DISCUSSIONI, NOTE E RASSEGNE

Denis O'Brien
EMPEDOCLES' ``MOUNTAIN PATH'' (FR. 24)
Abstract
Empedocles' fr. 24 is known only from its quotation by Plutarch. The
words as quoted leave themselves open to divergent interpretations.
The context in Plutarch nonetheless holds out some hope of being able
to decide which of the divergent interpretations would have matched
the use that Empedocles himself made of the two verses in his poem.
Keywords
Daimones, oracles, providence, Plutarch, Cleombrotus
i. divergent interpretations
In a recent issue of this journal, Jean-Claude Picot and William
Berg have provided the first full-scale study of a pair of verses (fr. 24)
quoted from Empedocles by Plutarch 1. The two verses, neither of
which is metrically complete, run as follows, when suitably emended:
joqtua+| e<se*qa| e<se*qzri pqora*psxm
lt*hxm lg+ seke*eim a\sqapo+m li* am 2.
1
J.-C. Picot-W. Berg, Along a Mountain Path with Empedocles (31 b 24 D.-K.),
Elenchos, xxxiii (2012) pp. 5-20. Plutarch. de def. orac. 15, 418 c.
2
Picot and Berg rightly see that two corrections of the text are needed, one

ELENCHOS
xxxiii (2012) fasc. 2
BIBLIOPOLIS

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With the text as emended, the interpretation adopted by our two

authors turns on the supposition that two ways are opposed, one of
them attaching the summits, as described in the first verse, and the
other completing a single path, the activity alluded to in the verse
following. Of these two ways, Empedocles supposedly advocates the
second to the exclusion of the first: completing a single path instead
of attaching summits 3.
``Summits'' and a ``pathway''
But are the two ways opposed, in the sense of being mutually
exclusive? The simple-minded reader (myself) intuitively adopts a
quite different meaning. Someone who ``joins summits to summits''
is in danger of not ``pursuing to the end a single pathway'', not because
the two types of activity are, in themselves, incompatible, but simply
because the first action may encroach unduly on the second. So understood, Empedocles' words are most naturally construed as a warning.
Empedocles is warning us that, by ``joining summits to summits'', we
risk not completing our journey, in so far as we risk ``not pursuing a
single pathway to the end''.
With this reading of the two verses, there need be no implication
that the traveller or his guide has therefore to avoid the ``summits''.
We do not have to hear Empedocles telling us to ``complete a single
path instead of attaching summits''. The one activity does not have to
exclude the other. The point is simply that, if we are to heed the poet's
warning, we have to ``pursue one path to the end'', and therefore
complete our journey, even if more especially if in the course of
our journey, we ``join summits to summits''.

to satisfy the metre and dialect of the first verse: e<se*qzri (Scaliger), in the place of
e<se*qai| and e<se*qairi in the manuscripts, the other to give a satisfactory meaning to
the second verse: lg+ seke*eim (Knatz 1891, Paton 1893), in the place of the manuscripts' lg*se ke*ceim.
3
J.-C. Picot-W. Berg, art. cit., pp. 13 and 14.

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An imaginary example
It is easy enough to imagine how such a warning might have
applied to the structure of Empedocles' own poem. The extant fragments and secondary sources provide several ``summits'', several hilltops or mountaintops which give a good view of various features of
Empedocles' elaborate cosmic system: the ``one'' and the ``more than
one'', the works of Love and the works of Strife, the origin of the
human race and its threatened annihilation.
The two verses that Plutarch has quoted are designed to warn us,
not that we have to forego such ``summits'', but that we have to be
sure to complete the journey, by following to the end the path that
Empedocles has traced for us, and that is none other than the history
of the cycle. Only by completing the journey will the successive ``summits'' take their place in the context of the whole. The ``one'' and the
``more than one'', if we pursue the path that has been laid out for us,
will be recognised as successive and recurring states, with the time
when all things are ``more than one'' divided between a world where
Love's power increases and a world such as our own, where Strife's
power is temporarily on the increase.
My example is unashamedly a plea pro domo 4. I must therefore at
once emphasise that it is put forward here as no more than a hypothetical example, an imaginative reconstruction, of a possible context for
the meaning I would give to Plutarch's two verses. There is no suggestion that my arbitrary illustration has any specific foundation in the
words Plutarch has recorded, or any specific foothold in the context of
his quotation. My point is simply that, with such an example, ``summits'' and the ``single path'' do not have to be taken as antagonistic, in
the way that Picot and Berg think they are. Empedocles does not have
to be heard as advocating ``completing a single path instead of attaching summits''. The words Plutarch has quoted may be taken instead,
and perhaps more naturally, as a warning. Don't let viewing successive
summits stop you from completing your journey. However many ``sumThe ``single path'' is a straightforward summary of the thesis put forward in
Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle, Cambridge 1969.
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mits'' may be included in the journey, what matters is that the ``path''
you tread should not be left without a telos.
A choice
Picot and Berg do not seem to have taken account of the interpretation I have outlined. If they have, they offer no arguments
against it. Intuitively, it seems to me the more natural interpretation
of the words that Plutarch has recorded. But ``intuitions'' may differ,
often do differ, and a simple statement of the difference is rarely
sufficient to carry conviction. Even so, the choice, once it has been
brought into the open, can hardly be avoided. The one interpretation
is not simply a variant of the other. Empedocles, in the context of his
poem, presumably made his intention clear. Plutarch, in quoting the
two verses, presumably knew what it was that he intended. Can we
wrest an indication of the meaning from Empedocles' own words? If
not, can we persuade Plutarch, even at this late hour, to share his
knowledge with us?
ii. the metaphor
The wording of the metaphor
The imagery of the metaphor is not, in itself, problematic. Picot
and Berg construe the ``summits'' (joqtua*|) as already part of the
metaphor 5. So do I. The ``summits'', in so far as they are all of a piece
with the metaphor of the ``path'' (a\sqapo*m), are hilltops or mountaintops, a common meaning of the word in Homer as elsewhere 6. In
J.-C. Picot-W. Berg, art. cit., p. 11: The summits and the path of which
Empedocles speaks are to be taken in a metaphorical way, is followed (p. 12) by:
Empedocles opposes the summits (joqtua*|) to a single path (a\sqapo+m li* am) which,
with the summits in the background, could easily evoke a mountain path.
6
L.-S.-J., s.v. joqtug*, i 2 (p. 983): ``top, peak of a mountain''. I write of
``hilltops'' as well as ``mountaintops'', to take account of the meaning given for the
same Homeric texts by L.-S.-J., s.v. o>qo|, i 1 (p. 1255): ``mountain, hill ''. The
difference between a ``hill'' and a ``mountain'' is not as clear-cut as one might think
5

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Empedocles' two verses, the hilltops or mountaintops are most simply

taken as a metaphor for the ``high-points'' of a speech, the topics that
the speaker makes most of, the parts of his speech that he singles out
for emphasis, the moments, perhaps, when he pauses for effect 7.
The accumulation of successive topics, the ``joining'' of ``summits
to summits'', is designated, appropriately enough, by a verb (pqora*psx) which implies a juxtaposition, but not a fusion, whether of
physical objects that are ``put next'' to each other and therefore
``touch'' (the meaning of the uncompounded verb), or in a figurative
sense of ``honours'' and the like that are ``conferred'' on someone and
thereafter adhere to that person 8. In Empedocles' verse, if it is to play
a part in the metaphor, the same verb is most easily taken to imply that
the speech is ``put together'' by one topic being ``joined'' to another, as
the speech progresses.
At the same time, in ``joining summits to summits'', the speaker
is pictured as himself passing from one hilltop or mountaintop to the
next, a movement implied by the verb (pqora*psx) only in so far as it is
part of the metaphor, just as in the notion of ``completing'' a pathway
(seke*eim) there is again the implication, but only in the context of the
it would be. ``Mount Hymettus'' is undoubtedly an o>qo|, in ancient as in modern
Greek, and in English is commonly referred to as a ``mountain'', but the climb to
the summit, hardly more than an evening stroll even for those who are no longer in
the prime of youth, is usually classified as a ``hill climb''.
7
The word is commonly used as a metaphor in connection with ``speeches''
and ``speaking''. See L.-S.-J., s.v. joqtug*, ii 1 (p. 983): ``metaphorical'', several
examples, including our two verses. In taking both ``summits'' and a ``path'' as
parts of the same metaphor, I exclude, as do Picot and Berg, the use of joqtug* to
refer to a ``crown'' or ``wreath'' (cfr. L.-S.-J., s.v., ii 2), an interpretation adopted
notably by E. Bignone, Empedocle. Studio critico, Torino 1916, ad loc. (pp. 418-9).
Bignone has been misled by an over-literal understanding of the verb (pqora*psxm):
``weaving wreaths, one with another'' might perhaps pass muster as a meaning for
the first verse, taken on its own; but ``weaving wreaths'' and completing, or not
completing, a ``pathway'' would seem an unlikely conjunction of images in what is
syntactically a single sentence. For the meaning I would give to the verb, in the
context of the metaphor, see the continuation of my main text above.
8
See L.-S.-J., s.v. pqora*psx (p. 1502) i 1: the literal meaning, ii 2: the
figurative use.

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metaphor, that ``completion'' implies movement. In ``pursuing a single

pathway to the end'', the speaker is pictured as a traveller, moving
ever closer to his destination.
The bias of the Oxford editors
The metaphorical use of the two verbs (pqora*psx, seke*x) does
not imply that either verb has to be given what the lexicographer
would recognise as a new ``meaning''. ``Springing from peak to peak'',
the paraphrase adopted by the Oxford editors to illustrate the object
of the verb in the first of our two verses (joqtua*|) does not imply that
``springing'' should have been listed under a separate head in the entry
for the verb (pqora*psx) 9.
The paraphrase (marked as such by the use of roman as opposed
to italic font) is in any case hopelessly inappropriate. ``Springing'', or
``leaping'', ``from peak to peak'' would be a hazardous activity for even
the most agile athlete, unless the peaks in question were much closer
together than the ``peaks'' of mountain ranges are usually imagined as
being. But the choice of verb is not only comical. It has led to a gloss
that perpetuates the notion of an activity that is of itself awkward and
inappropriate: ``i.e. treating a subject disconnectedly'' 10.
The gloss of the Oxford editors has given the interpretation of
the metaphor a twist whose influence is plainly to be seen in the
commentary on the metaphor adopted by Picot and Berg. The ``summits'', so they tell us, are ``digressions'' 11. The traveller who moves
from mountaintop to mountaintop is condemned to wander indecisively between different points of view, as opposed to someone who
pursues to the end a single path, moving slowly, meticulously, and
decisively toward his goal 12.
There is no warrant for that reading of the metaphor in the words
that Plutarch has recorded. If we read Empedocles' two verses without
the bias of the Oxford editors, there need be no implication that the
For the paraphrase, see again L.-S.-J., s.v. joqtug*, ii 1 (p. 983).
See again ibid.
11
J.-C. Picot-W. Berg, art. cit., p. 8.
12
Ibid., p. 20.
9

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``summits'' are disconnected ``digressions'', nor any implication that

the orator has therefore to forego the ``summits'', in order to bring his
speech to a successful conclusion 13.
The meaning of the metaphor
The language of the metaphor, for all its elaboration, leaves open
the question of the relation between the ``summits'' and a ``pathway''.
By way of advocating completion of ``a single path'', is Empedocles
forbidding the traveller to ``join summits to summits'' and therefore,
in terms of the metaphor, discouraging him from visiting successive
hilltops or mountaintops in turn? Are the summits therefore distracting ``digressions'', digressions that endlessly repeated stop the speaker
from ever reaching his goal 14?
Alternatively, are Empedocles' words to be taken more simply as
a warning? Is the point that going from one hilltop or mountaintop to
the next, and therefore ``joining summits to summits'', puts the traveller at risk of not ``pursuing one path to the end'', and therefore not
completing his journey, but without any implication that the two activities are for that reason, in themselves, incompatible? Are the ``summits'' therefore ``high-points'', topics that the orator may well choose
to dwell upon, provided only that, in doing so, he does not lose sight of
the end in view, the conclusion that his speech has to lead to?
The original context no doubt made Empedocles' meaning clear.
Our best hope today of finding an answer to such questions, and

The attempt to reinforce the opposition by a spatter of adverbs (``indecisively'', for movement from ``summit'' to ``summit'', as opposed to ``slowly'', ``meticulously'' and ``decisively'', for movement along a single pathway) merely makes
the bias the more obvious. It is true that the verb seke*x does commonly imply, not
merely the ``conclusion'', but the ``completion'' of a project. For the wide range of
uses, see L.-S.-J., s.v. (pp. 1771-2), including use relating to a ``road'' or a ``journey''
(i 1). My writing of a ``successful conclusion'' therefore falls within a possible range
of reference for the second verse of our fragment. But even a ``successful'' conclusion need not have been reached ``slowly'', ``meticulously'', or even ``decisively''.
14
See J.-C. Picot-W. Berg, art. cit., p. 13: The process of attaching summits has no end.
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therefore discovering the meaning that must underlie the fragment,

will be to turn to the context in Plutarch.
iii. plutarch's quotation
Introducing the fragment
Cleombrotus, the speaker at this point in Plutarch's essay, introduces his quotation with the remark: a\kk\ i% ma lg+ so+ \Elpedo*jkeiom
ei\pei& m do*nx... 15. How are we to construe these seemingly simple
words? The form do*nx is either a future indicative or an aorist subjunctive 16. According to Goodwin, the future is never to be found with
i% ma 17. The verb has therefore to be parsed as an aorist subjunctive,
both in Plutarch's text and when the identical form of words occurs in
Plato's Republic (vi 509 d 3: i% ma lg+ do*nx) 18. The translation of the
two texts is the same: ``Lest I should seem...''. But what is the relationship of the verb and its adjuncts (i% ma + lg*) to the three words intervening: so+ \Elpedo*jkeiom ei\pei& m?
Plutarch's invention
No other occurrence of so+ \Elpedo*jkeiom (the neuter article and
the adjective in the singular) is to be found in the computerised Thesaurus linguae graecae. This is presumably Plutarch's own light-hearted
invention, an expression made up for the occasion, and tossed off with
a smile, all part of the debonair attitude that Plutarch likes to adopt as
an antidote to the vast and varied erudition displayed throughout the
Moralia.
This is the reading of the manuscripts. I shall turn in due course (infra,
vi and vii) to the emendation of the text adopted by W. Sieveking, in his
Teubner edition (1929).
16
L.-S.-J., s.v. doje*x (p. 441). The subjunctive is formed from e>dona.
17
W.W. Goodwin, Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb, Rewritten and enlarged, London 1897, 334 (p. 115).
18
See W. Veitsch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, New edition, Oxford
1887, s.v. doje*x (p. 198).
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The adjectival ending (-eio|) is commonly to be found attached to

a proper name 19. ``Substantivised'' by the addition of a neuter article,
as is so+ \Elpedo*jkeiom, the expression, though hardly in everyday use,
is not a solecism. The plural, sa+ \Elpedo*jkeia, is to be found in a
fragment of Eudemus quoted by Simplicius, with some fairly non-descript meaning ``Empedoclean doctrines'' or ``Empedoclean principles'' 20. The singular crops up with other famous ``names'' (so+ Pissa*jeiom, so+ \Amanaco*qeiom). References to Hesiod, in later writers, are
not infrequently tagged as so+ < Grio*deiom 21.
My point therefore is not that there is anything untoward, or
even particularly innovative, in such a construction, simply that so+
\Elpedo*jkeiom is sufficiently unusual no other occurrence in the
computerised TLG for the expression to be seen here as very likely
Plutarch's own coinage, sprung on the reader as something of a jeu
d'esprit, but with some fairly common-or-garden meaning. Construed
as the object of ei\pei& m, the expression would most simply be taken to
mean something as innocuous as ``to say what Empedocles says'' or ``to
speak as Empedocles speaks''.
An expression of disagreement?
The difficulty lies in adapting such a meaning to the context, and
specifically to the disclaimer: ``Lest I should seem...'' (i% ma lg+ do*nx).
Does Cleombrotus introduce his quotation by asserting that he would
not want to ``give the impression'' (cfr. i% ma lg+ do*nx) of ``saying what
Empedocles says'', of ``speaking as Empedocles speaks'' (so+ \Elpedo*See E. Schwyzer, Griechische Grammatik, Band ii, dritte unveranderte
Auflage, Munchen 1959, pp. 467-8. Since Liddell-Scott-Jones do not list proper
names, they do not list the corresponding adjectives. Both may be found duly
recorded in the final edition of H. Stephanus, Thesaurus graecae linguae, Parisiis
1831-1865.
20
Simpl. phys. 480, 20 (Eudem. fr. 67 Wehrli). The passage has to do with
the theory of the elements. Simplicius' brief quotation from Eudemus leaves the
allusion to ``things Empedoclean'' without any clearly defined content.
21
For references, see infra, vii. Jean-Claude Picot kindly pointed out the
two parallels, so+ Pissa*jeiom and so+ < Grio*deiom.
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DENIS O'BRIEN

jkeiom ei\pei& m)? Does Cleombrotus therefore introduce his quotation

by expressing disagreement with Empedocles?
We may well think that such a meaning would sit oddly in the
context of Plutarch's essay. Why, at this point in his speech, should
Cleombrotus trouble to quote Empedocles' verses for the simple purpose of contradicting them?

iv. discordant voices

Cleombrotus `versus' Empedocles
The interpretation of Cleombrotus' opening words as an expression of disagreement, odd though it may seem, is not in itself impossible. Cleombrotus will follow his quotation of the two verses with the
words: e\a*rase* le soi& | pqx*soi| so+ pqorg&jom e\pihei& mai se*ko|. ``Allow
me to provide an ending that will match my opening remarks''. Despite the seemingly irenic tone, has Cleombrotus construed Empedocles' two verses as a prohibition, a prohibition that Cleombrotus has
chosen to ignore?
Empedocles, so it might be argued, in the verses that have been
quoted, advocates ``not pursuing a single pathway to the end'' (lg+
seke*eim). Cleombrotus does add an ``ending'', his speech will have a
telos. In preparing to add a telos, Cleombrotus therefore warns the
company that he has no wish to give ``the impression'' (cfr. i% ma lg+
do*nx) that he is about ``to say what Empedocles says'', ``to speak as
Empedocles speaks'' (cfr. so+ \Elpedo*jkeiom ei\pei& m). By adding a telos,
Cleombrotus parts company with Empedocles.
If I linger over such a possibility, it is because that does appear to
be the perspective adopted by no less a commentator than W.K.C.
Guthrie 22. Guthrie is persuaded that, in the verses quoted as supposedly elsewhere, Empedocles advocates ``joining summits to summits'',
and that he therefore deliberately chooses, and deliberately advises the
W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, ii, Cambridge 1963,
pp. 136-7.
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recipient of his poem, ``not to pursue a single pathway to the end'' 23.
With Guthrie's reading of the fragment, Cleombrotus' addition of a
telos does therefore have to be taken, in the context of Plutarch's
essay, as an expression of dissent.
Guthrie's interpretation
Guthrie's interpretation is quoted at length and extensively criticised by Picot and Berg in their article 24. But their criticism is
founded on the belief that Guthrie has taken no account of the context
of the quotation in Plutarch 25. Is that likely? It is true that Guthrie
does not refer to the words that precede the fragment in Plutarch's
essay. But does the interpretation he has given of the fragment perhaps stem nonetheless from the meaning he thinks to have found in
Cleombrotus' prefatory remark?
Cleombrotus seemingly prefaces his quotation with the assertion
that he will ``avoid giving the impression of saying what Empedocles
says'' or ``of speaking in the way that Empedocles does'' (so+ \Elpedo*jkeiom ei\pei& m). When he declares, following the quotation, that he
will add a telos to his preliminary remarks, Cleombrotus (so Guthrie
may have thought) is therefore expressing his disagreement with Empedocles. Cleombrotus (so Guthrie may have told himself) has heard
Empedocles' words as a prohibition (``not to pursue a single pathway
to the end''), a prohibition that he has deliberately flouted, by adding
a telos when Empedocles had told him not to.
With the fragment placed in such a setting, the die is cast. Placed
in a context that may seem devious but is not impossible, the two
verses would have been heard, by Plutarch's speaker and therefore,
so one may suppose, by Plutarch himself, as Empedocles' condemnation of the ``single pathway'' and of the telos that the pathway would
lead to. Where Cleombrotus and Plutarch supposedly lead the way,
Fitting the heads of my tale into one another, not to traverse a sole and
single path is Guthrie's tentative translation of the fragment (ibid., p. 136).
24
J.-C. Picot-W. Berg, art. cit., pp. 8-9 and 16-20.
25
This I take to be indicated by their concluding remarks (ibid., p. 20,
looking back to p. 6).
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DENIS O'BRIEN

Guthrie not unnaturally thinks to follow. He looks for parallels that

would appear to support what he takes to be the implication of Cleombrotus' quotation, and therefore waxes lyrical over Empedocles' elaborate interweaving of arguments by going back on his tracks, putting
things in a different way, repeating lines and half-lines in new contexts 26.
These are all features of Empedocles' style that Guthrie has no
difficulty in illustrating from the extant fragments, and which he takes
as confirmation that, in the two verses Cleombrotus has quoted, Empedocles does indeed condemn a ``sole and single path'' in favour of
the repetitions and the toings and froings that Guthrie supposes are
alluded to in the first of the two verses that Cleombrotus has quoted.
Cleombrotus and Plutarch
Such a reading of the fragment and its context I must emphasise
is my own tentative reconstruction of the train of thought that may
have led to the pages that Picot and Berg have taken as the main target
of their criticism. Whether or not my diagnosis is right, whether or not
Guthrie has been led to his interpretation of the fragment by hearing
Cleombrotus' opening words as an expression of dissent, that is undoubtedly the scenario that his reading of the fragment will require.
Guthrie's Empedocles does not add a telos. Cleombrotus does add a
telos. He does what Empedocles, on Guthrie's reading of the fragment,
tells him not to do...
Is that likely? We return to the question (supra, iii): why should
Cleombrotus trouble to quote Empedocles' verses at this moment in
his speech, if his only purpose is to contradict them? The question is
more puzzling even than it may seem. Cleombrotus' expression of
dissent would require a reversal of the favourable attitude that Plutarch habitually adopts in his references to Empedocles. Admittedly,
Cleombrotus does not have to be taken as a mere mouthpiece for
Plutarch's own opinions. Even so, a passing reference to Empedocles,
accompanied by a quotation whose only purpose would be to provide
26

W.K.C. Guthrie, op. cit., p. 136.

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the occasion for a casual expression of dissent, would be decidedly

anomalous in Plutarch's pages, a point that Picot and Berg have
made much of, and rightly so 27.
But how are we to avoid the anomaly? If that is not the meaning,
if Cleombrotus' opening words are to be construed as a favourable
comment on the quotation that follows, expressing agreement with
the words he is about to quote, what explanation can be given of
the seeming expression of dissent: ``Lest I seem to be saying what
Empedocles says...''? How can Cleombrotus present his telos as being
in conformity with the policy advanced in the verses he has quoted, if
he has started by saying exactly the opposite?
v. diels' parenthesis
A change of perspective
If Picot and Berg seem hardly conscious of that difficulty, it is
because they have been led to circumvent Guthrie's reading of the
fragment, and the questions it raises, by construing the three words in
Cleombrotus' introductory remark, so+ \Elpedo*jkeiom ei\pei& m, as a parenthesis: to quote the Empedoclean saying 28.
The infinitive (ei\pei& m), once it has been isolated as part of a
parenthesis, no longer depends on the verb that follows (do*nx). Cleombrotus therefore no longer sets out to avoid ``giving the impression''
that he will ``say what Empedocles says''. The verb introducing the
quotation leads directly into the quotation itself. Cleombrotus will
avoid ``giving the impression'' of ``not completing a single path'',
and will therefore, as he claims in the words following the quotation,
add the telos that, in the two verses preceding, he has been told to
add 29.
Construed in this way, the fragment and Cleombrotus' comment
27
28
29

J.-C. Picot-W. Berg, art. cit., p. 12.

Ibid., p. 11.
I summarise what I take to be the thrust of the Picot-Berg interpretation.

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on the fragment take on a meaning wholly different from the meaning

Guthrie had given them. The verses are no longer, as Guthrie supposes, a description of what Empedocles himself has done or is about
to do. The infinitive and the negation (lg+ seke*eim) express a warning.
Empedocles warns against ``not pursuing a single pathway to the end''.
Cleombrotus heeds the warning. He will not fail to ``pursue a single
pathway to the end''. He will therefore add a telos to his speech. By
adding a telos, he does what Empedocles tells him to do. His remarks,
before and after the quotation, are an expression of agreement.
With this change of perspective, Cleombrotus, and therefore
Plutarch, are in favour of what Empedocles has said. The danger posed
by Guthrie's interpretation has been laid to rest. Plutarch and Empedocles have been reconciled. All is for the best, in the best of all possible
worlds...
An all too easy victory
But the victory has been won too easily. Can the opening three
words, so+ \Elpedo*jkeiom ei\pei& m, be taken as a parenthesis? Despite
basking in the authority of Diels, the syntax Picot and Berg have relied
on, for their own interpretation and for their supposed refutation of
Guthrie, is not a convincing construal of the Greek 30.
Picot and Berg are content to refer to Smyth for an ``absolute''
use of the infinitive 31. But Smyth's examples are all well-known conventional idioms, often repeated and easily recognisable (x<| e>po| ei\pei& m, etc.). Plutarch's hapax is not at all at home in such a company. A
more detailed list of expressions, drawn up by Kuhner-Gerth under
the rubric ``Der formelhafte Infinitiv'', is again made up exclusively of
easily recognisable, conventional idioms 32. Exactly what Plutarch's
supposed so+ \Elpedo*jkeiom ei\pei& m is not.
H. Diels, Poetarum philosophorum fragmenta, Berolini 1901, ad loc. (p. 117).
H.W. Smyth, Greek Grammar, Cambridge Mass. 1956, 2012a (p. 447).
See again J.-C. Picot-W. Berg, art. cit., p. 11.
32
R. Kuhner-B. Gerth, Ausfuhrliche Grammatik der Griechischen Sprache,
Teil 2, Band ii, Hannover-Leipzig 1904, 473b (pp. 17-9). See also 585, 4 (pp.
508-9).
30
31

EMPEDOCLES' ``MOUNTAIN PATH'' (FR. 24)

315

An unsolved puzzle
Guthrie's interpretation may be wrong. But the counter-interpretation put forward by Picot and Berg is no less vulnerable. The infinitive in Cleombrotus' preparatory remark cannot convincingly be
construed as part of a parenthesis. If, as would indeed seem probable,
Cleombrotus' words, preceding the quotation, are to be heard as an
expression of approval, an indication of the speaker's and therefore
Plutarch's agreement with Empedocles, then some other explanation
of the syntax is called for. But what other explanation can there be?
vi. emperius' emendation
A defective transmission
The text of Plutarch's essay has not come down to us in a good
state. Comparison with extracts made by Eusebius and Theodoretus
shows that surviving manuscripts are often unreliable, with many
seemingly trivial errors: jai+ e\kho*msa for jasekho*msa (Eusebius), e\jei* mot| for e\jei& mom (Eusebius and Theodoretus), sot*s{ for sot*sxm (again
Eusebius and Theodoretus) 33. In the text of the fragment (418 c), the
manuscripts' lg*se ke*ceim for the reasonably certain lg+ seke*eim is one
more in a long list of such errors 34.
Is the ei\pei& m of the manuscripts, in the words introducing the
fragment, perhaps also to be laid at the door of a slapdash copyist?
33
My random examples are taken from the apparatus of Sieveking's Teubner
edition, cap. 21, 421 c-d (p. 85, lines 6, 17 and 19).
34
The scribe, so we may well suppose, has added a letter to separate two
identical vowels (seke*eim), failing therefore to recognise a form of the verb that was
no longer familiar to him, and has compounded his error by running together the
negative particle with the first syllable of the verb that follows, very easy to do if
the text he was copying from left no space, or too little space, between the words.
The verse is unlikely to have been misquoted by Plutarch. The error is therefore to
be counted as one more of the many scribal errors that have infected the transmission of Plutarch's essay in the manuscripts that we depend on today. (A different
emendation, seke*reim, and therefore a different explanation, will be found in
C. Gallavotti, Empedocle, poema fisico e lustrale, Milano 1975, p. 182.)

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DENIS O'BRIEN

Replaced by poiei& m, the infinitive is easily understood as dependent on

the verb that follows (do*nx), and acquires a meaning that lends itself
easily enough to the context 35.
A repeated negation
The clue to the meaning will lie in the repeated negation. The
negation in Cleombrotus' opening remark (i% ma lg*...) looks forward to
the same negation in the second of Empedocles' two verses (lg+ seke*eim...). Cleombrotus is out to ``avoid giving the impression'' (i% ma lg+
do*nx) of ``doing what Empedocles says'' (so+ \Elpedo*jkeiom poiei& m),
namely ``not completing a single pathway'' (lg+ seke*eim a\sqapo+m li* am).
The two negations cancel each other out, in so far as, by bringing his
own speech to an appropriate ending, Cleombrotus will do what Empedocles wants him to do, and therefore avoids giving the impression
of doing what Empedocles tells him not to do.
Such is the meaning that is most naturally given to the words that
follow the quotation: e\a*rase* le soi& | pqx*soi| so+ pqorg&jom e\pihei& mai
se*ko|. ``Allow me to provide an ending that will match my opening
remarks''. Cleombrotus adds a telos because Empedocles has asked for
one. With poiei& m for ei\pei& m and the double negation, the words preceding the quotation may be understood, easily enough, as carrying the
same implication. Empedocles, in the words that will be quoted, warns
against ``not completing a single pathway'' (lg+ seke*eim...). Cleombrotus' introductory remark, duly emended and translated ad sensum, will
be: ``But lest I should seem to be doing what Empedocles tells us not to
do...''
``Not to do...''
Adding, as I have done, an explicit negation to the translation of
+
so \Elpedo*jkeiom (``what Empedocles tells us not to do'') may seem
The emendation (poiei& m, Emperius 1847) is adopted by Sieveking in his
Teubner edition of Plutarch's essay (1929). Diels condemns the emendation out of
hand as ``false'' (Poetarum philosophorum fragmenta, cit., ad loc.). But he is able to
do so, only because he clings to the reading of the manuscripts as an incise.
35

EMPEDOCLES' ``MOUNTAIN PATH'' (FR. 24)

317

impossibly bold. Let me therefore at once emphasise that the addition

is designed merely to bring out the point, for a reader dependent on
translation, that Cleombrotus is not saying that he will avoid doing
what Empedocles says he should do. The meaning, in the context, is
exactly the opposite. He is out to avoid giving the impression of doing
what Empedocles says he should not do.
Empedocles, in the words that will be quoted, warns against ``not
completing a single pathway'' (lg+ seke*eim...). Cleombrotus heeds the
warning. He will not ``give the impression'' (cfr. i% ma lg+ do*nx...) of
doing what Empedocles tells him not to do. He will therefore ``add an
ending'' to match ``the words that he first uttered'', so ``completing a
single pathway'', as he is advised to do by Empedocles, in the verses
quoted.
Once that point has been grasped, the negation in the translation
of Cleombrotus' preface to his quotation (so+ \Elpedo*jkeiom, ``what
Empedocles tells us not to do'') may be dispensed with. Cleombrotus'
introductory words can be given a simpler and more conventional
translation, provided they are heard as looking forward to the negation
in the two verses that follow. Cleombrotus will avoid ``appearing to do
what Empedocles speaks of'' (cfr. i% ma lg+ so+ \Elpedo*jkeiom poiei& m
do*nx...), in so far as he will avoid leaving his speech without a telos.
The expression so+ \Elpedo*jkeiom (``what Empedocles speaks of'')
has to be heard as anticipating the whole of the quotation that follows,
including the negation. Cleombrotus will avoid ``giving the impression'' of doing ``what Empedocles speaks of'' when, in the two verses
quoted from his poem, Empedocles speaks, disapprovingly, of leaving
a path, or a speech, without an ending. Cleombrotus will provide an
ending. He is therefore able to reassure the company that he would not
want to ``give the impression'' of doing ``what Empedocles speaks of'',
and therefore leaving his speech without the ending that Empedocles,
in the verses quoted, has insisted on.
We arrive at the happy conclusion whereby Cleombrotus, and
therefore Plutarch, are in agreement with Empedocles, but we do so
without being encumbered by a ``parenthesis'' that has little chance of
being a correct construal of the Greek.

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DENIS O'BRIEN

vii. empedocles' ``precept''

Is the emendation needed?
The possibility of corruption, and the consequent need for emendation (Emperius' poiei& m), is not to be pushed aside lightly, as merely
one more example of the excessive enthusiasm for emendation often to
be found in scholars of the older school. The correction, as corrections
go, is a fairly slight one, requiring, as it does, restoration of a word
containing the same number of letters as the word in the manuscripts,
and with only one exception the same letters, though in a different
order (poiei& m in the place of ei\pei& m). The editor of Plutarch's essay in
the Teubner collection found the word convincing enough to be given
a place in his text (1929), and it has been retained by the editors of
both the Loeb and the Bude editions 36.
Even so, the reader of the preceding pages may well ask himself:
is it necessary? Certainly, if emendation were the only alternative to
Diels' parenthesis, then Emperius' emendation would win the day. But
once we have disentangled the sequence of thought, required even if
the text is emended, then we may well pause to ask whether, in order
to maintain the implied negation, the heavy artillery of emendation is
needed.
The text makes good enough sense without an emendation. If
Cleombrotus is out to express agreement with Empedocles, as in the
context he would certainly seem to be doing, then he can hardly be
supposed to have said that he will avoid ``appearing to say what Empedocles says'' or ``appearing to speak as Empedocles speaks''. But
with the indeterminate expression so+ \Elpedo*jkeiom, he may well be
taken to mean that he will avoid ``appearing to speak in the way that
Empedocles speaks of'' (cfr. i% ma lg+ so+ \Elpedo*jkeiom ei\pei& m do*nx...),
with the implication that he will avoid ``appearing to speak'' in the way
that Empedocles, in the verses to be quoted, has condemned.
36
The Teubner edition: Sieveking 1929. The later publication (1972) is an
unchanged reprint. The Loeb edition: Babbitt 1936. The Bude edition: Flaceliere
1974.

EMPEDOCLES' ``MOUNTAIN PATH'' (FR. 24)

319

A memorable metaphor
``Doing'' or ``speaking''? The choice is a narrow one. If, as seems
more than likely, Plutarch's quotation is to be counted as expressing
his agreement with Empedocles, then the two verses have to be taken
as a warning not to leave a speech ``without an ending'' (lg+ seke*eim).
Cleombrotus will therefore add an ``ending'' (se*ko|), and in so doing
he will avoid ``appearing'' to repeat the error that Empedocles has so
memorably spoken of in his metaphor of the summits and a pathway.
If we adopt Emperius' emendation, he will avoid giving the impression
of ``doing'' what Empedocles tells him not to do (poiei& m). If we keep to
the reading of the manuscripts, he will avoid giving the impression of
``speaking'' in the way that Empedocles has told him not to speak
(ei\pei& m). In neither case will he speak in a way that would contradict
Empedocles.
Emperius' poiei& m gives the right meaning. But the same meaning
can, almost as easily, be drawn out of the manuscripts' ei\pei& m, provided the expression so+ \Elpedo*jkeiom is firmly anchored in its context, and therefore taken to mean, not ``what Empedocles says'', and
not ``the way that Empedocles speaks'', but as referring to the content
of the verses that will be quoted, Empedocles' insistence that a speech
should not be left without a telos.
Once the text has been understood in this way, once the sequence
of thought has been brought to the fore, Plutarch's so+ \Elpedo*jkeiom,
an expression very likely coined for the occasion, comes into its own as
Empedocles' ``precept''. The precept is expressed as a negation. A
``path'', and a speech, must not be left ``without an ending'' (cfr. lg+
seke*eim). Cleombrotus will not give the impression of infringing the
precept. His path will be taken to its ending. His speech will be
brought to a conclusion.
The neuter adjective (so+ \Elpedo*jkeiom)
The meaning of ``precept'' for so+ \Elpedo*jkeiom is fully in line
with the occurrences already noted (supra, iii) of the equivalent expression attached to other great ``names''. Simonides' so+ Pissa*jeiom,
quoted by Plato (Prot. 339 e 3), is a saying attributed to a grand figure

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DENIS O'BRIEN

of the past (``it is hard to be good''), introduced semi-ironically so that

the author of the poem can go one better (``not difficult, impossible'').
The expression so+ < Grio*deiom, possibly from Plutarch (de lib. educ. 13,
9 e, a treatise of doubtful authenticity), introduces a piece of conventional wisdom, followed by equally sententious maxims from Democritus and Euripides. Other uses of the same expression (so+ < Grio*deiom), too numerous to be listed here (easily recoverable from the
computerised Thesaurus linguae graecae), again introduce some venerable Hesiodic verse or maxim 37.
Perhaps more to the point, the expression so+ \Amanaco*qeiom is
twice used in texts that are undoubtedly by Plutarch, once to introduce the famous opening words of Anaxagoras' treatise ``all things
were together'' (quaest. conv. v 2, 679 a), and once to introduce an
indirect allusion to his no less famed discovery of the explanation of an
eclipse (de facie 16, 929 b).
Such a range of meaning easily fits the present text. Though frequently introducing, as here, a quotation, the neuter adjective, substantivised by the addition of an article, is essentially a reference to what has
been said, to the content as much as to the form, to a memorable
utterance, to what no-one else has said quite so well, or in quite the
same way, or for quite the same reason. The metaphor of ``summits''
and a ``pathway'' has given an Empedoclean imprint to a precept that
would have been less striking and less quotable in any other guise.
viii. a questionable antithesis
Cleombrotus on the ``joining of summits''
Whether we adopt Emperius' emendation, as Sieveking has done,
or keep to the reading of the manuscripts, the result for our present
In searching the TLG, it is noteworthy that there appears to be no occurrence of the neuter expression in oblique cases where there would be a risk of
confusion with the masculine (``a follower of x'', ``a disciple of x''). Presumably
an indication that the use of the neuter was not so well-established that it could
hope to compete on equal terms with its solidly entrenched masculine confrere.
37

EMPEDOCLES' ``MOUNTAIN PATH'' (FR. 24)

321

enquiry is therefore, in all essentials, the same. In the comment that

follows his quotation, Cleombrotus makes it abundantly clear that he
will not do what Empedocles tells him not to do: his se*ko| is an
obedient answer to Empedocles' warning against lg+ seke*eim. Whichever word Cleombrotus used in his introduction to the fragment (ei\pei& m, poiei& m...), the sentiment expressed will presumably have been to
the same effect: he does not want to give the impression of failing to
follow Empedocles' guidelines, Empedocles' ``precept''.
So understood, Cleombrotus' two comments, preceding and following his quotation, enable us to return to the question that it is the
purpose of this article to address, but now with much better hope of
finding an answer, since the question is now more tightly circumscribed. In protesting that he will follow Empedocles' precept, in so
far as he will not leave his speech without an ending, does Cleombrotus show himself favourable or not to a ``joining'' of ``summits''?
But first a warning. In looking for an answer to that question, we
have to avoid being guided by an arbitrary symmetry, by an antithesis
that may seem to dictate the answer, independently of what may or
may not be found in the text of Plutarch.
An over-simple opposition?
The interpretation of a text a commentator supposes to be false
all too often determines the interpretation that the same commentator
seeks to put in its place. Guthrie (supra, iv) supposes that Empedocles advocates joining summits to summits and that he therefore excludes completion of a single pathway. Picot and Berg give the fragment exactly the opposite meaning. Empedocles favours a ``single
pathway'' and therefore excludes the ``summits''.
Picot and Berg rightly look askance at Guthrie's apparent assumption that, in following a single pathway, Cleombrotus, and therefore Plutarch, is in disagreement with Empedocles. But the interpretation of the fragment they are therefore led to adopt is the exact converse of the interpretation they reject. The opposition Guthrie has
established between ``summits'' and a ``single pathway'', is repeated,
but with the value of the two terms reversed. Joining the summits

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DENIS O'BRIEN

excludes a single pathway (Guthrie). Completing a single pathway

makes it impossible to visit the summits (Picot and Berg).
In pursuing our enquiry, we need to be wary of that Manichaean
choice, of that over-simple opposition. The two interpretations cannot
both be right. But it does not follow that only one of them is wrong. In
setting aside Guthrie's interpretation, we are under no obligation to
adopt its mirror image. The question we have to ask has not yet been
answered. Cleombrotus will add a telos to his speech, adopting therefore the Empedoclean ``precept'' that the ``path'' of his speech must
not be left without an ending. But does he therefore abandon the
``summits''? The answer to that question is not a foregone conclusion.
It is not a question that can be left to the mercy of an arbitrary
antithesis.
In ``completing a single pathway'', is Cleombrotus' aim, as Picot
and Berg presumably think it should be, to do so by avoiding the
``summits''? Does Cleombrotus think that, in order to add an ``ending'', as Empedocles has told him to, he has to forego the ``summits''?
The answer to that question cannot be dictated by any antecedent
assumption on the relation of ``summits'' and a ``pathway''.
ix. plutarch's world
Cleombrotus' dazzling discourse
To look for an answer to the question, we need to extend the
context of Plutarch's quotation. For no less than four folio pages (de
def. orac. 10-15, 414 e -418 d), with only minimal interruptions from
Demetrius (11, 415 d-f) and Philip (15, 418 a), Cleombrotus has regaled the company with a dazzling account of daimones and their
doings. His long speech includes a detailed calculation of the lifespan allotted to beings that are divine but not immortal, exotic descriptions of the extraordinary rites used to commemorate individual
daimones and, when necessary, to appease them, strange and fabulous
legends that tell of the part they play in the governance of the universe
and the lives of men.
Cleombrotus' dazzling display of erudition, culled from his long

EMPEDOCLES' ``MOUNTAIN PATH'' (FR. 24)

323

journeyings in Egypt and the East (cfr. 2, 410 a), has been prompted
by the question introduced early on in the essay (5, 411 e) and dominating the pages immediately preceding his intervention (6-9, 412 f414 e): why, throughout Greece, are the oracles falling silent? Having
led the company on from one topic to the next with ever more amazingly detailed stories illustrating the power, the influence and the
origin of daimones, Cleombrotus quotes Empedocles' two verses
(418 c), indicating by the repeated reference to a telos (seke*eim in
the fragment, se*ko| in his comment) that the speech is drawing to a
close, and letting it be known, by his reference to an ``appropriate
telos'' (so+ pqorg&jom se*ko|), that the conclusion to the speech will
give an answer to the question. The two verses are therefore followed
by a single long and solemn sentence (16, 418 c-d, eight lines of text):
the oracles have fallen silent because the daimones have abandoned
them, and silent they will remain until the daimones return 38.
A modern misconception
Cleombrotus' conclusion does not meet with universal agreement
(16, 418 d-e), but none of the assembled company, and least of all
Cleombrotus himself, gives the slightest sign of thinking that the disquisition on daimones has gone on for too long. The participants in the
debate are all serious-minded intellectuals. On their arrival at the
clubhouse where the major part of the debate is to take place, it has
already been made clear that they are not prepared to while away the
hours as others do, ogling young athletes (cfr. 6, 412 d) or discussing
whether ba*kkx in the future (bakx&) has lost the first or second lambda
(6, 412 e). Oracles and daimones are not classed with such frivolities.
Calculating the life span of a daimon as nine thousand seven hundred
and twenty years is a matter of engrossing interest (10-12, 415 a38
The ``solemnity'' is marked by the almost Churchillian ring of the opening
words: Let it dare be said by us as it has been said by many before us... (418 c:
sesoklg&rhx lesa+ pokkot+| ei\qg&rhai jai+ g<li& m). Cleombrotus is later invited to return
to the fray (20-21, 420 e-f), but with the clear implication that the passage following
his quotation from Empedocles (418 c) had been designed to draw his initial contribution to a close.

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DENIS O'BRIEN

416 c). There is no suggestion that, in providing unexpected information on this and other no less important topics, Cleombrotus' contribution to the debate could or should have been made any shorter than
it was.
The modern reader has therefore to avoid any preconception
that, for the select company gathered in the clubhouse at Delphi, on
a summer's afternoon in the late first century, the best pathway is the
quickest and the shortest 39. Leisured and learned, and curious, Lamprias and his friends do not for one moment expect Cleombrotus to
apologise for his glittering display of exotic and abstruse information.
It would never have occurred to them that there had to be a choice,
that if they wanted a quick ``ending'' they would have to forego the
``summits''. They would never for one moment have wanted to pass by
the ``summits'' in their haste to reach the telos. They do indeed want
an answer to their question. They do indeed look for a conclusion. But
not at the cost of foregoing the thrilling episodes that will have made
the journey to the telos worthwhile.
The purpose of Plutarch's quotation
Plutarch's world is not Empedocles' world. But the background
to his essay is essential for an understanding of the fragment. Cleombrotus would never have quoted Empedocles' two verses in the way he
does if there had been a canker in the rose, if the two verses, in their
original context in Empedocles' poem, had carried a meaning and an
implication that, in the context of the quotation in Plutarch's essay,
would have made a mockery of Cleombrotus' own behaviour and of his
friends' admiration and interest. There is no hint of a suggestion that
The dramatic date of the meeting is usually given as 83-84 A.D. from a
reference (2, 410 a) to the role of Callistratus in the organisation of the Pythian
Games. See P.-W., RE xxi 1, s.v. Plutarchos, i 8 (col. 676, 43-677, 19), and ii 3
(col. 712, 28-50). The scene is the sacred precinct of the oracle at Delphi. ``A
summer's afternoon'' is my inference from the description of the arrival at the
Cnidian clubhouse (6, 412 d). ``Ogling young athletes'', from the same passage (see
above), is my perhaps exaggerated attempt at realism. A more innocent construction could be put on the words in the text (412 d: hexle*mxm sot+| a\hkgsa*|).
39

EMPEDOCLES' ``MOUNTAIN PATH'' (FR. 24)

325

Cleombrotus could have got to the point earlier if only he had not been
so long-winded.
Cleombrotus' calling on the fragment, in the conclusion to his
speech, therefore clearly favours the meaning outlined earlier. Cleombrotus' se*ko| is a straightforward allusion to Empedocles' seke*eim. The
high-spots in his preceding speech invite comparison with Empedocles'
``summits''. The Empedoclean quotation is designed to show that
Cleombrotus' contribution to the debate has to be completed. There
is no implication that, in order to be completed, it had to be, or should
have been, curtailed, and that the high-spots should therefore have
been omitted.
So understood, the image Cleombrotus appeals to, in quoting
Empedocles' verses, is not of someone having to forego the ``summits''
by sticking to ``a single path'', skirting the higher ground therefore,
with mountain peaks seen only ``in the background'' 40. The metaphor,
in the context of Plutarch's essay, has exactly the opposite purpose.
Visiting the ``summits'' must not keep us from ``following to its end a
path that is one''. But there is no indication that we have therefore to
choose between the two. There is no suggestion that the path should
have been shorter, or quicker, and that, in order to make it so, the
``summits'' should have been avoided.
Plutarch and Empedocles
The original context of the two verses can hardly have been any
different. We need to remember that, reading Cleombrotus' quotation
in the pages of Plutarch, we are only one step from Empedocles' own
poem 41. The not infrequent references to Empedocles in the De defectu
I do no more than repeat the image adopted by Picot and Berg in stating
their preferred interpretation. See Along a Mountain Path, cit., p. 12. The two
authors would appear to assume that paths through mountainous countryside are
invariably designed to avoid climbing summits, and are never to be found ``joining
summits to summits''. An assumption that is not borne out by Plutarch's use of the
metaphor. See the continuation of my main text above.
41
In the so-called Catalogue of Lamprias (n. 43), Plutarch is credited with a
multi-volume work entitled ei\| \Elpedojke*a.
40

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DENIS O'BRIEN

oraculorum and elsewhere in the Moralia show that he was still a

familiar enough figure to the people Plutarch was writing for. Cleombrotus' learned friends may be expected to have known the context of
Empedocles' verses; there would have been knowing smiles at the
reference to so+ \Elpedo*jkeiom. Knowing smiles that would have
quickly faded if the two verses had been given the meaning that Picot
and Berg have suggested for them. In ``pursuing a single pathway to
the end'', the orator is not asking his audience to ignore all the wonderful things he has said up to that point. Had that been the implication of the ``path'' that is ``one'' in its original context, Cleombrotus'
quotation of the two verses in the finale to his speech would have been
greeted with incomprehension and incredulity.
x. the framework of the quotation
An unhappy jingle?
There remains a difficulty in the body of the fragment. Does
*
lthxm in the second verse depend on the ``summits'' (joqtua*|) of
the verse preceding or on the ``single path'' later in the same verse
(a\sqapo+m li* am)? Picot and Berg opt for an enjambement: the ``summits'' are ``speech-summits''. To my ear, this produces an unhappy
jingle, once the verses are read aloud: pqora*psxm lt*hxm. I prefer
therefore to construe the words that have been recorded from the
earlier verse as making up a complete unit of meaning, and to hear
the plural lt*hxm as dependent on the singular a\sqapo+m li* am.
In joining lt*hxm to the noun that follows (a\sqapo*m), and not to
the noun that precedes (joqtua*|), I do no more than state a preference. I cannot myself read the two verses in any other way. In places
where there is an undoubted enjambement, with the same repeated
vowel as in our pair of verses (-xm/-xm), the two words are related as
noun and adjective, and the assonance arises from the repeated caseending (fr. 8, 1-2: a<pa*msxm/hmgsx&m, fr. 112, 10-11: e\pi+ mot*rxm/pamsoi* xm).
Even so, although not, to my ear, an example of enjambement, the
place of lt*hxm as the first word of the second verse does not break the

EMPEDOCLES' ``MOUNTAIN PATH'' (FR. 24)

327

continuity of thought and meaning essential to the metaphor. The

``words'' that make up the ``one path'' (lt*hxm, a ``defining'' genitive)
do not have to exclude the ``summits'' that the traveller is pictured as
``joining together'' in the verse preceding. The ``single path'' is a path
of discourse, the path of the ``words'' (lt*hxm) that complete the tale
that Empedocles has to tell in my hypothetical reconstruction, the
history of the cycle a ``path'' and a journey that has to be brought to
an end, whatever ``summits'' may have been taken in on the way.
Text and translation
Plutarch's sentence may therefore be read and translated as follows (de def. orac. 15, 418 c):
a\kk\ i% ma lg+ so+ \Elpedo*jkeiom ei\pei& m do*nx,
joqtua+| e<se*qa| e<se*qzri pqora*psxm,
lt*hxm lg+ seke*eim a\sqapo+m li* am,
e\a*rase* le soi& | pqx*soi| so+ pqorg&jom e\pihei& mai se*ko|.
But lest I should seem to be speaking in the way that Empedocles
speaks of,
`joining summits one to another,
without pursuing one path of words to the end',
allow me to provide the remarks that I started from with an appropriate ending 42.

42
The plural e<se*qa| e<se*qzri is translated by a singular (``one to another'')
only because this is the English idiom. The use of a singular does not imply any
restriction on the number of summits joined ``one to another''. Translating so+
\Elpedo*jkeiom by an adverbial expression (``in the way that Empedocles speaks
of'') is again a concession to the English idiom. ``Doing what is described by
Empedocles'', the translation of Emperius' emendation (poiei& m) by the author of
the Loeb edition (F.C. Babbitt, Plutarch's Moralia, v, Cambridge Mass.-London
1936), keeps closer to the Greek by giving the verb a direct object. It is difficult to
match the Greek idiom when translating the reading of the manuscripts (ei\pei& m),
simply because ``say'' or ``speak'', the usual translations of ei\pei& m, do not allow the
same freedom as the Greek verb in the choice of a ``cognate'' accusative. See L.-S.-J.,
s.v. i 1 (p. 489).

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Plutarch's abbreviated quotation leaves the participle of the first

verse (pqora*psxm) and the infinitive of the second (seke*eim) without
their syntactical anchorage in the text of the poem. In the context in
which they have been quoted by Plutarch, the two words have therefore to be heard as syntactically dependent on the verb that introduces
the quotation (do*nx), and which therefore governs both the infinitive
that precedes (ei\pei& m) and the infinitive that follows (seke*eim), with the
second infinitive so to speak spelling out the meaning of the first,
literally: ``Lest I appear to be speaking (ei\pei& m) in the way that Empedocles speaks of'', and therefore appear ``not to be completing (lg+
seke*eim) a path that is one''.
An extended quotation?
Such a construction might seem to leave the door open to the
possibility that the two words lg+ do*nx are to be taken as part of the
quotation 43. The three long vowels (the second vowel lengthened, as
schoolboys were once taught to say, ``by position'') would happily
complete the metre of the first verse of the fragment. But extending
the quotation in this way is not as straightforward as it is sometimes
made out to be. If the negative particle and the verb (lg* followed by
do*nx) began the quotation, the words intervening between the negation and the verb (so+ \Elpedo*jkeiom ei\pei& m) would have to be heard
parenthetically. Too high a price to pay for those who prefer to restrict
an ``absolute'' infinitive to its more conventional uses 44.
Even with no parenthesis, it is of course still possible that the two
words (lg+ do*nx) have been taken from the text of the poem, and have
been pressed into service as a way of introducing the quotation. But
This is the thesis espoused by B.A. van Groningen, La composition litteraire archaque grecque, procedes et realisations (``Verhandelingen der Koninklijke
Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen'', Afdeling Letterkunde, n.r. lxv 2),
Amsterdam 1958, in his chapter on Empedocles (pp. 201-22). See esp. pp. 211-3
and 221-2.
44
Van Groningen, ibid., p. 211, perpetuates Diels' punctuation of so+ \Elpedo*jkeiom ei\pei& m as a parenthesis. See supra, v for the syntactical difficulty, not
noted by van Groningen.
43

EMPEDOCLES' ``MOUNTAIN PATH'' (FR. 24)

329

that can be no more than a surmise. As we have them, the verb and its
negation are part of the syntax of the sentence that provides a framework for Empedocles' words, the sentence that begins with a final
clause (or a clause of ``purpose''): ``Lest I appear...'' (i% ma lg* followed
by do*nx), and that will be completed by a main verb only after the
quotation: ``allow me...'' (e\a*rase* le).
The quotation in context
That simple framework is all that is needed to give syntactical
support to the words that are quoted. The two part verses are inserted
as an extension of the final clause. Cleombrotus will add an ``appropriate ending'' in order not to appear to be neglecting Empedocles'
``precept'' by leaving his speech without an ending. The carefree erudition is typical of Plutarch's world. Cleombrotus smooths the way to
his peroration with a graceful literary allusion. In letting it be known,
by his choice of quotation, that his speech is drawing to a close, he has
no intention of apologising for, still less of repudiating, all that has
gone before.
On the contrary, the thesis that will be summarised in the closing
lines of the oration, the thesis therefore that will bring the speech to
an ``appropriate ending'', will do so by showing how all the many
fascinating facts relating to daimones, as recounted in the main body
of the speech, point to the role of daimones in the management of
oracles, and therefore to the presence or absence of daimones as explaining both the decline of oracles and their possible resurgence.
xi. cleombrotus' ``theology''
Gods and `daimones'
Simple though it may seem, the thesis summarised in the concluding sentences of the speech is the expression of a deeply held
conviction. Cleombrotus, so we have been told in the opening pages
of Plutarch's essay (2, 410 a-b), has dedicated his life and fortune to
preparation of a work of philosophy that would have as its crown and

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DENIS O'BRIEN

purpose a ``theology''. His main preoccupation, as it appears in the

pages of Plutarch, and especially in the opening sentences of his contribution to the debate (10, 414 f-415 b), is to distinguish between
gods and daimones, and to free the former from the vicissitudes of a
``providential'' intervention in human affairs that it would be beneath
their dignity to engage in.
This is the issue that, after his initial reticence (5, 411 e-f),
prompted Cleombrotus to engage in the discussion in the first place
(9, 414 c-d), and that is to be heard as the sub-text of the conclusion to
his speech (15, 418 c-d). It is daimones, and not gods, who have charge
of oracles, and it is because such beings fall short of the divinity
attaching to the higher gods that they may be supposed to fluctuate
in the fulfilment of their role, either by absenting themselves from the
oracular shrines, as they have done of recent years, or by returning, as
perhaps one day they will, in order to restore the oracles to their
former glory.
An ideological commitment
Cleombrotus' ``theological'' preoccupation provides the perspective needed for grasping the unity of his speech. The long discourse is
not the equivalent of a cabinet de curiosites, a miscellaneous collection
of facts and figures, strung together for no more than their anecdotal
interest. The detailed description of daimones and their doings, recounted in the body of the speech (10-15, 414 e-418 c), has to be
heard as all part of Cleombrotus' ``theological'' programme, his ideological commitment.
The description of god's power and ``majesty'' (relmo*sg|) as incompatible with the workings of oracles had initially been put forward
with great forcefulness by Lamprias (9, 414 e), in reply to an objection
by Cleombrotus that his preceding remarks had made it sound as
though the gods themselves were directly responsible for the governance of oracles. Cleombrotus expresses his approval of the reply
(o\qhx&| ke*cei|) in the opening words of his speech (10, 414 e), and
seizes the opportunity to expatiate on the need to distinguish between
gods and daimones if we are to arrive at a proper appraisal of the works
of ``providence'' (10, 414 f-415 b).

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331

It is that distinction, so it will be explained in the course of the

speech (13, 417 a-b), that enables us to ascribe the governance of
oracles, not directly to the gods (plural or singular), but to daimones
who are ``servants'' and ``ministers'' of the gods, a status peculiarly
suited to their intervention, or lack of intervention, in such ``local''
affairs as the management of oracles 45.
An embedded quotation
The train of thought that leads from Cleombrotus' opening remarks (10, 414 f-415 b) through the main body of the speech (10-15,
415 b-418 c) to his peroration (15, 418 c-d) gives point to the two
verses from Empedocles, embedded as they are in a sentence that is
clearly designed to mark the unity of the speech, and its continuity.
The long account of daimones and their doings that intervenes between
the ``opening remarks'' and the ``appropriate ending'' explains how
and why the silence of oracles can plausibly be construed as a direct
result of the difference between gods and daimones that is a central
tenet of Cleombrotus' ``theology''. The verses Cleombrotus has chosen
to quote at this point (15, 418 c-d) have to be heard with a meaning
that is appropriate to that context. They have to bear out the claim
that the long speech that has preceded, far from being a rambling
digression, is an essential part of the whole. The speech has a purpose

That this is the main thrust of Cleombrotus' thesis has been rightly
grasped by the bright young Heracleon, in his comment immediately following
the speech (16, 418 e), and there is the same reaction, much later in the discussion
(46, 435 a), by Ammonius, the ``philosopher'' of the group (cfr. 4, 410 f). In both
places, Cleombrotus' speech is recognised as the exposition of a coherent thesis,
relating the decline of oracles, and their possible revival, to the ``providential'' role
of daimones at a level appropriate to beings that are divine, but not immortal. I am
not sure that the same point has been as clearly seen by Bernadette Puech, author of
the relevant entry in R. Goulet (ed.), Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, ii, Paris
1994, pp. 432-3 (n. 160: Cleombrotos de Sparte). Puech attempts to evaluate the
``seriousness'' of Cleombrotus' contribution to the debate, but without ever stating
clearly the thesis that, in the pages of Plutarch (our only source for his opinions),
Cleombrotus sets out to defend.
45

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DENIS O'BRIEN

and a unity. Talk of ``summits'' and a ``pathway'' has to endorse that

unity.
The verses Cleombrotus has picked on to illustrate the sentence
that marks the continuity between his opening remarks and the conclusion of his speech, integrated as they are into the very syntax of the
sentence that announces his conclusion (15, 418 c), cannot have had a
meaning whose ultimate purpose would have been to destroy the unity
of his speech. For the verses to have served the purpose for which they
have been quoted, the ``ending'' cannot have been heard as a repudiation of the ``summits'' that have preceded.
In the verses as quoted, there can have been no implication that
``joining summits to summits'' is a process that, once started, can never
be brought to an end 46. There can have been no implication that, for
the journey to have an end, the ``summits'' would have to have been
avoided. Any such implication would have been a rude anti-climax, a
perplexing disavowal of the whole of the speech up to that point, of
the whole of the carefully thought out ``theology'' that gives the speech
its unity and its coherence.
xii. envoi
A personal ending. The stimulus for writing this article is entirely
due to Jean-Claude Picot. My attempts to meet or to parry his many
penetrating and detailed objections more than doubled the length of a
first draft, and greatly improved both the content and the argument of
the several versions that followed. I am deeply indebted to his openminded generosity, the like of which is not always to be found in the
groves of academe.
I am also most grateful to Suzanne Stern-Gillet for critical comment on the methodological implications of an earlier version of the
article, comments that led to a radical re-casting of my argument and
46
See again (cfr. supra, ii) J.-C. Picot-W. Berg, art. cit., p. 13: The process of attaching summits has no end. See also: Attaching summits to summits
appears to be a mechanical process, endless, boring, without variation (p. 17).

EMPEDOCLES' ``MOUNTAIN PATH'' (FR. 24)

333

conclusions. I would emphasise, here as earlier (supra, i), that the

limited evidence available for the study of this fragment does not allow
for even the moderate degree of certainty that can be hoped for in the
interpretation of fragments where a more generous supply of secondary material enables Empedocles' ipsissima verba to be related to his
elaborate cosmological and zoogonical theories.
With no more than two part verses to work on, verses that do not
make up a complete sentence, and with the context in Plutarch our
best if not our only guide to the meaning Empedocles has given to
words that are avowedly metaphorical, it is hardly surprising that
argument and counter-argument are, more even than they usually
are, an expression of conflicting intuitions. In making out a case for
one interpretation of the fragment in the light of my own intuition, I
do not claim that any other is demonstrably false. Despite the forcefulness of my concluding remarks ( xi), the arguments I have brought
to bear in support of my personal conviction have no pretension to
being the last word on the subject.
CNRS Centre Jean Pepin, Paris
plotinus@wanadoo.fr