler and
evans, over is sometimes vague with respect to contact, but they accept
that lakoffs position on polysemy as a conceptual phenomenon is
correct (still supporting that the context in word meaning is vital).
Based on our research in the second part, we would say that this
vagueness is more emphasised in the case of metaphorical expressions,
as we do not always have a clear image schema for the landmark (static
object, C) and its relationship with the trajectory (mostly a moving
object, S). the principled polysemy approach tries to offer a better
10. their criticism in this respect relies on tuggy 1993.
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interpretation, proposed by tyler and evans (2003), by developing clear

decision principles that make semantic network analyses objective and
verifiable. their conclusion is illustrated below:
Figure 3. the proto-scene for over

It is worth noticing that they illustrate the central sense (protoscene) of over, as having a clear above sense (2003. 344-6), contrary to
lakoff, who identified an above and across sense as prototypical.
Finally, we would like to present their network of over, which is based
on the proto-scene above:
Figure 4. tyler and evans: network of over

We have already mentioned that Brugmans work (1981) triggered
off a new development in the study of prepositions and metaphors as
8.1. Over (eNGlISH)
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well. She meticulously analysed many cases, and contoured the

prototypical senses of over, completed and systematized by her
followers (lakoff, Dewell, tyler & evans 2001). the most complex word
in metaphorical expressions is probably over, and it is a must to explain
how we approach it. Based on Brugman (1981. 1), lakoff (1987), tyler
and evans (2003, 2004), we can say that it is a polysemous word with
a large number of meanings or senses, and one that belongs to various
lexical categories; Brugman also states that all non-prepositional uses
of over derive from one or another sense of the preposition. According
to langacker, the polysemy of lexical items should be expected as the
normal state of affairs (1999. 125), and polysemy results when multiple
variants become entrenched as connected units; in fact this connection
differentiates them from cases of homonymy.
We do not wish to discuss here the classical problem of lexical
semantics, namely the ambiguity of an expression, as clear-cut
distinction is rather difficult to produce (langacker 1999. 125).
Brugmans assumption is that the position of over in the sentence will
reflect the particular relation the schema bears to the imagination of the
configuration as a whole, as prefixed verbs with over result in very
different images of the landmark and the trajector and their places in the
over schemata, so parts of speech have a strong historically based and
fixed position in a language, for instance conventional usage (1981. 36).
Brugman also states that there is a conceptual category, which is above
all the lexical categories, comprising all senses, named by the word over,
and each sense is a lower-level category. A few are central members of
this higher category, but all senses are full members, which is different
from Kay and macDaniels approach (1978). the primary, prototypical
senses of over are purely physical relations (Brugman 1981. 5), so when
we try to present metaphorical expressions, we have to take into
consideration the diagrams depicting physical over cases based on space
grammar paved by langacker, Brugman, lakoff and others.
thus we try to represent metaphorical senses consistent with the
spatial senses, and based on similarities prove Brugmans claim that
there are relationships even between spatial and non-spatial senses of
the word. moreover, we would like to depict a gradient shift from
concrete cases to abstract ones, by gradually changing pure physical
constituents to pure metaphorical ones. the illustrations for the
examples, unless otherwise mentioned, belong to us.
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8.2.1. above + across Sense

Based on Brugman (1981) and lakoff (1980), the following example
is the most basic case (and from now on we try to consciously replace
prototypical with central or basic sense):
the bird flew over the yard.
Figure 5. over above + across sense

In this case, the central member of the higher-level category over
offers various metaphoric extensions: talk over lunch, spend money
over a period of time. reddy (1979) pointed out that they can only be
objects of communication (*We heard a plane over lunch), as according
to reddys conduit metaphor, words are objects passed back and forth
between the interlocutors. Consequently, *We wept over lunch. is not
acceptable, but We had a good cry together over lunch. is better,
according to Kay, as it is more communicative. If we analyse the
participants in this prototypical case, we can have a list of contributors
to the case, and when we want to trace the possible metaphorical
extensions we should check the nature of:
trajector (S, tr)
landmark (C, lm)
Source-path (obstacle)-destination
meaning of the verb
Now let us see what happens if we start replacing these elements
one by one:
the plane flew over the yard. (personification / zoomorphism)
the bag flew over the yard. (it was thrown; zoomorphism)
the bag got over the yard. (we dont know how, abstract verb)
the bag got over it. (unspecified destination)
the idea got over. (complex metaphor, where parts combine into
something else)
the media passed over details of the case. (Kovcs 2005)
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And we can continue with idiomatic expressions as well, although

sometimes it may be difficult to decide whether a particular schema is
to be applied in these cases. Brugman and her followers realized that it
is important whether the source and the target are seen as containers
with boundaries or not (cf. BODY AS CONtAINer, IDeAS Are
eNtItIeS), the extension of the landmark (extended or not, one, two or
three dimensional), the possible contact between S and C, exemplified
by the impediment/obstacle/difficulty (lIFe IS A JOUrNeY,
PrOGreSS IS A DIFFICUlt mOvemeNt FOrWArD).
Another important thing to mention here is that concrete cases
have been classified as above+across, and the shortest possible path
was canonically attributed to them. In our opinion, metaphorical
extensions do not necessarily take this route, as in the case of the sixth
example taken from Kovcs; a further note is that (logically) S tends to
move along as effortlessly as possible; if there is friction, it should be
minimal (walk over the bridge), as stopping on the way ceases the
perceived situation, turning it into on. If too much effort is put into the
realization of above, then the across sense has to suffer. Finally, let us
not forget the idiomatic expression (he is sitting on the fence), which
perfectly encapsulates the ideas stated above.
Although at first this seems to have been accepted, tyler and evans
challenge this view, stating that based on the fact that proto-scenes are
idealized, they do not contain detailed information about the nature of
either S or C (2004. 264, describing landmark and trajector), and if we
are to see both an above and an across case, it cannot be a proto-scene.
the figure indicates tyler and evans central meaning for over, where
the dotted line indicates that S is within potential reach of or being
conceptually proximal to C.
Figure 6. tyler and evans: central meaning for over

this means that the central sense lacks the across element, so let us
take a look at a pure above sense.
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8.2.2. above
this case of over has a static sense, there is no path, consequently
there is not contact:
hang the painting over the fireplace. (Brugman)
Figure 7. over above sense

In this static sense, neither the shape or dimensionality of S, nor
those of C are important to grammaticality readings, and they do not
affect degree of membership in the supercategory (Brugman 1981. 26),
but it seems important that they are not mutually substitutive. (Satellite
is orbiting 100 miles above/?over the earth). If there is intimacy, then
both are acceptable, otherwise only above, so the further out S is from
C, the less appropriate is over. Charles Fillmore analyses a famous case:
their apartment is above (not over) ours.,
From which we can conclude that direct verticality is important,
above is neutral to the degree of closeness of S and C (Fillmore 1981. 27).
the above sense of over occurs in sentences like ill pick chocolate
over vanilla any time. (S is chocolate and C is vanilla, chocolate is held
in higher esteem by the speaker, concludes Brugman).
However simple it may seem, there is a need to add a few remarks.
the schemas try to present the most central senses, but the drawings
obviously reflect the canonical reference point mentioned in the
theoretical part: side view, C is closer to the earths surface (respecting
the law of gravity), consequently metaphorical expressions employ this
scene more readily:
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Dark clouds are hanging over me. (being outside, somewhat fuzzy
meaning)
Dark clouds are hanging over me. (being inside, it is more clear the
intention)
Dark clouds are hanging over my plans.
My plans clouded over.
Our prerequisite here is that only static verbs go with this sense,
both in concrete and abstract meanings. Only those verbs can be applied
here, which narrate an action, but motion is minimized: watch over,
brood over, ponder over. the really interesting fact is that the canonical
schema is occasionally heavily shaken by metaphorical extensions:
she stood over him and made him eat his lunch. (Kovcs),
and we can only say that static distance is the only fact that matters,
metaphorically the gaze of the eyes may control this stability, indicated
by arrows, which serve as distancing elements:
Figure 8. Kovcs: stand over somebody

Brugmans remark joins over and above into an interesting
relationship: if S and C are relatively close, both are acceptable (watch
over), but if the distance is felt huge, only above would be natural to use
(cf. John lennons above us only sky), and we have to remember tyler
and evans remark (2004) when proving that over and above cannot be
taken as full synonyms, as jump over the wall would mean something
different from jump above.
8.2.3. across
It is encoded in this schema that S is in contact with C, although S
is still vertical with respect to C. According to Brugman, the basic idea
is that in each of the cases the endpoint of the trajectory is on the other
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side of C than the beginning point (walk over the hill, fall over the cliff,
climb over the hill), and in some cases C is seen as a barrier, obstacle,
impediment which is traversed. Boundary traversal becomes important
with contact (thus the meaning of the verb becomes very important).the
basic schema is this one:
Figure 9. over across sense

the image stresses the central idea: boundary traversal, which can be
either from one side to the other (completely), or just passing/crossing the
estimated middle of C. We tend to think that the endpoint focus is
somewhat more important than the first crossing (of the virtual border),
as metaphorically getting to the other side becomes the traversal of a
barrier or other obstacle, such as state lines, time zone boundaries (cf.
Brugman). to support our thought, we can paraphrase tyler and evans,
who build up their network of over highlighting the endpoint of these
cases based on real force dynamics, according to which listeners are
interpreting utterances, and they take objects are being exposed to force
dynamics, in our case gravity (2004. 265). thus a sentence containing
jump over a fence includes the landing as well.
metaphorical examples might require extraordinary effort where
there is obstacle-traversal rather than boundary-traversal, which is a
little further from the central sense (cf. Sandra & rices network
analyses):
he handed over the case. (Kovcs)
the company handed over the situation. (metonymical extension)
the company won over a few valuable employees. (extra effort,
syntactic reinforcement)
the company won over few valuable employees. (dissatisfaction,
rather fuzzy)
One can observe that crossing the borderline is rather fuzzy in these
cases, as we can imagine a concrete situation metonymically (an actual
8.1. Over (eNGlISH)
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file has been handed over representing the most important data about a
particular case), which is rather difficult to image in the next case. the
last but one example is the most complex in our view, as we have
metonymical extension included (company standing for employers),
the meaning of the verb suggests effort (only one can win), and the
situation of winning becomes clear when certain number of employees
are to be found at the company (rather subjective). moreover, the
indefinite article in this case underlines the positive attitude of the
company towards the situation, especially in contrast with the last
case, where the zero article refers to dissatisfaction, causing tension
between the meaning of the verb (win) and the numeral with no article.
Brugman also warns us about another special case (jump over the creek,
step over body), where S and C are not in contact, curved trajectory
with contact non-contact contact with a surface on which the
landmark rests (cf. verb sense). If there is focus on traversal of an
obstacle, this allows metaphorical as well as spatial uses of this sense
of over tend to be idiomatic, see the first two examples below, whereas
the last one refers to avoidance of this obstacle. Note that this is again
a marginal case, as strictly speaking the moment of realization is above
sense, but the starting point and endpoint is fixed:
it took him years to get over her. (Brugman)
i cant get over the stupidity of his economic policies. (Brugman)
this century has jumped over many epidemic rages often met a
century ago.
8.2.4. Covering
this sense canonically includes both linear, and extended
landmarks and trajectories (walk over/across the bridge); in these cases
we have linear C, and there is a corresponding point-for-point
correspondence between S and C, the S is itself a creation of a
corresponding shape and extent (Brugman). metaphorically, we have
messages that flash over the telegraph wires, which is a very interesting
case, as C is physical, S is an abstract entity which has a correlation
with the symbols that are transmitted via C. One can agree with
Brugman that abstract medium is better (cf. announce over the
newspaper), as there is no metaphor for information visually gathered
in which C linear and S a point. Here we can mention reddys remark
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(words are objects shot through space), or even lakoffs (1987. 449),
stating that mIND IS A CONtAINer, IDeAS Are eNtItIeS, so
communication involves taking ideas out of the mind, putting them
into words, and sending them to other people via various trajectories.
the schema represents this sense:
Figure 10. over cover sense 1

However, another covering sense is instantiated by cases where C
is dimensional (spread the cloth over the table, paint over the line,
mantilla over her head, vase over stain, as in Brugman1981. 30). In
these cases S, while static, possesses a shape and size such that it can
cover C; roughly, S is the same size as C, although heretofore we had
cases when S was considerably smaller than C. the before mentioned
canonical view of schemas changes as well, as in metaphorical cases
side view is either irrelevant, or changes into top view:
Figure 11. over cover sense 2

Although this schema is drawn to render top view, horizontal
covering, it can easily changed metaphorically into vertical covering:
she put a veil over the picture.
? she hung tapestry over the wall yesterday. (Brugman)
* she hung painting over the wall. (Brugman)
she put a mask over her face. (Brugman)
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In the second and third sentence covering is a rather fuzzy concept,

which means that the presence of contact between S and C opens
possibilities for on or across (cf. Brugmans remark, when the size of S
is much smaller than C, 1981. 31). Another case is when distance plays
a role; the greater the distance, the better to use in front of. metaphorical
expressions encapsulate superiority, complete control, and covering
sense is combined with above:
he succeeded in overcoming his shyness.
he made over his entire fortune.
she mourned over her sons body. (Brugman)
she mourned over the loss of her son. (Brugman)
You shouldnt cry over spilt milk.
*A tree stood over the body. (Brugman)
In the third sentence C marks a physical space and over names a
spatial configuration (somewhat abstracted nevertheless, since mourning
is not a physical activity), and the next sentence turns to more
metaphoric extension, over signifies an intensified reaction to an entire
event. the last but one example triggers off a proverb (idiomatic
expression), and this complex image includes more than one schema
(covering and excess). the incorrect usage in the last case marks that only
animate entities can be used in this covering sense (Brugman 1981. 28).
8.2.5. excess
In many of these cases the subject is the S, which is in a container
(C), and it exceeds the tacit level; the prepositional object is taken as an
unanalysed C:
the water overflowed the cup. (Brugman)
the water flowed over the cup. (Brugman)
the second example is grammatical if the cup is upside-down or on
its side, which cancels out the normal boundaries of its walls. the cup
in the first sentence is in its canonical position, where C is shaped by
the walls, and over disallows this presupposed boundedness of the
motion and further specifies that the motion exceeds the presupposed
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boundaries by going (roughly) above and across them. According to

Brugman, the boundary is the most important part, not necessarily the
whole C, and the boundary traversed may or may not be a physical
barrier (cf. pilot overshot the runway), where we have a conceived
boundary relative to the correct point of landing the plane. the schema
below presents this scene:
Figure 12. over excess sense

Brugman even offers a metaphoric point of view (1981. 39), when
non-physical entities can be viewed as having boundaries, over can
refer to an excess of that activity, boundary is the cessation of the
activity. the prefix over- cancels the presupposed boundary and
specifies that the activity has exceeded that point of cessation
(oversleep), where a particular time corresponds to the endpoint of the
activity. It appears that the notion of canonical form is a crucial factor,
and when there is no generally agreed-upon amount of the activity
whose canonical extent comprises C. Natural boundaries are highly
context-specific, and there are many cases when excess of activity
produces a negative result (overcook, overdose, overstep decency),
which is the usual case. the best case is when intended:
he likes his egg overfried.
lakoff also emphasises the basic starting point, namely that overprefixed words belong to this category. S is fluid-like in the container,
which has vertical sides. Path is upward and over the side of the
container, C is the side of the container, path is the path of flow, S is the
level of the fluid, but it is more than that, as semantically involves
excess, syntactically over becomes a prefix. Height of the side of the
container characterizes the maximal normal amount of fluid, relative to
some assumed norm (river overflowed). When it is beyond limit, it is
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8.1. Over (eNGlISH)
wasted and creates a mess; this regular correlation in experience is the

basis of the metaphor on which the excess schema is based:
An ACtivitY is A ContAiner for the effort/energy. (lakoff)
So our examples should include emotions (cf. lakoff and Kvecses
analysis of ANGer IS A FlUID), and time is also a typical participant
in this metaphoric extension:
Dont overreact!
Doesnt he overestimate himself?
the second example is again problematic, as excess sense is
combined with reflexive one (see below), but nevertheless realistic.
8.2.6. Reflexive
lindner discovered that in particular cases the trajectory may equal
the landmark (S = C, 1981:122), which is called reflexive sense. the
following schemas present two possibilities of the situation:
Figure 13. over reflexive sense

In one of the cases we have about 90 movement, whereas in the
second one we can have a movement ranging from 90 to 360. the key
idea in the left image is that the uppermost part of the S = C comes
closer to the canonical reference point (from vertical to horizontal),
whereas in the right image we can observe across (from one side to the
other) situations ranging from single crossing to multiple ones. there is
only one entity under consideration, a reflexive trajector, which is not
a strict entity in the first case (part of a bounded mass relative to itself
as it used to be bounded) (Brugman). An important realization of S = C
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is the image on the right, as parts of a single entity act as S and other
parts of the same entity act as C:
roll the log over. (Brugman/Kovcs)
turn the paper over. (Brugman/Kovcs)
Another variant is in which no part of the moving thing moves
above or across any other part, instead, the entity as a whole traces the
reflexive path (fence fell over, knock over the lamp, Brugman). Brugman
concludes that the left image is a transformed schema of the most
prototypical one. When discussing particles, she observes that verbparticle constructions have often been banished, having the status of
idioms, which were hardly ever studied in this respect. Intransitivity
signals the identity between S and C (he fell over himself to be nice to
her), where prepositional object fulfils C function, and perceive separate
S and C, though the object pronoun is reflexive:
he knocked the lamp over.
he knocked over the lamp.
Brugmans analysis concludes that this case seems to be transitive,
whereas we still have an S = C relationship, as S of the first event is not
crucial to the understanding of the event. metaphorical extensions
include that lIFe IS A SOUrCe OF WISDOm, CHANGeS Are
mOvemeNtS: he turned over a new leaf in his life.
8.2.7. time
the concept of time was intentionally avoided so far, as it is a vast
area of study, another global concept similar to space. According to
evans (2004), temporal experience is a pre-requisite for abilities such as
event perception and comparison, rather than an abstraction based on
such phenomena. the difference between space and tie is described in
evans and Green:
Unlike space, time is not a concrete or physical sensory experience.
moreover, unlike the human sensory-perceptual apparatus that is
specialised for assessing spatial experience (among others, the visual
system), we have no analogous apparatus specifically dedicated to the
processing of temporal experience. Despite this, we are aware of the
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passing of time. this awareness of time appears to be a wholly

introspective or subjective experience.(2006. 75)
According to evans (2004), temporal experience can ultimately be
related to the same perceptual mechanisms that process sensory
experience, and evans and Green propose a basic difference between
tIme and SPACe: while tIme has the property of progression, SPACe
is static (2006:515). thus the concept of tIme is described in terms of
motion, thus the expressions including time are all metaphoric in nature.
the interesting part is that while lakoff and Johnson (1980) describe two
models for tIme, evans and Green offer three: the moving time model,
the moving ego model and the temporal sequence model. the first two
are similar to lakoff and Johnsons two models, and the third one deals
with concepts of eArlIer and lAter. their examples are:
Monday precedes tuesday.
tuesday follows Monday.
the new aspect discovered by evans and Green (2006. 85) is that
both references to tIme relate to each other, and the ego (i.e. now) is
excluded:
Figure 14. Cognitive models for tiMe

langacker says that the fact that we often conceive and speak of
time in spatial terms only shows the utility of such metaphor for
higher-level conceptualization. It does not imply that the experience of
time is reducible to a purely spatial one; if anything, the opposite
would seem more plausible (1987. 149). He even agrees with Givn
(1979) who considers that time is in some sense more fundamental than
space: the conception of spatial relationships involves scanning, which
requires processing time, and our notions of spatial extension are
intimately bound up with time extended physical actions (e.g.
movement and the manipulation of objects). langackers examples are:
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A train went through the tunnel.

it takes only five seconds to go through the alphabet.
i went through the book in just three hours.
he can go quickly from one mood to another.
this milk is about to go sour.
these examples show the vast possibility of time to construe our
mental space as well, and all the cases connected to the schemas for
over can relatively easily include time:
time flew over this remote village.
he supported them over the decades.
i often oversleep when i shouldnt.
In Kvecsess view, time is independent from human beings, and
thus, it can be seen as an agent, like a thief or a reaper, because time
affects life and people: life is a precious possession, time takes it, so it is
a thief; people are plants, and the reaper kills people. more generally, we
understand time non-metaphorically as a changer. At this point we pay
a tribute to his huge work of mapping the major source and target
domains for metaphors: common source domains include the human
body, health and illness, animals, plants, buildings and constructions,
machines and tools, games and sport, money and economic transactions,
cooking and food, heat and cold, light and darkness, forces, movement
and direction. Common target domains (abstract, diffuse, no clear
delineation) are listed below, in brackets one can identify the typical
source domains connected to them:
emotion (forces)
desire (force, psychological: hunger)
morality (orientation, economic transactions, forces, light and dark)
thought (less active aspects are understood in terms of
perception, such as seeing)
society and nation (person/family, machine, human body)
politics (force, games, sport, business, war)
economy (building, plant, journey with movement and direction)
human relationships (plant, machine, buildings)
communication (containers, objects, and sending)
time (object that moves is the major metaphor, but it is a notoriously
different concept to understand)
life and death (journey, day, light, warmth, arrival, birth and..)
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religion (God, Father, King, Shepherd)

events and actions (movement and force) (Kvecses 2002. 16-21)
langacker states that the domain of time is comparably organised to
space. Within its vast extension, our immediate experience is always
confined to a small portion of it, and we typically direct our attention to
events and situations of limited duration. these fundamental aspects of
our moment-to-moment experience give rise to a number of conceptual
archetypes (which have a strong experiential basis, langacker 1999. 171);
setting, location, occupant, interaction, participants, and a canonical
event consist of the energetic interaction between two participants
(langacker 1999. 67). the speakers location is often viewed as a special
vantage point, and time of speaking is a temporal vantage point
(langacker 1999. 207). ribot highlights the diachronic aspect of time: it
was often personified and even worshipped in many religions (2002.
165-166), an honour never shared by space. the possible reason may be
that time has a human, interior aspect, and it opposes space the way
dynamic opposes static, although we now know that einstein had a
different opinion about it. It is also worth mentioning that
psychologically viewed , time is only dynamic, in metaphorical
expressions time can appear as both dynamic and static-like, mentioned
by lakoff and Johnson as well (1980. 43):
time flies.
the man slept from six to eight.
he jumped over the time his daughter grew up.
evans (2004) presents three major approaches to time: orientation,
concepts for time and models for time. In his view, the concepts for time
include eight senses (duration, moment, instance, event, matrix, agentive,
measurement-system and commodity), but their inspection is not our
major concern at this stage. Instead, we would like to highlight some
further cases which can hardly fit into the system described so far.
8.2.8. Other senses

Further metaphorical extensions regarding over are considered as
sub-schemas or combined schemas of the ones described previously,
for instance repetition:
he stabbed the wolf over and over again.
think it over (again).
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over is an adverb, but still resembles the previous schemas, with

extended C and contact with C, indicating motion, and with various
metaphorical possibilities: above+across, across, covering, etc. C is
understood metaphorically as an earlier completed performance of the
activity, it is the only occurrence of over with this sense, so it is less tied
to the other senses (lakoff 1987).
In general, activities with a prescribed structure are understood as
extended landmarks, and performing such an activity is understood
metaphorically as travelling along a prescribed path over that C. When
you get to the end, the activity is over (lakoff 1980):
the play is over. ( extended, contact, endpoint focus)
Your game is over.
However, we have already presented above (basic meanings) that
evans and Green have a different network system for over (e.g. transfer is
included, the above and across sense is set aside in favour of above)
based on their principled polysemy approach, whereas Sandra & rices
criticism on lakoff (1995. 91) is based on the incompleteness of the
system or the lack of clear motion types of the moving object on the path:
the boy jumped over the rope.
he skated over the crack in the ice.
they are both logically possible combinations along the three
dimensions used to describe the above and across sense of over, yet
they are not taken up; another interesting remark is the absence of
linear and curvilinear trajectories:
the plane flew over the ditch.
the boy jumped over the ditch.
they conclude that it may be impossible to posit a single schematic
sense for all usages, which is quite the opposite of lakoffs conclusion:
over is basically a preposition, but it can function as an adverb, a
prefix, a particle, and a predicate adjective. It has more than a hundred
identifiable senses, which are linked to one another by family
resemblances. Brugman (1981) has shown that the senses of over form
a category with a radial structure. (1987. 377-8)
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CHAPter 9.
MetaPHORICaL aBOve-SItUatIONS
9.1. aBOve (english)

Above becomes the synonym of over in the sense of over when
motionless. A strict upright orientation indicates altogether the distance
between C and S, but with a slight difference in the two cases: whereas over
usually remains controllable, that is, the distance is usually sensible, only
enough to avoid contact (minimal effort for success), above may be
exaggerating, keeping a distance more than necessary from C. Often
participating in constructions lacking everyday usage and sense, no wonder
that above appears more frequently in metaphorical extensions, which are
to be treated below. Another remark would be that tyler and evans (2004.
280, Note 5) warn us about the difference between above and over:
Although our representation of the proto-scene for over strongly
resembles that of above, it is misleading to translate the meaning of the
proto-scene for over with the above sense, as lakoff (1987) does.
they argue that if we accept lakoffs approach, then the combination
of a verb (jump in their example) with the prepositions may mislead the
speakers interpretation: jump over the wall may refer to either the top of
the wall or to a place higher than the wall. And now let us consider the
metaphorical cases.
9.2. Metaphorical aBOve

this preposition requires for its scope at least enough spatial
expanse to include its two participants and their divergent locations
along the vertical axis (cf. langacker 1999. 49). the schema includes
verticality of the trajector relative to the landmark and the absence of
contact between the two, which is exactly the schema described for
over (above). metaphorically extended cases are also possible, which
may come close to beyond:
this is above me.
this is beyond my understanding.
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Figure 15. ABove

In these cases there is no motion, as relationship is really important;
static sense is an alternative to over, and neither the shape or
dimensionality of S nor those of C are important to grammaticality
readings, they do not affect degree of membership in the supercategory
(Brugman 1981. 26). many details of the schemata are highly dependent
on the context, on the particular details provided by the surrounding
words in the sentence in which above/over occurs. For instance, the size
of S relative to its C is not important if S is above C, but when C is twoor multi-dimensional but upright in its orientation, S must be at least the
approximate size of S.
regier observes that part of what above denotes is the possibility of
S striking C if it is allowed to fall under the influence of gravity. more
specifically, if the direction of potential motion tends to lead S to C,
this could be taken as evidence for above. this can explain the
situation in the schemas below (regier 1996. 82-3, Fig 5.1 and 5.3),
where the direction of the motion is not enough; we need proximal
orientation: the orientation of the virtually directed line segment
connecting C to S where the two objects are closest. 11 And we need
centre-of-mass orientation:
Figure 16. regier: ABove

11. the illustrations preserve the original terms, namely tr for S and lm for C.
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let us not forget the distance closure element mentioned by

Brugman (referring to over / above):
over seems more readily applicable when the lm (C) and tr (S)
are close to each other, a restriction that does not apply to the use of
above. Perhaps the lm and tr are more easily perceived as being in the
same scene when there is some upper limit placed on the distance
which can be between them. Perhaps the closeness element has to do
with the amount of effect the tr has on the lm, or vice versa. this
cluster of senses of over contrasts with two other spatial categories,
each of which constrains the range of distance allowable between tr
and lm. these are on and above. (1981. 63)
She completes the description with a very important remark:
starting from an above + across configuration we can get to an abovescene via gradual and minor shifts:
the plane flew over the city.
the plane is above the clouds.
It is also worth mentioning regiers intuition, whose major
contribution in his book was the focus on negative examples. He believes
that when we learn a word, that one is explicitly a positive example,
whereas the others are implicit negatives (language acquisition). Our
remark here is that there are positive examples for any case, and the
moment we know or understand that case, we can find potentially
negative examples any time later; fuzzy-set theory and categorisation
may come handy here (usually when we sum up, we can mention
negative examples after positive ones). regiers contribution is vital in
bringing into focus negative examples, but it is questionable whether
on is a negative example, even a weak one, as regier describes (1996.
65), as above, or the fuzzy boundary/meeting point of them is really
relevant (cf. Brugman). He firmly believes, that when polysemous over
is learned with the full contrast set we have been using (above, below,
left, right, around, on, out of, through, in), the picture clarifies itself
considerably (1996. 168).
At a given point, above can turn into negative example for other
spatial terms as below or in. the reason for this is, of course, the human
semantic potential, which is fully characterizable only in cognitive and
neural terms (regier). langacker correctly observes that above and below
are essentially the same, the only difference lying in the perspective of S
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and C; once S is above C, and in the other case it is below C (1987. 219).
However, he offers a case when this can be solved unconventionally:
the kite is above the house.
the house is above the kite.
In the first case we can observe a normal horizontal/vertical
dimensional grid we calculate in relation to the surface of the earth,
whereas in the latter case we ignore the conventional coordinate system
(if i stand on my head).
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CHAPter 10.
MetaPHORICaL aCROSS-SItUatIONS
10.1. across (english)

the senses of across and above were already mentioned when
describing over, and we can say that the prototypical case of across
indicates the covering of a distance, where the upper surface part of the
lower entity comes into contact with S. the nature of C is a type of
obstacle, which requires lesser force to cover. this is due to the fact that
the preposition encapsulated in across is rather on than in, as in the case
of through. What is still similar with through is that the object might
remain within the boundaries of C entity, only action verbs are able to
create this relation, and the meanings of verbs may indicate superficiality
in both cases: run through, browse through, walk across. However, in its
literal meaning through is inconceivable without contact, whereas across
includes cases without contact, thus approaching to over: to fly
over/across, to jump over/across.
the central realization of this case would be the end-point focus, as
Bennett observed (cited by lakoff 1987. 441), an end-point which is in
the focus of tyler and evans as well when describing the on-the-otherside sense of over (2004. 272-3). Bennett offers the following examples:
harriet walked across the street. (path)
harriet lives across the street. (end of path)
talmy accepts that the locative sense is important, but he offers a
nine-criterial component of meaning (cf. talmy 2003, 2006). lakoff
adds that there is a natural relationship not only between a onedimensional S and a sequence of points, but also between a onedimensional S and a zero-dimensional moving S that traces a path:
sam walked across the street. (0D S)
there was a rope stretched across the street. (1D S)
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10.2. Metaphorical aCROSS

lakoff states that it is natural about the image-schema
transformation to follow the path of a moving object until it comes to
rest, and then to focus on where it is (cf. walk across the street). We
would highlight the importance of C as a potential obstacle,
impediment, virtual or real boundary, which is a possibility for the
cases to become metaphorical:
his message came across. (Kvecses12)
he happened to come across an old friend.
Dictionary definitions emphasise its crosswise orientation, a from
one side to the other side traverse, or along a horizontal line (cf.
crosswords). Here we can mention David Baileys key events, e.g.
entry and exit from C are key events. If the entry and exit are on the
same side is not similar with the situation when the entry is on one side
and the exit is on the other side. We believe that this has a lot to do with
across, but it also comes close to through. langacker offers further
examples (1991. 217), which can be easily applied to metaphorical
extensions:
harvey crawled across the table.
the team crawled across the championship.
A famous movie star is sitting across the table.
he ran across a friend.
langacker adds that the trajector of across successively occupies all
the points along a path leading from one side of its C to the other. the
profiled relationship is purely objective and makes no reference to the
ground in the first case, whereas the third case is a simple atemporal
relation:
the tr (S) does not move, but occupies a single static position
with respect to the lm (C). there is, however, a sense of directionality
and the motion of a path. to specify the trs location vis--vis the lm,
a reference point is invoked that is generally equated with the ground
12. Conduit metaphor: ideas are assumed to travel along a conduit.
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(unless otherwise indicated). In particular, the tr lies at the endpoint

of a path that originates at the reference point and traverses the lm in
just the same way that the moving tr does in the first case. Here,
though, nothing moves objectively. It is the conceptualizer who traces
along the path to compute the trs fixed location but he does so only
mentally, as one aspect of his construal of the scene. Hence the
objective motion figuring in the first meaning of across is replaced in
the second by a kind of subjective motion inherent in the construal
relation. the subjective path is an essential part of the profiled
relationship, for it determines its configuration. (l991. 217)
If we take the first schema for over (over = above + across), and
gradually subtract above, we get the perfect across sense, says
Brugman (1981. 61); she also mentions that another way to exploit
across itself is to generalize it from being relevant to one dimension (i.e.
being linear) to relating to more than one dimension that is covering.
Covering is distinguished from across in only that the former involves
an approximation on the part of S of one dimension of C; the latter is
an approximation of all dimensions of C. the obvious overlap case is
the one in which both S and C are linear, so that going across is also
covering. the generalization of across to covering then allows a new
range of shifts in details of the schemata in our first sentence below:
there is deep silence across the battlefield.
the child hurried across the street.
the second sentence profiles a locative relationship wherein the
trajector lies at the endpoint of a path leading from one side of the
landmark to the other (street). the paths source is a reference point
that usually remains implicit, being identified with the location of the
speech event (langacker 1999. 50). So it is high time to dot the i and
present the central schema for across:
Figure 17. ACross
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the last remark here is that this schema does not necessarily
represent above + through, although this version is easy to picture: we
are more interested in the interior of the landmark, or if we have multidimensional S and C, the size is relevant (roughly the same, cf. over /
across).
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CHAPter 11.
MetaPHORICaL tHROUGH-SItUatIONS
11.1. through (english)

the case study of through may resemble the case study of over, and
in a similar framework we can state that in one central case the
penetration of a potential obstacle and covering an itinerary within the
boundaries of an entity or space ensures the framework. In order to
support our statement for the romanian (prin, peste) and Hungarian (t,
keresztl, fltt) prepositions, postpositions, and satellites as well, we
can mention vasiliu 1961, vasiliu 1973, Dominte 1970 and Hadrovics
1969, Nagy 1994 and Szilgyi 1996, respectively.
Another, still basic or central sense may be when we have no
penetration just inherence, continuous or discontinuous, with
movement. the case without movement involves among:
the pin goes through the cloth.
he marches through the field.
he lives among the trees.
[el locuiete printre copaci. rO]
[A fk kztt l. HU]
the idea of obstacle is more stressed, either vertical or horizontal,
extended or not, with focus on the end point or not. Consider the
examples:
the sword went through the heart.
he went through the marsh to his friend.
Discontinuity is in fact the holes, empty spaces between the similar
entities clustering into a perceived whole, and through indicates the
route, which in english implies an effort towards a straight passing line,
unless the nature of the entity permits. Here it is worth observing that
language seems to appreciate well the balance between risk and gain,
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check for instance forest as an obstacle of discontinuous entity; if the

force is immense (e.g. tsunami), it chooses the shortest, fastest possible
way, whereas the lesser the force, the more winding the itinerary.
evans and Green (2006. 185) highlight the importance of the PAtH
schema, which ...constitutes an experiential Gestalt: it has internal
structure but emerges as a coherent whole ... the CONtAINer schema
is a concept that consists of interior, boundary and exterior elements
... Because a path is a means of moving from one location to another,
it consists of a starting point or SOUrCe, a destination or GOAl and
a series of contiguous locations in-between which relate the source
and goal.
Our through typically refers to the PAtH which lies in-between the
SOUrCe and the GOAl, and a proper analysis of through should
discuss cases when various parts are focused in the sentence. evans
and Green (2006. 360) offer the semantic network for through,
exemplified below:
(a) the relationship is through.
(b) the tunnel through vale Mountain was completed in the 1980s.
(c) she did it through love.
(d) the trip abroad was funded through the miscellaneous fund.
(e) the ball whizzed through the hole in the net.
(f) he looked through the window.
(g) the relationship seemed to have evolved through the years.
(h) the dog jumped through the hoop.
(i) the skewer is through the meat.
(j) the stream runs through the pasture.
(k) the jogger ran through the tunnel.
11.2. Metaphorical tHROUGH

let us start with regiers (1996. 105-6) observation in this case: it is
clear that the source and the destination are not the only elements in S
that are essential here. the fact that S was inside C in mid-path is also
significant. It is interesting that although it is critical that S be inside
C at some point during the path, that is, after the source and before
the destination, the exact spot along the path is not at all critical. this
is much less strict than across, so it is obvious that we have more cases
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fitting this image than the previous one. exact timing of events,
velocity, wiggling, and most other details of the motion S do not appear
to be relevant, and it is worth mentioning the central instantiation:
now its outside now its inside now its outside: see? it went
through. (regier)
this is a situation when the emphasis is on the endpoint, which
leads to a further important remark about its nature: it is a complex
entity, as the existence of a form denoting through in a language implies
the existence of forms like in and into, since the model predicts that
through would be unlearnable otherwise (regier 1996):
he went through many hardships.
the famine extended through time.
the schema is similar then to the previous schema referring to
across, but the stress is (in many cases) on the successful crossing (from
any one side to any other side):
Figure 18. Metaphorical throUgh

langacker makes it very explicit (1987. 239, 262) that S (S1, S2 and
so on, any of them representing S) and C are not uniform, as we have to
distinguish SA (before the penetration and impact between S and C), SB
(the in-relation), and SC bears an out-relation to C. the schema then is
as follows: [out + in + out = through], exemplified below in the first
sentence:
A nail is sticking through that board.
this road is winding through the mountains.
A somewhat metaphorical extension is the second example, where
the speaker scans mentally along the path of the road, or hill in a
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direction; only a limited part of the path falls within the scope of
predication at any one moment, and with the passage of processing
time the accessible part is perceived as moving in the direction of
scanning. But it is not correct: wind is perfective verb, so it implies
constancy rather than change through time (langacker 1987). On the
other hand, matlock (2004) analyses the second sentence in terms of
fictive motion language (cf. langacker 1986, talmy 1996), and
reflexivity may be another keyword when interpreting the sentence (cf.
matlock in Bergen 2007. 295).
Kvecses also emphasises the fact that the understanding of the
word through requires the notion of path (2002. 137). An accessible
metaphorical extension is the path itself:
this path will lead through many difficulties.
i know this settlement through and through.
this highly metaphoric case reinforces that this is a repetitive
schema for over (8.2.8) with virtual paths based on previous physical
experience; this is the time to remember Brugmans winding covering
sense (he searched it all over the house) combined with the concept
KNOWleDGe IS rePetItION (repetitito est mater studiorum).
Baileys key events remain hidden here, as in this complex case entry
and exit seem irrelevant, as well as sides.
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CHAPter 12.
MetaPHORICaL PRIN-SItUatIONS
12.1. Prin (Romanian)

According to vasiliu (1961. 18), covering the distance within a
continuous entity can be regarded as its literal meaning, which can
refer to going through a particular border as well. A further concrete
meaning is the indication of the approximate interior of an object or
space. However, vasiliu (1961. 29) correctly observes that covering the
distance does not imply a precise delimitation of the space traversed.
We can distinguish an entering, piercing, penetrating action
combined with the going-through movement. vasiliu highlights that
we need a continuous entity, and there is no exit from it. However, we
think that in many cases there is an exit, which comes to complete,
finalize the action itself, as in the examples below:
oamenii trec pe jos prin centrul oraului.
[People walk through the centre of the town.]
patineaz prin sal.
[He is skating through the room.]
A trecut prin cartierul nostru.
[He went through our neighbourhood.]
As we have already signalled in our introductory part, the
romanian prepositions discussed are combinations of two prepositions
in fact, and in the case of prin we can define two adjoining elements:
pe, which refers to impreciseness (cf. vasiliu 1961), and n, referring to
inherence. However, this impreciseness is questionable, as in our view
it simply indicates an entity having a surface upon which the contact
is observed, or the positioning of the route. Orientation within the
entity or space is stereotypically direct (that is, the shortest possible
way: through), but this is not always the case. Another thing worth
mentioning is that, after all, the entity or space our object comes into
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contact13 is perceived as an obstacle which is successfully penetrated,

and in some cases the exit also takes place either through the shortest
possible route or after pervading the entity or space. Nevertheless,
when we have static verbs, the preposition only refers to the inner
borders of the entity, without penetration from the outside, but
indicating an intrinsic presence:
trece prin camere cu uurin.
[He goes through the rooms easily.]
st prin cas toat ziua!
[He is staying/sitting (somewhere) in the house all day long.]
the further meanings can be associated with the particular
meanings of the verbs and nouns, and these usages of the prepositions
enrich their basic meanings, as described in vasilius 1973 article.
thus, the movement can be oriented or not (iese go out, danseaz
dance), penetration or interiority (trece pass, clrete ride), with or
without a contact between the static and the moving objects (in cases
when prin is realized without penetration), and it may be important
that there are no limits in any case (in the sense that it lacks precision
concerning the origins or the end point of the trajectory).
Dominte (1970. 238) also mentions approximation within an
unlimited space, where static verbs play an important role, whereas
prepositions combined with action verbs refer to the route, itinerary:
Cochiliile erau risipite prin nisip.
[the shells were scattered all over the sand.]
A trecut prin ora.
[He went through the town.]
Whereas prin indicates a continuous space or entity, the abovementioned authors agree that printre mainly differs from prin by the
fact that the route is through a discontinuous entity or space. the
combination of pe (on) and ntre (among) in a single preposition results
in approximation (Dominte 1970) when the verbs indicate state or
position, or in an itinerary with action verbs:
13. the situation described here only refers to action verbs, indicating movement.
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12.1. PrIN (rOmANIAN)
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Casele erau mprtiate printre dealuri. (Dominte)

[the houses were straggling among the hills.]
A fugit printre paznici. (Dominte)
[He ran through the guards.]
temporal situations regarding prin are also discussed by Dominte,
but we do not treat them here as they are considered from our point of
view as somewhat metaphorical already. On the other hand, Dominte
attributes the cases aforementioned to the auxiliary senses of pe, and
correctly observes that in fact introduces the instrumental sense of the
combined preposition prin, which are already metaphorical extensions.
He differentiates two categories of prepositions, namely principal and
auxiliary ones, where the first type refers to strict spatial-temporal
relationships, and the second category includes the other possible
meanings (other aspects, circumstances, where the sense slowly slips
into abstract meanings. Domintes conclusion is that prin and peste are
diachronically compound prepositions, and throughout time they
acquired separate meanings, so they should be treated as individual,
simple, polysemantic prepositions which are nevertheless close to the
spatial-temporal relationships. thus his conclusion can be interpreted
in the cognitive framework as trajectory (S), landmark (C), path (in one
case includes penetration from the outside and/or from the inside too,
in the other case is within the borders of the obstacle). So, one type of
prin refers to penetration (initial), going through the obstacle (oriented
or non-oriented route), and sometimes penetration (final), whereas
another type of prin refers to intrinsic presence within the borders of an
object with or without movement (depending on the combination with
an active or a static verb). the first case may be identified below when
prin1-3 is described, whereas the latter one can be observed in 12.4
and 12.5 (prin4-5); furthermore, less central cases are also presented.
According to the dictionary definitions (DeX 1998), there are at
least nine senses of the romanian preposition prin:
it introduces an adverb referring to space, when a moving object
covers a distance, or locates a moving object penetrating something:
lumina trece prin geam. [the light goes through the window.]
it refers to a closed space within which there is motion: se
ascund prin vguni. [they are hiding among the mountain gullies.]
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it refers to the space between two or more identical objects; in this

case the meaning is synonymous with the meaning of printre
there is an instrumental sense (cf. Dominte 1970): se nelege prin
soli. [It is understood through/by messengers.]
prin can have a due to, thanks to sense, which is a variant of the
instrumental sense
prin can also have a by, with the help of sense: Autorul ncepe
prin a-i expune planul. [the author starts by presenting his plan.]
stock-phrases: prin urmare [as such, consequently, so, thus]
it can be used in temporal expressions: tresare prin somn. [He
startles during his sleep.], where prin refers to in the middle of
something
prin can refer to proximity, vicinity, either in stock-phrases or in
other expressions referring to space and time: prin preajm [(somewhere)
around], de prin pdure [(somewhere) from the forest], de prin iulie
[from (about/around) July]
After searching the most important senses listed in the dictionary,
we will try to present the metaphorical extensions based on the literal
meanings and the findings of vasiliu (1961, 1973), Dominte (1970) and
Cuni (1999). the examples which come to illustrate the particular
cases are either the ones found in the dictionary14, or they belong to the
cited authors, in which case their name will be added in brackets.
12.2. PRIN1 through obstacle

In this case the prototypical participants are the moving object (S),
the static object which functions as an obstacle (C); the meaning of the
verb contributes a lot to the metaphorical meaning:
eroul trece prin foc i sabie.
[the hero goes through thick and thin.]
i iese prin piele.
[It comes out of him through his skin.= He is fed up with it.]
14 In these cases we usually have the infinitive form of the verb, which is
transformed into a sentence: a vedea ca prin ciur will appear as a sentence: vede
ca prin ciur.
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12.2. PrIN1 tHrOUGH OBStACle
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Figure 19. prin1 through obstacle

In these cases the sentences can refer to both literal and figurative
cases, as the combination of the participants permits it; we tend to call
these cases weak metaphorical expressions, whereas the examples
below get further from a literal interpretation:
trage gologanul prin barb.
[He is pulling the farthing through his beard. = He is stingy.]
l trece prin toate apele.
[She is dragging him through all waters. = causing him hard times]
the obstacle may be either a horizontally or vertically extended
object, but sometimes there are cases when this is irrelevant, as in the
example below:
i trec muli bani prin mini.
[A lot of money goes through his hands.]
It is interesting to notice that we can identify a similar expression
regarding the Hungarian t:
Multe viei (Destini umane) i-au trecut prin mini. (romanian)
emberi sorsok mentek t a kezn. (Hungarian)
[Human destinies went through his hands.]
It is our firm belief that we have to separate those cases when S goes
through C by penetrating it, and those cases when S goes through an
aperture in C. If we are to interpret the entire case, the result is the same:
S is on the other side of C, both through C and through the aperture in
C when the action is over.
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12.3. PRIN2 through aperture

each language we examine in our study contains specific obstacles
which refer to either one aperture in an object (e.g. a ring), or a set of
apertures (e.g. a sieve). these apertures are usually perceived as vertical,
but there are some cases when we can identify a clearly horizontally
extended aperture (e.g. a tunnel). Our examples below will present single
and multiple apertures which are either horizontally extended or not:
A scpat ca prin urechile acului. (single aperture, not extended)
[He escaped as if through the pin-point. = He had a narrow escape.]
A reuit printr-un tub subire. (single aperture, extended)
[He made it through a narrow tube.]
A dat prin ciur i drmon. (multiple aperture, not extended)
[He has passed through the mill. = He has seen a lot in his time.]
In these cases the direction of the moving object is straight (i.e. the
shortest possible way through the aperture(s), after which this line is
kept, but there is a special case, which blurs this straight vision, and
offers a different perspective:
s ne uitm prin prisma inculpatului.
[let us take a look through the prism/from the angle of the accused.]
Figure 20. prin through prism

It is clear that the prism offers a certain type of aperture, a unique
one, as the direction of the impetus is changed. Our last example
highlights the close relationship between prin and printre:
Arat tras (ca) prin(tr-un) inel.
[She looks as if pulled through a ring. = She looks willowy/
slender.]
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12.4. PrIN3 CreAte APertUre
12.4. PRIN3 create aperture

While prin1 does not change C, prin3 changes the nature of C, as an
aperture is created in C after the contact between S and C. the
romanian examples abound in cases when heart is involved as C; in
these cases S can be an iron rod (glowing red) or a knife if the
metaphoric expression is connected to pain, grief, sorrow, or suffering;
when S is an icicle, then the expression is connected to extreme fear:
A simit ca i cum i-ar fi trecut un fier ars rou prin inim.
[He felt as if a hot iron rod went through his heart.]
vznd fiara, i-a trecut un sloi de ghea prin inim.
[Seeing the beast, an icicle went through his heart.]
In these cases the aperture either remains for ever or leaves a mark.
However, there are cases when the aperture may be perceived as
temporary, as after S goes through it, C is restored to its initial position:
A intrat prin ua din dos.
[He entered through the back-door.]
A scpat prin ua din dos.
[He escaped through the back-door.]
Figure 21. prin3 create aperture

In these cases S enters or exits C through a potential aperture which
opens for a short period of time. It is important to mention that these
examples seem to contradict vasiliu, who states that the central sense of
prin indicates the approximate interior of an object or space without exit.
the meaning of the verb makes it clear whether there is entrance or exit.
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12.5. PRIN4 inside

this case is regarded as one of the two central senses according to
vasiliu (1961). the prototypical image contains a closed space (C), and
within the borders of C there is an S which may be static or in motion.
In the metaphorical expressions S is typically in motion:
se plimb ca vod prin lobod.
[He is walking as a prince through the orache. = He is peacocking
about/swaggering along.]
i umbl vorba prin gur.
[His words are moving all over his mouth. = He speaks a lot.]
Figure 22. prin4 inside

Nevertheless, static verbs may also be associated with prin4:
e srcie prin toat ara.
[there is poverty all over the country.]
the illustrations above show vasilius idea, according to which this
type of prin reflects an intrinsic presence within borders with motion.
When there is a motionless case within borders, then S may be
imagined either as a widespread object or as a set of scattered items.
12.6. PRIN5 through inside

We tend to think that this case is a combination of prin1 and the
formerly presented prin4, as we can identify an initial penetration (S
entering C), then a movement inside C, usually form one end to the other:
i-a trsnit prin minte c ea a avut dreptate.
[It struck through his mind that she was right.]
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12.6. PrIN5 tHrOUGH INSIDe
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i treceau multe gnduri prin cap.

[many thoughts went through his head. = He was overwhelmed by
thoughts.]
Figure 23. prin5 through inside

In these cases ideas may be interpreted as moving objects which go
through the head or mind which function as obstacles; sometimes ideas
remain, but they may as well leave. this is in similar both in Hungarian
and english:
tcikzott az agyn egy gondolat. (Hungarian)
[An idea flashed across/through his mind.]
If we want to further analyse ideas, we can also clearly identify two
more cases in these languages; the first refers to both an entering and an
exiting event, while the second case indicates only an entering event:
it goes in at one ear and out at the other.
this idea set him thinking about it.
-i intr pe o ureche i -i iese pe alta. (romanian)
l-a pus pe gnduri. (romanian)
egyik fln be, a msikon ki. (Hungarian)
szget ttt fejbe a gondolat. (Hungarian)
Kvecses describes IDeAS in terms of FOOD (2002. 73), according
to which cooking is thinking, swallowing is accepting, chewing is
considering, digesting is understanding and nourishment is similar to
mental well-being, deriving five conceptual metaphors upon these
similarities. Consequently, the examples in the left column should refer
to illness, and the most we can say about the right-hand column
examples is that IDeAS Are OBJeCtS (Kvecses 2002. 74), which is not
very satisfactory. there are other cases regarding IDeAS which seem to
be forced when trying to apply Kvecses approach (e.g. ideas pervade
the mind.), but let us turn to another interesting case regarding prin.
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12.7. PRIN6 instrumental

Domintes article (1970) offers the next two types of prin; one of
them refers to the so-called instrumental sense which is fully
metaphorical, and resembles the Hungarian keresztl instrumental. In
this case the meaning of prin is connected to from, via, by, by means of,
and the through-element is in the background, although we can set up
a similar schema to prin1, where the object preceded by prin functions
as the obstacle and the object before prin represents S:
se rspndete prin viu grai.
[It spreads by word of mouth.]
Au obinut-o prin contraband.
[He obtained it through/by smuggling. = He obtained it illegally.]
A avansat prin relaiile sale.
[He advanced due to his influential friends.]
Au fost luai prin surprindere.
[they were taken by surprise.]
12.8. PRIN7 proximity

this prin-sense is connected to proximity or approximation within
an unlimited space (Dominte 1970. 238), and in Domintes view the
static verbs are important in this sense:
st prin preajm.15
[He stands nearby.]
locuiete prin(tre) strini.
[He lives among strangers.]
Figure 24. prin7 proximity

15. Although this sense is obtained with the help of preajm in romanian (as A.A.,
one of the critics of the thesis mentioned), the overall meaning of the
construction makes it possible to be included in our description.
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12.9. PrIN8 tIme
Naturally, the verbs expressing motion refer to the route or

itinerary:
turcii nvlesc (de) prin toate prile.
[the turks ar invading from everywhere.]
the metaphorical aspect of the above sentence derives from the
expression containing prin, as it probably refers to at least three
directions, which offers a somewhat circular interpretation. this leads us
to a more clear circular movement of S around C, which is similar to the
Hungarian t cover around circular C and t cover around non-circular C:
se plimb prin jurul casei.
[He is walking around the house.]
Figure 25. prin circular

the cases described so far (prin1 prin7) may be regarded as the main
senses of the preposition (cf. Dominte) as they are connected to space.
However, there are other (auxiliary) senses as well, for instance the stock
phrases: prin rotaie [by turns], prin urmare [therefore, consequently].
It is not our major aim here to highlight similarities and differences
between languages regarding a particular preposition, but it can be
interesting to detect changes when prin or keresztl refer to the same case:
Multe viei i-au trecut prin mini. i iese prin nas. (romanian)
emberi sorsok mentek keresztl a kezn. Fln jn ki. (Hungarian)
12.9. PRIN8 time

prin can also appear in temporal cases, and according to the
dictionary , it refers vaguely to a period of time:
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se vor cstori prin luna mai.

[they will get married (somewhere) around/in may.]
planurile au fost concepute undeva prin 1995.
[the plans were drawn (somewhere) in 1995.]
In the sentences above prin indicates a shorter period of time
within a larger one, but it is not clearly delineated the exact position:
May and 1995 represent the maximum length of the action (31 days and
365 days, respectively), within which the event could have occurred
anywhere in-between the virtual boundaries highlighted by the dashed
vertical lines, thus reminding us the previous case referring to
proximity. Spatial and temporal proximity may strengthen the idea that
the analysis of prin must include both of them closely linked:
Figure 26. prin8 time

In conclusion, we can say that the romanian prin is a complex
preposition, postposition or adverbial particle, which comes close to
the english through and the Hungarian keresztl in many respects, for
instance penetration through the obstacle, covering a distance within
the borders of an object, optional exit from the object, or the
instrumental sense. regarding vasilius findings connected to prin, we
can say that we challenge the sharp distinction between the action
verbs referring to only penetration and the static verbs expressing only
intrinsic presence.
Furthermore, we have to add that not only enter-cases can be
identified regarding prin, but exit-cases as well, similarly to the english
and Hungarian cases. the romanian printre [through, among], which
can be a synonym for all prin-senses except the instrumental one, is not
discussed in details here. the instrumental case offered by Dominte
(1970) will help us describe a particular use of the Hungarian keresztl,
and identify ltal as a possible instrumental variant of t. Finally we
offer a possible network of prin-senses:
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12.9. PrIN8 tIme
table 4. A possible network of prin

Prin7 proximity
PRIN
Prin4 inside
Prin5 through inside
Prin1 through obstacle
Prin8 time
Prin2 through aperture
Prin3 create aperture

Prin6 instrumental
Imre Attila 2008
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CHAPter 13.
MetaPHORICaL PeSte-SItUatIONS
13.1. Peste (Romanian)

the issues concerning the romanian peste were discussed by
vasiliu (1961, 1973), Dominte (1970) and Cuni (1999). Before dealing
with the metaphorical extensions, it is important to check the dictionary
entry for this preposition (DeX 1998), which are listed below:
as a preposition, it expresses the idea of placing something over
something else, thus obtaining an over/above sense; the direction may
be vertical or horizontal (cover):
ploaia cade peste noi. [It is raining over/on us. = We are getting
wet in the rain.]
prul se mprtie peste pern. [the hair scatters (all) over the
pillow.]
when objects with surfaces are involved, there is either a kind of
covering sense, or covering a distance: Alearg peste cmpuri. [He runs
across fields.]
it can have a specific over-sense, which refers to circular objects
(around):
st ncins peste bru cu un cordon. [She is girded with a
belt/girdle around her waist.]
sometimes its over/above-sense can split into a more clear abovesense, with no contact:
se apleac peste el. [She bends over/above him.],
and a more emphasised over-sense:
sare peste gard. [He jumps over the fence.]
in temporal expressions it can refer to a length of time:
peste zi lucreaz. [He works during the day.]
hai peste un ceas. [Come in about an hour.], or to an excess
regarding a period of time:
A ntrziat peste dou ceasuri. [He was late for more than 2 hours.]
when it appears in-between two identical nouns, it can have an
over/cover-sense:
pune ntrebri peste ntrebri. [He asks questions over
questions. = He keeps asking questions.]
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13. metAPHOrICAl PeSte-SItUAtIONS
combined with numerals, it refers to an excess:

peste o mie de oameni au venit la concert.
[More than/over 1,000 people came to the concert.]
If we take a closer look at the possible senses above and start
replacing the constituents of the basic meanings to metaphorical ones,
we can also have a picture of the possible cases. thus we can discuss
the metaphorical peste expressing over, above, excess, cover senses and
peste referring to time.
According to vasiliu (1961), the basic meaning of this preposition
is very obvious: one object is above the other in space, and there is a
surface contact between them. the upper surface of the lower object
plays a major role, as this suffers the contact. As it was previously
mentioned, this preposition is a compound one as well, which in
present day romanian is regarded as a simple one. However, as in the
case of prin, this preposition also preserved the basic meanings of its
components, thus we can distinguish a pe situation [on] and a spre
[towards] situation (Cuni, 1999. 53). If the preposition is used with
action verbs of orientation, peste expresses the direction towards that
space, which is an upright one, very often a hovering or a covering one
(vasiliu 1961), the altitude playing an important part:
A srit peste gard. [He jumped over the fence.]
A trecut peste pod. [He went across the bridge.]
Dominte (1970) includes peste in the category of the main
prepositions expressing a strict spatial-temporal relationship, stating
that prepositions of diachronically compound origins turned simple
ones. He derives the abstract meanings from the main senses (e.g. pe),
which gradually changed, whereas Cunis more recent article (1999)
splits the main meanings of peste into three categories, expressing
spatial, temporal and quantitative relations. moreover, she observes
that in some spatial relations there is no contact between S and C, and
we can complete her observation with the remark that the lack of
contact is minimal, that is the moving object seems to preserve a
minimal distance in order to avoid contact:16
16. If contact is established, especially in combination with verbs indicating
movement (run, pass,), then peste can be translated into english with across
instead of over, and thus we get to vasilius 1961 description.
13.1. PeSte (rOmANIAN)
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A aruncat un bulgre peste acoperi. [He threw a snowball over

the roof.]
A srit peste groap. [He jumped over the hole.]
vasiliu (1973) distinguishes more cases based on various meanings
of peste combined with the meanings of various verbs and nouns, and
reaches the conclusion that the central peste contains overlapping,
contact, extension in a horizontal plan. the movement itself can be
existent or not (a alerga run, a sta stay), and if there is a movement,
then it can be oriented or not, sometimes indicating a final limit:
A pus cri peste caiete. [He placed some books over the notebooks.]
A cercetat peste tot. [He searched all over the place/house.]
A really valuable observation of vasiliu from our point of view is
when she finds the case when peste [over, across] and deasupra [above]
are interchangeable, and this happens when the noun of the
construction is perceived as an obstacle. this remark fits into our view
when we discussed above the extra effort peste needs in cases when
bypassing (not touching) the object guarantees the successful
perception of peste as over/above and not across. Cuni (1999) also
offers outstanding cognitive examples of various concrete perceptions
of peste, highlighting cases when we have initial and/or final limits,
thus peste training our mind to build up the whole prototypical frame:
noun(substitute, usually a pronoun) + verb + peste + noun,
where any of the satellite elements of peste can be missing, but
reconstructed with the help of peste if necessary.
Consequently, we can say here that the above scheme is the
prototypical case of peste, where all the elements refer to concrete
things, and the vertical and horizontal positioning offers either a
passing over an obstacle or a covering of a horizontally stretched object.
the relationship between the objects also indicates the upward or the
downward orientation as in the following (Cuni 1999) examples:
plapuma se ntinde peste pat. (downward)
[the quilt spreads all over the bed. = the quilt covers the bed.], and
erau cadavre peste cadavre. (upward, see also 13.2.4)
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[there were corpses one over the other(?)/put one on top of the
other. = the corpses were piled up.]
13.2. PeSte1 over-above

the central sense of peste is connected to an over-above image, and
the constituents are the static object (C), the moving object (S), and the
relationship between them expressed by the meaning of the verb. this
image has more variants, mainly based on the nature of the static object
and the meaning of the verb.
13.2.1. PeSte1 over-above v-obstacle no contact

In this case there is a static object which functions as a vertically
extended obstacle, and while S passes C, there is no contact between
the two objects. the root of the metaphorical sense is obviously the
literal meaning, but here they refer to something else:
l-a aruncat peste bord.
[He threw it over board. = He gave up using it.]
A srit peste gard.
[He jumped over the fence. = He exceeded the legal limits.]
A srit peste garduri.
[He jumped over many fences. = He was involved in love-affairs.]
Figure 27. peste1 over-above v, no contact

these expressions represent the first level of metaphorisation, but
once we use abstract concepts instead of concrete ones, the expressions
become more metaphoric:
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13.2. PeSte1 Over-ABOve
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A plecat peste voia prinilor.

[He left over his parents wish. = He left disregarding his parents
wish.]
13.2.2. PeSte1 over-above v-obstacle contact

peste may express situations in which there is a certain type of
contact between S and C, mainly deriving from the nature of C. the
example below offers both an over-above no contact and an over-above
contact interpretation:
Mereu trece peste mine. [He always oversteps me.]
Figure 28. peste1 over-above v, contact

In this case the most important event is the moment of passing over
the obstacle, although it may also be important for S to get to the other
side. this aspect becomes much more important when C is a horizontally
extended obstacle, as follows.
13.2.3. PeSte1 over-above H-obstacle no contact

In these metaphorical cases the obstacle is horizontally extended,
and it is important for S to exceed the borderline of C. Consequently,
peste refers to both covering the distance over-above C and reaching
beyond it:
A venit de peste lume.
[He came from the back of beyond.]
A ajuns peste (nou) mri i (nou) ri.
[He got over (nine) seas and (nine) countries. = He reached far
away/at the back of beyond.]
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Figure 29. peste1 over-above h, no contact

this usage of peste may be relevant from another angle as well; the
first sentence includes the source, whereas the second example
contains the goal (although blurry). So we can say that here we can
observe a weak from-to sense of peste, as we cannot clearly identify the
source and the goal. this is also mentioned by vasiliu (1973) when she
mentions that sometimes there is a final limit:
A cercetat peste tot. [He searched all over (the place/house).]
13.2.4. PeSte1 over-above upward

A rather complex peste expression is described by Cuni (1999),
when she identifies the cover of a horizontally extended object
combined with an upward movement:
erau cadavre peste cadavre.
[there were corpses one over the other(?)/put one on top of the
other. = the corpses were piled up.]
However, this is not a metaphorical case yet, but if we use a verb
expressing motion, we can easily obtain a highly metaphorical image,
where the cover aspect is either less important or not present:
A clcat/trecut peste cadavre n atingerea scopului.
[He rode roughshod over dead bodies for the sake of the cause.]
Figure 30. peste1 over-above upward
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13.2. PeSte1 Over-ABOve
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121
Cunis example is reflected by the first image, whereas the

metaphorical cases (b and c) refer to both an upward movement based
on the meaning of the verb and a possible upward-horizontaldownward movement, similar to peste situations described before, as
the meaning of the verb does not clearly show the direction.
Another type of upward movement can be observed in the
following examples:
Mereu i d ochii peste cap.
[She is always backing her eyes over her head. = She is always
flirting.]
A dat paharul peste cap.
[He backed the glass over his head. = He downed the drink.]
the metaphorical meaning derives from the whole sentence, and
the basic expression (a da peste cap) can be very rich in interpretation
depending on the context:
A dat toate planurile peste cap. [He changed/destroyed all the plans.]
l-a dat peste cap. [He defeated/ floored him.]
s-a dat peste cap s-i termine treaba la timp. [He did the impossible
to finish his job in time.]
Figure 31. peste1 over-above upward turn

In the last three cases the upward movement is completed by a
similar downward movement, and a closer analysis reveals that we
can also label these cases as reflexive. this means that an initially
static object is transformed into a moving one by being forced to
produce a more or less 180 turn, thus changing the initial object (cf.
t from-to tUrn).
moreover, there are further cases when the romanian peste cap
refers to something else, but this already leads us to our next type of
peste, which is a quantitative meaning (cf. vasiliu 1961, Cuni 1999).
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13.3. PeSte2 excess

According to lakoff, the spatial relationships have served as the
basis for non-spatial relationships, for instance including qualitative
and temporal ones too. In this part we deal with expressions containing
peste which have an excess sense, and we support the idea that they
derive from the over-above sense of peste presented before. Some
expressions are in between spatial and metaphorical sense (pn peste
cap), while others are only metaphorical (peste ateptri). the excess
refers to a basically upward movement, and the moving object (S)
exceeds a certain limit or level, which in english can be translated into
over, above, across and beyond. the examples found are the following:
sunt ocupat pn peste cap. [I am busy over my head. = I am
snowed under with work.]
obrznicia ta e peste msur. [You are impudent beyond measure/
limits.]
planul tu e peste putin. [Your plan is just above possible. = It is
impossible to carry out your plan.]
Ceea ce vrei e peste poate. [What you want is beyond possible. =
What you want is just not possible.]
Figure 32. peste2 excess

In the sentences above the limit is expressed by more or less
synonymous words (msur, putin, poate), and we can observe that
the sentences become more and more metaphoric due to the word
following peste. If we adapt vasilius term (1973), we can say that there
is a final limit in these examples as well, not a horizontal one, but a
vertical one, and S gets above it. In this respect peste comes very close
to the Hungarian fell, and it is irrelevant whether we have a static or
a motion verb involved in the expressions. Other expressions may also
belong to this category, for instance the ones containing numbers:
peste o mie de soldai au murit n btlie. [Over a thousand soldiers
died in the battle.]
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13.4. PeSte3 (partial) cover

the historical background of peste is described in both Domintes
(1970) and Cunis article (1999:53). According to them, we can
distinguish a pe (on) and a spre (towards) element; the first one leads
to a cover aspect of peste, and prototypically it refers to a downward
movement over a horizontally extended object. Our metaphorical
examples to support this description are presented below:
A trecut cu buretele peste incidentul de ieri. [He passed the sponge
over yesterdays incident.]
Colac peste pupz, a mai i minit. [A ring over a hoopoe, he even
lied. = to crown it all, he even lied.]
Jack i-a dat peste nas/bot. [Jack has hit him over/on the nose. = He
has put him in his place.]
In the examples above we can identify both full cover and partial
cover (last example), and this aspect can be also found regarding the
english over, above, or the Hungarian t cover or felett cover.
13.5. PeSte4 time

All the romanian authors discussing peste agree upon the temporal
aspect of it, we can only highlight the aspect of over-above-beyond the
limit regarding the temporal expressions. peste2 deals with excess, and
this means that the moving object (S) passes a usually upward limit.
this is only altered by the perspective, as time is perceived in two basic
ways. According to one perception, time is in motion, and usually
moves by fast (if it is slow, then it is clearly stated); the other option is
when time is a static and horizontally extended object and human
beings or various events pass over it. the expressions including the
romanian peste deal with this latter static time over which various
events pass, and there is no contact between the two:
s-a fcut matur peste noapte. [He grew up overnight.]
Multe s-au ntmplat peste var. [many things happened during
the summer.]
serul i va avea efectul peste puin. [the effect of the serum will
be felt over a short period of time (soon).]
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However, as time is perceived metaphorically, it can be perceived

as either a horizontally or vertically extended object.
A further discussion might include the presentation of the
metaphorical expressions regarding the romanian deasupra [above]
and asupra above/over] and their comparison with peste, and check
when they are interchangeable (cf. vasiliu) from the point of view of C
which is perceived as an obstacle. However, this would go beyond our
initial quest, and it can be a starting point of another work. Finally, we
would like to offer a network presentation of peste:
table 5. A possible network of peste
PESTE
peste1 over-above
H-obst. no contact
peste3 cover
peste1 over-above
V-obst. no contact
PESTE1 over-above
peste2 excess
peste1 over-above
V-obst. contact
peste1 over-above
turn-change
peste1 over-above
UPWARD
peste4 time
Imre Attila 2008
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CHAPter 14.
MetaPHORICaL t-SItUatIONS
14.1. t (Hungarian)
this is the most complex and with the widest network among the
Hungarian prepositions discussed, resembling much the english over.
However, when trying to describe the most common, central,
prototypical senses we try to follow the inventory below.
If one checks the dictionary presentation of t (rtSz.1992), they
can find that the first entry refers to t as an adverb referring to a place
over/through an obstacle, the second entry is t as a pre-verb (verbal
prefix, cf. talmys satellite), and the third one is t as a postposition.
the dictionary lists the following main senses of t:
from one side of the object to the other, especially on it: a hdon
t [across the bridge]
over/above an object, no contact: treplt a vros fltt. [He flew
over the city.]
crossing something: a folyn t [across the river]
through something, especially from one end to the other: alagton
t [through the tunnel]
through a hole: a kulcslyukon t [through the key-hole]
through a vertical obstacle dividing C1 and C2: a hatron t
[across the borderline]
through a vertical or horizontal obstacle which divides C1 and C2:
a falon t [through the wall]
passing by (going through) something on the way from one place
to the other: a falun thalad [it goes through the village]
during a specified time: veken t [throughout these years]
stock phrases referring to various obstacles: tzn-vzen t [through
fire and water; through thick and thin]
the alphabetical order of all t-situations was ensured by its preverbial sense, so all the listed entries and sub-entries with t have been
written on separate cards and grouped based on their meaning, which
nevertheless included all the senses of t as an adverb or postposition.
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14. metAPHOrICAl t-SItUAtIONS
We tried to describe the major senses of t in Hungarian in 1999,

which meant that we concluded our cases from the more than 1,000
cards obtained from the dictionary (rtSz. 1992), and were partially
described in Imre 1999. the Hungarian prepositions studied here are
often prefixes, preverbs (verb satellites) and t, being the most complex,
can blend the meanings of the romanian prin and peste, or the english
over, through, across. Our conclusion in 1999 was that there were two
basic types of t, and one of them creates a complete frame with inobstacle, on-obstacle, intrinsic movement with orientation or not,
surfaces describing itineraries with or without reaching a destination,
special cases when S becomes part of C:
gyngykkel tfzte a tertt.
[She threaded the table-cloth over with pearls. = She decorated the
table-cloth with pearls.]
Further cases are: the human body or animal acts as a three
dimensional C (cf. vasiliu 1973 concerning initial and final penetration
when discussing prin, or final goal oriented cases by lakoff 1987),
upward orientation with or without contact (above, over, across), where
the lack of contact creates fltt, and the contact with the upper surface
of C is rendered by fell. As it was previously mentioned (cf. the
presentation of over), we had cases of through the hole(s), turnings of
180 and 360. the other type of t appears in partial structures, where
we differentiated an initial and a final container, and the path covered
the distance between the two. However, this structure often takes the
form of a partial scheme, as speakers have their reasons not to indicate
the whole structure (obvious, interesting, focus, funny, avoiding
repetition in case of dichotomy). But for the constraint of presenting
concrete prototypical cases, we would use here the metaphor of bridge
that joins us, that is you (1) and me/us (2). However, a more recent
analysis forced us to enlarge the basic situations regarding t, and we
tend to think that there are more than two basic categories within t.
these are listed below:
t1 through (virtual) boundary/obstacle
t2 through aperture
t3 over-above
t4 change
t5 cover
t6 from-to
14.1. t (HUNGArIAN)
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As it was previously mentioned, the difference between through

obstacle and through aperture seems to be important in our discussion,
especially regarding the metaphorical cases in part two. Next to t, we
will include keresztl in our discussion. the problem with keresztl is
that we lack a rigorous cross-examination of the relationship of the two
preverbs, and we only have a clue that the meaning of the verbs they
are attached to may offer some explanation.
After having examined the t situations, we tend to think that the
central sense of t in Hungarian is connected to a from-boundary-to
complex image schema (cf. evans and Greens PAtH schema, 2006. 185),
where from refers to the source (container, C1), the boundary can be
anything between from and to, while to indicates the goal (container, C2).
However, there are very few cases when we have the whole image
mentioned within a sentence, as in the majority of cases we can observe
that we are either goal-oriented (cf. tyler and evans 2004) or boundaryoriented. If we are goal-oriented, then the source is not specified
(implied), and if we are boundary-oriented, then it can easily happen
that neither the source nor the goal is specified, but implied. this
means that all the t-cases may be divided into two huge categories,
one of them containing those cases when verb with t takes a type of
boundary (t valamin [over something]), and the other group contains
those cases when we are source or goal-oriented without taking into
account the boundary between the source and the goal (tad valamit
valakinek [to hand something over]).
t1 will refer to cases when boundary or impediment/obstacle is
implied: through-situations when the obstacle without hole(s) plays the
major role. t2 presents cases when we can observe a through-thehole(s) situation. t3 groups over/above-situations with no contact
between the moving and stable object, or over/across-situations with
vertical obstacle and possible contact between the moving and stable
objects, whereas t4 refers to changes. t5 describes the from-to
cases, and t6 presents covering senses. We can already observe, that
the first 3 cases all revolve around the same image (crossing a
boundary, going through an obstacle), which is completed by a from-to
image directing our attention to particular elements of the schema
(different types of sources and goals). the covering sense of t6 is
connected to t5, when the moving object (subject, S) spreads from
one end/side of the stable object (container, C) to the other. the next
part will present these six different t situations.
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14.2. t1 through (virtual) boundary/obstacle

this type of t mainly differs from t5 by the fact that the from-to
element is substantially diminished, instead our attention is directed
towards the boundary/obstacle. Whereas t basically refers to C1 and C2
in t5 situations, in t1 situations t refers to the boundary which
needs to be passed through. However, as this passing through the
boundary is the main goal in the majority of cases, we do not have a C
as a goal, the goal itself is getting from one side of the boundary to the
other. Consequently, our categorisation is centred around the nature of
the boundary, and based on the type of the boundary we have the
following main categories:
1. through horizontally extended boundary/obstacle (H):
tstl az erdn. [He walks through the forest.]
2. through vertically extended boundary/obstacle (v):
thatol a falon. [It penetrates (through) the wall.]
the horizontally extended boundary/obstacle can be divided into
more subcategories if we consider further aspects:
a) through = IN + tHrOUGH + OUt
tkocsizik a vroson. [He travels through the town by coach.]
b) through/over = tHrOUGH/Over INSIDe
tgondolja a helyzett. [He thinks his situation over.]
c) through/over = tHrOUGH/Over ON
tcsszik a jgen. [He slips through the ice.]
the vertically extended boundary/obstacle can be divided into the
following main subcategories:
a) through = (IN) tHrOUGH (OUt)
tmegy a hatron. [He goes through the border. = He crosses
the border.]
b) through = tHrOUGH + creating aperture(s)
ttr a falon. [He breaks himself through the wall.]
c) through/over = tHrOUGH/Over/ABOve/ACrOSS
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the route itself can further divide the categories above, for instance
we can differentiate cases when the moving object (S) goes straight
through the boundary/obstacle (tcsszik [slide through]), and cases
when we can observe a curvilinear-through (tbukdcsol [stumble
over/across, pitch and toss]). It is worth mentioning, that these two
types of routes seemed less important with t5, as we are more
interested in getting from one place to the other.
Another aspect is that through/over refers to more metaphorical
cases than from-to, and this inevitably causes that sometimes it is
difficult to distinguish whether the boundary/obstacle is horizontal or
vertical (ttr a szvemen [break through my heart, stab), it may
depend on the circumstances as well. Another matter which seem to
raise a problem, is the nature of going through it, for instance when
water is implied; swimming across a river may happen on the surface
of water, but nevertheless in the water as well. Crossing the river by
boat induces a picture connected more to on than in. So the
categorisation below may rely on partially subjective way of looking at
t1-situations, and we can conclude that the Hungarian inflections
(suffixes) are not of much help in this matter.
14.2.1. t1 through/over basic sense

the central image connected to this type of t is that during the
movement (from one place to another C1 and C2 implied) the moving
object (S) encounters a boundary, obstacle, obstruction, difficulty,
impediment, etc., and S goes through/over it. Once this happens, the
image seems to be complete, as one needs a further effort to picture
what happens after (for instance, if S went through it to get to a certain
place, cf. tyler and evans force dynamics). the proof that through/over
is not more than that is the fact that sometimes through/over means
nothing else than the movement of S from one end of the borderline
to the other, and the action is over.
the prototypical image encapsulates both when the boundary can
be regarded as horizontal and vertical, although a vertical one seems to
be a little more central than the horizontal one. However, as there are
much more cases with horizontal boundaries, we present first the t1
through h cases.
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14.2.2. t1 through H IN+OUt straight

this case refers to situations when S starts from one side of the
obstacle Probably this is the time to state that obstacles are perceived as
special types of boundaries; they are mainly explicit and they are more
difficult to get by than boundaries, as they are either more extended
than boundaries (made up of a single borderline), or they exert
resistance to S.
In this case S gets to the other side straight through the horizontally
extended obstacle during its movement :
tstl az leten. [He walks through life.]
sok bajon ment t. [He went through many hardships.]
Figure 33. t1 through h, in+out straight

the metaphorical situations come into being due to the meaning of
the verb (personification), the nature of the S or the nature of the
obstacle. For practical reasons, we preserved C, but in t1-cases it
refers to the static obstacle. Sometimes we obtain an H-obstacle by
many adjoining v-obstacles:
tgzol minden akadlyon. [He wades through all obstacles.]
the verb meaning may also create interesting situations, for
instance trg [chew over], as two separate images are melted together:
trgja magt a jegyzeteken. [He chews himself over the lecture
notes.]
In the sentence above the plural form of the obstacle makes an Hobstacle, and the meaning of the verb guides us towards a through-case
when through refers to creating aperture in the obstacle. However, the
second image can be maintained only when S refers to a mouse, as
human beings hardly chew themselves over/through anything, and the
final image is a complex metaphorical one.
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14.2.3. t1 through H IN+OUt non-straight

Due to the nature of the H, the going-through part may be rough,
full of effort (cf. the meaning of the verb) and it can only be possible if
S follows a non-straight (winding, curvilinear, detouring, etc.) way. this
route may be signalled by any part of the whole image: the meaning of
the verb, the nature of S, the nature of the obstacle as presented below:
tknldta magt a mocsron. [He took trouble with going through
the moor.]
tevickl a vlsgon. [He struggles his way through the crisis.]
Az emberisg mindig tkzdi magt a szenvedlyein. [Humanity
always cuts its way through its addictions.]
Figure 34. t1 through in+out, non-straight
14.2.4. t1 through H IN+OUt non-straight/apertures

this category contains obstacles which are created by a set of
members, for instance people, forest, sand, etc. the moving object can
go through only in a non-straight way, looking for apertures between
the parts of the mass-obstacle. this case is similar to the previous one,
except for the nature of the obstacle as shown below:
A rendrsg tfslte az erdt.
[the police combed the forest through.]
tdolgozta magt a tmegen.
[He made his way through the crowd.]
Figure 35. t1 through h in+oUt non-straight/apertures
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even if the meaning of the verb refers to a straight movement

between the parts of the obstacle (tvgta magt az erdn. [He cut his
way through the forest.]), the actual movement will resemble the one in
the illustration above.
14.2.5. t1 through H IN+OUt creating aperture

When creating aperture(s) while going through the obstacle, these
are practically created in a straight way, as this is the most beneficial
for the moving object (S). Both the basic and the metaphorical
expressions belonging to this group are small in number, as S needs a
considerable effort to create this type of through-situation; we suspect
that the meaning of verb (punch, burn through) may contribute a lot to
create this type of through-situation:
A goly tjrta a szvt. [the bullet went through his heart.]
tette magt a ksahegyen. [He chewed himself through the mushheap.]
Figure 36. t1 through h in+oUt creating aperture

However, the majority of cases belong to through v creating
aperture-situations. Another important remark is that the in+out
element plays a major role, as if we change the direction (for instance,
up-down), we obtain another situation which already contains the splitelement to be discussed later.
14.2.6. t1 through H IN+OUt over/above

this construction seemed to be highly metaphoric, as there were no
basic expressions found connected to this case. the most metaphorical
case is when all the components contribute to the image:
tzg a hbor az orszgon.
[the war roars through the country.]
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stt felhk vonulnak t az gen.

[Black clouds (trouble) pass through/across the sky.]
Figure 37. t1 through h in+oUt over/above

the duality of the movement refers to the fact that we have an
alternative way of expressing these situations with the explicit
presence of over/above:
stt felhk vonulnak t a fejnk fltt
[trouble passes through our heads. = We are in deep trouble.]
14.2.7. t1 through H IN+OUt S=route

the last case containing the in+out element is when the moving
object is in the focus. In these cases S corresponds to the route which
leads through the obstacle, and the verbs referring to the movement
offer the metaphoric interpretation:
Az t thalad a folyn. [the road leads through the river.]
Az svny tmegy a rten. [the path goes through the meadow.]
However, it is questionable whether there is a movement or not, as
the road or the path does not move. the problem may be puzzled out
by reflexivity which is added to the metaphorical interpretation. In this
respect Bergen (2007. 295) mentions matlock who was interested
mainly in the processing not of literal motion language, but of fictive
motion language. this fictive motion language (cf. langacker 1986 and
talmy 1996) describes static events and scenes using motion language.
Here are Bergens examples:
the road meanders through the valley.
the fence runs from the house down to the road.
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In the examples above neither the road nor the fence moves,
similarly to the Hungarian examples regarding t. Still, matlock (2004)
found evidence that the readers would mentally simulate motion
when reading sentences such as the fence runs along the garden,...and
fictive motion is far from being an example of a dead metaphor. (in
richardson et al. 2007. 332).
14.2.8. t1 through H IN+OUt / INSIDe

this category represents a link between in+out and inside cases
regarding through-situations. In the explicit form we mainly have a
through only inside image, which means that the moving object goes
through the static object perceived as an obstacle by getting from one
end of it to the other. Nevertheless, we have a sense that something is
missing from the picture, as we expect the finality. As there is no
explicit goal, we are left in doubt whether the movement stops at the
end of the obstacle or not:
sok neves szemlyisg vonult t a trtnelem sznpadn.
[many famous people proceeded through the stage of history.]
tfutott a problms gyeken. [He rushed through the problematic
cases.]
Figure 38. t1 through h in+oUt / insiDe

14.2.9. t1 through h inside straight
this situation contains metaphorical examples when the static
object is perceived as a type of container, and the meaning of the verb
allows a from-one-end-to-the-other interpretation. the route is
metaphorically straight:
tfut elmjben egy tlet. [An idea ran through his mind. = An idea
struck him.]
A knyvn thzdik az alapgondolat. [the main theme spreads
across the book.]
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Figure 39. t1 through h inside straight

Although we labelled the above cases as straight, when we speak in
metaphorical terms, one may have doubts to which extent this
movement is straight.
Figure 40. t1 through h inside non-straight

We tend to think the cases in the next subcategory are much more
convincing in taking them as not straight ones.
14.2.10. t1 through H ON
this type of through h emphasises the movement of S on the
surface of the obstacle, and through refers to going from one end of the
obstacle through/over the other end of it:
tvonul vonsain a gny rnya.
[the shade of irony passes through his face. = the shade of irony
appears on his face for a short time.]
tcikzik arcn a mosoly. [the smile flashes through his face.]
Figure 41. t1 through h on

As there are few cases of this type, we only mention here that there
may be variants when the movement of S or Sm starts before C or Cm and
cases when the movement starts exactly over/above C(m); another aspect
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worth mentioning is whether there is contact with the surface or not in

the case of metaphorical expressions. We tend to think that the image is
closer to the contact with the surface than with going over/above
without contact, which is reflected in the illustration as well.
14.2.11. t1 through Hv
this case seemingly has a lot in common with the next subcategory
regarding the type of obstacle. While Hv-obstacles can be observed both
here and in 14.2.12, we cannot observe a splitting aspect here. As there
is no split, we can observe a kind of tension between the meaning of the
verb and the nature of the obstacle: the verb suggests a H-obstacle,
whereas the obstacle may be either a typically v-obstacle, or it is
unspecified:
tsiklik az akadlyokon.
[He slides through the obstacles.]
tharcolta magt az ellensges vonalakon.
[He fought himself through the enemy lines.]
Az j irny ttrt a lelkeken.
[the new trend broke through the souls. = the new trend
conquered their souls.]
Figure 42. t1 through hv

the nature of obstacle is not defined, the enemy lines tend to be
linear, whereas souls is too metaphoric to be treated in terms of either
horizontal or vertical. this way this category and the following one
offer further links between H- and v-obstacles.
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14.2.12. t1 through Hv split

this case clearly represents a link between horizontally and
vertically extended obstacles; the meaning of the verb and the nature of
the obstacle may suggest both types. However, as we are mainly
interested in metaphorical cases this is less important. What is really
interesting in this case is the direction of the movement. So far we had
cases in which (with a few exceptions) the direction was prototypically
viewed as from left to right; here we can maintain this view, but here
we can also observe an up-and-down motion. the verbs thast [split
(into two)], tszel [cut through/across, intersect], tmetsz [cut (in two)],
tvg [cut in two/half] can bring about both types of motion:
tvgja magt a knos helyzeten. (left-right motion, S distances
after Ca and Cb is created)
[He extricated/freed oneself from the awkward situation.]
thastja a falut a patak. (left-right motion, S remains between Ca
and Cb )
[the brook cuts the village in two.]
tvgja a gordiuszi csomt. (up-and-down motion, S )
[He cuts the Gordian knot (in two).]
Figure 43. t1 through hv split
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the split sometimes may result in two equal parts (ketthast split
into two), but when t is involved, this can hardly happen, except for
mere coincidence. t signals only a from-one-side-to-the-other type of
motion regarding the obstacle which may be lengthwise or crosswise
and the two resulting parts should not be very disproportionate to each
other. there are further cases when seemingly we can talk about
temporary split (S splits the surface of C), which are described in 14.7.7
t6 through h on cover.
the following cases will deal with those type of through-cases
when the obstacle is vertically extended. this naturally involves that
we will have no in+out or inside situations, as the vertical obstacle
separates two sides.
14.2.13. t1 through v
this image constitutes the basis of the prototypical image regarding
through somewhat modified by those cases when the obstacle is
horizontally extended. No wonder that this case was highly productive
regarding the metaphorical expressions (54 out of 75). As the obstacle
is conceived as a vertical line, the verbs often refer to a fast motion:
emberi sorsok mentek t a kezn.
[Human destinies went through his hands. = He decided upon
human destinies.]
A gumikesztyn nem t t az ram.
[electric shock does not feel through rubber gloves.]
tverekedte magt az ellensges gyrn.
[He broke through the enemys ranks.]
Figure 44. t1 through v
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this situation may be linked to t5 from-to situations as well, as

once the moving object (S) crosses the vertical line, it gets to another
place. Another interesting case within this image is when the obstacle
is in the focus; in these cases, all metaphoric, the obstacle is used
reflexively, which has the capacity of letting S through itself:
Az veg tereszti a fnyt. [Glass lets light go through it. = light goes
through glass.]
A ruhja tltszik. [Her dress shows through/is transparent.]
Although these cases may seem at first sight that we have to deal
with aperture(s) in the obstacle, this is not the case, as we will have a
different category for these types of obstacles (t2).
14.2.14. t1 through v / over

there were a few cases when we could detect a link between
through v-obstacles and over/above obstacles; in these situations it is
important to check the relationship between the meaning of the verb
(e.g. tdob throw over) and the nature of the obstacle (e.g. akadly
lversenyen jump-horse races), and then the picture may become
fuzzy when facing the sentences below:
tkergette a lovt az akadlyon.
[He chased his horse through/over the jump.]
tdobta a kmeket a hatron.
[He threw the spies over the border.]
tnz rajta. [He looks through her.]
tlpte a hatrt. [He stepped over the border. = He went too far.]
Figure 45. t1 through v / over
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In our last example it only adds to the complexity of the image the fact
that the meaning of the sentence may also refer to overflowing/brimming
over/surpassing the (upper) limits of a scale regarding a metaphoric
container (e.g. common sense):
Figure 46. t1 through v / overflow
14.2.15. t1 through v creating aperture

this case abounds in basic meaning expressions; however it can be
very productive regarding metaphorical expressions as well. the
constituents of the image are the moving object (S), the obstacle, and
the verb referring to the motion, and all three can be metaphorical; we
present a gradual shift from basic meaning to a full metaphorical image:
Az asztalos tfrja a deszkt. (basic meaning) [the joiner bores
(through) the plank.]
Az rvz tvgja a tltst. (metaphoric verb) [the flood cuts its way
through the embankment.]
A fagy tszrja a tdt. (metaphoric S and verb) [the frost pierces
(through) the lungs.]
A merszsg tti a sors zrt. (full metaphoric image) [Bravery
goes through the lock of fate.]
Figure 47. t1 through v creating aperture
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the great majority of the verbs suggest force (punch through, cut
through, pierce through, stab through, etc.), as one can see in the
examples above, and the motion is straight; sometimes the impact
between S and C causes the latter to split into two, which may be
regarded as a minor subcategory.
A more important deviant subcategory would be when one can
discover a through v-obstacle create aperture-situation combined with
a joining element, as two obstacles are punched through only to be
joined together with the help of S, which can be, for instance, a thread.
Unfortunately we could not find metaphoric cases of this type, so we
only mentioned them here.
14.2.16. t1 through v creating temporary aperture

Strange as it may seem, sometimes the meaning of the verb seems
to offer this subcategory. the v-boundary (borderline, examination,
cordon, etc.) can be neutralized for a usually short period of time due
to an agent powerful enough to create a temporary aperture on C (a
border guard, a teacher, etc.). In other cases S is capable of creating a
temporary aperture on the obstacle:
tengedi a hatron. [He lets her go across/through the border. = He
lets her cross the border.]
tereszti a vizsgn. [He lets her pass (through) the exam.]
A np lassan tszivrgott a kordonon. [the crowd oozed through
the cordon.]
Figure 48. t1 through v creating temporary aperture

One can observe the three phases: phase 1 represents the throughmotion, phase 2 stands for the after-through when the temporary
aperture is visible, and phase 3 shows the distancing S and C restored
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to its original state. Interestingly, all the cases fitting this description
were metaphorical.
14.2.17. t1 through diminishing v

the last case belonging to v-obstacles is characterized by the way
S goes through C. C is basically viewed as an obstacle with aperturelike quality, either because is very thin or it is transparent and the rays
of light (and sight) penetrate it. However, as there is no aperture, the
obstacle partially blocks S, so when the moving object is on the other
side, it is weakened, diminished:
A beszlgets tszivrog a falon.
[the conversation oozes through the wall.]
A tejveg tszri a fnyt. [the milk bottle filters the light.]
A lba tltszott a vkony harisnyn.
[Her leg shows through the thin stockings.]
Figure 49. t1 through diminishing v

the obstacle may come closer to apertures if one conceives around
it proper supporting background; for instance, a window in itself may
function as an obstacle, but if it is a part of the wall, it is the only
possibility for the light to go through. this means that this category
serves as a viable link towards through aperture(s), which is exactly our
next category. Finally, let us offer a summarizing table of t1situations:
1 through/over BASIC
11 through HV
12 through/over HV
split
10 through/over H ON
Imre Attila 2008
16 through V
creating aperture
16 through V
creating temp. apert.
13 through V
14 through V
over
17 through V
diminishing
T1
through/over
03/22/2010
9 through H INSIDE
straight
8 through H
IN+OUT
INSIDE
6 through H IN+OUT
S=route
6 through H IN+OUT
over/above
2 through H IN+OUT
straight
3 through H IN+OUT
non-straight
4 through H IN+OUT
non-straight/apertures
5 through H IN+OUT
creating aperture

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table 6. A possible network of t1
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14.3. t2 through aperture

there were more situations within t1 when the problem of
apertures emerged. From this perspective t2 can be regarded as a
branch of t1 which presents cases with specific obstacles. However,
we think that t2 substantially differs from t1 due to the nature of
the obstacles involved here. As we are motion-oriented, we tend to
observe first the movement of S through C, but we might overlook the
simple fact that - in the proper sense of the word there is no obstacle,
as instead of the obstacle there is an aperture, a hole, an opening, a gap
which functions as a virtual boundary. Consequently, we separated
these cases naming them t2, and we accept that there are strong links
with t1; nevertheless, this is a different category.
As we use through to describe the motion regarding these cases, we
believe that these apertures are conceived as belonging to
boundaries/obstacles which surround, enclose them. these apertures
are naturally part of their surroundings, more precisely they are not
created during the motion and they are not temporary as in the cases
already discussed. these apertures are typical to be found in vobstacles, but there are cases with H-obstacles as well. In the great
majority of cases there is only one aperture, but we have situations with
many apertures as well (some objects can be pictured in fact as a set of
apertures joined together). Now let us take a look at them.
14.3.1. t2 through one aperture v

In these cases we have apertures which are to be found in
boundaries/obstacles conceived as vertically extended. the bulk of
these cases are basic, we could find few of them being metaphoric.
these abstract cases came into being due to the meaning of the verb or
the nature of the obstacle:
A holdvilg tst a tet rsn.
[the moonlight shines through the leak in the roof.]
tnz a kulcslyukon.
[He peeps through the key-hole.]
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Figure 50. t2 through one aperture v

the through-situation is observed when the S is already on the
other side of the v-obstacle.
14.3.2. t2 through one aperture H

many cases belonging to this type are connected to the rays of the
sun as S and the clouds, the air as the zone with the aperture(s).
Although it is rare it may happen that the sun shines through the
clouds in only one point, which probably serves as the basis for the
metaphorical expressions below:
A napsugr thaladt a lgrtegen. [the sunray went through the air.]
A kdn vgre tcsillant egy remnysugr. [A ray of hope shone
through the fog.]
A vonat tszaladt az alagton. [the train rushed through the
tunnel.]
We have already mentioned that there are cases when we have one
aperture involved and cases with many apertures. the next group
constitutes a link between single and multiple apertures.
14.3.3. t2 through aperture(s)

the possibility for this category to exist can be regarded to the
image created by the relationship between the obstacle containing the
apertures and the meaning of the verb which describes the motion. In
fact the obstacle we have is full of apertures (e.g. a fence, a sieve), but
we have only one moving object (S) which either employs only one
possibility of going through the obstacle full of apertures, or may use all
the apertures but they are viewed as one set:
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A szag thatolt a kertsen.

[the smell went through the fence.]
tlt a szitn.
[He can see through somebodys game/words/tricks.]
Figure 51. t2 through aperture(s)

the next case obviously presents situations with many apertures,
and more apertures are employed simultaneously while creating the
through-situation.
14.3.4. t2 through apertures

there are specific types of obstacles which can be considered as a
set of apertures; we could find in the dictionary entries curtain, sieve,
and riddle. Obviously, the metaphoric expressions are built on these
obstacles with apertures and the meaning of the verbs carry a strong
basic sense:
ttetszik a fggnyn a kert.
[the garden shows through the curtain.]
trostlta a megyei hivatalt.
[He sifted (through) the county office.]
tszrte a gondolatait / a tanknyv anyagt.
[He filtered (through) his thoughts/the content of the textbook.]
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Figure 52. t2 through apertures
14.3.5. t2 through under

the last case connected to apertures is very interesting. So far we
had apertures either on or in the obstacles, but this time we will present
that situation when the aperture is below, under the perceived obstacle,
thus the moving object (S) naturally uses this aperture to go through the
obstacle. metaphorically this situation may be employed in cases when
something illegal is about to happen:
A pult alatt vette t a brnyhst.
[He received the lamb (through) under the counter.]
Figure 53. t2 through under

there are many expressions containing the word under, and they
usually refer to something negative or not really pleasant: six feet
under, keep somebody under, be under a cloud, be under arms, be
under the doctor, under a shroud of darkness, etc. No wonder that
going under something instead of going through, over, across, or above
casts a bad light upon the motion in our sentence...
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the following table summarises the t2-situations:

T2
through
apertures
2 through one
aperture H
3 through aperture(s)
4 through apertures
1 through one
aperture V
5 through under
Imre Attila 2008
to sum up, this part has been very abundant in through-situations

as they differed due to all the components taking part in building up the
image. Consequently, we could observe many overlapping cases, rich
metaphorical extensions, and the fuzziness of the categories which were
set up based on focusing our attention on particular aspects caused her
and there that the same situation may have appeared in more than one
category. We consider this natural, not only because to err is human, but
this seemed inevitable when the changing of the verb combined with t
created newer and newer cases. the most prominent case of this kind
would be to examine the nature of examination as an obstacle. Owing
to the meaning of the verb (which we cannot be very independent of),
through our investigation exams, examinations can be perceived as
obstacles with either vertical or horizontal extension. One can go
through them either straight or non-straight (how diplomatic!), or using
a sudden, temporary aperture created on the otherwise impenetrable
wall of examination. exams can be easy nevertheless, as they also
appear connected to skimming through, of course if something illegal
happened during the examination, or S is very prepared. And the nature
of examination is only one of these cases. In conclusion, we think that
these through-situations are much more difficult to analyse than the
from-to situations. the next chapter, dealing with t3, will present the
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14.4. t3 Over (ABOve/ACrOSS)
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case of going over/above obstacles, which created a whole library of

literature in english starting with the famous Brugman and lakoff
analyses in the early 1980s.
14.4. t3 over (above/across)

When hearing t (over/above/through/across), a central image may
arise first, which comes close to the english over. According to
Brugman (1981) as well as lakoff and Johnson (1980), we have a static,
somewhat horizontally extended object (C) and another object moves
above it (S), crossing its virtual vertical boundaries, without touching
this static object:
Figure 54. t3 over (above/across)
Consider the sentences below to illustrate the image (all the

examples in these chapters are from rtSz. 1992, unless otherwise
mentioned):
A glya tszllt a t fltt. [the stork flew over the lake.]
A fst thzdik a kertnkn. [the smoke spreads across our
garden.]
14.4.1. t3 over-above vH no contact, no landing

When examining the Hungarian t3 over-above, there are some
aspects to consider. First of all, out of a database of more than 2,000 cases,
only very few examples were found regarding this image, both concrete
and metaphorical, which leads us to the presumption that his case is less
prototypical in Hungarian than in english. And, if we further analyse
them, we realise that the static object (C, for container) can be either
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horizontally extended (town, lake, ocean, garden, etc.), or vertically

extended (person, head of a person, top of a door, etc.), but at the same
time both horizontally and vertically extended (mountain). the
metaphorical situations take shape by substituting any concrete part of
the prototypical image with a metaphorical one, namely the S, the C, or
the path itself, represented by the arrow, which is the meaning of the verb.
It is also worth mentioning that in the first case one can observe that
there is no contact between S and C (above element), but it is also
important to see that in this image there is no landing present. this means
that the path is linear and not curvilinear, thus landing is not included,
contrary to the english prototypical image, a fact also observed by tyler
and evans when describing force dynamics of gravity (2004. 268):
treplt a problmkon. [He flew over the problems.]
14.4.2. t3 over-above vH no contact, landing

this image is slightly different from the previous one, as the
element of landing is already included or more than implied,
consequently the path is curvilinear:
tugrik/tlendlt az rkon. [He jumped over the ditch.]
We could not find a metaphorical case for this image, although it
would not be difficult to transform the case above into a metaphorical one.
We included it in our description, as it may represent a link between t3
and t2 (cf. through under). In this case the aperture (dent) represents
avirtual boundary/obstacle and S passes over/above it. Naturally, if
landing is implied, then there is also a connection with t5 from-to, as
landing involves distancing from C1 or Ca and approaching C2 or Cb:
Figure 55. t3 over-above vh no contact, landing
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14.4.3. t3 over-above v no contact, no landing

We tend to think that it would be difficult to name one central
image for t3 over-above, instead wed rather say that over-above vh
no contact can be split into 4 subgroups along the vH component and
the landing element; thus we obtain the following:
over-above v no contact no landing
over-above v no contact landing
over-above h no contact no landing
over-above h no contact landing,
around which we can attach more variants. the metaphorical t3
over-above v no contact, no landing contained cases when C is usually
a human being and S is a kind of threat, or the passing of time (which
is a type of threat, naturally):
A vihar tzg a fejnk felett. [the storm booms over (us).]
egy v hamar tsuhan az ember fltt. [A year glides quickly over
humans. = A year passes quickly in our life.]
Figure 56. t3 over-above v no contact, no landing

It is easy to observe that in these cases there is a tendency to use
felett/fltt [above] together with t- preverb to emphasise the no
contact aspect of the image. the verb meaning secures the presence of
movement, otherwise we would have only a static above case.
14.4.4. t3 over-above v no contact, no landing / through

obstacle
Another interesting case is the following, which may offer a
potential link between these cases and another major prototypical case,
which is t1 over-through obstacle. In this special case S is perceived
as taller than C, and there is an over-above situation with the help of
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sight. However, the case may be regarded as a link to over-through, as

the interpretation depends on the level of metaphorisation; it goes
without saying the literal background of this case:
olyan fajta ember, hogy tnz ms emberek feje fltt.
[He is the kind of man who looks over other peoples heads. = He
looks down on others.]
the sentence above explicitly states that we have an t3 case, but
this sentence has another variant as well:
tnz az embereken. [He looks through people. = He looks down
on people.],
and in this case the illustration is already t1 over-through obstacle:
Figure 57. t3 over-above v no contact,

no landing / through obstacle
14.4.5. t3 over-above (no) contact, no landing

the link between non-landing and landing images is represented
by the following situations:
thajol a korlton. [He bends over the rail.]
A fa (ga) tnylik a templom fedeln. [the branch of the tree
reaches over the roof of the church.]
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Figure 58. t3 over-above (no) contact, no landing

In these cases there is an initial C1 or Ca, but S does not get to C2 or
Cb; this leads us to the conclusion that t can be correctly used if S
passes the virtually extended line of the obstacle, more precisely, S
passed halfway through the obstacle. Another interesting remark is that
this case also represents the link between contact and non-contact
cases, as S can either touch or not C while moving. Unfortunately we
could not find metaphorical cases of this type, only basic ones, but we
included it in our description as it significantly contributes to the
fuzziness of categories.
14.4.6. t3 over-above time

the concept of time has already been included in our research. It is
a horizontally extended boundary/obstacle in which S has to go
through, or time either moves, usually fast, and passes by people who
seem to be motionless (cf. t5 from-to tiMe). In our present case,
tIme is perceived as a dot, or a virtually extended obstacle over which
S passes. the meaning of the verb indicates that there is no contact
between S and C. Here S is represented by a person/people who,
similarly to hurdle races, have to get over the virtual boundaries of
years, though they usually do not hurry. time in its full interpretation
is pictured as a set of vertical lines, representing the years:
Mr tlpte az tvenet.
[He stepped over fifty. = He is more than fifty years old.]
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Figure 59. t3 over-above time
14.4.7. t3 over-above v no contact, landing

this type is very close to the central image, except for the fact that
we clearly have a vertically extended obstacle. the meaning of the verb
combined with t assures both the over- and above-element expressing
motion (tugrik [jump over], tdob [throw over], tvel [span/arch over]):
nvsorolvasskor tugrott rajtam.
[He jumped (over) my name during roll-call.]
tlpett a hatron.
[He stepped over the border.]
Figure 60. t3 over-above v no contact, landing

It is easy to observe how close this case is to t5 from-to cases; the
only differentiating element is that the source and goal is absent. this
brings into picture t1 through boundary / borderline / obstacle, but
this is a special case, as S avoids C by moving over-above it and not
going through it.
An interesting, highly metaphoric and reflexive case can be
included in this category, when S is in focus:
nehezen tette t magt a megtrtnt dolgokon. [He got over the
things with difficulty.]
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Sometimes it is possible for S to (slightly) touch the top of C while

moving over it; this can happen if passing over C requires either a
considerable effort or S puts out minimal effort to go over C:
A lny tszkik a tzn. [the girl jumps over the fire.]
this case leads us to our next case, namely when there is contact
between S and C, although C is conceived as a vertical obstacle.
14.4.8. t3 over-above v contact, landing

Although few cases can be labelled as belonging to this image, we
consider them important when describing the network of possible t3
cases; the meaning of the verb helps us differentiate this category from
the previous one, as we can clearly build up the image:
tmszott minden trsadalmi korlton.
[He got over all social barriers.]
tcsapott a vz a gton. (understood metaphorically)
[the water swept through / across the dam.]
Figure 61. t3 over-above v contact, landing

this case is also important from another perspective as well; when
describing 3.4, we mentioned that there is a link between over-above
and through, and we can observe the same situation here. When the
obstacle contains a potential aperture (e.g. a fence), then we have two
possibilities while describing the t-case. One of them when we have
an over-above the obstacle, but the other one is through the aperture to
be found in C:
A tk tntt a kertsen. [the pumpkin grew over the fence.]
A nvny tfut a kertsen. [the plant runs through the fence.]
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the nature of the fence permits S to go either above or through it,

and the meaning of the verb is not explicit enough to decide which of
the two cases is triggered in the sentences above.
14.4.9. t3 over-above H no contact, no landing

this case was labelled as the prototype for the english over by
Brugman (1981) and lakoff (1980); nevertheless, tyler and evans (2004)
have a different view upon it, as they state there is no movement element
present in the proto-scene. Our approach began with those cases when
the boundary / obstacle is both vertically and horizontally extended,
then we discussed those cases when the obstacle is vertically extended.
We also added the element of landing, so in our analysis this case
became less central than in english. We already mentioned examples
belonging to this category in the introduction of t1, we only add here
that the metaphorical cases usually come into being due to the meaning
of the verb, which personifies S:
A mestersges bolyg tvonul a vros felett. [the satellite passes
over the town.]
the movement is linear, consequently there is no contact between S
and C, and there is no landing implied in the schema. logically, our next
case derives from this one, when we have the same type of horizontally
extended obstacle, but the movement changes to a curvilinear one.
14.4.10. t3 over-above H no contact, landing

landing inevitable brings into picture the from-to element, but
once again it is important to notice that no C1 and C2 is specified at all,
instead we only have Ss movement over the obstacle completed by the
so-called force dynamics of gravity mentioned by tyler and evans
(2004). the through-component is missing due to the meaning of the
verb, which refers to a curvilinear movement:
A np tugrotta a kapitalizmust. [the people jumped over
capitalism.]
testek a nehz tszakaszon. [they got over the hard part of the
road section.]
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Figure 62. t3 over-above h no contact, landing

We will also deal with from-to situations where we have a tendency
to focus on the goal rather than on the source, and once the goal was
specified, we may categorise it as a from-to situation (cf. t5 from-to
Close over). the last case within over-above deals with another
aspect, namely covering.
14.4.11. t3 over-above H cover

this case mainly involves situations when the verb implied refers
to seeing. Seeing is perceived as a moving object which covers a certain
area / distance, resembling covering:
tekintetvel tfogta az egsz vidket.
[His sight spanned over the whole area. = He could see the whole
area.]
ttekintette a tmeget.
[He looked over the crowd. = He surveyed the crowd.]
Figure 63. t3 over-above h cover

Considering the initial position of S, there are two main possibilities,
illustrated in the left. the sight metaphorically covers the area, and this
is possible only from an initial position which is above C.
It is worth mentioning a peculiar case. Although not explicitly stated
or marked, but when C can be located (unless not very metaphoric), one
can observe that the reference point is vaguely the ground. So far we
could see situations which are based on our anthropomorphic view
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relying on earthbound physical laws. However, we could detect a

situation, when the above schema is applied in space too, possibly due
to a mental rotation of the perceived image:
A Merkr tvonul a nap eltt. [mercury passes by the Sun.]
this is in fact a situation of over-above no contact, no landing, but
C is not situated on the ground, but it hovers in space, and it is rather
metaphorical, due to the verb referring to S and C, which also warns us
of our stereotypical thinking (in our case, typically european, i.e. from
left to right).
Finally, we will try to present a gradual metaphorisation below, the
first example is the least metaphorical, whereas the last case is the most
metaphorical one:
A villanyvezetk tmegy az ajt felett. (personification) [the
electric wire goes over the door.]
A vihar tzgott a fejnk felett. [the storms booms over.]
gondolatban treplte a bajokat. [He flew over hardships in
thought.]
Figure 64. gradual metaphorization

the following table tries to summarise the categories described in
this chapter, showing the possible links between the categories:
Imre Attila 2008
11 over-aboce H contact
covering
9 over-aboce H no contact
no landing
8 over-aboce V contact
landing
1 over-aboce VH no contact
no landing
10 over-aboce H no contact
landing
3 over-aboce V no contact
no landing
no landing
through V IN+OUT
2 over-aboce VH no contact
landing APERTURE
landing
5 over-aboce V (no) contact

no landing
over-aboce VH no contact
no landing
(gravitation)
landing TIME
T3
over-above

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160
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After going through these three t-cases, we tend to think that

their relationship is best characterized by the illustration below, where
we have cases when the boundary / obstacle is in focus, which comes
into relationship with the moving object. S can have three possible
relationships with C, described by t1, t2 and t3:
t1 stands for cases when S goes through C,
t2 stands for cases when S goes through aperture(s) in C,
t3 stands for cases when S goes over-above C
Figure 65. t1 related to t2 and t3

However, there are three more main categories regarding t, which
enlarge its usage. t4 refers to a specific relationship between S and C,
namely when the impact of the moving object is so large upon the static
one, that S changes C either partially or completely, t5 from-to,
which comes to complete t1, and t6 refers to cases when one can
observe a certain type of covering (cf. through h-obstacle on covering
and over-above h covering).
14.5. t4 CHaNGe
We have already been faced with this facet of t, when the impact of
S upon C is huge enough to produce a change within C, either partially
or completely. the changes met so far were only a so-called side-effect
of the various cases, and here is a summary of them, including those
which we will discuss in the following chapters as well:
t1 through h-obstacle inside creating aperture
t1 through v-obstacle creating aperture
t1 through v-obstacle creating temporary aperture
t5 from-to ChAnge s 1 to s2
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t5 from-to ChAnge s to s
t5 from-to ChAnge replacement
t6 cover ChAnge
t6 cover ChAnge AgAin
the list signals the importance of change among the t-situations,
yet it is not complete. In the following we will try to highlight those tcases whose main constituent is change itself. this change is mainly CC type, and not C1-C2 type. We tend to think of them as either
special through-cases, when the object has to go through a virtual
borderline / boundary to be accepted as changed, or
special type of from-to cases, when the change is within C; in
these cases we can think of a passive-like construction, where the focus
is on the endpoint of the action
Consequently, the prototypical image is represented by those cases
when S approaching C from the outside brings about a change within
C, and it is not specified what happens with S after this event. We
could, interestingly, distinguish two further important subgroups of the
prototype, namely when S heats up C, and cools it down, respectively.
We will also discuss changes combined with the again-aspect, coveraspect and add delete-aspect.
14.5.1. t4 change C-C (into) through inside

these cases are highly metaphoric, which means that it can easily
happen that all the constituents of the image contribute to the final
metaphorical image: S, C and the meaning of the verb. Another
perspective to look at changes, is to take them as special types of t1cases, as S goes through C, but changes can also be viewed as t5 fromto cases as well, as C reaches from StAte1 to StAte2. the examples
below show a gradual metaphorisation:
trendezi a hivatalt. [He reorganizes his office.]
talaktja a kormnyt. [He changes the cabinet.]
tadja magt egy rzsnek. [He lends himself to a feeling.]
A trsas lt tformlta az egynisgt. [the social life changed his
personality.]
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Figure 66. t4 change C-C (into) through inside

On the one hand it is worth mentioning that when these cases are
translated, one can hardly include over, across, above, through, and on
the other hand S contributes so actively to this transformation, that it
either melts into C, or it is also changed by the impact with C,
especially in the case of the next two situations.
14.5.2. t4 change C-C into through inside HOt

Surprisingly many cases were found when the change within C is
due to a thermal event; in these cases S is hotter than C and the latter is
heated. the verbs expressing this event are either active or passive: tft
tfl, thevt thevl, tmelegt tmelegl, tizzaszt tizzad,
tget tg, tst tsl [heat up, get hot / warm, become heated up,
make ot sweat, burn something through, shine through something, be
(well) done]. Strong positive or negative feelings are typically employed
as sources of heat, whose target are often body parts (e.g. heart, face,
cheek) or things connected to body parts (e.g. voice):
ttzesedett a hangja. [His voice became red-hot. = His voice filled
with emotions.]
tforrsodott a nztr. [the auditorium heated up.]
thevti az indulat az arct. [the temper heats up his face. = He
gets worked up.]
Kvecses (2002) extensive analysis regarding ANGer resulted in
many conceptual metaphors. thus we can say that anger is: a hot fluid
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in a container / a natural force / excess qi17 in the body / fire / heat /

in the heart, and these metaphors are reflected in our examples too.
14.5.3. t4 change C-C into through inside COLD

the occurrence of metaphorical expressions involving cooling
down is about one third compared to heating up. typical verbs are tht
thl, tfagy, tfzik, that [cool down, cool something down, freeze
over, gets cold, cold penetrates something], and the cold source may be
the weather (e.g. cold water, rain), whereas the metaphorical target can
be the human body itself or particular body parts, especially the heart:
thti magt. [He chills himself through.]
egszen tfagyott. [He froze (all over).]
A hideg thatja testt. [Cold penetrates his entire body.]
Without blowing hot and cold, one can easily observe that both the
hot and cold metaphorical expressions involve hyperbole in order to
render either feelings or the desperate situation.
14.5.4. t4 change C1-C2

these type of changes are much more profound than the previous
ones; the meaning of the verb sometimes clearly expresses the nature of
change (e.g. convert, rebuild, reconstruct, rename, etc.), but in many
cases the way of change relies on the imagination of the interpreter: turn
over, transforms into, change / transform / transmute something into
something by magic. Among the very typical changes of this type we can
find conversion of money, changing profession, transforming a literary
work of art, switching languages, etc., and the metaphorical changes are
the quadruple of the concrete ones. Here are some examples:
A munka termke tlnyeglt ruv. [the product of work changed
to consumer goods.]
tanrrl tnyergelt jsgrnak. [He changed his profession of
teacher to journalist.]
17. this was identified in Chinese by Brian King (1989) cited by Kvecses who
explains: Qi is energy that conceptualized as a gas (or fluid) that flows through
the body and that can increase and then produce an excess. (2002:168).
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Bartsguk tszellemlt. [their relation was pervaded by

friendship.]
Whereas changes of C-C type can be regarded as partial changes
within C, this type of change completely transforms C (reminding us
from-to situations, as from C1 we get to C2); in many cases (due to the
meaning of the verb) the nature of S or its way of action upon C remains
unknown, sometimes the change of C is merely a matter of time:
Figure 67. t4 change C1-C2
14.5.5. t4 change C-C tRIMMING

less minor changes within C can be described as only adding or
deleting something of C. these types of changes are typical of written
pieces of work, and adding or deleting mainly refers to stylistic changes:
tstilizlja a szerkeszt a cikket. (adding and deleting) [the editor
stylizes (over) the article.]
tpolitizlja a tananyagot. (adding) [He adds political overtones to
the material.]
However minor these changes may seem, they are still important
enough to observe them, consequently C turns into C.
14.5.6. t4 change aGaIN

these cases may be considered as an alternative to the previous
case, as trimming already involved (implied) a hidden again sense, as
sometimes in order to be able to add or delete one needs to go over C
repeatedly. However, here the again aspect is stronger, and the changes
are deep enough to cause controversy when deciding whether we are
faced with a C-C or a C1-C2 change:
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14.6. t5 FrOm-tO
tdolgozta a regnyt. [the novel has been re-written.]

tfogalmazta a bonyolult mondatokat. [the ponderous sentences
have been re-composed.]
A tvlatot trajzolta. [the perspective has been re-drawn /
sketched.]
On the one hand when something is redrafted, adapted (to the
stage), the core should be preserved, but it comes very difficult to state
whether we obtain a new piece or not. We may well remember this case
when describing another type of t through / over AgAin, where
repetition will only mean going through C again in order to better
remember it later, but without changing C at all. Again will be met as
well when discussing t6 cover, which contains cases both with
change and again, where the element of cover suggests that this change
primarily happens on the surface.
We tend to think that the cases described in this part refer to those
changes which bring about essential changes within C. the
relationship between t4-situations is presented in the table below:
T4
change
5 change C-C TRIMMING
6 change AGAIN
1 change C-C (into)
through inside
2 change C-C (into)

through inside HOT
4 change C1-C2
3 change C-C (into)

through inside COLD
Imre Attila 2008
14.6. t5 from-to
the central sense of t5 refers to cases when the obstacle is not as
relevant as the source (C1) and the goal (C2). In many cases we know
that there is a boundary / borderline / obstacle only due to the pre-verb
(verbal prefix, satellite), but the middle element (boundary) is only
implied. While mapping the various sub-cases of t5, we could
conclude that the from-to situation has at least three main possible (and
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very productive) variations; the most important of them can be labelled

as duality of the source and goal, and we can often identify this
situation when pairs of antonyms are involved: black and white, friend
and enemy, left and right, etc.
Duality leads to another keyword, namely closeness, as it often
happens that these pairs of participants are close to each other, and the
third important subcategory is change while there is a from-to shift,
either close or distant. this change can be viewed as a transition from
one state to another, and it can be marked either as S-S (alteration) or
S1-S2 (complete change). Nevertheless, there are less productive
situations from the central sense, for instance when both the source and
the goal are specified (we are usually goal-oriented), cases when the
source or the connection between from and to is highlighted, but we
can distinguish cases when from-to refers to again (cf. the english over
and over again), or the from-to marks a complex schema, where the
from-to is completed with a to-from movement as well (send somebody
over for). In the following we present all the situations we could
distinguish within t5.
14.6.1. t5 from-to basic sense

the central meaning of t5 mainly contains situations when the
implied obstacle derives from the meaning of the preverb t, and we
have the goal mentioned. In many cases the boundary / obstacle is not
important or its nature is unknown (e.g. tkerl [it gets on the other
side]). the full image contains both the source and the goal, although in
the overwhelming majority of cases the source is not mentioned (we are
target-oriented). Consequently, the central sense may be illustrated as
shown:
Figure 68. t5 from-to basic sense
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there were extremely few cases when both the source and the goal
were specified (4 basic and 13 metaphoric cases), and among the
possible explanations we can mention the possibility of tracking the
potential source based on the goal (cf. duality below), or that we are
goal-oriented:
tmenti a holmit a hzbl egy biztos helyre. (basic) [He saves the
stuff from the house to a safe place.]
Az apa tplntlta fiba a gylletet. (metaphoric) [the father
planted hatred into his son.]
14.6.2. t5 from-to GOaL ONLy

We found 54 concrete situations and 105 partially or completely
metaphorical ones, which obviously derive from the previous ones.
the possible ways of transforming a basic meaning into a metaphorical
one are the following:
1. metaphoric subject (the object of the sentence): tadja
tapasztalatt a fiatalnak.
[He hands his knowledge over to the young person. = He shares
his knowledge with the young person.]
2. metaphoric verb: ttereli a szt Jskra. [He diverts the
conversation (over) to Joe.]
3. metaphoric source and / or goal: tnyergel ms terletre. [He
changes the subject / topic.]
4. the combination of the previous ones: tadta lelkt az rnak.
[He gave his soul (over) to the lord.]
Figure 69. t5 from-to goAl onlY

It is worth mentioning that very productive cases are hand over, go
over, and take over concerning the metaphoric constructions, and in
many cases it is very easy to recover the original source of the
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movement. However, it is not typical to find source and goal in the

construction except for very rare cases, which can be taken as the full
prototypical image of t, where there is a double focus: on the one hand
the source and / or the goal (C1 and C2), and on the other hand the
medium through / over / across which S has to pass:
pista tcsempszte a bartjnak a puskt a vizsgn.
[Steve smuggled the cheat-sheet over to his friend during the
exam.],
where Pista (Steve) is the source of S, the cheat-sheet is the S; the
obstacle / impediment may be represented by the teacher, whereas the
exam itself stands for the setting.
In the following cases we will discuss further from-to cases, where
the central image schema slightly changes in certain aspects.
14.6.3. t5 from-to SOURCe ONLy

It was very hard to find cases when only the source was specified,
and still preserve the canonical here-there view. this view in fact
means that the canonical situation describes a here-there movement
(distancing) while creating the from-to image. the possible ways of
metaphorisation are presented below, showing that the source, the
movement itself (meaning of the verb), and the subject itself (the
moving object) can be metaphoric:
Az gyszsg tadta a vdlottakat. [the public prosecutors
department handed over the accused.]
A j kedly trkldik a szlkrl. [Good spirits is inherited
(over) from parents.]
Figure 70. t5 from-to soUrCe onlY
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In these cases the canonical distancing is shown in the illustrations

with arrows from left to right, whereas the next case differs mainly from
this one regarding the direction of the arrow.
14.6.4. t5 from-to tHeRe-HeRe

In these situations the directionality changes as specified in the
title; the source lies in the distance and the subject moves towards the
speaker, or to a place closer to the observer. this viewpoint can be
signalled by the meaning of the verb (tjn [come over]), the distant
source (a tloldalrl [from the other side]) or the goal (hozznk [to our
place]; ide [here]). All in all, we could find 17 metaphorical cases with
either the source or the goal specified:
thozza az sszeget erre az oldalra.
[He brings the sum over to this page. = He brings forward the sum.]
Az eszme that a szomszd orszgbl.
[the idea spreads (over) from the neighbouring country.]
Figure 71. t5 from-to there-here

In the situations presented so far we either had from-to or to-from
movement, but there are also cases, when one can hardly tell the
direction of the movement. this can happen in cases when neither the
source or the goal is specified, as follows below.
14.6.5. t5 from-to BOtH directions

In very rare cases there is a possibility of bidirectional
interpretation of the image; this is possible only when neither the
source or the goal is specified as in the example below:
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tzen pr gorombasgot. [He sends / showers abuse (over) to the

neighbour.]
thangzik az gysz. [One can hear (over) the cannon-shot.]
Figure 72. t5 from-to Both directions

If we want to interpret the sentence above, we can have two
possibilities:
a) thangzik az gysz az erdn tlra. [the cannon-shot (from
here) can be heard over-across the forest.]
b) thallatszik hozznk az gysz az erdn tlrl. [(at this point)
the cannon-shot can be heard from across the forest.]
14.6.6. t5 from-to aCtION

In particular cases, when the source and goal are not specified,
there is a possibility of focusing the image on the movement. the action
itself, expressed by the t-prefixed verb, becomes important exactly
due to the lack of explicit source and goal, and we could find 5 basic
and 18 metaphoric situations of this type. Here are some metaphoric
examples:
A jtkos tigazolt. [the player has been transferred (over).]
A szerencse tprtolt. [luck has changed sides.]
Figure 73. t5 from-to ACtion

If we want the whole image, usually it easy to complete the above
cases (from one team to the other, from one person to the other, from
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14.6. t5 FrOm-tO
one place to the other), but the central idea, we believe, is that the
action of transition is important in itself. this obviously raises the
question of the obstacle, but in the above situations we can only detect
an implied, mainly virtual obstacle (separator).
14.6.7. t5 from-to BRIDGING

this image can be regarded as a different case compared to the
previous ones, as it either seems to bridge two parts of the same kind (Ca
and Cb), or two relatively close entities (C and C), we could find 10 basic
and 7 metaphoric cases. the basic verb here is thidal [to bridge a gap], but
the verb tbeszl [talk over] can also function effectively here, as follows:
Az elnk prblja thidalni a nzeteltrseket. [the president is
trying to bridge the clash of views.]
Az rok egyik partjrl tbeszlnek a msikra. [they are talking
over the ditch.]
Figure 74. t5 from-to BriDging

It is important to observe in these cases that the link between the
two types / parts of C is only virtual, and the people involved have to
create the connection. However, there is a subcategory of this case,
when there are no people involved.
14.6.8. t5 from-to CONNeCtOR

As we forecast in the previous section, there is an interesting case,
where a personified connector is highlighted. this either creates a link,
or leads from one place to the other. We were able to find 4 metaphoric
cases of this type, which is small in number, but derives from two verbs
(tvisz [take over to] and tvezet [lead over to]) indicating that it is not
an isolated case:
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Az t tvisz a szomszd faluba. [the road takes / leads (over) to the

next village.]
ez a fejezet tvezet a kvetkez rszhez. [this chapter leads (over)
to the next part.]
Figure 75. t5 from-to ConneCtor

Although it may seem trivial, this case may have an important role
within the t-network. Based on the dictionary definition, this
connection may be linked to situations when two types of C are close
to each other (t5 from-to Close), but it may also be relevant in cases
when taking or leading from one place to another involves a hole-like
obstacle (t2 through CreAting ApertUre). And it is worth
noticing that in all the cases met here t can be replaced with el,
another preverb meaning away...to. However, the choice of preverb is
not arbitrary, as when an idea of obstacle / boundary is involved we
tend to use t, which is not present in the case of el:
Az t elvisz a szomszd faluba. [the road takes us to the next
village.]
ez a fejezet elvezet a kvetkez rszhez.[this chapter leads us to
the next part.]
14.6.9. t5 from-to UP
As we mentioned before, the canonical view of from-to image is
from left to right, and the source and goal are more or less at the same
altitude. However, there were three cases, one basic and two abstract,
when the motion was purely upwards, still preserving the from-to shift.
In the case of the basic meaning it was the verb that signalled the
upward movement (temel [lift over]), whereas in the abstract cases we
can observe the words in bold referring to the upward movement:
A dnts tszll felsbb brsgra. [the decision flies over to the
court of the first instance. = the decision is in the hand of court of the
first instance.]
tsoroltk magasabb beosztsba.
[He was transferred (over) to a higher duty. = He was promoted.]
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14.6. t5 FrOm-tO
Figure 76. t5 from-to Up
14.6.10. t5 from-to tURN

A from-to movement can also be obtained, for instance, by
switching a button. As a result, the button moves from a particular
position to a different one, and the meaning of the verb reflects this
transition:
tcsavarja a rdit egy msik hullmhosszra.
[He switches the radio(button) (over) to another wavelength.]
tfordtotta a beszlgetst egy msik tmra.
[He turned the conversation over to a new topic. = He changed the
topic.]
Figure 77. t5 from-to tUrn

Whereas the first sentence hides a metonymy (not the whole radio
is switched, only a button, which is a part of the radio), the second
sentence offers an image of a possible interpretation regarding speech;
here, speech is viewed as a round object (e.g. a button) which can be
switched to various speech-stations, namely themes. Another common
element regarding the two sentences is the fact that this switch merely
refers to a different position on a circular-like path, and t refers to the
transition itself. this may be an important remark from the perspective
of a different approach to from-to situations, namely duality. Without
duality, in these cases we cannot really define the degree of the turn, that
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is, if we have four different positions, we can turn from any position to
any different one in both directions! Another remark is that if we do not
switch the (virtual) button from a predefined point (source, any of 1, 2,
3, or 4) to another predefined one (goal), then we obtain an el [away]situation (elcsavarja a rdit egy msik hullmhosszra. [He switched
the radio to another wavelength.] elterelte a beszlgetst egy msik
tmra. [He turned the conversation to a new topic.]), but el- can be even
considered as synonym of t- in this schema. the illustration suggests
that a possible starting point is 1, and we can switch from 1 to either 4,
3, or 2, switching upwards or downwards.
Change may be another completing element of the image, as while
switching we change the position of S. Generally speaking, change is
usually possible when the source is relatively close to the goal, even if
they are opposite. the next three larger subcategories of from-to give an
insight to duality, change and closeness.
14.6.11. t5 from-to DUaL

Duality pervades our entire life, we often tend to categorise the
world into clear-cut pairs: black and white, up and down, here and there,
this and that, friend and enemy, to name just a few. Our background
knowledge only adds to these categories, as we will have cases when t
will only be justified if we know a particular situation. Duality may be
found in our bodily experience as well, as even our body-structure
contains dual parts: left and right seem to be the keywords here, as our
eyes, ears, arms, legs, kidneys, etc. can be easily and precisely referred to
with these words. Further location is also possible with left and right,
when we combine them with side. these combinations (left side, right
side) have given birth to various metaphorical expressions, some of
which will be presented in the following.
14.6.12. t5 from-to DUaL separate C1 and C2

In the situations below we mainly have pairs of antonyms which
stand for C1 and C2 (friend / us enemy, city countryside,
government rebels), and t refers to the transition from one side to
the other. the meaning of the verb in these cases is not clear enough to
specify the way this transition takes place, or it expresses a metaphoric
transition:
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175
tvndorolt az ellensghez. [He went over to the enemy. = He

changed sides.]
ttrt bks tra. [He went (over) to a peaceful road. = He became
peaceful.]
Figure 78. t5 from-to DUAl separate C1 and C2, central

the illustration presents a central image, but there are more
possibilities to obtain a metaphorical transition, if any of all the
constituents are metaphoric: either C1 or C2 or both, the movement
itself (cf. meaning of the verb), or the moving object (S). thus we obtain
the following illustrations:
Figure 79. t5 from-to DUAl separate C1 and C2, metaphorical

verbs of seeing easily create situations fitting into this category:
tlt / tnz a tls partra. [He looks over the other river bank. =
He can see as far as the other river bank.],
and this image turns into more metaphoric, if the source is personified:
A hz ablakai tnznek a tls partra. [the windows of the house
look out onto the other river bank.]
A variant of the t5 from-to DUAl situations requires a special
background knowledge. many t-situations imply the duality of
Budapest, the capital city of Hungary, which came into being by merging
two smaller cities on the banks of the Danube, namely Buda and Pest. If
we have this knowledge, it comes easy to interpret the sentences below:
tkvnkozik Budra. tcsbtottk Budrl pestre.
[He longs (over) to Buda. He was lured from Buda over to Pest.]
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Another type of background knowledge is necessary when we have

historical sentences. A clear example may be the kuruc-labanc duality,
referring to the anti-Hapsburg and pro-Hapsburg army in the 17th and
18th centuries in Hungary:
tllt a labancokhoz. [He went over to the pro-Habsburg army. =
He became a pro-Hapsburg.]).
A possible link between t5 from-to DUAl and t1 through
vertical obstacle may be signalled by the verb thatol make ones way
to / through, which was originally counted for t5, but the meaning
of the verb brings into focus the boundary / obstacle. Yet, those cases
where the goal was explicitly stated in the sentence have been
preserved for t5 in contrast with those t1 cases when only the act
of penetrating the obstacle was important, without mentioning either
the source or goal (cf. t1 through CreAting ApertUre).
the following from-to DUAl situations are linked with t3 over or
t1 through cases, but in in the following cases we always have
explicitly stated source and / or goal, whereas t3 over and t1
through has much more less to do with either the source or the goal,
both focusing on passing the borderline / obstacle either over / above or
through it.
14.6.13. t5 from-to DUaL over

In spite of the fact that it was difficult to find this case, the meaning
of the verb and the explicit source or goal offered a clue. this situation
is typically concrete, although theoretically it is easy to switch from
basic to metaphoric meaning. Out of the thirteen cases found five were
metaphorical:
tugrott a msik tmra.
[He jumped (over) to another topic.]
tdobja a csapatokat az szaki arcvonalra.
[He threw the troops (over) to the Northern front-line.]
Folyton tesik a l tls oldalra.
[He falls (over) on the other side of the horse. = He always swings
to the other extreme.]
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Figure 80. t5 from-to DUAl over

the last sentence clearly stems from a basic bodily experience, but
the context in which it occurred was a metaphoric one, namely when
somebody drastically changes their attitude concerning something.
14.6.14. t5 from-to DUaL through (on)

In these cases, due to the meaning of the verb, we have a stronger
presence of the horizontal obstacle (yet implicit), and the moving object
(S) gets from the source to the goal through the obstacle mainly on it:
A villamos tjr Budra. [the tram goes (over) to Buda.]
ttr a tloldalra. [He crosses over to the other side.]
Figure 81. t5 from-to DUAl through (on)

the illustration tries to show that the horizontal obstacle from one
point of view connects C1 and C2, but at the same time separates them
as well, especially employing their surface area. A further refinement
of the above image is when either the separator-connector obstacle is
mentioned in the structure, or the goal is focused. thus we further
defined a -focus case and a C2-focus situation.
14.6.15. t5 from-to DUaL -focus

In these situations duality is activated by our background
knowledge: if we are to cross a bridge, a river, or go along a corridor, we
know that there is another side, and our presupposition was that once
the obstacle between C1 and C2 was mentioned, it has to be important.
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these obstacles are symbolized with , as their surface is highly

relevant in the structure; we have rivers, lakes, corridors and bridges in
the sentences specified whose surface make the crossing possible; the
situations are mainly concrete (16 out of 21 cases), but there were
metaphorical cases too:
A nagy zaj tvonult a folyosn az eladterembe. [the huge noise
spreaded over the hall to the lecture room.]
tszlltak a csapatok a hdon / a folyn a tls partra. [the troops
(flew) went (over / across) the bridge / over the river to the other side.]
Figure 82. t5 from-to DUAl -focus

In the second case the choice of the verb can be regarded as
metaphorical, as flying is not possible on the bridge or river, it may only
refer to the easiness of crossing. However, if one crosses a river easily
this can be due to a vehicle on water, which is not specified in the
sentence.
14.6.16. t5 from-to DUaL C2-focus

Although not very many cases could be labelled as describing this
situation, they slightly differ from the previous cases, as is not
explicit in the sentences any more, but only implied. However, the
nature of can be easily reconstructed from C2 (the other side, the
other bank) and, respectively, from the verb meaning (pass through, go
over, skate over, etc.):
ttette lakhelyt a Dunntlra.
[He moved to Dunntl, a place over the Danube in Hungary.]
A vihar thajtotta a madarakat a tls partra.
[the storm chased the birds over to the other river bank.]
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Figure 83. t5 from-to DUAl C2-focus

All the cases of duality involved a more or less linear movement
from C1 to C2, except for one case, where over referred to an upward
then a downward movement, but still viewed as a linear transition
reaching from one place to another . Yet, there is another type of
movement connected to duality, namely turn. the last case connected
to duality presents this special movement.
14.6.17. t5 from-to DUaL turn

this turn is fixed as it has two positions (cf. t5 from-to tUrn);
one of them is about 180, whereas the other one is about 360, that is,
the moving object (S) gets back to its original starting point making a
circular movement. We called this a fixed turn, referring to the fact that
the moving object is somehow fixed to the static object (C) in case there
is one, and S does not turn around itself, adding a kind of reflexive
aspect to the image (S = C). the movement is nevertheless dual,
because S turns around either halfway (dual) or completely (doubling
this duality). Interestingly, in its basic sense a halfway turn (180-turn)
results in an opposite state (e.g. from one side to the other side),
whereas a complete turn (360-turn) results in getting back to the
original state, and except for the turn nothing changes. However,
when a metaphorical turn is implied, the 180-turn refers to a complete
change of the original state, whereas a 360-turn will produce the same
opposing state or attitude as the 180 one, but the full turn may be
taken as an emphasised form of the 180-turn:
thajtott az lete knyvben egy msik oldalra. (180 turn) [He
turned over a new leaf.]
teljesen tfordult a magatartsa. (180 or even anything between
180 - 360 turn)
[He completely changed (his attitude.)]
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Figure 84. t5 from-to DUAl turn

However, in the second case, we can hardly imagine any C, except
for a virtual one as a guiding line, but if S = C, then the original image
schemas may take shape as illustrated in Fig. 84.
14.6.18. t5 from-to DUaL highly metaphorical

In the last part we would like to offer further from-to dual cases
which are based on the previous images, but these are highly
metaphorical:
tvitte a trtet az egyenlet tloldalra. [He brings the fraction over
to the other side of the equation.]
tsiklott a gyakorlat elmletre. [the practice skated (over)
to(wards) theory.]
nem kvetlek mert nem vlt t az agyam. [I cannot follow you as
my brains cannot switch over. = that is beyond my brains now.]
tged knnyen tejtenek. [You can be easily dropped over. = You
can be easily fooled around.]
Now, at the end of from-to dual situations we can turn towards a
further group of from-to cases, as duality also implied in various
examples a certain closeness between C1 and C2. In the next part we will
switch our attention towards situations, in which C1 and C2 are viewed
as close to each other, still preserving the general from-to schema.
14.6.19. t5 from-to CLOSe vicinity

As we mentioned above, sometimes closeness is related to duality.
Still, within this category we grouped cases when in the concrete
meaning C2 is often represented by the (next-door) neighbour(hood). In
the basic meaning, the obstacle may be the neighbours fence, door or
the walls of their house, or it is only implied (based on the verb
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meaning). In the metaphorical cases (21 found) there is usually an

implied obstacle between C1 and C2 (a virtual line), and the vicinity is
also supported by the meaning of the verb (spread over, step over,
expand over, stretch over):
A fertzs tterjedt a lbra is. [the infection spread over onto the
leg too.]
tviszi a mssalhangzt a kvetkez sorba. [He wrote the
consonant in the next line.]
Az adssg tmegy a kvetkez hnapra.[His debt is transferred
(over) to the next month.]
Figure 85. t5 from-to Close vicinity

the verbs involved also suggest that there is a certain type of contact
between the source and the goal, but contrary to duality we cannot
conclude satisfactorily the source. the most typical metaphorical case is
illustrated left below, where the source and the goal are usually
concrete, the verb meaning referring to the transition is usually concrete
too, and the moving object is metaphoric. the illustration represents the
most metaphorical case (the last example above).
14.6.20. t5 from-to CLOSe through apertures

In the following cases the nature of S creates metaphorical
situations, and the meaning of the verb has led us to define a separate
category from this type of transitions. While getting from C1 to C2, the
S has to overcome a special, though implied obstacle, which behaves
like a filter / strainer / sieve. this means, that we are faced with a
through obstacle apertures-like situation, but taken metaphorically,
this special type of obstacle may be even the wall, or the virtual
boundary of a country as the examples below show:
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A beszd tszrdik az zletbl a hzba. [the speech from the

shop is overheard in the house.]
tszremlik a terembl a zene. [the music filters / comes through
the room.]
Az eszmk tszivrogtak Ausztriba. [the ideas spreaded over to
Austria.]
Figure 86.t5 from-to Close through apertures

We can also observe that the examples provide cases with both
source and goal, and either the source or goal. What is really important
is how Sm makes its way to C2(m). this depends on the nature of the
obstacle, which can be complex; it can be a combination of distance
(filtering air) and the openings of C1 and C2, or if C1 and C2 are joined
together there is also a possibility of joint openings of them or not, and
the distance (which should be nevertheless short, based on the meaning
of the verb) between the starting point of the movement to its endpoint.
the volume of speech or music only adds to the complexity of the
whole image schema.
14.6.21. t5 from-to CLOSe over

these cases require a certain upward and a downward movement
of S while passing from C1 to C2, as the implied obstacle is vertical. It
goes without saying that the metaphorical images rely heavily on the
basic ones in this case, and the meaning of the verb helps us a lot to
create metaphorical interpretations:
ttelepedett a gond a nyakamba. [the problem moved / settled
(over) onto my neck. = I am snowed under with problems.]
tpillantott a szomszdja jsgjba. [He glanced (over) at his
neighbours newspaper.]
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Figure 87. t5 from-to Close over
14.6.22. t5 from-to CLOSe change

the last case involving closeness is strongly connected to our next
subcategory of from-to, namely change. In this case the link between C1
and C2 is very strong, in fact they are perceived as adjacent. All the
members belonging to this category are highly metaphorical, which is
achieved by either the meaning of the verb or C1 and C2. During the
process, the initial S turns to, changes into a different S, so we marked
the initial state with S1, whereas the final state with S2. the transition
is so smooth from S1 to S2 that in fact we can talk about a gradual shift.
the concept of time may also be present as well, as the subtle transition
from one state to the other may happen in a general time framework:
A boldogsg tolvadt prba. [Happiness melted / turned (over) to
blush.]
Az alkonyat thajlott jszakba. [Dusk turned (over) to night.]
szpen tszenderlt az rkkvalsgba / msvilgra / msik
letbe. [He nicely dozed (over) into eternity / the other life. = He paid
the debt of nature.]
Figure 88. t5 from-to Close change

this type of from-to change is often found when the colour-scale is
involved, reminding us roschs prototype-theory, according to which it
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is going to be impossible to categorise the colour in-between the sourcecolour and the goal-colour in the sentences below:
A piros tcsap bordba. [red turns (over) into claret.]
A kk tmegy lilba. [Blue blends into violet.]
14.6.23. t5 from-to CHaNGe C1 to C2

this category is obviously connected to the previous one, but the
element of closeness is not present. the source (C1) does not offer a
guide to the goal (C2) and vice versa. the nature of the obstacle is not
clear, it is only reflected in the preverb (t). If the goal is specified, one
can only guess the source from various options belonging to similar
categories as in the examples below:
tcsap sznsznek. [He goes for an actor.]
ttrt az iszlmra. [He is converted to Islam.]
Figure 89. t5 from-to ChAnge C1 to C2

It is worth mentioning that the source is typically missing, and one
can argue that the moving object does not change, but it is only
transferred into another category. However, this is only partially true.
We argue that the nature of C so drastically changes due to this shift
that we practically have a completely changed C, marked with C2 (if
one changes their religion, we can practically call them complete
changes within the framework of religion, or if one changes their job,
then within the framework of job they already belong to a different
category). the next subcategory within change will present cases when
this change is less profound in C whose nature is only partially altered.
14.6.24. t5 from-to CHaNGe C to C

In this category we can find cases when the nature of C is only
partially changed, or only a part of C is changed, so we labelled the
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change with C. the metaphorical situations come into being very

easily, as any part of the image schema can be metaphorised as
presented below:
1. the meaning of the verb (personification); nevertheless, in the
sentence below we would say that S by being transferred from C1 to C2
not only changes itself, but it also changes the original C1 and C2;
another interpretation might be that S is inside C and they both change
due to the energy transfer:
A vz tadja a ht a krnyezetnek. [Water transmits heat to its
surrounding.]
2. the nature of the the source and goal (C1 and C2); S remains
basically the same, but its form changes, so we have in fact S:
tlteti olaszra a szndarabot. [He translates the play into
Italian.]
3. the moving object (S)
tcsoportostja az erit. [He regroups his forces.]
Figure 90. t5 from-to ChAnge C to C
14.6.25. t5 from-to CHaNGe replacement

the last type of change within the from-to frame is somewhat
peculiar; S1 is changed into S2, but S1 and S2 can be of the same kind
or (slightly) different. We could not find metaphoric cases in the
dictionary, but we suspect that this case may be the basis of a certain
type of metaphorical t-cases, namely when there is a mutual
interchange of S1 and S2 between C1 and C2. S1 is changed into S2
which usually belongs to the same category, and the replacement may
be carried out due to various reasons:
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Figure 91. t5 from-to ChAnge replacement

table 10. Basic and metaphorical ChAnge
Basic meaning
metaphorical usage18
tcserlte a tulipnt frissre a

lmban tcserlte a kt lnyt.
vzban.
[He mistook the two girls in his
(change within the same C; S1
sleep.]
similar to S2, same kind)
[She changed the tulip into a fresh
/ new one in the vase.]
tcserlte a tulipnt rzsra a
tcserlte az egyenlet kt oldaln
vzban.
a trteket.
(change within the same C; S1
[He commuted the fractions on
out, S2 in, different kind)
the two sides of the equation.]
[She changed the tulip to rose in
the vase.]
tcserlte a fekete tskt barnra.
(replacing S1 / C1 with S2 / C2)
[She changed the black bag to
brown.]
14.6.26. t5 from-to COPy

A further meaning of t5 from-to is linked with copy, a process
during which S is transferred from C1 to C2. this happens in such a
manner that at the end of the process we can find S both in C1 and C2.
Practically, we create a duplicate of S:
18. In these cases we can easily replace t with another preverb, namely fel
[up(ward)].
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14.6. t5 FrOm-tO
tviszi az brt j lapra. [He transfers the illustration (over) to

another sheet.]
tvezeti a rovatot a naplba. [He copies the side of the account to
the diary.]
tvgja a hanganyagot egy msik lemezre. [He (cuts and) copies
the soundtrack to another record.]
Figure 92. t5 from-to CopY

We can observe, that these cases become metaphorical mainly due
to the meaning of the verb, as in the situations found the (implied)
source and the goal were concrete.
14.6.27. t5 from-to FOR

this type of t-situation is rather complex. For refers to the fact that
S1 (due to an impetus) moves from C1 to C2 only to trigger the
movement of S2 backwards, from C2 to C1. typical verbs in this case are
send over for, call for, rush over for, go over for. We can differentiate
cases when active verbs are implied (trohan [rush over to a place for])
and cases with causative verbs (thvat [to call for]). In the first case the
above-mentioned impetus derives from S1, whereas in the latter case
the impetus comes from outside S1:
tzen a lnyrt a szomszdba. [He sends somebody / a word
(through somebody) in the neighbourhood for his daughter.]
tszl a szomszdrt. [He sends a word for the neighbour (to be
called.]
ttelefonlja a mrnkt a irodba. [He calls the engineer to tell
him to come to his office.]
Figure 93. t5 from-to For
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In these cases t possibly refers to the boundaries of C1 and C2, as

other obstacle is not explicit. Consequently C1 and C2 in particular
cases can be adjoining, or very close to each other, so this entire
subgroup may be a variant of t5 from-to Close, but there is an extra
movement, after which S2 gets to the source. the illustration above
represents the most probable case, when S1 gets back to C1 together
with S2, although this is not explicit in the sentences. However, as the
last sentence is more metaphoric than the previous two, the previous
remark does not apply.
14.6.28. t5 from-to tIMe

time constructions are metaphorical, and they resemble basic
category concepts; however, time can be separated into two main
subgroups from our point of view, namely time1, which means that
time is static, and is perceived as a string of containers along a path
from left to right. this image means that past can be found towards left,
whereas future is placed towards right; obviously present is somewhere
in the middle, and if we want to correlate an event with time, we place
the event into a time-container alongside this path:
Figure 94. t5 from-to tiMe

On the other hand, time may have a completely different
interpretation, which means that time is perceived as a (usually fast)
moving object, and this time2 usually passes by the speaker / viewer,
who in this schema represents the static reference point:
time flies.
time and tide wait for no man.
As time goes...
he races against time.
he is before / behind time.
time will show...
Nez (2007. 111) observes that lakoff and Johnson (1980) also
identified two different metaphorical cases, but both of them refer to
time in motion. One of them is time passing is Motion of an object and
the other is time passing is Motion over a landscape. the first model
14.6. t5 FrOm-tO
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has a fixed observer watching time in motion (cf. time1), whereas the
latter (moving ego) reflects our time2, when the observer moves with
respect to static time. Our cases, ten in number, all seem to be time1,
when time is viewed as a long, static gathering of containers each of
them having a special name: yesterday, the next day, summer, 21st
century, time of the roman empire, etc. the moving object (S) is either
taken out of a time-container and placed into another (forward or
backward!) or it is purely and simply stretched over a certain number
of time-containers:
thelyezi a cselekmnyt a rmai Birodalomba. [He places the plot
(over) to the roman empire.]
A magyarzat tnylik a kvetkez rra. [the explanation
stretches (over) to the next class.]
the shift from one time-container to the other can be various; the
moving object may go over, go through, take over, push over (postpone),
save, etc., and the moving object either gets in the time-container, or
arrives on the surface of it. In conclusion, we would like to offer a
revision of the various t5 from-to situations with the help of the
following illustration:
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table 11. A possible network of t5 cases
T5
FROM-TO
1 from-to TIME
1 from-to DUAL
separate C1 and C2
from-to SOURCE
only
from-to GOAL
only
from-to BASIC
1 from-to CHANGE
S1 to S2
2 from-to CLOSE
through apertures
1 from-to CLOSE
vicinity
from-to CLOSE
2 from-to CHANGE
S to S
3 from-to CLOSE
over
from-to CHANGE
3 from-to CHANGE
replacement
from-to DUAL
2 from-to DUAL
over
3 from-to DUAL
through (on)
4 from-to DUAL
focus
5 from-to DUAL
C2 focus
6 from-to DUAL
turn
7 from-to DUAL
highly metaphorical
8 from-to DUAL
body parts
from-to TURN
change
3 from-to CLOSE
change
from-to THERE
here
from-to BOTH
directions
from-to ACTION
from-to BRIDGING
from-to CONNECTOR
from-to UP
from-to COPY
again
from-to FOR
from-to INSIDE C
five cardinal points
Imre Attila 2008
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14.7. t6 cover
Before discussing the categories belonging to this group, we have to
specify what we understand by cover. the word itself usually offers an
image of a static, flat object (C), and a moving object (S) which spreads
over it, thus covering C. this prototypical image implicitly suggests a
100% covering, but in our cases we can sometimes observe a less than
100% coverage, which is nevertheless taken as full coverage. Another
aspect worth mentioning is that the covered object may be part of a
larger object (e.g. waist body), and in these cases covering does not
refer to the larger object. even if the larger object is mentioned to be
covered, this is to be taken hyperbolically, as in the sentence below:
tkarolta a felesgt. [He embraced his wife.],
which practically means that S has presumably covered only the middle
part of C (i.e. Cs waist). last but not least we would like to mention here
that in a few cases cover may refer to cover a certain distance, thus cover
resembles t1 through or t5 from-to. this can happen due to the fact
that while covering the distance, there are boundaries / obstacles /
impediments on the route and the whole action takes up time.
14.7.1. t6 cover around circular C

the bodily experience is very strong in these metaphorical cases, and
we can observe partially and completely metaphorised cases. the
meaning of the verb refers to the typically embracing movement of the
arms, so the static objects are either cylindrical body parts (e.g. neck,
waist, arm, leg), or other objects which are presumably cylindrical. the
image created by these cylindrical objects are so strong that the verbs
normally associated with them can be also used for non-cylindrical
objects as well (cf. t6 cover non-circular C). the easiest way to create
metaphorical situations out of concrete ones is to use a verb which usually
refers to human beings (personification), as in the examples below:
A nyakt tleli egy sor gyngy.
[A string of pearls embraces her neck.]
A Duna tfogja a mezt.
[the Danube encircles / encompasses the field.]
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Figure 95. t6 cover around circular C

Nevertheless, there are fully metaphorised cases as well, where all the
components are metaphorical, namely S, C and the meaning of the verb:
A llek szeretetvel tlelte a vilgot.
[She embraced the whole world with the love of her soul.]
14.7.2. t6 cover around non-circular C

As it was already mentioned, the images of cover around circular C
are so strong, that we can easily substitute the cylindrical C with a noncylindrical one. this does not affect the whole schema, as
metaphorically we have a similar situation to 14.7.1:
A gumi tfogja a cdult.
[the rubber band is around the card.]
A vaspntok tfogjk a ldt.
[the band / hoops irons hold the box together.]
Figure 97. t6 cover around non-circular C
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We could only find so-called weak metaphors regarding this case,

as only the meaning of the verb contributes to the metaphoric image
(personification).
14.7.3. t6 partial cover

In these cases we have no cylindrical static objects, instead we are
faced with usually flat-surfaced objects (C), and the moving object is not
extended enough to be able to fully cover C. thus we can label it as partial
cover, but taking into account its effect, it comes close to a full cover:
A levelet erek hlzzk t. [the leaf is encompassed by veins. =
the leaf is full of veins.]
Mindig thzza a szmtsaimat! [He is constantly cutting through
my designs. = He completely changes my plans.]
the types of covers presented so far belong to a main sub-group, as
while S is covering C, it does not change it. However, it is possible for
S to change C (see 14.7.9-11.).
14.7.4. t6 through H inside non-straight cover

It was already mentioned that sometimes cover refers to distances,
and while this distance is covered, there may be boundaries,
impediments on the way from one entity to the other. thus we we
describe 14.7.4-7 cases as t6-examples, but they have a lot in
common with t1 through or t5 from-to. Our first case seems to be
highly metaphoric, as we can observe that all the components can be
regarded as metaphorical. We present a gradual metaphorisation in the
sentences below:
tvizsglja a kziratot. [He examines the manuscript.]
tvizsglja a panaszt. [He looks into the complaint.]
tjrja a gynyr a szvt. [Bliss pervades her heart.]
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Figure 98. t6 through h inside non-straight cover

Although these cases are highly metaphorical, the next one is
purely metaphorical, and it may represent a link between through
inside and through cover situations.
14.7.5. t6 through H inside skim cover

the extra feature compared to the previous case (skim) offers a 100%
metaphorical interpretation, as one can observe in the examples below:
A szerkeszt tfslte a cikket. [the editor raked over / through the
article.]
tfutotta a leveleket. [He cast an eye over the letters.]
Figure 99. t6 through h inside skim cover

Skimming, deriving from the basic meaning connected to milk,
turned to a verb typical of reading, along with scanning. Skim-reading
and scan-reading are very fashionable at language-exams as well, but
we are interested in these verbs as they seem to help in the creation of
metaphorical expressions. the image created is highly valuable, as it is
on the verge of in and on situations as well; If you browse through
something, it is like on the surface of it, but nevertheless below the
surface as well. It is also questionable how straight or curvilinear the
movement is. When reading, sometimes we only read the headline,
sometimes the first paragraph, sometimes various fragments of the
written text. this approach is represented in the illustration by the
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twisting route of S. the last case connected to inside seemed to be one

of the most difficult cases of all due to the special verbs it employs
when creating the situation. let us take a look at them.
14.7.6. t6 through H inside creating apertures cover

this case is rather puzzling in conceiving it. even the nature of
obstacle may be perceived as two- or three-dimensional, though both
horizontally extended. the moving object penetrates the static one
repeatedly and creates apertures (holes) in it at more or less regular
intervals; as S is linear (long), when it goes through the obstacle, we
observe that in fact it stretches through the obstacle, it becomes part of
it. By adding itself to the obstacle it contributes to partially changing it
(link to change-situations):
ttri a kelmt azsrral. [She weaves hem-stitch into the fabric.]
A testet izmok ktegei szvik t. [the body is interwoven with
bundles of muscles.]
Az elbeszlst trfkkal szvi t. [He laces his narration with jokes.]
t may refer to going through the obstacle from one end to the other
and / or from one side of the other in the the case of two-dimensional
objects, and in the case of three-dimensional objects we can imagine t as
referring to a top-to-bottom and / or from-one-end-to-the-other movement.
14.7.7. t6 through H ON cover

In this case the moving object does not go from one end of the static
object to other on the surface of it, but it stretches along it; by staying
there we are offered a kind of covering sense:
homlokn vrs csk hzdik t. [there is a red line across his
forehead.]
Arcbrt redkkel szeli t a gond. [His face-skin is creased by
troubles.]
the second example offers a very complex combination of images
due to the meaning of the verb. the verb tszel [cut through, cut across,
intersect] seems to contain another aspect as well which comes to
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complete the image above, namely splitting (cf. 14.2.12 t1 through

hv split). moreover, metaphorically viewed, the case below can (quite
contradictorily) be called a temporary split (to be observed only on the
surface, scarlike):
A haj tszeli a tengert egy ht alatt. [the ship travels the sea in a
week. = the ship covers the distance in a week.]
to dot all our is we can also observe that this temporariness is even
specified by a time adverbial, and a synonym of the above expression
might be to cover a specified distance.
14.7.8. t6 cover (through) tIMe

While time can be perceived as a string of containers (cf. t5), here
time is typically pictured as a horizontally extended and static object,
in this case an obstacle with two ends. the motion of S is in fact any
action stretching between this interval of time. the motion is typically
straight, but can be non-straight as well, and time can be implicitly
present, incorporated in the verb.
tstlta az egsz dlutnt. [He was walking all afternoon.]
tkszkdte a telet. [He struggled over / roughed the winter.]
ttelelt a kis szobban. [He survived winter in the small room.]
Figure 100. t6 cover (through) tiMe

We could even find an example of splitting connected to time, in
which case t signals a crosswise intersection:
A mozdony fttye tmetszte az jszaka csendjt. [the whistle of
the engine broke the silence of the night.]
Although not typical, the cases above may refer not only to insidecases, but also to in+out-situations as well:
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tstlta az egsz dlutnt, s az estt is. [He was walking from

early afternon to / till night.]
ttelelt a kis szobban, tavasz vgig ki sem bjt onnan. [He spent all
the winter in the small room without piling out before the end of spring.]
14.7.9. t6 cover through / over aGaIN

Although very few cases were found (only three) when the through /
over-situation included the again-component as well, we have to
mention it, as again was present in other cases as well, for instance when
t refers to change. Here again is joined with through h inside (skim):
tolvasta a tanulmnyt (mg egyszer). [He read the paper / essay all
over again.]
tgondolta a beszdt (mg egyszer). [He thought his speech all
over again.]
Figure 101. t6 cover through / over AgAin

typically, when S gets to the other end of Cm, it returns more or
less to the original starting position and goes over again the same / a
similar route. As the action is repeated, we can metaphorically say that
C is covered again, which is a typical action when one wants to perfect
something. However, again may not only refer to repetition, as another
type of again can involve change as well (cf. t4).
14.7.10. t6 cover change

these cases are highly metaphoric, although the first image seems
rather basic: C is fully covered by S which spreads over it; although the
meaning of the verb and both S and C may be concrete, their
relationship turns metaphoric within the sentence:
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tti sszal. [He put an ace (over the card). = a playing card covers
another one, changing its value]
tmzolja magt demokratnak. [He painted himself to a democrat.
= He joins another party by painting himself in different colours]
At this stage we only mention that this change may be partial or
complete, and this category is closely linked to t4 which refers to
changes. However, we described cases when the cover aspect comes first
followed by the change aspect, whereas t4 lacks the covering element.
14.7.11. t6 cover change again

this category may be considered as a more complex one compared
to the previous one, as we can distinguish a cover, a change and an
again aspect within these cases which mix together; although there are
possibilities to discuss these cases from other perspectives as well, we
tend to think that the cover aspect triggers the other two: S spreads over
C (and covers it), and by this coverage C is changed. the meaning of the
verb implies that this event is in fact the second one, which adds the
again sense of the situation:
trta a sort pirossal. [He wrote the line over in red.]
Figure 102. t6 cover change again

We can say that after the initial impact of S1 over C there is another
one (S2), which transforms C into C. the illustration suggests a go
through-event, hence the action may start from the outside of C. After
the S2 changes C, S2 disappears, as it melts into C.
Finally we would like to present one of the most beautiful and
interesting t-situations, which combines t6 and t2, as we can
observe both a cover and a through apertures aspect:
A vadszl tfonja a kertst. [the virginia creeper / ampelopsis
enwreathes the fence.]
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14.7. t6 COver
Figure 103. t6 cover and through apertures

this case is slightly metaphoric, as both S and C are concrete. the
meaning of the verb offers a metaphoric image (referring to a typical
human activity), which contains multiple covering around cylindrical
objects (e.g. the net of the fence), but one can also distinguish a goingthrough-apertures-situation resembling 14.3.4. the table below shows
the relationship between the t6-situations presented in this chapter.
7 cover H on
3 partial cover
4 cover H INSIDE
non-straight
5 cover H INSIDE
skim
6 cover H INSIDE
creating apert.
1 cover around circular C
T6
cover
2 cover around non-circ. C
10 cover and change
11 cover and change

AGAIN
9 cover AGAIN
8 cover through TIME
Imre Attila 2008
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CHAPter 15.
MetaPHORICaL KeReSztL-SItUatIONS
15.1. KeReSztL (Hungarian)

Before examining the metaphorical keresztl (through, over, across)
cases, we would like to present the dictionary definitions regarding this
word which may function as an adverb, preverb (cf. talmys satellites)
and postposition. As an adverb, keresztl expresses a relationship in
which a moving object (S) gets from one end to the other of a static
object (C).
As a preverb, keresztl may express various relationships,
involving through, over and across situations; as there are many
situations, our main research will concentrate on keresztl as a preverb,
in concordance with the formerly presented t-situations.
As a postposition, keresztl firstly refers to situations similar to t
through border(line), impediment, obstacle cases. this involves the
following situations, based on the dictionary (rtsz. 1992):
through Hv-obstacle, creating aperture: utat tr valamin
keresztl [cut ones way through]
through H-obstacle, IN+OUt, creating aperture:
a hegyen keresztl alagutat fr [bore a tunnel through the
mountain]
through apertures, v-obstacle: a hord likacsain keresztl
[through the kegs interstices]
through one aperture, H-obstacle: fst a kmnyen keresztl
[smoke through the chimney]
through diminishing v-obstacle: vegen keresztl a fny [light
through the glass]
through apertures, H-obstacle:
fstn keresztl ltszik valami [something distinguishable
through the smoke]
through H-obstacle from one end to the other (ON):
rten keresztl megy [go through / across the field]
across H-obstacle: drtot kifeszt az ton keresztl [extend a wire
across the road]
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15. metAPHOrICAl KereSZtl-SItUAtIONS
through H-obstacle emphasised straight:

hegyen -vlgyn keresztl (stock phrase) [over mountains and
valleys]
through Hv-obstacle, IN+OUt: Miskolcon keresztl utazott
[travel through miskolc]
throughout time: vszzadokon keresztl [over the centuries]
(looking backwards) over ones shoulder : a vlln keresztl
utnapillant
things that cross (intersect) each other, due to the meaning of
the word:
egymson keresztl hevertek a testek [bodies lying one over /
above the other]
through a kind of (metaphoric) cover / deception:
hzelg szavain keresztl rezhet [feel through his flattering
words]
through mediators or mediatory things:
bartain keresztl megtud [know something through / from /
by / due to his friends]
stock phrases, idiomatic expressions: rkon-bokron keresztl [over
hedge and ditch], csak a testemen keresztl [only over my dead body]
As we can observe, these situations are similar to the t-situations,
except for those cases which heavily rely on the particular meaning of
keresztl: e.g. looking backwards over ones shoulder or things that
intersect each other. As metaphorical cases are based on concrete ones,
we thought it useful to present a sketch of keresztl as a postposition to
foreshadow the possible cases of keresztl as a preverb. Still, when
keresztl is used as a potential synonym for t, we have reasons to
think that both the from-to element and the through element to be
found in t are present within the keresztl-cases as well.
In the following we will discuss those situations in which keresztl
functions as a preverb (satellite) in the metaphorical expressions using
the same abbreviations as in the case of t: S for the moving object, C
for the static object, H for horizontally extended objects, v for vertically
extended objects and m for metaphorical.
In order to shape the basic difference between t and keresztl, we
have to mention something at the outset. When discussing t, we
mentioned that the full central image schema includes a source, a path
with a (virtual) boundary / borderline / obstacle and a goal. this means
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that S starts from C1 and goes through the borderline or another C

which functions as an obstacle before getting to C2. Although this full
prototypical image is hardly employed, one can usually easily
reconstruct it from the parts. However, when keresztl is used as a
potential synonym for t, we doubt that the from-to element is often
present. After having examined the keresztl-cases, not one example
was found to use this aspect. Although it is possible to construct, it is
very unlikely to sound natural, once we have t for this purpose:
Keresztlmentek a szomszdba egy kis tejrt. [they went over
(from their house) to their neighbours for some milk.]
moreover, as keresztl seems to be more awkward to use than t
(cf. its length), one should have a good reason to use it. If we check the
situations when S can get to the other side of the virtual line or C
functioning as an obstacle, there are three possibilities: over-above,
through (aperture), and under C. We suspect that keresztl mainly
evokes these types of movement, and keresztl may refer to a from-to
movement only when C is a horizontally extended object and S moves
form one side of it to the other. In the following we present the
metaphorical expressions regarding keresztl as a preverb.
15.2. KeReSztL1 through

the central sense of keresztl refers to cases when the relationship
between the moving S and the obstacle is in focus, and the source and
the goal cannot be identified. We have already mentioned that there are
three possible ways to get to the other side of C, and we will try to
highlight those metaphorical cases in which we can identify the
following relationships: through, throughout, across, over, above, under,
as in these cases keresztl possibly functions as a synonym for t.
15.2.1. Keresztl1 through H IN+OUt straight

In this case C is a horizontally extended object which serves as an
obstacle for the moving S. S goes through C in a straight line, often with
considerable effort (cf. the meaning of the verb: hatol [penetrate], gzol
[wade]):
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pista sok bajon ment keresztl. [Steve went through many

hardships.]
A tekintete keresztlhatol a sttsgen. [His look pierced through
the darkness.]
Az intzmny keresztlgzolt az alkalmazott rzelmein. [the
institution waded through the employees feelings.]
When C is metaphoric, there is a certain doubt whether it is a H or
not; a possible clue is the meaning of the verb, or if C is in the plural
form, then S has to cover a longer distance. A gradual shift towards
metaphorisation is easily observed in the three examples above, and
we can say that this case resembles t1 through obstacle. However,
there is a further case, which seems to belong here and to through
aperture as well:
A szl keresztlhz a szobmon.
[the wind blows through my rooms.]
Figure 104. Keresztl1 through h in+oUt straight

At first sight it may seem to be a clear through h in+oUt straightcase, but if we visualise the sentence, the wind enters through an
aperture into the room and leaves it through another aperture on the
other side. the case is metaphoric due to the meaning of the verb.
15.2.2. Keresztl1 through H non-straight

this case resembles the previous one, except for the way S passes
through C; as the title suggests, this is a winding route:
Keresztlvezette a kezdeti nehzsgeken. [She led him through the
initial hardships.]
Keresztlerszakolta a javaslatot. [He forced through his
suggestion.]
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Figure 105. Keresztl1 through h non-straight

this case was discussed at t1, still we would not say that in these
sentences t and keresztl are perfectly interchangeable, especially in
the second one. Although we could find examples for over-above h,
none of them was metaphorical, so we do not include them at this point.
15.2.3. Keresztl1 through H IN+OUt S=route

there were four metaphorical cases found when the route is focus
and this gives a sense of reflexiveness. these examples are metaphoric
due to the meaning of the verb:
Az svny keresztlhalad az erdn. [the path leads through the
forest.]
A hd keresztlvisz a folyn. [the bridge stretches / leads across
the river.]
these cases may also evoke a certain bridging aspect (cf. t5) as
well, so we may suppose a hidden from-to element, otherwise extremely
rarely met regarding keresztl. Both the path and the bridge connect two
separate places, but this image is suppressed by the meaning of
keresztl, which focuses on the passing through the obstacle.
15.2.4. Keresztl1 through H inside SKIM

the skim-part is emphasised by the meaning of the verb, and the
example below may be interpreted as a combination of over-above and
through, as the nature of sight usually includes a metaphorical contact
between S and C:
Keresztlfutott a reggeli postjn (a tekintetvel). [He cast an eye
over the morning post.]
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the example above is in fact a metonymical case (pars pro toto),

where the eyes (sight) stand for the whole body, and we can also
interpret this situation as a certain type of cover; however, our next case
may be regarded as the prototypical cover.
15.2.5. Keresztl1 through H ON+cover

In this situation the relationship between S and C is different from
the previous one; whereas 15.2.4 describes a case when S comes into
contact with the surface of C, then departs from it, here we can observe
that after S covers C, it remains over (on) it. this type of cover may be
regarded as a partial cover, which nevertheless is strong enough to
completely alter C:
Keresztlhzza a terveit / szmtsait. [He cuts through / crosses
his plans. = He upsets her plans.]
this case is rather complex, as all the elements of the case are
metaphorical; S upsets somebodys plans by virtually drawing a line
through these plans, which stand for C. the result is a complete
alteration of C, which leads us to interpret this case as highly
metaphorical. A less complex case may be the following, where
personification creates a similar situation to the one above:
Keresztlfekszik az gen az stks fnykvje. [the tail of the
comet stretches over the sky.]
It is easy to observe in this case that S and C are concrete, and the
meaning of the verb referring to the action transforms the situation into
a metaphorical one. this sense of keresztl is similar to 14.2.10 t1.
15.2.6. Keresztl1 through Hv split

We could find one case which refers to split, a case which is similar
to 14.2.12 t1. In the introductory part about keresztl we mentioned
that the length of the word compared to t may be an explanation why
keresztl is less restricted in its usage, and this case further supports
our argument; splitting involves a fast movement, and the combination
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of t with proper verbs referring to cutting into two seem to be much

more typical than the case below:
Az irts keresztlvgja az erdt. [the clearing cuts the forest into
two.]
Figure 106. Keresztl1 through hv split

this case can be regarded metaphorical only due to the meaning of
the verb, as both S and C are concrete. Furthermore, this case also fits
into another category already presented, namely 15.2.3 Keresztl1,
where S goes through an H-obstacle, but S is the route itself. the reason
why we considered this case a separate category is the element of split.
On the other hand, if we compare this case with 14.2.12 t1, we can
observe that the illustration is less complex (only from left to right),
although we can create the other type of split as well, from above:
Keresztlvgta a gordiuszi csomt. [He cut the Gordian knot
(in two).]
However, this usage can already be considered as a sub-variant of
split-into-two, as the cut can hardly be into two equal parts, although
this image schema is the central one; nevertheless, the two resulting
sides should not be very disproportionate.
15.2.7. Keresztl1 through v

Although much less common, we could find cases when keresztl
refers to a movement through v-obstacle, which seems to weaken our
basic theory about the difference between t and keresztl. Still, we
should also bear in mind that in these cases C is either metaphorically
perceived (thus it may be interpreted as both an H- and a v-obstacle,
depending on the circumstances), or one needs a considerable effort to
go through C, and the length of keresztl compared to the length of t
seems more appropriate. Consider the cases below:
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Keresztllt ravaszsgn. [He can see through his slyness.]

Keresztljut a vizsgn. [He will get through / over the exam.]
We may well remember the high occurrence of examination when
t was presented, and in the case above we considered it similar to
14.2.13 t1, when examination is either the place or a v-obstacle
(standing for the teachers as well).
15.2.8. Keresztl1 through v and cover+change

this case is rather complex, as we can identify a possible
combination of the previous one and a cover+ change aspect as well.
According to Kvecses (2002. 191-192), anger became a completely
negative emotion, and he argues that the prevalent metaphoric image is
a pressure cooker waiting to explode. In our case anger stands for S
which goes through the skin of the face (from the interior), covers the
face with blush (spreading over), thus changing it:
Keresztltr arcbrn a harag prja. [the glow of anger breaks
through her face-skin. = She turns red with anger.]
We label this case as a sub-variant of the previous one, as the
cover+change aspect plays a secondary role, reminding us t6 cover
ChAnge.
15.2.9. Keresztl1 through v over

this case is similar to 14.2.14 t1, which describes dual
possibility: S can pass either through C or over it, as the meaning of the
verb is metaphorical:
Keresztlnz a lnyon. [He looks through her. = He looks down
on her.]
Keresztljr az eszn. [She outwits him.]
We have already mentioned that these cases may result in a fuzzy
picture, as the combination between the meaning of the verb and the
nature of the obstacle defies a clear interpretation.
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15.2.10. Keresztl1 through v diminish

Our next example connected to v-obstacles resembles 14.2.17 t1,
as S is diminished to a certain extent while going through C; this
possible, as aforementioned, because the nature of C may be regarded
as a certain type of aperture, at least for specific types of moving
objects, as in the example below:
Keresztlmegy a falon a hang. [the sound goes through the wall.]
this case already comes close to the borderline between keresztl1
and keresztl2, as the first one deals with cases when C is without
aperture, whereas the latter includes cases when C contains aperture(s).
the next two categories present cases when S significantly alters the
nature of C by creating (temporary) aperture(s) while passing through it.
15.2.11. Keresztl1 through Hv create aperture

the importance of the relationship between the moving object and
the static one may be many fold; we would like to draw the attention
upon the way S comes into contact with C, and in this respect we
already mentioned the three major possibilities: S may go over-above,
through and under C, but while going through C S can either create or
not aperture(s) in C. this aperture may be unalterable or temporary (cf.
14.2.15 t1 and 14.2.16 t1). First we would like to present cases
when S goes through C and creates an aperture:
Keresztlszr valakit tekintetvel. [He is stabbing her with his
look. = He is looking right into the girl.]
Keresztlrgja magt a regnyen. [He is ploughing / wading
through the novel.]
Keresztltri magt az akadlyokon. [He is breaking through the
obstacles.]
Of course, the examples are metaphoric, consequently we can
categorise these cases under the label create aperture based on the
meaning of the prefixed verb and the nature of the obstacle.
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15.2.12. Keresztl1 through v create temporary aperture

the creation of temporary apertures cannot be considered a normal
course of events, thus it is important to highlight that after S passes
through this temporary aperture, C tends to dissolve this aperture. the
meaning of the verb plays a major role in finding these rare cases, as C
is usually perceived as a difficult obstacle in front of S:
Keresztlerszakoltk a fit a vizsgn. [the boy was pushed
through the exam.]
Keresztlengedtk a hatron. [they let him cross the border.]
Although examinations and frontiers are serious obstacles, there
are situations when one can find access through the back door; as our
cases are metaphorical, the back door is encoded in the meaning of the
verb. As there are much less metaphorical cases with keresztl than
with t, we will present a table of keresztl cases at the end of all cases
referring to it. the next part will present situations where S passes
through C via one or more apertures.
15.3. KeReSztL2 through aperture

15.3.1. Keresztl2 through v one aperture
In our endeavour so far we have tried to differentiate the various
types of obstacles based on the relationship between the moving object
(S) and the static one (C), and we still support the idea of separating
those cases when S goes through one or more apertures. linguistically
they are referred to with the same expressions as those without
apertures (see the highlighted suffixes):
Keresztlnz a lrsen. [He is looking through the oillet.]
Keresztlmegy a crna a t fokn. [the thread goes through the lug.]
Figure 107. Keresztl2 through v one aperture
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the effort of going through the obstacle is considerably less than in

those cases when there is no aperture, in fact the only real effort on
behalf of S is to aim properly while going through the aperture of C.
regarding keresztl, we could find examples resembling 14.3.2 t2,
when S goes through one aperture, but the dictionaries did not offer
metaphorical cases with v-obstacle and multiple apertures.
15.3.2. Keresztl2 through H aperture(s)

this case comes into being interestingly, as the nature of S permits
only a straight movement; however, as C is a set of joint obstacles, S
seems to find the gap between them, thus we can speak of multiple
apertures. virtually there are many possibilities for S to go through C (C
is a set of possible apertures), but only one of them is used, so this case
may be regarded as the link between single and multiple apertures (cf.
14.3.3 t2):
Keresztltr a nap a felhn. [the sun breakes / shines through the
cloud.]
Keresztlhatol a napsugr a lombokon. [the sunray penetrates the
foliage.]
Although the meaning of the verb refers to an action which is
typical for creating apertures, the nature of S and C does not permit
this; the rays pass through the leaves when the arrangement of the
leaves allows an aperture through them.
15.3.3. Keresztl2 through v apertures

Sometimes the nature of C may be considered as a set of apertures,
and S has the possibility of splitting into many parts in order to go
through the many apertures of C. In our examples usually neither S nor
C is abstract, so they are weak metaphorical cases (personifications),
resembling 14.3.4. t2:
Keresztlmegy a szitn a dara. [the middlings go through the sieve.]
Keresztlnz a fggnyn. [He is looking through the curtain.]
In the following we will present cases when keresztl is involved
in an over-above situations, resembling t3-cases.
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15.4. KeReSztL3 over-above

15.4.1. Keresztl3 over-above Hv no contact, no landing
the difference between H-obstacles and v-obstacles has been
maintained so far, but we could find very few cases with keresztl3
over-above. Consequently, the following three categories will include
examples disregarding the horizontal or vertical extension of C.
Our first situation presents the most prototypical case of the english
over, when S passes C over-above it, there is no contact between S and
C, and landing is not included in the image, resembling 14.4.1. t3:
Keresztlhalad a replgp a sksg fltt. [the plane flies over
the field.]
Keresztlmegy a glya az orszgon. [the stork comes across the
country.]
We included the no landing aspect into our description, as the image
itself of the above examples does not refer at all to the starting point or end
point; we need our background knowledge to conceive that the starting
point and endpoint lacks the over-above element. the illustration below
shows the difference between this case and the next one:
3.1 Keresztl no landing
3.2. Keresztl landing
Figure 108. Keresztl3 over-above hv no contact, (no) landing
15.4.2. Keresztl3 over-above Hv no contact, landing

the illustration in the previous part shows the image of this case:
S goes over-above C without contact, and both the starting and landing
point is on the ground and included in the image. the examples
below refer to cases when either the meaning of the verb is
metaphorical, or C is to be taken metaphorically:
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Keresztlhord az gy a hegyen. [the cannon carries across the

mountain.]
sosem lp keresztl a kszbn. [He never steps over the doorstep.
= He never goes beyond the limit.]
In these cases it is worth mentioning tyler and evanss force
dynamics gravity (2004), according to which the off-stage viewer
(vantage point) supposes that the endpoint of the schema includes the
landing as well. the illustration, however, preserves the possibility that
S may be metaphorical as well.
15.4.3. Keresztl3 over-above / through Hv

We had similar cases described at t3, and the interesting part
here is that there is in fact a double possibility for S to pass C.
According to the first interpretation, we have an over-above case, and it
is not clear if there is a contact between S and C or not. the second
interpretation refers to a situation where S goes through C:
Keresztljut az akadlyon. [He gets over the obstacle.]
Keresztlhalad a vihar a vroson. [the storm goes through the city.]
Although theoretically there are two possibilities, we suspect that
due to the meaning of keresztl these case are somewhat closer to a
through hv than over-above, whereas verbs prefixed by t seem to be
closer to an over-above case. And, of course, we may rely on the third
interpretation when S passes C both over-above and through it:
Figure 109. Keresztl3 over-above / through hv

We found cases with keresztl3 over-above hv, when there was
contact between S and C and the landing-element was also present, but
all of them were concrete (cf. 14.4.10 t4).
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the next category would be the covering sense of keresztl, but we

tend to believe that this is not typical (although possible), and there
were only two concrete cases found (e.g. Keresztlri az v a derekt.
[the belt is long enough to girdle her waist.]), and there were no
metaphorical cases found in the dictionary entries. In the following we
will discuss more or less isolated cases regarding keresztl, which
nevertheless enrich the usage of keresztl.
15.5. KeReSztL4 through-across H

In this category we included those cases when the prefixed verb
refers to a through and across movement, and there is no creating
aperture-aspect as the meaning of the verb may suggest:
Keresztlvg a mezn.
[He cuts his way through / across the field. = He takes the shortcut
through the field.]
Keresztlvgja magt mindenen. [He cuts his way through / across
everything.]
Mindig keresztlviszi akaratt. [She always has her way.]
15.6. KeReSztL5 again

Although we could identify many cases including again while
discussing t, it was very difficult to find this element combined with
keresztl:
Keresztljrta a hideg. [the cold went through him over and over
again. = He was taken in by the cold.]
At first sight this case may seem simple, but a deeper analysis
reveals hidden aspects as well; we can discover a through h nonstraight element, then there is a change inside cold aspect as well, to
which the again part is added. thus we would say that this case comes
close to 14.5.6 t4 change again too. While 14.5.3 t4 included cases
with C-C change, and the again aspect was absent, 14.5.6 t4 refers to
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a C1-C2 change with again aspect. this leads us to conclude that

keresztl again is one of the most complex cases so far.
A very specific case of keresztl derives from the meaning of the
preverb combined with the meaning of the verb presented in the
following.
15.7. KeReSztL6 block

A completely new case would be the keresztl block situation,
where we have another complex image. the possible image schema
includes a static object (C), a moving object (S) and the relationship
between S and C, which is similar to 14.7.3 t6, namely partial cover.
However, while t6 partial cover referred to partial covers equalling
full covers, here we have a different situation, as after S partially covers
C in a particular way (usually vertically across C in the shortest way),
we can discover that S blocks free passage. Consequently S becomes
another obstacle for another S:
Keresztlfekszik az ton. (concrete meaning) [He is lying across
the road.]
tskk keresztlfekszik tjt. (concrete / metaphorical meaning)
[thorns thwart his advancement.]
Figure 110. KeresZtl6 block

the raison dtre for this case is also supported by both the
dictionary definition for keresztl and various other expressions
containing the verb derived from kereszt (cross):
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pista folyton keresztezi utamat. [Steve is constantly crossing my

plans.]
Anysom mindig keresztbe tesz nekem. [my mother-in-law is
always checkmating me.]
this intersection is typical for keresztl which could not be found
when discussing t, and there are two more cases left to mention,
which cannot be found with keresztl-prefixed verbs. One of them
deals with time, while the other one functions as a postposition.
15.8. KeReSztL7 time

When presenting t, time was present in three main categories: t3
and t5 and t6. We tend to think that time is associated with
keresztl only resembling t6, namely when time is perceived as a
static object and S goes through it usually fast:
vszzadokon keresztl lt a tvhit. vszzadokon t lt a tvhit.
[People were under the delusion for centuries.]
the two examples show that t6 and keresztl referring to time
are interchangeable.
15.9. KeReSztL8 instrumental

this instrumental sense is described by Dominte (1970) referring to
the romanian prin (cf. prin6), but it can be perfectly applied to the
Hungarian keresztl as well. this meaning of keresztl seems to appear
only when keresztl is the postposition of a noun:
A bartain keresztl tudta meg az igazsgot. [He found out the
truth through his friends.]
A sajtn keresztl rteslt a trtntekrl. [He gathered from the
papers what had happened.]
these cases are highly metaphorical, so they are only partially
similar to through-cases, as they can be interpreted as from, via, by
15.9. KereSZtl8 INStrUmeNtAl
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means of, and in these cases the through-element is in the background,

although not completely absent:
A bartai ltal tudta meg az igazsgot. [He discovered the truth
due to / through his friends.]
where ltal is the instrumental equivalent for t.
the keresztl-situations are often able to substitute t, although
they are much less often used and varied. We have examined about 200
keresztl-situations, and 75% of them refers to through-cases:
keresztl1 labels through obstacle cases, whereas keresztl2 deals with
through aperture situations. there were very few cases referring to
over-above situations, these are referred to as keresztl3. the most
important difference between t and keresztl may be the fact that the
from-to aspect is extremely rich regarding t, while this aspect is almost
non-existent with the latter.
Furthermore, the cover and change aspects are very rare regarding
keresztl, instead we could find two new usages for keresztl. One of
them is the rather complex block-aspect, and the other one is the by
means of element, which is associated with postpositions.
On the whole, keresztl may function as a viable synonym for t
referring to mainly through obstacle, through aperture and over-above
cases. In the following we will try to summarise these keresztl cases
by the illustration below.
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table 13. A possible network of KeresZtl
through H-obst.
IN+OUT straight
through H-obst.
non-straight
through H-obst.
IN+OUT S=route
through H-obst.
inside skim
through H-obst.
ON + cover
through / across
H-obst
through HV-obst.
create aperture
through HV-obst.
create aperture
KERESZTL
through obstacle
KERESZTL
through aperture(s)
through V-obst.
through V-obst.
cover + change
through V-obst.
over
through V-obst.
diminish
through HV-obst.
split
KERESZTL
through V-obst.
one aperture
through H-obst.
aperture(s)
through V-obst.
apertures
TIME
over-above HV-obst.
no contact, landing
over-above HV-obst.
no contact, no landing
BLOCK
BY MEANS OF
AGAIN
KERESZTL
over-above
over-above HV-obst.
through
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CHAPter 16.
MetaPHORICaL FLtt / FeLett-SItUatIONS
16.1. Fltt / felett (Hungarian)

the Hungarian felett is basically an adverb of place or a postposition,
whose main equivalent in english is above, but when combined with
verb referring to movement, over may also be regarded as a suitable
equivalent. According to the dictionary (rtSz. 1992), the variant of felett
is fltt, which is used as a postposition, when it follows an inflexionless
word. the central sense of felett refers to an object which is vertically
higher than another one, and interestingly enough , we are provided a
similar example to the Brugman-lakoff-langacker example:
Az asztal felett lmpa lg. [the lamp is hanging over the table.]
However, the further dictionary definitions are not clear enough, as
metaphorical and basic meanings are mixed; for the time being, they
are presented in the dictionary order, and only those usages which may
be regarded as basic :
something that lies above a part of the body: a trde felett [above
his knee]
<in a written or printed document> something that is in the
upper part of the page(in a canonical view): a lap kzepe felett kt
sorral [two lines above the middle of the paper]
<with motion verbs> something that moves over / above the
position of a static object: a vros felett [over / above the city]
something having a horizontal border and the part which is
towards the sky: a vz felett [above water]
something that lies towards North from a particular geographical
place: Miskolc felett hegy van. [there is a mountain over miskolc.]
something which is over / above something, thus covers it:
ruhja felett kabtot viselt. [She was wearing a coat over her dress.]
the other usages refer to idiomatic and metaphorical expressions,
including time; these are presented in the second part of our analysis.
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Although we tend to think that the basic difference between felett

(fltt) and fell is that the first one refers to cases when there is no
contact between the two objects and the latter includes cases with
contact between the two objects, we will be interested to check whether
this statement is true in all the cases. the covering case (the last case
above) already signals that this matter is sometimes a matter of
interpretation.
Furthermore, the list of basic meanings forecasts the major possible
extensions into the metaphoric domain (e.g. above, but nevertheless a
cover aspect added), and it seems interesting that felett can refer to
describe both static relationships and cases when there is motion
involved (cf. the english above).
the prerequisite for the Hungarian fell is that it refers to an above
relationship between two objects, one of them static, whereas the other
one is in motion, which in fact constitutes the basic difference between
fell and felett. However, this distinction may turn fuzzy when, for
instance, the cover aspect is involved:
ruhja felett kabtot viselt. [She was wearing a coat over her
dress.]
Fell kabtot viselt. [She was wearing a coat on the top / above
(waist).]
the first example contains the previously presented felett, and we
would say that there is contact between the two objects, in our case the
clothes and the overcoat. In the second example fell refers to a case in
which there is a clear contact between the overcoat and what lies
underneath. According to the dictionary(rtSz. 1992), fell is basically
an adverb of place with the following basic usages:
on the top, or close to the top in case there is a set, collection of
items vertically one placed over the other: A ldban fell szp a
gymlcs. [the fruit is nice on top of the box.]
something which is viewed regarding its source, e.g. a river:
A Duna Bcs felett is hajzhat. [the Danube above Wien is
navigable.]
In this case the source is the upper part (cf. possibly the top of a
mountain, where it springs from), and the estuary is the lower part.
langacker (1987, 1991) mentioned the importance of the position
of the two objects involved while discussing the nature of above
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16.2. Felett1 ABOve A CertAIN level Or AmOUNt
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relationship; he concluded that the most central case is when one

object is exactly above the other, there is no contact between the two,
and the object below the other one usually serves as the reference point.
However, regarding the Hungarian fltt / felett, which is very close in
meaning to the english above, there are some aspects to consider when
the metaphorical extensions are examined. the examples we could
find fit into the concepts lakoff and Johnson described (1980), for
instance mOre IS UP, which are presented below.
16.2. Felett1 above a certain level or amount

We could find cases in which there is a normal, an average level to
which something else is compared, and this is higher than the standard.
Our examples contain comparisons regarding temperature, moral
values, talent, money, etc.:
A hmrsklet 10 felett van. [temperature is above 10.]
ez a teljestmny tlag felett van. [this performance is above
average.]
erklcsileg krnyezete felett ll. [morally he stands above his
surroundings.]
In these cases it is true that mOre IS UP, and according to the
consensus UPPer IS Better. Of course, higher temperature is better
than lower within reasonable limits, although exceptions can always be
found (e.g. when cold is needed to preserve something). the moment
these metaphorical cases are observed, there is a certain distance
between the two objects, though not as clear as in the case of the
english over and above, where the first one refers to a certain closeness
and the latter to a considerable distance between the two static objects.
Still, an idiomatic expression suggests a very clear distance:
Mindenek felett becslm az igazmondst. [I appreciate truth
above all.]
the examples above refer to a static relationship between the
participants, but our next example shows that felett is not always
associated with static images:
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16. metAPHOrICAl Fltt / Felett-SItUAtIONS
Jska Zsuzsi felett jr. [Joe is above Sue in school. = Joe attends a
higher class than Sue.]
Here we have a metaphorical case which is associated with motion;
a closer look reveals that Joe attends a higher class than Sue does, and
the case may be regarded as metaphoric. the two classes where the
pupils belong to do not have to be physically positioned one above the
other. Consequently the two levels (lower and higher) serve as the basis
for the above-situation, and we can conclude that although there is a
constant movement (change) between the levels of classes (in time both
children get into higher classes), the above relationship is preserved.
thus we tend to believe that both felett and above are proper to use if
the initial relationship between either the static or moving objects is
preserved:
Figure 111. Felett1 above a certain level or amount
16.3. Felett2 tIMe

A more clear motion can be observed regarding time expressions
connected to felett; in these cases time is moving over / above
somebody:
eljr az id pista felett. [time goes by / passes over Steve.]
Depending on the meaning of the verb, time can be slow but certain
(our example above), or time can be very fast (cf. the english proverb
time flies.).
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16.4. Felett3 COver
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16.4. Felett3 cover

there are metaphorical cases when we have the initial above
relationship, but we suspect that a certain type of cover aspect can be
associated with it:
szemlt tart a sereg felett. [He is mustering his troops.]
Uralkodik a npek felett. [He reigns over nations.]
the nature of the verb assures the metaphorical meaning, and in
the cases above felett indicates both lack of contact and a virtual cover;
the question whether this is a static relationship or not remains open,
thus we can say that this type of felett is also connected to over cover
or t6 cover. the dictionary mentions that due to foreign influence
there are cases when we can witness the use of felett instead of -rl, rl, -n suffixes:
vlemnyt mondott pista felett / pistrl. [He has given his
opinion on Steve.]
In this case his opinion is like a (death-)sentence which seems to
affect (cover) the person in question. Felett3 comes close to fell in this
last aspect, as fell is primarily connected to partial or full cover. lets
take a closer look at it in the next part.
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CHAPter 17.
MetaPHORICaL FeLL-SItUatIONS
17.1. Fell (Hungarian)

Our starting point is the dictionary definitions again (rtSz. 1992),
where we could find a few different usages for fell, as presented below:
<in written or printed documents> on top of the page or close to it:
ott fell olvasd. [read it on top of it.]
very closely above or under the surface of an item:
Csomagon fell van a cmzs. [the address is on top of the
parcel.]
something which geographically is situated higher than
something else:
A vz fellrl csorog. [Water is running from above.]
Fell as a postposition enriches the above presented usages:
something that is vertically above another thing, possibly there is
a contact between the two. In this case fell is a synonym for felett:
A kapun fell dsz van. [there is decoration above the gate.]
something that geographically lies closer to North:
A falun fell hegyek vannak. [there are mountains above the
village.]
something that is vertically above another thing, and there is no
contact between the two: elhajtotta a legyet a feje fell. [He shooed the
fly away from (above) his head.]
Fell as a preverb seems to be typical for either the cover (and thus
change) aspect, or something that passes over something else:
Fellblyegezte az igazolvnyt. [He overcanceled the certificate.]
Fellrta a cmzst. [He overwrote the address.]
Az rvz fellemelkedett a tltsen. [the flood rose above /
overflown the dam.]
the first example refers to a partial cover, which nevertheless
equals a full cover, as the action itself refers to a change in value of the
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document. the second case may refer to either a partial cover (similar
to the first one), or even a full erase of the address and writing a new
one. In the third example the moving object rises above the other one
and passes over it.the metaphorical extensions of this adverb, preverb
and postposition is discussed in the second part.
At this stage we are far from drawing a conclusion regarding the
prepositions, adverbs, postpositions discussed, but one thing is already
clear: the distinction between them is not as clear-cut as it may have
seemed at first, as they often tend to overlap in sense and usage, either
within one language (cf. the overlapping senses of peste and deasupra)
or between languages (cf. the multiple possibilities to translate t into
english: sometimes over, but it can be translated with across, through as
well). the reason why these words overlap may be that sometimes the
circumstances (the nature of S and C, the image schema associated with
the verb) are similar in which they appear; consequently the second part
of this work will try to highlight both the constituents which create a
particular situation and their possible metaphorical extensions.
17.2. Fell1 as an adverb

the most striking difference between fell and felett from our point
of view is that while the first one abounds in metaphorical extensions,
the latter is much more likely to be found in basic expressions. the
myth according to which fell refers to situations with contact between
the two objects is easily shaken by the following examples, where fell
functions as an adverb:
vitn fell ll. [this is beyond / past / without dispute.]
Fellrl jn az lds. [the blessing comes from above.]
Fellrl beszl Zsuzsval. [He is talking to Sue from above.]
In the sentences above fell refers to a place which is high above
another one, and supposedly there is no contact between the two
entities. However, there are further cases when fell involves a contact:
van fell. [He is on top. = He is the boss.]
Mindig marad fell. [He always gets the upper hand over the
others.]
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17.4. Fell3 AS A PreverB
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When hierarchically organised objects are involved, fell is often

involved (with its antonym, alul [below]):
szzadoson fell mindenki itt legyen. [everybody shall be here
above captain.]
Fell gy dntttek. [thats how they decided up there.]
Fell van a kirly, oldalt a grf. [the king is above, the count is
sideways.]
In these cases sometimes there is contact between the two objects
involved (e.g. first sentence), sometimes this matter is irrelevant, as
establishing the hierarchical order is much more important; naturally
we can also use the basic concept which seems to contradict the laws
of gravity, namely mOre IS UP, which leads to the next concept:
POWer IS UP.
17.3. Fell2 as a postposition

Fell as a postposition leads to further metaphorical expressions,
which resembles felett1 above a certain level or amount:
Minden remnyen fell szerepelt. [She succeed beyond all
expectations.]
erejn fell teljestett. [He succeeded beyond his power.]
hatvanan fell van. [Hes over sixty.]
As mentioned before, in these cases the presence or lack of contact
is irrelevant, as the focus of attention is directed towards the excess of
a (virtual) limit, reminding us over excess or t3 over-above.
17.4. Fell3 as a preverb

there were 26 cases found (rtSz. 1992) when fell functioned as a
preverb, and 25 were clear metaphorical extensions, and only one was
primarily basic and secondarily metaphoric in meaning:
sszal fellt. [He beats it with an ace.]
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the basic meaning is obvious in the example above, and the

metaphoric extension refers to both a cover and excess (in value or
quality). the other 25 cases can be grouped into two main categories.
the first one contains those cases when the fell preverb adds an againaspect and a certain type of cover-aspect to the overall meaning:
Aprlkosan fellvizsglta az gyet. [He went over the case with a
fine-tooth comb.]
Fellbrlta a javaslatot. [He reconsidered the proposal.]
In these cases the person who metaphorically is above, functions as
an expert, who (presumably) can judge much more clearly from a topview. the other group of cases includes an emphasised excess-aspect,
which may be completed with either a full cover or a partial one
equalling in value a full one:
Fellemelkedik a brlaton. [He is above all critics.]
Az sszeg fellhaladja az elvrsokat. [the sum goes over /
exceeds the expectations.]
Mindig kerekedik fell a csatban. [He always overcomes the
others in battles.]
Kpzeletet fellml. [It overshadows the imagination. = It defies
description.]
In these cases we can identify at least one moving object (S) which
exercises an upward and possibly a covering (overshadowing)
movement over another one:
Figure 112. Fell3 as a preverb
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CHAPter 18.
CONCLUSIONS
On the verge of being through with this part, let us draw a few
conclusions about these words used metaphorically. metaphorical
expressions naturally make use of concrete schemas, but they often add
or take something extra to the picture. many facets that are relevant
when concrete descriptions (e.g. nature of S or C) seem to sink into the
irrelevant aspects of metaphorical extensions, and we feel that we also
proved Sandra & rices prepositional network model, as we could detect
extensions, which communicate with each other without the
mediating central senses (cf. through). It is also relevant that the more
constituents a sense has, the more possibilities there are for
metaphorical extensions (cf. over).
One might ask whether this lexical investigation will lead us to any
results. In this respect, we should take into consideration Behaghels law:
elements, which belong together semantically, tend to occur together
syntactically. their semantic togetherness resides in conceptual overlap
involving salient substructures of the component elements (langacker
1999. 269). this has been tested when sometimes the verb and its particle
was more than enough to characterize the situation, and in other cases
the whole sentence was needed. the latter also proves the contextdependency of the various senses, which nevertheless indeed form a
partially radial structure. A single core meaning is not enough to describe
all the senses (cf. Brugman and lakoff), but the question about the
existence of a central theoretical sense above all the other remains open
(although Brugman answered it, we have to take into consideration more
recent findings of tyler and evans, for instance). During the work we
realized the potential importance of beyond and throughout, but these
will probably constitute the scope of our further research.
We also had the chance to test the relevance of dictionary
definitions, which indeed offer an insight into Brugmans focal senses.
All through the work, the idea that psychology is looking for hidden
aspects, revealing the very inner human soul was supported, whereas
cognitive linguistics highlights facts, gives evidence on how we
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18. CONClUSIONS
envisage ourselves or the world. A further improvement would be a test

including personal variations (cf. intercultural and intracultural
discrepancies), which we hope that is already taking shape.
As one of the critics of the thesis (H.P.) remarked, prepositions can
restrict the entities that can precede or follow them; for instance, above,
in its spatial sense can be associated with a certain type of nouns
(referring to concrete spatial entities). Although these are not always
specified, their conceptual content can be deduced from the context
(the flat above is for sale. Where shall i put it? Above the sofa.). there
could be more complex relationships between two entities expressed
by these prepositions, verbal prefixes, postpositions, satellites:
letters were sent all over the world.,
where S is made up of multiple entities spatially dispersed in order
to cover C.
Another important conclusion to highlight (thanks to H.P. and
S.Sz.) is that the specific sense of a particular word is often revealed by
the combination of the item with its neighbouring words, we can even
state that in many cases it is not the verb that determines the
relationship, but the verb is chosen to fit into the relationship. this is
one of the reasons why there are so many over or t-cases. Some of the
prepositions in the three languages have similar senses, for instance
over, above, peste, keresztl, fell can have in common excess in
certain contexts, whereas over, peste i t are connected to the force of
gravity. the vague localization expressed by the romanian prin can be
rendered in english only by an indefinite adverb:
e prin vecini. (romanian)
valahol a szomszdban van. (Hungarian)
[He is somewhere in the neighbourhood.]
the typological difference regarding the three languages can be
observed by the number of cases found in our database. Whereas
romanian grammatical structures of concepts of notions are obviously
different from Hungarian, there are vast differences in identifying the
structures of various situations / cases. thus the perception of romanian
prin or peste may result in completely different relationships in english
or Hungarian as in the examples above.
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231
As one of my critics remarked (S.Sz.), in romanian the sense of

motion is expressed by the verb. this means that the proper selection
of the verb is of utmost importance, as the type of motion is encoded
here. In english and Hungarian when over and t is uttered, we already
have one of the basic-central image schema formed, which is confirmed
by the verb. thus the spatial relationship between my place and the
neighbours is conceptualized as two different locations (C1 and C2)
separated by a (virtual) boundary / borderline that can be crossed. the
linguistic form to express this movement from C1 to C2 will be
expressed by a verb referring to motion (typically go) prefixed by t in
Hungarian. the same relationship may be expressed similarly in
english with over, but it is not compulsory, whereas in romanian we
will have something completely different:
tmegyek a szomszdba. (Hungarian)
trec pe la vecini. (romanian)
[Ill step over to / drop in on / look in on my neighbours.]
We can observe that in the romanian sentence the crossing element
is also present but encoded lexically in the verb, without peste. the
Hungarian t is so central in creating this relationship that very many
verbs fit into the relationship once we have the preverb: lp [step, a
pi-romanian], ugrik [jump, pop in on somebody, a sri-romanian],
or even verbs lacking the idea of motion nz [look, a se uita-romanian]:
tnzek a szomszdba. (Hungarian)
trec puin pe la vecini (s mai vd ce-i pe acolo.) (romanian)
[Ill pop in on my neighbours.]
the idea of motion is expressed by the preverb (t), as the verb in
Hungarian has little do with motion; the romanian verb (trec)
expresses both motion and crossing a (virtual) borderline or boundary,
whereas the english example expresses motion but only a faint idea of
crossing. Of course, finding synonymous expressions is also possible,
but they will not always render the exact idea.
We have tried to present the metaphorical expressions regarding
over, above, across, through, prin, peste, t, keresztl, fltt, fell by
grouping them according to their image schemas. However, the
categories we have got to are sometimes controversial, as the category
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18. CONClUSIONS
boundaries often tend to be fuzzy. the same expression sometimes

seems to belong to a certain group, and then we have a tendency to
label it differently. In the following we will try to present the possible
overlapping categories, which in our system imply aperture, cover,
time, over / above, again, change, excess and instrumental.
the aperture aspect turned to be important when describing the
english through, the romanian prin, and the Hungarian t and
keresztl, even in various subcategories, including cases with
apertures, temporary apertures or even creating apertures:
he went through the tunnel. (aperture)
sabia a trecut prin inima dragonului. (create aperture) (romanian)
[the sword went through the heart of the dragon.]
tengedtk a hatron. (temporary aperture) (Hungarian) [they let
him cross the border.]
In these situations S can create an aperture in C either permanently
or temporarily, or use one or more apertures in C in order to go through
it. Both v- and H-obstacles can have one or more apertures, and the
aperture can be created either in a v- or a H-obstacle. A special case
would be when the aperture is under C:
tbjt a kszb alatt. (Hungarian)
A scpat prin gaura de sub pragul uii. (romanian)
[He escaped through the hole under the door.]
the cover aspect (full or partial) was present when describing over,
above, prin, t and felett; in these situations S behaved differently from
the rest of cases, as it remained on / over-above C by spreading over it
and either came or not into contact with C. It is worth mentioning the
high occurrence of cover around cylindrical objects and those cases
when partial cover equalled a full cover.
A trecut cu buretele peste incidentul de ieri. [He passed the sponge
over what happened yesterday.]
Mindig thzza a szmtsaimat! [He is constantly frustrating my
designs.]
You shouldnt cry over spilt milk.
18. CONClUSIONS
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It is not our primary concern here to discuss the importance of

time, but we have to mention its dual image (static and moving) as well
as the various degrees in its speed when it is moving (conceptualized
subjectively). time was present within over, through, prin, peste, t,
keresztl and felett, practically in all categories, as the image schema
for time was very close to the central cases. If we remember this, we
will not overlook the importance of time, as generally speaking ,
time is conceived of metaphorically as having been constructed in
terms of concrete building blocks; only in our cases time is constructed
in different ways, functioning as either C or S; time can be a set of units
divided equally into a string of containers, it may be interpreted as a
horizontally or vertically extended static obstacle (C), or time can even
function as a usually rapidly moving object (S) over a static one. the
examples below present various concepts associated with time:
serul i va avea efectul peste puin. [the effect of the serum will
be felt soon.]
vszzadokon keresztl lt a tvhit. [People were under delusion
for centuries.]
he supported them over the decades.
the again aspect to our surprise proved to be a little more
complex than we would have thought within over, and t, as this aspect
may refer to pure repetition of the initial action (although we know that
there are no two exactly same actions, only similar ones) and this is
close to doing-it-again-in-order-to-improve-style actions. A different
type of again action is when one wants to change / modify something
about the initial action or effect.
Change was very abundant within over and t. Although its
presence could be detected (overtly or implied) in all the categories,
change is very complex from the perspective of t-situations; it may
extend from simple modifications, alterations (e.g. trimming) to
conversions, replacements or changes that lie beyond our grasp (e.g.
wizardry or other transformations).
excess became very important when describing over, above, peste,
t (both vertical and horizontal excess), keresztl and fltt / felett. the
limit above which we can talk about a particular change was very
productive in creating metaphorical expressions, probably because our
prepositions and satellites were all involved in cases when the (virtual)
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18. CONClUSIONS
boundary / borderline or obstacle / impediment (C) challenged S. this

excess of limit created cases when we could talk about C1 and C2, or the
two sides of C, or even C and C (changed / altered C):
rezultatul e peste ateptri. Ceea ce vrei e peste poate. A trecut
peste msur. (romanian)
[the result is (above) is beyond expectation. What you want is just
not possible.]
Keresztlltt a clon. Fellmlta a vrakozsokat. tlpte az
illendsg hatrt.( Hungarian)
[He went too far. He surpassed all expectation. He overstepped
decency.]
the writer has overwritten himself. (reflexive!) this is above me.
the examples uncover a further common aspect of the cases
described: when S moves along a path which is situated inside C
(through, prin, t), from one end to the other, including the possibility
of extending beyond the other end. this type can be detected in all
three languages when over, above, peste, keresztl, fell is involved.
We can finally mention that peste seems to be the least metaphorically
involved, as we could only trace four distinct cases, which seem to
perfectly coincide with the english over regarding over-above, excess,
partial cover and time, to be found within the Hungarian t as well.
If we concentrate on the common elements first, we should bear in
mind that however different two languages are, they cannot be so
different as not to observe the overwhelming similarities. more
precisely, in our case we tried to describe situations with over in two
Indo-european languages (english and romanian) and one Finno-Ugric
language (Hungarian). Of course, a meticulous research regarding over
triggered further cases to describe in all three languages, thus we had to
include above, across, through in english, prin, peste in romanian, and
keresztl, fltt / felett, fell in Hungarian (and the list is not complete:
asupra, deasupra in romanian, and tl, vgig in Hungarian may be also
added to the research as discovered while describing the former
prepositions-postpositions-adverbial particles). Although many cases
and sub-variants have been analysed, we could identify some common
aspects in all the three languages involved.
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One of the common aspects is that when we want to express an

over relationship, there are several variants, depending on the
circumstances. By circumstances we refer to those elements which
belong to the domain of meaning and within the domain of surface
expression mentioned by talmy (2000b. 21): motion, path, figure,
ground, manner and cause belonging to meaning, and verb, adposition,
subordinate clause being described as satellites. Satellites bring into
picture another common aspect of the three languages, as the
prepositions discussed can function as satellites of particular verbs,
although they should not be mistaken for prepositions:
[Satellite] is the grammatical category of any constituent other
than a noun phrase or prepositional-phrase complement...the satellite,
which can be either a bound affix or a free word, is thus intended to
encompass all of the following grammatical forms, which traditionally
have been largely treated independently of each other: english verb
particles ... latin verb prefixes. A set of forms that can function as
satellites in a language often overlaps partially, but not wholly, with a
set of forms in another grammatical category in that language, generally
the category of prepositions, verbs, or nouns. thus, english satellites
largely overlap with prepositions. (talmy 2000b. 101)
these satellites, present in all three languages build up a common
framework of cases, namely where we have the previously mentioned
figure (S), ground (C), motion and path (expressed by the satellite and
verb meaning). manner is encoded in the satellite and verb meaning as
well. the prototypical scenario for through, for instance, in all cases
meant that we have a moving object (S) trying to reach a place which is
separated by the present position of S by a non-moving object (C),
which functions as a border(line) / obstacle. Furthermore, the cases
described in all three languages signalled that it is worth separating
cases when C is a real obstacle, impediment having vertical and / or
horizontal extension, and cases when C is a borderline, virtual or real.
If C is a real obstacle, then the through-situation may be observed in
three possible ways: directly through it (and this brings into picture
through, prin, t, keresztl), or trying to avoid it either above (triggering
over, peste and felett cases) or below. the below-case is interesting, as
in all three languages we need further satellites or prepositions to
clarify the case: through under, prin sub (romanian), t alatt
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(Hungarian). Consequently, we could observe cases when the static

object is a border(line), obstacle or it contains aperture(s).
A further common element involving these three languages is the
way speakers (re)act when they face these cases, as it seems that force
dynamics (particularly gravity) is always implied, and although the
picture does not contain the end of the path, the interlocutors take it
for granted:
A srit peste gard. [He jumped over the fence.]
tugrotta az rkot. [He jumped over the ditch.]
the cat jumped over the wall. (tyler and evans 2004)
In all these three cases we imagine the scene, a scene including
landing as well; otherwise we would further clarify what it is at the
other end of the wall, fence or ditch.
Although there were many common aspects regarding the three
languages, including very general ones (force dynamics, up and down,
what can be considered a through-motion or an over / above-motion)
and rather specific ones (through apertures, excess, cover), we should
not overlook the differences observed when analysing the cases.
When describing two Indo-european and one Finno-Ugric
language, one should expect to find close similarities in the two Indoeuropean ones, but interestingly enough , we can state that
regarding the number of cases referring to the adpositions, english and
Hungarian are closer to each other than english and romanian. Before
offering a potential explanation, let us take a look at talmys (2000b. 53)
typological categories regarding motion verbs.
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18. CONClUSIONS
table 14. talmys typological categories

three main typological categories for motion verbs
Language/language family
the particular components of a
Motion event characteristically
represented in the verb root
romance
Semitic
Polynesian
Nez Perce
Caddo
Japanese
Korean
Indo-european (not romance)
Chinese
Finno-Ugric
Ojibwa
Warlpiri
Atsugewi (and apparently
most northern Hokan)
Navaho
motion + Co-event
motion + Figure
According to the table, romance languages (romanian) refer to

motion and path, whereas non-romance Indo-european and FinnoUgric languages encode the motion and the co-event in the verb-root.
this observation highlights another aspect of languages, namely
conflation. manner conflation is typical of english and Hungarian,
hence the immense number of cases regarding the english over and the
Hungarian t, for instance. As we mentioned in our introduction, we
could find thousands of cases for both english and Hungarian, whereas
only hundreds for the romanian. the explanation should be searched
for in the satellites of the languages, as english and Hungarian tend to
use more satellites (preverbs and prepositions); conversely, in
romanian the direction of motion included (cf. a iei, a intra, a cobor),
and the lack of preverbs in romanian means that the manner of the
motion heavily relies on the meaning of the verb, and our aim was to
analyse prepositions, preverbs, postpositions (adpositions), and not
verbs or nouns.
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18. CONClUSIONS
the way Hungarian encodes the path seems to be normal, whereas

the english encoding is atypical, according to talmy (2000b. 106-7):
[S]atellites should be well distinguished from prepositions. No
confusion can occur in most Indo-european languages, where the two
forms have quite distinct positional and grammatical characteristics.
For example, in latin, Classical Greek, and russian, the satellite is
bound prefixally to the verb, while the preposition accompanies the
noun (wherever it turns up in the sentence) and governs its case
However, a problem arises for english, which, perhaps alone among
Indo-european languages, has come to regularly position satellite and
preposition next to each other in a sentence. Nevertheless, there are
still ways in which the two kinds of forms satellites and prepositions
distinguish themselves... satellite over in its sense of rotation around
a horizontal axis does not have a close semantic counterpart in
prepositional over with its above or covering senses.
the typology of motion verbs and their satellites can be seen in the
table below, presented by talmys 2000b work:
table 15. talmys typology of Motion verbs
typology of motion verbs and their satellites
the particular components of a motion
language/language family event characteristically represented in the:
verb root
A. romance
Semitic
Polynesian
B. Nez Perce
C. Caddo
Indo-european
(not romance)
Chinese
Atsugewi (most northern
Hokan)
motion + Path
motion + Coevent
Satelite
A.
B. manner
C. (Figure/) Ground
[Patient]
Path
Path + Ground and

motion + Figure Cause
talmy (2000b. 118) also explains: for characteristic representation

of motion events latin exhibited the presumably Indo-european pattern
of using co-event-conflating verb roots together with path satellites that
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18. CONClUSIONS
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239
formed the prefixes on the verb roots. In english, we could witness the
development of a fresh path satellite system, thus we still have here the
inherited pattern to describe motion events with co-event verb
conflation. But languages arising from latin (in our case, romanian),
have a new system of path-conflating verbs instead of the path satellite
system. this is also the explanation why the gerundive constructions for
the expressing manner and cause have evolved in these languages. later
on he adds that path is the main category expressed by the satellites of
the Indo-european languages, except romance.
Another aspect worth highlighting is the fixedness of various
language patterns. english, being a rigid Subject-verb-Object language
(SvO), sometimes hides the most important piece of information within
a sentence, as it can rarely start, for instance, with a verb- or object.
talmy proves this by offering examples referring to possession in
contrast with Spanish and russian, but the case is similar with
romanian and Hungarian as well, which are much more flexible with
word-order. We included this remark as awareness of differences
between languages may lead to a more faithful translation from one
language into another, as we can all remember the famous remark
concerning metaphors: by highlighting one particular aspect of
something, we tend to overshadow others (cf. lakoffs example for
building, where chimney needs by far more imagination to function as a
basis for IDeAS Are BUIlDINGS). However, another opinion is 19 that
language correspondences are multiple. According to the synchronic
view, language is a stage of universal grammar, and the diachronic
approach encapsulates all the synchronic stages during time. thus the
common origin of different languages may not always lead to
similarities, as universal principles may be also triggered. this way the
seemingly different languages as english and Hungarian may become
closer to each other (both can easily create metaphorical expressions
based on syntactic-semantic structures anchored in the so-called
universal grammar), whereas english still offers many similarities with
romanian (cf. inflexion, configuration, accusative forms).
We are aware of the fact that the analysis of syntactic models of these
languages could have offered further results, but this would have gone
beyond our original aim. the inclusion of further sentence-level
structures present in english and Hungarian, but missing from romanian
19. the remark belongs to one the critics of the thesis (.O.).
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may already belong to generative or relational grammar (where over can

be part of the predicate: she turned the key over., the lake froze over. ).
the multiple meaning of the english over, through, above, across
and the Hungarian t, keresztl, felett (functioning as preposition,
postposition, satellite / preverb, adverb / adverbial particle) led to many
sub-cases as well, for instance straight or non-straight motion, and even
within the inside-aspect we can further distinguish skim or creating
aperture elements.
the romanian prin resulted in 8 distinct cases, out of which two
seem to be missing from the english description, namely the
instrumental sense and the proximity sense. the primary english
instrumental preposition is by, although through may be also possible.
Nevertheless, the Hungarian keresztl also has this instrumental sense:
A avansat prin relaiile sale. (romanian) [He advanced due to his
good connections.]
A sajtn keresztl rteslt a trtntekrl. (Hungarian) [He found
out about it through the press.]
the proximity sense of the romanian prin seems to be language
specific within this circle of the studied satellites and prepositions, but
at a closer look we can realize that this sense is gained due to the word
followed by prin (st prin preajm. [He lives in the neighbourhood.]). As
this sense of prin seems to be well-established in romanian, we have
cases referring to both space and time, and metaphorical expressions are
easy to find. this uniqueness leads to another important remark by
talmy (2000b) referring to typological categories. He admits that
although typological structuring among patterns must have its basis in
human cognitive organization, exactly how it is based there is not clear
as it may belong to an innate part of the language system, or it might be
something secondary, but this structure is responsible for choosing a
pattern in a language. moreover, only language and culture exhibit the
pattern of a universal abstract structure underlying a variability of
instantiation determined by the social group.(talmy 2000b. 377)
One of the conclusions based on patterns is that the nature of the
border(line), obstacle, impediment, etc., which (virtually or physically)
divides the path into two separate parts may be even more important than
we described it in our research. If we adopt a much more simplistic way
of presenting, for instance, the Hungarian t, then there is a possibility to
18. CONClUSIONS
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have t1 based on the point of view of government (binding), where the

real borderline plays a major role (having many sub-cases analysing all
the possible impediments), and we can have t2 encapsulating cases with
virtual borderline (including cultural, an social ones as well). Still, then
the description may become extensive when similarities and differences,
discrepancies are to be presented between virtual and real borderlines,
and this was not our major concern in this work.
After all, at the end of our research, we are in doubt whether we
could describe these satellites / prepositions properly, or we only
offered a personal view on a slice of grammar (cf. talmys own
interpretation of cognitive semantics, 2000a). Aitchison suggests an
analysis based on language use, and tomasello seems to support the
idea: how children learn language is not a logical problem but an
empirical problem. (tomasello 2003. 328). Psychologists and
neurobiologists have been constantly offering new data about the
human mind and brain alongside linguists, but we may be still far away
from clear evidence about the functioning of mind and its relationship
with language. Another aspect worth taking into consideration when
one endeavours dealing with language is Winchesters findings:
When Samuel Johnson compiled his Dictionary of english language
in 1755 under the sponsorship of Oxford University, he defined only
43,500 entries. the current oxford english Dictionary, a lineal descendant
of Johnsons seminal work and most recently revised in the 1980s,
contains over 500,000 definitions! this quantitative difference is not the
result of an increase in the number of english words since the eighteenth
century, but rather is an indication of the difficulty collecting the
enormous number of words we use in daily communication...word
meanings are continually changing, and by the enormous ambiguity of the
words we do use even when the meaning of a word is known, it must
be understood in a particular context and used according to the rules of
grammar and syntax in order to produce effective communication.
(Winchester 2003, cited by Purves 2004. 645)
But let us suppose that we are beyond the matter of dictionary
entries; within linguistics there is a well-shaped generative tendency
and cognitive line, and even within the latter there are also divergent
views regarding meaning or polysemy (cf. lakoffs full approach and
tyler and evans principled polysemy approach). We cannot say that
time will offer an answer to whose point of view or which tendency is
better than the other, as we have presented all through our research,
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meaning can be defined relative to a particular context (cf. the intricacy

and subjectivity of truth).
Native speaker cognitive semanticists cannot agree on the central
senses of categories regarding most frequently used prepositions (cf.
over). So being the case, we cannot say that we were able to offer a
better interpretation of the romanian and Hungarian prepositions
described, but we offered our (subjective) point of view, which was
nevertheless based on strict dictionary definitions and a corpus taken
from the most authoritative dictionaries in the respective languages,
completed with contextual support.20 this approach is supported by
evans and Green (2006. 207) when they state that the distinction
between dictionary knowledge (word meaning) and encyclopaedic
knowledge (non-linguistic or world knowledge) is artificial; their
solution is that we need an alternative view: dictionary knowledge is a
subset of more general encyclopaedic knowledge.
We have already stated that no linguist has ever written a perfect
grammar of any language (Aitchison 2008. 99). We have tried to offer
one possible view, which may enrich the understanding of either the
language itself or the grammar of a particular language. Harley is more
pessimistic as he states that there has been less research on language
production than on language comprehension...the investigation of
production is perceived to be more difficult than the investigation of
comprehension (2001. 349). Although our investigation followed the
streamline of cognitive semantics, Newmeyer (1999) seems to discover
that the cognitive and generative grammar may be close to each other in
the sense that the generative approach is consonant with the Cognitive
Commitment. Jackendoff also developed a theory of linguistic meaning
that comes close to cognitive approaches (non-objectivist).
Another problem we have tried to prove during our work is the
difficulty of translation from one language into another. Professional
translators and interpreters are often faced with this problem and no
wonder if we take into consideration Quines claim from 1960,
paraphrased by Wright (1997. 398): It is a commonplace that
expressions in one language may resist a fully satisfactory translation
into another...Quines claim (1960) is not that exact translation is
sometimes impossible, but that there is no such thing as exact
20. Cf. Fodor et al.: Practically anything that one can say about speech production
must be considered speculative, even by the standards current in
psycholinguistics. (1974. 434)
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translation: that for any expression, in any language, there will inevitably
be a range of alternative translations of it into any particular language
each of which, in conjunction with coordinating adjustments in the
translation of other expressions, will equally well and unimprovably
accommodate all the behavioural data concerning speakers use of the
translated language.
After cross-examining thousands of cases in three languages, we can
say that Quine is perfectly right, and the only trustworthy translation
depends on the context which is meaning in use, in Wittgensteins
words, sentence in use. this may be the explanation for situations when
over is not always translated into romanian and Hungarian as peste or
t, prin refers to through or among or via or around / approximately,
whereas t can be understood as over, through, or across. the overabove relationship was present in almost all categories as well, and this
relationship is a proof of the difficulty of interpretations. Whereas there
is a tendency to translate the romanian peste or the Hungarian t into
over in english, the examples may prove that over is but one possible
interpretation of peste; similarly, t may be translated as above, across,
through(out), or even for days on end. these interpretations, in fortunate
cases, may overlap, but sometimes the most correct choice depends on
all the elements of the t-situation, namely the nature of S, C, and the
meaning of the verb, as signalled above:
A plouat zile ntregi. (romanian) napokon t esett. (Hungarian)
it has rained for days (on end).
A trecut peste pod. (romanian) tment a hdon. (Hungarian)
he went across the bridge.
Calul a zburat peste obstacol. (romanian) A l treplt az
akadlyon. (Hungarian)
the horse flew over the jump.
A trecut prin multe suferine. (romanian) sok bajon ment t.
(Hungarian)
he went through many difficulties.
A visat cu ochii deschii pe tot parcursul orei. (romanian)
egsz rn t brndozott. (Hungarian)
he was daydreaming throughout the whole class.
Sometimes we are flabbergasted how these satellites and
prepositions appear and disappear when translated. We cannot but
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18. CONClUSIONS
agree with tyler and evans who start their article by stating that
language learning is one of the most complicated feats that human
beings accomplish (2004). We would only like to add, that a similarly
intricate problem, if not more difficult, is translation / interpretation. It
is true that details about particular prepositions still remain claims as
the conceptual organisation is largely based on the properties of
language and therefore inferential, as evans and Green observed (2006.
781), but our method which started as a lakoffian full-approach has
been influenced by the principled polysemy approach, thus trying to
offer an attempt to pinpoint problems regarding the english
prepositions on the one hand, and presenting a detailed network of the
romanian and Hungarian (more or less) equivalents on the other hand.
to sum up, we accept one of the claims of cognitive linguistics,
according to which it provides a unified and accessible account of how
many grammatical constructions and lexical items work, and how varying
uses of these forms are systematically related to one another (tyler and
evans 2004. 260). We believe that our research may turn beneficial for
second language learners in case they are presented a systematic network
of various senses for various prepositions starting from the proto-scene,
and inferring other senses as well. Although some uses of all prepositions
and satellites are idiosyncratic, we do not have to concentrate on them
from the very beginning, as parroting has little to do with our worldexperience referring to border, borderline, barrier, obstacle, impediment,
trench, ditch and so on. Secondary meanings can be more easily derived
from central ones or from nodes based on inference (cf. tyler and evans
2004. 278), as shifts in vantage point or putting the participants into the
limelight considerably contributes to the extra meanings 21.
While trying to decipher the intricacy of the particular prepositions
we discovered that further prepositions are needed if we really want to
present interrelated and extended meanings (i.e. beyond, among,
printre, asupra, deasupra, tl, vgig), but their description is already
beyond our initial conception and may serve as a starting point for a
further research. Until then we would like to finish with Santiago
ramon y Cajals words dating back to more than a century ago:
As long as our brain is a mystery, the universe the reflection of the
structure of the brain will also be a mystery.
21. this is the point where I can only thank my teachers (. O., e.P., C.t. and S. Sz.N.) for their valuable remarks upon the conclusion and the whole work overall.
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aPPeNDIX 1. LISt OF FIGUReS
Figure 1. Source domain hierarchy

Figure 2. Possible trajectories for the cat jumped over the wall
Figure 3. the proto-scene for Over
Figure 4. tyler and evans: network of Over
Figure 5. Over above + across sense
Figure 6. tyler and evans: central meaning for Over
Figure 7. Over above sense
Figure 8. Kovcs: stand over somebody
Figure 9. Over across sense
Figure 10. Over cover sense 1
Figure 11. Over cover sense 2
Figure 12. Over excess sense
Figure 13. Over reflexive sense
Figure 14. Cognitive models for tIme
Figure 15. ABOve
Figure 16. regier: ABOve
Figure 17. ACrOSS
Figure 18. metaphorical tHrOUGH
Figure 19. PrIN1 through obstacle
Figure 20. PrIN through prism
Figure 21. PrIN3 create aperture
Figure 22. PrIN4 inside
Figure 23. PrIN5 through inside
Figure 24. PrIN7 proximity
Figure 25. PrIN circular
Figure 26. PrIN8 time
Figure 27. PeSte1 over-above v, no contact
Figure 28. PeSte1 over-above v, contact
Figure 29. PeSte1 over-above H, no contact
Figure 30. PeSte1 over-above upward
Figure 31. PeSte1 over-above upward turn
Figure 32. PeSte2 excess
Figure 33. t1 through H, in+out straight
Figure 34. t1 through in+out, non-straight
Figure 35. t1 through H IN+OUt non-straight/apertures
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Figure 36. t1 through H IN+OUt creating aperture
Figure 37. t1 through H IN+OUt over/above
Figure 38. t1 through H IN+OUt / INSIDe
Figure 39. t1 through H inside straight
Figure 40. t1 through H inside non-straight
Figure 41. t1 through H ON
Figure 42. t1 through Hv
Figure 43. t1 through Hv split
Figure 44. t1 through v
Figure 45. t1 through v / over
Figure 46. t1 through v / overflow
Figure 47. t1 through v creating aperture
Figure 48. t1 through v creating temporary aperture
Figure 49. t1 through diminishing v
Figure 50. t2 through one aperture v
Figure 51. t2 through aperture(s)
Figure 52. t2 through apertures
Figure 53. t2 through under
Figure 54. t3 over (above/across)
Figure 55. t3 over-above vH no contact, landing
Figure 56. t3 over-above v no contact, no landing
Figure 57. t3 over-above v no contact, no landing / through
obstacle
Figure 58. t3 over-above (no) contact, no landing
Figure 59. t3 over-above time
Figure 60. t3 over-above v no contact, landing
Figure 61. t3 over-above v contact, landing
Figure 62. t3 over-above H no contact, landing
Figure 63. t3 over-above H cover
Figure 64. Gradual metaphorization
Figure 65. t1 related to t2 and t3
Figure 66. t4 change C-C (into) through inside
Figure 67. t4 change C1-C2
Figure 68. t5 from-to basic sense
Figure 69. t5 from-to GOAl ONlY
Figure 70. t5 from-to SOUrCe ONlY
Figure 71. t5 from-to tHere-Here
Figure 72. t5 from-to BOtH directions
Figure 73. t5 from-to ACtION
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Figure 74. t5 from-to BrIDGING
Figure 75. t5 from-to CONNeCtOr
Figure 76. t5 from-to UP
Figure 77. t5 from-to tUrN
Figure 78. t5 from-to DUAl separate C1 and C2, central
Figure 79. t5 from-to DUAl separate C1 and C2, metaphorical
Figure 80. t5 from-to DUAl over
Figure 81. t5 from-to DUAl through (on)
Figure 82. t5 from-to DUAl -focus
Figure 83. t5 from-to DUAl C2-focus
Figure 84. t5 from-to DUAl turn
Figure 85. t5 from-to ClOSe vicinity
Figure 86.t5 from-to ClOSe through apertures
Figure 87. t5 from-to ClOSe over
Figure 88. t5 from-to ClOSe change
Figure 89. t5 from-to CHANGe C1 to C2
Figure 90. t5 from-to CHANGe C to C
Figure 91. t5 from-to CHANGe replacement
Figure 92. t5 from-to COPY
Figure 93. t5 from-to FOr
Figure 94. t5 from-to tIme
Figure 97. t6 cover around non-circular C
Figure 98. t6 through H inside non-straight cover
Figure 99. t6 through H inside skim cover
Figure 100. t6 cover (through) tIme
Figure 101. t6 cover through / over AGAIN
Figure 102. t6 cover change again
Figure 103. t6 cover and through apertures
Figure 104. Keresztl1 through H IN+OUt straight
Figure 105. Keresztl1 through H non-straight
Figure 106. Keresztl1 through Hv split
Figure 107. Keresztl2 through v one aperture
Figure 108. Keresztl3 over-above Hv no contact, (no) landing
Figure 109. Keresztl3 over-above / through Hv
Figure 110. KereSZtl6 block
Figure 111. Felett1 above a certain level or amount
Figure 112. Fell3 as a preverb
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aPPeNDIX 2 LISt OF taBLeS
table 1. Distinctions between basic domains and image schemas

table 2. Four types of knowledge
table 3. Abbreviations
table 4. A possible network of PrIN
table 5. A possible network of PeSte
table 10. Basic and metaphorical CHANGe
table 11. A possible network of t5 cases
table 13. A possible network of KereSZtl
table 14. talmys typological categories
table 15. talmys typology of motion verbs
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KIvONat
A Metaforikus kifejezsek kognitv lersa [A Cognitive Approach

to Metaphorical expressions] 10 hasonl jelents prepozcit, igektt
s hatrozszt mutat be egy tbbezres angol, romn s magyar nyelv
trzsanyagbl, amely a hrom nyelv alapvet rtelmez sztraiban
tallhat: a shorter english Dictionary (2002), Dicionarul explicativ al
limbii romne [A romn nyelv rtelmez sztra](1998) s A magyar
nyelv rtelmez sztra (1992). A m a kvetkez szavak
alapjelentseit s metaforikus kiterjesztseit mutatja be: over [t], above
[fltt], across [keresztl], through [keresztl], prin [keresztl], peste
[t], t, keresztl, felett, s fell, amelyek magyarzatt tucatnyi tblzat
s szznl is tbb illusztrci segti.
RezUMat
A Cognitive Approach to Metaphorical expressions [O abordare

cognitiv a unor expresii metaforice] prezint 10 prepoziii i prefixe
verbale (preverbe) cu sensuri similare din limbile englez, romn i
maghiar; corpusul se bazeaz pe trei dicionare reprezentative ale
celor trei limbi, totaliznd cteva mii de cazuri depistate n shorter
english Dictionary (2002), Dicionarul explicativ al limbii
romne(1998) i A magyar nyelv rtelmez sztra [Dicionarul
explicativ al limbii maghiare] (1992). lucrarea ofer att o descriere a
sensurilor de baz (sensurile centrale) ct i a celor metaforice privind
over [peste], above [deasupra], across [deasupra-prin], through [prin],
prin, peste, t [peste], keresztl [prin], felett [deasupra], fell
[deasupra]. Descrierile sunt completate cu peste 10 tabele i peste 100
de ilustraii.
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aBOUt tHe aUtHOR
Imre Attila a Sapientia erdlyi magyar tudomnyegyetem

marosvsrhelyi mszaki s Humntudomnyok Kar angol szakos
adjunktusa s a fordt szak szakkoordintora. tanulmnyait
szlvrosban, marosvsrhelyen, kezdte. 1999-ben magyarangol
szakos tanri diplomt szerzett a kolozsvri BabeBolyai
tudomnyegyetem Blcsszkarn; mesteri oklevelt s doktori cmt
ugyanezen egyetem angol tanszkn szerezte. els nll ktete, a
logikus angol nyelvtan (leG) 2008-ban jelent meg az editura Didactic
i Pedagogic kiadnl.
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PUBLICatIONS
IN tHe SaPIeNtIaBOOK SeRIeS
Cri publicate
1.tONK mrtONvereSS KrOlY (SZerK.)
rtelmezs s alkalmazs. Hermeneutikai s alkalmazott filozfiai
vizsgldsok. 2002.
2. PetH GNeS (SZerK.)
Kptvitelek. tanulmnyok az intermedialits trgykrbl. 2002.
3. NAGY lSZl
Numerikus s kzelt mdszerek az atomfizikban. 2002.
4. eGYeD emeSe (SZerK.)
thetrumi Knyvecske. Sznhzi zsebknyvek s szerepk
a rgi sznhzi kultrjban. 2002.
5. vOrZSK mAGDOlNAKOvCS lICINIU AleXANDrU
mikrokonmiai kislexikon. 2002.
6. Kll GBOr (SZerK.)
mszaki szaktanulmnyok. 2002.
7. SZeNKOvItS FereNCmAK ZOltNCSIllIK IHArKABlINt AttIlA
mechanikai rendszerek szmtgpes modellezse. 2002.
810. tNCZOS vIlmOStKS GYNGYvr (SZerK.)
tizenkt v. sszefoglal tanulmnyok az erdlyi
magyar tudomnyos kutatsok 19902001 kztti eredmnyeirl.
IIII. 2002.
11. SOrBN ANGellA (SZerK.)
Szociolgiai tanulmnyok erdlyi fiatalokrl. 2002.
12. GBOr CSIllASelYem ZSUZSA (SZerK.)
Kegyessg, kultusz, tvolts.
Irodalomtudomnyi tanulmnyok. 2002.
13. SAlAt leveNte (SZerK.)
Knldni ebben az orszgban? Ankt a romniai magyarsg megmaradsnak szellemi feltteleirl. 2002.
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14. NmetI JNOSmOlNr ZSOlt

A tell telepek elterjedse a Nagykrolyi-sksgon s az r vlgyben. 2002.
15. NAGY lSZl (SZerK.)
tanulmnyok a termszettudomnyok trgykrbl. 2002.
16. BOCSKAY IStvNmAteKOvItS GYrGYSZKelY melINDA
KOvCS-KUrUC J. SZABOlCS
magyarromnangol fogorvosi szaksztr. 2003.
17. BrASSAI AttIlA (SZerK.)
Orvostudomnyi tanulmnyok. 2003.
Kztes kpek. A filmelbeszls sznterei. 2003.
19. KISS IStvN
erodlt talajok enzimolgija. 2003.
20. NAGY lSZl (SZerK.)
Korszer ksrleti s elmleti fizikatanulmnyok. 2003.
21. UJvrOSI lUJZA (SZerK.)
erdly folyinak termszeti llapota. Kmiai s kolgiai
vzminsts a rekonstrukci megalapozsra. 2003.
22. JZSeF KOlUmBN et AlII
lectures on nonlinear analysis and its applications. 2003.
Szabadon fordtotta Fordtsok a magyar sznjtszs cljaira a
XvIIIXIX. szzadban. 2003.
24. BAJUSZ IStvN (SZerK.)
mindennapi let a rmai Dciban. 2003.
25. SelYem ZSUZSABAlZS Imre JZSeF (SZerK.)
Humor az avantgrdban s a posztmodernben. 2004.
26. GBOr CSIllA (SZerK.)
Devcik, trtnelmek, identitsok. 2004.
27. rOtH-SZAmOSKZI mrIA (SZerK.)
vlassz okosan Kszsgfejleszt program az agresszivits
cskkentsre. 2004.
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28. SIPOS GBOr (SZerK.)

A kolozsvri Akadmiai Knyvtr rgi magyar Knyvtrgyjtemnyeinek katalgusa. 2004.
29. NemNYI GNeS (SZerK.)
A rurlis bevndorlk. Az elsgenercis kolozsvri vroslakk
trsadalma. 2004.
A Cski-medence teleplstrtnete a neolitikumtl a XvII. szzad
vgig a rgszeti adatok tkrben. 2004.
31. KOvCS ZSOlt (SZerK.)
erdly XvIIXvIII. szzadi ptszetnek forrsaibl. 2004.
32. KISS IStvN
A mikroorganizmusokkal beoltott talajok enzimolgija. 2004.
33. BrASSAI ZOltN et AlII
A kovsznai sznsavas frdk s mofettk a vgtagi
verrszkletek kezelsben. 2004.
34. HOrvtH IStvN (SZerK.)
erdly s magyarorszg kztti migrcis folyamatok. 2005.
35. GBOr CSIllA (SZerK.)
A trtnetmonds rtegei a kora jkorban. 2005.
Ismeretsg. Interkulturlis kapcsolatok a sznhz rvn: XvIIXIX.
szzad. 2005.
37. BerSZN IStvN (SZerK.)
Alternatv mozgsterek: mkds s/vagy gyakorls a kognitv
folyamatokban. 2005.
38. eGYeD Pter (SZerK.)
A kzssgrl a hagyomnyos, valamint a kommunitarista
felfogsokban. 2005.
39. JANCS mIKlS
Csiky Gergely dramaturgija s a XIX. szzad vgi magyar drmars
40. ZOltN BeNYBlA PAlNCZlSZl SZIlGYI
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41. KeSZeG vIlmOS (SZerK.)
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tgls Istvn jegyzetei. 2005.
43. ZOltN mAK
Quasi-triangular Fuzzy Numbers, therory and Applications. 2006.
44. BerSZN IStvN (SZerK.)
Gyakorlatetikapragmatizmus. 2006.
45. BeGe ANtAl
rgi s j szmelmleti fggvnyek. 2006.
46. BAlZS lAJOS
A vgy rtusai rtusstratgik. A szlets, hzassg, hall
szoksvilgnak lelki htterrl. 2006.
47. AlBert-lrINCZ eNIK
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48. NmetI JNOSmOlNr ZSOlt
A tell telepek fejldse s vge a Nagykrolyi-sksgon s az r
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49. tAmSI ZSOlt-JZSeF
Az erdlyi rmai katolikus egyhzmegye az 184849-es
forradalomban. 2007
Film. Kp. Nyelv. 2007
51. SZIlGYI GYrGYIFlrA GBOrArI GYUlA
Bihar megye gazdasgi-trsadalmi fejldse. eredmnyek s tvlatok. 2007.
52. OZSvtH ImOlA (SZerK.)
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53. IStvN UrK
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54. SZAB rPD
A tulajdonvlts folyamata romnia gazdasgi talakulsban.
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A romniai gazdasgi talakuls esettanulmnyokban. 2008.
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56. tKS GYNGYvr

Szakma vagy hivats? A kolozsvri magyar egyetemi oktatk sttuszcsoportja. 2008.
57. ZSIGmOND IStvN
metakognitv stratgik sszetevik s mrsk. 2008.
58. AmDreA vIrGINS
Crime Genres and the modern Postmodern turn: Canons,
Gender, media. 2008.
59. Pletl rItA (SZerK.)
Az anyanyelvoktats metamorfzisa. 2008.
60. mAK ZOltNlZr eDemt SZIlrD
elrejelz mdszerek gazdasgi s mszaki alkalmazsai. 2009.
61. SNDOr mIKlS SZIlGYI
Dynamic modeling of the Human Heart. 2009.
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Novel Image Processing methods Based on Fuzzy logic. 2009.
63. vA GYrGY
Studiu anatomic al unor cormofite din zona Ciucului. 2009.
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A Cognitive Approach To Metaphorical Expressions

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9 789731 970387

Cognitive approach - korr1

Cognitive approach - korr1

Cognitive approach - korr1

Cognitive approach - korr1

SaPIeNtIa BOOKS 64.

Cognitive approach - korr1

Cognitive approach - korr1

Cognitive approach - korr1

Cognitive approach - korr1

Cognitive approach - korr1

Cognitive approach - korr1

Cognitive approach - korr1

the present book tries to offer an insight regarding metaphorical

Cognitive approach - korr1

Cognitive approach - korr1

Cognitive approach - korr1

Cognitive approach - korr1

What one finds in language depends in large measure on what one

Cognitive approach - korr1

called early Wittgenstein expressed his view on language in his 1922

Cognitive approach - korr1

expressions are not necessarily independent of detectable stimulus

Cognitive approach - korr1

lewis warns us that semantics has a very important role, as

Cognitive approach - korr1

OUR CONCePtUaL SySteM

Cognitive approach - korr1

2. OUr CONCePtUAl SYStem

langacker highlights another aspect of conception, saying that

Cognitive approach - korr1

2. OUr CONCePtUAl SYStem

Cognitive approach - korr1

2. OUr CONCePtUAl SYStem

Cognitive approach - korr1

CONStItUeNtS OF COGNItIve GRaMMaR

3.1. Mental abilities

Cognitive approach - korr1

3. CONStItUeNtS OF COGNItIve GrAmmAr

conclusions of langackers study on reference point constructions

Cognitive approach - korr1

One consequence is that less canonical shapes are seen as more

Cognitive approach - korr1

3. CONStItUeNtS OF COGNItIve GrAmmAr

movements, such as smooth pursuit, vergence, optokinetic nystagmus,

3.3. Relationship, participants, perspective

Cognitive approach - korr1

3.3. relAtIONSHIP, PArtICIPANtS, PerSPeCtIve

conception of its participants (1999. 83). trajector is associated with

Cognitive approach - korr1

3. CONStItUeNtS OF COGNItIve GrAmmAr

comprise the whole schema of over, in few cases being top-viewed.

3.4. Image schema

Cognitive approach - korr1

3.4. ImAGe SCHemA

elements (gestalts) by contrast with features, which appeal neither to

Occupies lower position in the

Need not occupy lowest position

Derived from subjektive

Bergen (2007. 288) mentions that many discussions took place on

Cognitive approach - korr1

3. CONStItUeNtS OF COGNItIve GrAmmAr

component. On the other hand, the psychological point of view