Organizational Hierarchy Adaptation and Information Technology - 2002

Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182
www.elsevier.com/locate/infoandorg
Organizational hierarchy adaptation and

information technology
G.M. Schwarz
Department of Management, University of Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia
Abstract
Current debate on organization change is concerned increasingly with questioning the extent
to which different organizational designs are effective. Consequently, many new forms of
organizing have been proffered. In particular, new-form theorists acknowledge hierarchy but
rarely test it in generating a variety of information technology- (IT) related change outcomes.
This paper focuses on the robustness of hierarchy by tracing its characteristics within two
public organizations. It provides an understanding of the relationship between IT applications
and structural change by examining how the process of IT adaptation unfolds. Specifically, it
explores how managements disposition to IT change discerns the nature of an organizations
structure and the adaptation of that structure. I argue that the nature of managements application of information systemsand non-managements reaction to this practiceguides structural modification. Discussion focuses on explaining the continued presence of hierarchy in
IT environments where there is an expectation for significant structural change. 2002
Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Hierarchy; New organizational forms; Management roles; Information Technology change;
Organizational change
Ever since Weber (1968) introduced hierarchy as a fundamental part of organizing

labor, this key element of his bureaucracy abstraction has been well-explored in
organizational theory (Clegg, 1990). For several decades, acknowledging that many
IT applications exhibit Tayloristic work designs (Lyytinen & Ngwenyama, 1992),
various theorists have either focused on the dysfunctions or have overlooked a discussion of hierarchy in identifying an array of IT-related organizational changes
Tel.: +61-2-4221-5939; fax: +61-2-4221-4289.
E-mail address: gschwarz@uow.edu.au (G.M. Schwarz).
1471-7727/02/$ - see front matter 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182
(Bahrami, 1992; Bennis, 1966; Wasserman, 1971). Historically, one of the dominant
assumptions in organizational change literature is that the degradation of hierarchy
is a necessity for organizations to prosper. This belief is the premise of current
change assessments in organizational theory. Although hierarchy is acknowledged
as a basic aspect of organizing, it is viewed as a well-worn concept, not necessarily
needing to be tested further (Wareham, Bjrn-Anderson, & Neergaard, 1998).
The basis of this research position is that the value of organizational politics as
a theoretical perspective is well established. From the 1970s there has been an abundance of research illustrating the persistence of existing formal structures, and the
political alignments that are created through the implementation of new information
technologies (Kraemer, 1991; Laudon, 1974; Markus, 1983; Orlikowski, 1991; Starbuck, 1989). As Boudreau and Robey (1996) illustrate, however, there are a number
of contradictions, ambiguities, and confusions surrounding the rationale for the
organization of power arrangements. This ambivalence is especially the case in public sector organizations which have historically relied on power elites to perpetuate
established hierarchy schemes (Kraemer, King, Dunkle, & Lane).
With an understanding of the relationship between information technologies and
power, administrative reform, decision making and centralization, fewer researchers
have been inclined to study the interaction between current era technology change
outcomes and public sector management. This deficit has led to research on the use
of computing in government [having] declined precipitously (Kraemer and Dedrick,
1997:89). With this outlook as its stimulus, and recognizing that IT-related organizational change literature currently identifies a variety of change outcomes and theoretical positions, this paper adopts Markuss (1983:441) research invitation to investigate
the management of information by examining hierarchy authority. Specifically, the
paper reconsiders an understanding of the relationship between IT applications and
structural change by examining how the process of IT adaptation unfolds in public organizations.
With Webers (1968) conceptualization of bureaucratic hierarchy as its centerpiece, the research examines IT adaptation by investigating how management uses
technologies to enact change. To appreciate the nature of hierarchy in changing public technology environments, I acknowledge the contribution of previous management control research. As such, I accept that the disposition of an organizations
management to change must first be considered before a structural alignment effect
can be justified. The research is motivated by assumptions about changes to hierarchy
in the new-forms of organizing literature (new-form). This literature proposes that
changes within and around the organization induce significant structural modifications (e.g., Halal, 1994; Wigand, Picot, & Reichwald, 1997). Such an outlook
promotes the democratizing effects of technology change, suggesting that new technology applications have a decentralizing force on information and organizational
politics (Palmer & Dunford, 1997).
The research explores the association between technology and management selfinterest by reviewing the process of IT adaptation in two public organizations undertaking software changes, concentrating on the dialectic of authority (Orlikowski,
1992; 2000). This assessment is based on a recognition that IT innovation tends to
155
supplement rather than eliminate existing organizational structures (Townsend et al.,

1998). The appraisal of hierarchy in changing technology environments begins with
a clarification of the new-form call for structural change. In the next section, I provide
a review of the extant new-form literature and the confusion that exists within this
research. Having established the research basis, I then demonstrate the nature of
hierarchy and the pivotal role of domination (Giddens, 1984) in retaining hierarchy.
Based on these findings, ensuing discussion centers on how management use IT to
adapt structures and, consequently, on the implications of such action for management practice and change planning.
1. Background to the research

1.1. The study of technology in organizations
The legacy of Webers (1968) bureaucracy abstraction to organizational theory
has simultaneously been its overriding contribution to the conceptualization of the
organization, and its significant influence on the direction of technology impact
debate. Weber focused attention on a prescribed framework for the organization by
depicting precise functional categories. He thereby constructed a formal configuration
of organizational roles and procedures based on authority. This classification galvanized subsequent empirical tests to focus on, replicate and extend aspects of his framework. Early technology research readily acknowledged the causal role of technology
in ushering structural change.
The past decade, however, has witnessed the development of the structurational
perspective on technology as an alternative outlook on change (Barley, 1986;
DeSanctis & Poole, 1994; Lyytinen & Ngwenyama, 1992; Orlikowski & Robey,
1991; Orlikowski, 1992; Poole & DeSanctis, 1992; Walsham, 1993). Drawing on
Giddenss (1984) homeostatic process of agency and social structuring, this perspective supports a duality of structure (1984:19). It acknowledges that agency and
structure are mediated by and guide human agents, invoking understandings of interpretive schemas (i.e., standardized, shared stocks of knowledge), norms (i.e., rules
governing conduct), and facilities (i.e., means through which power is exercised).
This process guides the production or reproduction of an organizations social structure.
The use of IT has thus been recognized as being strongly influenced by users
understandings of the properties and functionality of a technology, based on an
agency/structure dichotomy (see Lyytinen & Ngwenyama, 1992, for a fuller review
of structuration). Orlikowskis (2000) recent appraisal of structuration extends the
perspective further. Examining the institutional, interpretive and technological conditions that shape different organizational structures, she proposes a practice-oriented
lens for studying the use of technology in organizations. In doing so, she inverts the
structurational model by suggesting that a practice lens focuses on knowledgeable
human action and how its recurrent engagement with a given technology constitutes
and reconstitutes particular emergent structures of using the technology (2000:421).
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Orlikowski illustrates that the dimensions of Giddenss duality argument can also
be a function of the recurrent use of technologies. As such, she expands our understanding of generalizations held about the conditions and consequences of change.
1.2. New forms of organizing theory
Support for new-form organizational theory often adopts the structurational perspective of technology. The fundamental assumption of the new-form organization
is that technological innovation is a critical component that is both driving and
enabling change in different business environments. This debate is concerned
increasingly with questioning the extent to which conventional notions of design are
effective (Ashkenas, Ulrich, Jick, & Kerr, 1995). Although multiple types of newform organizations are evident, the new-form is often described as an archetype.
Building and maintaining competitive and strategic advantage requires the creation
of dynamic core competencies. It also requires a focus on developing human capital
by implementing new IT that institutes a learning and innovative team-based culture
(Palmer & Dunford, 1997).
The resultant flexibility of task, function and informal, decentralized and participative project groupings has spawned the creation of many new organizational change
labels. The new-form organization is offered, among others things, as a boundaryless
(Ashkenas et al., 1995), cellular (Miles, Snow, Miles, Mathews, & Coleman, 1997),
constellation (Bahrami, 1992), horizontal (Ostroff, 1999), post-bureaucratic
(Nohria & Berkeley, 1994), spiders web, and virtual (Quinn, Anderson, & Finkelstein, 1996) corporation. Five dominant elements of change are evident in these
new-form listings: (i) organizational structure will be forced to become more flexible,
(ii) organizations will have to forge strategic network partnerships, (iii) decentralization will become the norm, (iv) information dissemination will encompass this
change in authority relations, and (v) job specialization and standardization will be
negated as peoples roles change.
New-form commentaries employ these elements of change to varying degrees, but
all suggest that the organization achieves some pattern of structural transformation
when enabled by IT. For example, early research on the topic emphasized the need
for fundamental structural transformation (e.g., Bennis, 1966; Toffler, 1970). Such
opinion maintained that altered technological and economic environments demanded
basic structural modifications. Current views on such change often assert that structural flexibility is fundamental to an organizations survival (e.g., Byrne, 1993;
Ostroff, 1999). Conversely, other researchers have positioned the new-form elements
to present the altered organization as a recreated hierarchy, while still acknowledging
the need for basic structural change alternatives (e.g., Quinn et al., 1996). This more
functional assessment of change is far more tentative in offering absolute structural
alteration as the cornerstone of technological and environmental developments. This
viewpoint acknowledges the need to change and to have structural flexibility. It
argues, however, that organizational change is a matter of reworking the most appropriate parts of the organization, rather than rededicating the whole organization
157
(Mirvis, 1997). New-form research thus presents organizations with several structural
change options when enabled by new technology.
1.3. Ambiguity in new-form research
Borrowing from Baskerville and Smithson (1995), and Boudreau and Robey
(1996), and serving as the basis for this paper, recent debate suggests that claims
for comprehensive structural change are overstated, based on the theoretical contradictions of new-form research. Not only are we being bombarded by one salvo
after another of organizational design solutions... (Keidel, 1994:12), as a result of
oversimplified or misleading attributions of change (Winter & Taylor, 1996), but
new-form theory is undermined by its enthusiasm for change. In particular, in an
effort to find an explanation for an orderly relationship between technology and
change, new-form theory has been eroded by research on the inaccurate representation of IT as the keystone of success (e.g., Markus & Benjamin, 1997), the lack
of appropriate empirical support (e.g., Ciborra, 1994), and research on the place and
nature of authority in the organization (e.g., Zuboff, 1988). It is the authority ambiguity that guides this research project.
As previously suggested, one of the main components of Giddenss (1984) structuration theory is that human interaction involves the application of normative sanctions, expressed through structures of domination and legitimation. These structures
retain and mediate order. The conditions and relations of power are key parts of the
structurational perspective of technology that have been generated from Giddenss
forms of institution. New-form theory challenges the basis of such authority retention. A series of research projects over the past twenty years, however, has illustrated
that the use of IT in organizations has not brought about significant change to
decision making, authority or organizational political schema. Information systems
have been shown to maintain existing administrative structures (Kraemer & King,
1979; Laudon, 1974; Perry & Kraemer, 1979), to centralize control (Danziger, Kraemer, Dunkle, & King, 1993; Robey, 1981), and to enhance power for those in
positions of authority (Markus, 1983; Kraemer & Dedrick, 1997; Zuboff, 1988).
In particular, Kraemer (1991) illustrates that the introduction and use of computing
systems reinforces existing structures of authority, centralized communication and
power in organizations. Underpinning his political bias thesis is the recognition that
organizations tend to conform to established institutional models while resisting
attempts to reform. How technology is used determines its effects, and as such,
whose interests are served. Management have thus tended to use IT to reinforce
their position in organizations (supporting Danziger et al., 1993; Orlikowski, 1991;
Kraemer & Dedrick, 1997; Kraemer & King, 1986; Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1997;
Robey & Boudreau, 1999). Subsequently, managers see no need to change their
ways. Quite the contrary. They have discovered that computing and other information
technologies are a powerful way to reinforce them (Kraemer, 1991:168). Laudons
(1974) analysis of computing and administration also reveals that despite the potential for change, established interest groups obstruct administrative reformbased on
the threat to power and control. Using this political perspective, Markus (1983), like
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Zuboff (1988), argues that this bias is a process of the nature of interaction between
people and the system. Markus illustrates that those in positions of power, and with
a key role in systems decision making, are more likely to avoid changes that could
affect their authority base. This process of self-examination allows the management
group to perceive and understand other peoples reaction to the system, dictating the
parameters of the implementation to serve their interests.
Recognizing Kraemers cumulative influence on the preceding authority retention
debate, and drawing on Robey and Boudreaus (1999) causal logic of opposition
viewpoint, this paper reconsiders the relationship between IT and structural change
in public organization. Although a weight of evidence supports the persistence of
existing formal structures within the public sector (e.g., Robey & Sahay, 1996), the
effects of decentralized technologies on organizational politics is still not yet well
understood (Kraemer & Dedrick, 1997). Most research in this field does not use
new-form theory as a theoretical basis. Moreover, most research on the alignment
between structure and politics within changing IT environments examines the
relationship between applications and organizational change. Internal factors under
the control of management are considered, but this is often done in terms of political
theory (e.g., Kraemer et al., 1989; Zuboff, 1988). With this observation in mind, I
examine the process of IT adaptation within two public sector organizations.
2. Method
2.1. Research design and sample
To address the research topic, separate divisions within two Australian organizations that were at different stages of introducing new software technology changes
were selected as critical cases. Each organization differed in their structural configuration at the time of IT change commencement, in size and age, and change
expectations. Both, however, had established hierarchies in place. This sample builds
on the recognition that historically, public-sector organizations have been highly
bureaucratized (Meyer, 1968). The use of this sample is intended to give a clearer
understanding of the process of IT adaptation by concentrating on organizations that
are readily identifiable as hierarchical. With IT implementation changes at its base,
I focus on the processes that shape hierarchy through the use of technology where
there is no question that hierarchy is significant to the organization. This approach
acknowledges that little substantive research exists about differences between publicand private-sector organizations within new-form theory. Furthermore, the choice of
the public sector recognizes that public administrators are often eager to adopt new
technological developments, and that information systems have long been viewed as
an instrument of administrative reform (Kraemer, 1991).
The first company reviewed, PubliTech, was a state-owned entity that was principally, but not solely, concerned with IT network management for the State publicsector. Mintzbergs (1979) professional bureaucracy characterized the organization
prior to the decision to implement the new system. The company specializes in
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network services (e.g., integrated network management and internet/intranet

services), but it has diversified to include IT services (e.g., bureau services and
software management), business systems (e.g., financial and HR management bureau
services) and information services (e.g., interactive telephone services and video
conferencing). The company has just over 400 employees. Data collection concentrated on the software reengineering experience of the corporate services division.
Sixty persons were employed in this division at the time the new system was introduced. The new system, Information and Financial Management System (IFMS), is
an enterprise resource planning system (ERP) implemented to replace the functions
of a fragmented manual waste management system. IFMS is a multi-faceted, integrated software package consisting of a suite of business process applications (or
modules) including financial accounting, investment management, human resource
development, controlling, logistics, treasury management and data management
components (Table 1).
Table 1
Dimensions of case study companies
Dimension
PubliTech
Unit of Research
Corporate Services Division
Study Analysis
Information
Information and Financial
Technology Innovation Management System (IFMS):
employed to better manage internal
business processes while establishing
platform for future consulting services
Context of Change
History: Company provides network
Journey
services for both public and private
sector. Division made up of 8
separate departments. Company
moving towards corporatization and
IFMS seen as providing financial
basis for this
Size: Division employs 60 people,
while the company employs about
400 people
WasteCo
Waste Management Division
Waste Management Information
System (WMIS): employed to achieve
the coordination of externally
determined environmental directives
with economic objectives
History: Division created by
combining three separate entities to
achieve waste minimization goals
through the use of WMIS
Size: Division employs 40 personnel,

while the three entities separately
employ approximately 454 people
(47, 400 and 7 respectively)
Funding: State government
Funding: Local government ($1.9
million over 5 years in a $50 million
waste management project)
Structural
Professional Bureaucracy (Mintzberg, Divisionalized Form (Mintzberg,
Configuration Prior to 1979)
1979)
Information
Technology
Innovation
Dominant Change
Extensive structural rededication with Fundamental changes to structure to
Expectation at
job function change and procedural
bring about economic efficiencies.
Commencement
and operational modification
Radical changes to user behavior
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The second company, WasteCo, was an entity established to develop and

implement a new citywide Waste Management Information System (WMIS). Data
collection concentrated on the waste management division created to operate, manage
and maintain the system. The division was made up of three separate and independent
units, being the local government waste management authority, the information system service provider, and the private waste site operator. These units were forced
together to operate as one entity and consisted of approximately 40 individuals. Prior
to the creation of WMIS the entity did not exist and local government manually
operated and maintained waste sites. As such, it is a byproduct of a centrally coordinated, centrally funded waste management program. Data collection centers on the
implementation and upgrade of a software system that coordinates the administration
of waste and landfill sites and directs the (physical) management of dumping on site
(Table 1). It specifically examines the operation of five waste disposal sites as the
third and final phase of WMIS application was developed and progressively
implemented.
Mintzbergs (1979) divisionalized form of organizing characterized the organization prior to WMIS development. The system was implemented initially in 1992 and
progressively upgraded over a seven-year period. One of the first of its kind worldwide, it monitors (e.g., through point-of-sale computing as well as image capture
computing), analyzes (e.g., weighbridges and data administration) and controls entry
to and from recycling, refuse and landfill sites. It also provides financial and statistical management information for the entire citys (population c.900,000) waste disposal process. For both cases, management referred to throughout the paper relates
to senior management reaction to IFMS and WMIS. This focus recognizes Caudles
(1990) observation that strategies for developing information technologies in government usually come from middle management, while key decisions about systems
implementation and emphasis come from senior management.
The choice of the two sites was based on a replication logic (i.e., studying sites
with similar change intentions) over a sampling logic (i.e., studying sites of different
natures). Following Dyer and Wilkins (1991) assessment of the merit of small
samples, I preferred to develop a stronger explanation of how the process of IT
adaptation unfolded, with a mind to testing my findings in different contexts in future
research (following Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1997). The case study design employed
adopts Yins (1994) literal replication justification. The two cases were purposely
selected because they allowed direct comparison over time. Both had an acknowledged commitment by management to implement new systems in order to bring
about some form of change, and were undertaking similar technological changes. By
identifying central change topics, and then clarifying the accuracy of these themes, a
replication logic ensured that continual contrast and comparison of results between
cases took place throughout data collection.
2.2. Data collection and analysis
Data collection methods included non-participative observation, reviewing documentation and archival records, and undertaking three waves of semi-structured inter-
161
views. OKeefes (1979) approach to social interaction was adapted in two ways
both during and after data were collected. The first wave of data collection (July
October 1997) was used to review and examine previous research themes, and then
to generate a research focus. The subsequent two waves (AprilJuly 1998; November
1998March 1999) were used to test, expand and modify this initial research focus.
In each case, the data collected and the analysis that followed immediately after
collection informed other observations, insights and data subsequently undertaken.
The general data collection procedure was similar for each case. Documentation
was reviewed in the first wave of data collection, in order to contextualize the nature
of the technology, organizational change objectives and to gain a better understanding of personnel roles and requirements. Both organizations had a variety of technical-based documentation (e.g., what, where, when, cost) and strategy relevant information (e.g., cost/benefit analysis) that contextualized change decisions, change
motives, technology potential and company aspirations. Updated documents, inhouse company and public domain publications supplemented the original notes in
the second and third wave of data collection. An understanding of the organizational
aspects (e.g., strategic direction, change in personnel, job specifications, work flow
and reporting practices) was gained through in-depth semi-structured interviews with
key personnel involved in the implementation and use of the system. These interviews dominated all data collection periods. In the first wave, the focus of the interviews was on the persons experience of the system implementation and their expectations for change. The second and third waves explored attitudes towards the way
the system was being used, and to changes in outlook and in perceptions of the
organization.
At PubliTech, the three waves of data collection encompassed two IFMS phase
releases. All participants were either members of the IFMS construction, implementation and adaptation team or the departments that had gained access to the system.
In the initial IFMS phase (first data collection period, four months into the
implementation), implementation was limited to core financial applications within
the financial and administrative units. With the second phase, the system was progressively introduced into all parts of the divisions operations (collection phases
were 11 and 18 months into implementation). A total of 62 interviews were undertaken over the twenty-month observation period with 21 key respondents, ranging
from directors, project committees, project management, project engineers, system
support and HR personnel.
At WasteCo, interviews were arranged with individuals within the waste management division who had experience of the early versions of the system (19926), as
well as those involved with the development of its third release (19979). WMIS
consultants who had built WMIS first phase release formed the largest sector of
participation in the first and second wave of data collection. Forty interviews were
undertaken with 14 individuals from all three parts of the conglomerate over the
period of observation.
Questions were customized to capture the different experiences of each case. In
general, however, they focused on new technology and the change process, change
experiences, and authority. In attempting to build a picture of hierarchy, a hierarchy
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checklist was included in all interviews. The checklist was a list of questions that
reflected several components specific to Webers (1968) hierarchy. These components included questions relating to hierarchy as respondents saw it, control and
reporting systems, reporting structures, communication patterns, accountability,
responsibility, and decision-making processes. The checklist enabled me to better
understand and characterize the difference between small-scale organizational
changes (i.e., limited to the job and job processes), and large-scale changes (i.e.,
fundamental structural reconfiguration) as technology use was being refined.
Following each period of data collection, I employed Wolcotts (1994) three-step
approach of organizing qualitative data. As is typical of inductive research, this
approach (description, analysis, and interpretation) first employed an analysis of data
for individual case studies, and then compared findings across cases. All interviews
were transcribed and coded. A coding scheme was developed by constructing data
out of the descriptive account given by respondents, and identifying and categorizing
the primary patterns in the data. This action was achieved by singling out information
that I thought was noteworthy in terms of a research theme (e.g., exceptions or
challenges). I then relegated data that I thought to be less significant in terms of this
theme to the background (e.g., data relating to personal problems unrelated to the
system). After identifying preliminary themes, I reviewed interview transcripts and
documentation and coded text into these themes. I followed this by comparing coding
classifications and reviewing any discrepancies.
After developing the coding scheme I attempted to transform data into a more
consistent, organized scheme. I did this by relabelling information gathered as data
was collected across each wave of data collection. I was able to impose some order
on the data collected by highlighting particular findings, identifying patterned regularities, continuously comparing IFMS and WMIS case results, and contextualizing
the data to previous research. This step embodies the literal replication logic adopted
throughout the research project. Having identified standards, sorted and ordered the
data collected, I set about reviewing these data patterns across both cases. I relied
on methods suggested by Eisenhardt (1989) to develop cross-case insights. In doing
so, throughout the aforementioned inductive process, I initially compared case
themes to identify common issues and dilemmas and refine the unique aspects of
each case. I then reviewed each theme for similarities and differences to develop
the emerging theoretical extension of my findings. With each iteration, as this process
evolved, I compared different sets of themes to refine my conceptual insights. After
each period of analysis, I went back through the individual cases to confirm my
observations.
3. Results: the constancy of hierarchy

The introduction, adaptation and manipulation of IFMS at PubliTech and WMIS
at WasteCo did not encourage fundamental structural transformation. New software
technology did not bring about the demise of hierarchy or the fixtures of authority
that had historically dominated these organizations. By using IFMS and WMIS to
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formalize behavior, specialize jobs, and create a reliance on functional groupings,

some form of hierarchy authority was generally retained. Each case suggests that
hierarchy has been able to adapt to new technology and the change aspects of
organizing labor, however, evidence indicates that hierarchy retention was contingent
upon management reaction to both new systems. Table 2 presents a synthesis of the
nature of hierarchy retention for both cases.
3.1. Overview of IFMS implementation
The implementation of IFMS began in May 1997, with the assistance of a wellknown international consultant working closely with the implementation team. The
selection of IFMS technology was made by senior management guided by the need
to replace a previously aging and unreliable financial management system, and to
Table 2
A synthesis of hierarchy stasis cross-case findings
Dimensions
PubliTech
Basis of the Initial

Belief in the Need for
New System Changes
New system commitment based on

the need to replace an aging and
unreliable information and financial
management system. System also
viewed as a means to generate
future revenue as the basis of the
company becoming an IFMS service
provider.
Hierarchy Parts
Sustained
Case Commonalities
WasteCo
Commitment to constant system

change and upgrade part of a wider
waste reduction program. System
seen as a means to win the war
against waste and achieve promised
environmental and organizational
outcomes. Management commitment
to creating a more efficient, more
profitable waste management
program.
Justification: Information
Justification: Information
technology as a driver of change
technology as means to significant
job change
Stability of trend increasing job
Three parts coming together to form
specialization,
quasi-autonomous entities coupled
together by a central machine
bureaucracy administrative structure,
High formalization,
Administrative centralization high,
Elaborate administrative structure,
Standardization of waste
management task and procedure,
Minor internal rearrangement within Limited vertical decentralization,
individual divisions small role
sharing teams forming,
Operations and interaction between Formal and informal authority
divisions unchanged.
differences increasingly manifest
Rational-legal authority dominance Dominance of one unit over others
Centralization and high complexity Modification of management change
within changing operating
expectation
environment
Changes at job and unit level
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bolster PubliTechs eventual sale by government. The new system was viewed as a
means to generate future revenue, with PubliTech considering itself to be a potential
national IFMS service provider. The implementation was initially concentrated in
the corporate services division, because its departments were seen as most likely to
aid the organizations transition to corporatization. Moreover, its departments already
relied on high technology use, thereby dispersing the system quickly and effectively
within this group.
IFMSs implementation and development was governed by a three-tier steering
committee structure. Senior management guided the process and made key decisions.
This group of managers included representatives from across all divisions within
the organization, and had the principal hand in determining commissioning contract
guidelines. Despite lacking any substantive technical knowledge of the system, the
dominant expectation of this group at the commencement of systems implementation
was that there would be extensive structural change. As an internal report endorsed
by the group reiterates,
[IFMS] is a software product that unlocks the path to efficient organization units
and to new structures....With its integrated processes for complete handling of
enterprise processes, it holds considerable potential for reengineering conventional
structures and organizational methods. It enhances performance by redesigning
core business processes to revitalize and optimize them. This overcomes the
divisions of labor that restrict productivity (1997).
With senior managements ascendant role in PubliTechs IFMS strategy, this
expectation guided the make-up of IFMS change decisions in the first phase of
implementation. The second tier of the committee included project managers and
implementation coordinators who were responsible for acting on managements
decisions in overseeing changes. This middle-management grouping were members
of the corporate services division and connected senior management and the
implementation team, having direct contact with both groups. Unlike senior management, most members of this group were drawn from a technical background, and
had previous knowledge of and experience with IFMS operations. This groups initial
expectations at the commencement of the implementation matched those of senior
management:
The implementation [of IFMS] will impact on the way people perform their jobs.
In order to achieve this change and our business objectives, the implementation
will need to be accompanied by the redesign of structures and business processes.
These changes are necessary to support new business processes. Simply touching
up current processes will not change behaviors (1997).
The third tier of IFMS implementation governance was IFMS consultants. This
group was responsible for developing the system, based on senior managements
165
instruction. They included the international consultant firm and IT contractors. Once
IFMS first phase was completed, consultants were also obligated to oversee operational matters, such as maintaining IFMS configurations, data archiving, data backup
and solving user problems. Project management and consulting members of the committee provided feedback to top tier management but had no veto rights over
implementation choices or the change process.
3.2. Impacts of IFMS on PubliTech
Far from fundamentally altering the corporate services division, IFMS at PubliTech promoted familiar but basic structural stability. Despite initial management-led
confidence that IFMS is magicits going to change the way that we structure things
around here (Deputy Director General, 1997), the application of IFMS did not
reduce the basic command-and-control hierarchy. The completion of the first phase
release of IFMS actually solidified differences between departments. Early in proceedings senior management presented change almost as if it were a company doctrine. Once IFMS first implementation phase began to take effect and once phase
two commenced, however, management began candidly identifying with the values
of what they were familiar withi.e., a parallel administration hierarchy with a
professional bureaucracy at its base (Mintzberg, 1979). Such a hierarchy was characterized by the coordinating systems of this configuration, dependent on the task being
undertaken. For example, consulting services staff generally required a large degree
of operating independence, while finance staff required close supervision and standardization of work processes. The junior project manager reflects on this outcome,
I think a more commercial entity presses for a flatter organization. However, we

are in the middle of a struggle between change to a flat entity and no change,
and I suspect its the traditional hierarchy thats winning. Whilst were a part of
government, I guess we have to conform to it in some way (1998).
Despite initial assertions to the contrary, based for the most part on an expectation
of change, administrative roles were reinforced and strengthened by IFMSs
implementation. Nonetheless, the system did instill some work independence, as was
originally touted. This change gave those using IFMS or relying on its data to do
their jobs an ability to define their own boundaries, access certain information and
undertake a series of roles that they were previously unable to do. The implementation, however, simultaneously restricted this new-found freedom. While it allowed
significant changes in specific task handling, management, consultants and operators
ultimately still retained much the same jobs that they held prior to its implementation.
For example, IFMS was originally promoted as enabling finance staff to initiate
reports on their own accordwithout needing to consult the next level of management at every step. The system was predicated on freeing information and on
allowing concurrent task engineering for both finance operators and administrators.
Accordingly, responsibilities for both groupings were presented as needing to be
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redefined, based on information access, and thus, accordant changes to the job. By
the completion of the first phase, however, the system still retained established task
restrictions associated with these functions. IFMS provided finance staff with far
more accurate and useful information. It allowed them to access, collate and manipulate this data in new ways. Regardless, these functions were still curtailed. Operator
decisions relating to task commencement, task completion and then general approval
for parts of job procedure (e.g., account undertakings) still needed to come from
the next level of management. Administrators still needed middle managements
authorization before they could use IFMS generated data in ways that differed from
the norm. The systematic order of the administration of these tasks had not been
altered in any notable fashion.
Notwithstanding the commercial reasoning for introducing IFMS, the adjustment
of managements change mindset has influenced users directly. Some individuals
publicly held the expectation that IFMS would allow an increase in autonomy for
system administrators. The procedural advantages of this action were viewed as taking effect almost immediately. A financial controller argued that:
These new applications have allowed management to devolve decision making

further down the line....In effect, all this has done is enable senior management
to check on and oversee things a lot more effectively (1998).
Some staff were reluctant to commit to genuine changes that would rededicate
roles or relationships. As a result, while IFMS originally offered some form of
change at the administrative level of the division, promising to give us the ability
to be able to achieve all the flexibility that we need but cant have now (project
manager, 1997), individual roles and the formalization of office remained much the
same. For example, twelve months after the initial release of the system, IFMS
allowed finance administrators to do their jobs remotely. There was, however, no
managerial commitment to encourage this change. Individuals were given no incentives to change their work habits, and as such, none had changed their working
patterns. This outcome was particularly noteworthy because it was still easier to
work from a central office. Remote users required the same authorizations to complete operations as those working on-site. The system offered a variety of similar
changes to working habits and associated authority schemes, such as promoting a
greater emphasis on teamwork by allowing all staff greater access to IFMS generated
data. But without any modifications to operations and procedures, there was an
unwillingness by staff to be the first to commit to these changes.
3.3. Overview of WMIS implementation
WMIS was initiated in WasteCo in September 1992under instruction from local
governmentby the senior management group of the waste management authority
and site operator units of the division. The system was part of an integrated public
campaign to reduce the waste going to the landfill by 50 percent by the year 2000
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(WasteCo Review, 1997). WasteCos troika partnership (waste management authority, service provider, and site operator) was established to develop and implement
a waste management system that would coordinate this process. The three units of the
division maintained a self-governing independence, with each historically operating
autonomously, having separate financial goals, public personae, and mission statements. Together, these units forged a new identity and common purpose, built around
WMIS. It was anticipated that the system would achieve this purpose by coordinating
kerbside recycling, hardfill recycling, and commercial composting, creating a waste
audit scheme (and the agencies to manage this scheme). To achieve this program of
waste management, A$1.9 million was spent on WMIS software development. The
system was initially implemented at the citys landfill site (i.e., burial of solid waste)
in 1992, and then progressively at each of the four smaller waste stations (handling
domestic, commercial, and residential solid waste) from 1993 onwards. WMISs
development, and its success in managing waste distribution, established WasteCo
as a market leader. By 1997, the success of the system in achieving waste minimization goals and improving site management had encouraged the division to begin
marketing the technology to other Australian waste management operators.
WMIS replaced an antiquated, manual and previously labor-intensive waste management process over its three-phase implementation period. The system was promoted in the early stages of its release as compelling users to change their behavior
(and the features of the division that guided this behavior) in achieving long-term
waste management goals. The initial release specification constituted a development
of functional requirements (for operations), automation procedures (for data collection and collation) and systems infrastructure (for data administration). The second
(19934) and third (19979) phases focused on reviewing and upgrading these initiatives, while developing the systems interface. WMIS was instituted to allow the three
parts of the division to retain their operational independence, while still being part
of a centrally funded public institution. The implementation of WMIS was governed
by the WMIS coordination group, which included senior and project management
representatives from all three WasteCo units. Drawing on the technical expertise and
feedback of the service provider, this grouping made all key decisions relating to
the nature and timing of the implementation.
3.4. Impacts of WMIS on WasteCo
In the first phase of WMIS implementation, the division operated as a series of
vertically integrated yet independent parts. Each unit shared responsibility for
effecting local-government determined waste management objectives, while playing
an important role in the organization of WMIS activities. The progressive development of WMIS, however, saw WasteCos interdependent divisionalized form move
towards the more dependent, centralized configuration typical of the machine
bureaucracy of the waste management authority unit. The division overturned the
advantages of operational integration by consolidating the routine, formalization and
standardization methods of coordination associated with the functional differentiation
of this type of bureaucracy. This situation evolved despite initial promises that early
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on we were told that the system would flatten our hierarchy (systems administrator).
As the same systems administrator points out, however, we now work on the presumption that there is a manager, that each division is broken down into sections
and there are section heads and team leaders. We no longer have the situation where
were allowing people to do their own thing.
The grouping of tasks and consolidation of the formulation, organization, and
coordination of waste management goals through WMIS use enabled the division to
centralize previously shared responsibilities. As such, the system fortified the functional distinctions that characterized waste management procedures prior to the process being computerized in 1992. Far from altering operations, functions and processes were strengthened over the three-phase release. As a result, a clear divide
between administrators and operators was strengthened, in keeping with the centralization of decision-making that epitomized waste management administrative procedures. A systems operator describes this situation:
Any changes that need to be madeeven the slightest changestill have to be

approved by the manager. Whether it is really his concern or not, thats the way
the division is structured now. The slightest change, whether it is something that
doesnt affect the operating system still has to be approved, so that no one can
really make a low-level decision and say lets just change this because it doesnt
affect anyone else, but its easy to do and saves us moneythis still has to go
to management (1998).
The functional requirements of gatehouse operator staff illustrate how this process
has compromised operator independence. Using WMIS to maintain the entrance to
each waste site, the informality and independence of this job has effectively been
subsumed by a subtle process of systems upgrade. By replacing a manual procedure
with an automated one, the division has been able to reinforce a centralization of
operations. This change has enabled the waste authoritys management to control
action in a far more concerted manner than they were able to prior to the system.
Operators still meet and greet customers, still inspect waste and determine its type,
and still reject clients based on strictly established environmental criteria. This process, however, is now largely an automated one. Operators are no longer able to
deal with, scrutinize or comment on data collected because this data now bypasses
them. The job, in effect, has been de-legitimized through a reliance on clear task
markers. Anyone with two days of WMIS training and an understanding of WasteCo
environmental regulations could be employed in this position. Operator behavior
is now guided by the system. As such, a clear divide between operators and data
administrators and management is broadened. Authority is enforced by the implicit
control over operator actions, obscured behind the user-friendly, easy-to-use system.
The inherently menial nature of the gatehouse operators job has meant that this
process would always depend to some degree on the standardization of its operating
work processes for coordination. Whereas the system was commissioned with the
promise of helping us improve our workflow by giving us more freedomsbecause
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after all, thats the blood, arteries and veins of what we do (operator), the tasks
that characterize this job have been increasingly centralized. This process ensured
that by the systems second-phase release, part-time university student employees,
with computing but no waste management experience, began to replace long-serving
waste operators. Prior to WMIS, the operator job was far more of a social experience
than it was about completing the task. Setting more rigidly enforced procedures in
place ensured a lack of ownership, as an operator bluntly observes:
I just dont care anymore, I just do whatever they [waste authority] wantI shrug
my shoulders and get into it. Go home, shake my head, kick the dog, whatever.
But at the end of the day, my role here is to do what they want me to do (1998).
For a senior system consultant, this process reflects the logic of managements
thinking on change:
If youre going for an organizational change and use IT as part of that system,
the IT has to reflect the organizational change, and the organizational change
comes from management. So the IT system has to reflect managements views
on organization change. I see nothing wrong with that (1997).
The gatehouse operator examplelike the waste spotter and site coordinator
rolesillustrates that WasteCos WMIS implementation has been an inherently
unequal process. It has not diminished the features of the original hierarchy configuration, nor has it aided the dissemination of authority. Rather, technology innovation has been used to enhance managements operational control. WMISs application has thus remained much the same since its inception in 1992. While its thirdphase release has allowed some changes to roles, the system has simultaneously been
used to enforce basic command-and-control structures. This decision was based on
the nature of system requirements, the perceived value of a machine bureaucracy
hierarchy, and a belief in the absolute need to meet centrally established waste monitoring performance standards.
3.5. Explaining outcome similarities: managements role in maintaining hierarchy
Support for hierarchy authority retention illustrates that information technology in
each case did not necessitate a de-bureaucratization of the organization. New technology reinforced the authority parts of Webers (1968) hierarchy because of the
perceived stability and security accompanying the configuration. Each set of senior
managers was adamant that legitimate authority was a necessary organizational
requirement. Management, therefore, progressively interpreted systems implementation in a manner that enforced an authority distinction. This action aligns with
Webers argument that a system of authority that limits itself to the appeal to material
or effectual or ideal motives as a basis for guaranteeing its continuance is ultimately
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self-effacing. Hierarchy was retained at PubliTech and WasteCo because management relied upon the authority that they had always held. Despite early comments
to the contrary, they did not encourage significant structural change. For PubliTechs
deputy director general, the need for an authority differentiation was tacitly logical:
We wanted benefits from [IFMS] and that was mainly management information
and the coordination of information....Ive seen situations when no ones taken
that role and I found that when someone walks in and has taken that role, somehow things are done better. Its almost as if they [subordinates] feel better....They
all feel that their ideas are going somewhere, theyre being discussed, whereas I
find that a group of individuals without someone driving a common purpose tends
to flake away. Its hard to keep that glue together to achieve something then
(1998).
WasteCos senior systems administrator reiterates this viewpoint:
Its human nature. There are leaders and there are followers. And thats fine,
because not everyone wants to make a decision. People need to be told what to
do and how they have to do it, and if anything goes wrong, then its not their
fault. Thats what they are comfortable with and so thats what we do (1998).
In each case, management viewed IT as a means to enforce the controls associated
with authority role differentiation, and thereby enhance existing authority relations.
Management used each system to reinforce standardization, centralization and formalization principles of a bureaucratic organizational construct. As such, once a
system had been implemented, management attempted to delineate parts of the
organization based on meeting its own requirements. This goal-oriented approach
ensured that management monitored the change situation, evaluated the nature of
structural changes, and then took corrective action to adjust roles and relationships,
and rules and procedures to meet their expectations. Such action describes a utilitarian preservation of self outlook. This outlook is characterized by IT being conceived, developed, coordinated and implemented by human agents who bring certain
specific interests and values to the change equation. As such, both sets of management primarily only promoted new IT once they were certain that it was likely to
lead to a maintenance of the legitimate control of Weberian hierarchy.
Management action reflected their vested interest in the structural status quo, viewing technology applications as an extension of the managerial position. They continually assessed the potential change situation in this vein, as a project manager at
PubliTech observed if you go and try to cater for everybody else and add all the
bells and whistles and the sorts of things that everybody wants, the system would
just become totally bogged down. So the main purpose of [IFMS] now is to provide
us with better information. Thats it. In both cases, several similar devices have
maintained management control. These included:
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1. A career system that depends on authority differentiation. Situational and institutional properties still closely follow a pattern of organization (i.e., promotion,
decision making, procedure) that is strongly linked to authority differentiation.
For PubliTech this situation reflects the influence of state government, while for
WasteCo, the waste management unit.
2. A socialization process whereby most non-management staff members learn to
ritualize authority as a sanctioned management tool. For example, primary system
users in both organizations were educated in this mindset through the training
routine employed. Finance and gatehouse operators were schooled only in the
basic parts of the system to enable them to do the minimum requirements of
the job.
3. Internal behavioral controls that foster role differentiation (e.g., operator roles).
The routine that this centralization engendered has subsequently promoted a constant cycle of recruitment, training, and systems familiarization, ensuring that
users and operations management were disenfranchised.
4. A system of direct supervision that formalizes functional differentiation.
For example, at PubliTech, despite the ability of IFMS to encompass a wide range
of new and sophisticated functions, senior management was reluctant to accept the
system without reworking its parts to comply with their own requirements. By undertaking a process of adapting system modules to meet their (authority based) change
expectations, it had subsequently become a means of upgrading rather than changing.
New system modules were continually forced to match the old system. Senior management, wary of changes that they believed they might have no control over,
enforced this constraint. The essential quality of this decision in managements eyes
was that it not only guaranteed stability, but that it was the rational thing to do.
The heart of managements utilitarian preservation posture at PubliTech was that
senior management ostensibly commissioned a management information system.
They selected particular IFMS modules to form the basis of the initial implementation scheme. Accordingly, IFMS was regarded as a system meant to improve managements access to and control of information. Implementation team members continually portrayed the system as an information system that achieved managements
goals first. Only once these were met were operator change objectives more closely
considered. The system was viewed as a means to improve reporting procedures
rather than a means to rationalize these procedures (as was originally touted). An
implementation team consultant reiterates this process:
There are management players that are actually working against the system...there
are a number of them thinking well, IFMS is going to expose me, so Ive got
to work against it. That force was very evident in this phase as to who wanted
what and why they wanted these things, and its part of the fact that weve been
in limbo for three months waiting for decisions about where were going. For
some managers the longer the process went along, the happier they were...they
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were quite happy that [the implementation] was moving the way it was moving
because it gave them time to position themselves (1999).
In accordance with this situation, the initial and overriding (information) advantages of IFMS primarily accrued to management. This result is not surprising given
the nature of the organization. Most management had spent little time actively interacting with the system in the first phase release, however, despite their role in the
design and commission. Consequently, most senior managers whose jobs were
directly affected by the information accrued through the system did not understand
how it worked. Neither did they recognize how they could use IFMS or how they
could encourage others to apply it in a more efficient manner.
At WasteCo, the limitations of WMIS first phase release meant that it was never
really going to threaten existing functional differentiation or the way information
was shared. Yet management instructed the service provider unit to initiate 582
change requests in the second phase release in order to centralize system generated
information, so that WMIS would always be a management system. On reflection
I dont think that theres been anything in the last five years that has changed that
(WMIS Consultant, 1997). Only a select few at head office could review cross-site
information together with waste management goals. Consequently, controls that were
previously embedded solely in rules, regulations, procedures, job titles and pay
grades were transplanted onto the progressive upgrades of the system.
WasteCos management reacted to technology implementation only when they
perceived it as a threat to the information flow that defined the outer limits of their
position of authority. Management assumed that they needed to use WMIS to anchor
their influence and to push the utilization of the system to ensure this influence. In
effect, management action reflects a form of management self-preservation. This
reaction is based partially on the fear of what a change to information flow could
mean for the management job, and partly on a belief that organizational rationality
is linked to authority differentiation (as in Weber, 1968). Assessing the situation,
management considered to what extent they would need to defend their positions.
They have then acted in accordance with this judgment. The key to this approach
is that management action was a premeditated, self-interested action. By preserving
their decision-making positions, management did not restrict WMIS changes without
reason. Instead, they protected their authority by not promoting the full extent of
the system. As a systems administrator, points out:
The people who had worked closest with the system, who had implemented the
system and saw it come to fruition, were comfortable with what was going on.
People who had nothing to do with itlike managementviewed it with skepticism or just tried to find something wrong with it (1997).
In both cases, this purposive management action guided the use of each new system in a fashion that ensured beliefs about the legitimacy of authority were maintained. Management continually appraised the situation in terms of how it affected
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their access to the information flow that characterizes rationallegal authority. If they
were satisfied that the initial changes (i.e., individual job change) were restricted to
retaining original role and relationship differences (i.e., their authority needs met)
and maintained their authority, they did little to change this situation. When they
considered their positions to be under threat (i.e., authority needs unmet), however,
they then acted to protect their authority.
4. Discussion and conclusion

In the present research, I aimed at empirically examining the nature of hierarchy
authority in public organizations by reflecting on the domination and legitimation
modalities of Giddenss (1984) structuration theory. Results indicate that IT is not
necessarily associated with flexible, decentralized new forms of organizing. Rather,
technology change results in the strengthening of management-centered and management-determined control. This action is driven by a system of managerial self-preservation. Managements utilitarian action at PubliTech and WasteCo resulted in a steplike filtering down process. For management, the need to legitimize their position
was dominant. In effect, managements utilitarianism is a form of management
insecurity. This reaction is based partially on the fear of what a change to information
flow could mean for the management job (i.e., retaining domination) and partly on
a belief that organizational rationality (i.e., legitimation) is linked to authority differentiation (supporting Weber, 1968).
Managements overarching hand in guiding the nature of structural change is not
new. These results confirm previous research in supporting why organizational structures (such as hierarchy) and organizing values (such as hierarchy authority) endure,
even in the face of elaborate programs of change. As previously illustrated, Kraemer
(1991), Markus (1983), Pinsonneault and Kraemer (1997), Robey and Boudreau
(1999) and Zuboff (1988) all indicate that IT does not bring about organizational
democracy because new technology has a power-restricting bias, thereby reinforcing
existing organizational arrangements. Similarly, Orlikowski (1991) and Starbuck
(1989) both explicitly address managements role in retaining their positions of dominance as technology changes. One may well question, then, why management action
at PubliTech and WasteCo is surprising. After all, both organizations were part of
a public sector that has traditionally been reliant on some form of centralization.
With new-form theory as its basis, however, and unlike previous research, these
cases provide empirical evidence of how the process of adaptation unfolded. There
are several conclusions and implications to draw from this process.
4.1. Theoretical conclusions of the research
To understand the retention of hierarchy at PubliTech and WasteCo, it is necessary
to recognize the basis of managements disposition to change. Management reaction
in using IFMS and WMIS as self-enforcing tools of authority is reasonable for public-sector organizations. Management within these organizations is publicly respon-
174
sible for their actions, as well as being accountable for expenses incurred to the
public purse. Despite public administration feeling the pressure to become more
efficient and to compete more effectively in a changing economy, these organizations
still need to deliver services, provide access to, and interact with its constituents
(Kraemer & Dedrick, 1997). Intentionally retaining the conditions of authority can
therefore be viewed as a prudent means of managing this process. Previous research
has already debated the ways that public-sector managers have centralized computing
facilities to achieve this response (e.g., Danziger et al., 1993; Kraemer et al., 1989),
while explaining the structural inertia or resistance response as a factor of organizational politics (e.g., Markus, 1983; Zuboff, 1988). Applying Orlikowskis (2000)
technology-in-practice extension of the structurational model, however, I suggest that
it is managements use of IFMS and WMIS in this prudent vein that explains the
process of adaptation in the two case studies.
As stated earlier, Orlikowski argues (adapting Giddens) that human interaction
with technologies is recurrent as users enact organizational structure through the use
of that technology. This enactment frames technology use because [f]ocusing attention on how structures are constituted and reconstituted in recurrent social practices
acknowledges that while users can and do use technologies as they were designed,
they can also circumvent inscribed ways of using technologies (2000:407). Applying
her practice lens for studying the use of technology to the utilitarian thesis, I propose
that PubliTech and WasteCo management action is a reasonable response for a public
organization, based on the type of enactment that these managers employed. Adding
a tangent to Orlikowskis inertia type of enactment (2000:422/3), I offer a group
identity technology-in-practice to explain the retention of hierarchy in these cases
(Fig. 1). In doing so, I acknowledge that the preceding findings largely address nonmanagement use of IFMS and WMIS.
I propose, however, that how non-management users employ technologies to sustain hierarchy (e.g., Orlikowskis limited-use technology-in-practice) is contingent
on management action. That is, when non-management employees use IFMS and
WMIS independent from management, they draw on the technological and structural
properties guided by managements power over, knowledge, assumptions, and expectations about the technology and its intended use. This interaction is recurrent, ensuring that management are able to reinforce a previously acknowledged position of
authority around this technology use. In both cases, management has been able to
fuse the implementation of each new system to hierarchy authority because this
process is supported by the identities that they have forged for themselves based
on such an enactment. For this reason, the technology-in-practice focus emphasizes
managements application of IFMS and WMIS, while drawing conclusions in terms
of the process of technological adaptation.
In this group identity practice of technology use, management rarely interacted
with WMIS and IFMS, involving themselves infrequently in the data and document
management parts of the application. Most relied heavily on their subordinates to
guide them in applying more sophisticated functions. They had little advanced
knowledge of the system, and were generally unmotivated to spend more time
becoming familiar with something that they regarded as outside their daily domain.
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Fig. 1. Group identity technology-in-practice authority stasis in two technology change environments
(applied to Orlikowski, 2000.)
This management use of technology supports Danziger et al. (1993), and Pinsonneault and Kraemer (1997). The senior management grouping in both cases thus
forged a common identity based on their positions as administrators, with a clear
authority demarcation as its basis. Change for this group was often talked about as
job function change, operational redefinition or information dissemination. It
was never spoken of in terms of authority or position modification. Regardless of
original statements of change, seniorityand the responsibility and accountability
that delimits the management rolewas viewed as the defining feature of each
organization and its operations. Accordingly, management classified organizational
members in terms of authority groupings. Results indicate that the modifications that
did take place (i.e., limited job change), a belief in each system as an information
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management system rather than a transforming system (i.e., technology management

orientation), and the socialization processes employed to retain this orientation (i.e.,
authority culture) all reinforced managements group perception.
The key to this group identity is that it is enacted through the recurrent use of
technology. Unlike new-form theory, which usually concentrates on external effects
on structures, the group identity enactment suggests that organizational change is a
factor of its internal environment. Both sets of managers allowed a utilitarian arrangement to emerge from the ongoing interactions they had with their subordinates and
the technology. They did this by viewing the new technology as an extension of the
managerial position, and thereby allowing the system to be adapted in a manner that
reflected their vested authority interests. This change took place precisely because
structures are not enacted in a social vacuum.
Group identity enactment is incongruous in places. For example, why would management purposely commission a new technology application to reinforce current
structures if the technology offered the potential to capitalize on new-form gains?
More specifically, why would these management groupings ever be inclined to introduce new systems that potentially worked against their self-interest? Like DeSanctis
and Poole (1994), Giddens (1984), Kraemer (1991), Orlikowski (2000), I suggest
that management draw on their institutional knowledge to guide their actions, which
may obscure the long-term implications of their actions. This knowledge guides the
nature of the management grouping reaction.
For example, at PubliTech, managements original change expectations were for
drastic structural reinvention. As IFMS took root, management continually reassessed
the viability of change, deliberately modified the properties of the technology, and
how they interacted with it. While the resultant technological changes were intentional, the structural consequences were less considered, contingent on this decision
(supporting Orlikowski, 2000). Giddens presents this monitoring process as a continuous flow of conduct because, human agents always know what they are doing on
the level of discursive consciousness. However...they may know little of the ramified
consequences of the activities in which they engage (1984:26). While they may not
have foreseen all the structural consequences of their actions, PubliTech and WasteCo management knew, and non-management understood, what their immediate use
of new systems would bring about. This recognition is the basis of the utilitarian
thesis with the institutional position of management in these organizations underpinning management reaction. Technology use is thus established less by structural
change than it is by group identity. After all, new IT is not an immutable object.
The key to this reaction is that non-management staff have been progressively
conditioned to an authority scheme, based on the pervasive influence of a normatively
coordinated legitimate order (Fig. 1). Managers are not able to direct structural
change outcomes unilaterally, but are dependent on a dialectic process of change
(Robey & Boudreau, 1999). In these cases, similar to Zuboffs (1988) mutual dependency construct, managements utilitarian action only existed because it was
reinforced by the instantiation of normative codes and sanctions built around hierarchys legal framework. In both organizations, management used technology
implementation as a vehicle of the need for control. This action was mediated by
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their organizational memory of the place of authority, whereby non-management

staff were socialized to hierarchy through established, historically-based norms
(supporting Boudreau & Robey, 1996, Walsh & Ungson, 1991). New-form theory
suggests that organizations will need to create a high-involvement environment of
power sharing, ignoring an organizations institutional history. This observation is
challenged by the management action at the base of a group identity technologyin-practice.
The socialization of authority that follows from this action encouraged a conditioned response to change at PubliTech and WasteCo. Unlike March and Simons
(1958) unobtrusive control, the type of enactment producing this action is explicit.
Managements utilitarian response, and the group identity subsequently generated,
is considered to be an elemental component of the management job. Management
authority is sustained and strengthened because non-management staff viewed authority as a path to functional stability when everything else around them was changing.
This outcome is particularly evident in the manner that PubliTech financial staff and
WasteCo gatehouse operators attempted to fall back onto manual procedures in the
first phase of the new system implementation, thereby reinforcing existing roles and
functions. While authority may be legitimately centralized, the utilitarian thesis relies
on this interrelationship between management and their subordinates to sustain it.
Although the group identity technology-in-practice lens is based on an authority
relationship, it is important to recognize that a claim for authority retention does not
refer to the use of IT as a tool to exercise a Bravermanian managerial prerogative.
Whereas new-form models of change downplay the presence of authority in the
organization (e.g., Byrne, 1993), the utilitarian thesis at the base of the group identity
lens presents management action as a proactive stance that incorporates a combination of the characteristics of the dimensions of control (supporting Storey, 1987).
It is easy to present the way that non-management users employ technologies to
sustain hierarchy, contingent on management action, as part of a deskilling effects
discussion. After all, as Zuboff (1988) reiterates, organizations are political entities.
Management action at both PubliTech and WasteCo illustrates, however, the manipulation of control in this way does not specifically encompass the alienation, deskilling
or control often associated with labor process theories (Garson, 1988), or social
action theories (Gorz, 1985). Management objectives are shaped by the wider social
and organizational structures within which managers function.
Both cases indicate that to employ the controls of the labor process would be selfdefeating, potentially limiting IT efficiencies and associated financial returns. The
utilitarian thesis is not so much about explicitly controlling workers. Rather, it is
about maintaining the conditions under which authority is reproduced. In accordance
with the view that management enactment of technology in these cases was reasonable, technology-based control can be viewed as a reflection of the alignment between
management needs and user requirements. Like Robey and Sahay (1996) and Pinsonneault and Kraemer (1997), this bond infers that while similar technologies may be
introduced into different organizations, it is the social processes and the context of
implementation that guides structural outcomes. This observation lends weight to the
notion that the value of information technology to an organization may well be
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dependent on how the systems function is integrated into the broader management process.
4.2. Implications of management action for managerial practice
Managements utilitarian response has three implications for undertaking IT innovation. First, managements self-preservation actions suggest that technology change
may represent an opportunity for management to use IT to manage change
impressions (drawing on Goffman, 1970). Recognizing that impression management
is not necessarily uniform in its application, senior management may need to pay
closer attention to the way that they commission technology change to achieve their
preferred utilitarian results. Unlike new-form theory assumptions, this approach does
not necessarily mean that management control needs to be curtailed or minimized
(although this may be an outcome of a more responsive management). Different
change situations may call for management to consider different approaches to this
condition. For instance, in certain cases management may need to create more
encompassing programs of IT implementation whereby non-management staff
involvement is far more apparent. Employees may need to be better involved alongside management in IT change preparation, implementation and upgrade to achieve
this outcome. This approach would ensure that management are forced to better
explain their change positions and to continuously justify their disposition towards
the nature of the control systems built around the implementation. Management
would need to be outwardly focused rather than continuously and repeatedly examining the change situation from a closeted perspective. Accepting that hierarchy is a
central feature of the organization, this action would not rid the organization of all
dimensions of control. It would, however, limit some of the negative consequences
of the social categorization associated with the group identity enactment.
Second, as the routine monitoring of aspects of technological change and their
historical context takes place, the way that management present themselves to organizational members may influence staff to act in accordance with managements projection of their definition of the change situation. Such a situation could have negative
implications for working relationships, and team member perceptions of their sense
of worth. The risk of such an approach is that it relies on an internal divide. The
routine created through the institutionalization of rules, procedures, and differentiation associated with hierarchy authority can lead to a sense of a lack of system
ownership. It could also alienate those who perceive their roles being dictated to by
others when a new system promises change. Such a reaction strengthens the group
identity technology-in-practice, sustaining authority differences. Management action,
therefore, may not allow the potential of technology change to be fully realized.
Finally, the utilitarian thesis at the base of managements group identity reaction
illustrates that how management restricts authority change is conditioned by their
understanding of the influence of technology on the organization. As the PubliTech
and WasteCo cases indicate, the success of systems change is a reciprocal process,
rather than a unidirectional one. Management may therefore need to have a series
of contingent approaches to systems implementation in place, if they intend to use
179
IT to center modifications around hierarchy authority. This situation has clear implications for change theory that redefines managements role. As change becomes a
far more recurrent occasion, reliant upon management opinion and reaction, an alteration to managements role is enforced. In new-form theory, the character of IT
implies that management generally takes a secondary position in managing the
change process. The utilitarian preservation thesis indicates a more central role for
this grouping. Management thus needs to be far more aware of the overt ramifications
of their technology change decisions. They must acknowledge the response their
actions provoke. Understanding this response, and setting in place procedures to react
to change, could potentially have several beneficial personnel consequences.
4.3. Limitations and future research directions
Like most research of this type, this study has limitations. Notably, I did not
compare the IT-enabled change experiences of private sector organizations with PubliCo and WasteTech findings. This approach, as previously stated, was purposely
undertaken, in recognizing that while the use of IT in the public sector has increased
greatly over the past decade, research on this use has declined (Kraemer & Dedrick,
1997). Nonetheless, this restrictive focusalong with the interpretive approach
adoptedconstrains my ability to generalize findings beyond this sector (and,
specifically, outside this setting). Moreover, I concentrated a discussion of the utilitarian thesis at the senior management level of decision making, while drawing on
structuration and administrative authority literature that advocates the multidimensional nature of the management role. Similarly, drawing on Orlikowski and Iacono
(2001), I recognize that IT is not neutral or universal. Because this technology is
commissioned, designed, implemented, and used by people with different interests
and values, any assumptions about change need to be tempered by the technological
features and context of my discussion. I acknowledge that IT is a complex, dynamic
and fragmented entity that may not necessarily allow the non-specific theorizing that
I have presented.
These limitations aside, I argue in this paper that understanding managements
disposition to IT change discerns the nature of an organizations structure and the
adaptation of that structure. By examining the process of IT adaptation in two public
organizations, I have given an insight into how an espoused thrust to achieve newform change is frustrated by the very people who propound the change, based on
their use of the technology. Findings indicate that as long as these organizations
have limited resources and contain multiple perspectives, some form of authority
and role differentiation will always be needed. Accordingly, this research re-establishes the viability of undertaking further, additional reviews of other aspects of
Webers (1968) hierarchy abstraction in changing technology environments.
A test of these findings could include a broader consideration of management roles
in other changing technology environments. This approach could also include closer
attention to issues relating to society and authority in IT change environments. Future
research might examine the utilitarian dependency relationship at the base of the
group identity technology-in-practice perspective by considering the place of a
180
leaderfollower effect in sustaining hierarchy within both the public and private sector. Such an examination could extend PubliTech and WasteCo studies by exploring
alternative explanations of managements need for self-promotion. This approach
may provide greater depth to the issues surrounding the deployment of new information technology. Moreover, it may also afford a deeper understanding of this authority relationship.
Acknowledgements
I thank Elizabeth George, Ron Weber, and Raja Chattopadhyay for their helpful
comments and suggestions. I am also appreciative of the constructive guidance provided by the editor-in-chief, Dan Robey and the two anonymous reviewers during
the review process.
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Organizational Hierarchy Adaptation and Information Technology - 2002

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Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

Organizational hierarchy adaptation and

Department of Management, University of Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia

Ever since Weber (1968) introduced hierarchy as a fundamental part of organizing

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

supplement rather than eliminate existing organizational structures (Townsend et al.,

1. Background to the research

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

network services (e.g., integrated network management and internet/intranet

Size: Division employs 40 personnel,

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

The second company, WasteCo, was an entity established to develop and

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

3. Results: the constancy of hierarchy

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

formalize behavior, specialize jobs, and create a reliance on functional groupings,

Basis of the Initial

New system commitment based on

Commitment to constant system

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

I think a more commercial entity presses for a flatter organization. However, we

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

These new applications have allowed management to devolve decision making

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

Any changes that need to be madeeven the slightest changestill have to be

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

4. Discussion and conclusion

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

management system rather than a transforming system (i.e., technology management

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

their organizational memory of the place of authority, whereby non-management

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

G.M. Schwarz / Information and Organization 12 (2002) 153182

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