G.R. No.

113092 September 1, 1994

MARTIN CENTENO, vs. HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS
236 SCRA 197

Facts: The officers of a group of elderly men of a civic organization known as theSamahang Katandaan
ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay,
Malolos, Bulacan. Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles,
a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation
was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development. As a
consequence, an information was filed against Centeno, for violation of PD No. 1564 or the Solicitation
Permit Law. Centeno filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged
therein do not constitute an offense, claiming that PD No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for
charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the
construction of a chapel.
Issue: Should the phrase "charitable purposes" be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a
religious purpose?

Ruling: No and that legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an
enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare
purposes," only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to include
solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not
have so stated expressly.
Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of
police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose
are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot
be held criminally liable therefor and therefore acquitted.

URSUA vs CA
Statutory Construction Purpose of a Law
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was convicted for violation of Sec. 1 of CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085
otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases by the RTC of Davao City which was affirmed
by the CA. Allegedly petitioner when asked by his counsel to take his letter of request to the Office of
the Ombudsman because his law firms messenger Oscar Perez had personal matters to attend to,
instead of writing his name wrote the name Oscar Perez when he was requested to sign. However,
Loida Kahulugan who gave him the copy of complaint was able to know through Josefa Amparo that

petitioner is not Oscar Perez. Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended
that petitioner be accordingly charged. Petitioner comes for review of his conviction to the SC as he
reasserts his innocence.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Cesario Ursua should be acquitted on the ground that he was
charged under the wrong law.
HELD: The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time and again the SC has
decreed that the statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evil
sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind
and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may
consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers.

People vs. Ladjaalam

December 24, 2012 by Lagangang Butas
People vs. Ladjaalam
G.R. Nos. 136149-51. September 19, 2000
Appellee: People of the Philippines
Appellant: Walpan Ladjaalam alias Warpan
Ponente: J. Panganiban
FACTS:
Four Informations were filed against appellant Walpan Ladjaalam in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Zamboanga City (Branch 16), three of which he was found guilty, to wit: 1) maintaining a drug den in
violation of Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972); 2)
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by
Republic Act. No. 8294; and 3) direct assault with multiple attempted homicide. The following
information was provided by the prosecution:
1) In the afternoon of September 24, 1997, more than thirty (30) policemen proceeded to the house of
appellant and his wife to serve the search warrant when they were met by a volley of gunfire coming from
the second floor of the said house. They saw that it was the appellant who fired the M14 rifle towards
them.
2) After gaining entrance, two of the police officers proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw
appellant firing the rifle. As he noticed their presence, the appellant jumped from the window to the roof
of a neighboring house. He was subsequently arrested at the back of his house after a brief chase.
3) Several firearms and ammunitions were recovered from appellants house. Also found was a pencil
case with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside, each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride.
4) A paraffin test was conducted and the casts taken both hands of the appellant yielded positive for
gunpowder nitrates.
5) Records show that appellant had not filed any application for license to possess firearm and
ammunition, nor has he been given authority to carry firearms.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
HELD:
No. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall unlawfully possess any
firearm or ammunition shall be penalized, unless no other crime was committed. Furthermore, if
homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm

shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Since the crime committed was direct assault and not
homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.

Republic of the Philippines vs. IAC and Spouses Pastor (G.R. No. 69344. April 26, 1991)
26APR
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and SPOUSES ANTONIO and CLARA
PASTOR, respondents.
Roberto L. Bautista for private respondents.
Ponente: GRIO-AQUINO
FACTS:
Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Internal Revenue, commenced an action in
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), to collect from the spouses Antonio
Pastor and Clara Reyes-Pastor deficiency income taxes for the years 1955 to 1959 with
surcharge and monthly interest, and costs. The Pastors filed a motion to dismiss the complaint,
but the motion was denied. They filed an answer admitting there was an assessment against
them for income tax deficiency but denying liability therefor. They contended that they had
availed of the tax amnesty under P.D.s Nos. 23, 213 and 370 and had paid the corresponding
amnesty taxes amounting of their reported untaxed income under P.D. 23, and a final payment
on October 26, 1973 under P.D. 370 evidenced by the Governments Official Receipt. The trial
court held that the respondents had settled their income tax deficiency for the years 1955 to
1959, not under P.D. 23 or P.D. 370, but under P.D. 213.
The Government appealed to the Intermediate Appellant Court, alleging that the private
respondents were not qualified to avail of the tax amnesty under P.D. 213 for the benefits of that
decree are available only to persons who had no pending assessment for unpaid taxes, as
provided in Revenue Regulations Nos. 8-72 and 7-73. Since the Pastors did in fact have a
pending assessment against them, they were precluded from availing of the amnesty granted in
P.D.s Nos. 23 and 213. The Government further argued that tax exemptions should be
interpreted strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. The Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court
of Appeals) rendered a decision dismissing the Governments appeal and holding that the
payment of deficiency income taxes by the Pastors under PD. No. 213, and the acceptance
thereof by the Government, operated to divest the latter of its right to further recover deficiency
income taxes from the private respondents pursuant to the existing deficiency tax assessment
against them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the tax amnesty payments made by the private respondents bar an action for
recovery of deficient income taxes under P.D.s Nos. 23, 213 and 370.
HELD:
YES. Petition for review is denied.
RATIO:
[T]he Government is estopped from collecting the difference between the deficiency tax
assessment and the amount already paid by them as amnesty tax. The finding of the appellate
court that the deficiency income taxes were paid by the Pastors, and accepted by the
Government, under P.D. 213, granting amnesty to persons who are required by law to file
income tax returns but who failed to do so, is entitled to the highest respect and may not be
disturbed except under exceptional circumstances
The rule is that in case of doubt, tax statutes are to be construed strictly against the
Government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer strictisimi juris for taxes, being burdens, are
not to be presumed beyond what the applicable statute (in this case P.D. 213) expressly and
clearly declares.

ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS V MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY AND CTA

(1977, Fernando)
FACTS:
Meralco imported insulating oil for use in its plant operations.
Acting Commissioner of Customs Norberto Romualdez held that these insulating oils are subject to a
special import tax, in which Meralco had to pay P995, under protest.
Meralco claims that the insulating oils are exempt by virtue of:
o 6 of RA No. 1394 exempts equipment and spare parts for use in industries from the
special import tax
o 9, Part Two of Meralcos franchise expressly exempts insulators from taxes of whatever
kind and nature in consideration for the payment of the percentage tax on its gross earnings
The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) reversed the holding of the Commissioner of Customs
o Citing Gregory J. Bradys Materials Handbook, it considered insulating oils as insulator
because insulating oils are used for cooling as well as for insulating.
o It also cited the use of Meralco for said oils, in oil circuit breakers where they are required to
maintain insulation between the contacts inside the tank and the tank itself.
ISSUE/s:
1. Can insulating oils be construed as insulators exempt under the special import tax?
2. Can the CTA be overturned in this case?
HELD/RATIO:
1. Yes. Regarding the construction of tax statutes and citing JBL Reyes in Republic Flour Mills v CIR, "It is
true that in the construction of tax statutes tax exemptions are not favored in the law, and are construed
strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. However, it is equally a recognized principle that where the provision
of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the court's seeking the legislative
intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction.
2. No. This time citing Balbas v Domingo, No other conclusion is possible in view of the well-settled
principle that this Court is bound by the finding of facts of the Court of Tax Appeals, only questions of
law being open to it for determination. Where the question is one of fact, it is no longer reviewable.
This is in line with the recognition that the CTA enjoys a wide discretion in construing tax statutes.
By the very nature of its function, dedicates exclusively to the study and consideration of tax problems, it
has developed an expertise on the subject. The only exception to overruling the CTA is if there has been
an abuse or improvident exercise of its authority (which is not the case here).
It would be an affront to the sense of fairness and of justice if in the exercise of its discretionary
authority, after determining that insulating oil comes within the term insulator, is not be upheld.

Misamis Oriental Association vs. Dept. of Finance Secretary238 SCRA 63

FACTS: Petitioner Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. is a domestic corporation
whosemembers, are engaged in the buying and selling of copra. The petitioner alleges that prior to
theissuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular 47-91, which implemented VAT Ruling 190-90, coprawas
classified as agricultural food product under 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code and,therefore,
exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution. Said circular classified copra as anagricultural
nonfood product and declared it "exempt from VAT only if the sale is made by the primaryproducer
pursuant to Section 103(a) of the Tax Code, as amended." The reclassification had the effect of denying to
the petitioner the exemption it previously enjoyed when copra was classified as anagricultural food product
under 103(b) of the NIRC.
ISSUES: WON the petitioner is exempt from the tax.
RULING: NO. In interpreting 103(a) and (b) of the NIRC, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue gave it
astrict construction consistent with the rule that tax exemptions must be strictly construed against thetaxpayer
and liberally in favor of the state. As the government agency charged with the enforcement of the law, the
opinion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in the absence of any showing that it isplainly wrong, is
entitled to great weight. Indeed, the ruling was made by the Commissioner of InternalRevenue in the exercise
of his power under 245 of the NIRC to "make rulings or opinions in connectionwith the implementation of

the provisions of internal revenue laws, including rulings on theclassification of articles for sales tax and
similar purposes."

RESINS V AUDITOR GENERAL

11

FEB

L 17888 | October 29, 1968 | J. Fernando

Facts:
Petitioner Resins Inc, as in Casco v. Gimenez, seeks a refund from respondent Central Bank on the claim that it was
exempt from the margin fee under RA 2609 for the importation of urea and formaldehyde, as separate units, used for
the production of synthetic glue, of which it was a manufacturer.
Since the specific language of the Act speak of urea formaldehyde and petitioner admittedly did import urea and
formaldehyde separately, it can be exempted if the law was construed to read urea and formaldehyde.

Issue: W/N Resins contention is with merit

Held:
No. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct from urea and formaldehyde as
separate articles. Resins contend that the approved Congress bill contained the conjunction and and that Congress
intended to exempt urea and formaldehyde separately, citing statements made on the floor of the Senate. Said
individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate, much less of the House of Representatives. It is
also well settled that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts. If there has been any mistake in the printing of
the bill, the remedy is by amendment or curative language not by judicial decree.
Additionally, refund partakes of a nature of an exemption, it cannot be allowed unless granted in the most explicit and
categorical language. The Court has held that exemption from taxation is not favored and never presumed, so that if
granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer (strictissimi juris). Petition denied.

Facts:

For equipment, machineries and spare parts it imported from October 1, 1992 to May 31, 1994, PLDT
paid the BIR the amount of P164,510,953.00, broken down as follows: (a) compensating tax of
P126,713,037.00; (b) advance sales tax of P12,460,219.00 and (c) other internal revenue taxes of
P25,337,697.00. For similar importations made between March 1994 to May 31, 1994, PLDT paid
P116,041,333.00 value-added tax (VAT). (Note: PLDT did not necessarily pay VAT directly to the BIR.)

After a ruling was handed down by the BIR to the effect that the PLDT is exempt from paying all taxes on
its franchise and earnings including the VAT because of the 3% franchise tax imposed on it by Section 12
of RA 7082, the PLDT claimed from the BIR a tax credit/refund of the VAT, compensating taxes, advance
sales taxes and other taxes it had been paying. When its claim was not acted upon by the BIR, PLDT
went to the CTA. The CTA ruled for PLDT, but made deductions (refundable amounts which period to
claim had already prescribed) from the total tax refund prayed for by PLDT. The CIR appealed to the CA.
The CA affirmed the CTAs decision. The CIR appealed to the SC, saying that the CA erred in ruling that
because of the 3% franchise tax the PLDT is exempt from paying all taxes, including indirect taxes.

Issue:
WON the 3% franchise tax exempts the PLDT from paying all other taxes, including indirect taxes.

Held:
No.
1. Direct taxes are those exacted from the very person who, it is intended or desired, should pay
them. They are impositions for which a taxpayer is directly liable on the transaction or business
he is engaged in.
2. Indirect taxes are those that are demanded, in the first instance, from, or are paid by, one
person in the expectation and intention that he can shift the burden to someone else. In other
words, indirect taxes are taxes wherein the liability for the payment of the tax falls on one
person but the burden thereof can be shifted or passed on to another person, such as when the
tax is imposed upon goods before reaching the consumer who ultimately pays for it. When the
seller passes on the tax to his buyer, he, in effect, shifts the tax burden, not the liability to pay it,
to the purchaser as part of the price of goods sold or services rendered.
3. The NIRC classifies VAT as an indirect tax the amount of [which] may be shifted or passed on
to the buyer, transferee or lessee of the goods. The 10% VAT on importation of goods is in the
nature of an excise tax levied on the privilege of importing articles. It is imposed on all taxpayers
who import goods. It is not a tax on the franchise of a business enterprise or on its earnings, as
stated in Section 2 of RA 7082.
4. Advance sales tax has the attributes of an indirect tax because the tax-paying importer of goods
for sale or of raw materials to be processed into merchandise can shift the tax or lay the
economic burden of the tax on the purchaser by subsequently adding the tax to the selling
price of the imported article or finished product.
5. Compensating tax also partakes of the nature of an excise tax payable by all persons who import
articles, whether in the course of business or not.
6. The liability for the payment of the indirect taxes lies with the seller of the goods or services, not
in the buyer thereof. Thus, one cannot invoke ones exemption privilege to avoid the passing on
or the shifting of the VAT to him by the manufacturers/suppliers of the goods he purchased.
Hence, it is important to determine if the tax exemption granted to a taxpayer specifically
includes the indirect tax which is shifted to him as part of the purchase price, otherwise it is
presumed that the tax exemption embraces only those taxes for which the buyer is directly
liable. Since RA 7082 did not specifically include indirect taxes in the exemption granted to PLDT,
the latter cannot claim exemption from VAT, advance sales tax and compensating tax.
7. The clause in lieu of all taxes in Section 12 of RA 7082 is immediately followed by the
qualifying clause on this franchise or earnings thereof, suggesting that the exemption is
limited to taxes imposed directly on PLDT since taxes pertaining to PLDTs franchise or earnings
are its direct liability. Accordingly, indirect taxes, not being taxes on PLDTs franchise or
earnings, are not included in the exemption provision.
8. PLDTs allegation that the Bureau of Customs assessed the company for advance sales tax and
compensating tax for importations entered between October 1, 1992 and May 31, 1994 when
the value-added tax system already replaced, if not totally eliminated, advance sales and
compensating taxes, is with merit. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 273, a multi-stage valueadded tax was put into place to replace the tax on original and subsequent sales tax. Therefore,
compensating tax and advance sales tax were no longer collectible internal revenue taxes under
the NIRC when the Bureau of Customs made the assessments in question and collected the
corresponding tax. Stated a bit differently, PLDT was no longer under legal obligation to pay
compensating tax and advance sales tax on its importation from 1992 to 1994. A refund of the
amounts paid as such taxes is thus proper.
9. P87,257,031.00 of compensating tax + P7,416,391.00 advanced sales tax = P94,673,422.00 total
refund.

Ong Chia vs. Republic of the Philippines (G.R. No. 127240. March, 27, 2000)

ONG

CHIA, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Ponente: MENDOZA
FACTS:
The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, among others for having failed to state all his former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7 and to
support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in his
petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published, with the petition and the
other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance with 7.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the documents annexed by the State to its appelants brief without having been presented and formally offered as
evidence under Rule 132, Section 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence justified the reversal of of the Trial Courts decision.
HELD:
YES. Decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. Petition was denied.
RATIO:
It is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the
applicant. [T]he rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioners argument of substantial compliance
with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law.
[T]he reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the
chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the
documents submitted to the appellate court by the State.

Finman General Assurance Corporation vs. C.A. (G.R. No. 100970. September 02, 1992)

FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and JULIA SURPOSA, respondents.
Aquino and Associates for petitioner.
Public Attorneys Office for private respondent.
Ponente: NOCON
FACTS:
[P]etitioner filed this petition alleging grove abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court in applying the principle of
expresso unius exclusio alterius in a personal accident insurance policy since death resulting from murder and/or assault are
impliedly excluded in said insurance policy considering that the cause of death of the insured was not accidental but rather a
deliberate and intentional act of the assailant in killing the former as indicated by the location of the lone stab wound on the insured.
Therefore, said death was committed with deliberate intent which, by the very nature of a personal accident insurance policy, cannot
be indemnified.
ISSUE:
Whether or not death petitioner is correct that results from assault or murder deemed are not included in the terms accident and
accidental.
HELD:
NO. Petition for certiorari with restraining order and preliminary injunction was denied for lack of merit.
RATIO:
The terms accident and accidental as used in insurance contracts have not acquired any technical meaning, and are construed
by the courts in their ordinary and common acceptation. Thus, the terms have been taken to mean that which happen by chance or
fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. An accident is an event that takes
place without ones foresight or expectation an event that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known
cause and, therefore, not expected.
[I]t is well settled that contracts of insurance are to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. Thus
ambiguity in the words of an insurance contract should be interpreted in favor of its beneficiary.