Int. J. Middle East Stud. 36 (2004), 429450.

Printed in the United States of America

DOI: 10.1017.S0020743804363051

Yoav Di-Capua

JA B A R T I O F T H E 2 0 T H C E N T U R Y :
T H E N A T IO N A L E P IC O F A B D A L -R A H M A N
A L -R A F I I A N D O T H E R E G Y P T IA N H IS T O R IE S

In January 1952, the Egyptian monarchy, for the second time, banned a history book by
Abd al-Rahman al-Rafii (18891966). Several months later, in the wake of the July
Revolution, al-Rafiis status had changed dramatically. From his former position as
an officially marginalized historian and politician he had become the editor of a daily
newspaper, a member of the new constitutional committee, and the head of Egypts bar
association. He subsequently won several state prizes for his scholarly achievements. His
books were reprinted and distributed widely. The president quoted him in his speeches.
By the early 1960s, al-Rafii had become Egypts most awarded and celebrated historian
of the 20th century and was selected as Egypts candidate for the Nobel Prize.
Why is al-Rafii considered Egypts national historian? What kind of history did he
write to become Egypts most lauded historian? Was his perspective on modern Egyptian
history originally his? Did other major historians share it, as well? And equally important,
what role did politics play in the reception of al-Rafiis work? In the following pages I
will try to answer some of these questions.
Al-Rafii was an independent historian whose only formal education was in the field
of law. Like many young, ardent nationalists at the turn of the 20th century, he believed
that law was a vocation necessary for changing the national reality in Egypt.1 However,
al-Rafii, a man of almost limitless energy, did not narrow his activity to any particular
field, and he was both a part-time journalist and a lawyer engaging in political activity
on behalf of the National Party (al-Hizb al-Watani).2 Nevertheless, from the mid-1920s
on, he dedicated most of his time to the writing of sixteen detailed tomes encompassing
Egyptian history from 1798 to 1959. In the early 1960s, this project came to be known
as the National Corpus (al-Mawsu a al-Wat.aniyya), the most extensive history of
modern Egypt ever to be written.3
Any researcher dealing with modern Egypt has some familiarity with al-Rafiis
work. No doubt, al-Rafii provided valuable information that often cannot be found
elsewherefor example, detailed lists of nationalist martyrs (shuhada) from the 1919
revolution, or a random report on the landing of the first Egyptian pilot.4 This information
illustrates the colorful range of his interests. Yet although he was an acknowledged

Yoav Di-Capua is a graduate student in the Department of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University,
Princeton, N.J. 08544, USA; e-mail: ydi@princeton.edu.
2004 Cambridge University Press 0020-7438/04 $12.00

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historian, his contribution to Egyptian historiography and intellectual life at large has
been often overlooked.5
This article sets out to shed light on al-Rafiis career in relation to other historians and
historiographical trends. The first part covers the Egyptian historiographical setting from
the beginning of the 20th century to the late 1940s. It argues that all modern Egyptian
historians worked within a paradigm that accepted the rise of Egypt and the decline
of the Ottoman Empire. Within this framework a basic division existed between promonarchic historians who perceived the monarchy as a generating historical force and
popular-nationalist historians who ascribed the same role to the people. Al-Rafii is
regarded here as the foremost representative of the second group.
In the second part I will analyze al-Rafiis corpus and underscore its centrality within
modern Egyptian historiography. I will maintain that this corpus should be treated not
merely as a collection of sixteen different books, as it has been conceived thus far, but
rather as a single coherent, systematic, and logically presented unified storya national
epic. A rereading of his corpus will show that from the early 1930s on, his was the only
narrative to encompass the whole course of Egypts modern experience.
Finally, I will briefly comment on the legacy of al-Rafii in relation to a basic tension
that exists in Egyptian historiography between two models of historical writing: the
academic (professional) and the popular (amateur). For contemporary Egyptian
historians, al-Rafii and Muhammad Shafiq Ghurbal (18941961) represent these polar
opposites of 20th-century historiography. The following quotes illustrate the gap:
Ghurbal: Science (ilm) in and of itself has a responsibility that cannot be borne by our nationalist
forces in their current stage. Hence, for the society at large, science should be the slogan of the
current Cultural Revolution . . . both for the realization of the goals of the nation, and for the sake
of science itself.6
Al-Rafii: I have loved history since I was young and perceived it as means for the moral upbringing
of the people and for national and political revival. . . . [I]n light of my experience, I see [history]
as an instrument for education and for enhancing the national consciousness in the hearts of the
people.7

At his death, Ghurbal left behind a solid academic tradition with many students
to perpetuate his legacy. Al-Rafii had no students. However, at his death he left an
equally critical endowment: a corpus that shaped popular historiography. Rightly or
wrongly, Ghurbal is regarded today as the founder of modern professional scholarship
whose legacy stands for scientific standards of inquiry and objectivity. Al-Rafii, in
contrast, is considered a politically affiliated and biased historian who sought to promote
history for public consciousness by all possible means. In the concluding section, I
will critically elaborate on this basic configuration of Egyptian historiography.
I. H IS T O R Y, H IS T O R IA N S , A N D P O L IT Y 1 9 0 0 5 0

Where Ottoman History Ends and Egyptian History Begins

In 1902 (in observance of the date in the Hijri calendar) and once more in May 1905
(for the Gregorian one) Egypts ruling family celebrated the centennial anniversary of
Muhammad Alis inauguration as viceroy of Egypt. The celebrators, who regarded

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431

Muhammad Ali as the founder of Modern Egypt, accentuated Egypts independent

position vis-`a-vis the Ottomans and its gradual transformation into a separate national
community. The ceremonial court rituals that once symbolized Egypts essential bond
to the sultans in Istanbul seemed to have been irreversibly erased from memory. Historiographically speaking, the celebrations also highlighted a corresponding perception of
recent Egyptian history that marked the rise of an Egyptian political community and
the decline of the Ottoman ordertwo sides of the same coin.8
Journals such as al-Muqtataf and al-Hilal published a series of articles that created a generic formula for the conceptualization of 19th-century Egypt. According to
this formula, until 1805 a period of oppression and political anarchy governed Egypt.
Muhammad Ali brought political stability and just government. Following that, Egypt
experienced economic, industrial, agricultural, scientific, and commercial progress. The
political autonomy achieved by the uncontested heroes, Muhammad Ali and his son
Ibrahim, created the infrastructure for a modern, independent Egyptian state.9 In this
way, 366 years of Ottoman rule (15161882) were ignored and gradually banished from
public consciousness.
To be sure, the central figure with regard to this shift was the prolific journalist and historical novelist Jurji Zaydan (18611914). Zaydans project consisted of history books,
journalistic articles, and historical novels on the same historical topics with the same
lessons. By blurring the boundaries between fiction and history, Zaydan popularized
his historical premises. Although Zaydan did not dub Muhammad Ali the founder of
Modern Egypt, in a series of historical novels and one history book he laid the historiographical foundations (in particular, accepting 1798 as a historic turning point) that
shaped this paradigm. In tarikh Misr al-hadith (The Modern History of Egypt [1889]),
Zaydan contrasted backward Ottoman rule with revitalization under Muhammad Ali.10
This representation was further popularized in the novels al-Mamluk al-Sharid (The
Fugitive Mamluk [1891]) and Istibdad al-Mamalik (The Mamluks Tyranny [1896]).
Despite its growing popularity, however, this perception still had to compete with other
narrativesfor example, that of British officials who identified modernization with their
rule alone, or of Ottoman-oriented intellectuals such as Muhammad Abduh. Writing
against the background of the celebrations, Muhammad Abduh blamed Muhammad
Ali (an illiterate ignoramus!) and his successors for distracting Egypt from its path of
economic and political stability, forming a tyrant regime, enslaving Egypt under foreign
rule, and, in short, destroying Egypt.11 Abduhs views, however, were marginalized and
seem to have disappeared nearly completely before World War I.
According to Kenneth Cuno, this founder paradigm perceives 1805 as the year in
which Ottoman history ended and Egyptian history began (an alternative date is 1798).
Cognizant of the position of post-colonial studies toward this historiographical issue,
Cuno rightly considered the decline paradigm as an EastWest joint venture, not as a
mere imposition by the West.12 Although during the past twenty-five years the decline
paradigm has been successfully challenged, if not altogether refuted, in Egyptian
historiography it still enjoys surprising persistence. Understanding this decline
paradigm as a mere imposition of Western concepts explains very little. It certainly
does not explain the complicated role played by its greatest popularizer, al-Rafii.
Ehud Toledano elaborates on the social and political realities that accompanied this
historiographical swing. According to Toledano, forgetting the Ottoman past was a

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Yoav Di-Capua

survival tactic employed by the Egyptian Ottoman elite to cope with the emergence of a
new nationalist identity.13 Although Toledano focuses solely on the role of the Egyptian
Ottoman elite, one should also consider the contribution of Syrian Christian immigrants
who had their own historical account to settle with the Ottomans. Indeed, certain of
these individuals, such as Zaydan, were pivotal in the deOttomanization process.
In the historiographical and political context, two major forces emerged in the post
World War I order: the monarchy and the popular parties. Although both parties accepted
the decline paradigm, the historiographical debate was far from being a finished
business. King Ahmad Fuad (191736) sought to establish an image of the monarchy
as the sole force that shaped modern Egypt. The popular groups, chief among them the
Wafd Party, regarded the peopleand themselves as their true representativesas
the single force that shaped Egypts modern history. Thus, a fierce debate ensued over
the question of who was the true historical force behind the building of modern Egypt:
Muhammad Ali/the monarchy or the people? In the years to come, this concern shaped
much of the historiographical landscape.
Monarchists versus Populist-Nationalists
Sami Zubaida has convincingly argued that becoming a nation-state involves a fundamental change of the rules according to which the political game is being conducted:
Alongside state forms there developed a whole complex of political models, vocabularies, organizations and techniques which have established and animated what I call a political field
of organization, mobilization, agitation and struggle. The vocabularies of this field are those
of nation, nationality and nationalism, of popular sovereignty, democracy, liberty, legality and
representation, of political parties and parliamentary institutions.14

This emerging political field almost automatically excluded the monarchy and embraced the nationalist populists, who were more compatible with it. Furthermore, the
premises of this field were adopted and popularized by nationalistPharaonic narratives,
which, although focused on a remote past, highlighted the role of people and their environment rather than that of dynasties. An early explication of the populist-nationalist
endeavor can be found in the work of the intellectual and liberalist politician Muhammad
Husayn Haykal, who embraced the Pharaonic orientation: [t]he birth and death of kings,
their accession to the throne, their disposition, and their conquests and wars are not the
basis for the life of nations.15 Because these assumptions were widely adopted, the
populist-nationalist camp did not need to write many history books. The monarchists, in
contrast, faced growing pressure to produce texts of official nationalism that celebrated
their centrality and concealed the discrepancy between the idea of the nation and that of
the dynasty.16
A brief evaluation of pro-monarchist writers reveals their incompatibility with the
new nationalist age and its requirements. Former court officials and members of the
ruling family such as Ahmad Shafiq, Umar Tusun, Amin Sami, and Fahmi Kaylani
were an integral part of the old, and now irrelevant, 19th-century Ottoman Egyptian
elite whose main language was Turkish. They had, as Toledano points out, an interest in
forgetting their Ottomanness but at the same time they could not envision Egypt without
the monarchy. An example is Amin Samis monumental project in six volumes, Taqwim

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433

al-Nil (Almanac of the Nile). This work took a quarter-century to write and fifteen years
to publish (191934). It was in such dissonance with the demands of modern nationalist
historiography that Jack Crabbs classified it along with 19th-century encyclopedists.17
In the words of Crabbs: it was a highly heterogeneous melange of materials ranging
from the technical to historical to the poetical.18 Amins encyclopedic style conveyed
the sense that political and social changes are incomprehensible as natural eventsthey
simply happen. Thus, many crucial questions, such as Khidiw Tawfiqs responsibility for
the British occupation, are left unresolved. A cumbersome though pro-monarchic project
such as Amins could do little to combat an effective nationalist argument. Instead, what
Fuad wanted were narratives that exemplified continuity, coherence, meaning, and a
clear supportive statement.
Cognizant of this reality, in 1917 Fuad proposed a prize for the best history book
on Ismails era (186379). The winner was the Palestinian-born historian Ilyas alAyyubi, who presented Ismail as an innovative reformer who followed in the steps
of the founder of modern Egypt.19 In this and other publications Ayyubi sustained
the monarchic historical narrative, which had a clear point of departure: a forefather
in the image of Muhammad Ali and a seemingly self-evident continuity, with each
khedive adding another layer to a grand Egyptian enterprise. The main signposts of
this narrative were the struggle of the dynasty (as opposed to the people) against the
Ottomans; military achievements in the Arabian peninsula, Sudan, Palestine, and Syria;
achievements in education, science, industrialization, and commerce; the opening of the
Suez Canal; and, finally, the formation of constitutional life under Khedive Ismail.20 This
narrative of perpetuation was woven around numerous monuments, public buildings, and
entire cities named after dynasty members combining a series of historical events and
figures into one seamlessly integrated picture with a simple message: Muhammad Ali
and his successors founded modern Egypt.21
The Royal Historiographical Project
The next stage in the perpetuation of the dynastys history involved more than a simple
book-prize competition. It started in 1920 as a modest library project that turned into a
vast archival enterprise. The archive venture lasted well into the 1940s and was developed
in four phases. Concurrently, the monarchy continued with repressive measures, such
as censorship, boycotting, and exertion of political pressure to cope with unfavorable
materials.22
In the first phase, Fuad summoned the Italian librarian and medieval historian Eugenio
Griffini to establish a research library.23 By the time of Griffinis early death in 1925, the
library already resembled an archive. Jean Deny, a French linguist who had mastered
Ottoman Turkish, was asked to continue in that direction.
Deny is mostly identified with the second phase of the project. Under his supervision,
a vast effort commenced to collect, translate (from English, Turkish, German, Greek,
Russian, French, and Italian), and ship to Egypt all the available documents in foreign
archives that referred to the dynasty. Deny and others were ordered to collect only documents that referred to events from 1805 forward, thus perpetuating through the archives
very structure the monarchic historical periodization. Deny was also responsible for
cataloging the Ottoman documents of the citadel, to be placed in the Abdin palace.24

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Yoav Di-Capua

In the third phase, selected documents were published so they could serve as source
material for independent scholarship such as that of the emerging academe.25 Fuads
complete control over the Egyptian Geographical Society and its resources enabled him
to use it in the publishing process.26 The court also employed translators who Arabized
the collection for the convenience of scholars who could not read Ottoman Turkish.
Finally, Fuad sponsored a group of foreign historians to work in the archive:
Francois Charles-Roux,27 Angelo Sammarco,28 Pierre Crabit`es,29 Georges Douin,30
Gabriel Hanotaux,31 Henry Dodwell,32 and others introduced a host of well-documented
studies. In their writing, some of which appeared also in Arabic, they erased Egypts
Ottoman past and placed the monarchy at the heart of the modernization process.
The originality and scope of this project raises several intriguing questions. Why did
Fuad favor foreign rather than local historians? What were the long-term implications
of this project, and who was influenced by it?
In 1925, only a few Egyptian historians were capable of such an academic effort,
and they generally favored non-monarchic interpretations. The case of Muhammad
Sabri, who worked in the Sorbonne under the supervision of the renowned French
Revolutionary historian Alphonse Aulard, is indicative of the attitude of many young
scholars who went abroad. While in Paris, Sabri worked as secretary of the Wafd and
later published a series of books which conceptualized the 1919 revolution in terms of the
French Revolution. The monarchy was mocked, and the Wafd/people were celebrated.
Aulard praised Sabri, but Fuad seemed to be less enthusiastic, and the books were
banned.33
Interestingly enough, summoning foreign scholars was not a novelty or an inappropriate act, as it was later regarded by the Nasserist regime. A significant part of the highereducation faculty was foreign. For more than thirty years, a fruitful dialogue existed
between Egyptian scholars and foreign Orientalists who were regarded as welcome
intruders. Their works were translated to Arabic, and local scholars rebutted them.34
Since Fuad was intimately familiar with this milieu, he hoped to replicate this interaction
in the field of monarchic history, as well.35 Indeed, he was partially successful.
The importance of this project cannot be exaggerated, for it gave birth to the first catalogued archive carefully designed to satisfy the demands of modern scholarly research.
The tendentious interests of Fuad gave birth to a new politics of the archive in which
access to research was a stick in the hands of the ruler to insure conformity and avert
historiographical surprises.36 Furthermore, the archive project created a political culture
in which the documents/past belong to the state and not to the people. In terms of
scholarship, by its very manipulative structure the archive was instrumental in erasing
Egypts Ottoman past and lending support to the founder thesis. Nevertheless, flawed
as it was, the project introduced new academic standards that significantly influenced a
crystallizing Egyptian academe.
The Academic School
The story of the academic historians and their writings has not been properly researched
yet. However, due to the large number of students who subscribed to his notions,
Muhmmad Shafiq Ghurbal is commonly identified as the founder of the academic
school of history writing.

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435

Returning to Egypt in 1924 after completing his masters degree under the supervision
of Arnold Toynbee at London University, Ghurbal was regarded as a promising historian.
By 1936, he had been nominated head of the history department at Fuad University,
becoming the first Egyptian to hold that position. His major academic and political
project was tams.r al-tarkhdoing his best to ensure that all newly appointed faculty
members were Egyptians and that Egypts history would be written by Arabs in Arabic.37
However, the tams.r efforts did not prohibit academic relations with Fuads foreign
historians and their scholarship. Trained in Europe during the heyday of scientific
history, Ghurbal believed that methodologically controlled research makes objective
knowledge possible. Furthermore, he assumed that truth in history could be discovered
only through painstaking archival work. For Ghurbal and his disciples, this conviction
was an achievable goal, not a noble dream.38
It was around this notion of the historians craft that the professional identity of
academic historians crystallized. In 1945, Ghurbal established the Egyptian Historical
Society and its journal, through which he promoted and institutionalized professional
and politically impartial scholarship.39 Fuads Abdin archive was the place where this
professional creed could be fully exercised.
A survey of works written under Ghurbals supervision at Fuad University illustrate
the scope of his cooperation with royal historiography: Ahmad Izzat Abd al-Karim
wrote Tarikh al-talim fi asr Muhammad Ali (The History of Instruction in Muhammad
Alis Era [1938]); Ahmad Ahmad al-Hitta composed Tarikh al-ziraa al-misriyya fi
asr Muhammad Ali (The History of Agriculture in Muhammad Alis Era [1950]);
Ali al-Jiritli published Tarikh al-sinaa fi misr fi al-nisf al-awwal min al-qarn altasi Ashar (The History of Industry in Egypt during the First Half of the Nineteenth
Century [1952]); and Jamal al-Din al-Shayyal concluded his Tarikh al-tarjama wa
al-haraka al-thaqafiyya fi asr Muhammad Ali (The History of Translation and the
Cultural Movement in Muhammad Alis Era [1951]). All of these scholars worked in
the Abdin archive, consulted the works of foreign historians, reacted to those works,
and, for the most part, (with the exception of al-Shayyal) accepted their assumptions
and methods, including the decline paradigm. Hardly any of these young historians
mastered Ottoman Turkish, which in any case was not taught at the university. The cooperation was so tight that after graduation some of Ghurbals students became archivists at
Abdin.40
Although Ghurbals career illustrates his own biases with regard to the Ottoman past41
and monarchic history, in todays Egypt he is considered the founding father of the
academic school, which is contrasted with the amateurism and bias of independent
historians such as al-Rafii.42 With this background in mind, we can now turn to discuss
the work of al-Rafii.
II. IN T R O D U C IN G A L -R A F I IS N AT IO N A L E P IC

Strongly socialized into the turn-of-the-20th-century nationalist movement, one may

recognize in al-Rafiis work the particular ideological and political influence of the
National Party. It was a volatile and lively environment eager to promote national
change on all possible fronts. Some of the most prominent members of this milieu,
such as Mustafa Kamil, also began to write history. Other history writers were lawyers,

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Yoav Di-Capua

publishers, editors, and political activists who participated in journalistic and editorial
writing.43 The primary motivation of these history writers was the necessity for political
relevancy. These works served as a vehicle for socializing, indoctrinating, and conscripting members to the nationalist cause. After several years of activity, the language,
rhetoric, and assumptions employed by these writers began to sink in. Al-Rafii was a
genuine disciple of this milieu and an ardent follower of his mentors in the National
Party, Muhammad Farid and Mustafa Kamil.
To be sure, the central characteristic of al-Rafiis project is its monumental and
inclusive overview of modern Egyptian history. No other work suggested to Egyptian
readers such a powerful and easily grasped account of their recent past. By discussing
the evolution of al-Rafiis work in a book-by-book format, I hope to underscore this
point.
Tarikh al-Haraka al-Qawmiyya, vol. 1 (1929)
In 1926, when al-Rafii began working on this book, he quickly realized that his project
would cover the whole history of modern Egypt, from Muhammad Ali to the present.
Though he began with the modest intent of writing a biography of Mustafa Kamil, he
soon understood that he must undertake a broader task: to search for the roots of the
nationalist struggle.44
Thus, al-Rafiis point of departure was 1798, the day Napoleon first stepped on
to Egyptian soil. To the Ottomans al-Rafii dedicated only one short and insignificant
chapter in that he downplayed their historic role.45 Periods and events that preceded
Ottoman rule, such as the Mamluk and Pharaonic era, were not even mentioned.46 In the
47

words of al-Rafii, all events prior to 1798 belong to an era of nationalist jahiliya.

By adopting this periodization, al-Rafi i accepted the basic feature of the decline
paradigm. Although he was probably not the first to adopt this view, al-Rafii was
certainly the first to systematize and popularize it in a populist-nationalist vein.
According to al-Rafii, the French invasion was the continuation of Western
Crusader aggressiveness against Egypt.48 In contrast to Zaydan, al-Rafii was not willing
to consider any positive aspects of the French expedition. As in previous failed attempts,
the French had to face the fierce resistance of the Egyptian people. The revolutionary
character of the peopleand hence, Egypts resistance to any foreign rule whatsoever
as regarded by al-Rafii as a self-evident metaphysical force, a force that governed
al-Rafiis entire project.
In the first volume, al-Rafii drew an analogy between the struggle against the French
and the 1919 revolution against the British.49 This popular struggle started as the French
troops approached Alexandria. The confrontation between the inhabitants of Alexandria,
), and the French forces
headed by Muhammad Kurayyim (Alexandrias Naqb al-Ashraf
was regarded as an indication of Egypts nationalist and revolutionary nature. Al-Rafii
emphasized that it was the people and its leaders, rather than the Mamluks, who organized
the opposition to the invaders.50 The military opposition to the French also continued after
the arrest of Kurayyim. Although praised by Napoleon for his bravery, Kurayyim refused
to cooperate with the French and was therefore executed.51 This populist-nationalist
interpretation presented Kurayyim as the first revolutionary martyr who chose death in
the face of humiliating surrender.

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Al-Rafii presented the story of the French presence in Egypt as a detailed account
of an uncompromising popular struggle. The various skirmishes, incidents, and clashes
were treated as the outcome of this inherent nationalist consciousness. The first Cairo
Revolution was a classic example of how the nationalist spirit functioned.52
Although al-Rafiis 400 pages are highly detailed, his basic argument is rather simple:
all was to be explained as the outcome of nationalist revolutionary consciousness, popular
forces, and heroic leaders. From the first volume, the nationalist factor and its agents are
the central thread that runs through the fabric of Egypts modern history. This historical
anachronism continued to govern his entire work.
Tarikh al-Haraka al-Qawmiyya, vol. 2 (1929)
Two major episodes are dealt with in the second volume: the second Cairo revolution
leading to the withdrawal (al-Jala ) of the French forces,53 and the popular revolution
against the Ottoman wali and the appointment of Muhammad Ali.
Al-Rafii presented the second Cairo revolution as an evolutionary continuation
of the first revolution. Both contributed to the formation of the nationalist factor (aluns.ur al-qawm ), which embraced the inhabitants of Cairo, including the Mamluk
forces. As in volume one, the critical historical phenomenon is the rise of the Egyptian
people, who drove the French from the country.54 The outcome of this popular success
was the appointment of Muhammad Ali to the governorship of Egypt by the people
themselves.
In the aftermath of French withdrawal, an authentic popular leadership, headed by
Umar Makram, was formed. Makram, functioning as Cairos Naqb al-Ashraf,
along
with other religious leaders, took an active part in resistance to French occupation.
These leaders gained their status through their talent, character, and activities. They were
appointed by the people. According to al-Rafii, the importance of popular leadership
was twofold: its social and religious structure reflected the continuous presence of
popular leadership in Egyptian history (as in 1882 and 1919), and this leadership was
responsible for the appointment of Muhammad Ali as governor.
Al-Rafiis account of Muhammad Alis appointment is that of a coalition between
him and the nationalist leadership. Unlike the Ottomans, Muhammad Ali acknowledged the importance of the nationalist factor and chose to join forces with it.55 Next,
Muhammad Ali used this coalition to drive the newly appointed Ottoman wali, Khurshid
Pasha, out of Egypt. This step was the outcome of Muhammad Alis conviction that he
would not seize power by the force of his soldiers but only by that of the people.56 The
popular leadership guided, directed, and realized the appointment of Muhammad Ali,
who was appointed by the will of the people.57
Al-Rafiis interpretation of Muhammad Alis seizure of power was a historiographic
novelty. Until then, no Egyptian historian had dared to claim that the forefather of the
monarchy was a mere tool in the hands of indigenous nationalist forces. By emphasizing
the role of Umar Makram, the catalyst for the election of Muhammad Ali, al-Rafii
contradicted the pro-monarchic interpretation. Furthermore, for al-Rafii, Makram embodied the revolutionary nature of the Egyptian people as a whole.58
In sum, the first two volumes of this project brought into focus a series of historical
concepts: the people, hero, enemy, and the nationalist factor. Pro-monarchic

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Yoav Di-Capua

concepts such as dynasty, monarchy, and, especially, religion did not play any
significant role in al-Rafiis story.
Asr Muhammad Ali (1930)
This book was published in 1930, when Muhammad Ali was at the heart of the historiographical consensus. Al-Rafii, however, did not join this consensus, preferring instead
to present the successful role of Muhammad Ali as the work of popular forces. Right
from the beginning of his account, al-Rafii underscored the compatibility and unity of
the nationalist element with the rule of Muhammad Ali. According to al-Rafii, Umar
Makrams popular leadership cooperated with and protected Muhammad Alis rule.
Similarly, without the active support of the people against the British fleet at Rashid and
other places, Muhammad Ali certainly would have have lost his position.59 Muhammad
Alis decision to exile Umar Makram and the massacre of the Mamluk forces at the
citadel were regarded by al-Rafii as nothing short of betrayal.60
However, al-Rafiis treatment of Muhmmad Alis career and that of his son Ibrahim
was slightly ambiguous.61 On the one hand, al-Rafii presents Muhammad Ali as a mere
instrument in the hands of popular forces, while on the other hand, he dedicates hundreds
of pages to discussing the achievements of Muhammad Alis policies. Thus, for instance,
opposition to foreigners, political and economic autonomy, and territorial independence
were the result of successful policies of Muhammad Ali (the lack of constitutional life
in that era stands as an exception). Particularly, al-Rafii was impressed by Muhammad
Alis refusal to grant the Suez Canal concession to the European powers and his stubborn
resistance to offers of Western financial assistance. Taking the book in its entirety, the
reader cannot tell what was the work of the people and what was the result of Muhammad
Alis actions. To be sure, however, by accentuating the achievements of Muhammad
Ali, al-Rafii certainly wanted to allude to the failures of his successors who subjected
the country to the rule of foreign authority.62
Interestingly, al-Rafiis view of this period positioned him in a sharp opposition to
Ghurbal. Whereas al-Rafii maintained that Egypt created Muhammad Ali, Ghurbal
insisted that it was Muhammad Ali [who] created modern Egypt.63 These differences
were not symbolic. Ghurbal, who two years earlier had published a work on the same
period, completely ignored the Cairo revolutions and the role of the popular leadership
in opposing the colonizer. In the words of Youssef Choueiri, Ghurbal has a story to tell. It
is dominated by a single hero, Muhammad Ali. All the others are either villains, ignorant,
or simply unlucky.64 Al-Rafii had a story to tell, as well. A single collective hero,
the Egyptian people, dominated it. All the others were mere decoration, insignificant
ornaments to the true historical forces. Ghurbal argued that conditions prevailing in
early-19th-century Egypt would have prevented the development of a national entity.
Hence, he saw al-Rafii as anachronistic. Al-Rafii, by contrast, pinpointed the birth
of Egyptian nationalism in this very period. A decade later, Ghurbal updated his view:
Muhammad Ali began, lived, and ended his life as an Ottoman. His mission, as he
defined it, was to revive Ottoman power and dress it in a new costume.65
However, the rift between Ghurbal and al-Rafii went far deeper than the issue of
Muhammad Alis role in history; it delved into questions of source material. Ghurbals
work reflected extensive archival work. Al-Rafii, in contrast, drew on secondary sources

Jabarti of the 20th Century

439

for remote periods and newspapers and personal connection for contemporary events.
His success prompted Ghurbal to take action. In Muhammad Ali al-Kabir, Ghurbal
tried to popularize the insights of his students who worked in the archive. He was eager
to prove that serious scholarship could also be relevant and popular. As is often the case
among scholars, these disagreements soon developed into overt rivalry. Hence, Ghurbal
and his disciples in the newly established Egyptian Historical Society banned al-Rafii.
At one point, just to underscore that things were indeed personal, Ghurbal insinuated
that al-Rafii was a mere lawyer.66
Asr Ismail, 2 vols. (1932)
In 1932, al-Rafii published his account of the reign of Abbas, Said, and Ismail.
This book marked a turning point in his relationship with the monarchy. As already
mentioned, the writing of history in this era was regarded as a highly sensitive matter.
As opposed to other voices in Egyptian historiography, al-Rafiis message with regard
to Abbas, Said, and Ismail was sharp, clear, and harsh. What other historians gently
alluded to al-Rafii dared to say out loud: Abbas, Said, and Ismail were responsible for the fiscal collapse of Egypt and its growing subjugation to Europe. Fuad,
then in the midst of his corrective historiographical effort, reacted to these charges
in a swift and harsh but not uncharacteristic way. A short while after the publication
of Asr Ismail, the Ministry of Education was asked by the court to prohibit public
libraries and schools from using the book.67 Eight years later, the court tried to win
al-Rafiis sympathy by granting him access to the archive from which he had been
expelled. In return, al-Rafii was supposed to amend his views. He turned the offer
down.68
In volume one, Al-Rafii titled the Abbas era the age of reaction. It was during
this period that the nationalist momentum came to a full stop. Academic institutions
were shut down; reforms in the army were suspended; vocational-training delegations
were asked to return to Egypt; and industry collapsed. Abbass constructive initiatives,
such as the AlexandriaCairo railway, were severely criticized for relying on Western
intervention. The historic reason for this failure was, according to al-Rafii, Abbass
weak, conservative, and incapable personality.69 Regardless of his real worth, Abbass
image as a royal wimp was popularized thanks to al-Rafii, while monarchic historians
remained mute on this issue as well as on that of the heritage of Said.
Al-Rafiis treatment of Saids reign was ambivalent. Though conducting extensive
reforms, Said opened the door to unprecedented foreign intervention. In particular,
al-Rafii criticized the Suez Canal concessions and Saids use of foreign loans.70 Deterioration that had begun under Said continued under Ismail. Al-Rafii referred to all of
these (negative) trends as the Ismail era, about which he wrote:
In terms of its relation to the present, this era is the most significant. This is because the system
and most of its negative factors appeared then, and are prevalent also today: the Mixed Courts,
the influence of Egypts foreign inhabitants, debts, and finally, Western interference in Egypts
political and financial matters. These negative aspects originated in the Ismail era.71

In volume two of Asr Ismail, al-Rafii drew readers attention to two key episodes in
the Ismail era: the collapse of Egypts fiscal system and the fate of its constitutional

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life. However, although highly critical of Ismail, al-Rafii also identified some positive
developments, such as the revival of women.72
Al-Rafiis analysis of Egypts financial difficulties was simplistic and demagogic.
According to his reasoning the cause of Egypts bankruptcy was Ismails prodigality:
lavish journeys to Europe, glamorous receptions, extravagant festivals, and the building
of numerous immoderate mansions and palaces. Other economic, political, and social
factors were conspicuously ignored. Al-Rafiis financial calculations seem problematic,
if not totally groundless.73 In any case, they supported his main thesis in a very effective
and persuasive way. Apart from Ismails habit of spending money, he was depicted as
an incapable and naive manager who sold the Suez Canal at a bargain price and thus
provided the British with the ultimate excuse to conquer Egypt.74
In the years 193032, a fierce anti-constitutional movement began, headed by Prime
Minister Ismail Sidqi and actively supported by Fuads court. The suspension of the
1923 constitution and Parliament were engraved on Egypts collective memory as acts
of sheer despotism. In the midst of this political upheaval, al-Rafii dedicated his time
to the writing of constitutional history under Ismail. Thus, this work was among the
most daring political statements of the time. For while ostensibly a mere historical
composition, in reality it openly subverted and severely criticized authority.
Al-Rafiis version refuted the monarchic narrative by presenting constitutional reform
as the outcome of an intimate relationship between the nationalist movement and constitutional principles. Ismails Parliament was passive and incompetent and lacked any
judicial power. Hence, it failed to prevent the financial fiasco and succumbed to Ismails
and absolute rule (h.ukum mut.laq). Then, continued al-Rafii, in 1876
tyranny (istibdad)
the popular forces transformed the Parliament into an active, assertive legislative body.75
In al-Rafiis view, the demand by popular forces for the introduction of a type of
proto-constitution was an indication of the revival of the nationalist spirit.76 When Ismail
finally capitulated and agreed to implement this ideal in the form of the Sharif Pasha
government, al-Rafii contended that Sharif Pasha was the forefather of constitutional life
in Egypt.77 Again, al-Rafii brought a relatively unknown figure to the fore and presented
him as a popular hero who embodied the national spirit and its historical ambitions.
Likewise, Ismail was presented as a marginal figure guided by Sharif Pasha. Moreover,
al-Rafii accentuated Ismails responsibility for the establishment of the Mixed Courts,
which were regarded at the time as institutions that perpetuated colonial injustice.78
Thus, we see that Asr Ismail was a carefully constructed political statement. The
timing of publication, the sensitive issues it dealt with, and especially its controversial
and categorical conclusions made the book indigestible to those in power. To cite just
one final example, al-Rafii writes:
Turkish was the spoken language in the houses of the princes of Muhammad Alis dynasty. More
attention was directed to the study of foreign languages, such as French, than to Arabic. This is
the reason for the loosening of ties between them and the people and to their lack of activity on
the national level. This alienation between the princes and the people was increased because some
of them lived in Europe and Istanbul.79

Why was this statement political? Like his predecessors, Fuad was part of this
categorization. His Turkish was far better than his Arabic; Turkish was the language of
his court; and, in fact, he would even have preferred to have been king of Albania.

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441

Al-Thawra al-Urabiyya wa al-Ihtilal al-Inglizi (1937)

In relation to the rest of his series, this book stands as an exception because it is the
only one that he was forced to rewrite. Thomas Mayer, who studies the place of the
Urabi revolt in Egyptian historiography, has convincingly demonstrated that until 1922
that led to chaos (fitna).80 Not only did
the revolt was perceived as a mutiny (is.yan)
the monarchy identify the revolt as a dangerous precedent for a military coup detat, but
nationalist circles were also critical of it, having witnessed the defeat at al-Tal al-Kabir.
A fierce critic of the revolt was Mustafa Kamil, who argued that it divided the people
and led to the British occupation.81 As early as 1909, al-Rafii identified with this view
and attacked Urabi.82
In 1937, al-Rafii claimed that the Urabi revolt was yet another popular revolution.83
In conformity with his central argument, a direct and invisible causethe revolutionary spirit of the peoplelinked these revolutionary events and tied them together.
According to al-Rafii, the goals of the revolt were just: saving the people from autocratic rule, the establishment of the constitutional system, and the prevention of foreign
intervention.
Although the revolt was just, it utterly failed. Al-Rafii cast the blame for the failure
on the army and on Khidive Tawfiq, the former because they abused the power granted
to them by the people, and the latter because Tawfiq cooperated with the British. Urabi
was presented as a weak and impulsive military leader who deserted the nationalist
movement at a decisive moment. Hence, the defeat in battle was moral as well as
military. According to al-Rafii, the military defeat paralyzed the national movement
and facilitated Egypts capitulation to the British.84
Toward the late 1940s, however, other nationalist writers mythicized Urabi and
attacked al-Rafii for his biased views.85 Al-Rafii, who thus far was always in the
forefront of nationalist historiographical changes, was forced to reappraise Urabis
legacy. Thus, in January 1952 he published his new account of the events in the form of
Al-zaim Ahmad Urabi (The Leader Ahmad Urabi). Although many of the themes of
the 1937 edition repeated themselves, in this book, Urabi was portrayed as a war hero
who was undermined by external forces.86 Thus, Urabi joined the gallery of popular
heroes and martyrs whose original curator was al-Rafii. The previous views of Mustafa
Kamil, and those of al-Rafii himself, were deserted, with no apparent explanation. The
monarchy, for its part, decided to ban the book. A few months later, the revolution
occurred, and al-Rafiis account was immediately released and sold out.87
Misr wa-l-Sudan fi Awwal Ahd al-Ihtilal 18821892 (1942)
The ten years discussed in this work, from the British occupation to the beginning of
Mustafa Kamils public activity, were characterized as an era of decadence. Al-Rafii
painted a gloomy picture in which national pride was humiliated by British occupation
and the indigenous elements that had collaborated with it. As a result, the ability to act
was curtailed, and no oppositional activities emerged.88
The most significant marker of Egypts helplessness was the separation of Sudan
in 1899. During that period, Egypt, he claimed, lost critical elements of its national
sovereignty: an independent army, political autonomy, and even constitutional order
(parties, elections, Parliament, and the like). Written during the growing antiBritish

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Yoav Di-Capua

atmosphere of World War II, this book is one of the strongest anti-colonial texts to have
appeared in that period. Egypt, al-Rafii concluded, had been continually exploited, its
natural and human resources exhausted, and the country did not gain from British presence any benefit whatsoever.89 Thus, al-Rafii formulated a counter-argument that came
to contradict the typical colonialist argument for material progress and modernization.
Although it was published only three years after his book on Mustafa Kamil, through
this work al-Rafii laid the groundwork for the big bang of Egyptian nationalismthe
appearance of Mustafa Kamil in national politics.
Mustafa Kamil: Baith al-Haraka al-Qawmiyya (1939)
So far I have distinguished between monarchic and populist-nationalist historiography.
However, the populist-nationalist school was not uniform as one might think. In the
early 1930s, a fierce competition for the commemoration of national leaders began
as each party mythicized its own members. In particular, the competition was over
the commemoration of Sad Zaghlul of the Wafd and Mustfa Kamil and Muhammad
Farid of the National Party. In 1936, the public intellectual Mahmud Abbas al-Aqqad
(18891964) published the biography of Zaghlul, and in July of the same year, a neo
Pharaonic granite mausoleum was built to commemorate him. Al-Rafii played a major
role in this rivalry.90 His struggle to have a similar mausoleum built for Kamil, as well
as his biographies of Kamil and Farid, should be read first and foremost against this
background.
In al-Rafiis own words, Mustafa Kamil is nothing less than the Christopher Columbus of Egyptian nationalism.91 It was Kamil who revived the national dynamic that
culminated in the 1919 revolution. Al-Rafiis message was clear: without Kamil and
his political party, Egypt would never have won its independence.92 The central topic
of the book was Kamils political legacy as it was understood, elaborated, dogmatized,
and propagated for more than thirty years by al-Rafii and other party members, such as
Fathi Radwan. Hence, all those who aided and supported Kamil, such as Khedive Abbas
II, were marginalized.93 The following is a list of the six most important principles laid
down by Kamil and the National Party: (1) the immediate and unconditional withdrawal
of all foreign forces from Egyptian soilthis principle was abridged as the demand for
against all forms of occupation, whether milial-jala ; (2) continuous struggle (jihad)
tary, economic, or culturala struggle that, according to Kamil, should be perpetrated
through journalism, education, political organizations, and the like;94 (3) constitutional
should stand at the center of Egyptian public life;95 (4) affinity to the
life (al-dustur)
Ottoman Empire. Kamils legacy could not resolve the contradiction between a distinctive Egyptian nationalism and Pan-Islamic affiliations. In this book, al-Rafii tried to
conceal this contradiction by arguing that Kamils priority was first fighting the British,
then separating from the Ottomans;96 (5) the unification of Egypt and Sudan (wih.dat
al-Nl);97 and (6) national unity. Despite Kamils Islamic political thought, he
wad
stressed that Egyptians belonged to one nation, whether they were Copts or Muslims.98
These notions, principles, and beliefs guided not only the National Party but also, as
has been made clear, al-Rafiis entire project. Seen in this light, the Kamil era brought
to a close a period of unorganized nationalism. Out of the despair of previous years
emerged a new, self-confident movement that was ready to challenge the British.

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Muhammad Farid Ramz al-Ikhlas wa-l-Tadhiya (1941)

While continuing to narrate the history of Egypt through the narrow prism of the National
Party leadership, this biography covered the years 190819. The distinction between the
historic national movement and the National Party became vague, to the degree that
the two appeared synonymous. Correspondingly, the principles introduced by Kamil
and the National Party ideology were depicted as those of the Egyptian people as a
whole.99 This focus has little to do with monarchic historiography. In fact, it represents the
ongoing struggle within the populist-nationalist camp for historiographical hegemony.
The main issue up for debate was: who deserved the most credit for the 1919 revolution
and the independence that followed it?
Two main themes characterize the book. First, the National Party led the people
to the 1919 revolution. Second, the jarda-umma groupespecially Sad Zaghlul
collaborated and identified with the British. Moreover, al-Rafii argued that the jardaumma group, the court, and the British encroached on the National Party and its
leaders.100

Thawrat Sant 1919, 2 vols. (1946)

After Kamil and Farid had prepared the ground, the last modern revolution in Egyptian
history was launched. Al-Rafii tried to evaluate whether the revolution was a success
or a failure.101 In line with his general attitude, he also tried to assess the contribution of
various political groups, including the monarchy, to the revolutions success.
According to al-Rafii, the long-term causes for the outbreak of the revolution originated in World War I. In particular, he identified an atmosphere of military suppression,
encroachment on constitutionalism and political freedom, and the deposition of the first
nationalist khedive, Abbas II.102 More direct and immediate causes were the formation of the Wafd and the arrest of Zaghlul, who headed it. Once begun, the revolution followed the pattern of earlier revolutions: it spread to the countryside and
encompassed all social classes and groups, including women.103 Al-Rafiis emphasis on womens participation was part of a growing acknowledgment of their role in
the nationalist struggle initiated by Muhammad Sabri. Writing in the same period,
Sabri cast the wife of the Wafds vice-president as Delacroixs Liberty Guiding the
People.104
Al-Rafii also highlighted the violent nature of this revolution, from which he falsely
claimed to exempt himself.105 He concluded Thawrat Sant 1919 by arguing that the
success of the revolution was partial. Although it succeeded in its moral, social, and, to
some degree, political aspects (notably the constitution), it completely failed to secure
Egypts full independence. Hence, al-Rafii perceived the revolution as an unfinished
revolution.
In 1947, 1949, and 1951, respectively, al-Rafii published the last three volumes of
his project, titled Fi aqab al-thawra al-Misriyya. Thus, by the eve of the revolution
al-Rafiis entire historiographical series covering the history of popular revolutionary
spirit from 1798 to 1952 was ready. In the formative stages of the revolution, when
the Free Officers were in dire need of a story that would explain their role in history,
al-Rafii was there to contribute his skills and perception. These were fully accepted

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Yoav Di-Capua

and even celebrated, and his monumental project was reformulated into a compact highschool textbook edition.106 The Free Officers now presented themselves as continuing
the popular struggle begun in 1798. Their job, as they themselves came to see it, was
to conclude the unfinished 1919 revolution.107 Hence, Muhammad Kurayyim, Umar
Makram, Ahmad Urabi, Mustafa Kamil, Muhammad Farid,108 and now Muhammad
Najib109 were all part of the same revolutionary genealogy. In Najibs words, [al-Rafiis
books] serve as the basis for the military movement and as nationalist ammunition for
the nation as a whole.110
C O N C L U S IO N S

What made al-Rafiis corpus so popular? A birds-eye view over al-Rafiis corpus
reveals a sequence of historical turning points that together form a basic story: military opposition to French occupation, popular Cairo revolutions, the nomination of
Muhammad Ali, the constitutional movement of Ismail, the Urabi revolution, the
activities of Kamil and Farid, and, finally, the 1919 revolution. Thus, modern Egyptian
history appears to be no more than a sequence of revolutionary events that was presented to the public as a repetitive series.111 As demonstrated earlier, around each of
these turning points al-Rafii created a heroic plot (a commemorative narrative).
These symbolic markers of change were integrated into a meta-narrative that was linked
to the peoples revolutionary spirit as the causal factor behind various events.
This reading of al-Rafiis work reveals not only its comprehensive and teleological nature, but also its temporal order. Similar to other nationalist historians, such as
the Zionist historian Ben Zion Dinur (Dinburg), al-Rafii was able to compress 150
years of Egyptian history into a compact series of memorable revolutionary key events.
Everything that occurred between these revolutionary events was deemed irrelevant.
Dinur, who also witnessed the political triumph of his historical convictions, employed
similar structural tactics to manipulate the historical dimension of time and thus erase
the experience of the Jewish diaspora that was incompatible with Zionist ideology.112
In both cases, this kind of stylistic choice was a down-to-earth, detailed, and appealing
narrative that was useful to the political community as a whole and especially to those
in power. Their work was directly relevant to daily political life and in harmony with the
hopes of the people for national independence.
However, despite al-Rafiis popularity, a basic division continued to govern the
historiographical field. With the advent of print capitalism, the struggle over meaning
and methodology in the writing of history became fiercer.113 The conflict between the
school of Ghurbal and the individual al-Rafii represents the essence of this struggle.
Both camps wrote history that had one common refereethe nation-state. They accepted
its natural and objective existence and made it the object of their investigation.
Furthermore, they both subscribed to the decline, paradigm which limited historical
imagination, a step that should have led to conformity. With so much in common, then,
how do al-Rafii and Ghurbal represent two opposing traditions?
The goal of Ghurbals school was clearly to standardize, regulate, and otherwise
monopolize historical writing. Cooperation with the monarchy was instrumental in this
regard. The monarchy, quite simply, provided members of this school with the means
to advance scientific history, the hallmark of their professional identity. For Ghurbals

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445

school, professionalism meant several things: (1) the adoption of an ethical code that
was committed to political impartiality; (2) academic autonomythat is, control over
who could be a practitioner and how it should be done; (3) a quest for monopoly vis-`a-vis
other groups; and (4) the claim of expert authority, or a conviction that only the academic
model can reveal historical truth. As we have seen, both in his writing and public
position al-Rafii was at odds with Ghurbals professional ideology. Since both factions
rendered services to the same constituencythe intellectually curious middle class
they also competed against each other over issues such as which history books students
would read and who and what would be published in the popular magazines. Given
the fact that al-Rafiis history for public consciousness was highly successful, the
competition turned into a schism. This rift has a fascinating history that cannot be related
in full here. In brief, popular historiography a la al-Rafii indeed grew in quantity,114 but
its qualitative value did not gain a foothold in the academic world. Although this reality
changed with the acceptance of cultural planning under the Nasserist state, the schism
between popular and academic writing is still evident in todays Egypt.115
From the late 1950s, al-Rafiis relevance gradually diminished. His strictly Egyptian
nationalist message was no longer relevant to a Pan-Arab movement and later to an
Arab socialist context. Now, a younger generation of historians such as Muhammad
Anis attacked him for distorting Egypts past and called for the rewriting of history.116
In what seems to have been his last public battle, al-Rafii argued, There is absolutely
no need for the rewriting of history, since I have already done so. I wrote history in an
honest and correct fashion; thus there is no need to rewrite it, as there is no need to
rewrite engineering and algebra.117 Regardless of his protest, the history of Egypt was
once again rewritten.
Despite the popularity of his books, al-Rafii died in December 1966 with only a few
Egyptian pounds to his name. His last wish was to be buried alongside Mustafa Kamil
and Muhammad Farid. Leaving from the Umar Makram mosque, his funeral cortege
turned onto Mustafa Kamil Square and ended in the Mustafa Kamil mausoleum.118 In
the following weeks, Egypts most important newspapers and journals eulogized him.
He was compared not only to the eminent historian Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti but also
to the neighborhoods Rababa poet whose fairy tales, though not always true, create a
sense of intimacy, belongingness, and relevance.119 They wrote that he was the first one
to tell us the full history of the national movement. They mentioned time and again
his devotion to the national struggle. He was, they wrote, a historian, a politician, and a
romantic, the Jabarti of the 20th century.120

NOTES

Authors note: This article is based on my Masters thesis, which was written under the supervision of
Israel Gershoni at Tel Aviv University. I thank him for his help and support. I am also indebted to Yumna
Masarwa, Samah Selim, Robert Tignor, and especially Khaled Fahmy for their valuable advice.
1 On the intellectual affinity between nationalism and legal thinking in this period, see Donald M. Reid,
Lawyers and Politics in the Arab World, 18001960 (Chicago: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1981), 5253, 5960.
2 In addition to serving as secretary of the party, during the years 192425 al-Rafii was a member of the
Majlis al-Nuwwab, and between 1939 and 1951, he was a member of the Majlis al-Shuyukh and a minister
of provisions (late 1949): Abd al-Rahman al-Rafii, Arba at ashar am fi al-barlaman (Fourteen Years in
Parliament) (Cairo: Matbaat al-Saada bi Misr, 1955), 15.

446

Yoav Di-Capua

3 Al-Rafiis

career can be divided into four stages. The first (191222) included the publication of four
books dominated by legal thinking. In the second, and the longest period (late 1920s to early 1950s), he
wrote the national corpus. In the third phase (late 1950s) he composed two books on the history of the July
revolution up to 1959. In the fourth period, he composed several less important publications on poetry and
pre-modern nationalism. The term corpus became prevalent in the 1960s: al-Ahram, 2 September 1964, 30;
al-Majalla, January 1962, 2227.
4 Abd al-Rahman al-Rafii, Fi aqab al-thawra al-Misriyya thawrat 1919 (In the Aftermath of the 1919
Revolution), 3 vols. (Cairo: Dar al-Maarif, 1988), 2:11819, 3:26569.
5 So far, three scholars have tried to evaluate al-Rafiis work. Jack Crabbs focused mainly on the political
aspects of al-Rafiis career in the wake of the July revolution in Egyptian Intellectuals and the Revolution:
The Case of Abd al-Rahman al-Rafii, in Egypt from Monarchy to Republic: A Reassessment of Revolution
and Change, ed. Simon Shamir (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), 25166. Other works provide valuable information but lack profound analysis: Muhammad Baha al-Din Ulwan, Abd al-Rahman al-Rafii:
muarrikh Misr al-hadith (Abd al-Rahman al-Rafii: A Historian of Modern Egypt) (Cairo: al-Haya alMisriyya al-Amma lil-Kitab, 1987); Hamada Mahmud Ahmad Ismail, Sinaat tarikh Misr al-hadith: dirasa
fi fikr Abd al-Rahman al-Rafii (Crafting Modern Egyptian History: A Study of Abd al-Rahman al-Rafiis
Thought) (Cairo: al-Haya al-Misriyya al-Amma lil-Kitab, 1987).
6 Quoted in Ahmad Abd al-Rahim Mustafa, Shafiq Ghurbal muarrikh (Shafiq Ghurbal, Historian),
al-Majalla al Tarikhiyya al-Misriyya 13 (1963): 278 (emphasis added).
7 Abd al-Rahman al-Rafii, Mudhakarati 18891951 (My Memories, 18891951) (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal,
1952), 61 (emphasis added).
8 Cuno, who drew heavily on an elusive colloquium paper by Sayid Ashmawi, was the first to point to
the importance of this paradigm in this period: Kenneth M. Cuno, Muhammad Ali and the Decline and
Revival Thesis in Modern Egyptian History, in Islah am tahdith? Misr fi asr Muhammad Ali, ed. Rauf
Abbas (Cairo: al-Majlis al-Aala li-lthaqafa, al-Jamiya al-Misriyya li-ldirasat al-Tarikhiyya, 2000), 93
119.
9 Anonymous, Tarikh Muhammad Ali Pasha, al-Muqtataf, June 1905January 1906, 55354, 52132,
63747, 71720, 797808, 901909, 99353, 1518, respectively. Jurji Zaydan, Muhmmad Ali Pasha,
al-Hilal, June 1902, 51741; idem, al-Yubil al-miawi li-tasis al-arika al-Khidiwiyya, May 1905, 44349.
10 Jurji Zaydan, Tarikh Misr al-hadith (Cairo: Matbaat al-Muqtataf, 1889), 78148, 21850. His second
(1911) edition developed the decline and revival concept even further: idem, Tarikh Misr al-hadith (Cairo:
Matbaat al-Hilal, 1911), 17497.
11 Muhammad Abdu, Athar Muhmmad Ali fi Misr, al-Manar 5 (1902): 17583; idem, A ahyaha
Muhammad Ali wa amatuha khalifuhu, al-Manar 5 (1902): 23237.
12 Cuno, Muhammad Ali and the Decline, 98.
13 Ehud R. Toledano, Forgetting Egypts Ottoman Past, in Cultural Horizons: A Festschrift in Honor of
Talat S. Halman, ed. Jayne Warner (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2001), 15067.
14 Sami Zubaida, Islam, the People and the State: Essays on Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle
East (London: Routledge, 1989), 14546.
15 In Israel Gershoni, Imagining and Reimagining the Past: The Use of History by Egyptian Nationalist
Writers, 19191952, History and Memory 4 (1992): 17.
16 Between 1920 and 1952, the university-trained historian Muhammad Rifat inserted populist-nationalist
themes, such as the Urabi revolt, into the most popular school textbooks of the time: Tarikh Misr al-siyasi
fi al-azmina al-haditha (The Political History of Egypt in the Modern Times) (Cairo: Wizarat al-Maaif
al-Umumiyya, 1941), 185223, 23839. Thomas Mayer, The Changing Past: Egyptian Historiography of the
Urabi Revolt, 18821983 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988), 1216.
17 Jack Crabbs, The Writing of History in Nineteenth Century Egypt: A Study in National Transformation
(Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1984), 11925.
18 Ibid., 120.
19 Ilyas al-Ayyubi, Tarikh Misr fi ahd al-Khidiw Ismail Pasha min sanat 1863 ila sanat 1879, 2 vols.
(Cairo: Maktabat Madabuli, 1990), first published in 1922.
20 Ibid.; idem, Muhammad Ali: Siratuhu wa amaluhu wa athruhu (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal, 1922).
21 See Yoav Di-Capua, Embodiment of the Revolutionary Spirit: The Mustafa Kamil Mausoleum in Cairo,
History and Memory 13 (2001): 105106.
22 See a complaint letter by a censored historian in al-Risala, September 1934, 148182.

Jabarti of the 20th Century

23 G.

447

Levi della Vida, An Obituary, Rivista degli Studi Orientali 10 (1925): 72630.
Hamuda Mahmud, al-Madkhal ila dirasat al-wathaiq al-Arabiyya (Introduction to the Study
of Arab Documents) (Cairo: Dar al-Thaqafa lil-Nashr wa-l-Tawzi, 1984), 4748; al-Jumayi, Itijahat alkitaba al-tarikhiyya fi tarikh Misr al-hadith wal-muasir (Trends in the History Writing of Modern and
Contemporary Egyptian History) (Cairo: University of Cairo Press, 1992), 4547.
25 See, for instance, Jean Deny, Sommaire des archives turques du Caire (Cairo: Soci
ete Royale de

Geographie dEgypte,
Publications Speciales, 1930).
26 Donald Reid, The Egyptian Geographical Society: From Foreign Laymens Society to Indigenous
Professional Association, Poetics Today 13 (1993): 42972.
27 Franc

ios Charles-Roux, Angleterre et lExpedition en Egypte

(Cairo: Societe Royale de Geographie

dEgypte,
Publications Speciales, 1925).
28 Sammarcos Egyptian publisher argued that only tendentious politicians who distorted the real facts and
blackened Ismails name wrote the history of this era. According to the publisher, although he was an Italian
citizen, Sammarco was apparently the first to present a balanced, objective, and patriotic account, as though
he himself were an Egyptian: Angelo Sammarco, al-Haqiqa fi masalat qanat al-Suways (The Truth in the
Suez Canal Case), trans. Taha Fawzi (Cairo: n.p., 1940), 17. Sammarco also published the official monarchic
narrative, Mawsuat tarikh Misr ibra al-usur (A Comprehensive History of Egypt across the Ages).
29 In 1933, Crabit`
es presented Ismail as a cautious yet ambitious reformer in Ismail the Maligned Khedive
(London: Routledge and Sons, 1933).
30 Between 1933 and 1939, Douin published his monumental work Histoire du r
egne du Khedive Ismail
(3 vols., 6 parts; Cairo: Societe Royal de Geeographic dEgypte, Publications Speciales, 193336), in which
he refuted claims of Ismails financial mistakes.
31 Hanotaux Gabriel, ed., Histoire de la Nation Egyptienne,

7 vols. (Paris: Ouvrage publie sous les auspices

et le haut patronage de sa majeste Fouad Ier, Roi dEgypte,

193037).
32 Henry Dodwell, The Founder of Modern Egypt: A Study of Muhammad Ali (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1931). An Arabic version was also published.
33 Muhammad Sabri, La R

evolution Egyptienne,
2 vols. (Paris: Librairie Vrin, 191921).
34 See an excellent work by Ronen Raz, The Transparent Mirror: Arab Intellectuals and Orientalism,
17891950 (unpublished Ph.D. diss. Princeton University, Princeton, N.J., 1997).
35 Several Orientalists closely monitored the advance of the archive project: Carlo Nallino, Una recente
storia dellEgitto dale origini as 1879, Oriente Moderno 15 (1935): 42125.
36 Al-Rafii was expelled from the archive because of a hostile publication (discussed later).
37 Ahmad Izzat Abd al-Karim, Kalimat tabin (A Eulogy), al-Majalla al-Tarikhiyya al-Misriyya 13
(1963): 12. Abd al-Rahim Mustafa, Shafiq Ghurbal, 25578.
38 For a case study of similar theoretical dilemmas in the United States, see Peter Novick, That Noble Dream:
The Objectivity Question and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1988).
39 Muhammad Anis, Shafiq Ghurbal wa madrasat al-tarikh al-Misri al-hadith (Shafiq Ghurbal and the
School of Modern Egyptian Historiography), al-Majalla 58 (1961): 1217.
40 Muhammad Muhammad Tawfiq, al-Halqa al-mafquda (The Missing Link), al-Hilal, May-June (1941),
58594.
41 Based on Ghurbals published Masters thesis (which was not translated into Arabic,) Piterberg pointed
out Ghurbals Orientalist bias. Further research, I hope, will prove that Ghurbals position toward the
Ottomans was more complex: Gabriel Piterberg, The Tropes of Stagnation and Awakening in Nationalist
Historical Consciousness, in Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East, ed. James Jankowski and Israel
Gershoni (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 4950.
42 Ahmad Abd Allah, ed., Tarikh Misr bayna al-manhaj al-ilmi wa-l-sira al-hizbi (Egyptian History:
Between Scholarly Study and Political Conflict) (Cairo: Dar Shuhdi lil-Nashr, 1988), 5354, 6566, 200.
43 Crabbs, Writing of History, 14684.
44 Abd al-Rahman al-Rafii, Tarikh al-haraka al-qawmiyya wa tatawwur nizam al-hukum fi Misr (The
History of the National Movement and the Development of the Administration in Egypt), 2 vols. (Cairo: Dar
al-Maarif, 1987), 1:2324.
45 Ibid., 2770.
46 However, in 1963, al-Rafii updated his corpus by publishing a volume that traced the origins of the
modern nationalist spirit through the Pharaonic, Graco-Roman, and Byzantine eras:. Abd al-Rahman al-Rafii,
24 Abbas

448

Yoav Di-Capua

Tarikh al-haraka al-qawmiyya fi Misr al-qadima min fajr al-tarikh ila al-fath al-Arabi (The History of the
National Movement from Ancient Egypt to the Arab Conquest) (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahda al-Misriyya, 1963).
In 1970, al-Rafiis drafts for another book covering the period from the Arab to the Ottoman conquest were
edited and published, as well: Abd al-Rahman al-Rafii and Said Abd al-Rahman Ashur, Misr fi al-usur
al-wusta min al-fath al-Arabi hata al-ghazu al-Uthmani (Medieval Egypt from the Arab to the Ottoman
Conquest) (Cairo: Dar al-Nahda al-Arabiyya, 1970).
47 Similar to Sabri, al-Rafii acknowledged the importance of Ali Beys rule but did not see its relevance
to the modern era.
48 Al-Rafii, Tarikh al-haraka al-qamiyya, 1:7580.
49 Ibid., 1:15556.
50 Ibid., 1:16972.
51 Ibid., 1:17880.
52 Although al-Rafii mentioned that the headquarters of the Cairo revolution was at al-Azhar, he does not
ascribe any religious character to the revolution: ibid., 268.
53 Jala
is a Quranic term associated with the deportation of Ahl al-Kitab from the Arab peninsula: Quran
59:3. See the discussion of National Party ideology later.
54 Al-Rafii, Tarikh al-haraka al-qamiyya, 2:257.
55 Ibid., 2:28990, 2:32226.
56 Ibid., 2:327.
57 Ibid., 2:337.
58 Al-Rafiis celebration of popular heroes was picked up in Muhammad Farid Abu Hadid, Sirat al-sayyid
Umar Makram (Umar Makram: A Biography) (Cairo: Lajnat al-Talif wa-l-Tarjama wa-l-Nashr, 1937), 20,
37, 40, 50, 6970.
59 Abd al-Rahman al-Rafii, Asr Muhammad Ali (The Muhammad Ali Era) (Cairo: Matbaat al-Fikra,
1930), 1929, 4546, 5556, 7573.
60 Ibid., 80121.
61 Al-Rafii presented Ibrahim as a true Egyptian hero (rather than as a Turk like Muhammad Ali): ibid.,
chap. 11.
62 Ibid., 66265.
63 Abd al-Rahman al-Rafii, Misr khalaqat Muhammad Ali (Egypt Created Muhammad Ali), al-Hilal,
August 1953, 4043, paraphrased Ghurbals conception.
64 Youssef Choueiri, Arab History and the Nation-State: A Study in Modern Arab Historiography 1820
1980 (London: Routledge, 1989), 71.
65 Shafiq Ghurbal, Muhammad Ali al-kabir (The Great Muhammad Ali) (Cairo: Dairat al-Maarif alIslamiyya, 1944), 62.
66 Ghurbal claimed that al-Rafiis lawyerly methods were simplistic and inappropriate. However, he
praised al-Rafii for his ability to document: Shafiq Ghurbal, Tarikh al-mufawadat al-Misriyya alBritaniyya (The History of Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations) (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahda al-Misriyya, 1952), 14
15.
67 Al-Rafii, My Memories, 6667, 7576.
68 Baha al-Din Ulwan, Abd al-Rahman al-Rafii, 26465.
69 Abd al-Rahman al-Rafii, Asr Ismail (The Ismail Era), 2 vols. (Cairo: Dar al-Maarif, 1987), 1:1527.
Ehud Toledano uncovered the demonization process of Abbas in State and Society in Mid-Nineteenth Century
Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 108 ff.
70 Al-Rafii, Asr Ismail, 1:3140, 1:6063, 1:6971.
71 Ibid., 1:73.
72 As mentioned later, the incorporation of women into nationalist historiography started after the 1919
revolution: ibid., 2:299300.
73 Although factual mistakes are uncharacteristic of al-Rafii, the eclectic financial evidence he provided
was based on an obscure source: ibid., 2:5558.
74 Ibid., 2:5865, 2:8387.
75 Ibid., 2:89 ff, 2:13738.
76 Ibid., 2:200203, 2:206207.
77 Ibid., 2:223.
78 Ibid., 2:27071.

Jabarti of the 20th Century

79 Ibid.,

449

2:301302. See also a review of his book in al-Hilal, February 1933, 51.
Changing Past, 7.
81 Ibid., 78; Crabbs, Writing of History, 16162.
82 The young al-Rafii published his views in Kamils al-Liwa: Hamada Mahmud, Crafting Modern
Egyptian History, 233.
83 Abd al-Rahman al-Rafii, al-Thawra al-Urabiyya wa-l-ihtilal al-Inglizi (The Urabi Revolution and
the British Occupation) (Cairo: n.p., 1966), 516.
84 Ibid., 595605.
85 See Mahmud al-Khafifs banned account, Ahmad Urabi, al-zaim al-muftara alayhi (Ahmad Urabi,
A Slandered Leader) (Cairo: Matbaat al-Risala, 1947). Mayer, Changing Past, 2021.
86 Abd al-Rahman al-Rafii, al-zaim Ahmad Urabi (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal, 1952), 36156.
87 The post-revolution title was changed to al-zaim al-thair Ahmad Urabi (The Revolutionary Leader
Ahmad Urabi) (Cairo: Dar wa Matabi al-Shaab, 1968).
88 Idem, Misr wa-l-sudan fi awwal ahd al-ihtill: tarikh Misr al-qawmi fi sanat 1882 ila sanat 1892
(Egypt and Sudan at the Beginning of the Occupation: Egyptian National History 188292) (Cairo: Maktabat
al-Nahda al-Misriyya, 1948), 17479.
89 Ibid., 17990.
90 Al-Hilal, July 1936, 102324; Di-Capua Embodiment, 96104.
91 Abd al-Rahman al-Rafii, Mustafa Kamil: baith al-haraka al-qawmiyya: tarikh Misr al-qawmi min
sanat 18921908 (Mustafa Kamil: Instigator of the National Movement: The Nationalist History of Egypt
18921908) (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahda al-Misriyya, 1950), 12.
92 Ibid., 15.
93 Ibid., 33637.
94 Ibid., 106108 ff.
95 Egyptians and Iranians ascribed the 1905 victory of Japan over Russia to the adoption of constitution by
the Japanese people, and this example was often cited: ibid., 41. See also Mustafa Kamil, al-shams al-mushriqa
(The Rising Sun) (Cairo: al-Arabi, 2001).
96 Al-Rafii, Mustafa Kamil, 34669.
97 Ibid., 401402.
98 Ibid., 43233.
99 Abd al-Rahman al-Rafii, Muhammad Farid ramz al-ikhlas wa-l-tadhiya: tarikh Misr al-qawmi min
sanat 1908 ila sanat 1919 (Muhammad Farid, the Symbol of Loyalty and Sacrifice: The National History of
Egypt 19081919)(Cairo: Dar al-Maarif, 1984), 48591.
100 Ibid., 7178, 137, 179, 48586. See also a review in al-Hilal, February 1949, 16667.
101 See al-Rafiis account of why he wrote the book in al-Hilal, February 1952, 1214.
102 Abd al-Rahman al-Rafii, Thawrat sanat 1919: tarikh misr al-qawmi min sanat 1919 Ila sanat 1921
(The 1919 revolution: Egyptian National History 19191921) (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahda al-Misriyya, 1955),
12, 1819, 52.
103 Ibid., 170, 185, 19091, 202203, 209.
104 Sabri, La R
`
evolution Egyptienne,
1:4243, 1:6566.
105 Al-Rafii expressed his reservations about violence in a subchapter titled My Memories from the
Revolution. However, there is evidence suggesting that he was a member of the black hand organization,
which targeted individuals during the revolution: ibid., 170, 185, 19091, 202203, 209. Baha al-Din Ulwan,
Abd al-Rahman al-Rafii, 13643; Crabbs, Egyptian Intellectuals and the Revolution, 251.
106 Originally published in 1957. Abd al-Rahman al-Rafii, Misr al-mujahida fi al-asr al-hadith (Militant
Egypt in the Modern Age) (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal, 1989).
107 See a speech by Muhammad Najib in al-Ahram, 24 January 1953, 1, 9.
108 In 1953, Kamil and Farid were reburied in an official state funeral: Di-Capua, Embodiment, 102104.
109 See an analogy between Najib and Urabi: Abd al-Rahman al-Rafii, al-Hilal, September 1952, 912.
110 Hamada Mahmud, Crafting Modern Egyptian History, 264; Crabbs, Egyptian Intellectuals and the
Revolution, 25962.
111 For a good example, see Abd al-Rahman al-Rafii, 10 Hawadith uzma fial-sittin sana al-akhira (Ten
Major Events in the Past Sixty Years), al-Hilal, January 1953, 2935. In this section I draw on Yael Zerubavel,
Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1995), 89.
80 Mayer,

450

Yoav Di-Capua

112 David

Myers, Re-Inventing the Jewish Past: European Jewish Intellectuals and the Zionist Return to
History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 130, 137, 141, 14445, 147, 150, 179.
113 On the relationship between the spread of national consciousness and modern communication, see
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso, 1991).
114 For a continuation of al-Rafiis scholarship, see Abd al-Hadi Masud, al-Thawrat fi Misr (The Revolutions in Egypt) (Cairo: Matbaat Makhimar, 1954).
115 Ahmad Abd Allah, ed., Tarikh misr; and Muhammad Afifi, ed., al-Madrasa al-tarikhiyya al-Misriyya
19701995 (The Egyptian Historical School, 19701995) (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1995), focused extensively
on issues of objectivity and politicization.
116 Al-Ahram, 24 March 1963, 7. Hamada Mahmud, Crafting Modern Egyptian History, 25255.
117 As quoted in Hamada Mahmud, Crafting Modern Egyptian History, 25455.
118 In 1988, Fathi Radwan, a prominent National Party member, was buried in the same place.
119 Ruz al-Yusuf, 12 December 1966, 19.
120 Abd al-Salam Halba, Jabarti al-qarn al-ishrin yatahadath, al-Quwwat al-Musalaha, December 1965,
20; Ruz al-Yusuf, 12 December 1966, 1820; Akhar Saa, 7 December 1966, 17; al-Akhbar, 6 December
1966, 7; al-Jumhuriyya, 6 December 1966, 24; Hamada Mahmud Crafting Modern Egyptian History, 281;
al-Musawwar, 9 December 1966, 1213.