Professional Documents
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GENERAL PRINCIPLES
BERNABE vs. ALEJO
A VESTED RIGHT is defined as one which is absolute,
complete and unconditional, to the exercise of which no
obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in
itself and not dependent upon a contingency.
Respondent however contends that the filing of an action
for recognition is procedural in nature and that as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to [or] arise from
procedural laws.
SUBSTANTIVE LAW creates SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
and the two terms in this respect may be said to be
synonymous. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS is a term which
includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal
system prior to the disturbance of normal relations.
SUBSTANTIVE LAW is that part of the law which
creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates
the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action;
that part of the law which courts are established to
administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law,
which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or
obtains redress for their invasion.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the
Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the
lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any
substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a
vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a
right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a
substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely
with procedure.
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GO vs. UCPB
The action for cancellation of real estate mortgage filed
by petitioner was primarily an action to compel the bank
to return to him the properties which the bank had
already initiated foreclosure proceedings.
CIVIL PROCEDURE:
The amount of judgment obtained by the defendantappellee on appeal cannot exceed the jurisdiction of the
court in which the action began. Since the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant's counterclaim
in excess of the jurisdictional amount, the appellate
court, likewise, acquired no jurisdiction over the same by
its decisions or otherwise. Appellate jurisdiction being
not only a continuation of the exercise of the same
judicial power which has been executed in the court of
original jurisdiction, also presupposes that the original
and appellate courts are capable of participating in the
exercise of the same judicial power.
When court transcends the limits prescribed for it by law
and assumes to act where it has no jurisdiction, its
adjudications will be utterly void and of no effect either
as an estoppel or otherwise.
FLORES vs. MALLARE-PHILLIPS
In cases where a plaintiff sues a defendant on two or
more separate causes of action, the amount of the
demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the
causes of action irrespective of whether the causes of
action arose out of the same or different transactions. If
the total demand exceeds P20,000, then the RTC has
jurisdiction. If the causes of action are separate and
independent, their joinder in one complaint is
permissive and not mandatory, and any cause of action
where the amount of the demand is P20,000 or less may
be the subject of a separate complaint filed with a MTC.
Where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of
action against a defendant join in a single complaint, the
TOTALITY RULE is applicable, as well as to cases
where a plaintiff has separate causes of action against
two or more defendants joined in a single complaint.
However, the causes of action in favor of the two or
more plaintiffs or against the two or more defendants
should arise out of the same transaction or series of
transactions and there should be a common question of
law or fact, as provided in 6 of Rule 3 [Compliance with
Rules of Joinder].
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as
plaintiffs or as defendants, under 6 of Rule 3, the total
of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test.
Needless to state also, if instead of joining or being
joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or
against the parties, the amount demanded in each
complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
PANTRANCO vs. BUNCAN
Permissive joinder of parties requires that: (a) the right to
relief arises out of the same transaction or series of
transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact
common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and (c) such
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Not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suits is
determined by the character of the objects for which the
entity was organized. Suits against State agencies with
relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in
private or non-governmental capacity, and various suits
against certain corporations created by the state for
public purposes, but to engage in matters partaking
more of the nature of ordinary business rather than
functions of a governmental or political character, are not
regarded as suits against the state.
ATO, as an agency of the Government not performing a
purely governmental or sovereign function, but was
instead involved in the management and maintenance of
the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive
prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence,
the ATO had no claim to the State's immunity from suit.
AMERICAN EXPRESS vs. SANTIAGO
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the right to due process for the heirs who, though not
duly notified of the proceedings, would be substantially
affected by the decision rendered therein. Thus, it is only
when there is a denial of due process, as when the
deceased is not represented by any legal representative
or heir, that the court nullifies the trial proceedings and
the resulting judgment therein.
Failure of the counsel to comply with his duty to inform
the court of the death of his client, such that no
substitution is effected, will not invalidate the
proceedings and the judgment rendered thereon if the
action survives the death of such party.
Criteria for determining whether an action survives the
death of a plaintiff: The question as to whether an action
survives or not depends on the nature of the action and
the damage sued for. If the causes of action which
survive the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and
principally property and property rights, the injuries to the
person being merely incidental, while in the causes of
action which do not survive the injury complained of is to
the person the property and rights of property affected
being incidental.
DAGADAG vs. TONGNAWA and GAMMOD
Where the petitioner (a public officer) ceases to be
mayor, the appeal and/or action he initiated may be
continued and maintained by his successor if there is
substantial need to do so. If the successor failed to
pursue the appeal and/or action, the same should be
dismissed.
CARANDANG vs. HEIRS OF DE GUZMAN
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subject matter,
prescription.
litis
pendentia,
res
judicata
and
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land. Where said parcels are the object of one and the
same transaction, the venue is in the court of ANY of the
provinces wherein a parcel of land is situated.
In the case, there is only one proceeding sought to be
nullified and that is the extra-judicial mortgage
foreclosure sale. And there is only one initial transaction
which served as the basis of the foreclosure sale and
that is the MORTGAGE CONTRACT.
RULE 5: UNIFORM PROCEDURE IN TRIAL COURTS
BAYUBAY vs. CA, BIG MAK BURGER
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly
administration of justice and the protection of substantive
rights in judicial and extra-judicial proceedings. It is a
mistake to suppose that substantive law and adjective
law are contradictory to each other or, as has been often
suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should
never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the
substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true;
the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact
the policy of the courts is to give effect to both kinds of
law, as complementing each other, in the just and
speedy resolution of the dispute between the
parties. Observance of both substantive and procedural
rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever
the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or
only a statute or a rule of court.
LUCAS vs. FABROS
Sec. 19 (c) of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure
effective November 15, 1991: "The motion prohibited by
this Section is that which seeks reconsideration of the
judgment rendered by the court after trial on the merits
of the case."
BONGATO vs. SPOUSES MALVAR
An action for forcible entry is a quieting process that is
summary in nature. It is designed to recover physical
possession in speedy proceedings that are restrictive in
nature, scope and time limits. The one-year bar within
which to bring the suit is prescribed to complement its
summary nature. Thus, after the one-year period has
lapsed, plaintiffs can no longer avail themselves of the
summary proceedings in the municipal trial court but
must litigate, in the normal course, in the regional trial
court in an ordinary action to recover possession, or to
recover both ownership and possession.
PASCUAL vs. JUDGE JOVELLANOS
Municipal trial court judges ought to be familiar with the
Rules on Summary Procedure governing ejectment
cases. Failure to observe them constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.
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