51.

VERA vs CUEVAS
MISAEL P. VERA, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and THE FAIR TRADE BOARD, petitioner, vs HON.
SERAFIN R. CUEVAS, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, INSTITUTE OF EVAPORATED
FILLED MILK MANUFACTURERS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., CONSOLIDATED MILK COMPANY (PHIL.) INC., and
MILK INDUSTRIES, INC., respondents.
May 31, 1979
DE CASTRO, J.
Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction to review decision of Judge Cuevas of CFI Manila

SHORT VERSION: Three milk companies are being required by the Commission of Internal Revenue to
withdraw their filled milk products from the market until they put words in their labels which are required by
Section 169 of the tax code. The milk companies get a preliminary injunction against the CIR. Later, the CIR
files for an injunction against the Fair Trade Board from hearing a special proceeding on a complaint for
misleading advertisement, mislabeling and/or misbranding involving the same milk companies. The issue is
who among the CIR and the FTB have jurisdiction to decide the matter.
SC says neither. Section 169 of the Tax Code was enacted with other provisions that have already been
repealed, resulting in Section 169 being repealed by implication and becoming a declaratory provision, losing
its tax purpose. Without its tax purpose, the CIR loses his authority to enforce it. Neither the CIR nor the FTB
have jurisdiction as the law that repealed Section 169 (RA 3720) provides that the Board of Food and Drug
inspection and the Food and Drug Administrator, with the Secretary of Health and the Secretary of Justice (if a
criminal prosecution need be instituted) have jurisdiction over the matter.

FACTS: Consolidated Milk Company sells the Darigold brand and Milk Industries sells Dutch Baby brand
(Milk Companies). Along with General Milk selling under the brand Liberty, these three milk companies are
the plaintiffs of an action for declaratory relief for an adjudication of their respective rights and obligations in
relation to the enforcement of Section 169 of the Tax Code against their filled milk products. [Civil Case]
Institute of Evaporated Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, Inc. is a corporation organized for the principal
purpose of upholding and maintaining at its highest the standards of local filled milk industry, of which all the
milk companies are members.

The Commissioner of Revenue (CIR) required the milk companies to withdraw from the market all of their
filled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code warning that
failure to comply will result in the institution of the necessary action against any violation. Section 169 of the
Tax Code reads as follows:

Section 169. Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk. All condensed skimmed milk and all
milk in whatever form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or
put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers,
and in all the language in which such containers are marked, with the words, "This milk is not
suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with other equivalent words.

CFI issued a writ of preliminary injunction, preventing the CIR from requiring the Milk companies to print on
the labels of their filled milk products the words, "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than
one year of age or words of similar import," as directed by Law, and from taking any action to enforce the
above legal provision until the case can be tried on the merits. The OSG appealed the writ on certiorari to the
SC.

Meanwhile, a special action for prohibition and injunction with a petition for preliminary injunction is filed by
the CIR praying that the Fair Trade Board (FTB) desist from further proceeding with FTB I.S. No. 1 entitled
"Antonio R. de Joya vs. Institute of Evaporated Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, etc." pending final
determination of the Civil Case. This special action concerned a complaint for misleading advertisement,
mislabeling and/or misbranding, alleging that the milk companies omitted to state in their labels any
statement sufficient to Identify their filled milk products as "imitation milk" or as an imitation of genuine cows
milk and omitting to mark the immediate containers of their filled milk products with the words: "This milk is
not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age or with other equivalent words as required
under Section 169 of the Tax Code. A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by CFI.

Both cases were consolidated and heard jointly. The CFI rendered its decision:
With regard to the Civil Case: perpetually restraining the CIR from requiring the Milk Companies to print in
their labels the words required by law
With regard to the special action: perpetually restraining the FTB from continuing in the investigation of the
complaints against the Milk Companies or any charges related to the manufacture or sale of their filled milk
products

The CIR and the FTB filed the present petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: WON Section 169 has been repealed by implication, resulting in the loss of authority of the
Commissioner in enforcing the same and that the proper authority is now with the Secretary of Health and
Secretary of Justice as provided for in RA 3720. (YES)

WON the Fair Trade Board has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute alleged misbranding,
mislabeling, and/or misleading advertisement of filled milk products. (NO)

RATIO: Section 169 of the tax code has already been repealed by implication. It was enacted in 1939, together
with Section 141 (which imposed a Specific tax on skimmed milk) and Section 177 (which penalized the sale of
skimmed milk without payment of the specific tax and without the legend required by Section 169), both of
which have been repealed, making section 169 a mere declaratory provision, without a tax purpose, or a penal
sanction.

Section 169 of the Tax Code does not apply to filled milk. The use of the specific and qualifying terms
"skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section, would restrict
the scope of the general clause "all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally
or in part." In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk" under the
familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular
terms they follow in the statute.

Section 169 is being enforced only against manufacturer of filled milk product and not as against
manufacturers, distributors or sellers of condensed skimmed milk such as SIMILAC, SMA, BREMIL, ENFAMIL,
OLAC, in which, as admitted by the CIR and FTB, the fatty part has been removed and substituted with
vegetable or corn oil. The enforcement of Section 169 against the specific Milk Companies only but not against
other persons similarly situated as them aounts to an unconstitutional denial of the equal pro petition of the
laws, for the law, equally enforced, would similarly offend against the Constitution.

As to jurisdiction/authority of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Since Section 169 is devoid of any tax purpose, petitioner Commissioner necessarily lost his authority to
enforce the same. The Commissioners contention that he still has jurisdiction to enforce Section 169 by virtue
of Section 3 of the Tax Code which provides that the Bureau of Internal Revenue shall also "give effect to and
administer the supervisory and police power conferred to it by this Code or other laws" is untenable. The
Bureau of Internal Revenue may claim police power only when necessary in the enforcement of its principal
powers and duties consisting of the "collection of all national internal revenue taxes, fees and charges, and the
enforcement of all forfeitures, penalties and fines connected therewith." The enforcement of Section 169
entails the promotion of the health of the nation and is thus unconnected with any tax purpose. This is the
exclusive function of the Food and Drug Administration of the Department of Health as provided for in
Republic Act No. 3720.
Republic Act No. 3720 provides:

Section 9. ... It shall be the duty of the Board (Food and Drug Inspection), conformably with the
rules and regulations, to hold hearings and conduct investigations relative to matters touching
the Administration of this Act, to investigate processes of food, drug and cosmetic manufacture
and to subject reports to the Food and Drug Administrator, recommending food and drug
standards for adoption. Said Board shall also perform such additional functions, properly within
the scope of the administration thereof, as maybe assigned to it by the Food and Drug
Administrator. The decisions of the Board shall be advisory to the Food and Drug Administrator.

Section 26. ...

xxx xxx xxx
(c) Hearing authorized or required by this Act shall be conducted by the Board of Food and
Drug Inspection which shall submit recommendation to the Food and Drug Administrator.
(d) When it appears to the Food and Drug Administrator from the reports of the Food and Drug
Laboratory that any article of food or any drug or cosmetic secured pursuant to Section 28 of
this Act is adulterated or branded he shall cause notice thereof to be given to the person or

persons concerned and such person or persons shall be given an opportunity to subject
evidence impeaching the correctness of the finding or charge in question.
(e) When a violation of any provisions of this Act comes to the knowledge of the Food and
Drug Administrator of such character that a criminal prosecution ought to be instituted
against the offender, he shall certify the facts to the Secretary of Justice through the
Secretary of Health, together with the chemists' report, the findings of the Board of Food and
Drug Inspection, or other documentary evidence on which the charge is based.
(f) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as requiring the Food and Drug Administrator to certify
for prosecution pursuant to subparagraph (e) hereof, minor violations of this Act whenever he
believes that public interest will be adequately served by a suitable written notice or warning.

From this, it is clear that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Fair Trade Board, are without
jurisdiction to investigate and to prosecute alleged misbranding, mislabeling and/or misleading
advertisements of filled milk. The jurisdiction on the matters cited is vested upon the Board of Food and Drug
inspection and the Food and Drug Administrator, with the Secretary of Health and the Secretary of Justice,
also intervening in case criminal prosecution has to be instituted.

DISPOSITIVE: Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

-Mike

Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople

GR L-44717, 28 August 1985 (138 SCRA 273)
En Banc, Gutierrez, Jr. (p): 10 concur, 1 concur in result, 1 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts: On 20 May 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association, in representation of its monthly paid
employees/members, instituted a complaint with the Regional Office IV, Department of Labor, now Ministry
of Labor and Employment (MOLE) against Chartered Bank, for the payment of 10 unworked legal holidays, as
well as for premium and overtime differentials for worked legal holidays from 1 November 1974.
Both the arbitrator and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled in favor of the petitioners
ordering the bank to pay its monthly paid employees the holiday pay and the premium or overtime pay
differentials to all employees who rendered work during said legal holidays.
On appeal, the Minister of Labor set aside the decision of the NLRC and dismissed the petitioners claim for
lack of merit basing its decision on Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction 9,
claiming the rule that If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less than P240, the maximum monthly
minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from January to December, he is presumed to be already paid
the 10 paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are made from his monthly salary on account of holidays in
months where they occur, then he is still entitled to the 10 paid legal holidays.
Issue: Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in maintaining that monthly paid employees are not entitled to
the holiday pay nor all employees who rendered work during said legal holidays are entitled to the premium
or overtime pay differentials.
Held: When the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it
says. An administrative interpretation, which diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the statute
delimits or withholds, is obviously ultra vires. In the present case, the provisions of the Labor Code on the
entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit, it provides for both the coverage of and
exclusion from the benefit. In Policy Instruction 9, the Secretary of Labor went as far as to categorically state
that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees, when the law clearly states that every worker
shall be paid their regular holiday pay.
While it is true that the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose
duty is to enforce it should be given great weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, the
same must be declared as null and void. It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct
constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the interactions of the three branches of the
government, almost always in situations where some agency of the State has engaged in action that stems
ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power. Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to
implement the Labor Code and Policy Instruction was declared null and void in IBAAEU v. Inciong, and thus
applies in the case at bar. Since the private respondent premises its action on the invalidated rule and policy
instruction, it is clear that the employees belonging to the petitioner association are entitled to the payment
of 10 legal holidays under Articles 82 and 94 of the Labor Code, aside from their monthly salary. They are not
among those excluded by law from the benefits of such holiday pay
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the Labor Ministers 7 September 1976 order, and reinstated with
modification (deleting the interest payments) the 24 March 1976 decision of the NLRC affirming the 30
October 1975 resolution of the Labor Arbiter.

BUSTAMANTE vs. NLRC (1996)

Padilla, J.

FACTS:

Private respondent moves to reconsider the earlier decision of the Supreme Court First Division on grounds
that (a) petitioners are not entitled to recover backwages because they were not actually dismissed but their
probationary employment was not converted to permanent employment; and (b) assuming that petitioners
are entitled to backwages, computation thereof should not start from cessation of work up to actual
reinstatement, and that salary earned elsewhere (during the period of illegal dismissal) should be deducted
from the award of such backwages.

ISSUE: How should backwages be computed?

HELD:

The prevailing rule is that backwages to be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee, should not be
diminished or reduced by the earnings derived by him elsewhere during the period of his illegal
dismissal. The underlying reason of this ruling is that the employee, while litigating the legality
(illegality) of his dismissal, must still earn a living to support himself and family, while his backwages
have to be paid by the employer as part of the price or penalty he has to pay for illegally dismissing his
employee.
Under Art. 279, as amended, the provision handling for "full backwages" to illegally dismissed
employees is clear, plain and free from ambiguity and, therefore, must be applied without attempted
or strained interpretation. Index animi sermo est.
Therefore, petitioners are entitled on their full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits
or their monetary equivalent, from the time their actual compensation was withheld on them up to the
time of their actual reinstatement.

HISTORY:

Pre-Labor Code
o Under RA 875, the CIR was given wide discretion to determine the amount of backwages. Thus,
in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the CIR increased or diminished the award of backpay,
depending on several circumstances, among them, the good faith of the employer, the
employee's employment in other establishments during, the period of illegal dismissal, or the
probability that the employee could have realized net earnings from outside employment if he
had exercised due diligence to search for outside employment. In labor cases decided during
the effectivity of R.A. No. 875, the Supreme Court acknowledged and upheld the CIR's authority
to deduct any amount from the employee's backwages, including the discretion to reduce such
award of backwages whatever earnings were obtained by the employee elsewhere during the
period of his illegal dismissal (Itogon-Suyoc ruling).

o Then came the Mercury Drug ruling, where the Court ruled that a fixed amount of backwages
without further qualifications should be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee, for the
purposes of expediency.
o A permutation of the aforementioned rule, the 3-year rule formulated by Teehankee was
adopted, where backwages are always computed for the fixed period of 3 years.
Post-Labor Code
o Art. 279 provided that an unjustly dismissed employee shall be entitled to his back wages
computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his
reinstatement.
o Despite the express provision that it should be computed from the time compensation was
withheld up to reinstatement, the Mercury Drug rule with the 3-year constant was still applied.
o On March 1989, Republic Act No. 6715 took effect, amending the Art. 279 of the LC. This added
other benefits to the computation of backwages, which should also be computed from the
time compensation was withheld up to reinstatement.
o In 1993, the Court in the Pines City Educational Center went back to the pre-Mercury Drug rule,
where the total amount derived from employment elsewhere by the employee from the date
of dismissal up to the date of reinstatement, if any, should be deducted therefrom. The
rationale in allowing the deduction was to prevent unjust enrichment by the employee at the
expense of the employer.
o In the present case, the Court overrules the Pines City case, and adopts as a general rule that
employees are entitled to full backwages from the time it was withheld up to the time of
reinstatement, without any deductions or limitatations as to period/amount.

ESPIRITU VS CIPRIANO Case Digest

ESPIRITU VS CIPRIANO

FACTS:
For resolution is the problem of whether RA No. 6126 may be held applicable to the case at bar. For
convenience we reproduce the pertinent provisions of law in question:
Section 1 no lessor of a dwelling unit or of land on which anothers dwelling is located shall, during
the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed between the lessor and the
lessee prior to the approval of this Act when said rental does not exceed 300php a month.
Section 6- This At shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved June 17, 1970

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 6126 will have retroactive effect at the case at bara

Held:
It is the contention of respondent which was upheld by the trial court that the case at bar is covered by
the aforecited law. We rule, otherwise. Established and undisputed is the fact that the increase in the rental of
the lot involved was effected in January, 1969, while the law in question took effect on June 17, 1970, or after
a period of one year and a half after the increase in rentals had been effected.
Likewise the claim of private respondent that the act is remedial and may. Therefore given retroactive
effect is untenable. A close study of the provisions discloses that far from being remedial, the statute affects
substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective construction therefore is in order. Article 4 of the civil
code ordains that law shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and that where the law is
clear. Our duty is equally plain. The law being a temporary measure designed to meet a temporary situation, it
has limited period of operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and unequivocal language that no lessor of
a dwelling unit or land shall during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental
agreed upon between the lessor and lessee prior to the approval of this act.
Hence the provision against the increase in monthly rental was effective only from March 1970 up to
March 1971. Outside and beyond that period the law did not by the express mandate of the Act itself,
operate. The said law did not, by express terms, purport to give retroactive effect.
We therefore rule that R.A. No. 6126 is not applicable at the case at bar. As the language of the law is
clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it plainly says.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992

OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners,
vs.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA,
ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO
PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUALFERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE
MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (a) the decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v.
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual,
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed the decision of the trial
court and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio
Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural,
adopted or spurious children and was survived by the following:
(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;
(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista
Manuel C. Pascual
Jose C. Pascual
Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
Erlinda C. Pascual
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit:
Avelino Pascual
Isoceles Pascual
Loida Pascual-Martinez
Virginia Pascual-Ner

Nona Pascual-Fernando
Octavio Pascual
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;
(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased,
to wit:
Olivia S. Pascual
Hermes S. Pascual
(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and
represented by the following:
Dominga M. Pascual
Mamerta P. Fugoso
Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
Eleuterio P. Sarmiento
Domiga P. San Diego
Nelia P. Marquez
Silvestre M. Pascual
Eleuterio M. Pascual
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the
intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).
On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to the Petition for letters of
Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of
Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to the effect that of her own
knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie
the statement made by the oppositors, that they were are not among the known heirs of the deceased Don
Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the
vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V
of such compromise agreement provides, to wit:
This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the aboveentitled proceedings until the final determination thereof by the court, or by another
compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal
heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual. (Rollo, p. 108)
The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners
Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres
Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).
On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 113-114) and
the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).

On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued an order,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby resolved to Deny this
motion reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual (Rollo, p. 136).
On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-526). and such motion
was denied.
Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14010 (Rollo, p. 15.).
On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the decision the dispositive part of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38)
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals
issued its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.
The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.
Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized and of the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA
645 [1987]) because being acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a
prior marriage when such children were under conception (Rollo, p. 418).
Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992 must be strictly construed
to refer only to spurious children (Rollo, p. 419).
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within the prohibition of Article
992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner
from the illegitimate child.
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this Court ruled that:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives
of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is
not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and
illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The

illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn
hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and
the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child
nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no
more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners herein
cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the
decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of Articles 902 and 989 of the Civil Code
allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual.
On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further elucidated the successional
rights of illegitimate children, which squarely answers the questions raised by the petitioner on this point.
The Court held:
Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate children, which
rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate
or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be
represented are themselvesillegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this
matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants
of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done
by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by
virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other
descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would
allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or
mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is
inapplicable to the instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestatobetween the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother. It may not be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the
exception.
The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by
right of representation" and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are
transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate
are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no
right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother.
(Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an
elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken
to mean exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as
to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the
law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even
if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that

exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not
curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).
Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category,
which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural children should be treated
differently, in the negative.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

PhilippineLaw.info Jurisprudence 1961 August

PhilippineLaw.info Jurisprudence SCRA Vol. 2
G.R. No. L-16258, San Diego v. Sayson, 2 SCRA 1175
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
August 31, 1961
G.R. No. L-16258
BARTOLOME E. SAN DIEGO, petitioner,
vs.
ELIGIO SAYSON, respondent.
Gregorio R. Paruganan for petitioner.
C. E. Santiago for respondent.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming a judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Manila which sentenced petitioner Bartolome San Diego to pay respondent Eligio Sayson the
sum of P5,541.76 with legal interest thereon from September 10, 1956, plus P500 as attorney's fees and costs.
In the action brought by respondent Eligio Sayson in the Court of First Instance of Manila, he alleged that in
November, 1954, he and San Diego entered into an agreement where by Sayson would furnish labor for the
construction of a building at 1200 Arlegui, Farnecio Quiapo, Manila, in accordance with the plans approved by
the city engineer, at the price of P15,000; that in the course of the construction the plans approved by the city
engineer were modified and changes were made not called for in the approved plans, for which plaintiff had
to perform and or furnish additional labor valued at P6,840.31; and that San Diego has refused to pay this
additional sum. In a special de defense, San Diego alleged that even granting that additional work had been
performed, he may not be held liable for the same in view of the provisions of Article 1724 of the Civil Code.
At the trial the Court of First Instance of Manila found the following extra or additional work performed by
Sayson:
. . . he testified that the width of the building was in decreased from 13.80 meters in the plan as approved to
14.30 meters; the party wall of hollow block as appearing in the plan was changed to reinforced concrete; that
although the mezzanine was ordered eliminated in the plan and therefore not included in the contract,
defendant had it constructed; that after the stairs were constructed, it was ordered removed (Exhibit A-1-a)
that the partitions were enlarged (Exhibit A-1-b); that the partitions on the second floor was raised, the
transem was removed and the partition elevated to the ceiling (Exh. A-1-c) ; that all the partitions which were
single in the plan were ordered made into double wall; the wooden flooring in Section 22 in the plan was
changed to reinforced concrete (Exhibit A-3-a) ; that the eaves facing Farnecio Street although crossed out by
the City Engineer were ordered made (Exh. A-1-d) ; that the walls had "costura" only under the plan but were
ordered plastered and ceilings were ordered although not included in the plan (Exhibit Ale These changes
which were ordered by defendant and his engineer are summarized on page 8 Exhibit B as follows:
xxxxxxxxx

For additional work performed P6,840.31. (Record on Appeal, pp. 18, 19-20.) .
Judgment for Sayson having been ordered for this amount the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals. In
said court petitioner herein again raised as his defense the provisions of Article 1724 of the Civil Code, but this
court held:
We do not see any plausible reason why defendant should not compensate plaintiff for the alterations done
by the latter at the instance of the former who has benefited thereby. Bid for such alterations were not
included in the amount of P15,000.00, which amount was computed and submitted in the light of the
approved plans. And since these alterations undoubtedly entailed expenses, time and efforts on the part of
the contractor, then he should be in justice and equity to him paid for by defendant as owner of the building
where they were done. It is true that there was no written agreement for such alterations but the absence
thereof should not be allowed to make the contractor poorer and the owner of the building richer. Defendant
in trying to justify his refusal to pay plaintiff for the latter's claim cites the following article of the Civil Code
Art. 1724. The contractor who undertakes to build a structure or any other work for a stipulated price, in
conformity with plans and specifications agreed upon with the landowner, in neither withdraw from the
contract nor demand an increase to the price on account of the higher cost of labor or materials, save when
there has been a change in the plans and specifications provided:
(1) Such change has been authorized by the proprietor in writing; and
(2) The additional price to be paid to the contractor has en determined in writing by both parties.
Obviously, the aforequoted provision of law is not applicable on the claim of defendant.
The decision was affirmed. Hence the case was brought re on an appeal by certiorari.
Article 1724 of the Civil Code is a modified form of article 1593 of the Spanish Civil Code which provides as
follows:
No architect or contractor who, for a lump sum, undertakes the construction of a building, or any other work
to be done in accordance with a plan agreed upon with the owner the ground, may demand an increase of the
price, even if the cost of the materials or labor has increased; but he may do when any change increasing the
work is made in the plans, provided the owner has given his consent thereto.
In his commentaries on this Article, Manresa said:
El articulo 1.793 del Codigo frances es mas previsor que el que comentamos, pues exige para que el aumento
de precio eda pedirse que los cambios o amplicaciones del plano se hayan autorizado por escrito y que se haya
convenido el precio con el propietario (X Manresa, Fifth ed., p. 926.)
Obviously influenced by the above criticism of the article, the Code Commission recommended and the
legislature proved the provision as it now stands. It will be noted at whereas under the old article recovery for
additional cost in a construction contract can be had if authorization on to make such additions can be proved,
the amendment evidently requires that instead of merely proving authorization, such authorization by the
proprietor must be made writing. The evident purpose of the amendment is prevent litigation for additional
costs incurred by reason of additions or changes in the original plans. Is this additional requirement of a
written authorization, to be considered as a mere extension of the Statute of Frauds, or is it a substantive
provision? That the requirement for a written authorization is not merely to prohibit admission of oral

testimony against the objection Of the adverse fact that the provision is party, can be inferred 'from the not
included among those specified in the Statute of Frauds, Article 1403 of the Civil Code. As it does not appear
to have been intended as an extension of the Statute of Frauds, it must have been adopted as a substantive
provision or a condition precedent to recovery.
Our duty in this respect is not to dispute the wisdom of the provision; we should only limit ourselves to
inquiring into the legislative intent, and once that is determined to make said intent effective. The new
provision was evidently adopted to prevent misunderstandings and litigations between contractors and
owners. Clearly it was the intention of the legislature in making the amendment to require authorization in
writing before costs of additional labor in a contract for the construction of a building may be demanded. We
find that the provision is applicable to the circumstances surrounding the case at bar, and we are duty bound
to enforce the same. The trial court should have denied the demand for additional cost as directed by the
provisions of Article 1724 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the writ is hereby granted, the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed, and the action of
respondent dismissed. Without costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and De Leon, JJ. concur.
Concepcion, Barrera and Natividad, JJ., took no part.

Demafiles v. Comelec
Case No. 91
G.R. No. L-28396 (December 29, 1967)
Chapter 4.18, Footnote 126, page 159
FACTS:
Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial Board voting to
reject returns. Petitioner challenged the right of 2 board members to sit, considering
that they were reelectionists. Respondent Commission ruled in favor of Petitioner.
Galido then asked for reconsideration, stating that the 2 board members in question
were disqualified only when the board was acting as a provincial but not as
municipal. In light of this, Respondent Commission reversed its previous decision.
ISSUES:
1. W/N this case is moot and the board had the authority to reject the returns from
Precinct 7.
2. W/N the board members who were candidates for reelection were disqualified
from sitting in the board in its capacity as a municipal board of canvassers.
3. W/N Respondent Commission can order the board of canvassers to count a return.
HELD:
RA 4970 reads the first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the municipality
of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for local officials and shall
have qualified. The Supreme Court ruled that and shall have qualified is devoid of
meaning. The term of office of municipals shall begin in the 1st day of January
following their election, despite the fact that Sebaste was a newly created
municipality.
No, a canvassing board may not reject any returns due to whatever cause.
However, since there is a possibility of fraud, the canvass made and proclamation
should be annulled. The law states any member of a provincial board or of
municipal council who is a candidate for office in any election, shall be incompetent
to act on the said body. Since Respondent Commission has the power to annul and
illegal canvass and proclamation, there is no reason as to why it cannot order

canvassing bodies to count all returns which are otherwise regular.

PhilippineLaw.info Jurisprudence 1970 May

PhilippineLaw.info Jurisprudence SCRA Vol. 33
G.R. No. L-25327, 33 SCRA 105
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
May 29, 1970
G.R. No. L-25327
,
vs.
POLICARPIO HIDALGO, SERGIO DIMAANO, MARIA ARDE, SATURNINO HIDALGO, BERNARDINA MARQUEZ,
VICENTE DIMAANO, ARCADIA DIMAANO, TEODULA DIMAANO, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS and THE
PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, respondents.
Jose O. Lara for petitioners. Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for respondents.
Teehankee, J.:
Two petitions for review of decisions of the Court of Agrarian Relations dismissing petitioners' actions as share
tenants for the enforcerment of the right to redeem agricultural lands, under the provisions of section 12 of
the Agricultural Land Reform Code. As the same issue of law is involved and the original landowner and
vendees in both cases are the same, the two cases are herein jointly decided.
Respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo was until the time of the execution of the deeds of sale on September
27, 1963 and March 2, 1964 in favor of his seven above-named private co-respondents, the owner of the
22,876-square meter and 7,638-square meter agricultural parcels of land situated in Lumil, San Jose, Batangas,
described in the decisions under review.
In Case L-25326, respondent-vendor sold the 22,876-square meter parcel of land, together with two other
parcels of land for P4,000.00. Petitioners-spouses Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Resales, as tenants thereof,
alleging that the parcel worked by them as tenants is fairly worth P1,500.00, "taking into account the
respective areas, productivities, accessibilities, and assessed values of three lots, seek by way of redemption
the execution of a deed of sale for the same amount of P1,500.00 by respondents-vendees 1 in their favor.
In Case L-25327, respondent-vendor sold the 7,638-square meter parcel of land for P750.00, and petitionersspouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo as tenants thereof, seek by way of redemption the execution of a
deed of sale for the same price of P750.00 by respondents-vendees in their favor.
As stated in the decisions under review, since the parties stipulated on the facts in both cases, petitionerstenants have for several years been working on the lands as share tenants. No 90-day notice of intention to
sell the lands for the exercise of the right of pre-emption prescribed by section 11 of the Agricultural Land
Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844, enacted on August 8, 1963) was given by respondent-vendor to
petitioners-tenants. Subsequently, the deeds of sale executed by respondent-vendor were registered by
respondents register of deeds and provincial assessor of Batangas in the records of their respective offices

notwithstanding the non-execution by respondent-vendor of the affidavit required by section 13 of the Land
Reform Code. 2 The actions for redemption were timely filled on March 26, 1965 by petitioners-tenants within
the two-year prescriptive period from registration of the sale, prescribed by section 12 of the said Code.
The agrarian court rendered on July 19, 1965 two identical decisions dismissing the petitions for redemption.
It correctly focused on the sole issue of law as follows: "(T)he only issue in this case is whether or not plaintiffs,
as share tenants, are entitled to redeem the parcel of land they are working from the purchasers thereof,
where no notice was previously given to them by the vendor, who was their landholder, of the latter's
intention to sell the property and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec. 13
ofRepublic Act No. 3844 before the registration of the deed of sale. In other words, is the right of redemption
granted by Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 applicable to share tenants?"
But proceeding from several erroneous assumptions and premises, it arrived at its erroneous conclusion that
the right of redemption granted by section 12 of the Land Reform Code is available to leasehold tenants only
but not to share tenants, and thus dismissed the petitions: "(S)ec 12 of Republic Act No. 3844, which comes
under Chapter I of said Act, under the heading 'Agricultural Leasehold System,' reads as follows:
'SEC. 12. Lessee's Right of Redemption. - In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the
knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price
and consideration: Provided: further, That where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be
entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of
redemption under this Section may be exercised within two years from the registration of the sale, and shall
have priority over any other right of legal redemption.'
The systems of agricultural tenancy recognized in this jurisdiction are share tenancy and leasehold tenancy.
(Sec. 4, Republic Act No. 1199; Sec. 4, Republic Act No. 3844). A share tenant is altogether different from a
leasehold tenant and their respective rights and obligations are not co-extensive or co-equal. (See Secs. 22 to
41, inclusive, and Secs. 42 to 48, inclusive, of Republic Act No. 1199; see also Secs. 4 to 38, inclusive,
ofRepublic Act No. 3844).
It is our considered view that the right of redemption granted by Section 12 ofRepublic Act No. 3844 is
applicable to leasehold tenants only, but not to share tenants, because said provision of law clearly, definitely,
and unequivocally grants said right to the 'agricultural lessee,' and to nobody else. In enacting the Agricultural
Land Reform Code, Congress was fully aware of the existence of share tenancy and in fact provided for the
abolition of the agricultural share tenancy system. (Sec. 4, Republic Act No. 3844.) If it were the intention of
Congress to grant the right of redemption to share tenants, it would have unmistakably and unequivocally
done so. We cannot extend said right to share tenants through judicial legislation, wherever our sympathies
may lie.
The agrarian court fell into several erroneous assumptions and premises in holding that agricultural share
tenancy remains recognized in this jurisdiction; that "a share tenant is altogether different from a leasehold
tenant and their respective rights and obligations are not co-extensive or co-equal"; and that the right of
redemption granted by section 12 of the Land Reform Code" is applicable to leasehold tenants only, but not to
share tenants, because said provision of law clearly, definitely, and unequivocally grants said right to the
'agricultural lessee,' and to nobody else."
1. The very essence of the Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy as
proclaimed in its title. Section 4 of the Code expressly outlaws agricultural share tenancy as "contrary to public
policy" and decrees its abolition. 3 Section 2 of the Code expressly declares it to be the policy of the State,inter
alia, "to establish owner cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture
and, as a consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to industrial development; to achieve a dignified

existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices; ... and to make the
small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a source of strength in our
democratic society." 4 It was error, therefore, for the agrarian court to state the premise after the Land
Reform Code had already been enacted, that "the systems of agricultural tenancy recognized in this
jurisdiction are share tenancy and leasehold tenancy." A more accurate statement of the premise is that based
on the transitory provision in the first proviso of section 4 of the Code, i.e. that existing share tenancy
contracts are allowed to continue temporarily in force and effect, notwithstanding their express abolition,
until whichever of the following events occurs earlier: (a) the end of the agricultural year when the National
Land Reform Council makes the proclamation declaring the region or locality a land reform area; or (b) the
shorter period provided in the share tenancy contracts expires; or (c) the share tenant sooner exercises his
option to elect the leasehold system.
In anticipation of the expiration of share tenancy contracts - whether by contractual stipulation or the tenant's
exercise of his option to elect the leasehold system instead or by virtue of their nullity - occuring before the
proclamation of the locality as a land reform area, the same section 4 has further declared in the third proviso
thereof that in such event, the tenant shall continue in possession of the land for cultivation and "there shall
be presumed to exist a leasehold relationship under the provisions of this Code."
2. The foregoing exposes the error of the agrarian court's corollary premise that "a share tenant is altogether
different from a leasehold tenant." The agrarian court's dictum that "their respective rights and obligations are
not co-extensive or co-equal "refer to their contractual relations with the landowner, with respect to the
contributions given, management, division or payment of the produce. 5
But the Land Reform Code forges by operation of law, between the landowner and the farmer - be a leasehold
tenant or temporarily a share tenant - a vinculum juris with certain vital juridical consequences, such as
security of tenure of the tenant and the tenant's right to continue in possession of the land he works despite
the expiration of the contract or the sale or transfer of the land to third persons, and now, more basically, the
farmer's pre-emptive right to buy the land he cultivates under section 11 of the Code 6 as well as the right to
redeem the land, if sold to a third person without his knowledge, under section 12 of the Code.
This is an essential and indispensable mandate of the Code to implement the state's policy of establishing
owner-cultivatorship and to achieve a dignified and self-reliant existence for the small farmers that would
make them a pillar of strength of our Republic. Aside from expropriation by the Land Authority of private
agricultural land for resale in economic family-size farm units "to bona fide tenants, occupants and qualified
farmers," 7 the purchase by farmers of the lands cultivated by them, when the owner decides to sell the same
- through rights of pre-emption and redemption - are the only means prescribed by the Code to achieve the
declared policy of the State.
3. The agrarian court therefore facilely let itself fall into the error of concluding that the right of redemption
(as well as necessarily the right of pre-emption) imposed by the Code is available to leasehold tenants only
and excludes share tenants for the literal reason that the Code grants said rights only to the "agricultural
lessee and to nobody else." For one, it immediately comes to mind that the Code did not mention tenants,
whether leasehold or share tenants, because it outlaws share tenancy and envisions the agricultural leasehold
system as its replacement. Thus, Chapter I of the Code, comprising sections 4 to 38, extensively deals with the
establishment of "agricultural leasehold relation," defines the parties thereto and the rights and obligations of
the "agricultural lessor" and of the "agricultural lessee" (without the slightest mention of leasehold tenants)
and the statutory consideration or rental for the leasehold to be paid by the lessee. There is a studied
omission in the Code of the use of the term tenant in deference to the "abolition of tenancy" as proclaimed in
the very title of the Code, and the elevation of the tenant's status to that of lessee.

Then, the terms "agricultural lessor" and "agricultural lessee" are consistently used throughout the Chapter
and carried over the particular sections (11 and 12) on pre-emption and redemption. The agrarian court's
literal construction would wreak havoc on and defeat the proclaimed and announced legislative intent and
policy of the State of establishing owner-cultivatorship for the farmers, who invariably were all share tenants
before the enactment of the Code and whom the Code would now uplift to the status of lessees.
A graphic instance of this fallacy would be found in section 11 providing that "In case the agricultural lessor
decides to sell the landholding the agricultural lessee shall have the preferential right to buy the same under
reasonable terms and conditions." It will be seen that the term "agricultural lessor" is here used
interchangeably with the term "landowner"; which conflicts with the Code's definition of "agricultural lessor"
to mean "a person natural or juridical, who, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor,
lets or grants to another the cultivation and use of his land for a price certains." 8 Obviously, the Code
precisely referred to the "agricultural lessor (who) decides to sell the landholding," when it could have more
precisely referred to the "landowner," who alone as such, rather than a civil law lessee, usufructuary or legal
possessor, could sell the landholding, but it certainly cannot be logically contended that the imprecision
should defeat the clear spirit and intent of the provision.
4. We have, here, then a case of where the true intent of the law is clear that calls for the application of the
cardinal rule of statutory construction that such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter thereof, for
whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, since adherence to the letter would result in
absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.
Section 11 of the Code providing for the "agricultural lessee's" preferential right to buy the land he cultivates
provides expressly that "the entire landholding offered for sale must be pre-empted by the Land Authority if
the landowner so desires, unless the majority of the lessees object to such acquisition," presumably for being
beyond their capabilities. Taken together with the provisions of Chapter III of the Code on the organization
and functions of the Land Authority and Chapter VII on the Land Project Administration and the creation and
functions of the National Land Reform Council, (in which chapters the legislature obviously was not laboring
under the inhibition of referring to the term tenants as it was in Chapter I establishing the agricultural
leasehold system and decreeing the abolition of share tenancy, 9 the Code's intent, policy and objective to
give both agricultural lessees and farmers who transitionally continue to be share tenants notwithstanding the
Code's enactment, the same priority and preferential rights over the lands under their cultivation, in the event
of acquisition of the lands, by expropriation or voluntary sale, for distribution or resale that may be initiated
by the Land Authority or the National Land Reform Council, are clearly and expressly stated.
Thus Chapter III, section 51 of the Code decrees it the responsibility of the Land Authority "(1) To initiate and
prosecute expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of private agricultural lands as defined in Section one
hundred sixty-six of chapter XI of this Code for the purpose of subdivision into economic family - size farm
units and resale of said farm units to bona fide tenants, occupants and qualified farmers ... and "(2) To
help bona fide farmers without lands of agricultural owner-cultivators of uneconomic-size farms to acquire
and own economic family-size farm units ...."
Similarly, Chapter VII, section 128 of the Code, in enjoining the National Land Reform Council to formulate the
necessary rules and regulations to implement the Code's provisions for selection of agricultural land to be
acquired and distributed and of the beneficiaries of the family farms, ordains the giving of the same priority
"to the actual occupants personally cultivating the land either as agricultural lessees or otherwise with respect
to the area under their cultivation."
5. It would certainly result in absurdity, contradictions and injustice if a share tenant would be denied the
rights of pre-emption and redemption which he seeks to exercise on his own resources, notwithstanding that
the National Land Reform Council has not yet proclaimed that all the government machineries and agencies in

the region or locality envisioned in the Code are operating - which machineries and agencies, particularly, the
Land Bank were precisely created "to finance the acquisition by the Government of landed estates for division
and resale to small landholders, as well as the purchase of the landholding by the agricultural lessee from the
landowner." 10 The non-operation in the interval of the Land Bank and the government machineries and
agencies in the region which are envisioned in the Code to assist the share tenant in shedding off the yoke of
tenancy and afford him the financial assistance to exercise his option of electing the leasehold system and his
preferential right of purchasing the land cultivated by him could not possibly have been intended by Congress
to prevent the exercise of any of these vital rights by a share tenant who is able to do so, e.g. to purchase the
land, on his own and without government assistance. It would be absurd and unjust that while the
government is unable to render such assistance, the share tenant would be deemed deprived of the very
rights granted him by the Code which he is in a position to exercise even without government assistance.
6. Herein lies the distinction between the present case and Basbas vs. Entena 11 where the Court upheld the
agrarian court's dismissal of the therein tenant's action to redeem the landholding sold to a third party by
virtue of the tenant's failure to tender payment or consign the purchase price of the property. There, the
tenant-redemptioner was shown by the evidence to have no funds and had merely applied for them to the
Land Authority which was not yet operating in the locality and hence, the Court held that no part of the Code
"indicates or even hints that the 2-year redemption period will not commence to run (indefinitely) until the
tenant obtains financing from the Land Bank, or stops the tenant from securing redemption funds from some
other source." 12 In the present case, the petitioners-tenants' possession of funds and compliance with the
requirements of redemption are not questioned, the case having been submitted and decided on the sole
legal issue of the right of redemption being available to them as share tenants. The clear and logical
implication of Basbas is where the tenant has his own resources or secures redemption funds from sources
other than the Land Bank or government agencies under the Code, the fact that the locality has not been
proclaimed a land reform area and that such government machineries and agencies are not operating therein
is of no relevance and cannot prejudice the tenant's rights under the Code to redeem the landholding.
7. Even from the landowner's practical and equitable viewpoint, the landowner is not prejudiced in the least
by recognizing the share tenant's right of redemption. The landowner, having decided to sell his land, has
gotten his price therefor from his vendees. (The same holds true in case of the tenant's exercise of the preemptive right by the tenant who is called upon to pay the landowner the price, if reasonable, within ninety
days from the landowner's written notice.) As for the vendees, neither are they prejudiced for they will get
back from the tenant-redemptioner the price that they paid the vendor, if reasonable, since the Code grants
the agricultural lessee or tenant the top priority of redemption of the landholding cultivated by him and
expressly decrees that the same "shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption." In the absence
of any provision in the Code as to manner of and amounts payable on redemption, the pertinent provisions of
the Civil Code apply in a suppletory character. 13 Hence, the vendees would be entitled to receive from the
redemptioners the amount of their purchase besides "(1) the expenses of the contract, and any other
legitimate payments made by reason of the sale; (and) (2) the necessary and useful expenses made on the
thing sold." 14
8. The historical background for the enactment of the Code's provisions on pre-emption and redemption
further strengthens the Court's opinion. It is noted by Dean Montemayor 15 that "(T)his is a new right which
has not been granted to tenants under the Agricultural Tenancy Act. It further bolsters the security of tenure
of the agricultural lessee and further encourages agricultural lessees to become owner-cultivators.
In the past, a landlord often ostensibly sold his land being cultivated by his tenant to another tenant, who in
turn filed a petition for ejectment against the first tenant on the ground of personal cultivation. While many of
such sales were simulated, there was a formal transfer of title in every case, and the first tenant was invariably
ordered ejected.

There is indication in this case of the same pattern of sale by the landowner to another tenant, 16 in order to
effect the ejectment of petitioners-tenants. This is further bolstered by the fact that the sales were executed
by respondent-vendor on September 27, 1963 and March 2, 1954 shortly after the enactment on August 8,
1963 of the Land Reform Code - which furnishes still another reason for upholding ... petitioners-tenants' right
of redemption, for certainly a landowner cannot be permitted to defeat the Code's clear intent by
precipitately disposing of his lands, even before the tenant has been given the time to exercise his newly
granted option to elect the new agricultural leasehold system established by the Code as a replacement for
the share tenancy outlawed by it.
9. Clearly then, the Code intended, as above discussed, to afford the farmers' who transitionally continued to
be share tenants after its enactment but who inexorably would be agricultural lessees by virtue of the Code's
proclaimed abolition of tenancy, the same priority and preferential right as those other share tenants, who
upon the enactment of the Code or soon thereafter were earlier converted by fortuitous circumstance into
agricultural lessees, to acquire the lands under their cultivation in the event of their voluntary sale by the
owner or of their acquisition, by expropriation or otherwise, by the Land Authority. It then becomes the
court's duty to enforce the intent and will of the Code, for "... (I)n fact, the spirit or intention of a statute
prevails over the letter thereof.' (Ta?ada vs. Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 23, 1957, citing 82 C.J.S., p. 526.) A statute
'should be construed according to its spirit or intention, disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the law.'
(Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 855.) By this, we do not correct the act of the
Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give due course to 'its intent.' (Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax
Appeals, 100 Phil. 850)." 17 The Court has consistently held in line with authoritative principles of statutory
construction that, it will reject a narrow and literal interpretation, such as that given by the agrarian court,
that would defeat and frustrate rather than foster and give life to the law's declared policy and intent. 18
Finally, under the established jurisprudence of the Court, in the interpretation of tenancy and labor legislation,
it will be guided by more than just an inquiry into the letter of the law as against its spirit and will ultimately
resolve grave doubts in favor of the tenant and worker. 19
The agrarian court's dismissal of the cases at bar should therefore be reversed and petitioners-tenants' right
to redeem the landholdings recognized section 12 of the Code.
In Case L-25326, however, the deed of sale executed by respondent-vendor in favor of respondents-vendees
for the price of P4,000.00 covers three parcels of land, while what is sought to be redeemed is only the first
parcel of land of 22,876 square meters, described in the deed. Petitioners-tenants' allegation that the
proportionate worth of said parcel "taking into account the respective areas, productivities, accessibilities and
assessed values of the three lots," is P1,500.00, was traversed by respondents in their answer, with the claim
that "the said land is fairly worth P20,000.00. 20 While the vendor would be bound by, and cannot claim more
than, the price stated in the deed, and the Code precisely provides that the farmer shall have "the preferential
right to buy the (landholding) under reasonable terms and conditions" or "redeem the same at a reasonable
price and consideration" 21 with a view to affording the farmer the right to seek judicial assistance and relief
to fix such reasonable price and terms when the landowner places in the notice to sell or deed an excessive or
exorbitant amount in collusion with the vendee, we note that in this case the deed of sale itself acknowledged
that the selling price of P4,000.00 therein stated was not the fair price since an additional consideration
therein stated was that the vendees would support the vendor during his lifetime and take care of him, should
he fall ill, and even assumed the expenses of his burial upon his death:
Ang halagang P4,000.00 ay hindi kaulat sa tunay na halaga ng mga lupa subalit ang mga bumili ay may
katungkulan na sostentohin ako habang ako'y nabubuhay, ipaanyo at ipagamot ako kung ako ay may sakit,
saka ipalibing ako kung ako ay mamatay sa kanilang gastos at ito ay isa sa alang-alang o consideracion ng
bilihang ito.

Under these circumstances, since the agrarian court did not rule upon conflicting claims of the parties as to
what was the proportionate worth of the parcel of land in the stated price of P4,000.00 - whether P1,500.00
as claimed by petitioners or a little bit more, considering the proportionate values of the two other parcels,
but the whole total is not to exceed the stated price of P4,000.00, since the vendor is bound thereby - and
likewise, what was the additional proportionate worth of the expenses assumed by the vendees, assuming
that petitioners are not willing to assume the same obligation, the case should be remanded to the agrarian
court solely for the purpose of determining the reasonable price and consideration to be paid by petitioners
for redeeming the landholding, in accordance with these observations.
In Case L-25327, there is no question as to the price of P750.00 paid by the vendees and no additional
consideration or expenses, unlike in Case L-25326, supra, assumed by the vendees. Hence, petitioners therein
are entitled to redeem the landholding for the same stated price.
ACCORDINGLY, the decisions appealed from are hereby reversed, and the petitions to redeem the subject
landholdings are granted.
In Case L-25326, however, the case is remanded to the agrarian court solely for determining the reasonable
price to be paid by petitioners therein to respondents-vendees for redemption of the landholding in
accordance with the observations hereinabove made.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 Per answer of respondents and the parties' stipulation of facts, respondents-vendees Saturnino Hidalgo and
Bernardina Marquez, together with petitioners-spouses Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Resales in Case L-25326
and petitioners-spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo in Case L-25327 compose the three sets of tenants
working on their lands.
2 "SEC. 13. Affidavit Required in Sale of Land Subject to Right of Pre-emption. - No deed of sale of agricultural
land under cultivation by an agricultural lessee or lessees shall be recorded in the Registry of Property unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given the written notice required in Section eleven of
this Chapter or that the land is not worked by an agricultural lessee." (R.A. No. 3844.)
3 "SEC. 4. Abolition of Agricultural Share Tenancy. - Agricultural share tenancy, as herein defined, is hereby
declared to be contrary to public policy and shall be abolished: Provided, That existing share tenancy contracts
may continue in force and effect in any region or locality, to be governed in the meantime by the pertinent
provisions of Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred and ninety-nine, as amended, until the end of the
agricultural year when the National Land Reform Council proclaims that all the government Machineries and
agencies in that region or locality relating to leasehold envisioned in this Code are operating, unless such
contracts provide for a shorter period or the tenant sooner exercises his option to elect the leasehold system:
Provided, further, That in order not to jeopardize international commitments, lands devoted to crops covered
by marketing allotments shall be made the subject of a separate proclamation that adequate provisions, such
as the organization of cooperatives, marketing agreements, or other similar workable arrangements, have
been made to insure efficient management on all matters requiring synchronization of the agricultural with
the processing phases of such crops: Provided, furthermore, That where the agricultural share tenancy
contract has ceased to be operative by virtue of this Code, or where such a tenancy contract has been entered

into in violation of the provisions of this Code and is, therefore, null and void, and the tenant continues in
possession of the land for cultivation, there shall be presumed to exist a leasehold relationship under the
provisions of this Code, without prejudice to the right of the landowner and the former tenant to enter into
any other lawful contract in relation to the land formerly under tenancy contract, as long as in the interim the
security of tenure of the former tenant under Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred and ninety-nine, as
amended, and as provided in this Code, is not impaired: Provided, finally, That if a lawful leasehold tenancy
contract was entered into prior to the effectivity of this Code, the rights and obligations arising therefrom shall
continue to subsist until modified by the parties in accordance with the provisions of this Code." R.A. 3844,
emphasis supplied.
4 Section 2, pars. (1), (2), and (6), R.A. 3844; emphasis supplied.
5 "(2) 'Agricultural lessee' means a person who, by himself and with the aid available from within his
immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by another with the latter's consent
for purposes of production, for a price certain in money or in produce or both. It is distinguished from civil law
lessee as understood in the Civil Code of the Philippines." Sec. 166, R.A. 3844.
"(25) 'Share tenancy' as used in this Code means the relationship which exists whenever two persons agree on
a joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his labor,
with either or both contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land
personally with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household, and the produce
thereof to be divided between the landholder and the tenant." Idem.
6 "See. 11. Lessee's Right of Pre-emption. - In case the agricultural lessor decides to sell the landholding, the
agricultural lessee shall have the preferential right to buy the same under reasonable terms and conditions:
Provided, That the entire landholding offered for sale must be pre-empted by the Land Authority if the
landowner so desires, unless the majority of the lessees object to such acquisition: Provided, further, That
where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said preferential right only to the
extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of pre-emption under this Section may be exercised
within ninety days from notice in writing, which shall be served by the owner on all lessees affected." R.A.
3844, emphasis supplied.

G.R. No. 104528 PNB VS OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

THIRD DIVISION[. January 18, 1996]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY
BOARD, ALFONSO MAGLAYA, ANGELINA MAGLAYA P. REYES, JORGE C. BERNARDINO, CORAZON DE LEON,
VICTORIANO ACAYA, FLORENCIA CULTURA, MARIA CAMPOS, ERNESTO SARMIENTO, SANTIAGO TAMONAN,
APOLONIA TADIAQUE, SIMEON DE LEON, NATIVIDAD J. CRUZ, NATIVIDAD B. LORESCO, FELICIDAD GARCIA, ANA
ANITA TAN, LUCAS SERVILLION, JOSE NARAWAL, represented by their duly authorized Attorney-in-Fact, CORAZON DE
LEON AND SPOUSES LEOPOLDO AND CARMEN SEBASTIAN, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
May a buyer of a property at a foreclosure sale dispossess prior purchasers on installment of individual lots therein, or compel them to
pay again for the lots which they previously bought from the defaulting mortgagor-subdivision developer, on the theory that P.D. 957,
The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree, is not applicable to the mortgage contract in question, the same
having been executed prior to the enactment of P.D. 957? This is the question confronting the Court in this Petition challenging the
Decision dated March 10, 1992 of the Office of the President of the Philippines in O.P. Case No. 4249, signed by. the Executive
Secretary, Franklin M. Drilon, by authority of the President.
Private respondents were buyers on installment of subdivision lots from Marikina Village, Inc. (represented by spouses Antonio and
Susana Astudillo). Notwithstanding the land purchase agreements it executed over said lots, the subdivision developer mortgaged the
lots in favor of the petitioner, Philippine National Bank. Unaware of this mortgage, private respondents duly complied with their
obligations as lot buyers and constructed their houses on the lots in question.
Subsequently, the subdivision developer defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage. As highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, the
bank became owner of the lots.
Acting on suits brought by private respondents (which were later consolidated), the HLURB Office of Appeals, Adjudication and
Legal Affairs (OAALA) in a decision rendered on October 28, 1988 ruled that PNB -- without prejudice to seeking relief against
Marikina Village, -- Inc. may collect from private respondents only the remaining amortizations, in accordance with the land
purchase agreements they had previously entered into with Marikina Village, Inc., and cannot compel private respondents to pay all
over again for the lots they had already bought from said subdivision developer. On May 2, 1989, the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board affirmed this decision. On March 10, 1992, the Office of the President, invoking P.D. 957, likewise concurred with
the HLURB. Hence, the present recourse to this Court.
Under Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, appeals from judgments or final orders of the x xx Office of the President x xx may
be taken to the Court of Appeals x xx. However, in order to hasten the resolution of this case, which was deemed submitted for
decision three years ago, the Court resolved to make an exception to the said Circular in the interest of speedy justice.
Petitioner bank raised the following issues:
1 .The Office of the President erred in applying P.D. 957 because said law was enacted only on July 12, 1976, while the subject
mortgage was executed on December 18, 1975; and
2. Petitioner Bank is not privy to the contracts between private respondents and mortgagor-subdivision developer, hence, the Office of
the President erred in ordering petitioner Bank to accept private respondents remaining amortizations and issue the corresponding
titles after payment thereof.
Normally, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, (1)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. However,
it is obvious and indubitable that P.D. 957 was intended to cover even those real estate mortgages, like the one at issue here, executed
prior to its enactment, and such intent (as succinctly captured in the preamble quoted below) must be given effect if the laudable
purpose of protecting innocent purchasers is to be achieved:
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its inhabitants the requirements of decent human settlement and to provide them
with ample opportunities for improving their quality of life;
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged
on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems,
lighting systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous
subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and
encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers for
value; (Italics supplied).
While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, yet the same can be plainly inferred from the, unmistakable
intent of the law to protect innocent lot buyers from scheming subdivision developers. As between these small lot buyers and the
gigantic financial institutions which the developers deal with, it is obvious that the law -- as an instrument of social justice -- must

favor the weak. Indeed, the petitioner Bank had at its disposal vast resources with which it could adequately protect its loan activities,
and therefore is presumed to have conducted the usual due diligence checking and ascertained (whether thru ocular inspection or
other modes of investigation) the actual status, condition, utilization and occupancy of the property offered as collateral. It could not
have been unaware that the property had been built on by small lot buyers. On the other hand, private respondents obviously were
powerless to discover the attempt of the land developer to hypothecate the property being sold to them. It was precisely in order to
deal with this kind of situation that P.D. 957 was enacted, its very essence and intendment being to provide a protective mantle over
helpless citizens who may fall prey to the razzmatazz of what P.D. 957 termed unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers.1
The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances and condition it sought to remedy, must be
enforced. Sutherland, in his well-known treatise on Statutory Construction (quoted with approval by this Court in an old case of
consequence, Ongsiako vs. Gamboa2), says:
The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The
intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The
intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent
with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away- from the true intent and purpose of
the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative
enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense
which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and, objects of the legislature.3
Truly, this Court cannot allow the injustice that will be wrought by a strictly prospective application of the law. Little people who have
toiled for years through blood and tears would be deprived of their homes through no fault of their own. As the Solicitor General, in
his comment, argues:
Verily, if P.D. 957 were to exclude from its coverage the aforecited mortgage contract, the vigorous regulation which PD. 957 seeks
to impose on unconscientious subdivision sellers will be translated into a feeble exercise of police power just because the iron hand of
the State cannot particularly touch mortgage contracts badged with the fortunate accident of having been constituted prior to the
enactment of P.D. 957. Indeed, it would be illogical in the extreme if P.D. 957 is to be given full force and effect and yet, the
fraudulent practices and manipulations it seeks to curb in the first instance can nevertheless be liberally perpetrated precisely because
PD. 957 cannot be applied to existing antecedent mortgage contracts. The legislative intent could not have conceivably permitted a
loophole which all along works to the prejudice of subdivision lot buyers (private respondents).4
Likewise noteworthy are certain provisions of P.D. 957, which themselves constitute strong arguments in favor of the retroactivity of
PD. 957 as a whole. These are Sections 20, 21 and 23 thereof, which by their very terms have retroactive effect and will impact upon
even those contracts and transactions entered into prior to PD. 9575 enactment:
SEC. 20.Time of Completion.- Every owner or developer shall construct and provide the facilities, improvements, infrastructures and
other forms of development, including water supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and indicated in the approved
subdivision or condominium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any form of advertisement, within one year
from the date of the issuance of the license for the subdivision or condominium project or such other period of time as may be fixed by
the Authority.
SEC. 21.Sales Prior to Decree.- In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units sold or disposed of prior to the effectivity of this
Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or developer of the subdivision or condominium project to complete compliance with
his or its obligations as provided in the preceding section within two years from the date of this Decree unless otherwise extended by
the Authority or unless an adequate performance bond is filed in accordance with Section 6 hereof.
Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations under this and the preceding provisions shall constitute a violation
punishable under Section 38 and 39 of this Decree.
SEC. 23.Non-Forfeiture of Payments.-No installment payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or condominium project for the lot
or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or
developer, desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to develop the subdivision or condominium
project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. Such buyer may, at his option, be
reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests, with interest thereon at the legal
rate. (Italics supplied)
As for objections about a possible violation of the impairment clause, we find the following statements of Justice Isagani Cruz
enlightening and pertinent to the case at bench:
1Preamble,

Presidential Decree No. 957.

2 86 Phil. 50 (April 8, 1950).

Vol. II,Sutherland, Statutory Construction, pp. 693-695.

Comment filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the public -respondent, p. 9;

Rollo, p. 78.

Despite the impairment clause, a contract valid at the time of its execution may be legally modified or even completely invalidated by
a subsequent law. If the law is a proper exercise of the police power, it will prevail over the contract.
Into each contract are read the provisions of existing law and, always, a reservation of the police power as long as the agreement
deals with a matter affecting the public welfare. Such a contract, it has been held, suffers a congenital infirmity, and this is its
susceptibility to change by the legislature as a postulate of the legal order.
This Court ruled along similar lines in Juarez vs. Court of Appeals6:
The petitioner complains that the retroactive application of the law would violate the impairment clause. The argument does not
impress. The impairment clause is now no longer inviolate; in fact, there are many who now believe it is an anachronism in the
present-day society. It was quite useful before in protecting the integrity of private agreements from government meddling, but that
was when such agreements did not affect the community in general. They were indeed purely private agreements then. Any
interference with them at that time was really an unwarranted intrusion that could properly struck down.
But things are different now. More and more, the interests of the public have become involved in what are supposed to be still private
agreements, which have as a result been removed from the protection of the impairment clause. These agreements have come within
the embrace of the police power, that obtrusive protector of the public interest. It is a ubiquitous policeman indeed. As long as the
contract affects the public welfare one way or another so as to require the interference of the State, then must the police power be
asserted, and prevail, over the impairment clausq.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in Breta and Hamor vs. Lao, et al.7, penned by then Court of Appeals Associate Justice Jose A.
R. Melo, now a respected member of this Court, is persuasive, the. factual circumstances therein being of great similarity to the
antecedent facts of the case at bench:
Protection must be afforded small homeowners who toil and save if only to purchase on installment a tiny home lot they can call their
own. The consuming dream of every Filipino is to be able to buy a lot, no matter how small, so that he may somehow build a house. It
has, however, been seen of late that these honest, hard-living individuals are taken advantage of, with the delivery of titles delayed, the
subdivision facilities, including the most essential such as water installations not completed, or worse yet, as in the instant case, after
almost completing the payments for the property and after constructing a house, the buyer is suddenly confronted by the stark reality,
contrived or otherwise, in which another person would now appear to be owner.
xxx

xxx

xxx

We cannot over emphasize the fact that the BANK cannot barefacedly argue that simply because the title or titles offered as security
were clean of any encumbrance or lien, that it was thereby relieved of taking any other step to verify the over-reaching implications
should the subdivision be auctioned on foreclosure. The BANK could not have closed its eyes that it was dealing over a subdivision
where there were already houses constructed. Did it not enter the mind of the responsible officers of the BANK that there may even be
subdivision residents who have almost completed their installment payments? (Id., pp. 7 & 9).
By the foregoing citation, this Court thus adopts by reference the foregoing as part of this Decision.
The real estate mortgage in the above cited case, although constituted in 1975 and outside the beneficial aegis of P.D. 957, was struck
down by the Court of Appeals which found in favor of subdivision lot buyers when the rights of the latter clashed with the mortgagee
banks right to foreclose the property. The Court of Appeals in that case upheld the decision of the trial court declaring the real estate
mortgage as null and void.
As to the second issue of non-privity, petitioner avers that, in view of the provisions of Article 13 11 of the Civil Code, PNB, being a
total stranger to the land purchase agreement, cannot be made to take the developers place.
We disagree. P.D. 957 being applicable, Section 18 of said law obliges petitioner Bank to accept the payment of the remaining unpaid
amortizations tendered by private respondents.
SEC. 18.Mortgages.- No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or developer without prior written approval of the
Authority. Such approval shall not be granted unless it is shown that the proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used for the
development of the condominium or subdivision project and effective measures have been provided to ensure such utilization. The
loan value of each lot or unit covered by the mortgage shall be determined and the buyer thereof, if any, shall be notified before the
release of the loan. The buyer may, at his option, pay his installment for the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall apply the
payments to the corresponding mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for, with a view to enabling
said buyer to obtain title over the lot or unit promptly after full payment thereof. (Italics supplied)
Privity of contracts as a defense does not apply in this case for the law explicitly grants to the buyer the option to pay the installment
payment for his lot or unit directly to the mortgagee (petitioner), which is required to apply such payments to reduce the corresponding
portion of the mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for. And, as stated earlier, this is without
prejudice to petitioner Banks seeking relief against the subdivision developer.

6 214 SCRA 475,480 (October 7, 1992).

7CA-G.R.

No. 58728-R, promulgated on November 11, 1981.

Finally, before closing this Resolution, we enjoin petitioner Bank to focus not only on the strictly legal issues involved in this case but
also to take another look at the larger issues including social justice and the protection of human rights as enshrined in the
Constitution; firstly, because legal issues are raised and decided not in a vacuum but within the context of existing social, economic
and political conditions, law being merely a brick in the up-building of the social edifice; and secondly, petitioner, being THE state
bank, is for all intents and purposes an instrument for the implementation of state policies so cherished in our fundamental law. These
consideration are obviously far more weighty than the winning of any particular suit or the acquisition of any specific property. Thus,
as the country strives to move ahead towards economic self-sufficiency and to achieve dreams of NIC-hood and social well-being
for the majority of our countrymen, we hold that petitioner Bank, the premier bank in the country, which has in recent years made
record earnings and acquired an enviable international stature, with branches and subsidiaries in key financial centers around the
world, should be equally as happy with the disposition of this case as the private respondents, who were almost deprived and
dispossessed of their very homes purchased through their hard work and with their meager savings.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is hereby DENIED, petitioner having failed to show any
REVERSIBLE ERROR or GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION in the assailed decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ.,concur.

SUBJECT: AMENDMENTS
DOMINGO SARCOS, as Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur petitioners vs HON. RECARELO CASTILLO, Provincial
Governor of Surigao del Sur & the Hon. Provincial Board of Surigao del Sur respondents
FACTS:
Sarcos, an independent candidate, won in the 14 November 1967 elections, as Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del
Sur. Castillo charged Sarcos with misconduct and dishonesty in office. Such act alleged constituted connivance
with certain private individuals, to cut and fell timber and selling of the timber cut, for own use and benefit,
within the communcal forest reserve of the municipality of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, to the damage and
prejudice of the public and the government.
As early as 18 April 196 there was already a charge under oath for abuse of official power in consenting to and
authorizing the violations of forestry laws was filed against petitioner by Municipal Council of Barobo. It was
on the basis of this administrative complaint that the Castillo filed petition ordering the immediate suspension
of Sarcos from position as Mayor saying that the acts committed by mayor Sarcos affects his official integrity,
the petition was in accordance with the Sec.5 of RA 5185- Decentralization Act of 1967.
ISSUES:
WON Provincial Governor is vested power to order preventive suspension of Mayor Sarcos under RA 5185
HELD / RATIONALE:
No. Castillo as governor lacks authority to order the preventive suspension of the Petitioner, Sarcos.
According to the Decentralization Act of 1967, particularly the paragraph dealing with preventive suspension:
"The President, Provincial Board and City or Municipality Council, as the case may be, shall hear and
investigate the truth or falsity if the charges within 1- days after receipt of such notice." It was the former law
Sec. 2188 of Rev. Adm. Code which gives power to the Governor to order preventive suspension, however, it
was already repealed by the Decentralization Act of 1967.
The court was also lead to the suspicion that politics was a cause for the order by Governor of the preventive
suspension of the Mayor, being an independent candidate thus of a different political persuasion.
The writs of certiorari and prohibition are then granted. The preventive suspension order by Castillo is
annulled and set aside. Mayor Sarcos to be reinstated to his position.
*The Decentralization Act, to which the decision in this case is based, amended / repealed Sec. 2188, Rev.
Adm. Code. The former law provides that the provicnicla gorvernor, if the charge against a munucupola
officaial was municipal official was one affecting his official integrity, could order his preventive suspension. It
was repealed by the RA NO. 5185 Sec. 5 which provides that now it is the provincial board which has been
granted the power to order preventive suspension.

200 SCRA 80; G.R. NO.93177 COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA [2 AUG 1991]
Facts:The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to appear in person
before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged participation the failed coup on December 1 to 9, 1989.
Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A
motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for reconsideration.Alleging denial of due process.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM No.14.
He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of
preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty. However he was not released immediately.
The RTC now declared that even military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.
The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that they were
being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal
charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their
release.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.
Held: NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial
investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of
February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they
filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had been
expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a
waiver of their right to submit controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory challenge. (Right to
challenge validity of members of G/SCM)
It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles of
War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial
proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and
on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the
military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more
emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.
On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, there was substantial
compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special Investigating
Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one year because hundreds of officers and
thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup.
Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is granted,
and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under article
18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also granted, and the orders of the
respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.

CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES

L-2877 (38 SCRA 284) March 31, 1971

FACTS: In 1956, herein appellants brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law spouse, herein
appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was
executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of
being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an
affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and
inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at
the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship.

HELD: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during marriage, policy
consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition should
apply to a common-law relationship.

As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in favor of the
other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then
there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the
benefit of nuptials.

The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in appellant having exclusive
right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to
the other half.

Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall
be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

G.R. No. L-57499

June 22, 1984

Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

MERCEDES CALIMLIM- CANULLAS, petitioner, vs. HON. WILLELMO FORTUN, Judge, Court of First
instance of Pangasinan, Branch I, and CORAZON DAGUINES, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner MERCEDES Calimlim-Canullas and FERNANDO Canullas were married on December 19, 1962.
They begot five children. They lived in a small house on the residential land in question with an area of
approximately 891 square meters, located at Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. After FERNANDO's father died in
1965, FERNANDO inherited the land.
In 1978, FERNANDO abandoned his family and was living with private respondent Corazon DAGUINES.
During the pendency of this appeal, they were convicted of concubinage in a judgment rendered on October 27,
1981 by the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch II, which judgment has become final.
On April 15, 1980, FERNANDO sold the subject property with the house thereon to DAGUINES for the sum
of P2,000.00. In the document of sale, FERNANDO described the house as "also inherited by me from my
deceased parents."
Unable to take possession of the lot and house, DAGUINES initiated a complaint on June 19, 1980 for quieting
of title and damages against MERCEDES. The latter resisted and claimed that the house in dispute where she
and her children were residing, including the coconut trees on the land, were built and planted with conjugal funds
and through her industry; that the sale of the land together with the house and improvements to DAGUINES was
null and void because they are conjugal properties and she had not given her consent to the sale,
In its original judgment, respondent Court principally declared DAGUINES "as the lawful owner of the land in
question as well as the one-half of the house erected on said land." Upon reconsideration prayed for by
MERCEDES, however, respondent Court resolved:
WHEREFORE, the dispositive portion of the Decision of this Court, promulgated on October 6, 1980, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
(1) Declaring plaintiff as the true and lawful owner of the land in question and the 10 coconut trees;
(2) Declaring as null and void the sale of the conjugal house to plaintiff on April 15, 1980 (Exhibit A)
including the 3 coconut trees and other crops planted during the conjugal relation between Fernando
Canullas (vendor) and his legitimate wife, herein defendant Mercedes Calimlim- Canullas;

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the construction of a conjugal house on the exclusive property of the husband ipso facto gave the land
the character of conjugal property;
(2) Whether or not the sale of the lot together with the house and improvements thereon was valid under the
circumstances surrounding the transaction.

HELD: The determination of the first issue revolves around the interpretation to be given to the second paragraph of

Article 158 of the Civil Code, which reads:

xxx xxx xxx
Buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during the marriage on land belonging to one of the
spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the
same.

We hold that pursuant to the foregoing provision both the land and the building belong to the conjugal partnership but the
conjugal partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of the land. The spouse owning the lot becomes a creditor of
the conjugal partnership for the value of the lot, which value would be reimbursed at the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.

It is true that in the case of Maramba vs. Lozano, relied upon by respondent Judge, it was held that the land belonging to
one of the spouses, upon which the spouses have built a house, becomes conjugal property only when the conjugal
partnership is liquidated and indemnity paid to the owner of the land. We believe that the better rule is that enunciated
by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Padilla vs. Paterno, 3 SCRA 678, 691 (1961), where the following was explained:
As to the above properties, their conversion from paraphernal to conjugal assets should be deemed to retroact
to the time the conjugal buildings were first constructed thereon or at the very latest, to the time immediately
before the death of Narciso A. Padilla that ended the conjugal partnership. They can not be considered to
have become conjugal property only as of the time their values were paid to the estate of the widow
Concepcion Paterno because by that time the conjugal partnership no longer existed and it could not acquire
the ownership of said properties. The acquisition by the partnership of these properties was, under the 1943
decision, subject to the suspensive condition that their values would be reimbursed to the widow at the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership; once paid, the effects of the fulfillment of the condition should be
deemed to retroact to the date the obligation was constituted (Art. 1187, New Civil Code) ...

The foregoing premises considered, it follows that FERNANDO could not have alienated the house and lot to
DAGUINES since MERCEDES had not given her consent to said sale.

Anent the second issue, we find that the contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy.
The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal
home where his wife and children lived and from whence they derived their support. That sale was subversive of the
stability of the family, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.

Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts whose cause, object, or purpose is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy are void and inexistent from the very beginning.

Article 1352 also provides that: "Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatsoever. The
cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy."

Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to each other subject to certain exceptions.
Similarly, donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or con
conveyances between spouses were allowed during marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a
basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as
well as to protect the institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply to a couple
living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise, "the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn
out to be better than those in legal union." Those provisions are dictated by public interest and their criterion must be
imposed upon the wig of the parties. That was the ruling in Buenaventura vs. Bautista, also penned by Justice JBL Reyes
(CA) 50 O.G. 3679, and cited in Matabuena vs. Cervantes. We quote hereunder the pertinent dissertation on this point:

We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the
spouses during the marriage, policy considerations of the most exigent character as when the dictates of morality
require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.

As announced in the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals decision, Buenaventura vs. Bautista, 50 OG 3679,
interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language of
the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, 'to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his
descendants because of fear of undue influence and improper pressure upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our
ancient law, ..., then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and
wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years
bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly
increased'. Moreover, as pointed out by Ulpian "It would not be just that such donations should subsist, lest the
conditions of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better." So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our
family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to
concubinage (Emphasis supplied).
Susan Nicdao Cario vs. Susan Yee Cario
GR No. 132529

February 2, 2001

FACTS:

SPO4 Santiago Cario married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he had two children, Sahlee
and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cario also married respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cario
became bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis, and died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan
Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and
financial assistance from various government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to collect
P146,000 from MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee received a total of P21,000
from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance.
On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against Nicdao, praying that Nicdao be ordered to
return to her at least one-half of the P146,000 Nicdao had collected. For failing to file her answer, Nicdao was
declared in default.
Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of and without first obtaining a
judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and Cario. But she claimed good faith, having no
knowledge of the previous marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife
of the deceased. Yee submitted that Carios marriage to Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the
required marriage license.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void;
(2) Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death benefits from government
agencies despite the nullity of their marriage.
HELD: Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law,
for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.

Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the deceased was solemnized in
1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence therof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the
marriage void ab initio.

It does not follow, however, that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void ab initio, the death benefits
would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must
be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage; otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.

One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the
applicable property regime. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would
be not absolute community nor conjugal partnership of property, but governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148
of the Family Code, on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.

Liyao Jr vs Tanhoti-Liyao
G.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002

FACTS: On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed Civil Case No.
24943 before the RTC of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious)
child of the late William Liyao against herein respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L.
Tan and Linda Christina Liyao. The complaint was later amended to include the allegation that petitioner was in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao, petitioner having been recognized
and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime.

It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have raised a number of issues which relate solely to the
sufficiency of evidence presented by petitioner to establish his claim of filiation with the late William Liyao.
Unfortunately, both parties have consistently overlooked the real crux of this litigation: May petitioner impugn his own
legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao?

HELD: We deny the present petition.

Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The
presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on
the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to
protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.

The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence
to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code provides:

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and
before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the
husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which
preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for ten (10) years from her husband, Ramon
Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to have sexual
relations with Ramon Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim, petitioner presented a document
entitled, Contract of Separation, executed and signed by Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver of rights to any and all claims
on any property that Corazon Garcia might acquire in the future.

The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was
conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his
wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the
legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper
cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is
a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide
whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in
exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none even his heirs can
impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory.

It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein
petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William
Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner to
maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional
circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself
cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child,
then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers alleged paramour. On the
other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who
successfully defeated the presumption.

Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying
for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter?

We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed to contest the
legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time
of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was initiated by
petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the
legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within
the period limited by law.

Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the evidence presented by both parties on the
petitioners claim of alleged filiation with the late William Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent and positive
evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.

G.R. No. L-29658

November 29, 1968

ENRIQUE V. MORALES, petitioner,

vs.
ABELARDO SUBIDO, as Commissioner of Civil Service, respondent.

Political Law Journals vs Enrolled Bill

Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not
possess a bachelors degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police. Morales was the chief of
detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began
his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of
the former Chief , Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time,
given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Subido approved the
designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for failure to meet the minimum educational
and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position. Instead, the respondent certified other
persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section
reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. No person may be appointed
chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree from a recognized institution of
learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of
Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police
department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any
high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with
the rank of captain and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person who has served the police department of
a city can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being
deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree and
has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or
police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least
three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who
has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but
when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the
insertion of the phrase or has served as chief of police with exemplary record. Morales went on
to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which
according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to
the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the
journals, to look searchingly into the matter.
HELD: The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines
shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau
of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect
due to the other branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of
what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments.
Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine
what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of
the legislative process. The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the
journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution
expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a
legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question
which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC
does not now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be
entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.