Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par value of P4,440,700.

00; 5 and the certificate of

stock issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth
P30,000.00.6

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014
THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner, v. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO,
CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M.
ANDERSON, AND FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, Respondents.

On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on
the inventory, and that she (Thelma) be allowed 30 days within which to file a formal
opposition to or comment on the inventory and the supporting documents Teresita had
submitted.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to present
evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the court to resolve the motion for
approval of the inventory.7cralawred

The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for
purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the
administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are
all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties
are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement
and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and
whether property included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the
deceased spouse.

On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to
examine Teresita on the inventory.
With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the issue of
what properties should be included in or excluded from the inventory, the RTC set dates for
the hearing on that issue.8cralawlawlibrary
Ruling of the RTC
After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued on March 14, 2001
an order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties
that should be included, and accordingly ruled:

Antecedents
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second
wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado,
Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M.
Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado
and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court hereby
denies the administratrixs motion for approval of inventory. The Court hereby orders the said
administratrix to redo the inventory of properties which are supposed to constitute as the
estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado by including therein the properties mentioned in the
last five immediately preceding paragraphs hereof and then submit the revised inventory
within sixty (60) days from notice of this order.

Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate
shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation
Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate
stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.

The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an account of her administration of
the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to her possession. She must
render such accounting within sixty (60) days from notice hereof.

On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for
the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdios estate (Special Proceedings
No. 3094CEB).1 The RTC granted the petition considering that there was no opposition. The
letters of administration in favor of Teresita were issued on September 7, 1992.

SO ORDERED.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the
reconsideration of the order of March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real properties
affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and
that the parcels of land covered by the deed of assignment had already come into the
possession of and registered in the name of Mervir Realty. 10 Thelma opposed the motion.

As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio on December

14, 1992 for the consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that
at the time of his death, Emigdio had left no real properties but only personal properties
worth P6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of P32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth
P20,000.00; pieces of jewelry valued at P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty
worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P22,708.25. 2

On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration,11 stating that there was no
cogent reason for the reconsideration, and that the movants agreement as heirs to submit to
the RTC the issue of what properties should be included or excluded from the inventory
already estopped them from questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue.

Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory,
Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined
regarding it. The RTC granted Thelmas motion through the order of January 8, 1993.

Decision of the CA
Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to approve the
inventory, and in ordering her as administrator to include real properties that had been
transferred to Mervir Realty, Teresita, joined by her four children and her stepson Franklin,

On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8,
1993,3 supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806
Mervir Realty shares of stock;4 the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10,
1991 involving real properties with the market value of P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407

considering that there is nothing wrong or objectionable about the estate planning scheme;
that the RTC, as an intestate court, also had no power to take cognizance of and determine
the issue of title to property registered in the name of third persons or corporation; that a
property covered by the Torrens system should be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness
of title; that the RTC, by disregarding the presumption, had transgressed the clear provisions
of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on the matter; and that the RTC also gravely
abused its discretion in holding that Teresita, et al. were estopped from questioning its
jurisdiction because of their agreement to submit to the RTC the issue of which properties
should be included in the inventory.

assailed the adverse orders of the RTC promulgated on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001
by petition for certiorari, stating:
I
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING
THAT THE REAL PROPERTY WHICH WAS SOLD BY THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO
DURING HIS LIFETIME TO A PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY
CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.

The CA further opined as follows:

II
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING
THAT REAL PROPERTIES WHICH ARE IN THE POSSESSION OF AND ALREADY
REGISTERED IN THE NAME (OF) PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY
CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.

In the instant case, public respondent court erred when it ruled that petitioners are estopped
from questioning its jurisdiction considering that they have already agreed to submit
themselves to its jurisdiction of determining what properties are to be included in or excluded
from the inventory to be submitted by the administratrix, because actually, a reading of
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated March 26, 2001 filed before public respondent
court clearly shows that petitioners are not questioning its jurisdiction but the manner in
which it was exercised for which they are not estopped, since that is their right, considering
that there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of limited jurisdiction
when it issued the assailed Order dated March 14, 2001 denying the administratrixs motion
for approval of the inventory of properties which were already titled and in possession of a
third person that is, Mervir Realty Corporation, a private corporation, which under the law
possessed a personality distinct and separate from its stockholders, and in the absence of
any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said
titles in favor of Mervir Realty Corporation should stand undisturbed.

III
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONERS ARE NOW ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING ITS JURISDICTION IN
PASSING UPON THE ISSUE OF WHAT PROPERTIES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE
INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO MERCADO.12
On May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari, disposing as follows: 13

Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court had no authority to determine the
applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction and even if public
respondent court was not merely acting in a limited capacity as a probate court, private
respondent nonetheless failed to adjudge competent evidence that would have justified the
court to impale the veil of corporate fiction because to disregard the separate jurisdictional
personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established
since it cannot be presumed.14

WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is GRANTED

partially. The assailed Orders dated March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 are hereby reversed
and set aside insofar as the inclusion of parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353 located at
Badian, Cebu with an area of 53,301 square meters subject matter of the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the various parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of
Assignment dated February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in the revised inventory to be
submitted by the administratrix is concerned and affirmed in all other respects.

On November 15, 2002, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration of Teresita, et al.15

SO ORDERED.

Issue
Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory
notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for
corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?

The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition for certiorari because the
order of the RTC directing a new inventory of properties was interlocutory; that pursuant to
Article 1477 of theCivil Code, to the effect that the ownership of the thing sold shall be
transferred to the vendee upon its actual and constructive delivery, and to Article 1498 of
the Civil Code, to the effect that the sale made through a public instrument was equivalent to
the delivery of the object of the sale, the sale by Emigdio and Teresita had transferred the
ownership of Lot No. 3353 to Mervir Realty because the deed of absolute sale executed on
November 9, 1989 had been notarized; that Emigdio had thereby ceased to have any more
interest in Lot 3353; that Emigdio had assigned the parcels of land to Mervir Realty as early
as February 17, 1989 for the purpose of saving, as in avoiding taxes with the difference that
in the Deed of Assignment dated January 10, 1991, additional seven (7) parcels of land were
included; that as to the January 10, 1991 deed of assignment, Mervir Realty had been even
at the losing end considering that such parcels of land, subject matter(s) of the Deed of
Assignment dated February 12, 1989, were again given monetary consideration through
shares of stock; that even if the assignment had been based on the deed of assignment
dated January 10, 1991, the parcels of land could not be included in the inventory

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is meritorious.
I
Was certiorari the proper recourse
to assail the questioned orders of the RTC?
The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Thelma contends that the resort to the special
civil action for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC by Teresita and her corespondents
was not proper.

Thelmas contention cannot be sustained.

To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals,19 where the Court declared that a
probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of
title provisionally, and reminded, citing Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, that the patent reason
is the probate courts limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership,
which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in
a separate action. Indeed, in the cited case of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals,20 the Court
pointed out:

The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether the
assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. In PahilaGarrido v.
Tortogo,16 the Court distinguished between final and interlocutory orders as follows:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first
disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action,
leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has
determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else
to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the
merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an
order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to
be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or
judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

All that the said court could do as regards the said properties is determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by
the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties
and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of
the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. (Bold emphasis
supplied)

The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ of preliminary
injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the subject of an appeal.
The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of
appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the
merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will
necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will
compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may
interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are
interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the
subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for
appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.

On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to take
against the assailed orders. The final judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court,21 which also governs appeals in special proceedings,
stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable may be the subject of an appeal in due course. The same rule states
that an interlocutory order or resolution (interlocutory because it deals with preliminary
matters, or that the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered) is
expressly made nonappealable.
Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of the
possibility that material issues may be finally determined at various stages of the special
proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the specific instances in
which multiple appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings, viz:

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special
civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorariunder Rule 65
allowed to be resorted to.

Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. An interested person
may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First
Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:

The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresitas motion for the approval of the
inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were
interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a
final determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the
concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory were provisional and subject to revision at anytime during the course of the
administration proceedings.

(a) Allows or disallows a will;

(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the
estate to which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased
person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;

In Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court, in affirming the decision of the
CA to the effect that the order of the intestate court excluding certain real properties from the
inventory was interlocutory and could be changed or modified at anytime during the course of
the administration proceedings, held that the order of exclusion was not a final but an
interlocutory order in the sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to the San
Lorenzo Village lots. The Court observed there that:

(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;

(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person,
or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the
rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of
a special administrator; and

The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or
should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto
but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3 Morans
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 4489 and 473; Lachenal vs. Salas,
L42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).18 (Bold emphasis supplied)

(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the
person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for
reconsideration.

discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.
Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not come under any of the
instances in which multiple appeals are permitted.

There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and
limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate
but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the
estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can
do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the
inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. Such determination is
provisional and may be still revised. As the Court said inAgtarap v. Agtarap:26

II
Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion
in directing the inclusion of the properties
in the estate of the decedent?
In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
for including properties in the inventory notwithstanding their having been transferred to
Mervir Realty by Emigdio during his lifetime, and for disregarding the registration of the
properties in the name of Mervir Realty, a third party, by applying the doctrine of piercing the
veil of corporate fiction.

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an
intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is
that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a
probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in
the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute,
there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing
parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a
final determination of the conflicting claims of title.

Was the CA correct in its conclusion?

The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in reaching its conclusion,
ignored the law and the facts that had fully warranted the assailed orders of the RTC.
Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be
granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to
serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the
surviving spouse, the RTC becomes dutybound to direct the preparation and submission of
the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator,
has the duty and responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the issuance
of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz:

However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and

convenience.

Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. Within three (3)
months after his appointment every executor or administrator shall return to the court atrue
inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased which has
come into his possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the court
may order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their assistance.

First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of
property without prejudice to final determination of ownership in a separate
action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is
competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters
incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is
conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.27 (Italics in the original; bold
emphasis supplied)

The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and
personal properties of the decedent in the inventory. 22 However, the word all is qualified by
the phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the
properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her
possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true
inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded
from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of another person or entity.

It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its directive for the
inclusion of the properties in question in its assailed order of March 14, 2001, viz:

The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of
the decedent is to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the
executor or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the
estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate. 23 Hence, the RTC that
presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of
what properties should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta,24 the CA
cannot impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which
properties are to be included or excluded from the inventory in the absence of positive
abuse of discretion, for in the administration of the estates of deceased persons, the judges
enjoy ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not interfere with or
attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a
positive abuse of discretion.25 As long as the RTC commits no patently grave abuse of

In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted that Emigdio Mercado was one of
the heirs of Severina Mercado who, upon her death, left several properties as listed in the
inventory of properties submitted in Court in Special Proceedings No. 306R which are
supposed to be divided among her heirs. The administratrix admitted, while being examined
in Court by the counsel for the petitioner, that she did not include in the inventory submitted
by her in this case the shares of Emigdio Mercado in the said estate of Severina Mercado.
Certainly, said properties constituting Emigdio Mercados share in the estate of Severina
Mercado should be included in the inventory of properties required to be submitted to the
Court in this particular case.

In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado also admitted in
Court that she did not include in the inventory shares of stock of Mervir Realty Corporation
which are in her name and which were paid by her from money derived from the taxicab
business which she and her husband had since 1955 as a conjugal undertaking. As these
shares of stock partake of being conjugal in character, onehalf thereof or of the value
thereof should be included in the inventory of the estate of her husband.

acquired during that property regime did not pertain to the conjugal partnership of gains
carried the burden of proof, and that party must prove the exclusive ownership by one of
them by clear, categorical, and convincing evidence. 30 In the absence of or pending the
presentation of such proof, the conjugal partnership of Emigdio and Teresita must be
provisionally liquidated to establish who the real owners of the affected properties
were,31 and which of the properties should form part of the estate of Emigdio. The portions
that pertained to the estate of Emigdio must be included in the inventory.

In the third place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado admitted, too, in Court
that she had a bank account in her name at Union Bank which she opened when her
husband was still alive. Again, the money in said bank account partakes of being conjugal in
character, and so, onehalf thereof should be included in the inventory of the properties
constituting as estate of her husband.

Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in the name of Mervir
Realty, the RTC made findings that put that title in dispute. Civil Case No. CEB12692, a
dispute that had involved the ownership of Lot 3353, was resolved in favor of the estate of
Emigdio, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was still in Emigdios
name. Indeed, the RTC noted in the order of March 14, 2001, or ten years after his death,
that Lot 3353 had remained registered in the name of Emigdio.

In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing in this case that Lot No. 3353
of Pls657D located in Badian, Cebu containing an area of 53,301 square meters as
described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 of the Registry of Deeds
for the Province of Cebu is still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado until now.
When it was the subject of Civil Case No. CEB12690 which was decided on October 19,
1995, it was the estate of the late Emigdio Mercado which claimed to be the owner thereof.
Mervir Realty Corporation never intervened in the said case in order to be the owner thereof.
This fact was admitted by Richard Mercado himself when he testified in Court. x x x So the
said property located in Badian, Cebu should be included in the inventory in this case.

Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all in Civil Case No. CEB12692. Such lack of
interest in Civil Case No. CEB12692 was susceptible of various interpretations, including
one to the effect that the heirs of Emigdio could have already threshed out their differences
with the assistance of the trial court. This interpretation was probable considering that Mervir
Realty, whose business was managed by respondent Richard, was headed by Teresita
herself as its President. In other words, Mervir Realty appeared to be a family corporation.
Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor of Mervir Realty
was a notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from the inventory of the
properties involved. A notarized deed of sale only enjoyed the presumption of regularity in
favor of its execution, but its notarization did not per se guarantee the legal efficacy of the
transaction under the deed, and what the contents purported to be. The presumption of
regularity could be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 32 As the Court
has observed in Suntay v. Court of Appeals:33

Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several parcels of land by the late
Emigdio S. Mercado to Mervir Realty Corporation on January 10, 1991 by virtue of the Deed
of Assignment signed by him on the said day (Exhibit N for the petitioner and Exhibit 5 for the
administratrix) was a transfer in contemplation of death. It was made two days before he died
on January 12, 1991. A transfer made in contemplation of death is one prompted by the
thought that the transferor has not long to live and made in place of a testamentary
disposition (1959 Prentice Hall, p. 3909). Section 78 of the National Internal Revenue Code
of 1977 provides that the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the
value at the time of his death of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the
decedent has at any time made a transfer in contemplation of death. So, the inventory to be
approved in this case should still include the said properties of Emigdio Mercado which were
transferred by him in contemplation of death. Besides, the said properties actually appeared
to be still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado at least ten (10) months after his
death, as shown by the certification issued by the Cebu City Assessors Office on October
31, 1991 (Exhibit O).28

x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the
presumption of regularity, it is not the intention nor the function of the notary public to validate
and make binding an instrument never, in the first place, intended to have any binding legal
effect upon the parties thereto. The intention of the parties still and always is the primary
consideration in determining the true nature of a contract.(Bold emphasis supplied)
It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares of stock of Mervir Realty with
the real properties owned by Emigdio would still have to be inquired into. That Emigdio
executed the deed of assignment two days prior to his death was a circumstance that should
put any interested party on his guard regarding the exchange, considering that there was a
finding about Emigdio having been sick of cancer of the pancreas at the time. 34 In this regard,
whether the CA correctly characterized the exchange as a form of an estate planning
scheme remained to be validated by the facts to be established in court.

Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence
relevant to the procedure for preparing the inventory by the administrator. The aforequoted
explanations indicated that the directive to include the properties in question in the inventory
rested on good and valid reasons, and thus was far from whimsical, or arbitrary, or
capricious.
Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from Severina Mercado should be
included in the inventory because Teresita, et al. did not dispute the fact about the shares
being inherited by Emigdio.

The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the name of Mervir
Realty could not be a valid basis for immediately excluding them from the inventory in view of
the circumstances admittedly surrounding the execution of the deed of assignment. This is
because:

Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code in August 3, 1988, their property regime was the conjugal partnership of gains.29 For
purposes of the settlement of Emigdios estate, it was unavoidable for Teresita to include his
shares in the conjugal partnership of gains. The party asserting that specific property

The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a system of
registration of titles to lands. However, justice and equity demand that the titleholder should
not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the States
agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third
persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop

forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the
certificate at the time of registration or that may arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the
integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of
land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their
duties.35

Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the case; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the
costs of suit.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., LeonardoDe Castro, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ. concur.

Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the deed of assignment of January
10, 1991, such lots should still be included in the inventory to enable the parties, by
themselves, and with the assistance of the RTC itself, to test and resolve the issue on the
validity of the assignment. The limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court might have
constricted the determination of the rights to the properties arising from that deed,36 but it
does not prevent the RTC as intestate court from ordering the inclusion in the inventory of the
properties subject of that deed. This is because the RTC as intestate court, albeit vested only
with special and limited jurisdiction, was still deemed to have all the necessary powers to
exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective. 37

Endnotes:
1

Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the
important purpose of resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement to the heirs.
Article 1061 of theCivil Code required every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse,
herein Teresita herself, to bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he (or
she) may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination
of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. Section 2, Rule 90 of
the Rules of Court also provided that any advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an
heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings,
and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions
and on the heir. Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as
an intestate court about the matters relating to the inventory of the estate of the decedent by
authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous title to
any compulsory heir by the decedent.38
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of
estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate
court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under
the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the possession of the
administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude
properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC
commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the
regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the
judicial or quasijudicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a
positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of
law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasijudicial powers
acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 39

Instead of administratrix, the genderfair term administrator is used.

Rollo, p. 118.

Id. at 125.

Id. at 127129.

Id. at 130.

Id. at 134.

Id. at 56.

Id. at 135.

Id. at 140.

10

Id. at 24.

11

Id. at 156.

12

Id. at 25.

13

Id. at 2134; penned by Associate Justice Mercedes GozoDadole (retired), and

concurred by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. (retired/deceased) and Associate
Justice Amelita G. Tolentino.

In light of the foregoing, the CAs conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC was unwarranted and erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review
on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDEthe decision promulgated on May 15,
2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by the Regional
Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch in
Special Proceedings No. 3094CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio Mercado,

14

Rollo, pp. 3233.

15

Rollo, p. 35.

16

G.R. No. 156358, August 17, 2011, 655 SCRA 553, 566567.

17

No. L39532, July 20, 1979, 91 SCRA 540.

18

Id. at 545546.

19

G.R. No. 128781, August 6, 2002, 386 SCRA 216, 226227.

20

G.R. No. 75773, April 17, 1990, 184 SCRA 367, 372.

21

Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (as amended under A.M. No. 07712SC;
effective December 27, 2007) provides:

34

Section 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order
that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared
by these Rules to be appealable.

Rollo, p. 138.

35

Rabaja Ranch Development Corporation v. AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits

System, G.R. No. 177181, July 7, 2009, 592 SCRA 201, 217, citing Republic v. Guerrero,
G.R. No. 133168, March 28, 2006, 485 SCRA 424, 445.

No appeal may be taken from:

36

(a) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
(b) An interlocutory order;
(c) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(d) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or
compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
(e) An order of execution;
(f) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate
claims, counterclaims, crossclaims and thirdparty complaints, while the main case is
pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
(g) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.

ReyesMesugas v. Reyes, G.R. No. 174835, March 22, 2010, 616 SCRA 345, 350,
citing Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, No. L6243133, August 3,
1984, 131 SCRA 606.
37

Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra at 621.

38

Gregorio v. Madarang, G.R. No. 185226, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 340, 345.

39

Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 153852, October 24,
2012, 684 SCRA 410, 422423.

In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special
civil action as provided in Rule 65.
THIRD DIVISION
22

The word all means every one, or the whole number of particular; the whole number (3
Words and Phrases 212, citing State v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 66 Me. 488, 510). Standing
alone, the word all means exactly what it imports; that is, nothing less than all (Id. at 213,
citing In re Stahelis Will, 57 N.Y.S.2d 185, 188).
23

A.C. No. 10164

March 10, 2014

STEPHAN BRUNET and VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS BRUNET, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN, Respondent.

Siy Chong Keng v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 60 Phil. 493, 500 (1934).

RESOLUTION
24

71 Phil. 66 (1940).

25

Id. at 68.

26

G.R. No. 177099, June 8, 2011, 651 SCRA 455.

MENDOZA, J.:
On August 9, 2002, complainant spouses Stephan and Virginia Brunet (complainants) filed a
complaint against respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren (Atty. Guaren) before the Commission
on Bar Discipline (CED), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they engaged the services of Atty. Guaren for
the titling of a residential lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres; that Atty. Guaren
asked for a fee of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) including expenses relative to its
proceeding; that it was agreed that full payment of the fee shall be made after the delivery of
the title; that Atty. Guaren asked for an advance fee of One Thousand Pesos (Pl,000.00)
which they gave; that Atty. Guaren took all the pertinent documents relative to the titling of
their lot-certified true copy of the tax declaration, original copy of the deed of exchange,
sketch plan, deed of donation, survey plan, and original copy of the waiver; that on March 10,
1997, Atty. Guaren asked for additional payment of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) which
they dutifully gave; that from 1997 to 2001, they always reminded Atty. Guaren about the
case and each time he would say that the titling was in progress; that they became bothered
by the slow progress of the case so they demanded the return of the money they paid; and
that respondent agreed to return the same provided that the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) be deducted to answer for his professional fees.

27

Id. at 471473, citing, among others, Coca v. Pizarras Vda. De Pangilinan, No. L27082,
January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 278, 283; Alvarez v. Espiritu, No. L18833, August 14, 1965, 14
SCRA 892, 899; Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227 (1948); and Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil.
561 (1942).
28

Rollo, pp. 139140.

29

See. FAMILY CODE, Art. 105, 116.

30

Dewara v. Lamela, G.R. No. 179010, April 11, 2011, 647 SCRA 483, 490, citing Coja v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151153, December 10, 2007, 539 SCRA 517, 528.
31

See Alvarez v. Espiritu, No. L18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892, 899.

32

San Juan v. Offril, G.R. No. 154609, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 439, 445446
citingNazareno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138842, October 18, 2000, 343 SCRA 637,
652.

Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client relationship

between them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against them in a case pending
before the Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC).

33

Atty. Guaren admitted that he indeed charged complainants an acceptance fee

of P10,000.00, but denied that the amount was inclusive of expenses for the titling of the lot.
He claimed, however, that he received the payment ofP1,000.00 and P6,000.00; that their

G.R. No. 114950, December 19, 1995, 251 SCRA 430, 452453, cited in Nazareno v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138842, October 18, 2000, 343 SCRA 637, 652.

agreement was that the case would be filed in court after the complainants fully paid his
acceptance fee; that he did not take the documents relative to the titling of the lot except for
the photocopy of the tax declaration; and that he did not commit betrayal of trust and
confidence when he participated in a case filed against the complainants in MCTC explaining
that his appearance was for and in behalf of Atty. Ervin Estandante, the counsel on record,
who failed to appear in the said hearing.

G.R. No. 201234

March 17, 2014

HEIRS OF AMADA A. ZAULDA, namely: ELESEO A. ZAULDA and RODOLFO A.

ZAULDA, Petitioners,
vs.
ISAAC Z. ZAULDA, Respondent.
DECISION

In the Report and Recommendation,1 dated August 24, 2012, the Investigating
Commissioner found Atty. Guaren to have violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility
when he accepted the titling of complainants lot and despite the acceptance of P7,000.00,
he failed to perform his obligation and allowed 5 long years to elapse without any progress in
the titling of the lot. Atty. Guaren should also be disciplined for appearing in a case against
complainants without a written consent from the latter. The CBD recommended that he be
suspended for six (6) months.

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
assailing the February 11, 2011 Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA G.R. SP No.
05379, dismissing the petition for review of the petitioners, and its March 6, 2012
Resolution,2 denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The February 11, 2011 CA
Resolution reads:

In its May 20, 2013 Resolution,2 the IBP Board of Governors, adopted and approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of the CBD, suspending Atty. Guaren from the
practice of law for three (3) months only.

A perusal of the Petition revealed there were impediments to the Court's subsequent action
thereon:
1. the Petition was not filed in the nick of time inasmuch as the Court could not
have pursued action on or before September 9, 2010 which was supposedly the
last day specified on the Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review
dated August 23, 2010, postmarked August 24, 2010, and received by this Court on
September 13, 2010 for the simple reason that this Division apparently received a
copy of the Motion only on September 14, 2010, and the Rollo was forwarded to the
Office of the ponente only on January 5, 2011. Certainly, parties and counsel
should not assume that Courts are bound to grant the time they pray for. By parity
of reasoning, a motion that is not acted upon in due time is deemed denied.

The Court adopts the findings of the IBP Board of Governors on the unethical conduct of
Atty. Guaren, except as to the penalty.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not
money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making
venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a
livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. 3
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:

2. there was no competent evidence regarding petitioners identity on the attached

Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping as required by Section 12,
Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which now requires a photocopy of
petitioners competent evidence of identity.

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Accordingly, petitioners Petition for Review dated September 9, 2010 is hereby DISMISSED.

In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of P7,000.00 as
partial payment of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the
case for the titling of complainants' lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached
his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence when he neglected a legal matter
entrusted to him.1wphi1

SO ORDERED.3

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren is found GUILTY of having violated

Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective from receipt of this
Resolution, with a warning that a similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.

The controversy stemmed from a complaint for recovery of possession and declaration of
ownership filed by the heirs of Amada Aguila-Zaulda, namely, Eleseo A. Zaulda and Rodolfo
A. Zaulda (petitioners), against respondent Isaac Z. Zaulda (respondent), before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Banga-Libacao-Madalag, Banga, Aklan (MCTC).

[Emphases supplied]
The Antecedents:

The complaint4 alleged, among others, that petitioners were the legal heirs of the late Amada
Aguila Zaulda; that the latter was one of the children and legal heirs of the late Teodulo
Aguila and Dorotea Zolina (Spouses Aguila); that they were co-owners of a parcel of land,
Lot 917-M, with an area of 4,263 square meters, situated in Barangay Guadalupe, Libacao,
Aklan; that they acquired the subject property by inheritance from the Spouses Aguila per
Deed of Extra-judicial Partition of Realty, dated November 2, 1993; that they have been in
open, continuous and adverse possession of the subject property since time immemorial as
evidenced by tax declarations for the years 1945, 1953, 1957, 1980, 1985, and 1990; that
sometime in March 2000, respondent, through force and intimidation, forcibly entered the
subject property and, there and then, cut and took with him bamboos and other
forest/agricultural products; that on March 29, 2000, respondent, together with two (2) other

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records of
the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and
the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

unidentified persons, forcibly entered the subject property and, with threat and intimidation,
constructed and built a house made of light material; and that petitioners demanded
respondent to vacate and turn over the subject property to them but the latter refused to do
so.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Kalibo, Aklan (RTC), partly modified the
decision of the MCTC and declared respondent as the owner and possessor of lots 1 and 3,
the dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

In his Answer,5 respondent averred that Erene Aguila Zaula (Erene), his predecessor-ininterest, was the actual and physical possessor of the subject land; that the property which
the petitioners were claiming was donated to the Municipality of Libacao, Aklan, for school
site purposes; that after the donation, Tax Declaration No. 6636 covering the said land was
cancelled, and a new Tax Declaration No. 8619 in the name of the Municipality of Libacao
was issued and Tax Declaration No. 8618 for the remaining portion of 3,805 square meters
was issued to Spouses Aguila; that in Tax Declaration No. 8618, it was erroneously entered
therein that it contained 14,500 square meters when it should be only 3,805 square meters;
that petitioners caused the survey of the land and instead of confining themselves to the
remaining area of 3,805 square meters, they included part and portion of the property
including the subject land which was owned by Erene; and that when the heirs of Erene
found out that part of their land was included in the tax declaration issued to spouses Aguila,
they filed a protest before the DENR.

1) Defendant Isaac Zaulda is declared, as reflected in the Commissioners

Sketches and Reports, dated July 11, 2002 and March 4, 2004, the lawful owner
and possessor of Lot No. 916 (shaded blue) and parts of Lot 1 and 3 (shaded
green) as against the plaintiffs;
2) Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the dispositive portion of the decision appealed from is
affirmed.
Costs against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner Eleseo Zaulda, the lone surviving heir of Amada Aguila-Zaulda, after his co-heir
Rodolfo Zaulda passed away, filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure before the CA. In the assailed resolution, dated February 11, 2011, the CA
dismissed the petition for being filed out of time and for lack of competent evidence on
affiants identity on the attached verification and certification against forum shopping.

On December 29, 2008, the MCTC rendered judgment, 6 disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds preponderance of evidence in favor of
plaintiffs (as regards Lots 1, 3 and 6) by:

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in the assailed resolution, dated
March 6, 2012.

1. Declaring plaintiffs the lawful owners entitled to possession of the Lots 1, 3 and 6
described in the Commissioners Report and Sketches being part and parcel of
plaintiffs inherited Lot 917;

Hence, petitioners filed this petition, raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time
despite the motion for extension of time having been timely filed; and

2. Declaring Lot 1 as the portion owned by the heirs of Amada Zaulda and Lot 3 as
the portion owned by the heirs of Coronacion A. Vidad by virtue of the Deed of
Extra-judicial Partition executed by the heirs of spouses Teodulo and Dorotea
Aguila; Lot 6 (portion of the barangay road) as included in plaintiffs inherited Lot
917;

2. Whether or not the CA erred in not passing upon the issue of whether or not the
RTC erred in reversing the decision of the MCTC based on erroneous findings of
facts and on mere suppositions and presumptions absent any evidence on the
same.

3. Ordering the defendant Isaac Zaulda and intervenors Celedonia Aguila-Villorente

and Danny A. Villorente, their assigns and privies to peacefully deliver possession
of the above-mentioned lots to plaintiffs and/or their representatives;

On January 17, 2013, respondent filed his Comment, 9 reiterating that no special and
important reason exists to warrant the Courts review of the assailed CA resolutions, the
same having been issued in accord with law and supported by jurisprudence.

4. Ordering the defendant Isaac Zaulda to remove the nipa houses he built found
on Lot 3 at his expense.

On June 6, 2013, petitioners filed their Reply, 10 invoking the relaxation of the strict application
of procedural rules in the interest of substantial justice. They submit that the petition should
not have been dismissed based on technicalities because the appeal was instituted in
accordance with the rules. They pray that the petition be given due course as they were
deprived of their property without due process of law considering that the case was not
properly ventilated upon, more so that the findings of fact of MCTC and RTC were different.

Further, (with respect to Lots A and B):

5. Declaring Lots A and B described in the Commissioners Sketch found on page
164 of the record, as the combined area of Lot F-39 owned by parties predecessor
Estanislao Aguila covered by tax declaration no. 011-0458 and are therefore coowned by his heirs: plaintiffs, defendant, and intervenors included along with the
rest of the children and descendants of Teodulo Aguila, Erene Aguila Zaulda and
Jaime Aguila;

The Courts Ruling:

Petition for review from the RTC to the CA is governed by Rule 42 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:

6. Ordering all parties to respect the co-ownership among them over Lots A and B
until they execute an agreement of partition into three (3) equal parts representing
the shares of Teodulo, Erene and Jaime.

Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the
Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified
petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said
court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, x x x. The petition shall be filed and
served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the
denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration x x x. Upon proper motion x x x,

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.7

the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to
file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. [Emphasis supplied]
In this case, the petitioners complied with the requirements laid down in the above quoted
provision.

15-day extension period. The Court held in that case that being a few days late in the filing of
the petition for review did not automatically warrant its dismissal and where strong
considerations of substantial justice were manifest in the petition, the stringent application of
technical rules could be relaxed in the exercise of equity jurisdiction. It found that the
circumstances obtaining in that case merited the liberal application of the rule absent any
intention to cause delay.

Records show that on March 10, 2010, petitioners timely filed a motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial11 of the RTC decision (dated January 20, 2010, received by petitioners on
February 25, 2010), but the same was denied in the RTC Order, 12 dated August 4, 2010,
copy of which was received by petitioners on August 10, 2010. Thus, they had until August
25, 2010 within which to file a petition for review pursuant to said Section 1, Rule 42.

As regards the competent identity of the affiant in the Verification and Certification,
records16 show that he proved his identity before the notary public through the presentation
of his Office of the Senior Citizen (OSCA) identification card. Rule II, Sec. 12 of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice requires a party to the instrument to present competent evidence
of identity. Sec. 12, as amended, provides:

On August 24, 2010, petitioners filed their Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Review before the CA, paying the docket and other lawful fees and deposit for costs and
prayed for an additional period of fifteen (15) days from August 25, 2010 or until September
9, 2010, within which to file the said petition.

Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. The phrase "competent evidence of identity"
refers to the identification of an individual based on:

On September 9, 2010, they filed the Petition for Review.

(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing
the photograph and signature of the individual, such as but not limited to, passport,
drivers license, Professional Regulations Commission ID, National Bureau of
Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal ID, voters ID, Barangay
certification, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security
System (SSS) card, PhilHealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seamans book, alien certificate of
registration/immigrant certificate of registration, government office ID, certificate
from the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP),
Department of Social Welfare and Development certification [as amended by A.M.
No. 02-8-13-SC dated February 19, 2008]; or

13

The Court notes that the petition for review before the CA was filed within the additional
fifteen (15) day period prayed for in their motion for extension of time to file it, which was filed
on time by registered mail. To repeat, the petition was filed on September 9, 2010, within the
fifteen (15) day period requested in their motion for extension of time to file the petition.
As earlier stated, the Motion For Extension Of Time To File Petition For Review, which was
filed through registered mail on August 24, 2010, was filed on time. It was physically in the
appellate courts possession long before the CA issued its Resolution on February 11, 2011,
dismissing the petition for review for being filed out of time. The record shows that 1] the CA
received the motion for extension of time to file petition for review on September 13, 2010; 2]
the CA Division received the motion on September 14, 2010; and 3] the ponentes office
received it on January 5, 2011.

(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who
personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is
privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the
individual and shows to the notary public documentary identification.

Indeed, there was a delay, but it was a delay that cannot be attributed at all to the petitioners.
The almost four (4) months that lapsed before the records reached the ponentes office was
caused by the gross incompetence and inefficiency of the division personnel at the CA. It
was the height of injustice for the CA to dismiss a petition just because the motion for
extension reached the ponentes office beyond the last date prayed for. Clearly, the
petitioners were unreasonably deprived of their right to be heard on the merits because of the
CAs unreasonable obsession to reduce its load. In allowing the petitioners to be fatally
prejudiced by the delay in the transmittal attributable to its inept or irresponsible personnel,
the CA committed an unfortunate injustice.

It is clear from the foregoing provisions that a senior citizen card is one of the competent
identification cards recognized in the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. For said reason, there
was compliance with the requirement. Contrary to the perception of the CA, attachment of a
photocopy of the identification card in the document is not required by the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice. Even A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, amending Section 12 thereof, is silent on it.
Thus, the CAs dismissal of the petition for lack of competent evidence on the affiants
identity on the attached verification and certification against forum shopping was without
clear basis.

The petitioners could not also be faulted that the motion for extension of time was received
by the CA on September 13, 2010. The rules allow parties to file a pleading by registered
mail.14 They are not required to ensure that it would be received by the court on or before the
last day of the extended period prayed for. Though no party can assume that its motion for
extension would be granted, any denial thereof should be reasonable.

Even assuming that a photocopy of competent evidence of identity was indeed required, nonattachment thereof would not render the petition fatally defective. It has been consistently
held17 that verification is merely a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement, affecting merely the
form of the pleading such that non-compliance therewith does not render the pleading fatally
defective. It is simply intended to provide an assurance that the allegations are true and
correct and not a product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading
is filed in good faith. The court may in fact order the correction of the pleading if verification is
lacking or it may act on the pleading although it may not have been verified, where it is made
evident that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed so that the ends of justice may
be served. The Court, in Altres v. Empleo,18 issued guidelines based on previous
jurisprudential pronouncements respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or
submission of a defective, verification as well as on certification against forum shopping, as
follows:

Granting that the petition was filed late, substantial justice begs that it be allowed and be
given due course. Indeed, the merits of petitioners cause deserve to be passed upon
considering that the findings of the RTC were in complete contrast to the findings of the
MCTC which declared petitioners as the lawful owners entitled to possession of the lots in
question.
In Montajes v. People of the Philippines,15 petitioner therein, due to erroneous computation,
filed his petition for review before the CA two (2) days after the expiration of the requested

10

xxx

SKUNAC CORPORATION and ALFONSO F. ENRIQUEZ, Petitioners,

vs.
ROBERTO S. SYLIANTENG and CAESAR S. SYLIANTENG, Respondents.

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily

render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act
on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule
may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

x x x.19

This treats of the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision 1 and Resolution2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August 10, 2012 and February 18, 2013, respectively, in
CA-G.R. CV No. 92022.

Again, granting arguendo that there was non-compliance with the verification requirement,
the rule is that courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses which do not really
impair the proper administration of justice. After all, the higher objective of procedural rule is
to ensure that the substantive rights of the parties are protected. Litigations should, as much
as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. Every party-litigant must be
afforded ample opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case, free from the
unacceptable plea of technicalities.20

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case, as narrated by the CA, are as follows:
The civil cases before the [Regional Trial Court of Pasig City) involved two (2) parcels of land
identified as Lot 1, with an area of 1,250 square meters (Civil Case No. 63987) and Lot 2,
with an area of 990 square meters (Civil Case No. 63988), both found in Block 2 of the
Pujalte Subdivision situated along Wilson Street, Greenhills, San Juan City which are
portions of a parcel of land previously registered in the name of Luis A. Pujalte on October
29, 1945 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. (-78865) (-2668) -93165
("Mother Title") of the Register of Deeds for the City of Manila.

In Coca-Cola Bottlers v. De la Cruz,21 where the verification was marred only by a glitch in
the evidence of the identity of the affiant, the Court was of the considered view that, in the
interest of justice, the minor defect can be overlooked and should not defeat the petition.
The reduction in the number of pending cases is laudable, but if it would be attained by
precipitate, if not preposterous, application of technicalities, justice would not be served. The
law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to
render or dispense justice. "It is a more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a
technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal rather than dispose of
the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression
of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not miscarriage of
justice."22 [Italicization supplied]

Plaintiffs-appellants Roberto S. Sylianteng and Caesar S. Sylianteng ("appellants") base their

claim of ownership over the subject lots a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in their favor by
their mother, Emerenciana Sylianteng ("Emerenciana"), on June 27, 1983. Appellants further
allege that Emerenciana acquired the lots from the late Luis Pujalte [Luis] through a Deed of
Sale dated June 20, 1958 as reflected in Entry No. P.E. 4023, annotated on the covering
TCT, by virtue of which she was issued TCT No. 42369. Then, when she sold the lots to
appellants, TCT No. 39488, covering the same, was issued in their names.

What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant should be given the
fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to
lose life, liberty, honor, or property on technicalities. The rules of procedure should be viewed
as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed.23 At this juncture, the Court reminds all members of the
bench and bar of the admonition in the often-cited case of Alonso v. Villamor:24

[Herein petitioners] Skunac Corporation ("Skunac") and Alfonso F. Enriquez ("Enriquez"), on

the other hand, claim that a certain Romeo Pujalte who was declared by the RTC of Pasig
City, Branch 151 in Special Proceedings No. 3366 as the sole heir of Luis Pujalte, caused the
reconstitution of the Mother Title resulting to its cancellation and the issuance of TCT No.
5760-R in his favor. Romeo Pujalte then allegedly sold the lots to Skunac and Enriquez in
1992. Thus, from TCT No. 5760-R, TCT No. 5888-R, for Lot 1 was issued in the name of
Skunac, while TCT No. 5889-R for Lot 2 was issued in the name of Enriquez.

Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust.1wphi1 Technicality, when it
deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no vested rights in
technicalities.

[Respondents] contend that they have a better right to the lots in question because the
transactions conveying the same to them preceded those claimed by [petitioners] as source
of the latter's titles. [Respondents] further assert that [petitioners] could not be considered as
innocent purchasers in good faith and for value because they had prior notice of the previous
transactions as stated in the memorandum of encumbrances annotated on the titles covering
the subject lots. [Petitioners], for their part, maintain that [respondents] acquired the lots
under questionable circumstances it appearing that there was no copy of the Deed of Sale,
between Emerenciana and Luis Pujalte, on file with the Office of the Register of Deeds.3

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 11, 2011 and March 6, 2012
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 05379 are SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS petitioners' Motion For Extension Of Time To File Petition
For Review filed with the Cou1i of Appeals and gives due course to their Petition for Review.
The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for decision on the merits of the petition.

On November 16, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig (RTC) rendered judgment in favor
of herein petitioners. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads as follows:

SO ORDERED.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants

and against the plaintiffs:
1. Declaring as null and void TCT No. 42369 in the name of Emerciana (sic)
Sylianteng and TCT No. 39488 in the name of plaintiffs herein and ordering the
cancellation thereof;

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 205879

2. Declaring the herein defendants as buyers in good faith and for value; and

April 23, 2014

11

3. Declaring TCT No. 5888-R in the name of SKUNAC Corporation and TCT No.
5889-R in the name of Alfonso Enriquez as valid.

EMERENCIANA SYLIANTENG BY THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON

CITY.

The complaint-in-intervention is ordered dismissed.

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT

PETITIONERS ARE THE LAWFUL OWNERS OF THE SUBJECT LOTS SINCE
THEY HAVE VALIDLY ACQUIRED THE SAME FROM ROMEO PUJALTE, THE
SOLE HEIR OF LUIS PUJALTE.

With costs against the plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.4

V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL

AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COST OF
SUIT TO RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONERS WERE NOT IN
BAD FAITH IN PURCHASING THE SUBJECT LOTS.6

Herein respondents then filed an appeal with the CA.

On August 10, 2012, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the appeal is GRANTED. The decision dated
November 16, 2007 of Branch 160, Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil Case No.
63987 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The petition lacks merit.

At the outset, the Court observes that the main issues raised in the instant petition are
essentially questions of fact. It is settled that, as a rule, in petitions for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be put in issue. 7 Questions of
fact cannot be entertained. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule, to wit:

Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs-appellants Roberto S. Sylianteng and

Caesar S. Sylianteng and against defendants-appellees Skunac Corporation and Alfonso F.
Enriquez, and intervenor-appellee Romeo N. Pujalte:
1. Declaring as null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5760-R in the name of
Romeo N. Pujalte, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5888-R in the name of Skunac
Corporation, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5889-R in the name of Alfonso F.
Enriquez;

(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or

conjectures;

2. Upholding the validity of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42369 in the name of
Emerenciana Sylianteng, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 39488 in the names
of Roberto S. Sylianteng and Caesar S. Sylianteng; and

(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;

(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;

3. Ordering defendants-appellees Skunac Corporation and Alfonso F. Enriquez,

and intervenor-appellee Romeo N. Pujalte, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffsappellants Roberto S. Sylianteng and Caesar S. Sylianteng:

(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;

a. Moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00,

(g) When the CAs findings are contrary to those by the trial court;

b. Exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00,

(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based;

c. Attorney's fees in the amount of P250,000.00, and

(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;

d. The costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.5

(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record; or

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated
February 18, 2013.

(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 8

Hence, the instant petition with the following assignment of errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING IN THE CASE
THE PROVISION OF THE CIVIL CODE ON DOUBLE SALE OF A REGISTERED
LAND.

In the instant case, the findings of the CA and the RTC are conflicting. It, thus, behooves this
Court to entertain the questions of fact raised by petitioners and review the records of this
case to resolve these conflicting findings. Thus, this Court held in the case of Manongsong v.
Estimo9 that:

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT

RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF SALE BETWEEN
LUIS PUJALTE AND THEIR PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST, EMERENCIANA
SYLIANTENG.

We review the factual and legal issues of this case in light of the general rules of evidence
and the burden of proof in civil cases, as explained by this Court in Jison v. Court of Appeals:
x x x Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and
upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of
trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the
burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a
verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING NULL

AND VOID TCT NO. 42369 PURPORTED TO HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO

12

burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants. The
concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or
more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of
truth.10

Moreover, Section 4 (b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "[w]hen a document is
in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical contents, all such
copies are equally regarded as originals."
In addition, evidence of the authenticity and due execution of the subject deed is the fact that
it was notarized. The notarization of a private document converts it into a public
document.19 Moreover, a notarized instrument is admissible in evidence without further proof
of its due execution, is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents, and has in its favor
the presumption of regularity.20 This presumption is affirmed if it is beyond dispute that the
notarization was regular.21 To assail the authenticity and due execution of a notarized
document, the evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.22

Coming to the merits of the case, the abovementioned assignment of errors boils down to
two basic questions: (1) whether or not respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Emerenciana,
validly acquired the subject lots from Luis, and (2) whether or not respondents, in turn, validly
acquired the same lots from Emerenciana.
The Court rules in the affirmative, but takes exception to the CA's and RTC's application of
Article 1544 of the Civil Code.

In the present case, petitioners failed to present convincing evidence to prove that the
notarization of the subject deed was irregular as to strip it of its public character. On the
contrary, a certified copy of page 26 of the notarial register of the notary public who notarized
the subject deed of sale, which was issued by the Records Management and Archives Office
of Manila, shows that the sale of the subject lots by Luis to Emerenciana was indeed
regularly notarized.23

Reliance by the trial and appellate courts on Article 1544 of the Civil Code is misplaced. The
requisites that must concur for Article 1544 to apply are:
(a) The two (or more sales) transactions must constitute valid sales;
(b) The two (or more) sales transactions must pertain to exactly the same subject
matter;

Petitioners further argue that the deed of sale between Emerenciana and Luis was not
registered with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. The Court, however, agrees with the
CA that the said deed was, in fact, registered as evidenced by official receipts 24 issued to this
effect. Petitioners, again, did not present any evidence to assail the authenticity of these
documents.

(c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject
matter must each represent conflicting interests; and
(d) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject
matter must each have bought from the very same seller. 11

Petitioners also question the authenticity of the subject deed of sale (Exhibit "B-1-C") by
arguing that only one copy of such deed was prepared as only one document number was
assigned by the notary to the said deed. Petitioners claim that this is contrary to the claim of
respondents that the said deed of sale was prepared, executed and notarized in several
copies. The Court is not persuaded.

Obviously, said provision has no application in cases where the sales involved were initiated
not by just one but two vendors.12 In the present case, the subject lots were sold to
petitioners and respondents by two different vendors Emerenciana and Romeo Pujalte
(Romeo). Hence, Article 1544 of the Civil Code is not applicable.

It is true that Section 246, Article V, Title IV, Chapter II of the Revised Administrative Code
provides that "[t]he notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged
before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the
instrument the page or pages of his register on which the same is recorded." In this regard,
the Court agrees with respondents' contention that the "instrument" being referred to in the
abovequoted provision is the deed or contract which is notarized. It does not pertain to the
number of copies of such deed or contract. Hence, one number is assigned to a deed or
contract regardless of the number of copies prepared and notarized. Each and every copy of
such contract is given the same document number. It is, thus, wrong for petitioners to argue
that only one copy of the June 20, 1958 deed of sale was prepared and notarized, because
only one document number appears on the notarial book of the notary public who notarized
the said deed. On the contrary, evidence shows that at least two copies of the subject deed
of sale was prepared and notarized one was submitted for registration with the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City and the other was retained by Emerenciana, which is the copy
presented in evidence by respondents.

Nonetheless, the Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the CA that Emerenciana's
acquisition of the subject lots from Luis and her subsequent sale of the same to respondents
are valid and lawful. Petitioners dispute such finding. To prove their contention, they assail
the authenticity and due execution of the deed of sale between Luis and Emerenciana.
Petitioners contend that respondents' presentation of the "duplicate/carbon" original of the
Deed of Sale13 dated June 20, 1958 is in violation of the best evidence rule under Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.14 The Court does not agree.
The best evidence rule is inapplicable to the present case. The said rule applies only when
the content of such document is the subject of the inquiry.15 Where the issue is only as to
whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to
or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence
is admissible.16 Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need to
account for the original.17 In the instant case, what is being questioned is the authenticity and
due execution of the subject deed of sale. There is no real issue as to its contents.

As to petitioners' contention that the copy of the deed of sale presented by respondents in
evidence is of dubious origin because it does not bear the stamp "RECEIVED" by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, suffice it to state that the Court finds no cogent reason to
disagree with respondents' contention that the duplicate original of the subject deed of sale
which they presented as evidence in court could not have been received by the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City because only the original copy, and not the duplicate original, was
submitted to the Register of Deeds for registration.

In any case, going to the matter of authenticity and due execution of the assailed document,
petitioners do not dispute that the copy of the deed of sale that respondents submitted as
part of their evidence is a duplicate of the original deed of sale dated June 20, 1958. It is
settled that a signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document executed at the same time as
the original is known as a duplicate original and maybe introduced in evidence without
accounting for the non-production of the original.18

13

Petitioners also question the authenticity of and the entries appearing on the copy of the title
covering the subject properties in the name of Luis. However, the Court finds no cogent
reason to doubt the authenticity of the document as well as the entries appearing therein,
considering that the parties (herein petitioners and respondents) stipulated 25 that the
machine copy of TCT No. 78865 in the name of Luis, marked as Exhibit "DDD" for
respondents, is a faithful reproduction of the original copy of the said title, including the
memorandum of encumbrances annotated therein. Included in the memorandum of
encumbrances is Entry No. P.E. 4023, which states, thus:

to note the disquisition of the CA as to the legitimacy of Romeo's claim, and its subsequent
effect on petitioners' rights to the disputed properties, to wit:
Appellees' [herein petitioners'] predicament is further compounded by Romeo Pujalte's
conviction on November 18, 2005 of the offense of Use of Falsified Documents, for falsifying
the documents that enabled him to deceive the estate court and have himself named as Luis
Pujalte's sole heir. He did not appeal his conviction and, instead, applied for probation. It
goes without saying that the documents purportedly conveying the lots in question to
appellees and which are founded on Romeo Pujalte's alleged rights over the estate of the
late Luis Pujalte do not deserve any consideration at all. x x x33

This certificate of title is hereby cancelled (sic) partially with respect to Lots 1 and 2, Blk. 2 by
virtue of a Deed of Sale ratified on June 20, 1958 before Armenio P. Engracia of Notary for
the City of Manila and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42369 is issued in the name of
Vendee, Emerenciana A.S. de Sylianteng, filing the aforesaid Deed under T-No. 42369.26

Indeed, not being an heir of Luis, Romeo never acquired any right whatsoever over the
subject lots, even if he was able to subsequently obtain a title in his name. It is a well-settled
principle that no one can give what one does not have, nemo dat quod non habet. 34 One can
sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more right than
what the seller can transfer legally.35 Since Romeo has no right to the subject lots,
petitioners, who simply stepped into the shoes of Romeo, in turn, acquired no rights to the
same.

The same entry appears in Exhibit "11" for petitioners. 27

P.E. No. 4023 has been entered on TCT No. 78865 by the then Acting Register of Deeds of
San Juan.1wphi1Petitioners assail the regularity of such entry. However, one of the
disputable presumptions provided under Section 3 (m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court is that
official duty has been regularly performed. Under the said Rule, this presumption shall be
considered satisfactory unless contradicted and overcome by other evidence. In the present
case, petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to contradict the presumption of
regularity in the performance of the duties of then Acting Register of Deeds of San Juan.

In addition, and as correctly pointed out by the CA, petitioners' position is neither helped by
the fact that, in the present case, Romeo filed a Verified Complaint-in-Intervention36 with the
RTC, denying that he sold the subject lots to petitioners and claiming that the same
properties still form part of the estate of Luis.

Petitioners, nonetheless, insist that they have valid title over the subject properties. They
trace their respective titles from that of Romeo. Romeo, in turn, derives his supposed
ownership of and title over the subject lots from his claim that he is the sole heir of the estate
of his alleged predecessor-in-interest, Luis. Evidence, however, shows that Romeo never
became the owner of the subject properties for two reasons.

Stretching petitioners' contention a bit further, granting that both petitioners and respondents
bought the disputed lots in good faith by simply relying on the certificates of the sellers, and
subsequently, acquiring titles in their own names, respondents' title shall still prevail. It is a
settled rule that when two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the
same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail, and, in case of successive
registrations where more than one certificate is issued over the land, the person holding a
prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a subsequent
certificate.37 The titles of respondents, having emanated from an older title, should thus be
upheld.

First, as shown above, the disputed lots were already sold by Luis during his lifetime. Thus,
these parcels of land no longer formed part of his estate when he died. As a consequence,
Romeo's sale of the disputed lots to petitioners was not affirmed by the estate court, because
the subject parcels of land were not among those included in the said estate at the time that
Romeo was appointed as the administrator thereof. As shown in its October 11, 1993
Order,28 the RTC of Pasig, acting as an estate court, denied Romeo's motion for approval of
the sale of the subject lots, because these properties were already sold to respondents per
report submitted by the Register of Deeds of San Juan.

Anent petitioners' bad faith, this Court finds no persuasive reason to depart from the findings
of the CA that petitioners had prior knowledge of the estate proceedings involving the subject
lots and that they have notice of the defect in the title of Romeo.
It is true that a person dealing with registered land need not go beyond the title. However, it
is equally true that such person is charged with notice of the burdens and claims which are
annotated on the title.38 In the instant case, The Torrens Certificate of Title (TCT No. 5760-R)
in the name of Romeo, which was the title relied upon by petitioners, also contained Entry
No. P.E. 4023, quoted above, which essentially informs petitioners that the lots which they
were about to buy and which they in fact bought, were already sold to Emerenciana. 39 This
entry should have alerted petitioners and should have prodded them to conduct further
investigation. Simple prudence would have impelled them as honest persons to make deeper
inquiries to clear the suspiciousness haunting Romeo's title. On the contrary, rather than
taking caution in dealing with Romeo, petitioners, instead, subsequently executed deeds of
sale40 over the same properties but all of which were, nonetheless, disallowed by the estate
court in its Order41 dated October 11, 1993 on the ground that the said lots were already
sold, this time, by Emerenciana to respondents. In this regard, petitioners acted in bad faith.

In fact, as early as July 14, 1960, prior to Romeo's appointment as administrator of the estate
of Luis, Paz L. Vda. de Pujalte (Paz), the mother of Luis, who was then appointed
administratrix of the estate of the latter, in her Inventory and Appraisal29 which was submitted
to the estate court, already excluded the subject properties among those which comprise the
estate of Luis. Subsequently, in the Project of Partition30 of the residual estate of Luis, dated
March 22, 1963, Paz again did not include the disputed lots as part of such residual estate.
Hence, Romeo's sale of the subject lots to petitioners is invalid as it is settled that any
unauthorized disposition of property under administration is null and void and title does not
pass to the purchasers.31
Second, even granting that the subject lots formed part of the estate of Luis, it was
subsequently proven in a separate case that Romeo is not his heir. In a criminal case for use
of falsified documents filed against Romeo, it was proven that his claim of heirship is
spurious. In the said criminal case, his birth certificate and the marriage certificate of his
supposed parents, which he presented before the estate court, to prove his claim that he is
the sole heir of Luis, were found by the criminal court to be falsified. 32 In this regard, it bears

Thus, as correctly held by the CA, respondents are entitled to moral damages. Moral
damages are treated as compensation to alleviate physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
and similar injury resulting from a wrong.42 In the instant case, respondents satisfactorily

14

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

established their claim for moral damages. They endured suffering brought about by
Romeo's bad faith in using falsified documents to enable himself to acquire title to and sell
the subject lots to petitioners to the prejudice of respondents. Respondents also suffered by
reason of petitioners' stubborn insistence in buying the said properties despite their
knowledge of the defect in the title of Romeo. 43 Though moral damages are not capable of
pecuniary estimation, the amount should be proportional to and in approximation of the
suffering inflicted.44 Respondents sought the award of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages
from each of the petitioners, but the Court agrees with the CA that the total amount
of P500,000.00 is sufficient for both respondents.

Footnotes
1

Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon with Associate Justices Samuel H.

Gaerlan and Abraham B. Borreta concurring; Annex "A" to Petition, rollo pp. 42-63.
2

Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon with Associate Justices Hakim S.

Abdulwahid and Samuel H. Gaerlan concurring; Annex "B" to Petition, id. at 64-67.

As to exemplary damages, these are imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. 45 They are
imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or
as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions. 46 While respondents were again
seeking the amount of P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages from each of the petitioners,
the CA correctly reduced it to a total of P500,000.00.

Rollo, pp. 43-45.

Records, Vol. V, p. 156.

Rollo, pp. 62-63. (Emphasis in the original)

Id. at 21.

Respondents are also entitled to attorney's fees, as awarded by the CA, on the strength of
the provisions of Article 2208 of the Civil Code which provides, among others, that such fees
may be recovered when exemplary damages are awarded, when the defendant's act or
omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons, or in any other case where
the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered.

Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Banas, G.R. No. 184116, June 19, 2013, 699 SCRA 157,
165.
8

Andrada v. Pilhino Sales Corporation, G.R. No. 156448, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA
1, 10. (Emphasis ours)
9

452 Phil. 862 (2003).

10

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
dated August 10, 2012 and February 18, 2013, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 92022, are
AFFIRMED.

Id. at 876-877. (Emphasis in the original)

11

Cano Vda. de Viray v. Usi, G.R. No. 192486, November 21, 2012, 686 SCRA 211,
237-238; Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Tirol, 606 Phil. 641, 650 (2009).
(Emphasis in the original)

SO ORDERED.

12

Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Tirol, supra note 11; Consolidated Rural
Bank (Cagayan Valley) v. Court of Appeals, 489 Phil. 320, 331 (2005).

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

13

WE CONCUR:

Exhibit "B-1-C," folder of exhibits, Vol. 2, pp. 43-46.

14

Under the best evidence rule, as applied to documentary evidence and subject to
exceptions as provided under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original itself when the subject of inquiry is its
contents.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

15

Gaw v. Chua, 574 Phil. 640, 655-656 (2008).

16

Id. at 656.

17

Id.

18

Vallarta v. Court of Appeals, 256 Phil. 596, 602-603 (1988).

19

Gaw v. Chua, supra note 15, at 655.

20

Chua v. Westmont Bank, G.R. No. 182650, February 27, 2012, 667 SCRA 56, 65-66.

21

Meneses v. Venturozo, G.R. No. 172196, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 577, 586.

22

Manongsong v. Estimo, supra note 9, at 877-878.

23

See Exhibit "B-1-J," folder of exhibits, Vol. 2, p. 55.

24

Exhibits "B-1-G" and "B-1-H," folder of exhibits, Vol. 2, pp. 52-53.

25

TSN, September 13, 2001, pp. 19-22.

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

15

26

Exhibit "DDD-1-D," records, Vol. IV, p. 570.

27

See records, Vol. IV, p. 446.

28

Exhibit "P," folder of exhibits, Vol. 2, p. 129.

29

Exhibit "Q," folder of exhibits, Vol. 1, p. 130.

30

Exhibi "J-3," id at 100.

31

Lee v. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85, 467 Phil. 997, 1016 (2004);
Dillena v. Court of Appeals, 246 Phil. 644, 653 (1988).
32

See Exhibit "GGG," records, Vol. IV, pp. 591-595.

33

Rollo, pp. 57-58.

34

Rufloe v. Burgos, 597 Phil. 261, 270 (2009).

35

Id.

36

Records, Vol. 1, pp. 251-255.

37

Sanchez v. Quinio, 502 Phil. 40, 46 (2005), citing Margolles v. CA, G.R. No. 109490,
February 14, 1994, 230 SCRA 97, 114.
38

Casimiro Development Corporation v. Mateo, G.R. No. 175485, July 27, 2011, 654
SCRA 676, 689-690.
39

See note 26.

40

See Exhibits "N-1," "N-2," "O-1," "O-2," folder of exhibits, Vol. 2, pp. 117-121 and 124128.
41

Exhibit "P," folder of exhibits, Vol. 2, p. 129.

42

Spouses Eliseo and Empera Triz C. Bautista v. Spouses Mila and Antonio Jalandoni,
et al., G.R. No. 171464, November 27, 2013.
43

See also TSN, July 10, 1995, p. 13.

44

Spouses Eliseo and Empera Triz C. Bautista v. Spouses Mila and Antonio Jalandoni,
et al., supra note 42.
45

Civil Code, Art.2229.

46

Spouses Eliseo and Empera Triz C. Bautista v. Spouses Mila and Antonio Jalandoni,
et al., supra note 42.

16