BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B.

EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1,767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, thru and by their

Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL MUNDOvs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATIONS ADMINISTRATOR, NLRC,
BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION
GRN 104776, December 5,1994.
FACTS:
This is a consolidation of 3 cases of SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court for Certiorari.
On June 6, 1984, Cadalin, Amul and Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other OCWs instituted a class suit by filing an Amended
Complaint with the POEA for money claims arising from their recruitment by ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION (AIBC) and
employment by BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC (BRI) which is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in
construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas
employment on behalf of its foreign principals.
The amended complaint sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and secondarily,
the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund; interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay;
fringe benefits; reimbursement of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing
prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII
On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the Motion to Strike Out of the Records filed by AIBC but required the claimants to correct the
deficiencies in the complaint pointed out.
AIB and BRII kept on filing Motion for Extension of Time to file their answer. The POEA kept on granting such motions.
On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions for extension of time and asked that AIBC and BRII declared in default for failure to
file their answers.
On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers within ten days from receipt of the order.
(at madami pang motions ang na-file, new complainants joined the case, ang daming inavail na remedies ng both parties)On June 19, 1987, AIBC finally
submitted its answer to the complaint. At the same hearing, the parties were given a period of 15 days from said date within which to submit their
respective position papers. On February 24, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted position paper. On October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a Consolidated
Reply, POEA Adminitartor rendered his decision which awarded the amount of $824, 652.44 in favor of only 324 complainants. Claimants submitted
their Appeal Memorandum For Partial Appeal from the decision of the POEA. AIBC also filed its MR and/or appeal in addition to the Notice of Appeal
filed earlier.
NLRC promulgated its Resolution, modifying the decision of the POEA. The resolution removed some of the benefits awarded in favor of the claimants.
NLRC denied all the MRs. Hence, these petitions filed by the claimants and by AlBC and BRII.
The case rooted from the Labor Law enacted by Bahrain where most of the complainants were deployed. His Majesty Ise Bin Selman Al Kaifa, Amir of
Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1176, otherwise known re the Labour Law for the Private Sector. Some of the provision of Amiri
Decree No. 23 that are relevant to the claims of the complainants-appellants are as follows:
Art. 79: x x x A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour equivalent to his wage entitlement increased by a minimum of twenty-rive per centurn
thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a minimum off fifty per centurn thereof for hours worked during the night which shall be deemed to being
from seven oclock in the evening until seven oclock in the morning .
Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.
If employee worked, 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to him x x x.
Art. 81; x x x When conditions of work require the worker to work on any official holiday, he shall be paid an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his
normal wage.
Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one years continuous service with his employer shall be entitled to Laos on full pay for a period of not less
than 21 days for each year increased to a period not less than 28 days after five continuous years of service.
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in respect of the proportion of his service in that year.
Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite duration may be terminated by either party thereto after giving the other party prior
notice before such termination, in writing, in respect of monthly paid workers and fifteen days notice in respect of other workers. The party terminating a
contract without the required notice shall pay to the other party compensation equivalent to the amount of wages payable to the worker for the period of
such notice or the unexpired portion thereof.
Art. Ill: x x x the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon termination of employment, a leaving indemnity for the period of his employment
calculated on the basis of fifteen days wages for each year of the first three years of service and of one months wages for each year of service

thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to payment of leaving indemnity upon a quantum meruit in proportion to the period of his service completed
within a year.
ISSUE:
1.
WON the foreign law should govern or the contract of the parties.(WON the complainants who have worked in Bahrain are entitled to the
above-mentioned benefits provided by Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain).
2.
WON the Bahrain Law should apply in the case. (Assuming it is applicable WON complainants claim for the benefits provided therein have
prescribed.)
3.

Whether or not the instant cases qualify as; a class suit (siningit ko nalang)

(the rest of the issues in the full text of the case refer to Labor Law)
RULING:
1.
NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence governing the pleading and proof of a foreign law and admitted in
evidence a simple copy of the Bahrains Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the Private Sector).
NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the
claimants. It was of the belief that where the laws of the host country are more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country
shall form part of the overseas employment contract. It approved the observation of the POEA Administrator that in labor proceedings, all doubts in the
implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII themselves, provided that the laws of the host country became applicable
to said contracts if they offer terms and conditions more favorable than those stipulated therein. However there was a part of the employment contract
which provides that the compensation of the employee may be adjusted downward so that the total computation plus the non-waivable benefits shall be
equivalent to the compensation therein agree, another part of the same provision categorically states that total remuneration and benefits do not fall
below that of the host country regulation and custom.
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it. Article 1377 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines provides:
The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is already a prepared form containing the stipulations of the employment
contract and the employees merely take it or leave it. The presumption is that there was an imposition by one party against the other and that the
employees signed the contracts out of necessity that reduced their bargaining power.
We read the overseas employment contracts in question as adopting the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof. The
parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed. In such a case, the foreign law is adopted as a system to regulate the relations of
the parties, including questions of their capacity to enter into the contract, the formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth.
Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed
incorporated into their contract as a set of terms. By such reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign
contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the contract.
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties. Such party expectation is protected by giving effect to the parties own choice of the
applicable law. The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship the parties or their transaction. There is no question that the contracts sought
to be enforced by claimants have a direct connection with the Bahrain law because the services were rendered in that country.
2.
NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims of the complainants was 3 years, as provided in Article 291 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines, and not ten years as provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines nor one year as provided in the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976.
Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:
A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not actionable after the lapse of one year from the date of the expiry of the Contract.
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum (local court), Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of
actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign
substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on
the characterization given such a law. In Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir. [1955]), where the issue was the applicability of
the Panama Labor Code in a case filed in the State of New York for claims arising from said Code, the claims would have prescribed under the
Panamanian Law but not under the Statute of Limitations of New York. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Panamanian Law was procedural
as it was not specifically intended to be substantive, hence, the prescriptive period provided in the law of the forum should apply. The Court observed:
. . . we are dealing with a statute of limitations of a foreign country, and it is not clear on the face of the statute that its purpose was to limit the

enforceability, outside as well as within the foreign country concerned, of the substantive rights to which the statute pertains. We think that as a yardstick
for determining whether that was the purpose, this test is the most satisfactory one.
The Court further noted: Applying that test here it appears to us that the libellant is entitled to succeed, for the respondents have failed to satisfy us that
the Panamanian period of limitation in question was specifically aimed against the particular rights which the libellant seeks to enforce. The Panama
Labor Code is a statute having broad objectives. The American court applied the statute of limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law,
after finding that there was no showing that the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be substantive. Being considered merely a procedural
law even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum (local Court) on prescription of actions.
However the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum (local Court) has a
borrowing statute. Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A borrowing statute directs the
state of the forum (local Court) to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are several kinds of
borrowing statutes, one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued will not be enforced in the forum even though the
local statute was not run against it.
Section 48 of Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. It provides: If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is
barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48
cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forums public policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period
of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution emphasized that:The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development (Sec. 10).
The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare (Sec. 18).
In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law.
The next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the filing of the claims is 3 years, as provided by the Labor Code or 10 years, as provided
by the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accross:
(1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment
In this case, the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on the written contracts between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period provided
by Art. 1144(l) of the New Civil Code should govern.
3. NO. A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many and the parties are so numerous
that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court. When all the claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain law many of the claimants
worked outside Bahrain. Some of the claimants were deployed in Indonesia under different terms and condition of employment.
Inasmuch as the First requirement of a class suit is not present (common or general interest based on the Amiri Decree of the State of Bahrain), it is only
logical that only those who worked in Bahrain shall be entitled to rile their claims in a class suit.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature of the claims is the same (for employees benefits), there is no common question of
law or fact. While some claims are based on the Amiri Law of Bahrain, many of the claimants never worked in that country, but were deployed
elsewhere. Thus, each claimant is interested only in his own demand and not in the claims of the other employees of defendants. A claimant has no
concern in protecting the interests of the other claimants as shown by the fact, that hundreds of them have abandoned their co-claimants and have
entered into separate compromise settlements of their respective claims. The claimants who worked in Bahrain can not be allowed to sue in a class suit
in a judicial proceeding.
WHEREFORE, all the three petitioners are DISMISSED.

Navida v Dizon

Facts:
Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different Texas state courts by citizens of twelve foreign countries, including the
Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they allegedly sustained from their exposure to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a
chemical used to kill nematodes (worms), while working on farms in 23 foreign countries. The cases were eventually transferred to, and consolidated in,
the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The defendants in the consolidated cases prayed for the dismissal of all
the actions under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
In a Memorandum Order, the Federal District Court conditionally granted the defendants motion to dismiss provided the defendants:
(1) participated in expedited discovery in the United States
(2) either waived or accepted service of process and waived any other jurisdictional defense in any action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in
his home country or the country in which his injury occurred.
(3) waived any limitations-based defense that has matured since the commencement of these actions in the courts of Texas;
(4) stipulated that any discovery conducted during the pendency of these actions may be used in any foreign proceeding to the same extent as if it had
been conducted in proceedings initiated there; and
(5) submitted an agreement binding them to satisfy any final judgment rendered in favor of plaintiffs by a foreign court.
In the event that the highest court of any foreign country finally affirms the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of an action commenced by a plaintiff in these
actions in his home country or the country in which he was injured, that plaintiff may return to this court and, upon proper motion, the court will resume
jurisdiction over the action as if the case had never been dismissed for.
Case 1 (125078) and 2 (125598):
336 plaintiffs from General Santos City filed a Joint Complaint in the RTC of General Santos City. Named as defendants therein were: Shell Oil Co.
(SHELL); Dow Chemical Co. (DOW); Occidental Chemical Corp. (OCCIDENTAL); Dole Food Co., Inc., Dole Fresh Fruit Co., Standard Fruit Co.,
Standard Fruit and Steamship Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DOLE); Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands International, Inc.
(CHIQUITA); Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DEL MONTE); Dead Sea Bromine
Co., Ltd.; Ameribrom, Inc.; Bromine Compounds, Ltd.; and Amvac Chemical Corp. (The aforementioned defendants are hereinafter collectively referred
to as defendant companies.)
NAVIDA, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of the illnesses and injuries to the reproductive systems which they allegedly suffered
because of their exposure to DBCP. They claimed, among others, that they were exposed to this chemical during the early 1970s up to the early 1980s
when they used the same in the banana plantations where they worked at; and/or when they resided within the agricultural area where such chemical
was used. NAVIDA, et al., claimed that their illnesses and injuries were due to the fault or negligence of each of the defendant companies in that they
produced, sold and/or otherwise put into the stream of commerce DBCP-containing products. According to NAVIDA, et al., they were allowed to be
exposed to the said products, which the defendant companies knew, or ought to have known, were highly injurious to the formers health and well-being.
Without resolving the motions filed by the parties, the RTC of General Santos City issued an Order dismissing the complaint. First, the trial court
determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because the substance of the cause of action as stated in the complaint against the
defendant foreign companies cites activity on their part which took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial domain of the
Philippines. These acts of defendants cited in the complaint included the manufacture of pesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution
through sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream of commerce. The subject matter stated in the complaint and which is
uniquely particular to the present case, consisted of activity or course of conduct engaged in by foreign defendants outside Philippine territory, hence,
outside and beyond the jurisdiction of Philippine Courts, including the present Regional Trial Court.
Second, the RTC of General Santos City adjudged that NAVIDA, et al., were coerced into submitting their case to the Philippine courts, merely to comply
with the U.S. District Courts Order and in order to keep open to the plaintiffs the opportunity to return to the U.S. District Court.
Third, the trial court ascribed little significance to the voluntary appearance of the defendant companies. Defendants have appointed their agents
authorized to accept service of summons/processes in the Philippines pursuant to the agreement in the U.S. court that defendants will voluntarily submit
to the jurisdiction of this court. While it is true that this court acquires jurisdiction over persons of the defendants through their voluntary appearance, it
appears that such voluntary appearance of the defendants in this case is conditional. Thus in the Defendants Amended Agreement Regarding
Conditions of Dismissal for Forum Non Conveniens filed with the U.S. District Court, defendants declared that (t)he authority of each designated
representative to accept service of process will become effective upon final dismissal of these actions by the Court. The decision of the U.S. District
Court dismissing the case is not yet final and executory since both the plaintiffs and defendants appealed therefrom. Consequently, since the authority of
the agent of the defendants in the Philippines is conditioned on the final adjudication of the case pending with the U.S. courts, the acquisition of
jurisdiction by this court over the persons of the defendants is also conditional.
Fourth, the RTC of General Santos City ruled that the act of NAVIDA, et al., of filing the case in the Philippine courts violated the rules on forum
shopping and litis pendencia. This court frowns upon the fact that the parties herein are both vigorously pursuing their appeal of the decision of the U.S.

District court dismissing the case filed thereat. To allow the parties to litigate in this court when they are actively pursuing the same cases in another
forum, violates the rule on forum shopping so abhorred in this jurisdiction. Moreover, the filing of the case in the U.S. courts divested this court of its
own jurisdiction. This court takes note that the U.S. District Court did not decline jurisdiction over the cause of action. The case was dismissed on the
ground of forum non conveniens, which is really a matter of venue. By taking cognizance of the case, the U.S. District Court has, in essence, concurrent
jurisdiction with this court over the subject matter of this case. It is settled that initial acquisition of jurisdiction divests another of its own jurisdiction.
Case 3 (126654), 4 (127856), 5(128398)
Another joint complaint for damages against SHELL, DOW, OCCIDENTAL, DOLE, DEL MONTE, and CHIQUITA was filed before Branch 16 of the RTC
of Davao City by 155 plaintiffs from Davao City. They alleged that as workers in the banana plantation and/or as residents near the said plantation, they
were made to use and/or were exposed to nematocides, which contained the chemical DBCP. According to ABELLA, et al., such exposure resulted in
serious and permanent injuries to their health, including, but not limited to, sterility and severe injuries to their reproductive capacities.
The RTC of Davao City, however, junked Civil Cases. The Court however is constrained to dismiss the case at bar not solely on the basis of the above
but because it shares the opinion of legal experts given in the interview made by the Inquirer in its Special report Pesticide Cause Mass Sterility,
Former Justice Secretary Demetrio Demetria in a May 1995 opinion said: The Philippines should be an inconvenient forum to file this kind of damage
suit against foreign companies since the causes of action alleged in the petition do not exist under Philippine laws. There has been no decided case in
Philippine Jurisprudence awarding to those adversely affected by DBCP. This means there is no available evidence which will prove and disprove the
relation between sterility and DBCP.
Eventually, the cases reached the SC!
Present case:
The main contention of the petitioners states that the allegedly tortious acts and/or omissions of defendant companies occurred within Philippine
territory. Said fact allegedly constitutes reasonable basis for our courts to assume jurisdiction over the case.
DOLE similarly maintains that the acts attributed to defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict, which falls under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. DOLE
also argues that if indeed there is no positive law defining the alleged acts of defendant companies as actionable wrong, Article 9 of the Civil Code
dictates that a judge may not refuse to render a decision on the ground of insufficiency of the law. The court may still resolve the case, applying the
customs of the place and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law.
CHIQUITA (another petitioner) argues that the courts a quo had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cases filed before them. CHIQUITA avers that
the pertinent matter is the place of the alleged exposure to DBCP, not the place of manufacture, packaging, distribution, sale, etc., of the said chemical.
This is in consonance with the lex loci delicti commisi theory in determining the situs of a tort, which states that the law of the place where the alleged
wrong was committed will govern the action. CHIQUITA and the other defendant companies also submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC by
making voluntary appearances and seeking for affirmative reliefs during the course of the proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTCs have jurisdiction over the subject matter in these cases.
Held: Yes.
1. The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. Once vested by law, on a
particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature
through the enactment of a law.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No.
7691, was:
In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of
the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive
of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:
The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129,
as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in
cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court.
It is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of action and that the total amount sought in the complaints is approximately P2.7 million for each
of the plaintiff claimants. The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over the cases filed in General Santos City and Davao City.
2. The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the
question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendants. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action
pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.

Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict which is the basis for the claim for damages filed
by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., with individual claims of approximately P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which obviously falls within the
purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the RTCs.
3. It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they dismissed the cases on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption
that the cause of action narrated by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial
boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., the manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other disposition,
resulting in their becoming part of the stream of commerce, and, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs.
Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or the situs of the act complained of, would be determinative of jurisdiction and
venue for trial of cases. In personal civil actions, such as claims for payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow the action to be commenced and tried
in the appropriate court, where any of the plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant, where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are available only in the Philippines. First,
plaintiff claimants are all residents of the Philippines, either in General Santos City or in Davao City. Second, the specific areas where they were
allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., initially filed
their claims for damages. Third, the testimonial and documentary evidence from important witnesses, such as doctors, co-workers, family members and
other members of the community, would be easier to gather in the Philippines.
----Re: Jurisdiction over the person
The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the defendant companies. All parties
voluntarily, unconditionally and knowingly appeared and submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo. All the defendant companies
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo by making several voluntary appearances, by praying for various affirmative reliefs, and by
actively participating during the course of the proceedings below.
In line herewith, this Court, in Meat Packing Corporation of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, held that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in
civil cases is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summ ons. Furthermore, the active
participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the courts jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the
case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or bodys jurisdiction.
--Jurisdiction v Exercise of Jurisdiction
It may also be pertinently stressed that jurisdiction is different from the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not
the orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants and the subject matter, as in
the case of the courts a quo, the decision on all questions arising therefrom is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in
the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which does not affect its authority to decide the case, much less divest the court of the
jurisdiction over the case.
---Re: Bad faith in filing cases to procure a dismissal and to allow petitioners to return to the forum of their choice.
This Court finds such argument much too speculative to deserve any merit.
It must be remembered that this Court does not rule on allegations that are unsupported by evidence on record. This Court does not rule on allegations
which are manifestly conjectural, as these may not exist at all. This Court deals with facts, not fancies; on realities, not appearances.