Banco Espano V Palanca

1.
2.
3.
4.

Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as
security to his debt. His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property is worth
75k more than what he owe. Due to the failure of Engracio to make his
payments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracios
property. Engracio however left for China and he never returned til he died.
Since Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their
intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The lower
court further orderdd theclerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that itd
be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco petition to
execute Engracios property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf
of Engracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling.
Vicente averred that there had been no due processas Engracio never
received the summons.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed.
HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for
judicial due process had been met. The requisites are;
There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to
hear and decide the matter before it.
Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or
over the property subject of the proceedings.
The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.
Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.
Imelda Marcos V SB
Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft & Corruption for a
dubious transaction done in 1984 while they were officers
transacting business with the Light Railway Transit. The case was raffled to
st
the 1 Division of the Sandiganbayan. The division was headed by Justice
Garchitorena with J Balajadia and J Atienza as associate justices. No
decision was reached by the division by reason of Atienzas dissent in favor
of Imeldas innocence. Garchitorena then summoned a special division of the
SB to include JJ Amores and Cipriano as additional members. Amores then
asked Garchitorena to be given 15 days to send in his manifestation. On the
date of Amores request, Garchitorena received manifestation from J
Balajadia stating that he agrees with J Rosario who further agrees with J
Atienza. Garchitorena then issued a special order to immediately dissolve the
special division and have the issue be raised to the SB en banc for it would
already be pointless to wait for Amores manifestation granted that a majority
has already decided on Imeldas favor. The SB en banc ruled against Imelda.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process has been observed.
HELD: The SC ruled that the ruling of the SB is bereft of merit as there was
no strong showing of Imeldas guilt. The SC further emphasized that Imelda
was deprived of due process by reason of Garchitorena not waiting

forAmores manifestation. Such procedural flaws committed by respondent

Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of its decision convicting petitioner.
Garchitorena had already created the Special Division of five (5) justices in
view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices in the First Division. At
that stage, petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the five (5) justices,
especially the new justices in the persons of Justices Amores and del
Rosario who may have a different view of the cases against her. At that
point, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice Balajadia may change their
mind and agree with the original opinion of Justice Atienza but the
turnaround cannot deprive petitioner of her vested right to the opinion of
Justices Amores and del Rosario. It may be true that Justice del Rosario had
already expressed his opinion during an informal, unscheduled meeting in
the unnamed restaurant but as aforestated, that opinion is not the opinion
contemplated by law. But what is more, petitioner was denied the opinion of
Justice Amores for before it could be given, Presiding Justice Garchitorena
dissolved the Special Division.
Delgado V CA
Delgado together with 3 others were charged for estafa causing the
frustration of one medical student. Delgado was assisted by one Atty. Yco.
The said lawyer has filed for multiple postponement of trial and one time he
failed to appear in court by reason of him being allegedly sick. No medical
certificate was furnished. The court was not impressed with such actuation
and had considered the same as Delgados waiver of her right to trial. The
lower court convicted her and the others. She appealed before the CA and
the CA sustained the lower courts rule. Delgado later found out that Yco is
not a member of the IBP.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was observed.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Delgado. An accused person is entitled to be
represented by a member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her
before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there
is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate
considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings.
This would certainly be a denial of due process.
Consulta v people
Consulta is charged for stealing a gold necklace worth 3.5k owned by a
certain Silvestre. He was convicted by the lower court. Consulta raised
before the CA the issue that he was not properly arraigned and that he was
represented by a non lawyer.
ISSUE: Whether or not Consulta was denied of due process.
HELD: The SC ruled that Consultas claim of being misrepresented cannot
be given due course. He was assisted by two lawyers during the proceeding.
In the earlier part, he was assisted by one Atty. Jocelyn Reyes who seemed
not to be a lawyer. Granting that she indeed is not a lawyer, her withdrawal

from the case in the earlier part of the case has cured the defect as he was
subsequently assisted by a lawyer coming from the PAO.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALBERTO OPIDA y QUIAMBAO and VIRGILIO MARCELO, accusedappellants.
CRUZ, J.:
This is an automatic review of the Decision of the Circuit Criminal Court,
Seventh Judicial District, imposing the death penalty upon Alberto Opida and
Virgilio Marcelo for the crime of murder.
Unlike the victim in this case, who died from only one stab wound, the
decision under review suffers from several fatal flaws, all equally deadly. It
suffices to discuss only one of them.
Time and again this Court has declared that due process requires no less
1
than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Bolstering this requirement,
we have added that the judge must not only be impartial but must also
appear to be impartial, to give added assurance to the parties that his
2
decision will be just. The parties are entitled to no less than this, as a
minimum guaranty of due process. This guaranty was not observed in this
case.
On July 31, 1976, in Quezon City, several persons ganged up on Fabian
Galvan, stoned and hit him with beer bottles until finally one of them stabbed
him to death. The actual knife-wielder was identified as Mario del
3
Mundo. Nonetheless, Alberto Opida and Virgilio Marcelo were charged with
4
murder as conspirators and, after trial, sentenced to death.
The basis of their conviction by the trial court was the testimony of two
prosecution witnesses, neither of whom positively said that the accused were
at the scene of the crime, their extrajudicial confessions, which were secured
without the assistance of counsel, and corroboration of the alleged
5
conspiracy under the theory of interlocking confession.
What is striking about this case is the way the trial judge conducted his
interrogation of the two accused and their lone witness, Lilian Layug. It was
hardly judicious and certainly far from judicial, at times irrelevant, at Worst
malicious. Reading the transcript, one gathers the impression that the judge
had allied himself with the prosecution to discredit at the outset the credibility
of the witnesses for the defense.
Opida is a police character, admittedly a member of the Commando gang
6
and with a string of convictions for robbery, theft and vagrancy. It is worth
noting that the judge took special interest in his tattoos, required him to
remove his shirt so they could be examined, and even described them in
7
detail for the record.
Besides belaboring Opida's criminal activities and his tattoos, the judge
asked him if he had "ever been convicted at the National Mental Hospital
with what else but malice and suggested to him that his claim of manhandling

by the police was a lie because investigators leave no mark when they
8
torture a suspect. This was a point that could have been validly raised by
the prosecution but certainly not by the court. The judge also made it of
record that the witness was gnashing his teeth, was showing signs of
hostility, that he was uneasy and that he was restless. "Now, whom do you
9
want to fool the judge asked, "the prosecutor, your lawyer, or the court?
In the hearing of September 22, 1976, the interrogation of Virgilio Marcelo,
the other accused, was conducted almost wholly by the judge who started
cross-examining the witness even before the defense counsel could ask his
first question, and took over from the prosecution the task of impeaching
10
Marcelo's credibility. The judge asked him about his drug addiction, his
membership in the Commando gang, his tattoos, his parentage, his activities,
his criminal record all when he was supposed to be under direct examination
by his own lawyer. Defense counsel could hardly put in a word edgewise
11
because the judge kept interrupting to ask his own questions.
The questions were not clarificatory but adversary; and when they were not
adversary, they were irrelevant, and sometimes also cruel. At one point, the
judge drew from the witness the statement that his mother was living with
another man; forthwith he suggested that the mother was unfaithful to his
12
father. We deplore this sadistic treatment of the witness, especially as, for
all his supposed "toughness," he could not answer back. We fail to see what
possible connection the mother's infidelity could have had, by any stretch of
the imagination, with the instant prosecution.
But the judge was to save the best or worst of his spite for the third witness,
Lilian Layug, a waitress in the restaurant where the appellant Opida was
working as a cook. Noting at the outset that she spoke English, he wanted to
know where she had learned it and asked in ill-concealed insinuation if she
13
had worked in Angeles City or Olongapo or Sangley. Because she was
14
gesturing nervously, he asked, "Are you a conductor? Of the two accused,
he asked her, "They are very proud of belonging to the Commando gang to
which the witness answered, putting him in his place, "That I do not know,
15
Your Honor."
One cannot but note the mockery in the following questions put by the judge
to the witness, who was probably wondering what the interrogation was all
about
Court
Q You are a very good friend of Alberto
Opida?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q You have known him for years?
A One year only, Your Honor.
Q He always feed you with his favorite
menu?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q He is a very good cook?
A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Because what he could cook, you could

not cook?
A I know also how to cook, Your Honor.
Q Answer my question.
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Whenever you try to cook what he
cooked, you could not imitate it, because he
is a good cook?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q So, your admiration developed because of
his cooking?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What favorite dish does he cook that you
like, as far as you are concerned?
A Adobo, Your Honor.
Q Most often you request him to cook adobo
for you?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q That is precisely one of the reasons why
you also admire him?
A That is also a part, Your Honor,
Q Whenever you request him to cook adobo
for you, he always accommodate you?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q As a matter of fact, the moment that he
starts cooking adobo, you could smell it
already?
A Yes, Your Honor,
Q That starts your admiration for him.
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And in return you reciprocate?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What kind of reciprocation do you give to
Alberto Opida, whenever you admire his
cooking of adobo for you, cooking just for
you?
A None, Your Honor.
Q Whenever he cooks adobo, he was
singing?
A Sometimes, Your Honor.
Q What kind of song?
A He is singing a song with intended for
Cora, Your Honor.
Q And you were also affected by it?
A No, Your Honor.

Q You mean to say, you are not very fond of

emotional songs?
A I am not, because Cora is not minding
him, Your Honor.
Q But sometimes he sings in the absence of
Cora because, as you said, he is cooking
adobo for you?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What does he sings (sic) for you?
A He sings many songs, Your Honor.
Q For example, give the title
A Milagro, Your Honor.
Q He also sings Diyos Lamang Ang
Nakakaalam?
A Sometimes, Your Honor.
Q He also sings Kapantay ay Langit?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q He also sings Sapagkat Tayo'y Tao
Lamang?
A I did not hear, Your Honor.
Q But, you said he also sings even in the
absence of Cora?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q You smell adobo while he cooks and
sings. So, you developed admiration also?
A Little only, Your Honor.
Q One way or another you have appreciated
him, but the only thing, as you know, he is
related to Cora in the same way?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q That is why you are testifying in his favor?
Because of the smell of adobo and his
songs and it is an admiration. Therefore,
there is that tendency to testify in his favor?
A Yes, Your Honor. 16
On direct examination, Opida challenged his extrajudicial confession,
claiming it had been obtained without observance of the rights available
under Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution, particularly the right to
17
counsel. Parenthetically, the extrajudicial confession of Marcelo was also
18
made without assistance of counsel. Opida also testified, under
questioning from his counsel, that he had been repeatedly hit with a "dos por
19
dos" by a police officer while he was being investigated.
We have consistently held that the rights guaranteed during a custodial
investigation are not supposed to be merely communicated to the suspect,
especially if he is unlettered, but must be painstakingly explained to him so
he can understand their nature and significance. Moreover, manhandling of

any sort will vitiate any extrajudicial confession that may be extracted from
20
him and renders it inadmissible in evidence against him.
Those principles were given mere lip service by the judge, who did not bother
to look deeper into the validity of the challenged confessions.
Given the obvious hostility of the judge toward the defense, it was inevitable
that all the protestations of the accused in this respect would be, as they in
fact were, dismissed. And once the confessions were admitted, it was easy
enough to employ them as corroborating evidence of the claimed conspiracy
among the accused.
The accused are admittedly notorious criminals who were probably even
proud of their membership in the Commando gang even as they flaunted
21
their tattoos as a badge of notoriety. Nevertheless, they were entitled to be
presumed innocent until the contrary was proved and had a right not to be
22
held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
The judge disregarded these guarantees and was in fact all too eager to
convict the accused, who had manifestly earned his enmity. When he said at
23
the conclusion of the trial, "You want me to dictate the decision now?" , he
was betraying a pre-judgment long before made and obviously waiting only
to be formalized.
The scales of justice must hang equal and, in fact, should even be tipped in
favor of the accused because of the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Needless to stress, this right is available to every accused, whatever his
present circumstance and no matter how dark and repellent his past. Despite
their sinister connotations in our society, tattoos are at best dubious
adornments only and surely not under our laws indicia of criminality. Of bad
taste perhaps, but not of crime.
In any event, convictions are based not on the mere appearance of the
accused but on his actual commission of crime, to be ascertained with the
pure objectivity of the true judge who must uphold the law for all without favor
or malice and always with justice.
Accused-appellants Opida and Marcelo, who have been imprisoned since
1976, have sent us separate letters pleading for the resolution of their death
sentences one way or the other once and for all. Considering the way they
were tried, we now declare that they should not be detained in jail a minute
longer. While this is not to say that the accused are not guilty, it does mean
that, because their constitutional rights have been violated, their guilt, if it
exists, has not been established beyond reasonable doubt and so cannot be
pronounced. Due process has stayed the uneven hand of the quick
condemnor and must set the defendants free.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Alberto Opida and Virgilio Marcelo is
reversed and they are hereby ordered released immediately. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Abad Santos, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr. and
Paras, JJ., concur.
Feria and Fernan JJ., are on leave.

People v. Mortera (April 23, 2010)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. BENANCIO MORTERA y
BELARMINO, Appellant.
Mendoza, J.:
FACTS:
Benancio Mortera y Belarmino was accused to have killed with a knife
Robelyn Rojas y Mallari by means of treachery. The witnesses Ramil
Gregorio and Jovel Veales testified that while drinking, they saw the victim
and the accused shook hands and when the former was already walking
away, Mortera stabbed him at the back. On the other hand, accused then
admitted during the trial that he killed the victim for self defense even if he
pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. According to the accused, Robelyn
got angry to him when he was not able to give money for the victims liquor;
the victim attacked him with a spray gun (for painting) which caused the
accused to fall down. When Robelyn was attempting to hurt him again, the
accused stabbed him and then immediately ran. During the cross
examination, the accused kept on changing his statements and narrations
that is why the Judge Jesus Carbon, Jr. uttered some of the following
towards the accused: You were not even telling the truth to Atty. Mendoza,
You killed him, Just making a story". Since the trial court did not believe
that Mortera killed the victim for self defense because the victims wound was
located at back contrary to statement of the accused that he stabbed him
infront, Mortera was convicted guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt.
Mortera appealed the decision in the Court of Appeals raising the issue of
denial of due process of law and his right to an impartial trial. He claimed that
the trial court judge, Judge Jesus Carbon, was hostile towards him and
prejudged his guilt as could be inferred from his "prosecutor-like" conduct. In
its decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC with
modification as to the civil liability of the accused. The CA ruled that the trial
judge did not transgress the standard of "cold neutrality" required of a
magistrate and added that the questions he propounded were "substantially
clarificatory." The claim of self-defense was rejected for failure to prove the
element of unlawful aggression by clear and convincing evidence.
Still not satisfied, the accused now comes before the Supreme Court
invoking that there was a denial of his right to due process and his right to
have an impartial trial. The accused argues that Judge Jesus Carbon, Jr.
displayed his hostility towards him and condemned him even before the

defense could rest its presentation of evidence. By saying that he was "just
making a story," and the like, the judge already concluded his guilt during
trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sarcastic remarks of Judge Carbon, Jr. towards
Mortera during the cross examination denied the accused of his right to due
process.
HELD:
NO. Although the trial judge might have made improper remarks and
comments, it did not amount to a denial of his right to due process or his right
to an impartial trial. The remarks of the Judge were not reflective of his
partiality since those were within the context. Not only did the accused
mislead the court by initially invoking a negative defense only to claim
otherwise during trial, he was also not candid to his own lawyer, who was
kept in the dark as to his intended defense.
The accused having admitted the killing, a reverse order of trial could have
proceeded. As it turned out, the prosecution undertook to discharge the
burden of proving his guilt, when the burden of proof to establish that the
killing was justified should have been his
Most probably, the trial judge was peeved at the strategy he adopted. The
trial judge cannot be faulted for having made those remarks, notwithstanding
the sarcastic tone impressed upon it. The sarcasm alone cannot lead us to
conclude that the trial judge had taken the cudgels for the prosecution.
There was no denial of due process, the sarcastic conduct of the Judge was
substantially clarificatory. Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions
of the lower courts.

Rodriguez vs. Judge Blancaflor, GR No. 190171

March 14, 2011
Ponente: Mendoza, J.:
Facts: Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor was Criminal Case No.
22240 for arson (arson case), entitled People of the Philippines v. Teksan
Ami, in which Tulali was the trial prosecutor. During the pendency of the

case, Tulali was implicated in a controversy involving an alleged bribery

initiated by Randy Awayan (Awayan), the driver assigned to Judge Blancaflor
under the payroll of the Office of the Governor of Palawan, and one Ernesto
Fernandez (Fernandez), to assure the acquittal of the accused, Rolly Ami
(Ami), and the dismissal of the arson case.
On June 29, 2009, a day before the scheduled promulgation of the decision
in the arson case, Tulali filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation withdrawing his
appearance in the said case to prevent any suspicion of misdemeanor and
collusion. He attached to the said manifestation a copy of the administrative
complaint against Awayan filed (but eventually withdrawn) by his superior,
Rodriguez, before the Office of the Governor of Palawan. On June 30, 2009,
Judge Blancaflor rendered his decision acquitting Ami of the crime of arson.
Purportedly on the basis of the administrative complaint filed against Awayan
and Rodriguez, Judge Blancaflor summoned several witnesses including
Tulali and heard their testimonies. On July 30, 2009, he issued an order
summoning Rodriguez to appear before him for the purpose of holding an
inquiry on matters pertaining to his possible involvement in Tulalis filing of
the ex-parte manifestation and the administrative complaint against Awayan,
among others.
On August 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed his Motion for Clarification as to the
purpose of Judge Blancaflors continued inquiries considering that the
decision in the arson case had already been promulgated.
After the submission of petitioners respective position papers, Judge
Blancaflor issued the assailed October 13, 2009 Decision finding petitioners
guilty of direct contempt. The penalty of indefinite suspension from the
practice of law and a fine of P100,000.00 each were imposed upon them.
Petitioners argue that the contempt proceedings are null and void for
contravening their rights to due process of law. They claim that they were
denied their rights to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against them, to confront the witnesses and present their own evidence.
According to petitioners, Judge Blancaflors disregard of due process
constituted grave abuse of discretion which was further aggravated by the
unlawful manner of simultaneously conducting suspension and contempt
proceedings against them.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Blancaflor did not observe due process in
conducting the suspension and contempt proceedings against Rodriguez and
Tulali.

Ruling: Yes, Judge Blancaflor did not observe due process in conducting the
suspension and contempt proceedings against Rodriguez and Tulali. It must
be emphasized that direct contempt is adjudged and punished summarily
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules. Hence, hearings and opportunity
to confront witnesses are absolutely unnecessary.
In the same vein, the petitioners alleged "vilification campaign" against
Judge Blancaflor cannot be regarded as direct contempt. At most, it may
constitute indirect contempt, as correctly
concluded by the OSG. For indirect contempt citation to prosper, however,
the requirements under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules must be
satisfied, to wit:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a
charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent
to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to
be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts
may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxx
(d) any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct,
or degrade the administration of justice;
x x x.
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt
may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was
committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a
verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of
documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal
action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but
said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the
court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the
principal action for joint hearing and decision.
In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the elementary
procedure which requires written charge and due hearing. There was no
order issued to petitioners. Neither was there any written or formal charge

filed against them. In fact, Rodriguez only learned of the contempt

proceedings upon his receipt of the July 30, 2009 Order, requiring him to
appear before the Court in order to clarify certain matters contained in the
said order. Tulali, on the other hand, only learned of the proceedings when
he was ordered to submit his compliance to explain how he came in
possession of the administrative complaint against Awayan.
In the case at bench, there was also no prior and separate notice issued to
petitioners setting forth the facts constituting the misconduct and requiring
them, within a specified period from receipt thereof, to show cause why they
should not be suspended from the practice of their profession. Neither were
they given full opportunity to defend themselves, to produce evidence on
their behalf and to be heard by themselves and counsel. Undoubtedly, the
suspension proceedings against petitioners are null and void, having violated
their right to due process.
Likewise, Judge Blancaflors suspension order is also void as the basis for
suspension is not one of the causes that will warrant disciplinary action.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules enumerates the grounds for disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar from his office as attorney, to wit: (1)
deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral
conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of
the lawyer's oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority to do so. Judge Blancaflor failed to show that the suspension was
for any of the foregoing grounds.