ARTICLE VI

THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 22. The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written
questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not
be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the
State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance
shall be conducted in executive session.
Arnault vs. Nazareno [G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950]
This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of
the Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses called to be
examined by the special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a
lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a representative of the vendor. During
the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said representative, at the
same time invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a
resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned until he
shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name of the person to
whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection
therewith. Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus
ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in a
congressional hearing in aid of legislation.
HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to
conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness who
refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be detained during the term of the members
imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the witness right to
due process of law.
Arnault vs. Nazareno [G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950]
Post under case digests, Political Law at Thursday, February 23, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic
Mind
Facts: On February 27, 1950, the senate adopted a resolution creating a special committee to
investigate on the purchase by the government of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates
owned by Ernest Burt as represented by Jean Arnault.
The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the
transaction at the expense of the government.
The special committee called and examined among other witness, Jean Arnault. However, for
the latters refusal to answer some questions propounded on him, the names of the person to
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whom he gave the money as well as answer to the pertinent questions in connection therewith,
the Senate resolved to imprison him until such time as he decided to answer relevant questions
put to him in connection with the investigation of a government transaction.
Issue: Whether or not the Senate has the authority to punish petitioner for contempt.
Held: The supreme court affirmed, considering that the questions were pertinent to the
pursuance of the Senate Resolution.
The supreme court also held that the offender could be imprisoned indefinitely by the state, it
being a continuing body, provided that the punishment did not become so long as to violate
due process.
GUDANI VS. SENGA
Posted by kaye lee on 10:51 PM
GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 [Article VI Sec. 22: Congress' Power of Inquiry; Legislative
Investigation]
FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud
and the surfacing of the Hello Garci tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the
executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative
inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting
Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without
Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a
directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for
allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the Chain of
Command. Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court
Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP
preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.
RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is
liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the
appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate
remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons
to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so
inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the
military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President
has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior
consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing.
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In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and
affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability
of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on
executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the
actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as
commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the
legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is illadvised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is
similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct
legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified
anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement
today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed
forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the
appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed
with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is
nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.
In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of CAMILO L. SABIO v.
HON. SENATOR RICHARD J. GORDON, et al.
G.R. No. 174340 17 October 2006,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. (En Banc)
[Congress Power of Inquiry]
FACTS:
Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and
his Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by
the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time
invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all
PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.
RULING:
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No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the
Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective
committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of investigatory power to the committees
and it means that the mechanism which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its
investigative functions are also available to the committees.
It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and
expansive construal. The Courts high regard to such power is rendered more evident
in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that the power of inquiry is broad
enough to cover officials of the executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the
doctrine in Arnault that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for
legislation, is a proper subject for investigation and that the power of inquiry is
co-extensive with the power to legislate.
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI,
Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress
power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any
provision granting such exemption. The Congress power of inquiry, being
broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as
proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends to government agencies created by
Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate
or even abolish. PCGG belongs to this class.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to
enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its
purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles.
Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is
inconsistent with the constitutional provisions on the Congress power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec.
21), the principle of public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II,
Sec. 28), and the right of access to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7).

Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in
the absence of any constitutional basis.
-------------------------------------------------Comment:
Former President Cory issued EO No. 1 creating the PCGG. She entrusted upon this
body the task of recovering the ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the deposed
President Marcos and his close associates. To ensure the PCGGs unhampered
performance of its tasks, Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that: No member or
staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its
official cognizance.
20 years later, the Senate invited PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio to be one of the
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resource persons in a Senate investigation. However, Chairman Sabio declined the

invitation invoking Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1.May Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 be
invoked by Chairman Sabio to justify non-appearance on legislative investigations?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 is declared REPEALED by the 1987 Constitution. The Congress
power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends to government
agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to
regulate or even abolish. (Sabio vs. Gordon, October 17, 2006)
Note: Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of
Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees.

BENGZON VS SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE EN BANC

It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses
unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they
obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa Corys brother in law,
among others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the country including
MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took
over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was
referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee.
After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly
prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due
process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations and that his
allegations are baseless and malicious.
Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senates privilege hour upon which he insisted to
have an inquiryregarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopas and Bengzons plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their
attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and
legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their
grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et al filed a petition
for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief against the
SBRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.
HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no
suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible
violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. In other words, the purpose of the inquiryto be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee
was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in
connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa
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Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the
contemplatedinquiry by the SBRC is not really in aid of legislation because it is not related to a
purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out
whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA
No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter that appears more within the
province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice
that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case.
======================================
FACTS:
PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin Romualdez, et al for engaging in devices,
schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of plaintiff and the
Filipino people.
The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged
take-over personal privilege before the Senate on the alleged "takeover of SOLOIL Inc," the
FlagShip of the First Manila Management of Companies or FMMC by Ricardo Lopa and called
upon the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case with regard to RA 3019
(Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of Public Officers [SBRC])
started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the
SBRC to appear before it and testify on what they know regarding the sale of 36 corporations
belonging to Benjamin Romualdez. Lopa and Bengzon refused to testify, invoking their rights to
due process, and that their testimony may unduly prejudice the defendants and petitioners in
case before the Sandiganbayan.
SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying and the SBRC continued its
investigation of the matter.
The petitioners filed for prohibition with a prayer for TRO and/or injunctive relief, claiming that
the SBRC in requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and
legislative purpose.
The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for reconsideration filed by one of the defendants
of the civil case.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether or not the SBRC's inquiry has valid legislative purpose.
3. whether or not the civil case of Sandiganbayan is beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire
into.
4. Whether or not the inquiry violates the petitioners' right to due process.

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RULING:
1. Yes. In Angara vs Electoral Commission, the Constitution provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. The Court has provided that the allocation of constitutional boundaries is a task
which the judiciary must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case,
"(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the
rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It
cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by
no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."
The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for
the purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee to conduct inquiries into private affairs in purported aid of legislation.

2. No.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of
the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may
refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed
legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters
vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.
It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in
aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since
the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr.
Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a
matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.
3. No. It cannot be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to Senate
Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly,
neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected with the government but are
private citizens.
4. Yes. The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected.
It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for the banning or
prohibition of investigations where a violation of a basis rights is claimed. It only requires that in
the course of the proceedings, the right of persons should be respected.
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What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a witness testifying at all,
simply because he is already facing charges before the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the
Constitution allows him to interpose objections whenever an incriminating question is posed or
when he is compelled to reveal his court defenses, but not to refuse to take the witness stand
completely.
Senate vs. Ermita
Senate of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Ermita
G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006

Carpio, Morales J.:

Facts:
The Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project
of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment
Group (hereinafter North Rail Project).
The President then issued Executive Order 464, Ensuring Observance of the Principle of
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights
of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution,
and For Other Purposes, which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.
Issues:
1. Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;
2. Whether or E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern; and
3. Whether or not respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they
implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Held:
1. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution. This power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch; it
is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of
legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the
operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation.
2. Yes. Although there are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in
investigations in Congress necessarily deprives the people of information which, being
presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern.

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3. Yes. While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that
the same is exempt from the need for publication.
======================================
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the
Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the
said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate
committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before
the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department
heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention.
AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the
said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and
scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in
the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and
flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment
of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP)
officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment
of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials
who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege;
and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such
hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the presidents approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then
invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with
only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring military
personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani
and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial
proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the
rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight
functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the
provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the
1987 Constitution. The Congress power ofinquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article
VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing
either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end
that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far
incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry
with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative
body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true
recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely
related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the
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Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential
not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section
22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid
of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he
can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of
legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the
question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore,
while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining
to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the
other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to
compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section
22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power
of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When
Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact
that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power
the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress
except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the
executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is
sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent
under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face.
For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the
question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to
appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in
such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a
valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive
Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the
President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation
of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when
the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section
21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
Romulo L. Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, et.
al.

G.R. No. 180643

25 March 2008

FACTS:
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On April 21, 2007, the DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply of equipment and
services for the NBN Project in the amount of nearly Php6B and was to be financed by the
Republic of China. Several Resolutions regarding the investigation and implications on national
security and government-xto-government contracts regarding the NBN Project were introduced
in Senate. Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain
personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was summoned to
appear and he testified to the Committees for eleven (11) hours, but refused to answer three
important questions, invoking his right to executive privilege. For failing to appear in the other
days that he was summoned, Neri was held in contempt.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Neri can invoke executive privilege;
2. Whether the invocation of executive privilege violate Sec. 28, Art. II and Sec. 7, Art. III;
and
3. Whether the Committees gravely abused their discretion by holding Neri in contempt.
RULING:
1. The communications elicited by the three questions are covered by executive privilege.
Despite the revocation of E.O. 464, there is a recognized claim of executive privilege.
The privilege is said to be a necessary guarantee of presidential advisors to provide the
President and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process
of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling
to express except privately. Furthermore, the claim was properly invoked by the letter
provided by Executive Secretary Ermita stating the precise and certain reason that the
said information may impair the countrys diplomatic as well as economic relations with
the Republic of China.
2. The petitioner was able to appear in at least one of the days where he was summoned
and expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators,
with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege. The right to
public information and full public disclosure of transactions, like any other right, is
subject to limitation. These include those that are classified by the body of
jurisprudence as highly confidential. The information subject to this case belongs to
such kind.
3. The Committees violated Sec. 21, Art. VI of the Constitution for having failed to publish
its Rules of Procedure. Inquiries are required to be in accordance with the duly
published rules of procedure. Without these, the aid of legislation are procedurally
infirm.
NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE Leave a comment
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
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FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of
U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the
Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007
hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers
were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared
in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that
Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN
project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and
that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner
refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring
that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid
down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and
an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his
testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v.
Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way
diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry
relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of
military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the
doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the
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President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational
proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains
important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials necessary in her executive and
policy decision-making process and, that the information sought to be disclosed might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put,
the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating
to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are
received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner
can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third,
there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not
appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September
26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly
manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only
of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article
III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
ARTICLE VII
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people
for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the
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day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date, six years thereafter. The President
shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who has succeeded as President and has
served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any
time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the
service for the full term for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be
held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of
canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the
President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate
shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the
presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or
more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen
by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose.
Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for
which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members
of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a
majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the
vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with
its rules without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling for a special election
to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later
than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed
certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution and shall become law
upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall
be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of
paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot
be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the
vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.
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Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within
forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the
Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall
not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the
same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function,
nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures,
after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.
=======================================================
daza vs singson
The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a
political realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission
on Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the
new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA
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which consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza
questioned such replacement.
ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the
composition of the Commission on Appointments.
HELD: As provided in the constitution, there should be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected by
each House respectively on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties
therein, this necessarily connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it that the
requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon
the initial organization of the Commission but also subsequently thereto NOT the court.
Coseteng vs Mitra (G.R. No. 86649)
Posted: July 25, 2011 in Case Digests
0
Facts:
Congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in representatives from diverse political parties
Petitioner Anna Dominique Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the banner of
KAIBA.
A year later, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino or LDP was organized as a political party.
As 158 out of 202 members of the House of Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP,
the House committees, including the House representation in the Commission on Appointments,
had to be reorganized. Petitioner Coseteng then wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra
requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the Commission
on Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal.
On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, revised the House majority membership
in the Commission on Appointments to conform with the new political alignments by replacing
Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP, with Rep. Luis C. Singson, LDP, however, Congressman Ablan, KBL, was
retained as the 12th member representing the House minority.
On February 1, 1989, Coseteng and her party, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs
praying that the Supreme Court declare as null and void the election of respondent Ablan,
Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin,
and Singson, as members of the Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as
such and to enjoin also the other respondents from recognizing them as members of the
Commission on Appointments on the theory that their election to that Commission violated the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation
Issue:
1. WON the question raised is political.
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2. WON the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties therein as provided in Section 18,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Holding/
Held:
1. No, it is not. The political question issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson, where this Court
ruled that the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission on
Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution is justiciable, and, even if the question were
political in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the
authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government.
2. Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
reads: Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of
the Senate, as ex oficio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The
Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the
Congress from their submission. The commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the
Members. (Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.) The composition of the House membership in the
Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties
in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the
House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members
in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to
ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP
(respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL
(respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that
this apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was done
on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein. There is no merit in
the petitioners contention that the House members in the Commission on Appointments should
have been nominated and elected by their respective political parties. The petition itself shows
that they were nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by
the House (not by their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The
validity of their election to the Commission on Appointments-eleven (11) from the Coalesced
Majority and one from the minority-is unassailable.
Guingona Vs Gonzales
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC
senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement
that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the
traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators
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elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for
NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the
majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8
and that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also
pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the
elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one
LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged
that the compromise is against proportional representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys representation in
the CoA.
HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional
membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political
parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other
manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of
the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership
into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect
Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membership was correspondingly reduced
leaving the latters representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is
no longer in compliance with its mandate that membershipin the Commission be based on the
proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more
representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the
LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected
senators-members in theCoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has
only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the
parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional representation
especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party.
While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective
departments. They were appointed in an acting capacity only. Senator Aquilino Pimentel
together with 7 other senators filed a complaint against theappointment of Yap et al. Pimentel
averred that GMA cannot make such appointment without the consent of the Commission
on Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order
No. 292, only the undersecretary of the respective departments should be designated in an
acting capacity and not anyone else.
On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the president is
empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to issue appointments in an
acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission
on Appointments even while Congress is in session. Further, EO 292 itself allows the president
to issue temporary designation to an officer in the civil service provided that the temporary
designation shall not exceed one year.
During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad
interim appointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.
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HELD: Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided the
safeguard so that such power will not be abused hence the provision that the temporary
designation shall not exceed one year. In this case, in less than a year after the
initial appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress was in recess, GMA issued the ad
interim appointments this also proves that the president was in good faith.
It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president. The choice is
the presidents to make and the president normally appoints those whom he/she can trust. She
cannot be constrained to choose the undersecretary. She has the option to choose. An alter
ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence.
Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President
who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the Presidents confidence. That person may or may not be the permanent
appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be
the permanent appointee.
Anent the issue that GMA appointed outsiders, such is allowed. EO 292 also provides that the
president may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other
competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the
President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service,
as long as the President deems that person competent.
NOTE: Ad Interim Appointments vs Appointments in an Acting Capacity
Ad Interim Appointments

Appointments in an Acting
Capacity

Description

It is a permanent appointment because it

takes effect immediately and can no longer
be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office. The fact
that it is subject to confirmation by the COA
does not alter its permanent character
(Matibag vs Benipayo)

Acting appointments are a way

of temporarily filling important
offices but, if abused, they can
also be a way of circumventing
the need for confirmation by the
Commission onAppointments.

When
Effective

Upon Acceptance by Appointee

Upon Acceptance by Appointee

When
Made

When Congress is in recess

Any time when there is vacancy

Submitted
to the COA

Yes

No

BAYAN MUNA VS. ROMULO DIGEST

G.R. NO. 159618: Feruary 1, 2011
BAYAN MUNA, Represented by Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, Rep.
LIZA L. MAZA, Petitioner
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v.
ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary , and BLAS F. OPLE, in his
capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Respondents.
FACTS:
In 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which,
by its terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states.
In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP, represented by then DFA
Secretary Ople, finalized a non-surrender agreement which aimed to protect certain persons of
the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in
international tribunals.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the
Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without
force and effect.
ISSUE:
Whether the Respondents abused their discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction for concluding the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement in contravention of
the Rome Statute.
Whether the agreement is valid, binding and effective without the concurrence by at
least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate.
HELD: The petition is bereft of merit.
INTERNATIONAL LAW: Rome Statute
First issue
The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome Statute.
Far from going against each other, one complements the other. As a matter of fact, the
principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC. According to Art. 1 of the
Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC is to be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of
the signatory states]. the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states,
like the RP, over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the complementary
jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling or unable
to prosecute.
Also, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a State-Party and a
signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory state is
only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty. The
Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification
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by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to follow any provision in
the treaty would be premature. And even assuming that the Philippines is a State-Party, the
Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of international agreements entered into between
States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party to the Rome Statute.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 2/3 concurrence
Second issue
The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our
history, we have entered executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and
consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright
protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of
these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.
Executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence. As the President
wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in the external affairs of the nation is,
as Bayan would put it, executive altogether. The right of the President to enter into or ratify
binding executive agreements has been confirmed by long practice.
Petition is DISMISSED.

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